(1) Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,

描述一下那些使一个小而注定失败的商品纺织企业转变为如今强大的伯克希尔的管理系统和政策，

(2) Explain how the management system and policies came into being,

 解释一下这些管理系统和政策是如何形成的，

(3) Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,

在一定程度上解释一下伯克希尔为何表现如此出色，

(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and

预测一下如果巴菲特很快离开，伯克希尔的异常良好结果是否会继续，

(5) Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

考虑一下伯克希尔在过去50年的伟大成绩是否有可能对其他地方产生有用的启示。

(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.

伯克希尔将成为一个分散的企业集团，只对那些无法做出有用预测的活动持反对态度。

(2) Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.

其母公司几乎所有业务都通过独立法人子公司进行，这些子公司的首席执行官将拥有极大的自主权。

(3) There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.

企业总部几乎没有什么东西，只有一个小办公室，里面有董事长、首席财务官和几个主要帮助首席财务官进行审计、内部控制等的助理。

(4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.

伯克希尔的子公司将始终包括财产保险公司。这些保险公司作为一个整体，预计会逐步产生可靠的承保收益，同时产生可观的“浮存金”（来自未支付的保险负债），用于投资。

(5) There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.

不会有重要的系统性人员管理系统、股票期权系统、其他激励系统、退休系统等，因为子公司会有自己不同的系统。

(6) Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.

伯克希尔的董事长将为自己保留仅仅几个活动。

(i) He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.

他将管理几乎所有的证券投资，这些投资通常存在于伯克希尔的财产保险公司中。

(ii) He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.

他将挑选所有重要子公司的首席执行官，确定他们的薪酬，并从每个人那里获得一份私下的接班人推荐，以备不时之需。

(iii) He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.

他将部署大部分子公司不需要的现金，在这些子公司增加了竞争优势之后，理想的使用方式是将这些现金用于收购新的子公司。

(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.

 他将随时为任何子公司的首席执行官提供几乎所有需要的联系，而几乎不需要额外的联系。

(v) He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.

他将撰写一封长篇、逻辑严谨且有用的信件，作为年度报告的一部分，内容是他希望作为一个被动股东时所希望的，并且他会在年度股东大会上花费几个小时回答问题。

(vi) He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.

他会努力成为一个榜样，培养一种文化，这种文化在他离开之前和之后都能长时间地对客户、股东和其他员工发挥良好的作用。

(vii) His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and

他首先的优先事项是预留大量时间用于安静阅读和思考，特别是那些可能促进他坚定学习的内容，无论他多大年纪；并且

(viii) He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.

他还会花费大量时间热情地欣赏他人所取得的成就。

(7) New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.

新的子公司通常会通过现金购买，而不是发行新股票。

(8) Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.

伯克希尔不会支付股息，只要每一美元的留存收益所创造的市场价值超过一美元。

(9) In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.

在购买新子公司时，伯克希尔会寻求以公平价格购买一个董事长可以很好理解的优质业务。伯克希尔还希望有一个优秀的首席执行官，预期他将长期留任，并且能够良好地管理公司，无需总部的帮助。

(10) In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.

在选择子公司首席执行官时，伯克希尔会尽量确保其诚信、技能、精力和对业务及其所处环境的热爱。

(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.

作为重要的首选行为，伯克希尔几乎不会出售子公司。

(12) Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.

伯克希尔几乎不会将子公司的首席执行官调任至另一个无关的子公司。

(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.

伯克希尔绝不会因为年龄问题而强迫子公司的首席执行官退休。

(14) Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.

伯克希尔将保持较少的债务，以力求在所有条件下保持（i）几乎完美的信用状况以及（ii）在出现特殊机会时现金和信贷的便捷可用性。

(15) Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.

伯克希尔总是对有意出售大型企业的潜在卖家友好。这样的业务提案会得到及时的关注。除非达成交易，否则除了董事长和伯克希尔的一两个其他人员之外，没有人会知道这个提案。他们也不会将此事透露给外人。

(1) He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.

他特别希望持续最大化系统中最重要人员的理性、技能和奉献精神，从他自己开始。

(2) He wanted win/win results everywhere–in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.

他希望在任何地方都能获得双赢的结果，例如，通过给予忠诚来赢得忠诚。

(3) He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.

他希望做出最大化长期结果的决策，要求这些决策者通常能够长时间留在岗位上，承担决策的后果。

(4) He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.

他希望最小化来自总部的大型官僚机构几乎不可避免的负面影响。

(5) He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.

他希望像本·格雷厄姆教授一样，个人贡献于所获得的智慧的传播。

(1) The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,

巴菲特的建设性特质，

(2) The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,

伯克希尔系统的建设性特质，

(3) Good luck, and

好运气，以及

(4) The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.

一些股东和其他崇拜者（包括媒体中一些人）异常强烈和富有感染力的忠诚。

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

我相信这四个因素都存在并且是有帮助的。但主要的重担是由建设性特质、异常的忠诚和它们的相互作用来承担的。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

特别是，巴菲特决定将自己的活动限制在少数几个领域，并最大化对这些领域的关注，并持续了50年，这是一种极端成功的做法。巴菲特的成功与罗杰·费德勒在网球上取得成功的原因相同。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

巴菲特实际上是在使用著名篮球教练约翰·伍登的成功方法，伍登在学习将几乎所有比赛时间分配给他最好的七名球员后，赢得了大多数比赛。这样，对手总是面对他最好的球员，而不是次好的球员。而且，额外的比赛时间使得最好的球员的进步超出了正常水平。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

而且，巴菲特比伍登更成功，因为在他的情况下，技能的运用集中在一个人身上，而不是七个人，并且他的技能随着年龄的增长不断提高，而不是像篮球运动员的技能那样随着年龄的增长而退化。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

此外，通过将如此多的权力和权威集中在通常长期任职的子公司首席执行官身上，巴菲特也在创造强大的伍登效应。这些效应增强了首席执行官的技能和子公司的成就。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

随后，随着伯克希尔系统将许多子公司及其首席执行官所渴望的自主权赋予他们，而伯克希尔也变得成功和知名，这些成果吸引了更多和更优秀的子公司进入伯克希尔，以及更优秀的首席执行官。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

而更优秀的子公司和首席执行官则需要总部的关注更少，从而形成了通常被称为“良性循环”的效果。

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

伯克希尔始终将财产保险公司作为重要子公司，这种做法效果如何？

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

效果非常好。伯克希尔的雄心壮志极其极端，但即便如此，它达成了目标。

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

财产保险公司通常会投资于与其股东权益大致相等的普通股，就像伯克希尔的保险子公司一样。在过去50年里，标准普尔500指数的年均回报率约为10%，税前，这为伯克希尔创造了显著的顺风。

早期的GEICO就是这么安排的。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came.

在巴菲特时代的早期几十年，伯克希尔保险子公司的普通股大幅超越了指数，正如巴菲特所期望的那样。后来，随着伯克希尔持股规模的扩大和所得税考虑导致超越指数的部分回报变得微不足道（可能不是永远如此），伯克希尔获得了其他更好的优势。

Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

阿吉特·贾因凭空创建了一个庞大的再保险业务，这个业务不仅产生了巨大的“浮存金”，还带来了丰厚的承保收益。GEICO也被纳入伯克希尔，随后GEICO的市场份额四倍增长。伯克希尔其余的保险业务也大幅改善，这主要得益于声誉优势、承保纪律、找到并维持在良好的市场细分领域以及招聘和留住杰出人才。

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

后来，随着伯克希尔几乎独特且相当可靠的企业个性和大规模被广泛知晓，其保险子公司获得并抓住了许多其他公司无法获得的有吸引力的机会，购买了私人发行的证券。这些证券大多有固定的到期日，并产生了杰出的结果。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希尔在保险方面的杰出成果并非自然结果。通常情况下，即使管理非常出色，财产保险业务也会产生平庸的结果。而这样的结果几乎没有用。伯克希尔的更好结果如此惊人，以至于我相信，如果巴菲特回到一个较小的基础，尽管保持他的聪明才智并恢复年轻，他也无法重现这样的成果。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

伯克希尔是否因成为一个分散的企业集团而受到影响？没有，它的机会因扩大了经营领域而得到有益的增加。巴菲特的技能防止了其他地方常见的不良影响。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

为什么伯克希尔更愿意用现金购买公司，而不是用自己的股票？因为很难找到比用伯克希尔股票所得到的价值更高的东西。

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?

为什么伯克希尔在收购保险业务以外的公司时，对于伯克希尔的股东来说效果如此之好，而这种收购的正常结果通常对收购方的股东不利？

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor.

伯克希尔通过设计具有了方法论上的优势，以补充其更好的机会。它从不设有一个“收购部”来施加购买压力。也从不依赖于“帮手”的建议，这些帮手通常会偏向于交易。巴菲特保持了对自身能力的真实认识，他虽然低估了自己的专业知识，但他比大多数企业高管更了解商业中有效的和无效的因素，这得益于他作为被动投资者的长期经验。

And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.

最后，即便伯克希尔获得的机会远远优于大多数其他公司，巴菲特也经常表现出几乎非人类的耐心，并且很少购买。例如，在他控制伯克希尔的前十年里，巴菲特看到一家企业（纺织品）接近死亡，而有两家新企业进入，净增加了一家。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least 50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.

在巴菲特领导下的伯克希尔犯了哪些重大错误？虽然犯错误是常见的，但几乎所有巨大的错误都在于没有进行购买，包括没有购买沃尔玛股票时，这是肯定会获得巨大成功的。遗漏错误非常重要。如果伯克希尔抓住了几个它不够聪明而未能识别为几乎肯定的机会，它的净资产现在至少会高出500亿美元。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.

我清单上的倒数第二个任务是：预测如果巴菲特很快离开，伯克希尔是否会继续保持异常优异的业绩。

The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

答案是肯定的。伯克希尔在其子公司中拥有许多基于持久竞争优势的业务势头。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.

此外，其铁路和公用事业子公司现在提供了大量投资于新固定资产的良好机会。许多子公司现在正致力于进行明智的“增值”收购。

Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if (1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.

只要伯克希尔系统的大部分保持不变，目前的势头和机会如此巨大，即使（1）巴菲特明天离开，（2）他的继任者只是能力中等的人，（3）伯克希尔再也不购买大型企业，伯克希尔几乎肯定会在很长一段时间内保持一个优于正常水平的公司。

But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.

但是，在这个假设下，巴菲特很快离开的情况下，他的继任者不会是“只是能力中等的人”。例如，阿吉特·贾因和格雷格·阿贝尔是经过证明的出色人才，他们可能会被低估为“世界级”。我会选择“世界领先”的描述。在一些重要方面，他们每个人都是比巴菲特更优秀的商业执行者。

In my view, the future of Berkshire remains very bright, even if it will be somewhat less bright without Buffett. And that’s a bright future.

在我看来，即使没有巴菲特，伯克希尔的未来仍然非常光明。即便这样，这依然是一个光明的未来。