2015-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2015-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Buffett’s opening joke

巴菲特的开场笑话

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。谢谢。谢谢。

I’m Warren; this is Charlie. He can hear. I can see. We work together. (Laughter)
我是沃伦；这是查理。他能听见。我能看见。我们一起工作。（笑声）

In just a couple of minutes we’ll move onto the questions and answers and follow the same procedures as in previous years.
在几分钟内，我们将进入问答环节，并遵循与往年相同的程序。

2. John Landis and “Trading Places”

约翰·兰迪斯和《换位人生》

WARREN BUFFETT: But first, there’s just a couple of special introductions I’d like to make. And I’d like to start it off with John Landis. Do we have a spotlight that we can pick out John?
沃伦·巴菲特：但首先，我想做几个特别的介绍。我想先介绍约翰·兰迪斯。我们有聚光灯可以照到约翰吗？

John is the man that directed, conceived, et cetera, of the Floyd Mayweather fight.
约翰是指导、构思等弗洛伊德·梅威瑟比赛的人。

And John, as you know, directed “Coming to America,”″ Animal House,” and the one I particularly like is “Trading Places.”
约翰，你知道的，执导了《来到美国》、《动物屋》，我特别喜欢的是《换位人生》。

If you haven’t seen “Trading Places,” by all means get it. It has Dan Aykroyd, and Eddie Murphy, and Charlie’s favorite, Jamie Lee Curtis. (Laughter)
如果你还没有看过《换位人生》，一定要去看看。里面有丹·艾克罗伊德、艾迪·墨菲，还有查理最喜欢的杰米·李·柯蒂斯。（笑声）

And it’s a truly great movie.
这是一部真正伟大的电影。

It brought back Ralph Bellamy and Don Ameche.
它带回了拉尔夫·贝拉米和唐·阿梅齐。

Don Ameche had disappeared. Have we got a light on — can we get a light on John? Where’s John? He should be right down here. (Applause)
唐·阿梅奇消失了。我们有灯光吗——我们能把灯光打在约翰身上吗？约翰在哪里？他应该就在这里。（掌声）

We’re going to find — over here? Come on.
我们要找——在这里吗？快点。

Well, John, thank you, thank you, thank you. He did all that and now came to the meeting. We really appreciate it.
好的，约翰，谢谢，谢谢，谢谢。他做了所有这些，现在来参加会议。我们真的很感激。

3. Thank you, Carrie Sova

谢谢你，凯莉·索瓦

WARREN BUFFETT: The other person I want to say — have a special thanks for — is a young, 30-year-old woman who has a 1 1/2-year-old baby at home and manages to put on this whole event with the help of hundreds that come from our various companies, and that’s Carrie Sova.
沃伦·巴菲特：我想特别感谢的另一个人是一位 30 岁的年轻女性，她家里有一个 1 岁半的宝宝，能够在来自我们各个公司的数百人的帮助下组织整个活动，她就是凯莉·索瓦。

I hope Carrie is here, that we can give her a thanks. (Applause)
我希望凯莉在这里，我们可以感谢她。（掌声）

Carrie, a few months ago, while she was already working on this meeting, I said to Carrie, “I think it would be kind of nice if we had a commemorative book, sort of a retrospective on the 50 years.” And I said, “Would you mind turning out a book, you know, in your spare time during these couple months while you’re putting together the meeting?”
凯莉，几个月前，当她已经在为这个会议做准备时，我对凯莉说：“我觉得如果我们有一本纪念册，算是一种对 50 年回顾的书，那会很好。”我说：“你介意在这几个月的空闲时间里，帮忙出一本书吗，反正你也在筹备会议？”

And she put together what I think is an absolutely terrific book, which we have outside. We printed up — we thought we printed 15,000 copies, but I think there’s not quite that many. We sold 5,000 yesterday and then held back copies.
她整理了一本我认为绝对精彩的书，我们在外面有。我们印了——我们以为印了 15,000 本，但我觉得数量并没有那么多。昨天我们卖出了 5,000 本，然后保留了一些副本。

But it’s really a nice history of Berkshire Hathaway. And the credit, 100 percent, goes to Carrie for putting that together. So I’d just like to thank her personally and I hope you’ll thank her.
但这确实是关于伯克希尔哈撒韦的美好历史。所有的功劳，百分之百，归功于凯莉的整理。因此，我想亲自感谢她，希望你们也能感谢她。

4. More people than seats

人数超过座位数

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’ll have the annual meeting at 3:30, and at that time we will be voting on directors, but many of you won’t be here at that time, although we’ll have a full house in here.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将在 3:30 举行年度会议，届时我们将投票选举董事，但许多人在那个时候不会在这里，尽管我们这里会座无虚席。

I should mention all of the overflow rooms in — here at the CenturyLink — are full now.
我应该提到这里的CenturyLink的所有分会场现在都满了。

There may be seats — we’ve got the grand ballroom and the second ballroom over at the Hilton — and there may be some seats left over at the Hilton. So if you can’t find a seat here at the CenturyLink, either here or in the overflow rooms, at least give it a try over there at the Hilton.
可能还有座位——我们在希尔顿有大宴会厅和第二个宴会厅——希尔顿那边可能还有一些座位。所以如果你在CenturyLink找不到座位，无论是在这里还是在分会场，至少可以试试希尔顿那边。

We’ve got all the rooms we could possibly get, but I think the attendance may have outrun the seats this time.
我们已经得到了所有可能的房间，但我认为这次的出席人数可能超过了座位。

5. Berkshire directors introduced

伯克希尔董事介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to introduce the directors, and, like I say, you’ll vote on them at a little after 3:30.
沃伦·巴菲特：我想介绍一下董事们，正如我所说，你们将在 3:30 稍后对他们进行投票。

And if they’ll stand — and we’ll get a light down here — and withhold your applause until the end, and you can withhold it then, if you would like. (Laughter)
如果他们能站起来——我们在这里会有光——请在最后再鼓掌，如果你愿意的话，最后再鼓掌也可以。（笑声）

And we’ll do this alphabetically.
我们将按字母顺序进行。

You’ve met Charlie, of course, but we’ll start with Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Sue Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer. They’re a great bunch of directors. (Applause)
你当然见过查理，但我们先从霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、苏·德克、比尔·盖茨、桑迪·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默开始。他们是一群很棒的董事。（掌声）

We’re missing one of our great directors, Don Keough, my neighbor from over 55 years ago.
我们怀念我们伟大的董事之一，唐·基欧，我 55 年前的邻居。

He was a coffee salesman, then, for Butter-Nut Coffee, for those of you around Omaha.
他曾是一名咖啡销售员，后来为 Butter-Nut 咖啡工作，适合在奥马哈附近的人。

He broadcast Nebraska football games and around 1950 had a radio show on WOW, for 15 minutes.
他播报内布拉斯加州的足球比赛，并在 1950 年左右在 WOW 电台有一个 15 分钟的广播节目。

He was followed by a fellow named Johnny Carson, who had another 15-minute program. And Don, when I would see him in later years, he’d always say, “What happened to that Carson fellow?” (Laughs)
他身后跟着一个叫约翰尼·卡森的人，他有另一个 15 分钟的节目。唐，在我后来几年见到他时，他总是会说：“那个卡森家伙怎么了？”（笑）

And Don died a few weeks ago, but we are very grateful that his wife, Mickie Keough, has joined us together, so let’s have a hand for Mickie Keough. Mickie, will you stand? (Applause)
唐几周前去世了，但我们非常感激他的妻子米基·基欧与我们团结在一起，所以让我们为米基·基欧鼓掌。米基，你能站起来吗？（掌声）

Mickie practically raised our kids, so if they have any faults, talk to Mickie about it. (Laughter)
米基几乎是把我们的孩子养大的，所以如果他们有什么缺点，就去找米基谈谈吧。（笑声）

6. Q1 earnings

第一季度收益

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We have just — we have one slide that relates to our quarterly earnings that — if we could put up.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们有一张与我们季度收益相关的幻灯片——如果可以的话，请展示出来。

We released these yesterday afternoon, and nothing particularly remarkable.
我们昨天下午发布了这些，没有什么特别值得注意的。

The railroad, BNSF, did dramatically better last year, not only in earnings, but in all kinds of performance measures, in terms of train velocity, and on time, and you name it, so that the —
铁路公司 BNSF 去年表现显著提升，不仅在收益方面，在各种绩效指标上，包括列车速度、准时率等等，都是如此，因此——

You know, we got behind last year, early in the year, and there’s been lots of money, and more important, lots of effort, spent to get the railroad operating like it should be.
你知道，我们去年年初落后了，花了很多钱，更重要的是，花了很多精力来让铁路像应该那样运作。

And in the first quarter those efforts paid off. We gained share. Our earnings, relative to other railroads, improved dramatically, so, you know, we got the trains running. We’re going to spend a lot of money making sure we get even better.
在第一季度，这些努力得到了回报。我们的市场份额增加了。与其他铁路公司相比，我们的收益显著改善，所以，你知道，我们的列车运行正常。我们将花费大量资金确保我们做得更好。

But the improvement has been huge, and I want to thank Matt Rose and Carl Ice for a really extraordinary performance and having our railroad running the way it should be running. So thanks, Matt and Carl. (Applause)
但改进是巨大的，我想感谢马特·罗斯和卡尔·艾斯的非凡表现，让我们的铁路运行得如它应该运行的那样。所以谢谢你们，马特和卡尔。（掌声）

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: (Inaudible)
观众的声音：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t quite get, it but I’ll assume it was complimentary. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我没完全明白，但我假设这是个赞美。（笑声）

7. Rotating questioners

轮流提问者

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I think we’re ready to move on to our questioners.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我想我们可以开始提问了。

We’ll handle it the same way as before. We start with the journalists, we move to the analysts, and then we move to the audience, and we keep doing that until about noon.
我们将以与之前相同的方式处理。我们从记者开始，然后转向分析师，接着再转向观众，我们会一直这样做，直到中午左右。

And at that time, we take a break for about an hour, and then we come back and we repeat the procedure.
那时，我们休息大约一个小时，然后我们回来重复这个过程。

After we get through a — I think it’s either 48 or 54 questions, then we just take them all from the audience. We have various zones where people have been selected, by drawing, to ask questions personally.
在我们完成大约 48 或 54 个问题后，我们就会从观众那里收集所有问题。我们有不同的区域，经过抽签选出的人员可以亲自提问。

8. Carol Loomis introduction

卡罗尔·卢米斯介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: But we start off the first one with a woman who retired after 60 years, setting a longevity record for all of Time Inc. — she retired at Fortune — been my friend for many years, and in my opinion the best print business journalist in the world, Carol Loomis. That doesn’t soften her up at all, folks. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：但我们首先要提到一位在 60 年后退休的女性，她为时代公司创造了一个长寿记录——她在《财富》杂志退休——她是我多年的朋友，在我看来是世界上最优秀的印刷商业记者，卡罗尔·卢米斯。这并没有让她变得柔弱，大家。 （掌声）

CAROL LOOMIS: I’ll make my customary, very short speech.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：我将发表我惯常的非常简短的演讲。

The three of us have been getting questions for two months, and there have been a lot of them.
我们三个人已经收到问题两个月了，问题很多。

Warren and Charlie have no idea what our questions are going to be, and some of them are very tough. Warren is right that I don’t normally soften them up.
沃伦和查理不知道我们的问题会是什么，其中一些问题非常棘手。沃伦说得对，我通常不会让问题变得温和。

And we’re sorry, we got hundreds of questions, literally, many hundreds, and we’re sorry if we didn’t pick yours, which doesn’t mean it wasn’t a good question. It’s just that the — our ability to ask as many as you’d like — as you would like to get yours in — was limited.
我们很抱歉，我们收到了数百个问题，真的很多，我们很抱歉如果没有挑选到你的问题，这并不意味着你的问题不好。只是我们的能力有限，不能像你们希望的那样问尽可能多的问题。

9. Defending Clayton Homes from predatory lending accusations

保护克莱顿住宅免受掠夺性贷款指控

CAROIL LOOMIS: So, my first question is from a man in Timpson, Texas, who happens to have a familiar name, Frank Gifford, but wants to make it clear that he isn’t the football Frank Gifford, but rather a travel photographer.
卡罗伊尔·卢米斯：所以，我的第一个问题来自德克萨斯州的廷普森，一位名叫弗兰克·吉福德的男士，他想澄清一下，他不是那位足球运动员弗兰克·吉福德，而是一位旅行摄影师。

And his question is a hard one. He says, “I’ve been a shareholder for 15 years, but I’m now suffering heartburn. Until recently I considered Berkshire an ethical company, benefiting society through” — and here he mentions two Berkshire companies headquartered in his home state — he says, ”— through BNSF and ACME Brick.
他的问题很棘手。他说：“我已经是股东 15 年了，但现在我感到心烦意乱。直到最近，我一直认为伯克希尔是一家有道德的公司，通过”——在这里他提到两家总部位于他家乡州的伯克希尔公司——他说，“——通过 BNSF 和 ACME 砖业。”

“Two points call that opinion into question now: One is the Seattle Times story on predatory practices at our Clayton Homes subsidiary.
“现在有两个因素使这一观点受到质疑：一个是《西雅图时报》关于我们克莱顿住宅子公司掠夺性行为的报道。”

“Clayton mainly responded with platitudes to this article and would not answer questions, so I have to assume the facts in the story are correct.
Clayton主要用空洞的说辞回应了这篇文章，并且不回答问题，所以我不得不假设报道中的事实是正确的。

“The other point that I want to mention is our growing partnership with 3G Capital. I sold my Tim Horton stock in disgust before 3G gutted 20 percent of the corporate staff and plunged this well-run company deep into junk territory.
我想提到的另一个点是我们与 3G 资本日益增长的合作关系。在 3G 裁减了 20%的公司员工并将这家运营良好的公司推向垃圾评级之前，我因厌恶而卖掉了我的 Tim Horton 股票。

“Other takeovers 3G has made have been still more brutal.
3G进行的其他收购也更加残酷。

“You and Charlie have made many statements about upholding Berkshire’s reputation, and you have avoided anti-social investments like tobacco and gambling.
“你和查理已经发表了许多关于维护伯克希尔声誉的声明，并且你们避免了像烟草和赌博这样的反社会投资。”

“Your efforts years ago to keep Berkshire’s textile mills running show you once aspired to balance capitalism with compassion.
“您多年前努力保持伯克希尔的纺织厂运转，表明您曾渴望将资本主义与同情心相平衡。”

“I cannot make the moral case for practices at either Clayton or 3G, and I wonder how you can do so.”
“我无法为Clayton或3G的做法辩护，我想知道你们是如何做到的。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s talk first about the Clayton article because there was some important mistakes in that, but I think it’s first — it’s better to back up even to the situation in mortgage lending that’s taken place, and why Clayton follows a pattern that, actually, is exemplary and rather extraordinary, in the home building and mortgage business.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们先谈谈克莱顿的文章，因为其中有一些重要的错误，但我认为首先——更好的是回顾一下抵押贷款领域发生的情况，以及为什么克莱顿遵循了一种实际上是典范且相当非凡的模式，在住房建设和抵押贷款业务中。

If you look back at the housing bubble in — well, ending more or less in 2008, one of the great problems, in fact, maybe the greatest cause, was the fact that the mortgage holder became totally divorced from the mortgage originator and from the home builder.
如果你回顾一下住房泡沫——好吧，差不多在 2008 年结束，实际上其中一个重大问题，甚至可能是最大的原因，就是抵押贷款持有者与抵押贷款发放者和房屋建筑商完全脱节。

In other words, the home builder built a house and sold it, took his profit, and that was that. It didn’t really make much difference who he sold it to.
换句话说，房屋建筑商建了一座房子并将其出售，获得了利润，就这样了。卖给谁其实并没有太大区别。

And the mortgage originator would originate a mortgage but then package those, securitize them, and often sell them around — even around the world — so people thousands and thousands of miles had no connection with the original transaction.
抵押贷款发起人会发起一笔抵押贷款，然后将其打包、证券化，并经常在全球范围内出售，因此成千上万公里外的人与原始交易没有任何联系。

And the mortgage originator suffered no loss if the loan went bad.
如果贷款出现问题，抵押贷款发起人不会遭受任何损失。

So we had these two parties: the one that connected with the home buyer, and the one that originated the mortgage, and they had no connection with the actual outcome of whether it was a good mortgage or not.
所以我们有这两个参与方：一个是与购房者联系的，另一个是发放抵押贷款的，他们与实际结果——这是否是一个好的抵押贷款——没有任何关联。

At Clayton, unlike virtually anybody — there’s a few — we offer the — we offer mortgages to all the buyers of our homes. And we have retained roughly 12 billion of mortgages on 300,000 homes.
在克莱顿，与几乎所有人不同——虽然有一些例外——我们向所有购买我们房屋的买家提供抵押贷款。我们保留了大约 120 亿的抵押贷款，涉及 30 万套房屋。

Now, when a mortgage goes bad, two people lose: the person that owns the house loses, and the person that owns the mortgage loses.
现在，当贷款出现问题时，两个方面都会受到损失：拥有房屋的人损失，拥有贷款的人也损失。

And in our case, we have this identity of interest. We have no interest in selling anybody a house, and having that mortgage default, because it is a net loss to us. It is a net loss to the customer.
在我们的案例中，我们有这种利益的认同。我们没有兴趣向任何人出售房屋，并让那笔抵押贷款违约，因为这对我们来说是净损失。这对客户来说也是净损失。

And like I say, that’s not true of most home builders. It’s not true of most mortgage originators.
而且就像我说的，这对大多数房屋建筑商来说并不成立。这对大多数抵押贷款发放者来说也不成立。

So you — and there’s been much talk, in terms of possible changes in mortgage rules, to try and get the mortgage originator to keep some skin in the game. And they’ve talked about them retaining maybe 3 percent of the mortgage or something like that, just so they would have an interest in, really, what kind of a mortgage they were putting on the books.
所以你——关于可能的抵押贷款规则变化，有很多讨论，试图让抵押贷款发起人保持一定的利益关系。他们谈到可能让他们保留大约 3%的抵押贷款，或者类似的比例，这样他们就会对自己放入账本的抵押贷款类型有一定的兴趣。

Well, we keep — in many cases — we offer to everybody, but we keep — probably in half the cases, we keep 100 percent of the mortgage, so we have exactly the same interest as society has, and as the home buyer has, in not making mortgage loans to people who are going to get in trouble on those loans.
好吧，我们在许多情况下——我们向所有人提供，但我们保留——在一半的情况下，我们保留100%的贷款，所以我们与社会和购房者有着完全相同的利益，即不向那些可能出现贷款问题的人提供贷款。

Now, it’s true that manufactured housing hits the lower end of the market, in terms of house values. Of the homes selling for $150,000 — new homes selling for $150,000 or less — 70 percent of them are manufactured houses.
现在，确实在房屋价值方面，预制房屋处于市场的低端。在售价为 150,000 美元的新房中，售价为 150,000 美元或更低的房屋中，70%是预制房屋。

And some of those people — most — many — of those people do not qualify, on a FICO score, to obtain loans that are government guaranteed. Some do, but most don’t.
这些人中有些人——大多数——许多人在 FICO 评分上不符合获得政府担保贷款的资格。有些人符合，但大多数人不符合。

And the question is: can you lend intelligently to people who have a good chance of making the payments, keeping that house?
问题是：你能否聪明地借款给那些有很大机会按时还款的人，保住那栋房子？

And Clayton has been exemplary in doing that. About 3 percent of the mortgages default in a year, you know, and when they do, we lose money and the person who bought the house loses money.
克莱顿在这方面表现得非常出色。每年大约有 3%的抵押贷款违约，你知道，当它们违约时，我们会亏钱，买房的人也会亏钱。

But 97 percent don’t, and most of those people would not be living in the kind of houses that you can see right here at the auditorium, without the financing availabilities that Clayton makes available, and others make available.
但 97%的人没有，而这些人中的大多数如果没有克莱顿和其他人提供的融资机会，就不会住在你在礼堂看到的那种房子里。

And I invite you to go out and look at that house for $69,500. That house will be transported and erected, ready to go — you have to have the land and that — and I’ll get to that in a second — but for 69,500, you have that house with appliances, with air-conditioning, with a couple bedrooms, 1200 square feet. And probably you’ll put another 25,000 or so in the house, but — in terms of the land and preparation there — so maybe it will be $95,000.
我邀请你去看看那栋售价 69,500 美元的房子。那栋房子将被运输和搭建，准备就绪——你需要有土地——我稍后会提到这一点——但以 69,500 美元的价格，你可以拥有这栋配备家电、空调、几间卧室、1200 平方英尺的房子。你可能还会在房子上再花大约 25,000 美元，但——就土地和准备工作而言——所以总费用可能是 95,000 美元。

But I just — you know, you can make your own judgment as to whether that’s a decent value. And I know most of you are not living in $95,000 homes, but there are an awful lot of people that aspire to do that.
但我只是——你知道，你可以自己判断这是否是一个合理的价值。我知道你们大多数人并不住在 95,000 美元的房子里，但有很多人渴望做到这一点。

And we help them, with our own money at risk, to move into those homes. And if we make a mistake, it hurts them and it hurts us. And that is a very unusual arrangement in the financial industry.
我们用自己的资金帮助他们搬进这些房子。如果我们犯了错误，这会伤害他们，也会伤害我们。这在金融行业中是一个非常不寻常的安排。

Now, I read that story, and in it, there was an item in it, which, reading through the story, I just knew wasn’t true. I mean, nobody that knew anything about manufactured housing could have put that up.
现在，我读了那个故事，里面有一项内容，我在阅读故事时就知道那不是真的。我的意思是，任何了解预制房屋的人都不可能写出那样的东西。

I’d like to put that up on the slide, where it says, “Another Clayton executive said in a 2012 affidavit that the average profit margin on Clayton homes sold in Arkansas between 2006 and 2009 was 11,170 — roughly 1/5 of the average sales price of the homes.”
我想把这段放在幻灯片上，上面写着：“另一位克莱顿高管在 2012 年的宣誓书中表示，2006 年至 2009 年间在阿肯色州出售的克莱顿房屋的平均利润率为 11,170 美元——大约是房屋平均销售价格的五分之一。”

So this fellow is quoting somebody as saying that we’re making a 20 percent profit on home sales.
所以这个家伙引用某人说我们在房屋销售上赚取 20%的利润。

Well, I knew that that was nonsense, so I asked for the affidavit. And I read the affidavit about three times, and nowhere in that affidavit was it — was this statement made.
好吧，我知道那是胡说，所以我要求提供宣誓书。我读了宣誓书大约三遍，宣誓书中没有任何地方提到——没有这个陈述。

Now, what was said was what I’ll show in the next slide. It’s hard for me to see what’s up there, but it should show Item 6, where it says Clayton Manufactured Homes sold 2,201 homes, and Item 7, that four percent of the gross profit from the home sales totaled 983,000.
现在，所说的内容将在下一张幻灯片中展示。我很难看到上面的内容，但应该显示第 6 项，那里写着 Clayton 制造的房屋售出了 2,201 套房屋，以及第 7 项，房屋销售的毛利润中有 4%总计为 983,000。

So if we’ll move to the next slide. I did a little arithmetic and, sure enough, if you take 25 times the commission for — the commission is 4 percent, so you take 25 times — and then you divide by the number of homes, you come up with 11,170.
所以如果我们移动到下一张幻灯片。我做了一些算术，果然，如果你把佣金的 25 倍计算出来——佣金是 4%，所以你乘以 25——然后除以房屋的数量，你会得到 11,170。

But, that statement in the affidavit said gross profit, and gross profit is not the same thing as profit. I’m not sure that the fellow that wrote the story understood that.
但是，宣誓书中的那句话提到了毛利润，而毛利润与利润并不是同一回事。我不确定写这个故事的人是否理解这一点。

So I have put on the next page the difference, for example, of a couple other retailers. I put Macy’s and Target.
所以我在下一页列出了其他几个零售商的区别，比如梅西百货和塔吉特。

And Macy’s has a 40 percent gross profit margin, but a pretax margin of 8 1/2 percent, after taxes of 5.4.
梅西百货的毛利率为 40%，但税前利润率为 8.5%，税后利润率为 5.4%。

Gross profit is what you — if it’s the case of Macy’s, what they pay for a sofa or something, and what they sell it for. But they also have the expenses of paying salespeople, rent, utilities, advertising, all kinds of other things.
毛利润是你——如果是梅西百货的情况，就是他们为沙发或其他东西支付的费用，以及他们的销售价格。但他们还要支付销售人员的工资、租金、水电费、广告费以及其他各种费用。

So the idea that gross profit and net profit are the same thing is — you know — anybody that understands accounting would never make a mistake like that.
所以毛利润和净利润是同一回事的想法——你知道——任何懂会计的人都不会犯这样的错误。

In our particular case, on the next page, our gross margin is what the fellow said in the affidavit, and he used the word “gross,” of 20 percent. But the writer of the story turned that into a profit margin, and our profit margin is actually three percent. So I’d just like to point out the mathematics on that particular subject.
在我们特定的情况下，在下一页，我们的毛利率是那位在宣誓书中所说的“毛”的 20%。但是故事的作者将其转化为利润率，而我们的利润率实际上是 3%。所以我想指出在这个特定主题上的数学问题。

There’s one other item you should see — and, again, I have trouble seeing the — what’s up there — but we have a — in every retail Clayton establishment, we have a lender board which shows exactly what a variety of lenders are willing to do and what their terms are.
还有一项你应该看到的东西——我再次很难看清楚——上面有什么——但在每个 Clayton 零售店里，我们都有一个贷款人公告板，上面显示了各种贷款人愿意提供的服务及其条款。

And we also have a sheet, which I think will be put up there, and it’s less than a full page, and it sets out the lenders who are available.
我们还有一张表，我想会放在那里，内容少于一整页，列出了可用的贷款人。

And at the very top — I’m just looking to see whether I can find that right here — at the very top of it, it basically says, you know, check out more than one lender, and you can send the application to any of these people. And we have people sign at the bottom, and there’s no small print on it. I can’t see it here, but — it may look like small print — but it’s one page, and multiple lenders are put on that sheet.
在最上面——我只是想看看我是否能在这里找到——在最上面，它基本上说，你知道，查看多个贷款人，你可以将申请发送给这些人中的任何一个。我们让人们在底部签名，底部没有小字。我在这里看不到，但——它可能看起来像小字——但它是一页纸，多个贷款人被列在那张纸上。

Sometimes people borrow — if there’s a credit union in San Antonio that’s very big, the local bank is very big, and we also will lend money to the buyer of the home, if they wish.
有时人们会借钱——如果在圣安东尼奥有一个非常大的信用合作社，本地银行也很大，我们还会向买房者提供贷款，如果他们愿意的话。

If you buy that home that’s out there, we’ll give you a list of four or five lenders, probably including your local bank, and you will probably take the loan that offers you the best terms.
如果你买那房子，我们会给你提供四到五个贷款人的名单，可能包括你的本地银行，你可能会选择那些提供最佳条款的贷款。

So, I make no apologies whatsoever about Clayton’s lending terms.
所以，我对克莱顿的贷款条款毫不感到歉意。

I get letters from people complaining about our subsidiaries in various ways. I mean, some people call the office, some people write in. I can say, in the last three years I have not received one call — we’ve got 300,000 loans — I’ve not received one call from any party in connection with a Clayton Home.
我收到来自人们的信件，抱怨我们在各个方面的子公司。我的意思是，有些人打电话到办公室，有些人写信。我可以说，在过去三年里，我没有接到过一个电话——我们有 30 万个贷款——我没有接到过任何与 Clayton Home 有关的电话。

Moreover, we are — at Clayton — we are regulated in almost every state — every state in which we have financing, which is practically every state.
此外，我们在克莱顿几乎在每个州都受到监管——我们有融资的每个州，实际上几乎是每个州。

And in the last three years, we have had — I think its 91 examinations by the state, 91 examinations.
在过去三年中，我们经历了——我认为是 91 次州级检查，91 次检查。

They come in. They look at our practices. They make sure that they conform with the laws.
他们进来。他们查看我们的做法。他们确保这些做法符合法律。

And in those 91, we — I think the largest fine we’ve had has been $5,500, and the largest group of refunds we had was about $110,000.
在这 91 起检查中——我认为我们收到的最大罚款是 5500 美元，而我们收到的最大退款金额约为 11 万美元。

Yeah, there were — and, you know, those were regulated, not only by those states, were regulated by HUD, all kinds of people.
是的，确实有——而且你知道，这些不仅受到那些州的监管，还受到住房和城市发展部（HUD）以及各种人的监管。

When we can, we try to get people an FHA loan, because that’s the best loan for them to get.
如果可能的话，我们会尽量帮助人们获得FHA贷款，因为那是他们能获得的最佳贷款。

But, as I say, most of our borrowers are below the 620 FICO score. And it’s true that three percent or so will lose their homes in a year. It’s true that 97 percent of those people will have a home where their average principal and interest payment is a little under $600 a month, and that takes care of having a two- and perhaps three-bedroom house, well equipped. I invite you to go through it.
但是，正如我所说，我们的大多数借款人 FICO 评分都低于 620。确实，大约有 3%的人会在一年内失去他们的家。确实，这 97%的人平均每月的本金和利息支付略低于 600 美元，这足以支付一套两居室甚至三居室的房子，设备齐全。我邀请你来了解一下。

And Clayton has behaved, in my book, extraordinarily well.
克莱顿在我看来表现得非常好。

The article talked about 30-year mortgages. Over 4 1/2 years ago, I said we’re not going to have 30-year mortgages. So we don’t have them, except for the FHA-guaranteed ones, which, of course, have a very low rate.
这篇文章谈到了 30 年期抵押贷款。四年半前，我说我们不会有 30 年期抵押贷款。所以我们没有，除了那些由 FHA 担保的贷款，当然，它们的利率非常低。

So I have no — I’m proud of the Clayton management. I’m proud of the fact they put, this year, maybe 30,000 people in homes at a very low cost, a very good home. And a very high percentage of those people are going to have those loans paid off, probably in 20 years, and have a home that has cost them — has been a real bargain, basically.
所以我没有——我为克莱顿的管理感到自豪。我为他们今年让大约 30,000 人以非常低的成本住进非常好的房子而感到自豪。而且这些人中有很高的比例可能会在 20 年内还清贷款，拥有的房子基本上是个真正的便宜货。

I’ll get to the other question — the 3G question, too — in just a second, but we’ll give Charlie a chance to say what he’d like to.
我马上会回答另一个问题——3G 的问题——但我们先给查理一个机会，让他说说他想说的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know a lot about the mortgage practices at Clayton, but I certainly know that we’ve sold an enormous number of houses and we have a big share of the total market in manufactured.
查理·芒格：我对克莱顿的抵押贷款实践了解不多，但我确实知道我们已经售出了大量房屋，并且在预制房屋的总市场中占有很大份额。

WARREN BUFFETT: About 50 percent.
沃伦·巴菲特：大约 50%。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Fifty percent.
查理·芒格：百分之五十。

And it’s a very constructive thing. Personally, I’ve always wondered why manufactured houses don’t have a bigger share of the market. It’s such an efficient way of creating quite usable houses.
这是一件非常有建设性的事情。就我个人而言，我一直想知道为什么预制房屋在市场上没有更大的份额。这是一种非常高效的方式来创造相当可用的房屋。

Part of the reason is that the track builders, under capitalism, got so efficient. And isn’t Clayton now doing some track building itself?
部分原因是资本主义下的传统建筑商变得非常高效。难道克莱顿现在自己也在做一些传统建筑吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think so, yes.
查理·芒格：我认为是的。

So, Clayton is a very productive part of the economy, but we can’t make lending to poor people who buy houses 100 percent successful for everybody. We wouldn’t be running the business right if the foreclosure rate was zero. Too many people would deserve credit that wouldn’t get it.
因此，克莱顿是经济中一个非常有生产力的部分，但我们不能让对购买房屋的贫困人群的贷款对每个人都100%成功。如果我们的止赎率为零，那么我们的业务就做错了。这样会有太多人获得信贷，他们实际上并不应得。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The big causes of default are the loss of a job, death, and divorce. And, you know, that happens with high-priced houses as well, but it happens more often with people that are living closer to the edge.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。违约的主要原因是失业、死亡和离婚。你知道，这也发生在高价房屋上，但更常见于那些生活在边缘的人。

But I don’t think that’s a reason to deny them a house, and particularly when so many — it turns out so well for so many.
但我认为这不是拒绝他们拥有房子的理由，尤其是当结果对许多人来说都很好时。

The 2008 recession was — and ’9 — was very interesting, because all kinds of securitized deals, involving houses costing hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars, the default rate on those was many, many, many times what happened in our own case.
2008 年的经济衰退非常有趣，因为涉及数十万美元的住房的各种证券化交易，其违约率远远高于我们自己的案例。

And similarly with delinquency rates. Our delinquency rates are running 3 percent, currently.
同样，违约率也是如此。我们目前的违约率为 3%。

And, you know, it — the people want to live in those houses, and I think they deserve the right to.
人们想住在那些房子里，我认为他们有权这样做。

Incidentally, we had a — a few years ago we had a couple houses here, we called them the “Warren” and the “Charlie.”
顺便提一下，几年前我们这里有几栋房子，我们称它们为“沃伦”和“查理”。

The “Charlie” sold first, and it sold to one of the cameramen who was in the credits on the movie you just saw. And you can check with Matt, and he’s — Matt Mason — he is very, very happy with that house he bought four or five years ago.
“查理”首先被卖出，买家是你刚刚看到的电影中出现在片尾的一个摄影师。你可以问问马特，他是马特·梅森，他对四五年前买的那栋房子非常非常满意。

10. Defending 3G from accusations of excessive job cuts

为 3G 辩护，反对过度裁员的指控

WARREN BUFFETT: The second question was about 3G, and I don’t think you can ever find a statement that Charlie and I have ever made, in terms of Berkshire’s companies or anybody else’s, where we said that there should be more people working than are needed in a company.
沃伦·巴菲特：第二个问题是关于 3G 的，我认为你永远找不到查理和我在伯克希尔的公司或其他任何公司方面所说的声明，我们说一个公司应该有比需要更多的人在工作。

And the 3G people have been successful in building marvelous businesses. And it is true that they have entered into some purchases where there were considerably more people running the business than needed. And the interesting thing is that after they reduced the headcount to the number needed, the companies have done extremely well.
3G在建立出色的企业方面取得了成功。确实，他们进行了一些收购，其中经营企业的人数远远超过了所需人数。有趣的是，在他们将员工人数减少到所需的数量后，这些公司表现得非常好。

I mean, you’ve seen Burger King outgrow its main competitor by a significant margin. You’ve seen Tim Horton have some very good figures in the first quarter.
我意思是，你已经看到汉堡王以显著的差距超越了主要竞争对手。你也看到Tim Horton在第一季度有一些非常好的数据。

And I don’t know of any company that has a policy that says we’re going to have a lot more people than we need. But a good many companies end up in that position, and if 3G buys into one, they quite promptly — and treat people well in terms of the severance — but they get it down to what they need.
我不知道有哪家公司有政策说我们会有比需要的更多的人。但许多公司最终会处于这种情况，如果 3G 收购了其中一家，他们会很快——并且在遣散方面对员工很好——但他们会将员工减少到所需的数量。

And I hope our Berkshire companies are not being run with more people than they need, either. They usually aren’t when we buy them, and, you know, we look for those companies that are well managed.
我希望我们的伯克希尔公司也没有雇用超过所需的人。通常在我们收购时并不是这样，而且你知道，我们寻找那些管理良好的公司。

3G is — will — if they find out that 100 people are doing what 50 people can do, they’ll get it to where 50 people are doing it. And I think that actually makes sense throughout American business. Charlie?
3G 是——将会——如果他们发现 100 个人在做 50 个人能做的事情，他们会让 50 个人来做。我认为这在整个美国商业中实际上是有道理的。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the alternate to the system of having your company right-sized, the right number of people, is what eventually happened in Russia. And there, everybody had a job. And the way it all worked out was some workers said, “Well, they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work,” and the whole damn economy didn’t work. Of course, we want the right number of people in the jobs.
查理·芒格：那么，维持公司员工数量合理的系统的替代方案就是在俄罗斯最终发生的情况。在那里，每个人都有工作。结果是一些工人说：“好吧，他们假装付钱给我们，我们假装工作，”整个经济就这样瘫痪了。当然，我们希望工作岗位上有合适数量的员工。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s interesting. In the railroad business — in the railroad business after World War II, in 1947 or thereabouts — I think there were about 1.6 million people in the railroad business, and it was a lousy business. And capital was short for any kind of improvements.
沃伦·巴菲特：这很有趣。在铁路行业——在二战后，1947 年左右——我认为当时铁路行业大约有 160 万人，但这是一个糟糕的行业。而且任何改进都缺乏资金。

And now there are less than 200,000. So they’ve gone from a million-six to less than 200,000, carrying more freight, more distance, and doing it in far safer conditions. Safety has improved dramatically in the railroad industry.
现在人数少于 200,000。因此，他们从 160 万减少到不到 200,000，运输更多的货物，行驶更远的距离，并在更安全的条件下进行。铁路行业的安全性显著提高。

And if somebody thinks it would be better to be running the railroads with a million-six, you know, people doing it, you would have a terrible railroad system. You wouldn’t have anything like you have today.
如果有人认为用一百六十万人来运营铁路会更好，那么你将会有一个糟糕的铁路系统。你不会拥有今天这样的铁路。

Efficiency is required over time in capitalism, and I really tip my hat to what the 3G people have done.
在资本主义中，效率是随着时间而要求的，我真的对 3G 团队所做的事情表示敬佩。

11. Will Van Tuyl move away from negotiations in auto sales?

Van Tuyl会退出汽车销售谈判吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonny Brandt?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。乔尼·布兰特？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Thank you, Warren, for allowing me — inviting me — to be part of this 50th anniversary celebration. I have a question about Van Tuyl.
乔纳森·布兰特：谢谢你，沃伦，感谢你让我——邀请我——参与这次 50 周年庆祝活动。我有一个关于Van Tuyl的问题。

Van Tuyl is a fabulously productive auto dealer that has, since its founding, used a traditional negotiated model with a particular successful emphasis on profitable add-on insurance and financial products.
Van Tuyl是一家极具生产力的汽车经销商，自成立以来，一直采用传统的谈判模式，特别成功地强调了盈利的附加保险和金融产品。

Meanwhile, at least some other auto dealers, CarMax and Don Flow among them, have adopted, or are moving towards, models which emphasize fixed prices, transparency, and low sales pressure.
与此同时，至少一些其他汽车经销商，包括 CarMax 和 Don Flow，已经采用或正在向强调固定价格、透明度和低销售压力的模式转变。

Given the evolving regulatory environment and changing consumer preferences, will Van Tuyl eventually need to adapt to this new mode of selling, or do you feel the traditional method of selling cars will be viable for decades into the future?
鉴于不断变化的监管环境和消费者偏好的变化，Van Tuyl 是否最终需要适应这种新的销售模式，还是您认为传统的汽车销售方法在未来几十年内仍然可行？

If the market requires a new way of selling, how hard is it for a sales culture that has been successful for decades doing business one way to change to another?
如果市场需要一种新的销售方式，那么一个成功了几十年的销售文化从一种方式转变为另一种方式有多难呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If a change is required, it will be made. And I don’t know the answers to which way it’s going to go on that. The — it’s true that people are — have been — and that’s not new — that’s been experimented with before — where people have tried a one-price system and no negotiating, no haggling and everything.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果需要改变，就会进行改变。我不知道这方面会朝哪个方向发展。——人们确实一直在——这并不是新鲜事——以前也有过这样的实验——人们尝试过一种一价制，没有谈判，没有讨价还价。

And I think a very large number of people would like to see that system, except when they actually get into it, it seems to break down for some reason.
我认为很多人都希望看到那个系统，但当他们真正进入时，似乎出于某种原因它会崩溃。

It — there’s negotiation going on in a lot of businesses that — and it always amazes me. People say they don’t like it, but it’s what ends up happening.
在很多企业中都有谈判进行，这总是让我感到惊讶。人们说他们不喜欢，但这就是最终发生的事情。

And so Van Tuyl will adapt to what the customer wants. We’ll see how some of these experiments go. And I don’t think there would be any problem at all if the world goes in that direction and Van Tuyl going to it.
因此，Van Tuyl 将会适应客户的需求。我们将看看这些实验的结果。如果世界朝那个方向发展，而 Van Tuyl 也朝那个方向前进，我认为这完全没有问题。

But I wouldn’t be surprised if five or ten years from now the system is pretty much the same. I wouldn’t be totally surprised if it changes, either, but I can’t predict the outcome.
但我不会感到惊讶，如果五年或十年后系统基本上还是一样。我也不会完全感到惊讶如果它发生变化，但我无法预测结果。

I can predict that Van Tuyl, and the subsequent auto dealerships we buy, I can predict that they will be a very important part of Berkshire and I think will be quite profitable in relation to the capital we employ in the business.
我可以预测，Van Tuyl 以及我们后续购买的汽车经销商将成为伯克希尔非常重要的一部分，我认为与我们在业务中投入的资本相比，它们将非常有利可图。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I very much like that acquisition, partly because I think we can do a lot more like it. I —
查理·芒格：我非常喜欢这项收购，部分原因是我认为我们可以做更多类似的事情。我——

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you think you’ll be negotiating on cars ten years from now, when you buy a new one?
沃伦·巴菲特：你认为十年后在买新车时还会进行谈判吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s been amazingly resistant to change for my whole lifetime.
查理·芒格：在我一生中，它一直对变化表现出惊人的抵抗力。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Happens in the jewelry business, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在珠宝行业也会发生这种情况。

I mean, there’s certain items — well, it happens in real estate. I mean, let’s just say that some real estate firm said we’re only going to take listings where you can’t negotiate.
我的意思是，有些物品——实际上，房地产也是如此。假设某些房地产公司说我们只接受那些无法议价的房源。

Do you think? — I’m not sure how it would do, in terms of obtaining both listings and customers.
你认为呢？——我不确定这在获取房源和客户方面会如何表现。

People seem to want to negotiate. If they hear a house is priced at 200,000, they’re not going — unless it’s some unusual situation — they’re not going to step right up and pay the 200. They’re going to bid.
人们似乎想要谈判。如果他们听说一栋房子的价格是 20 万，他们不会直接上来支付 20 万——除非是一些特殊情况——他们会出价。

When people are dealing with a big ticket item — a lot of people — their natural tendency is to negotiate and they particularly will do so if they think that’s built into the system.
当人们处理大宗商品时——很多人——他们的自然倾向是进行谈判，特别是如果他们认为这已经融入系统中。

So I’m not sure how it changes, but we’ll do fine, whatever direction it goes.
所以我不确定它会如何变化，但无论它朝哪个方向发展，我们都会很好。

12. Company characteristics for predictable earnings

可预测收益的公司特征

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now we go to the shareholder at Station 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在我们去 1 号站的股东。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. Great to be here. This is my first time here, incredibly lucky to have my question answered.
观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。很高兴来到这里。这是我第一次来这里，能有机会得到我的问题解答，真是太幸运了。

So my question is this: can you name at least five characteristics of a company that gives you confidence to predict its earnings ten years out in the future? And can you also use IBM as a case study, how we check all those boxes?
我的问题是：你能列出至少五个让你有信心预测一家公司未来十年收益的特征吗？同时，你能以 IBM 为案例，说明我们如何满足这些条件吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, what are your five? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你的五个是什么？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t have a one-size-fits-all system for buying businesses. They’re all different, every industry is different, and we also keep learning. So what we did ten years ago, we hopefully are doing better now. But we can’t give you a formula that will help you.
查理·芒格：我们没有一个适合所有企业的购买系统。每个企业都不同，每个行业也不同，我们也在不断学习。因此，我们十年前所做的事情，希望现在做得更好。但我们无法给你一个能帮助你的公式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, if you’re looking at the BNSF railroad as we were in 2009 or if you’re looking at Van Tuyl in 2014, there are a lot of things that go through our minds. And most of the things that go through our minds are things that will stop us from going further.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，如果你在看2009年的BNSF铁路，或者2014年的Van Tuyl，我们会考虑很多因素。我们考虑的大部分事情都是会阻止我们进一步投资的因素。

I mean, there’s — the filters are there. And there are a lot of things that, if we see it in a business, including, maybe, who we’re dealing with, will stop us from going on to the next layer. But it’s very different in different businesses.
我的意思是，过滤器是存在的。而且有很多事情，如果我们在一个商业中看到，包括，也许是我们正在打交道的人，会阻止我们进入下一个层次。但在不同的商业中，这种情况是非常不同的。

We are looking for things where we do think we’ve got some reasonable fix on how it’s going to look in five or ten years, and that does eliminate a great many businesses. But it’s not the same — it’s not the same five questions at all.
我们在寻找那些我们认为可以合理预测未来五年或十年的业务情况的因素，这确实排除了很多企业。但这并不是——完全不是相同的五个问题。

Certainly, when we’re buying a business where we’re going to have somebody that’s selling it to us continue to run it for us, you know, a very big question is, you know, do we really want to be in partnership with this person and count on them to behave in the future when they don’t own the business, as they behaved in the past when they do own the business. And that stops a fair number of deals.
当然，当我们购买一个业务并让卖家继续为我们运营时，一个非常重要的问题是，我们是否真的想与这个人建立合作关系，并依赖他们在未来的行为，尽管他们不再拥有这个业务，而是像过去拥有业务时那样表现。这会阻止相当数量的交易。

But I can’t give you five — we don’t have a list of five. Or if we do, Charlie has kept it from me. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now we go to the shareholder at Station 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好了，现在我们转到1号站的股东。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. Great to be here. This is my first time here, incredibly lucky to have my question answered.
观众成员：你好，沃伦。你好，查理。很高兴来到这里。这是我第一次来这里，非常幸运能得到回答我的问题的机会。

So my question is this: can you name at least five characteristics of a company that gives you confidence to predict its earnings ten years out in the future? And can you also use IBM as a case study, how we check all those boxes?
所以我的问题是：你们能否列举出至少五个特征，使你们对预测一家公司未来十年的盈利感到有信心？你们也可以用IBM作为案例研究，说明我们如何检查这些特征？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, what are your five? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你的五个是什么？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t have a one-size-fits-all system for buying businesses. They’re all different, every industry is different, and we also keep learning. So what we did ten years ago, we hopefully are doing better now. But we can’t give you a formula that will help you.
查理·芒格：我们没有一套通用的系统来购买企业。每个企业都不同，每个行业也不同，我们也在不断学习。所以我们十年前做的事情，现在希望做得更好。但我们不能给你一个公式来帮助你。

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, if you’re looking at the BNSF railroad as we were in 2009 or if you’re looking at Van Tuyl in 2014, there are a lot of things that go through our minds. And most of the things that go through our minds are things that will stop us from going further.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，如果你在看2009年的BNSF铁路，或者2014年的Van Tuyl，我们会考虑很多因素。我们考虑的大部分事情都是会阻止我们进一步投资的因素。

I mean, there’s — the filters are there. And there are a lot of things that, if we see it in a business, including, maybe, who we’re dealing with, will stop us from going on to the next layer. But it’s very different in different businesses.
我的意思是——这些筛选标准是存在的。如果我们在某个业务中发现这些因素，包括可能涉及到的合作对象，它们会阻止我们继续深入。但是在不同的业务中，这些因素差异很大。

We are looking for things where we do think we’ve got some reasonable fix on how it’s going to look in five or ten years, and that does eliminate a great many businesses. But it’s not the same — it’s not the same five questions at all.
我们在寻找那些我们认为可以合理预测未来五年或十年的业务情况的因素，这确实排除了很多企业。但这并不是——完全不是相同的五个问题。

Certainly, when we’re buying a business where we’re going to have somebody that’s selling it to us continue to run it for us, you know, a very big question is, you know, do we really want to be in partnership with this person and count on them to behave in the future when they don’t own the business, as they behaved in the past when they do own the business. And that stops a fair number of deals.
当然，当我们购买一家公司时，我们还会要求卖家继续为我们经营这家公司，那么一个非常重要的问题是，我们是否真的想与这个人合作，并且指望他们在将来（当他们不再拥有这家公司时）像过去一样行事（当他们拥有这家公司时）。这会阻止相当数量的交易。

But I can’t give you five — we don’t have a list of five. Or if we do, Charlie has kept it from me. (Laughter)
但我不能给你五个——我们没有五个的清单。或者，如果有的话，查理一直没有告诉我。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You want anything more?
沃伦·巴菲特：你还想要什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

13. Munger supports IBM stake purchase

芒格支持购买 IBM 股份

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question is for Charlie. It comes from John Baylor (PH).
贝基·奎克：这个问题是问查理的。来自约翰·贝勒（PH）。

He says, “Charlie, you broke Warren of his cigar butt buying habits. With the significant innovation that is occurring in technology, is IBM similar to those textile mills in the 1960s, and did you try to talk Warren out of buying IBM?”
他说：“查理，你让沃伦戒掉了买雪茄烟蒂的习惯。随着科技的重大创新，IBM 是否类似于 1960 年代的纺织厂，你是否试图劝沃伦不要买 IBM？”
系统层面的少亏大赚保证了积极尝试的能力。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is no.
查理·芒格：答案是否定的。

I think IBM is a very interesting company. It totally dominated Hollerith machines, you know, the punch card computing. And then when they invented electronic computing, it dominated that for a while.
我认为 IBM 是一家非常有趣的公司。它完全主导了Hollerith机器，也就是打孔卡计算。然后当他们发明电子计算时，它在一段时间内也主导了这一领域。

It’s very rare that when a technological change comes along that people adapt as successfully as IBM did that time.
当技术变革发生时，人们能够像IBM那样成功适应的情况非常少见。

Well, now they have the personal computer, and that’s been a mixed bag. And — but I think IBM is a very credible company.
好吧，现在他们有了个人电脑，这是一种复杂的情况。不过，我认为 IBM 是一家非常可信的公司。

We own a lot of companies that have temporary reverses, or once were mightier in some ways than they are now.
我们拥有许多公司，它们曾经在某些方面比现在更强大，或者经历了暂时的逆境。

IBM is still an enormous enterprise, and I think it’s still a very admirable enterprise, and I think we bought it at a reasonable price.
IBM 仍然是一家庞大的企业，我认为它仍然是一家非常值得钦佩的企业，我认为我们以合理的价格收购了它。

WARREN BUFFETT: When we bought it, it was a two-to-nothing vote. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：当我们买下它时，投票结果是二比零。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

14. Why we don’t “talk up” our investments

为什么我们不“夸大”我们的投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, there’s one thing I always find interesting.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一句，有一件事我总是觉得很有趣。

We get asked questions about investments we own, and people think we want to talk them up, you know, or —
我们经常被问到关于我们拥有的投资的问题，人们认为我们想要夸大它们，你知道的，或者——

We have no interest in encouraging other people to buy what — the investments we own.
我们对鼓励其他人购买我们拥有的投资没有兴趣。

I mean, we are better off, because either we or the company is likely to be buying stock in the future. Why would we want the stock to go up if we’re going to be a buyer next year, and the year after, and the year after that?
我的意思是，我们的处境更好，因为我们或公司很可能在未来购买股票。如果我们明年、后年以及再后年都要买入股票，为什么我们会希望股票上涨呢？

But the whole mentality of Wall Street is that if you buy something — even if you’re going to buy more of it later on, or if the company is going to buy its own stock in — the people seem to think that they’re better off if it goes up the next day, or the next week, or the next month, and that’s why they talk about “talking your book.”
但华尔街的整体心态是，如果你买了某样东西——即使你以后还会买更多，或者公司会回购自己的股票——人们似乎认为如果它在第二天、下周或下个月上涨，他们会更好，这就是为什么他们会谈论“谈论你的持仓”。

If we talked our book, from our standpoint, we would say pessimistic things about all four of the biggest holdings we have, because all four of them are repurchasing their shares, and, obviously, the cheaper they repurchase their shares, the better off we are. But people don’t seem to get that point.
如果我们从我们的立场谈论我们的投资，我们会对我们拥有的四大持股说一些悲观的话，因为这四家公司都在回购自己的股票，显然，它们回购股票的价格越便宜，我们就越好。但人们似乎没有理解这一点。

Do you have any idea why, Charlie?
你知道为什么吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, if people weren’t so often wrong, we wouldn’t be so rich. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：沃伦，如果人们不是那么常常犯错，我们就不会这么富有。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s finally explained it to me. OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他终于向我解释清楚了。好的。（笑声）

15. “Three extraordinary pieces of luck” with insurance

“三次非凡的运气”与保险

WARREN BUFFETT: Gary? 沃伦·巴菲特：加里？

GARY RANSOM: Thank you. 加里·兰索姆：谢谢你。

In his letter, Charlie talked about Berkshire’s insurance success, quote, “being so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.”
在他的信中，查理谈到了伯克希尔的保险成功，引用道：“如此惊人地庞大，以至于我相信如果巴菲特回到一个小的基础，同时保留他的智慧并恢复他的青春，他现在将无法重现这一点。”

Do you agree that you could not repeat that success today? And if so, what do you think are the conditions in the insurance industry today that would inhibit a repeat of that performance?
你是否同意你今天无法重现那种成功？如果是这样，你认为今天保险行业中有哪些条件会阻碍这种表现的重现？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I had many, many, many pieces of luck, but I had three extraordinary pieces of luck, in terms of the insurance business.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我有很多很多的运气，但在保险业务方面，我有三次非凡的运气。

One was, when I was 20 years old, having a fellow on a Saturday, a fellow named Lorimer Davidson, be willing to spend four hours with some 20-year-old kid who he never heard of before, explain the insurance business to him.
有一次，当我 20 岁的时候，在一个星期六，有一个叫洛里默·戴维森的家伙愿意花四个小时和一个他从未听说过的 20 岁小孩在一起，向他解释保险业务。

So I received an education at age 20 that was — I couldn’t have gotten at any business school in the United States. And that was just pure luck. I mean, I just happened to go to Washington. I had no idea I would run into him. I had no idea whether he would talk to me, and he spent four hours with me. So just chalk that one up, the chance of that happening again.
所以我在 20 岁时接受的教育——这是我在美国的任何商学院都无法获得的。这纯粹是运气。我是说，我恰好去了华盛顿。我完全不知道我会遇到他。我也不知道他是否会和我交谈，而他和我聊了四个小时。所以就把这归结为，再次发生这种事情的机会。

In 1967, I got lucky again when Jack Ringwalt, who, for about five minutes every year wanted to sell his company, because he would get mad about something, some claim would come in that he didn’t like or something of the sort. And I told my friend Charlie Heider, I said, “Next time Jack is in the mood, be sure to get him to my office.” And Charlie got him up there one day, and we bought National Indemnity.
1967 年，我再次走运，当时杰克·林格沃特每年大约有五分钟的时间想要出售他的公司，因为他会因为某些事情而生气，某个他不喜欢的索赔会出现，或者类似的事情。我告诉我的朋友查理·海德，我说：“下次杰克有情绪的时候，一定要把他带到我的办公室。”查理有一天把他带到了那里，我们买下了国家赔偿公司。

We couldn’t have done that — we not only couldn’t have done it a day later, we couldn’t have done it an hour later. You know, that — that was lucky.
我们不可能做到这一点——我们不仅不能在一天后做到，甚至连一个小时后也做不到。你知道，那——那真是运气。

And then I really got lucky in the mid ’80s when, on a Saturday, some guy came in the office and he said, “I’ve never worked in the insurance business, but maybe I can do you some good.” And that was Ajit Jain. And, you know, how lucky can you get?
然后我在 80 年代中期真的很幸运，一个星期六，有个家伙来到办公室，他说：“我从未在保险行业工作过，但也许我能帮到你。”那个人就是 Ajit Jain。你说，运气能有多好呢？

So, if you ask me whether we can pull off a trifecta like that again in the future, I’d say the odds are very much against it.
所以，如果你问我我们未来是否能再次实现这样的三重胜利，我会说机会非常渺茫。

But the whole — the whole thing in business is being open to ideas as they come along, and insurance happened to be something that I could understand. I mean, that was in my sweet spot.
但在商业中，最重要的是对新想法保持开放，而保险恰好是我能理解的领域。我是说，那正是我的强项。

If Lorimer Davidson had talked to me about some other business, you know, it wouldn’t have done any good. But it just so happened he hit a chord with me on that in explaining it. I could understand what he was talking about. And I could understand what National Indemnity was when Jack had it for sale.
如果洛里默·戴维森跟我谈论其他生意，你知道，这没有任何意义。但恰好他在解释时触动了我的心弦。我能理解他在说什么。我也能理解当杰克把国家赔偿公司出售时的情况。

And that’s — there’s an awful lot of accident in life, but if you keep yourself open to having good accidents happen, and kind of get past the bad accidents, you know, some good things will happen. Might not happen in insurance — you know, it can happen in some other field — probably would happen in some other field — if you were to start in today.
生活中有很多意外，但如果你保持开放的心态，让好的意外发生，并且努力克服坏的意外，你知道，一些好事会发生。可能不会在保险行业发生——你知道，它可以在其他领域发生——如果你今天开始，可能会在其他领域发生。

So, no, we could not have — you couldn’t expect to have three lucky events like that happen, and there were many more along the way.
所以，不，我们不可能——你不能指望会发生三次这样的幸运事件，而且在这个过程中还有更多。

But, you know, we — I think if we were starting over again, we’d find something else to do. What about it, Charlie?
但是，你知道，我们——我觉得如果我们重新开始，我们会找到其他事情去做。查理，你觉得怎么样？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t think we would have that kind of success.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为我们不会取得那种成功。

You know, mostly we bought wonderful businesses and nourished them. But the reinsurance division was just created out of whole cloth right here in Omaha, and it’s a huge business. Insurance has been different for us.
你知道，我们主要是买下了出色的企业并培育它们。但再保险部门完全是在这里的奥马哈创建的，这是一个庞大的业务。保险对我们来说一直是不同的。

16. Berkshire’s culture “runs deep”

伯克希尔的文化“根深蒂固”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2? And if you’ll say where you’re from too, please?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站？请告诉我你来自哪里。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Warren, dear Charlie. I’m Lawrence from Germany, and in my home country, you two are regarded as role models for integrity. And at Berkshire, its culture is its most important competitive edge.
观众成员：亲爱的沃伦，亲爱的查理。我是来自德国的劳伦斯，在我的祖国，你们两位被视为诚信的榜样。在伯克希尔，文化是其最重要的竞争优势。

Hence, my question: how can we, as outside investors, judge the state of Berkshire’s culture long after you depart from the company?
因此，我的问题是：作为外部投资者，我们如何判断在您离开公司后，伯克希尔的文化状态？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s fair that you do, you know, come with a questioning mind to the culture, post-me and Charlie, but I think you’re going to be very — I don’t think you should be surprised, but I think you will be very pleased with the outcome.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为你带着质疑的心态来了解文化是公平的，尤其是在我和查理之后，但我认为你会非常——我不认为你会感到惊讶，但我认为你会对结果感到非常满意。

The culture — I think Berkshire’s culture runs as deep as any large company could be in the world.
我认为伯克希尔的文化在世界上任何大型公司中都可以说是深厚的。

It’s interesting you’re from Germany, because just three or four days ago, we closed on a transaction with a woman named Mrs. Louis, in Germany.
有趣的是你来自德国，因为就在三四天前，我们与一位名叫路易斯夫人的女士在德国完成了一笔交易。

And she and her husband had built a business [Detlev Louis Motorrad-Vertriebs GmbH]. Over 35 years, they’d spent developing this business of retail shops, dealing with motorcycle owners, and lovingly, had built this business.
她和她的丈夫建立了一家企业 [Detlev Louis Motorrad-Vertriebs GmbH]。在 35 年里，他们花费了大量时间发展这家零售商店，服务摩托车车主，并且用心地建立了这家公司。

Her husband died a couple years ago. And Mrs. Louis, in Germany — it came about in sort of a roundabout way — but she wanted to sell to Berkshire Hathaway. And, you know, that would not have been the case 30 or 40 years ago.
她的丈夫几年前去世了。路易斯夫人，在德国——这件事是通过一种迂回的方式发生的——但她想把公司卖给伯克希尔·哈撒韦。你知道，30 或 40 年前情况并不是这样。

So it does — it’s a vital part of Berkshire to have a clearly defined, deeply embedded culture that pervades the parent company, the subsidiary companies. It’s even reflected in our shareholders.
所以确实如此——在伯克希尔，拥有一个明确界定、深深植根的文化是至关重要的，这种文化渗透到母公司和子公司中。它甚至反映在我们的股东身上。

And, you know, when you have 97 percent of the shareholders vote and say we don’t want a dividend, I don’t think there’s another company like that in the world.
而且，你知道，当 97%的股东投票表示我们不想要分红时，我认为世界上没有其他公司像这样。

So we have a — our directors sign on for it and, there again, we behave consistently. Instead of having a bunch of directors who are — love to be a director because they’d like to get $2- or $300,000 a year for showing up four times a year, we have directors who look at it as a great opportunity for stewardship, and who want their ownership, and have their ownership, represented by buying stock in the market, exactly like you do.
所以我们有一个——我们的董事签署了这个协议，而我们在这里又表现得一致。我们不是一群因为每年只需出席四次就能赚到 20 万或 30 万美元的董事，而是有一些董事把这看作是一个很好的管理机会，他们希望自己的所有权得到体现，并通过在市场上购买股票来实现这一点，正如你所做的那样。

So we — it’s — we try to make clear and define that culture in every way possible, and it’s gotten reinforced over the years to an extreme degree. People who join us believe in it; people who shun us don’t believe in it, so we — it’s self-reinforcing.
所以我们——这——我们尽可能清晰地定义这种文化，并且多年来这种文化得到了极大的强化。加入我们的人相信这一点；而避开我们的人则不相信，所以我们——这是一种自我强化。

And I think it’s a virtual certainty to continue and to become even stronger, because once Charlie and I aren’t around, it will be so clear that it’s not the force of personality, but it’s the — it’s institutionalized that, you know, nobody will doubt that it will really continue for decades and decades and decades to come.
我认为这几乎可以肯定会继续下去，并且会变得更强，因为一旦查理和我不在了，大家会清楚地看到，这并不是个人魅力的力量，而是制度化的，没人会怀疑它会在未来几十年、几十年、几十年里真正继续下去。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as I said in the annual report, I think Berkshire is going to do fine after we’re gone. In fact, it will do a lot better, in dollars. But, percentage-wise, it will never gain at the rate we did in the early years, and that’s all right. There’s worse tragedies in life than having Berkshire’s assets and have the growth rates slow a little.
查理·芒格：正如我在年报中所说，我认为在我们离开后，伯克希尔会表现得很好。事实上，它在美元上会表现得更好。但是，从百分比上看，它永远不会像我们早期那样增长得快，这没关系。生活中还有比拥有伯克希尔的资产和增长率稍微放缓更糟糕的悲剧。

WARREN BUFFETT: Name one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：说一个。 （笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren and I have one not very far ahead.
查理·芒格：沃伦和我有一个不太遥远的目标。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Yeah, yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。是的，是的。（笑声）

OK. Andrew? 好的。安德鲁？

I should say culture is everything at Berkshire. And if you run into a terrible culture, it’s — you know, the Salomon thing was up there on the screen, and it would be hard to turn Salomon into a Berkshire. I don’t think we could have done it, Charlie.
我应该说文化在伯克希尔是一切。如果你遇到糟糕的文化，嗯，Salomon的事情就在屏幕上，很难把Salomon变成伯克希尔。我认为我们做不到，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think anybody’s ever done it on Wall Street.
查理·芒格：我认为在华尔街没有人做到过这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. It’s just — it’s a different world.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。这只是——这是一个不同的世界。

And that doesn’t mean that Berkshire is a monastery, by any means, but it does mean that — I can guarantee you that Charlie and I, and a great, great many of our managers, are more concerned — and Carrie Sova who put this meeting together and everything — they are more concerned about getting a good job done for Berkshire than what they get out of it themselves.
这并不意味着伯克希尔是一个修道院，但我可以保证，查理和我，以及我们许多经理，更关心的是为伯克希尔做好工作，而不是他们自己能从中获得什么，凯莉·索瓦也是为了这个会议而付出了很多努力。

And, you know, it’s great to work around people like that.
而且，你知道，和这样的人一起工作真是太好了。

17. Health concerns about sugar won’t stop Coca-Cola’s growth

对糖的健康担忧不会阻止可口可乐的增长

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, Warren. This question comes from Simone Wallace (PH) in New York, New York.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，沃伦。这个问题来自纽约的西蒙·华莱士（PH）。

And she writes, “Over the last 50 years, we Berkshire shareholders have, effectively, been long sugar consumption, through directly owned companies, such as See’s Candies, Dairy Queen, in funding Heinz, and publically-traded investments, such as Coca-Cola today.
她写道：“在过去的 50 年里，我们伯克希尔的股东实际上一直在长期消费糖，通过直接拥有的公司，如 See’s Candies、Dairy Queen，资助亨氏，以及今天的可口可乐等上市投资。”

“Yet, from improvements in scientific research, we as a society have become increasingly attuned to the true costs of greater sugar consumption, in the form of rising health-care costs.
然而，随着科学研究的进步，我们作为一个社会越来越意识到增加糖消费的真实成本，这表现为不断上升的医疗费用。

“We are seeing this awareness of sugar’s impact in changing consumer behavior. Carbonated soft drink volumes are declining, and consumer packaged goods companies, focused on the center aisles of supermarkets, are struggling with organic growth.
我们看到消费者对糖影响的意识正在改变消费行为。碳酸饮料的销量正在下降，专注于超市中心过道的消费品公司在有机增长方面面临困难。

“If we have reached — have we reached an inflection point in human behavior in how consumers view sugar consumption? And do you think Coca-Cola’s moat, and potentially that of Heinz’s or Kraft’s, is narrowing? And if not, what news would it take you to be convinced that it is?”
“如果我们已经到达——我们是否在消费者对糖消费的看法上达到了人类行为的拐点？你认为可口可乐的护城河，以及亨氏或卡夫的护城河，正在缩小吗？如果没有，什么消息会让你相信它正在缩小？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s an enormously wide moat, but I think it’s also true that the trends you described are happening.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为这是一个非常宽广的护城河，但我也认为你所描述的趋势确实在发生。

But, you know, there will be 1.9 billion eight-ounce servings of Coca-Cola products, not Coca-Cola, but Coca-Cola products, consumed in the world today.
但是，你知道，今天全球将消费 19 亿份八盎司的可口可乐产品，不是可口可乐，而是可口可乐产品。

I don’t think you’re going to see anything revolutionary, and I think you will see all food and beverage companies adjust to the expressed preferences of the consumers as they go along.
我认为你不会看到任何革命性的变化，我认为所有食品和饮料公司会随着消费者的偏好而进行调整。

No company ever does well ignoring its consumers.
没有公司能在忽视消费者的情况下做得好。

But there will be — I would predict — 20 years from now there will be more people — there will be more Coca-Cola cases consumed — than there are now, by some margin.
但我预测，20 年后，消费的可口可乐数量将会比现在多出一些。

Back in the late 1930s, Fortune ran an article saying that the growth of Coca-Cola was all over.
在 1930 年代末，《财富》杂志发表了一篇文章，称可口可乐的增长已经结束。

And when we bought our Coca-Cola stock in 1988, you know, people were not that enthused about growth possibilities for the product.
当我们在 1988 年购买可口可乐股票时，你知道，人们对该产品的增长潜力并不是那么热衷。

I sit here as somebody who, for the — in the last 30 years, one-quarter of all the calories I’ve consumed come from Coca-Cola. (Laughter)
我坐在这里，作为一个在过去 30 年中，四分之一的卡路里摄入来自可口可乐的人。（笑声）

And that is not an exaggeration. I am one-quarter Coca-Cola. I’m not sure which quarter.
这并不是夸张。我是四分之一的可口可乐。我不确定是哪一部分。

But — and, you know, if you really — I don’t think there is this choice. I think there’s a lot to be said about being happy with what you’re doing.
但是——你知道，如果你真的——我认为没有这个选择。我认为对自己所做的事情感到快乐是很重要的。

If I’d been eating broccoli and Brussels sprouts, and all that, all my life, I don’t think I’d live as long. You know, I — (Laughter)
如果我一辈子都在吃西兰花和抱子甘蓝之类的东西，我觉得我活不久。你知道，我——（笑声）

Every meal, I would approach, thinking, you know, it’s like going to jail or something. (Laughter)
每顿饭，我都会想，知道吗，这就像是去监狱一样。（笑声）

No. I think — I think — Charlie? (Laughter)
不，我认为——我认为——查理？（笑声）

Charlie’s 91, and his habits aren’t that different than mine. They’re slightly better, but —
查理 91 岁了，他的习惯和我的差不多。虽然稍微好一些，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s no question about it. The way I look at it is, sugar is an enormously helpful substance. It prevents premature softening of the arteries. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：毫无疑问。我认为，糖是一种极其有益的物质。它可以防止动脉过早软化。（笑声）

And the way I look at it, is that, if I die a little sooner that will just be avoiding a few months of drooling in a nursing home. (Laughter)
从我的角度来看，如果我早点死，那只是避免在养老院里流几个月的口水。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I have enjoyed every meal we ever had, virtually, except when I was eating at my grandfather’s and he made me eat those damn green vegetables.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我几乎享受过的每一顿饭，除了我在我祖父家吃饭的时候，他让我吃那些该死的绿叶蔬菜。

There, obviously, are some shifts in preferences, although it’s remarkable how durable items are in this field.
显然，偏好发生了一些变化，尽管在这个领域，物品的耐用性是令人惊讶的。

We — Berkshire Hathaway — I believe, was the largest shareholder of General Foods from about 1981 or thereabouts, to about 1984 when it was bought by Philip Morris.
我们——伯克希尔·哈撒韦——我相信，从 1981 年左右到 1984 年左右，我们是通用食品的最大股东，当时它被菲利普·莫里斯收购。

And, you know, that’s 30-plus years ago, and those same — those same brands — you know, they went through Philip Morris, they got spun out as Kraft, they broke Kraft into two pieces. But now, we’re going to own those brands, and they’re terrific brands.
而且，你知道，那是 30 多年前的事，那些同样的品牌——你知道，它们经历了菲利普·莫里斯，后来被分拆成卡夫，又将卡夫分成了两部分。但现在，我们将拥有这些品牌，它们是很棒的品牌。

Heinz — Heinz goes back to 1869. The ketchup came out a little later. They went bankrupt, actually, when they were counting on the horseradish or whatever it was.
亨氏——亨氏的历史可以追溯到 1869 年。番茄酱稍晚一些才问世。实际上，他们在依赖辣根或其他什么东西时破产了。

But the ketchup came out in the 1870s. Coca-Cola dates to 1886. It’s a pretty good bet that an awful lot of people are going to like the same thing.
但番茄酱是在 1870 年代问世的。可口可乐的历史可以追溯到 1886 年。可以相当肯定的是，很多人会喜欢同样的东西。

And when I compare drinking Coca-Cola, you know, to something that somebody would sell me at Whole Foods —(Laughter)
当我将喝可口可乐与有人在Whole Foods卖给我的东西相比时——（笑声）

I don’t know — I don’t see smiles on the faces of people at Whole Foods. (Laughter and applause)
我不知道——我没有看到Whole Foods里人们的笑脸。（笑声和掌声）

So I like the brands we’re buying, Andrew.
所以我喜欢我们正在购买的品牌，安德鲁。

18. Why Buffett likes local auto dealerships

巴菲特为什么喜欢当地汽车经销商

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg Warren?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格·沃伦？

GREGGORY WARREN: Thank you, Warren. I just wanted to circle back and add on to Jonathan’s question on Van Tuyl Group.
格雷戈里·沃伦：谢谢你，沃伦。我只是想回过头来，补充一下乔纳森关于Van Tuyl集团的问题。

What is it that attracted you most to the deal? Potential for consolidation in a highly fragmented industry, which would allow you to put some of your excess capital to work, or the unique positioning in the auto chain of the auto dealer sector, which has its hands not only in auto sales but financing insurance and parts and services?
是什么吸引你对这笔交易最感兴趣？在一个高度分散的行业中整合的潜力，这将使你能够利用一些多余的资本，还是在汽车经销商行业中独特的定位，这个行业不仅涉及汽车销售，还包括融资、保险以及零部件和服务？

I know that Charlie just said that he’d like to do more deals like it, but where do you feel the greatest return will come from longer term? Rolling up auto dealerships or tapping into the advantages that are inherent in the full service model?
我知道查理刚才说他想做更多这样的交易，但你觉得从长远来看，最大的回报会来自哪里？收购汽车经销商还是利用全方位服务模式固有的优势？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There are not any huge advantages of scale, at least that I’m aware of, in owning lots of dealerships. But running dealerships well is a very good business. It’s a local business.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。至少在我所知道的范围内，拥有很多经销商并没有什么巨大的规模优势。但经营好经销商是一项非常好的生意。这是一个地方性业务。

So I don’t see that having some — there’s 17,000 dealers in the country, and if you ask the people here in Omaha to name a bunch of dealers, they’d come up with a bunch of local names.
所以我认为有一些——全国有 17,000 个经销商，如果你问奥马哈的人列举一些经销商，他们会想出一堆当地的名字。

And I don’t think that you widen profit margins, particularly, by having a thousand dealers versus having a hundred or even having one very good dealer.
我认为，增加利润率并不是通过拥有一千个经销商，而是通过拥有一百个甚至一个非常好的经销商。

So we will be buying, I hope, more dealerships, but it will be based on local considerations.
所以我们希望会购买更多的经销商，但这将基于当地的考虑。

We don’t see the finance business, in dealers — we don’t bring anything to that party.
我们在经销商那里看不到金融业务——我们没有为这个派对带来任何东西。

[CEO] John Stumpf is here from Wells Fargo. I think they’re the biggest auto finance company in the United States. And they have a cost of funds advantage over Berkshire.
[首席执行官] John Stumpf在这里，他来自Wells Fargo。我认为他们是美国最大的汽车金融公司。他们在资金成本上有优势。

Berkshire is able to borrow money at a low price, but I forget whether John’s liabilities cost him something like 12 basis points or something like that last quarter. And we can’t come up with money as cheap as the banks can, and they’re the natural lenders for loans, so we’re not going to be in the finance business.
伯克希尔能够以低价格借款，但我忘了John的负债成本是否在上季度大约12个基点。我们不能像银行那样低价融资，他们是贷款的自然放贷者，所以我们不会进入金融业务。

We will keep looking for dealerships, maybe groups of dealers. It doesn’t give us a buying advantage from a manufacturer. And we will hope that we run those local operations very well and that they’re regarded by the people who buy cars as a local business, not some part of some giant operation.
我们将继续寻找经销商，也许是经销商集团。这并没有给我们从制造商那里获得购买优势。我们希望能够很好地运营这些地方业务，并且希望购车的人将其视为本地企业，而不是某个大型企业的一部分。

So, I think you’ll see us buying more, but I don’t think you’ll see us widening out margins from what existed before, except in the cases where we can run a local dealer better.
所以，我认为你会看到我们会购买更多，但我不认为你会看到我们扩大之前的利润率，除非在我们能够更好地运营当地经销商的情况下。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And Van Tuyl has a system of meritocracy where the right people get the power and get some ownership.
查理·芒格：是的。Van Tuyl有一种优胜劣汰的系统，正确的人获得权力和部分所有权。

So on the — it reminds me a lot of the Kiewit Company, an Omaha company and whose headquarters Berkshire resides as a tenant. And the Van Tuyl and Kiewit are kissing cousins. Those are very successful cultures, and I think they’ve got a very good thing going for them. The right people are prospering in Van Tuyl.
这让我很想起Kiewit公司，一家总部位于奥马哈的公司，伯克希尔在这里作为租户。Van Tuyl和Kiewit是非常相似的。这些都是非常成功的文化，我认为他们有很好的发展。Van Tuyl的正确人士正在繁荣。

19. Building culture and values at Berkshire

在伯克希尔建立文化和价值观

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9? And if you’ll identify where you’re from, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站？请告诉我你来自哪里。

Oh, I’m sorry. Station 3. You’re number 9. I apologize.
哦，对不起。3 号站。你是 9 号。我很抱歉。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Apology accepted. (Laughter)
观众成员：道歉接受。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’d have cut off your mic if you hadn’t. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你不这样做，我们就会切断你的麦克风。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fair enough.
观众成员：说得好。

My name is Stuart Kaye, and I’m from Stamford, Connecticut.
我的名字是斯图尔特·凯，来自康涅狄格州的斯坦福德。

And I wanted to follow up on the questions that have been asked about culture and stewardship at Berkshire Hathaway, because I’m currently in year five of helping build a firm called Matarin Capital Management, and we discuss values and culture quite a bit.
我想跟进一下关于伯克希尔哈撒韦的文化和管理的问题，因为我目前正在帮助建立一家名为 Matarin Capital Management 的公司，已经是第五年了，我们经常讨论价值观和文化。

And so I’d like some tips from you about what characteristics you thought about 45 years ago when you were building the culture and values at Berkshire Hathaway.
所以我想请教您一些建议，关于您在 45 年前建立伯克希尔哈撒韦的文化和价值观时考虑的特征。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well I think culture has to come from the top, it has to be consistent, it has to be part of written communications, it has to be — you know, has to be lived, and it has to be rewarded when followed, and punished when not.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为文化必须来自高层，必须是一致的，必须成为书面沟通的一部分，必须——你知道，必须被实践，并且在遵循时得到奖励，而在不遵循时受到惩罚。

And then it takes a very, very long time to really become solid.
然后，真正变得稳固需要非常非常长的时间。

And obviously, it’s easier — much easier — to do it if you inherit a culture you like, and it’s easier in smaller firms, I think.
显然，如果你继承了一个你喜欢的文化，这样做会更容易——容易得多，而且在小公司里，我认为这更容易。

I can think of a lot of companies — very big companies — in this country, and I don’t think if Charlie and I were around them for ten years we’d be able to accomplish much of anything.
我能想到很多公司——非常大的公司——在这个国家，我认为如果查理和我在他们身边待十年，我们也不可能取得太多成就。

So it — you know, it is a grain of sand type of thing. And people — just like your child, you know, sees what you do rather than what you say, it’s the same thing in a business, that people see how those above them behave and they move in that direction.
所以这就像一粒沙子一样。人们——就像你的孩子，你知道的，他们看到你做的事情而不是你说的话，在商业中也是一样，人们看到那些在他们之上的人是如何行为的，他们就会朝那个方向发展。

They don’t all move that way. We’ve got 340,000 people now working for Berkshire, and I will guarantee you that there’s, you know, some number —a dozen, maybe 50, maybe 100 —that are doing something today that they shouldn’t be doing.
他们并不是都那样行动。我们现在有 34 万人在伯克希尔工作，我可以保证，有一些人——可能十个，也可能五十个，甚至一百个——今天在做一些他们不应该做的事情。

And we — what you have to do is when you find out about it, you have to do something about it.
我们——你需要做的是，当你发现这件事时，你必须采取行动。

I didn’t like, for example, making 30-year mortgages at Clayton five years ago. And I said, “We’re not going to make 30-year mortgages, you know, unless they’re government guaranteed.”
我五年前在克莱顿时不喜欢做 30 年期的抵押贷款。我说：“我们不会做 30 年期的抵押贷款，除非它们是政府担保的。”

And when we bought Kirby, there was some sales practices we didn’t like, and we particularly didn’t like them with older people. So we put in a golden age policy where, if you’re over 65 and you bought a Kirby and for any reason you didn’t like it, any time up to a year, you could send it and get all of your money back. And I encouraged people to write me if they had a problem on anything like that.
当我们购买Kirby时，有一些销售做法我们不喜欢，尤其是对老年人。因此，我们制定了一项黄金年龄政策，如果您超过 65 岁并购买了Kirby，出于任何原因在一年内不喜欢它，您可以退回并全额退款。我鼓励人们如果遇到类似问题就写信给我。

So it takes a lot of time, and you’ll — you know, at GEICO we’re going to — you know, we’re going to settle millions and millions and millions of claims. And I will guarantee you that when two people are in an auto accident, they don’t agree 100 percent of the time on whose fault it was, so they may go away and be unhappy for a time.
这需要很多时间，而在 GEICO，我们将会处理数百万的索赔。我可以保证，当两个人发生汽车事故时，他们并不总是 100%同意是谁的错，因此他们可能会一段时间感到不愉快。

But we work all the time at trying to behave with other people as if our positions were reversed. That’s what Charlie’s always advised in all our activities, and we’ve tried to follow it. And we’re certainly far from perfect at it, but if you keep working at it, it does get results.
但我们一直努力尝试与他人相处，仿佛我们的立场是相对的。这是查理在我们所有活动中一直建议的，我们也尽量遵循。我们当然还远未做到完美，但如果你不断努力，确实会取得成效。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the one thing that we did that’s worked best of all is we were always dissatisfied with what we already knew and we always wanted to know more. And Berkshire, if Warren and I had stayed frozen in time, particularly Warren, it would have been a —
查理·芒格：是的。我认为我们做得最好的事情就是我们总是对自己已经知道的感到不满，总是想要知道更多。如果沃伦和我一直停滞不前，特别是沃伦，那将是一个——

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to do it, understand.
沃伦·巴菲特：我想这样做，明白吗。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It would have been a terrible place. It’s what we kept learning that made it work, and I don’t think that will ever stop.
查理·芒格：那将是一个可怕的地方。正是我们不断学习的过程让它运作起来，我认为这永远不会停止。

20. Any company with an economist has “one employee too many”

任何有经济学家的公司都有“多余的员工”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Mona Dyan (PH). And it concerns two indicators, Warren, that you have discussed in the past about the general level of the stock market.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自莫娜·迪安（PH）。它涉及到两个指标，沃伦，你过去曾讨论过关于股市整体水平的。

The first one is the percentage of total market cap relative to the U.S. GNP, which you have said is probably the best single measure of where valuations stand at any given moment.
第一个是总市值相对于美国国民生产总值的百分比，您曾说过这可能是衡量任何时刻估值水平的最佳单一指标。

This indicator is at about 125 percent. That is the ratio of total market cap to U.S. GNP, and that’s about what it was when Warren talked about this back in 1999 just before the — shortly before — the bubble broke.
该指标约为 125%。这是总市值与美国国民生产总值的比率，这大约是沃伦在 1999 年谈论此事时的水平，就在泡沫破裂之前不久。

The second indicator, which you mentioned in a famous 1999 speech that subsequently became an article in Fortune, is the corporate profits — is corporate profits — as percent of GNP.
第二个指标，您在 1999 年一场著名演讲中提到，后来成为《财富》杂志的一篇文章，就是企业利润——企业利润——占国民生产总值的百分比。

You had said at the time that that number ranged between 4 percent to 6 1/2 percent over a long period of time, which I believe was 1951 to 1999.
你当时说过，这个数字在很长一段时间内（我相信是 1951 年至 1999 年）介于 4%到 6.5%之间。

Well, as of Friday, it is about 10 1/2 percent, according to the St. Louis Federal Reserve site. That is way above the range you had mentioned.
好吧，截至周五，根据圣路易斯联邦储备银行网站，约为 10.5%。这远高于您提到的范围。

Are the current levels of either one, or both, of these indicators a matter of concern for the general investing public?
当前这两个指标中的任何一个或两个的水平是否让普通投资者感到担忧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the — it might be — the second figure, which is the profits as a percentage of GDP, might be a concern for other segments of society because what it indicates is that American business has done wonderfully well in recent years.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，第二个数字，即利润占 GDP 的百分比，可能会让社会的其他部分感到担忧，因为这表明美国企业近年来表现非常出色。

And I know it says how — what a terrible disadvantage it has, because of U.S. tax rates and a host of other things, you know, the facts are that American business has prospered incredibly.
而且我知道这表明——它有什么样的严重劣势，因为美国税率和其他很多因素，事实上，美国企业已经繁荣得令人难以置信。

And the first comparison is very much affected by the fact that we live in an interest rate environment, which Charlie and I probably would have thought was almost impossible, not too many years ago.
第一个比较则受到我们生活在一个利率环境中的影响，Charlie和我可能会认为这几年前几乎是不可能的。

And, obviously, profits are worth a whole lot more if the government bond yield is 1 percent, than they’re worth if the government bond yield is 5 percent.
显然，如果政府债券收益率为1%，利润的价值会远高于政府债券收益率为5%时的价值。

So it gets back — and, you know, Charlie in that movie talked about alternatives and opportunity cost. And for many people, the opportunity cost is owning a lot of bonds, which pay practically nothing, or owning stocks, which are selling at fairly high prices historically, but they weren’t selling at those historic prices with interest rates like this.
所以它回到了——你知道，查理在那部电影中谈到了替代方案和机会成本。对于许多人来说，机会成本就是拥有大量几乎没有收益的债券，或者拥有股票，而这些股票的历史售价相对较高，但在这样的利率下，它们并没有以那些历史价格出售。

So I would not — I look at those numbers, but I also look at them in the context of the fact that we’re living in a world that has incredibly low interest rates, and the question is how long those are going to prevail. Is it going to be something like Japan that goes on decade after decade, or will we be back to what we thought was normal interest rates?
所以我不会——我看那些数字，但我也把它们放在我们生活在一个利率极低的世界这个背景下来看，问题是这种情况会持续多久。它会像日本那样持续十年又十年，还是我们会回到我们认为的正常利率水平？

If we get back to what are normal interest rates, stocks at these prices will look pretty high. If we continue with these kinds of interest rates, stocks will look very cheap. And now I’ve given you the answer and you can take your pick. (Laughs)
如果我们回到正常的利率水平，这些价格的股票看起来会很高。如果我们继续维持这种利率水平，股票看起来会非常便宜。现在我已经给了你答案，你可以自己选择。（笑）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, since we failed to predict what happened, and what exists now, why would anybody ask us what our prediction is in the future? (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，既然我们未能预测发生了什么，以及现在的情况，为什么还会有人问我们对未来的预测是什么呢？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. We — incidentally, the one thing I can assure you, Charlie and I, to my knowledge, or my memory, I can’t recall ever us making an acquisition or turning down one based on macro factors that — you know, and we talk about deals when they come along, but whether it was See’s Candy, or whatever it might have been, the Burlington Northern we bought at a terrible time, in general economic conditions.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。顺便说一下，我可以向你保证，查理和我，依我所知，或者说我的记忆，我不记得我们曾基于宏观因素进行过收购或拒绝过收购——你知道，我们会在交易出现时讨论，但无论是See’s，还是其他什么，我们在经济条件糟糕的情况下收购了伯灵顿北方铁路。

But we don’t — it just doesn’t come up, because we don’t — we know we don’t know what the next 12 months, 24 months, 30 — we know we don’t know what that’s going to look like. But it doesn’t really make any difference if we’re buying a business to hold for a hundred years.
但我们并不这样做——这根本没有出现，因为我们知道我们不知道接下来的 12 个月、24 个月、30 个月会是什么样子。但如果我们是为了持有一百年而收购一家公司，这其实并没有什么区别。

What we have to do is figure out what’s likely to be the average profitability of the business over time and how strong its competitive mode is and that sort of thing.
我们需要做的是弄清楚这个业务在一段时间内的平均盈利能力可能是什么，以及它的竞争优势有多强，类似的事情。

So, people have trouble believing that. They think we talk about it. We think any company that has an economist, you know, certainly, has one employee too many. (Laughter)
所以，人们很难相信这一点。他们认为我们讨论这些问题。我们认为任何有经济学家的公司，肯定多了一个员工。（笑声）

Charlie? Can you think of anything rude to say that I haven’t said? (Laughter)
查理？你能想到我还没说过的任何粗鲁的话吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it would be hard to top that one. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，要超越那个可不容易。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I know. OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我知道。好的。（笑声）

21. Effect on BNSF of new crude-by-rail safety rules

新的原油铁路运输安全规则对 BNSF 的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: There’s been an awful lot written about what should be done to improve the safety of the crude-by-rail infrastructure. Both this week and last month, federal regulators introduced new standards. These new standards include thicker tanks, better fire protection, electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, and speed limits in more populous areas to reduce the chance of derailments near where people live.
乔纳森·布兰特：关于如何改善原油铁路基础设施的安全性，已经有很多文章写了。联邦监管机构在本周和上个月都推出了新的标准。这些新标准包括更厚的油罐、更好的防火保护、电子控制的气动刹车，以及在人口较多地区的限速，以减少在居民附近发生脱轨的可能性。

The railroad association has complained that the brakes are too expensive, while others have complained about what they view as an overly-long timetable to switch out the old tank cars.
铁路协会抱怨刹车太贵，而其他人则抱怨他们认为更换旧油罐车的时间表过长。

Given the tank car industry’s limits on manufacturing and retrofitting capacity, and the impact on overall rail network velocity from speed limits, do you think the new rules strike the right balance between efficiency and safety?
鉴于罐车行业在制造和改装能力上的限制，以及速度限制对整体铁路网络速度的影响，您认为新规则在效率和安全之间达到了正确的平衡吗？

For Berkshire, what impact will these new rules have on the operations of Marmon’s Union Tank Car subsidiary and on the BNSF Railroad?
对于伯克希尔，这些新规则将对Marmon的联合油罐车子公司和 BNSF 铁路的运营产生什么影响？

Can you also update us on the BNSF initiative to purchase up to 5,000 of its own oil tankers — oil tank cars — which is a departure from historic industry practices, and what drove that decision?
你能更新一下BNSF购买最多5000辆自有油罐车的计划吗——这与历史上的行业惯例有所不同，这一决定的驱动因素是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, you’ve asked all the questions I’ll be asking.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，你问的都是我将要问的问题。

But I think those rules just came out, what, two days ago now? Yeah. And they’re 300 pages. And little as I have to do with this meeting and everything, I have not read those, although I have talked very briefly to Matt Rose and also Frank Ptak who runs our — the company that manufactures and leases tank cars.
但我认为那些规则刚刚出台，嗯，才两天前吧？是的。而且它们有 300 页。尽管我与这次会议和所有事情的关系不大，但我还没有阅读这些规则，尽管我与马特·罗斯和弗兰克·普塔克进行了非常简短的交谈，他负责我们制造和租赁油罐车的公司。

You know, our interest — actually, the interest of our railroad and our tank car manufacturing and leasing operation may diverge in various ways.
你知道，我们的利益——实际上，我们的铁路以及我们的罐车制造和租赁业务的利益可能在各个方面有所不同。

Clearly, we’ve got an interest — the country has an interest — in developing safer cars, and we found that the — some cars we thought were safe have turned out to be less safe than we thought going in.
显然，我们有兴趣——国家也有兴趣——在开发更安全的油罐车方面，我们发现一些我们认为安全的油罐车实际情况比我们最初认为的要差。

The most dangerous kinds of thing we carry, of course, are — as a common carrier, we have to carry chlorine, we have to carry ammonia, and we’re required to carry that. We’d rather not carry it.
我们所携带的最危险的东西，当然是——作为一个公共承运人，我们必须携带氯，我们必须携带氨，而且这是我们的义务。我们宁愿不携带这些。

There are dangerous products that have to get transported in the country, and they’re — it’s more logical to transport them by rail than either truck or pipeline, and some of those we’d rather not carry but we do carry.
有一些危险产品必须在国内运输，铁路运输比卡车或管道运输更为合理，其中一些我们宁愿不运输，但我们还是运输。

I would say that the — probably everybody will be somewhat unhappy with the rules, but the — you know, it’s up to — it is up to Washington, and the government, to devise the rules under which something that is potentially dangerous is transported.
我想说，可能每个人对这些规则都会有些不满，但这——你知道，这取决于——这取决于华盛顿和政府，来制定在运输潜在危险物品时的规则。

And transporting by pipeline has its problems. Transporting by rail has its problems.
通过管道运输有其问题。通过铁路运输也有其问题。

And railroads have gotten dramatically safer over the years. Our safety figures — and Burlington Northern leads the industry in safety — but the safety figures get better and better year after year.
铁路在这些年中变得显著更安全。我们的安全数据——而Burlington Northern在安全性方面领先整个行业——但安全数据年复一年地变得越来越好

And — but you are — but you’re going to have derailments, and you better have very safe cars carrying that, and nothing will be perfect.
而——但是你是——但是你会遇到脱轨的情况，你最好有非常安全的车辆来运输这些，什么都不会是完美的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, big companies and successful companies, like Burlington Northern and Exxon and Chevron and so on, have a lot of engineers and they have long histories of trying to be way safer than average and knowing a lot about how to do it. And none of that is going to change.
查理·芒格：是的。大型公司和成功的公司，比如伯灵顿北方铁路、埃克森美孚和雪佛龙等，拥有很多工程师，并且有着长期努力比平均水平更安全的历史，知道如何做到这一点。而这一切都不会改变。

You’d be out of your mind to own these big companies and not run them with big attention to safety. And we’re not out of our minds and neither are the people who run Burlington Northern. The safety is going to be improved continuously, and should be.
你要是拥有这些大公司却不高度关注安全，那就真是疯了。而我们并没有疯，经营伯灵顿北方铁路的人也没有。安全将会不断得到改善，应该如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And it has been consistently, but —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这一直是这样，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But there are new problems. For one thing, the Bakken crude has been proven to be quite a bit more volatile than most of the crude that is —
沃伦·巴菲特：但也有新的问题。首先，Bakken原油被证明比大多数原油更具挥发性——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not really crude. It’s condensate. I mean, it’s almost misnamed, to call it crude. It is more volatile.
查理·芒格：它实际上不是原油。它是冷凝液。我的意思是，把它称为原油几乎是错误的。它更具挥发性。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

I can tell you — and I may write about this next year in the report, though — that Burlington Northern has the best safety record among the big railroads. And Berkshire Hathaway Energy, it’s extraordinary, their safety record, in terms of utilities. And every new utility we purchase at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we’ve brought — the safety statistics, they’ve gotten far better after Greg Abel has taken over.
我可以告诉你——我可能会在明年的报告中写到这一点——伯灵顿北方铁路在大型铁路公司中拥有最佳的安全记录。而伯克希尔哈撒韦能源在公用事业方面的安全记录也非常出色。我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源购买的每一个新公用事业公司，在格雷格·阿贝尔接手后，他们的安全统计数据都有了显著改善。

CHARLIE MUNGER: After they bought the Omaha pipeline, which had been mismanaged and safety had been improperly ignored, we watched those people, the Berkshire employees, just work day and night improving the safety. They didn’t want more pipeline explosions.
查理·芒格：在他们收购了被管理不善且安全被忽视的奥马哈管道后，我们看到这些人，伯克希尔的员工，昼夜不停地改进安全。他们不想再发生更多的管道爆炸。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We went from last out of 40-some — I think it was — to either second or first. And if we were second, it was because our other pipeline was first. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们从40多个公司中排在最后——我认为是——到第二或第一。如果我们是第二，那是因为我们的另一条管道排在第一。（笑声）

22. “Lucky” to have avoided business school

“幸运”地避开了商学院

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 4?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 4 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett. Nirav Patel from Haverhill, Massachusetts.
观众成员：您好，芒格先生和巴菲特先生。我是来自马萨诸塞州哈弗希尔的尼拉夫·帕特尔。

What advice would you give to someone who’s trying to network with influential people but doesn’t have access to the alumni network of a top business school?
您会给那些想要与有影响力的人建立联系但没有顶级商学院校友网络的人什么建议？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me take that one. I think you should do the best you can — (Laughter)
查理·芒格：让我来回答这个。我认为你应该尽力而为——（笑声）

— playing the hand you’ve got.
— 打好手中的牌。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is very Old Testament on this. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理在这方面非常像旧约。（笑声）

He didn’t get much past Genesis. (Laughter)
他没能读到创世纪以外的内容。（笑声）

Was his question that he didn’t have a lot of associations because of —?
他的问法是因为——他没有很多联系？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he’d like to have you help him —
查理·芒格：好吧，他希望你能帮他——

WARREN BUFFETT: — tap into —
沃伦·巴菲特：—— 进入 ——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — tap — do well without business school training. I never had any business school training, why should you have any? (Laughter)
查理·芒格：—— 充分利用——在没有商学院培训的情况下做得很好。我从未接受过商学院培训，为什么你应该有呢？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And actually, I would say the business school training, particularly in investments, was a handicap about 20 years ago when they were preaching efficient market theory because essentially they told you it didn’t do any good to try and figure out what a company was worth because the market had a price perfectly already. Imagine paying, you know, 30 or $40,000 a year to hear that. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我想说大约 20 年前，商学院的培训，特别是在投资方面，是一种障碍，因为他们当时在宣扬有效市场理论，因为本质上他们告诉你，试图弄清楚一家公司值多少钱是没有任何好处的，因为市场已经完美地给出了价格。想象一下，每年花 3 万或 4 万美元来听这个。 （笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: You were very lucky to avoid a lot that you’ve avoided. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：你很幸运，避免了很多事情。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: How do you feel about your law school training, Charlie, while we’re on it? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，既然我们谈到这个，你对你的法学院培训有什么感觉？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I have a son-in-law who recently explained how modern profit-obsessed law school — law firms — work. He said it’s like a pie eating contest, and if you win, you get to eat a lot more pie. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我有一个女婿，他最近解释了现代以利润为中心的法学院——律师事务所是如何运作的。他说这就像一个吃派比赛，如果你赢了，你就能吃到更多的派。（笑声）

23. Railroad accidents, insurance, and BNSF

铁路事故、保险和 BNSF

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky. You’re on.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。你可以开始了。

BECKY QUICK: This question is a follow-up to the one that Jonathan Brandt just asked. It’s an appropriate follow-up for that, though.
贝基·奎克：这个问题是对乔纳森·布兰特刚才提问的跟进。这是一个合适的跟进。

It comes from Mark Blakley in Tulsa, Oklahoma, who says that one risk to Berkshire and BNSF appears to be a large railroad accident.
这来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的马克·布莱克利，他表示，伯克希尔和 BNSF 面临的一个风险似乎是一次大型铁路事故。

“It appears many recent accidents have occurred in rural areas. However, how would a worst-case scenario, perhaps one in a more urban area or a BP-type accident, impact BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway? And is the company insured or protected against such losses?
“最近在农村地区发生了许多事故。然而，最坏的情况，比如在城市地区或类似 BP 的事故，将如何影响 BNSF 和伯克希尔哈撒韦？公司是否投保或保护以防此类损失？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Our insurance — reinsurance — unit actually went to the four major railroads offering very high limits. I think we — this is from memory, I could be off on this somewhat, but I think we offered something like $5 or $6 billion, excess — or maybe a billion and-a-half or something like that that the railroad retained.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们的保险——再保险——部门实际上向四大主要铁路公司提供了非常高的限额。我记得，从记忆中，这可能有点出入，但我想我们提供了大约50到60亿美元的超额保险——或者可能是15亿美元，铁路公司保留了一部分。

So we — there’s no question about it. If you had the exact wrong circumstances, you know, a train with a lot of ammonia or chlorine or something, you know, right in some terrible urban area, the possibility always exists that that can happen.
所以我们——这毫无疑问。如果你遇到完全错误的情况，比如一列载有大量氨或氯的火车，正好在某个糟糕的城市地区，发生这种情况的可能性总是存在的。

It can happen — you know, you can have plane crashes. There are things that are very small probabilities.
这可能发生——你知道，飞机坠毁是有可能的。有些事情的概率非常小。

But if we run trains millions and millions of miles, year after year, something will happen just like, you know, they happen in every other possible accident way.
但是，如果我们运行火车数百万英里，年复一年，总会发生一些类似的事故，就像其他所有可能的事故方式一样。

So you minimize it. You obviously — you run trains slower in urban areas. They’ve already instituted that with crude. I think they’ve brought it down to 35 miles an hour in towns of 100,000. That’s the maximum.
所以你要尽量减少风险。显然，你会在城市地区减慢火车速度。他们已经对原油实施了这种措施，我认为他们已经将速度降到100,000人口城镇的每小时35英里。这是最高速度。

So you’re always working to be safer; you’ll never be perfectly safe.
所以你总是在努力变得更安全；你永远不会完全安全。

We do not — we have some insurance at Burlington Northern, but we don’t need insurance at Berkshire. You know, we’ve got the capability to take any loss that comes along. So we actually would be more likely to be offering that insurance, and we did offer that insurance, and the railroad industry didn’t like our rates, which is understandable, and so they haven’t bought it. But that doesn’t mean they won’t at some time in the future.
我们没有——我们在伯灵顿北方有一些保险，但在伯克希尔我们不需要保险。你知道，我们有能力承受任何损失。因此，我们实际上更可能提供那种保险，我们确实提供过那种保险，但铁路行业不喜欢我们的费率，这可以理解，所以他们没有购买。但这并不意味着他们将来不会购买。

I should add one thing that I forgot to say to Jonathan. The — I don’t think we will be buying the 5,000 railcars. I think — I don’t know that for sure, but, you know, there’s going to be a lot going on in terms of retrofitting.
我应该补充一点，我忘了告诉Jonathan。我们可能不会购买5,000辆铁路罐车。我不确定这一点，但你知道，会有很多关于改装的工作。

Our Marmon operation has actually taken on a new facility that will be working very hard — once we know what the retrofit requires — we will be, I’m sure, working three shifts on retrofitting cars, probably our own, probably some other people’s. We’ll be building new cars. The industry has been waiting to see what the requirements would be before moving ahead.
我们的Marmon公司实际上接受了一个新设施，一旦我们知道改装要求是什么，我们将非常努力地工作——我相信，我们会在改装火车上工作三班，可能包括我们自己的，也可能包括其他人的。我们会制造新车。这个行业一直在等待看到要求是什么才采取行动。

The first quarter of 2015, there were practically no tank cars ordered. There’s a backlog, but there’s — no tank cars were ordered, because we need to see what the regulations are.
2015 年第一季度，几乎没有订购罐车。虽然有积压，但没有订购罐车，因为我们需要了解法规是什么。

But we’ll be very active in retrofitting and in manufacturing new cars, but I don’t think we’ll be — historically the railroads have never really owned tank cars. That goes back to the Rockefeller days.
但我们会在改装和制造新车方面非常活跃，但我不认为我们会——从历史上看，铁路公司从未真正拥有油罐车。这可以追溯到洛克菲勒时代。

And I think the present method of having car lessors, such as the one we own, I think will continue in the future rather than having the railroads own them.
我认为，目前拥有罐车租赁公司，如我们拥有的公司，将继续存在，而不是铁路公司拥有这些罐车。

24. Why move assets around insurance subsidiaries?

为什么要在保险子公司之间转移资产？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。加里？

GARY RANSOM: I have a question on intercompany transactions within the insurance companies.
加里·兰索姆：我对保险公司之间的内部交易有一个问题。

In the last couple of years, you’ve had a number of them, including 50 percent of the business ceded up to — from GEICO — to National Indemnity.
在过去几年中，你们进行了许多这样的交易，包括将GEICO的50%业务转移到National Indemnity。

You did something similar with MedPro and with GUARD. You also moved some of the companies — or the subsidiaries — like Clayton Homes, out of the Geico sub and up into the holding company.
你对 MedPro 和 GUARD 做了类似的事情。你还将一些公司——或子公司——比如 Clayton Homes，从 Geico 子公司转移到控股公司。

It seems like a lot more activity than normal, and I’m just asking, what is the main purpose of all those movements, what financial flexibility might it provide you, and why now?
似乎比正常情况活跃得多，我只是想问一下，所有这些动作的主要目的是什么，它可能为你提供什么样的财务灵活性，以及为什么是现在？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there are a lot of things at Berkshire that the ‘why now’ is answered by — going to be answered by the fact, well, we just got around to it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，伯克希尔有很多事情，“为什么现在”这个问题的答案就是——我们只是刚刚开始做这件事。

The huge chunk of capital, in the insurance companies, is at National Indemnity. So we have moved through these, quote, “share arrangements,” we moved premium volume that is generated at GEICO or MedPro or different companies, we’ve moved that up to the parent, because that’s where all the — there’s a — you know, there’s just extra layer after extra layer after extra layer of capital there, and it makes it a little simpler that way.
所以我们通过这些所谓的“分享安排”将GEICO、MedPro或其他公司的保费收入转移到母公司，因为那里有——你知道，有一层又一层的额外资本，这样做会更简单一些。

It makes it a little simpler just in keeping all the money invested, as opposed to having 50 pockets or 75 pockets to look at it, if you have a couple of main pockets to look at it.
这样可以简化管理资金的过程，而不是有50个口袋或75个口袋来处理，如果你只有几个主要的口袋来处理的话。

There’s no real change in the certainty of payment of policies or anything of the sort.
保单支付的确定性或其他方面没有实质性的变化。

It really makes life a little — just a little easier — in terms of managing the money by having most of the — most of the funds concentrated in National Indemnity.
这确实让生活变得稍微——只是稍微容易一些——在管理资金方面，因为大部分资金集中在国家赔偿公司。

So there’s no mastermind to it. We ended up with a few companies in GEICO Corp, which was a holding company for GEICO itself. And it just seemed that we probably ought to get those up to the parent company level and we put them there.
所以这并没有什么幕后操控。我们最终在 GEICO 公司中拥有了一些公司，而 GEICO 公司本身是一个控股公司。我们觉得应该把这些公司提升到母公司层面，于是我们就这样做了。

But our general approach is just to keep every place loaded with more capital than anybody could possibly conceive of us needing. And that’s going to result, more and more, probably, in the funds being concentrated in National Indemnity.
但我们的一般方法是保持每个地方的资本比任何人可能认为我们需要的都要多。这将导致资金越来越集中在国家赔偿公司。

25. “Dollar will be the world’s reserve currency 50 years from now”

“美元将在 50 年后成为世界储备货币”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren. Good morning, Charlie. My name is David Tollefson (PH) from Minneapolis, Minnesota.
观众成员：早上好，沃伦。早上好，查理。我叫大卫·托利夫森，来自明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达州。

Currently, the U.S. is not a prospective founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, where many European countries are. The AIIB is relatively small, but if this is part of an ongoing trend in the next 50 years, how will that impact the U.S. multinational corporations? Thank you.
目前，美国并不是亚洲基础设施投资银行的潜在创始成员，而许多欧洲国家则是。亚投行相对较小，但如果这在未来 50 年内成为一种持续趋势，这将如何影响美国的跨国公司？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a subject I know absolutely nothing about, so let’s hope Charlie does. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是我完全不了解的一个话题，所以我们希望查理知道。 （笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know a little less than you do. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我知道的比你少一点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I really apologize to you, in terms of your question, but, you know, if we started talking about it, we’d be bluffing.
沃伦·巴菲特：我真的很抱歉，关于你的问题，但你知道，如果我们开始谈论这个，我们就是在虚张声势。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you have a second question? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你还有第二个问题吗？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Off the top of my head, how about the dollar as a reserve currency? Do you have any issues or concerns in the next 50 again — I know we’re in a good position now — but with us losing that position?
观众成员：我随便想想，美元作为储备货币怎么样？在接下来的 50 年里，你们有没有什么问题或担忧——我知道我们现在处于一个良好的位置——但我们会失去这个位置吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the dollar will be the world’s reserve currency 50 years from now, and I think the probabilities of that are very high. Nothing certain, but I would bet a lot of money on that one.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为美元在50年后仍会是世界的储备货币，我认为这种可能性非常高。虽然没有绝对确定的事情，但我愿意在这个问题上赌一大笔钱。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have a little feeling on that subject. I’m probably more nervous than a lot of people about printing a lot of money and spending it. There are times when you have to do it, I’m sure, and we just came through one.
查理·芒格：嗯，我对这个话题有一点感觉。我可能比很多人更担心大量印钞和花钱。有时候你必须这样做，我相信，我们刚刚经历过一次。

But I’m happier when we print money and use it improving infrastructure than I am when we just spread it around with a helicopter. (Applause)
但我更开心的是我们印钞票并用它来改善基础设施，而不是仅仅用直升机把钱撒出去。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: So what do you think is going to happen if we keep spreading it around with a helicopter?
沃伦·巴菲特：那么你认为如果我们继续用直升机撒钱，会发生什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s always more dangerous than the economic profession thinks.
查理·芒格：我认为这总是比经济学界认为的更危险。

26. Subsidiaries using the Berkshire Hathaway name

使用伯克希尔哈撒韦名称的子公司

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. With that, we’ll go to Andrew.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。接下来我们请安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from a local shareholder, Max Rudolph, who writes in:
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自一位当地股东，马克斯·鲁道夫，他写道：

“Recently, several subsidiaries were renamed to include Berkshire or BH in their name, which Mr. Buffett has avoided doing previously, at least due in part, I imagine, to increased reputational risk should something go wrong.
最近，几家子公司被重新命名为包含“伯克希尔”或“BH”的名称，而巴菲特先生之前一直避免这样做，部分原因我想是如果出现问题，声誉风险会增加。

“Can you discuss how you decide which subs are allowed to rebrand, and discuss those risks, given that Clayton, NetJets, and others, have received negative publicity this year?”
“你能谈谈你们如何决定哪些子公司可以重新品牌化，并讨论这些风险吗？考虑到Clayton、NetJets等公司今年收到了负面宣传。”

And attached to that question, Steve Rider (PH) of Chicago asks, “Will Fruit of the Loom become Berkshire Undergarments?” (Laughter)
附带这个问题的是，来自芝加哥的Steve Rider问道，“Fruit of the Loom会变成‘Berkshire Undergarments’吗？”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if it does, we won’t pay him a royalty for the idea. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果这样的话，我们就不会为这个想法支付他版权费。（笑声）

The — we did create a Berkshire Hathaway HomeService operation, which is a franchise operation.
我们确实创建了一个Berkshire Hathaway HomeService的业务，这是一项特许经营业务。

We bought two-thirds of the Prudential franchise operation a couple of years ago, and we have a contract where we can buy the — where we will — buy the remaining third in another couple of years.
我们在几年前购买了Prudential特许经营业务的三分之二，并且我们有一份合同，未来几年中我们将购买剩余的三分之一。

And so we were going to lose the rights to Prudential over time. And Greg Abel asked me about using Berkshire Hathaway, and I told him that they could use it, but that if I started hearing of any abuses of it or anything of the sort, we would yank it, and that maybe that would be a useful tool in making sure that people behaved like we wanted them to. And so far, that’s worked out fine.
因此，我们将逐渐失去Prudential的使用权。Greg Abel问我是否可以使用Berkshire Hathaway的名字，我告诉他可以使用，但如果我开始听到任何滥用情况，我们将会撤回使用权，这也许是一个有用的工具，以确保大家按我们希望的方式行事。目前为止，一切运作得很好。

We’ve had no idea that we wanted to take Berkshire Hathaway into becoming a household name and that that would create extra value, but we were going to rename a large franchising operation.
我们并没有想过要将Berkshire Hathaway变成一个家喻户晓的名字，也没有意识到这会创造额外的价值，但我们确实计划重新命名一个大型特许经营业务。

And, like I say, as long as the name does not get abused, that will be fine. And the Van Tuyl Auto — we’re calling it the Berkshire Hathaway Automotive Group.
而且，就像我说的，只要这个名字不被滥用，那就没问题。Van Tuyl 汽车——我们称之为伯克希尔哈撒韦汽车集团。

Certain of the dealers will have the right to use that as a tag line and others won’t. And, again, if there’s problems connected with it, we’ll change it.
某些经销商将有权使用这个名称作为标语，其他经销商则没有。同样，如果出现问题，我们将会改变它。

But in a sense, that isn’t bad. If there are going to be problems, I’d just as soon hear about them. If I hear about them because the name is “Berkshire Hathaway,” that may mean that I get on top of them faster than I would otherwise.
但从某种意义上说，这并不好。如果会出现问题，我宁愿早点知道。如果我听到这些问题是因为名字是“伯克希尔·哈撒韦”，那可能意味着我能比其他情况下更快地掌握这些问题。

We have no — we have — a good many of our companies, at the bottom of their letterhead or something of the sort, they say a “Berkshire Hathaway Company,” and that’s fine.
我们有很多公司，在他们的信头底部或类似的地方，会写上“伯克希尔哈撒韦公司”，这很好。

But we have no — we do not anticipate that we’re going to turn it into some huge asset by branding a bunch of products that way.
但我们不预期通过这种方式给一堆产品打上品牌来将其转变为一个巨大的资产。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d be crazy to try and sell Berkshire Hathaway peanut brittle instead of See’s. Those old brand names are worth a lot of money.
查理·芒格：我们如果试图销售伯克希尔·哈撒韦的花生糖而不是西氏的，那简直是疯了。那些老品牌的价值非常高。

27. MidAmerican’s embrace of wind power

MidAmerican对风能的拥抱

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGGORY WARREN: This question is on the energy business.
格雷戈里·沃伦：这个问题是关于能源行业的。

During last year’s meeting, we touched briefly on the topic of distributed generation, a method of generating electricity on a small scale at the point of consumption, from renewable and nonrenewable energy sources. Much of this has come around the last several years due to the growth of renewable energy sources like solar and wind.
在去年的会议上，我们简要讨论了分布式发电的问题，这是一种在消费点小规模地发电的方法，涉及可再生和非可再生能源来源。近年来，由于太阳能和风能等可再生能源的增长，这一领域取得了很大进展。

Up until now, though, it has been difficult, if not cost prohibitive, for self-generators to store this energy.
然而，直到现在，对于自发电者来说，储存这些能源仍然困难重重，甚至成本过高。

Now that Elon Musk has joined the fray this week with his idea of batteries for the home, for his new Tesla Energy initiative, which could lead the way for larger systems, and realizing that disruptive technologies can, at times, upend an industry’s business model and competitive positioning, how long do you believe it will be before distributed generation becomes a meaningful threat to your utilities, especially if power can be stored more easily at the end user’s place of business or home?
现在，埃隆·马斯克本周推出了他的家庭电池概念，为他的Tesla Energy计划铺路，这可能为更大规模的系统开辟道路。考虑到颠覆性技术有时可以颠覆一个行业的商业模式和竞争定位，您认为分布式发电多久后会成为您公用事业的一个重要威胁，特别是当电力能够更容易地储存在最终用户的商业地点或家庭时？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you put your finger on storage being the key. And Charlie follows storage a little bit more than I do, and maybe I’ll have Greg Abel talk about it.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你指出存储是关键。查理对存储的关注程度比我高一点，也许我会让格雷格·阿贝尔谈谈这个。

But obviously, distributed energy is something we pay a lot of attention to.
但显然，分布式能源是我们非常关注的一个领域。

One of the — probably the best defense is to have very low-cost energy, and MidAmerican has done a terrific job in that respect. And the figures, in terms of people who have adopted solar in our territories, are just minuscule and will stay that way.
其中一个——可能是最好的防御措施就是拥有非常低成本的能源，而 MidAmerican 在这方面做得非常出色。在我们辖区内，采用太阳能的人数非常少，并且将保持这种状态。

But huge improvements in storage would make a difference in a lot of ways. And, Charlie, what are your thoughts on that?
但在存储方面的巨大改进会在很多方面产生影响。查理，你对此有什么看法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, obviously, we’re going to use a lot more renewable energy because the fossil fuels aren’t going to last forever. And, obviously, Berkshire is very aggressive and very well located, in terms of this development.
查理·芒格：显然，我们将会使用更多的可再生能源，因为化石燃料不会永远存在。而且，显然，伯克希尔在这方面的发展非常积极，地理位置也非常优越。

You know, I grew up here in this part of the world, and to have 20 percent of the power of Berkshire utilities in Iowa coming from the wind, I regard as a huge stunt.
你知道，我是在这个地区长大的，伯克希尔的20%的电力来自风能，我认为这是一个巨大的壮举。

And it’s, of course, very desirable, in a windy place like Iowa where the farmers like the extra income, to be getting a lot of power out of the wind. And, of course, we’re going to have a lot better storage, and the technology has been improving.
当然，在像爱荷华州这样多风的地方，农民们喜欢额外的收入，因此从风中获取大量电力是非常可取的。当然，我们将拥有更好的储存技术，而且技术也在不断进步。

And this is — it’s not a threat, it’s a huge benefit to humanity, and I think it will be a huge benefit to Berkshire. And everything is working for us.
这不是威胁，而是对人类的巨大好处，我认为这对伯克希尔也将是巨大的好处。一切都在为我们服务。

I love owning MidAmerican in an era where we’re going to have more storage, more wind, more solar, more grid.
我喜欢拥有MidAmerican，因为我们将拥有更多的储能、更多的风能、更多的太阳能和更多的电网。

And I think we’re so lucky. What the hell would we do if the fossil fuels run down, if we didn’t have the sun to use indirectly in these forms?
我认为我们非常幸运。如果化石燃料耗尽，我们该怎么办，如果没有太阳能以这些形式间接使用？

And, of course, the — it’s going to be a lot more storage. And, of course, there will be some disruption in the utility industry, but there will be more opportunity, I think, than disruption.
当然，将会有更多的储存技术。同时，公用事业行业也会经历一些颠覆，但我认为机会会比颠覆更多。
很不错的观点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Just in the last week, we’ve announced two different — we’re already the leader — and we’ve announced two different projects.
沃伦·巴菲特：就在上周，我们宣布了两个不同的项目——我们已经是行业领导者——并且我们宣布了两个不同的项目。

One in Nebraska — I think it’s 400 megawatts in Nebraska. That will be the first time we’ve had a wind farm here.
一个在内布拉斯加州——我认为是400兆瓦。这将是我们第一次在这里建设风电场。

And then, we just got approval in the last couple days for, I think, a billion-and-a-half-worth more of wind in Iowa.
然后，我们在过去几天刚刚获得批准，我认为在爱荷华州又增加了价值十五亿的风能。

And I think Charlie mentioned 20 percent, but if we could — if Greg Abel could take the microphone, I think it’s a lot greater percentage than that now. It’s a moving target. So I may not have kept Charlie posted on the number.
我认为查理提到过 20%，但如果格雷格·阿贝尔能拿起麦克风，我认为现在的比例要大得多。这是一个不断变化的目标。所以我可能没有让查理及时了解这个数字。

But, Greg, would you bring people up to date on what percent we will be in Iowa when the present projects are completed, and also what has happened in Nevada and a few places like that? Greg?
但是，格雷格，你能告诉大家在目前的项目完成后，我们在爱荷华州的百分比是多少吗？还有内华达州和一些类似地方发生了什么？格雷格？

GREG ABEL: So, I’d love to provide an update. Actually, as it’s been touched on, we announced our tenth project in Iowa. That brings us to more than 4,000 megawatts built over the last ten years in that state.
格雷格·阿贝尔：我很高兴能提供一个更新。实际上，正如之前提到的，我们在爱荷华州宣布了我们的第十个项目。这使我们在过去十年中在该州建成的总功率超过了 4000 兆瓦。

And at the end of 2016, we will now have 58 percent of our energy — approximately 58 percent — of our energy that we provide to our customers coming from wind.
到 2016 年底，我们将有大约 58%的能源——我们提供给客户的能源——来自风能。

And then, if you continue to — thank you. (Applause)
然后，如果你继续——谢谢你。（掌声）

And then, if you continue to look at our other utilities and our unregulated businesses — Warren, you’ve touched on this in the past — we now have more than $18 billion committed to renewable assets across our different utilities.
如果你继续关注我们的其他公用事业和非监管业务——沃伦，你过去提到过这一点——我们现在已经承诺在不同的公用事业中投入超过180亿美元用于可再生资产。

And if you look at NV Energy, our Nevada utility, for example, we’ve committed to retire 76 percent of their coal by 2019, and a large portion of that will be replaced with renewable energy. So, clearly a continued commitment to that. (Applause)
如果你看看我们的内华达州公用事业公司 NV Energy，例如，我们承诺到 2019 年淘汰 76%的煤炭，其中很大一部分将由可再生能源替代。因此，显然我们对此有持续的承诺。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Greg, in our utility business, do you think we have more disruption to fear, or more opportunity to love?
查理·芒格：Greg，在我们的公用事业业务中，你认为我们面临的更多是颠覆的威胁，还是机遇？

GREG ABEL: Distributed generation and solar bring great opportunities for all of our different utilities, and we’ll embrace it.
格雷格·阿贝尔：分布式发电和太阳能为我们所有不同的公用事业带来了巨大的机遇，我们将积极拥抱这一点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is, you couldn’t be luckier, is what I’m telling you.
查理·芒格：我的意思是，你再幸运不过了。

WARREN BUFFETT: And one thing that has helped in this respect, is that wind and solar are — the development of wind and solar at present — are dependent on tax credits.
沃伦·巴菲特：在这方面，有一点是有帮助的，那就是目前风能和太阳能的发展依赖于税收抵免。

In other words, the federal government has made a decision that the market system would not produce solar or wind under today’s economics, but it has an interest, as a society, in developing it. So they have established a credit — I think it’s one-point — electric is 1.9 cents a kilowatt — for ten years.
换句话说，联邦政府已经决定，在今天的经济条件下，市场系统不会生产太阳能或风能，但作为一个社会，它对发展这些能源有兴趣。所以，他们设立了一个税收优惠——我认为是1.9美分每千瓦时——为期十年。

And because Berkshire Hathaway Energy is part of the consolidated tax return of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated, it has been able to invest far more money than it would make sense to invest on a stand-alone basis.
因为Berkshire Hathaway Energy是Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated合并税表的一部分，它能够投资比单独投资更大金额的钱。

Among electric utilities in the United States, there’s really no one situated as well as MidAmerican Energy is, because it’s part of this consolidated tax return, to really put its foot to the floor, in terms of developing wind and solar.
在美国的电力公司中，没有哪家公司像 MidAmerican Energy 那样处于如此有利的位置，因为它是这个合并报税的一部分，能够真正全力以赴地发展风能和太阳能。

So it’s become the biggest developer, by far, among the utility industry, and it — I think it’s very likely to continue to be, simply because most utilities really don’t pay that much income tax and, therefore, they’re sort of limited in how far they can push development of wind and solar.
因此，它已经成为公用事业行业中最大的开发商，远远超过其他公司，我认为它很可能会继续保持这一地位，原因很简单，因为大多数公用事业公司实际上并不支付太多的所得税，因此，他们在推动风能和太阳能的发展方面受到了一定的限制。
政策套利，跟最早期做的一样。

28. Buffett’s most memorable failure

巴菲特最难忘的失败

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Linen Cygaloski (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois, and Berkeley, California.
观众成员：你好。我是 Linen Cygaloski（拼音）。我来自伊利诺伊州的芝加哥和加利福尼亚州的伯克利。

I’d like to thank you for giving the opportunity to ask this question. This is my first meeting. I plan to attend once every 50 years. (Laughter)
我想感谢您给我机会问这个问题。这是我的第一次会议。我计划每 50 年参加一次。（笑声）

And also, for your essay on the — both of your essays — on the past, present, and future of Berkshire.
还有，关于你们的论文——你们两篇关于伯克希尔的过去、现在和未来的论文。

As we reflect on the last 50 years, I’d like to ask you this question: what was your most memorable failure and how did you deal with it? Thank you.
在回顾过去 50 年时，我想问你这个问题：你最难忘的失败是什么，你是如何应对的？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we’ve discussed Dexter many times in the annual report, where I — back in the mid-1990s — I looked at a shoe business in Dexter, Maine, and decided to pay 400-or-so million dollars for something that was destined to go to zero in a few years, and I didn’t figure that out.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在年报中多次讨论过Dexter，我在 1990 年代中期看过位于缅因州Dexter的一家鞋业公司，决定花大约四亿多美元购买一些注定在几年内归零的东西，而我没有意识到这一点。

And then on top of that, I gave the purchase price in stock, and I guess that stock would be worth, I don’t know, maybe 6 or 7 billion now. It makes me feel better when the stock goes down because the stupidity gets reduced. (Laughter)
然后在此基础上，我以股票的形式支付了购买价格，我想那股票现在可能值六七十亿。我觉得当股票下跌时心情会好一些，因为愚蠢的事情减少了。（笑声）

Nobody misled me on that, in any way. I just looked at it and came up with the wrong answer. But I would say almost any time we’ve issued shares, it’s been a mistake. Wouldn’t you say that, Charlie?
没有人以任何方式误导我。我只是看了一下，得出了错误的答案。但我想说，几乎每次我们发行股票都是一个错误。你不觉得是这样吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course.
查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t do it much anymore.
查理·芒格：我们现在不太这样做了。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

We probably could have pushed harder, particularly in the earlier years.
我们可能可以更努力，特别是在早期的几年。

We’ve always been — well, we’ve had all of our own net worth in the company, we’ve had all our family’s net worth, and we’ve had all these friends that came out of our partnership, many of whom put half or more of their net worth with us, so we’ve been very, very, very cautious in what we’ve done.
我们一直以来——好吧，我们在公司里的净资产全部来自于我们自己，我们家庭的净资产也全部来自于此，还有许多从我们的合作关系中结识的朋友，他们中的许多人将一半或更多的净资产投入到我们这里，因此我们在所做的事情上非常非常非常谨慎。

And there probably were times when we could have stretched it a little and pulled off something quite large, that we made a mistake, looking back.
而且可能有时候我们本可以稍微放宽一下，完成一些相当大的事情，回头看我们犯了一个错误。

But, I wouldn’t want to take a 1 percent chance, you know, of wiping out my Aunt Katie’s net worth or something. It’s just not something in life that I could live with.
但是，我不想冒 1%的风险，知道会毁掉我凯蒂阿姨的净资产之类的。这是我在生活中无法接受的事情。

So I would rather be, you know, a hundred times too cautious than 1 percent too incautious, and that will continue as long as I’m around.
所以我宁愿一百倍地小心谨慎，也不愿一丝毫地不谨慎，只要我还在，就会一直这样。

But people looking at our past would say that we missed some big opportunities that we understood, and could have swung, if we wanted to go out and borrow more money.
但人们回顾我们的过去会说，我们错过了一些我们理解的重大机会，如果我们想要借更多的钱，我们本可以把握住这些机会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s obviously true. If we had used the leverage that a lot of successful operators did, Berkshire would be a lot bigger.
查理·芒格：嗯，这显然是事实。如果我们使用了很多成功运营商使用的杠杆，伯克希尔会大得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: A lot bigger.
沃伦·巴菲特：大得多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot bigger.
查理·芒格：大得多。

And — but we would have been sweating at night. It’s crazy to sweat at night. (Laughter)
而且——但我们会在晚上焦虑。晚上焦虑是疯狂的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Over financial things.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于财务方面的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Over financial things, yes. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：在财务方面，是的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we won’t pursue that.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们不会追求那个。

29. Surprised that low rates haven’t sparked inflation

感到惊讶的是，低利率没有引发通货膨胀

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗？（笑声）

CAROL LOOMIS: In your 2008 annual letter, you mentioned that a likely consequence of the Treasury and Federal Reserve’s action to stabilize the economy would be, quote, “an onslaught of inflation.”
卡罗尔·卢米斯：在您2008年的年度信中，您提到财政部和美联储采取的稳定经济的措施可能会导致“通货膨胀的冲击”。

Now that we are presumably nearing the time when the Federal Reserve will begin raising interest rates, could you share your thoughts regarding both the likelihood of accompanying high inflation, and the consequences that might follow?
现在我们可能即将迎来美联储开始提高利率的时机，您能分享一下您对高通胀的可能性以及可能产生的后果的看法吗？

And if high rates of inflation did occur, how would the consequences for Berkshire compare to those for most large companies?
如果发生高通胀率，伯克希尔的后果与大多数大型公司的后果相比会如何？

And this question, I say belatedly, came from James Cook (PH) of Waterville, Maine.
这个问题，我迟到了才说，是来自缅因州沃特维尔的詹姆斯·库克（PH）。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, so far we’ve been very wrong — or I’ve been very wrong. Charlie has probably been a little bit wrong, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，到目前为止我们一直是错的——或者说我一直是错的。查理可能也错了一点。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course.
查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这个——

No, I would not have predicted that you could have five or six years of, you know, close to zero rates, and now get negative rates in Europe, and run fairly large deficit, although the current deficit is not that large. I mean, the country could sustain on average, you know, 2 or 2 1/2 percent deficits forever and not increase the ratio of debt to GDP. So the word “deficit” is not a dirty word. But very large deficits, and sort of uncontrollable, are scary.
不，我不会预测到你可以经历五年或六年的接近零的利率，现在欧洲出现负利率，并且进行相当大的赤字，尽管目前的赤字并不算大。也就是说，国家可以在长期内维持平均2%或2.5%的赤字而不增加债务与GDP的比例。所以“赤字”这个词并不是个脏词。但非常大的赤字，且有些不可控，是令人害怕的。

But, you know, we’ve taken the Federal Reserve balance sheet up from a trillion to over 4 trillion, and we’ve done a lot of things that weren’t in my Economics 101 course, and so far nothing bad has happened, except for the fact that people who saved and kept their money in short-term savings instruments have just totally gotten killed, in terms of their — the income that they received from that.
但是，你知道，我们已经将联邦储备的资产负债表从一万亿提高到超过四万亿，我们做了很多在我的经济学 101 课程中没有的事情，到目前为止没有发生什么坏事，除了那些将钱存入短期储蓄工具的人，他们的收入完全受到了重创。

But it’s still hard for me to see how if you toss money from helicopters that eventually you don’t have inflation.
但我仍然很难理解，如果你从直升机上撒钱，最终怎么会没有通货膨胀。

Certainly, if the money supplied grows faster and faster relative to the output of goods and services, something like that is supposed to happen.
当然，如果提供的货币相对于商品和服务的产出增长得越来越快，就应该发生类似的事情。

But I’ve been surprised by what’s happened. I’ve been — you know, when Poland issues bonds at negative interest rates, you know, I did not have that list — in my list — of forecasts a few years ago.
但我对发生的事情感到惊讶。我一直在想，当波兰以负利率发行债券时，我几年前并没有把这个列入我的预测清单中。

And so I think we’re operating in a world that Charlie and I don’t understand very well and that —
所以我认为我们正处在一个查理和我不太理解的世界里——

And to the second part of the question, I think Berkshire, in almost any kind of environment, will do better than most big companies.
对于问题的第二部分，我认为在几乎任何环境下，伯克希尔的表现都将优于大多数大公司。

I mean, we are prepared for anything. We’ll always be prepared for anything. And if we see really unusual opportunities, we’re also prepared to act. And that gives us a real advantage over most big companies.
我的意思是，我们已经为任何事情做好了准备。我们将始终为任何事情做好准备。如果我们看到真正不寻常的机会，我们也准备好采取行动。这使我们在大多数大公司面前拥有真正的优势。

We don’t count on anybody else. We’re sitting with over 60 billion right now. I’d rather be sitting with 20 billion and made a great $40 billion acquisition.
我们不依赖其他人。我们现在有超过 600 亿美元。我宁愿手里有 200 亿美元，进行一笔价值 400 亿美元的伟大收购。

But we will — you know, we will be very willing to act if economic turbulence of any kind occurs, and we’ll be prepared and most people won’t be.
但我们会——你知道，如果发生任何形式的经济动荡，我们会非常愿意采取行动，我们会做好准备，而大多数人不会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We have made very little progress in life by trying to outguess these macroeconomic factors. We basically have abdicated.
查理·芒格：是的。我们在生活中几乎没有通过试图预测这些宏观经济因素而取得什么进展。我们基本上已经放弃了。

We’re just swimming all the time, and we let the tide take care of itself.
我们一直在游泳，让潮水自己去处理。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we really don’t see — we’ve not seen great successes by others who have been all involved in macro predictions. I mean, they get a lot of air time, but that’s about all that happens.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们真的没有看到——我们没有看到其他在宏观预测方面取得巨大成功的人。我是说，他们获得了很多曝光，但这就是发生的全部。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The trouble with making all these economic pronouncements is that people gradually get so they think they know something. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：发表这些经济声明的问题在于，人们逐渐会觉得自己知道了一些东西。（笑声）

It’s much better just to say, “I’m ignorant.” (Laughter)
说“我无知”要好得多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We will find things, though, under any circumstances.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。无论在什么情况下，我们都会发现一些东西。

They don’t come at an even flow. They may not — and, you know, you cannot predict the size or anything — but you can be sure that over the next ten years, you’ll see a lot of things you didn’t think were possible.
它们不会均匀地流动。它们可能不会——你知道，你无法预测规模或其他任何东西——但你可以确信，在接下来的十年里，你会看到很多你认为不可能的事情。

And we will occasionally see something that makes sense for Berkshire, and we will be prepared to do it both psychologically and financially.
我们偶尔会看到一些对伯克希尔有意义的事情，我们将做好心理和财务上的准备。

30. Deferred taxes aren’t a “hidden form of equity”

递延税款不是“隐性股权”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: For a variety of reasons, bonus depreciation on fixed assets investments in the noninsurance businesses perhaps being the most important, Berkshire’s cash taxes have been meaningfully lower than reported taxes for the last several years.
乔纳森·布兰特：由于各种原因，尤其是非保险业务中固定资产投资的超额折旧，伯克希尔的现金税务在过去几年里明显低于报告税务。

The cumulative difference between cash taxes and reported taxes, which could be viewed as another form of float, now stands at around 37 billion.
现金税与报告税之间的累计差额，可以视为另一种形式的浮动，目前约为 370 亿。

Do you consider any portion of the cash flow from annual increase in deferred taxes to be economic earnings?
您是否认为递延税款的年增加部分的现金流量是经济收益的一部分？

Is this a sustainable dynamic, or do you expect the relationship between cash and reported taxes to ever flip, for instance, if bonus depreciation ever expires?
这是一个可持续的动态吗？或者您是否预计现金税务和报告税务之间的关系会翻转，例如，如果超额折旧到期？

Given Berkshire’s massive appetite for capital spending at the utility and the railroad, is it possible, instead, that its deferred tax liability will never have to be paid, no matter what Congress does with bonus depreciation? And is it perhaps even likely that this form of float will continue to grow?
鉴于伯克希尔在公用事业和铁路方面对资本支出的巨大需求，这种递延税务负债是否有可能永远不需要偿还，无论国会对超额折旧做什么？这种形式的浮动是否可能会继续增长？

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably the most likely answer — there’s two forms of float from deferred taxes.
沃伦·巴菲特：最可能的答案是——递延税款有两种形式的浮动。

One is the unrealized appreciation on securities, and they’re — who knows what happens? I don’t think the appreciation is going to disappear, but we may decide to realize some of it from time to time. In fact, we could realize a lot of it.
一种是证券上的未实现增值，谁知道会发生什么？我不认为增值会消失，但我们可能会决定不时地实现其中的一部分。实际上，我们可能会实现其中的大部分。

If you move over to the depreciation, which you’re talking about, on the 37 billion — because the total deferred taxes, as I remember, maybe 60 billion or something like that — that is a factor of accelerated depreciation. And one form or another of accelerated depreciation has been around a long time.
如果转到您提到的折旧方面，370亿美元——因为总的递延税款，我记得可能是600亿美元左右——那是加速折旧的因素。某种形式的加速折旧已经存在很长时间了。

Occasionally the — I think the bonus depreciation one year went to 100 percent. I could be wrong on that.
偶尔，我认为某一年的超额折旧达到了 100%。我可能错了。

The — certainly in our utility business, that helps our customer and it doesn’t help us, basically. I mean, we get a — we will get a return on equity, and that is not — that’s not free equity to us, or anything of the sort.
在我们的公用事业业务中，这确实有利于我们的客户，对我们基本上没有帮助。我的意思是，我们会获得一个——我们将获得一个股本回报，这不是——对我们来说不是免费的股本，或者类似的东西。

The regulatory commissions take that into account. Return on invested capital, in terms of how the surface transportation board would look at it, again, I don’t think we benefit enormously by that.
监管委员会会考虑到这一点。就地面运输委员会的看法而言，投资资本的回报，我认为我们并不会因此获得巨大的好处。

But it does mean there’s less cash going out the door and we, therefore, don’t need to borrow as much money for capital investment as otherwise.
但这确实意味着现金流出减少了，因此我们不需要像否则那样借那么多钱用于资本投资。

But I don’t think I would look at that as a hidden form of equity. I’d rather have the deferred taxes than not have them, but it’s not meaningful there.
但我不认为我会把它看作是一种隐藏的股本。我宁愿有递延税款而不是没有，但这在这里并不重要。

Now what could happen, is that, overwhelmingly, those deferred taxes were probably, entirely even — to the extent they’re in the United States — were accrued at a 35 percent rate.
现在可能发生的是，这些递延税款很可能，甚至完全——在它们位于美国的情况下——是以 35%的税率累积的。

So if the corporate rate changed, then you would have a major change in the deferred tax item. And there’s always a possibility of that.
所以如果公司税率发生变化，那么递延税项将会有重大变化。而且这种情况总是有可能发生的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it would be a book entry. It wouldn’t mean much.
查理·芒格：但这只是一项账面记录。它并没有太大意义。

WARREN BUFFETT: It wouldn’t mean much. Yeah, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：这没什么意义。是的，是的。

We do — the float from the insurance business, we regard as a terrific asset. The deferred tax liability is a plus, but it’s not — it’s not a big asset.
我们——来自保险业务的浮动，我们视为一个很棒的资产。递延税务负债是一个加分项，但它——它不是一个大资产。

31. Lessons on hidden incentives from Teledyne’s Henry Singleton

来自Teledyne的亨利·辛格尔顿的隐性激励课程

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Dan Hutner from Vermont.
观众成员：嗨。我叫丹·哈特纳，来自佛蒙特州。

I was wondering if you could talk about Henry Singleton’s Teledyne, and whether you learned lessons from that, used it as a model, and what you think about how it ultimately unwound, and how you might want Berkshire to continue differently?
我想知道你是否可以谈谈亨利·辛格尔顿的Teledyne，以及你是否从中学到了经验教训，是否将其作为模型，以及你对它最终解散的看法，以及你希望伯克希尔以不同方式继续发展的想法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s a very good question. And Charlie knew Henry Singleton. I knew a lot about him. I mean, I studied him very carefully, but Charlie knew him personally, as well as studying him.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是个很好的问题。查理认识亨利·辛顿。我对他了解很多。我是说，我非常仔细地研究了他，但查理不仅研究了他，还与他有过个人交往。

So I’m going to let Charlie answer that. But there’s a lot to be learned from both what Singleton did in his operating years and then what happened subsequently.
所以我让查理来回答这个问题。但从辛格尔顿在他运营期间所做的事情以及随后发生的事情中，有很多可以学习的地方。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Henry Singleton was very interesting. He was a lot smarter than either Warren or I.
查理·芒格：亨利·辛顿非常有趣。他比沃伦和我都聪明得多。

Henry was the kind of guy that always got 800 on every test and left early. And he could play chess blindfolded, at just below the grand master level, when he was an old man.
亨利是那种每次考试都能得到 800 分并且提前离开的人。作为一个老人，他能在盲棋下接近大师级别的水平。

That said, I watched him invest, and I watched Warren invest, and Warren did a lot better. He just worked at it.
话虽如此，我看着他投资，也看着沃伦投资，沃伦的表现要好得多。他只是更加努力。

Henry was thinking about inertial guidance, and Warren was thinking about securities. And the extra work enabled Warren to get by with his horrible deficit of IQ, compared to Henry. (Laughter)
亨利在考虑惯性导航，而沃伦在考虑证券。额外的工作使沃伦弥补了他与亨利相比的智商劣势。（笑声）

And the interesting thing —
有趣的是——

WARREN BUFFETT: But let’s not quantify it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：但我们不要量化它。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. The interesting thing about Singleton is he had very clever incentives on all the key executives, and they were tough, and they were important, and they were meaningful.
查理·芒格：不。有趣的是，辛格尔顿对所有关键高管设定了非常聪明的激励措施，这些激励措施很严格、很重要，并且意义重大。

And in the end, he had three different Defense Departments that got into scandals.
最后，他有三个不同的国防部卷入了丑闻。

He wasn’t doing anything wrong. He wasn’t trying to hurt the Defense Department on purpose. But the incentives got so strong, and the culture of performance got so strong, that people actually — it went too far — in dealing with the government, Teledyne did.
他并没有做错什么。他并不是故意想要伤害国防部。但激励措施变得如此强烈，绩效文化也变得如此强烈，以至于人们实际上——这走得太远了——在与政府打交道时，泰雷德公司确实如此。

And so, we haven’t had any trouble like that, that I know of. Can you think of any, Warren?
所以，我知道我们没有遇到过这样的麻烦。你能想到有什么吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. And Charlie and I, we really believe in the power of incentives. And there’s these hidden incentives that we try to avoid.
沃伦·巴菲特：没有。查理和我确实相信激励的力量。而且我们试图避免这些隐藏的激励。

One — we have seen, both of us, more than once, really decent people misbehave because they felt that there was a loyalty to their CEO to present certain numbers — to deliver certain numbers — because the CEO went out and made a lot of forecasts about what the company would earn.
首先——我们都曾多次看到，一些真正正直的人因为觉得对他们的CEO有忠诚，要呈现某些数字——交付某些数字——而出现不当行为，因为CEO出去做了很多关于公司收入的预测。

And if you — if you go and say — if I were to say that Berkshire’s going to earn X per share next year, and we have a bunch of executives in the insurance business that set loss reserves and do all kinds of things, or companies in other areas that can load up channels at the end of quarters, at the end of years, I’ve seen a lot of misbehavior that actually doesn’t profit anybody financially, but it’s been done merely because they don’t want to make the CEO look bad, in terms of his forecast. Or he’s done it, because he doesn’t want to look —
如果你——如果你说——如果我说伯克希尔明年每股收益将达到X，我们在保险业务中有一群高管负责设定损失准备金和做各种事情，或者其他领域的公司可以在季度末、年末囤积渠道，我见过很多不当行为，实际上没有给任何人带来经济利益，但只是因为他们不想让CEO在预测方面显得很糟糕。或者他这样做，因为他不想显得——

When they get their ego involved, people do things that they shouldn’t do.
当人们把自我牵扯进来时，他们会做一些不该做的事情。

So we try to eliminate incentives that would cause people to misbehave, not only for financial rewards, but for, you know, ego satisfaction.
所以我们努力消除那些会导致人们不当行为的激励，不仅是为了经济奖励，还有为了自我满足。

I think that’s probably pretty unusual to even be considering that in the business, but we’ve seen enough, so we do consider it.
我认为在这个行业考虑这个可能是相当不寻常的，但我们已经看到了足够的情况，所以我们确实考虑它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I might also report that at the end, Henry wanted to sell his business to Berkshire for stock, so he was very smart right to the very end.
查理·芒格：我还想报告一下，在最后，亨利想将他的业务以股票出售给伯克希尔，所以他一直非常聪明。

WARREN BUFFETT: We had a case at National — it’s interesting.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们在National公司有一个案例——这很有趣。

You really have to understand — should understand — human behavior, if you’re going to run a business, because when National Indemnity — we’re going back to the late 1960s —
你真的必须理解——应该理解——人类行为，如果你打算经营一家公司，因为当国家赔偿公司——我们回到 20 世纪 60 年代末——

Jack Ringwalt was a marvelous man, and he ran it, and he had another marvelous man who worked for him, his tennis partner, and that fellow was in charge of claims.
杰克·林格沃特是一个了不起的人，他负责管理一切，还有另一个了不起的人为他工作，他的网球搭档，那位先生负责索赔。

And when the claims man would come in to Jack and say, “I just received a claim for $25,000” or something, for some long-haul truck or something, Jack would say — Jack — it was just his personality.
当理赔人员来找杰克说，“我刚收到一个25000美元的索赔”或其他类似的事情，杰克会说——杰克——这只是他的个性。

He would start berating the fellow and say, “How could you do this to me?” and “These claims are killing me,” and all of that, and he was joking.
他会开始责备那个家伙，说，“你怎么能这样对我？”以及“这些索赔正在毁了我，”所有这些，他是在开玩笑。

But the fellow he was joking with couldn’t take it, really, and he started hiding claims. And he just didn’t — he stuck them in a drawer.
但那个他开玩笑的家伙真的不能接受，他开始隐藏索赔。他只是——把它们放在一个抽屉里。

And that caused us to not only misreport fairly minor figures, but it also caused us to misinform our reinsurers, because they had an interest in the size of claims.
这导致我们不仅错误报告了一些相对较小的数字，还误导了我们的再保险公司，因为他们对索赔的规模有兴趣。

And the fellow that was hiding the claims had no financial interest in doing it at all, but he just didn’t like to walk into the office and have Jack kid him about the fact that he was failing him.
那个隐藏索赔的人根本没有任何经济利益，但他就是不想走进办公室，让杰克嘲笑他失败的事实。

And you really have to be very careful in the messages you send as a CEO. And if you tell your — if you tell your managers you never want to disappoint Wall Street, and you want to report X per share, you may find that they start fudging figures to protect your predictions.
作为首席执行官，您在发送的信息中必须非常小心。如果您告诉您的经理，您永远不想让华尔街失望，并且希望报告每股 X 的收益，您可能会发现他们开始篡改数据以保护您的预测。

And we try to avoid all that kind of behavior at Berkshire. We’ve just seen too much trouble with it. (Applause)
我们尽量避免在伯克希尔出现这种行为。我们已经见识到太多麻烦了。（掌声）

32. Berkshire isn’t “too big to fail”

伯克希尔并不是“太大而不能倒”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Anthony Sterochi (PH) in Lincoln, Nebraska.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自内布拉斯加州林肯的安东尼·斯特罗基（PH）。

He says, “If government regulators deem Berkshire Hathaway’s reinsurance business too big to fail, how would government regulation of the reinsurance business affect Berkshire Hathaway?”
他说：“如果政府监管机构认为伯克希尔哈撒韦的再保险业务太大而不能倒闭，那么政府对再保险业务的监管将如何影响伯克希尔哈撒韦？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The question — there’s two, essentially, regulatory aspects to it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这个问题——本质上有两个监管方面。

One is there’s the European — and I hope I’m describing this right — I may be wrong, a little bit, on some technicality — there’s a European group that is looking at insurers, generally, and has designated, I believe, nine or so insurance companies as — I’m not sure what they call them — but they deserve special attention, I’ll put it that way. There’s a technical name for it.
有一个是欧洲的——我希望我描述得正确——我可能在某些细节上有点错误——有一个欧洲小组正在关注保险公司，通常，他们指定了大约九家保险公司——我不确定他们称之为什么——但他们值得特别关注，我就这么说吧。对此有一个专业术语。

The one that’s more relevant in the United States is the Financial Stability Oversight Committee, I believe they call it, which designates so-called SIFIs, systemically important financial institutions.
在美国更相关的是金融稳定监督委员会，我相信他们称之为，该委员会指定所谓的系统重要性金融机构（SIFIs）。

And large banks are in that category. And then the question is, what non-banks are in it?
大型银行属于这一类别。那么问题是，哪些非银行也在其中？

And they designated General Electric, and Prudential, and recently, Metropolitan, and Metropolitan is fighting the designation.
他们指定了通用电气、保诚，最近还有大都会，而大都会正在对这一指定进行抗争。

The question is whether — question isn’t just whether you’re large. I mean, Exxon Mobil is large, Apple is large, Walmart’s large, and nobody thinks about them as SIFIs.
问题是——问题不仅仅是你是否庞大。我的意思是，埃克森美孚很大，苹果很大，沃尔玛也很大，但没有人把他们视为系统重要性金融机构（SIFI）。

The definition on a non-bank SIFI would be 85 percent of revenues coming from financial matters, and we don’t come remotely close on that. I mean, we’re 20 percent or thereabouts.
非银行系统重要性金融机构（SIFI）的定义是 85%的收入来自金融事务，而我们远远达不到这个标准。我是说，我们大约只有 20%。

But the real question is whether problems that Berkshire might encounter could destabilize the financial system in the country. And we have not been approached. Nobody’s ever called me.
但真正的问题是，伯克希尔可能遇到的问题是否会使该国的金融系统不稳定。我们没有被接触过。没有人打过电话给我。

They spent a year with Metropolitan, even before they designated them. So there’s — we have no reason, in logic, or in terms of what we’ve heard, to think that Berkshire would be designated as a SIFI.
他们与大都会花了一年时间，甚至在他们被指定之前。因此，从逻辑上或根据我们所听到的内容，我们没有理由认为伯克希尔会被指定为系统重要性金融机构（SIFI）。

I mean, during the last time of trouble, we were about the only party that was supplying help to the financial system, and we will always conduct ourselves in a way where the problems of others can’t hurt us in any significant way.
我的意思是，在上次危机期间，我们几乎是唯一一个向金融系统提供帮助的机构，我们将始终以一种其他问题无法对我们造成重大伤害的方式来行事。

And I think we’re almost unique, among financial institutions, in the layers of safety that we’ve built into our system, in terms of both cash, and operating methods, and everything else. So, it’s a moot question.
我认为，在金融机构中，我们在现金、运营方法以及其他方面所建立的安全层面上几乎是独一无二的。因此，这只是一个无关紧要的问题。

It — the law exists. We haven’t been approached about it as we — as I know — as I mentioned.
法律是存在的。我们还没有被就此事接触过，正如我所知道的，正如我提到的。

Apparently it takes a year or so, even if they approach you while they listen to your presentation and look at your facts. And I do not think Berkshire Hathaway comes within miles of qualifying as a SIFI.
显然，这需要一年左右的时间，即使他们接触你时，他们也会听取你的陈述并查看你的事实。我认为伯克希尔哈撒韦远远不符合SIFI的资格。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think that’s true. But I think that, generally speaking, there is still too much risk in a lot of high finance. And the idea that Dodd-Frank has removed it all permanently is nonsense. And people like hanging onto it.
查理·芒格：我认为这是真的。但我认为，通常来说，很多高金融领域仍然存在太多风险。而认为多德-弗兰克法案已经永久消除了所有这些风险的想法是胡说八道的。人们喜欢固守这些。

You know, trading derivatives, as a principle, if you’re shrewd, is a lot like running a bucket shop in the ’20s or a gambling parlor in the current era. And you have a gambling parlor that you have a proprietary edge in, and you say it’s sharing risk, and helping the economy, and so forth. That’s mostly nonsense.
你知道，交易衍生品原则上，如果你很精明，就很像是在20世纪20年代经营一个非法交易所或在当前时代经营一个赌博场。你有一个你有专有优势的赌博场，你说它是在分担风险，帮助经济，等等。这大多数都是胡说八道。

The people are doing it because they like making money with their gambling parlor, and they like favorable labels instead of unfavorable labels.
人们这样做是因为他们喜欢通过赌博厅赚钱，他们喜欢有利的标签而不是不利的标签。

So, I think there’s still danger in the financial system. And I also think our competitors don’t like it that they deserve regulation and we don’t. And I think there’s danger in that too.
所以，我认为金融系统仍然存在危险。我也认为我们的竞争对手不喜欢他们应该受到监管而我们不需要监管。我认为这也是一种危险。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. One thing that may not be — (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。有一件事可能不是——（掌声）

I haven’t read much about it, but my understanding is that Dodd-Frank actually weakens the power of the Fed, and to some extent the Treasury, too, to take the kind of actions they took in 2008, primarily.
我对这方面了解不多，但我的理解是，多德-弗兰克法案实际上削弱了美联储的权力，在某种程度上也削弱了财政部在 2008 年采取类似行动的能力。

And those powers were needed to keep our system, in my view, from really going into utter chaos.
而这些权力在我看来是必要的，以防我们的系统真的陷入彻底的混乱。

The ability to say, and have people believe you when you say it, that whatever needs to be done, will be done, has resided in the Federal Reserve and with the Central Bank — the European Central Bank.
能够说出并让人们相信你所说的，无论需要做什么，都会被完成，这种能力一直存在于美联储和中央银行——欧洲中央银行。

And the fact that people believed when Hank Paulson said that the money market funds are going to be guaranteed, that stopped a run on 3 1/2 trillion of money market funds that had lost 175 billion in deposits in the first three days, there, back in September of one week.
当亨克·保尔森（Hank Paulson）说货币市场基金将得到保障时，人们相信这一点，这停止了对3.5万亿美元货币市场基金的挤兑，这些基金在头三天已经损失了1750亿美元，回到一个星期的9月。

If that — if people hadn’t believed that, you would have seen that 175 billion turn into a trillion very quickly. I mean, the system would have gone down.
如果人们不相信这一点，你会看到那 1750 亿很快变成一万亿。我的意思是，系统会崩溃。

So the — when you have a panic, you have to have someone, somewhere, who can say and be believed, and be correctly believed, that he or she will do whatever it takes.
所以当你感到恐慌时，你必须有一个人，在某个地方，能够说出并被相信，并且被正确地相信，他或她会不惜一切代价去做。

And you saw what happened in Europe when Draghi finally said that, and you saw what happened in the United States when Bernanke and Paulson, more or less together, said it.
你看到德拉吉最终说出那句话时欧洲发生了什么，你也看到伯南克和保尔森几乎同时说出那句话时美国发生了什么。

And if you don’t have that, panics — they will accelerate like you cannot believe.
如果你没有那样的东西，恐慌会加速到你无法想象的程度。

You know, in the old days, the only way you could stop a run on a bank was, basically, for somebody to come and pile up gold. I mean, they used to race it to the branches that were having a problem. I remember reading the history of the Bank of America on that, and how they would put out runs before the Federal Reserve existed, and the only thing that stopped it was to pile up gold.
你知道，在过去，唯一能阻止银行挤兑的方法是，基本上，某人来堆积黄金。我是说，他们曾经将黄金运送到出现问题的分支机构。我记得读过关于美国银行的历史，以及在美联储存在之前，他们如何扑灭挤兑，唯一能阻止它的是堆积黄金。

I mean, if the CEO of the bank came out and said, you know, our Basel II ratio is 11.4 percent, the line would just lengthen. It would not get the job done.
我的意思是，如果银行的CEO出来说，你知道，我们的巴塞尔协议II比例是11.4%，队伍只会变长。这是没有用的。

Gold got the job done. Bernanke and Paulson got the job done, but the only way they got it done was saying, “We’re guaranteeing new commercial paper. We’re guaranteeing that the money market funds won’t break the bank. You know, we’re going to do whatever’s necessary.”
黄金完成了任务。伯南克和保尔森完成了任务，但他们完成任务的唯一方式就是说：“我们在担保新的商业票据。我们在担保货币市场基金不会破产。你知道，我们会做任何必要的事情。”

I think Dodd-Frank weakens that, and I think that’s a terrible thing to weaken. (Applause)
我认为多德-弗兰克法案削弱了这一点，我认为削弱这一点是件可怕的事情。（掌声）

33. Selling workers’ comp insurance online

在线销售工人赔偿保险

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。加里？

GARY RANSOM: You have started a direct workers’ comp operation online, BHDWC.com. It looks a little bit like you’re Geico-izing some of the commercial lines.
加里·兰索姆：你已经在网上启动了一个直接的工人赔偿业务，BHDWC.com。看起来有点像你在将一些商业险种“Geico化”。

What’s the overall strategy of that effort, and how big do you think it can grow, and what concerns might you have on channel conflict with GUARD, who uses independent agents?
这个努力的整体战略是什么？你认为它能发展多大？你对与使用独立代理的 GUARD 之间的渠道冲突有什么担忧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We — well, Progressive did pretty well with the channel conflict between direct writing and agents.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们——好吧，Progressive 在直接承保和代理人之间的渠道冲突中表现得相当不错。

We will find out what the consumer wants. But we are experimenting with online workers’ comp. As you can tell, we’ve done pretty well with online direct auto over the years.
我们将找出消费者想要什么。但我们正在尝试在线工伤赔偿。正如你所看到的，多年来我们在在线直接汽车保险方面做得相当不错。

We’ll find out. I don’t think that — I don’t think the channel conflict is a big problem for us. It might be a bigger problem for some other companies, but I don’t think that’s a big problem.
我们会找到答案。我认为——我认为渠道冲突对我们来说不是一个大问题。对其他一些公司来说，这可能是一个更大的问题，但我认为这对我们来说不是一个大问题。

It’s a trickier thing. We write commercial auto through GEICO, and that’s grown and it’s not small, but it hasn’t achieved private passenger auto proportions at all. So we’ll find out.
这是一件更棘手的事情。我们通过 GEICO 承保商业汽车，这一业务在增长，而且规模不小，但它还没有达到私人乘用车的规模。所以我们会拭目以待。

But we believe in experimenting at Berkshire, and we’ve got the know-how to write that business in direct, and we’ll find out if the customer wants to buy it that way.
但我们在伯克希尔相信实验，我们有能力以直接方式撰写该业务，我们将找出客户是否想以这种方式购买。

We’ve got an awfully good insurance business, but the nature of the insurance business has changed. I mean, GEICO was all direct mail back in 1936, when Leo Goodwin and his wife sat there and stuffed envelopes.
我们有一个非常好的保险业务，但保险业务的性质已经发生了变化。我的意思是，GEICO在1936年完全是通过直接邮寄，当时Leo Goodwin和他的妻子坐在那里填充信封。

And the basic idea of saving people money on auto insurance continues to this day, but it went from direct mail to — it went to the TV and the phone, went to cable TV, and then went to the Internet and — and goes to mobile and it — you know, the world moves on.
节省人们汽车保险费用的基本想法一直延续到今天，但它从直接邮寄转到——转到电视和电话，转到有线电视，然后转到互联网——并转到移动设备——你知道，世界在不断发展。

And the key is to be able to save people money and give them good service. And whatever way does that in the most effective way is going to be what wins 20 or 30 or 50 years from now, and we’ll try to stay on top of it.
关键是能够为人们省钱并提供良好的服务。无论哪种方式能以最有效的方式做到这一点，20 年、30 年或 50 年后就会胜出，我们会努力保持领先。

34. Question you’ve never been asked

你从未被问过的问题

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Paula, and I’m from Gainesville, Florida.
观众成员：你好。我叫保拉，来自佛罗里达州的盖恩斯维尔。

And I would just like to ask Mr. Buffett, after all these years of interviews and meetings, what is the one question that you’ve never been asked that you would like to answer now? (Laughter and applause)
我想问巴菲特先生，经过这么多年的采访和会议，您有没有一个从未被问过但现在想回答的问题？（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can think of the question I haven’t been asked, but I’m not sure I want to answer it now. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我能想到一个我没有被问到的问题，但我不确定我现在想回答它。（笑声）

I think I’ve been asked almost all of them, and many of them, time after time after time.
我想我几乎被问过所有这些问题，而且很多问题一次又一次地被问。

Charlie, do you have anything that you’re just dying to be asked?
查理，你有没有什么特别想被问的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if this lady will first tell us the worst thing she ever did in her life. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，如果这位女士先告诉我们她一生中做过的最糟糕的事情。(笑声)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Those secrets are not —
观众成员：那些秘密不是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Paula, I wish we could help you. Have you got another question you’d like to throw at us?
沃伦·巴菲特：保拉，我希望我们能帮到你。你还有其他问题想问我们吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I could ask you another question.
观众成员：我可以问你另一个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. 沃伦·巴菲特：好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can I buy you lunch? (Laughter)
观众：我可以请你吃午饭吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think she’s talking to you, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我想她在跟你说话，查理。（笑声）

He always wins. You saw him in the movie. He always gets the girl.
他总是赢。你们在电影里看到了。他总是赢得女孩。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I’m so heavily involved with those girls in the movie, I just don’t have room on my list. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的。我与电影中的那些女孩关系密切，我的名单上实在没有空间了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Paula. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，保拉。（笑）

35. Buffett: We run Berkshire almost as tightly as 3G would

巴菲特：我们对伯克希尔的管理几乎和 3G 一样严格。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This is a toughy, and I should say we’ve probably got — or at least I got — several dozen emails on 3G, and so this is a follow-up to what you talked about on 3G earlier.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这很棘手，我应该说我们可能收到了——或者至少我收到了——关于 3G 的几十封电子邮件，所以这是对你之前谈论 3G 的跟进。

And specifically, actually, it’s two questions in one that actually came from the audience after your response about 3G. So just to put it in perspective, those shareholders are in the audience, and they asked not to be named, so here we go.
实际上，这实际上是一个包含两个问题的问题，来自于观众在你关于 3G 的回答之后。因此，为了让大家更清楚，这些股东在观众中，他们要求不透露姓名，所以我们开始吧。

This shareholder writes, “I intend no disrespect to 3G’s money making abilities and, as a Berkshire shareholder, like the partnership very much. However, you took more than a decade to shut down the Berkshire mills.
这位股东写道：“我并不想对 3G 的赚钱能力表示不尊重，作为伯克希尔的股东，我非常喜欢这个合作伙伴关系。然而，你们花了十多年才关闭伯克希尔的工厂。”

“You take great pride in letting Berkshire’s managers run their companies for you, and as Charlie says, almost to the point of abdication. And that approach has made Berkshire a very attractive home for companies.
“您非常自豪地让伯克希尔的管理者为您管理他们的公司，正如查理所说，几乎到了放弃的地步。这种做法使伯克希尔成为一个非常吸引公司的家。”

“You’ve even bought newspaper groups in the face of the internet tidal wave, and acknowledged they didn’t have the same investment characteristics of other Berkshire businesses.
“你甚至在互联网浪潮面前收购了报纸集团，并承认它们与其他伯克希尔业务没有相同的投资特征。”

“Are you actually saying 3G’s management method is congruent with yours?
“你真的在说 3G 的管理方法和你的相符吗？”

“Asked another way, if 3G ran Berkshire, would there not be significant layoffs and consolidation among the companies and intense focus on short-term profits?”
“换句话说，如果 3G 管理伯克希尔，难道不会在公司之间进行大规模裁员和整合，并且对短期利润进行强烈关注吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I think there would be — there would be some companies they’d make changes in. But I would say that GEICO, for example, 33,000 employees, or whatever the number is, is run just as efficiently as 3G would run it.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。我认为会有一些公司会进行变动。但我想说，举例来说，GEICO，33000 名员工，或者不管具体数字是多少，运营效率与 3G 管理的效率是一样的。

I would say our home office, with 25 people — we could have a home office with 500 people. We could have floors devoted to strategy, and floors devoted to human resources and comparing the salaries of everybody at all our different companies, and so on.
我会说我们的总部有 25 个人——我们可以有一个有 500 人的总部。我们可以有专门用于战略的楼层，还有专门用于人力资源的楼层，以及比较我们所有不同公司的每个人的薪水等等。

If they walked into that situation, they’d cut it back. I don’t know whether they’d get it down to the 25 we have, but we do not believe in having extra people around.
如果他们进入那种情况，他们会削减人员。我不知道他们是否能把人数减少到我们现在的 25 人，但我们不相信周围需要多余的人。

And our newspapers, you know, unfortunately, you know, they have had to cut back, as revenue has kept shrinking.
我们的报纸，你知道，不幸的是，他们不得不削减，因为收入一直在减少。

And the idea that you run a fat operation just because you’re making a lot of money — we cut back on our textile business — I closed the Waumbec mill considerably before we closed the Berkshire mills. It was only when it became apparent that it was just hopeless, we gave up on it.
而且，认为只因为你赚了很多钱就可以运行一个庞大的操作——我们削减了我们的纺织业务——我在关闭伯克希尔的纺织厂之前，就关闭了Waumbec纺织厂。只是当显而易见它已经无望时，我们才放弃了它。

But in the meantime, every time at Berkshire — I had a drawer full of proposals that said if we put in this kind of a loom, we’ll be able to get rid of eight people, and we put in the loom.
但与此同时，在伯克希尔，每次我都有一个抽屉里装满了提案，上面说如果我们投入这种织机，就能裁掉八个人，而我们也确实投入了这台织机。

I mean, we were trying to reduce our labor complement all the time because we were in competition with people that were doing the same thing.
我的意思是，我们一直在努力减少我们的劳动力，因为我们与那些做相同事情的人竞争。

So I don’t think there’s any — I don’t think there’s anything in — we do have some businesses that probably have more people than we need, and I don’t do something about it.
所以我认为没有任何——我认为我们确实有一些业务可能有比我们需要的更多的人，而我对此没有采取任何措施。

But I don’t encourage it in any way and most of our managers don’t operate that way.
但我并不以任何方式鼓励这样做，而且我们大多数经理也不是这样运作的。

And it’s true, if 3G were running our operations, they would get more active at that than I will. But that doesn’t mean that I endorse it. It just means that I basically tolerate it where I’ve got a manager that I think well of.
而且这是真的，如果 3G 在运营我们的业务，他们会比我更积极。但这并不意味着我支持它。这只是意味着在我认为不错的经理那里，我基本上是容忍它的。

I think better of the 3G way — method — of operation than I do of our operators where they really have excess people in it. We’ve got very few of those, but we do have a few.
我认为3G的方法比我们的操作方式更好，如果我们真的有多余的人。我们这种情况非常少，但确实存在。

So, I would never advocate running a business at a loss. If you — where it’s going to continue. And you’ll see that in our economic principles that’s been in the back of the book — back of the annual report — for 30 years or so.
所以，我绝不会提倡以亏损的方式经营企业。如果你——将继续这样做。你会看到我们的经济原则，这些原则在报告的后面——年度报告的后面——已经有30多年了。

And the same goes for having excess people around, and I think you’ll see our attitude toward excess people best expressed in our office here that has 25 people, and Charlie’s office in Los Angeles that has two, counting him.
同样的道理也适用于周围有过多的人，我认为你会在我们这里的办公室中看到我们对过多人员的态度，这里有 25 个人，而查理在洛杉矶的办公室只有两个人，包括他自己。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d say we’ve got two-thirds of one. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我可以说我们有三分之二的一个。（笑声）

We’re getting by with practically nothing.
我们几乎一无所有地勉强过活。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

36. “Great brands will survive and the great retailers will do well”

“伟大的品牌将会生存下来，优秀的零售商将会表现良好”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGGORY WARREN: This is sort of a follow-on to the 3G question.
格雷戈里·沃伦：这有点像是对 3G 问题的后续。

When we look at the body of work that the firm has put together in the consumer staples universe, Anheuser-Busch, InBev, Burger King, Tim Hortons, and now Kraft Heinz, one gets the sense that they view the average consumer staples firm as being undermanaged, with a potential for substantially greater levels of profitability.
当我们看到这家公司在消费品领域的工作成果，比如安海斯布希、百威英博、汉堡王、蒂姆·霍顿斯和现在的卡夫亨氏，给人一种感觉，即他们认为普通的消费品公司管理不善，具有显著更高的盈利潜力。

Given the ongoing struggles of many packaged food firms, most of which compete in a mature category against private label and/or store brand offerings that undercut them in price and diminish the value of their brands, and many of them having to deal with large retailers, like Walmart, that provide meaningful sales volumes but are also quite demanding and continuously pushing for the lowest price available, do you see the potential for further consolidation in the industry with a firm like Kraft Heinz emerging as a big consolidator? Or do you feel that Nestle’s more recent squawking about the deal, and 3G Capital’s reputation as being a bit heavy-handed with cost cutting, being enough to keep further consolidation at bay?
考虑到许多包装食品公司面临的持续困境，其中大多数公司在成熟领域与私人标签和/或商店品牌竞争，这些品牌以较低的价格削弱了他们的品牌价值，而且许多公司还需要与像沃尔玛这样的大型零售商打交道，这些零售商提供了有意义的销售量，但也相当挑剔，并不断推动最低价格，你是否看到行业中进一步整合的潜力，像卡夫亨氏这样的公司可能会成为主要的整合者？或者你是否认为雀巢最近对交易的不满和3G资本在成本削减方面的声誉足以阻止进一步的整合？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there will be deals in the future. I mean, there are bound to be.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，未来会有交易。我是说，这肯定会发生。

But the strong brands — you know, just look at the ones that General Foods added in the 1980s and the ones that Kraft has now that come from that same company.
但强大的品牌——你知道，只要看看通用食品在1980年代增加的品牌，以及卡夫现在拥有的那些来自同一公司的品牌。

And, I mean, Coca-Cola sold more cases of beverages last year than any year in their history and they’ll sell more this year. I mean, it’s — a strong brand is really potent stuff.
而且，我的意思是，去年可口可乐销售的饮料箱数比他们历史上的任何一年都要多，今年的销售量也会更多。我的意思是，一个强大的品牌真的是非常有力的东西。

I mean, take Heinz Ketchup or something of the sort. It’s 60 percent brand share in the United States, but it’s much higher in many other countries.
我指的是，比如亨氏番茄酱。在美国，它的品牌份额是 60%，但在许多其他国家则更高。

So you’ll always have the fight between the retailer and the brand, and the retailer is going to use all the pressure they’ve got and, therefore, the brand has to stand for something in the consumer’s mind.
所以你总会看到零售商和品牌之间的斗争，零售商会利用他们所有的压力，因此品牌必须在消费者心中代表某种东西。

Because, in the end, the retailer may want to shift to a house brand, a private label, but — and they — private labels have been around forever in the soft drink field. I mean, I can remember when I was looking at Cott Beverage and all of those and thinking, what will it do to us?
因为最终零售商可能想转向自有品牌，私人标签，但——而且——私人标签在软饮料领域已经存在很久了。我是说，我记得我在关注 Cott Beverage 和所有这些时，想知道这会对我们造成什么影响？

I remember when Sam Walton sent me the first six-pack. He told me, it’s the first six-pack of Sam’s Cola, 20 years ago, and believe me, Walmart has plenty of power, but so does Coca-Cola.
我记得萨姆·沃尔顿第一次给我寄来六罐装时。他告诉我，这是 20 年前的第一批萨姆可乐，相信我，沃尔玛有很多实力，但可口可乐也一样。

And the brand — you’ve got to nourish them. You know, you’ve got to take very, very, very good care of them. They have to stand for the promise that’s in people’s mind about them.
品牌——你必须去滋养它们。你知道，你必须非常非常非常好地照顾它们。它们必须代表人们心中对它们的承诺。

But a lot of people have tried to — I don’t know how many dozens, or maybe hundreds, of cola beverages there have been over the years. RC Cola. You know, they came up with the first diet product back in the early ’60s, and that looked like a big maneuver.
但很多人尝试过——我不知道这些年来有多少种可乐饮料，可能有几十种，甚至几百种。RC 可乐。你知道，他们在 60 年代初推出了第一款减肥产品，这看起来是一个大举措。

Wilkinson came up with the blade back in the ’60s after Gillette, but Gillette ends up with 70 percent, by dollar value, worldwide of razor blades after 100 years.
威尔金森在 60 年代推出了刀片，但在 100 年后，吉列的剃须刀片在全球的美元价值中占据了 70%。

So there’s all — you’ve got to protect a brand. You’ve got to enhance it in every way. You’ve got to get a promise in people’s minds that gets delivered that way.
所以所有的一切——你必须保护一个品牌。你必须在各个方面提升它。你必须在人的心中建立一个承诺，并以这种方式兑现。

But that’s the question Charlie and I faced in 1972 when we looked at See’s. See’s was selling for $1.95 a pound, Russell Stover was selling a little cheaper, and you had to decide how much damage could a Russell Stover do if they came after See’s, and they copied our shops, and all that sort of thing.
但这就是查理和我在 1972 年面对的问题，当时我们看到了 See's。See's 的售价是每磅 1.95 美元，Russell Stover 的价格稍微便宜一些，你必须决定如果 Russell Stover 来竞争 See's，模仿我们的商店，等等，他们能造成多大的损害。

If you protect a brand — if you got a terrific brand and you protect it, it’s a fabulous asset.
如果你保护一个品牌——如果你拥有一个出色的品牌并且保护它，那它就是一个极好的资产。

But you’ll always have trouble dealing with Costco and Walmart and the rest of the guys — Kroger, you name it, you know, they’re tough, too.
但你总是会在与好市多、沃尔玛以及其他公司打交道时遇到麻烦——克罗格，你说的那些，他们也很难对付。

But the great brands will survive and the great retailers will do well.
但伟大的品牌会生存下来，伟大的零售商会表现良好。
横向和垂直的竞争。
Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’ve almost exhausted this topic. The — there’s no question about the fact that waves of layoffs frighten people. A job is a very important part of a person’s life, and it’s no small thing to lose it.
查理·芒格：好吧，我们几乎已经讨论完这个话题。毫无疑问，裁员潮让人感到恐惧。工作是一个人生活中非常重要的一部分，失去工作绝非小事。

So — but on the other hand, I don’t think you — what would our country be if we kept everybody on the farms? All this prosperous group would be pitching hay and milking cows at 4:00 in the morning. No, we need — we need our businesses to be right sized.
所以——但另一方面，我认为如果我们让每个人都留在农场，我们的国家会变成什么样？所有这些繁荣的群体都会在早上四点割草和挤奶。不，我们需要——我们需要我们的企业适度发展。

37. Value investing in China?

在中国的价值投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9?
沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 站？

Better have some fudge, Charlie.
最好吃点软糖，查理。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Very exciting to see my superstars here. I’m Leo (inaudible) from China and a loyal fan of you and Charlie.
观众成员：看到我的超级明星在这里真是太激动了。我是来自中国的 Leo（听不清），是你和 Charlie 的忠实粉丝。

Many Chinese investors feel all kinds of performance pressure, question, and even laughing, at value investing.
许多中国投资者感受到各种业绩压力，质疑，甚至嘲笑价值投资。

Many also believe that value investing, that doesn’t apply to China, where the stock market just doubled over the last six months.
许多人还认为，价值投资不适用于中国，因为中国股市在过去六个月中翻了一番。

I would like to ask Mr. Buffett, do you think value investment can be widely applied in all markets, or just the (inaudible) markets, just as the ones in the United States?
我想问巴菲特先生，您认为价值投资可以广泛应用于所有市场，还是仅仅适用于（听不清）市场，比如美国的市场？

Do you have any suggestions for value investors to hold against pressure and to be much happy? Thank you.
你对价值投资者在压力下保持冷静和快乐有什么建议吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure I got all of it, but Charlie will help me.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定我全部都明白，但查理会帮我。

I certainly think investment principles do not stop at borders. So if I were investing in China or any place else — India, UK, Germany — I would apply exactly the same sort of principles that I learned from “The Intelligent Investor.”
我当然认为投资原则并不受国界限制。因此，如果我在中国或其他地方投资——印度、英国、德国——我会应用我从《聪明的投资者》中学到的完全相同的原则。

I would think of stocks as a small piece of a business. I would think of investment fluctuations being there to benefit me, rather than to hurt me. And I would try to focus my attention on businesses where I thought I understood the competitive advantage they had and where they would — what they would — look like in five or ten years.
我会把股票看作是企业的一小部分。我会认为投资波动是为了让我受益，而不是伤害我。我会试着把注意力集中在我认为我理解其竞争优势的企业上，以及它们在五年或十年后会是什么样子。

So I don’t think I would change the principles at all. I’m not sure I got all of the question.
所以我认为我不会改变这些原则。我不确定我是否理解了所有的问题。

Maybe Charlie can elaborate on the rest.
也许查理可以详细说明其余的部分。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the Chinese have a history of being very entrepreneurial and gambling very heavily when they have the opportunity, and it has created great volatility in the Chinese stock markets.
查理·芒格：嗯，中国人有着非常创业的历史，当他们有机会时会进行大量赌博，这在中国股市中造成了巨大的波动。

And when things get bouncy and prosperous, like our Internet craze here in the United States, China looks a lot like Silicon Valley.
当事情变得活跃和繁荣时，就像我们在美国的互联网热潮一样，中国看起来很像硅谷。

I think China would be way better to be more value investor minded and less absorbed in waves of speculation.
我认为中国应该更加注重价值投资，而不是沉迷于投机潮流。

So I think the more China copies the way Berkshire operates, I think the better it will be for China. (Applause)
所以我认为中国越是模仿伯克希尔的运作方式，对中国就会越好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There’s a certain irony, in that we will — we would — do the best, over decades, if we operated in a market where people operated very foolishly.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。有一种讽刺的是，如果我们在一个人们非常愚蠢地操作的市场中运作，经过几十年，我们会表现得最好。

And the more people respond to short term events and exaggerated things or — anything that causes people to get wildly enthusiastic or wildly depressed, actually, is what allows people to make lots of money in securities.
而越多的人对短期事件和夸大的事物做出反应，或者——任何让人们变得极度热情或极度沮丧的事情，实际上都是让人们在证券中赚取大量金钱的原因。

And, on the other hand, it’s not the greatest thing for a society. And Charlie and I have benefited enormously by the fact that over a 50-year period, there have been a few periods, probably the most extraordinary being 1973 and ’74, where you could buy stocks unbelievably cheap, cheaper than happened in 2008 and 2009.
另一方面，这对社会来说并不是最好的事情。查理和我在过去 50 年中受益匪浅，期间有几个阶段，可能最非凡的是 1973 年和 1974 年，那时你可以以难以置信的低价购买股票，价格比 2008 年和 2009 年还要便宜。

And, you know, it doesn’t make sense to have that much volatility in the market, but humans behave the way humans behave, and they’re going to continue to behave that way in the next 50 years.
而且，你知道，市场上有如此大的波动是没有道理的，但人类的行为就是这样，人类在接下来的 50 年里仍然会继续这样行为。

I mean, if you’re a young investor, and you can sort of stand back and value stocks as businesses and invest when things are very cheap, no matter what anybody is saying on television or what you’re reading, and perhaps, if you wish, sell when people get terribly enthused, it is really not a very tough intellectual game. It’s an easy game, if you can control your emotions.
我的意思是，如果你是一个年轻的投资者，能够站在旁观者的角度来评估股票作为企业，并在一切都非常便宜的时候投资，无论电视上有人怎么说或者你在读什么，或许，如果你愿意，在人们变得非常热情时卖出，这其实并不是一个非常复杂的智力游戏。如果你能控制自己的情绪，这是一场简单的游戏。

And as Charlie says, we’ve talked about a little bit that the Chinese market may be more — there may be more speculative influences in it, even than in the United States, because it’s a relatively new development and it may lend itself to greater extremes, and that should produce great opportunities. Charlie?
正如查理所说，我们稍微谈到过，中国市场可能更具投机性影响，甚至超过美国，因为这是一个相对较新的发展，可能会导致更大的极端情况，这应该会带来很好的机会。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But there’s great opportunities for excess and nasty contractions after unnatural booms and so on.
查理·芒格：是的。但是在不自然的繁荣之后，存在过度和恶性收缩的巨大机会等等。

I think China is wise to dampen the speculative booms and to — and I think the Chinese — I don’t think that value investing will ever go out of style. Who in the hell doesn’t want value when you buy something? How can there be anything else that makes any sense except value investing?
我认为中国明智地抑制投机性繁荣，我认为中国人——我认为价值投资永远不会过时。谁会在购买东西时不想要价值呢？除了价值投资，还有什么其他的选择是有意义的呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: It never gets that popular though. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：不过它从来没有那么受欢迎。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: People are looking for an easier way.
查理·芒格：人们在寻找更简单的方法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that’s a mistake. It looks easier, but, in fact, it’s harder. And there’s a lot of misery to be obtained by misusing stocks.
查理·芒格：这是一种错误。看起来更简单，但实际上更难。错误使用股票会带来很多痛苦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Nobody buys a farm to make a lot of money next week or next month, or they buy, you know, an apartment house. They buy it based on what they think the long-term future is. And if they get a — if they make a reasoned calculation of that and the purchase price looks attractive, they buy it and then they don’t get a quote on it every day or every week or every month or even every year, and that’s probably a better way to look at stocks.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有人会为了下周或下个月赚很多钱而买农场，或者买公寓楼。他们是基于对长期未来的看法来购买的。如果他们对这一点进行了合理的计算，并且购买价格看起来有吸引力，他们就会买下它，然后他们不会每天、每周、每月甚至每年都去查看一次，这可能是看待股票的更好方式。

38. U.S. needs to protect against catastrophic terror attacks

美国需要防范灾难性恐怖袭击。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: “Mr. Buffett, you have expressed your optimism about the future of America many times and have often made the point that the U.S. simply has a superior economic system.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：“巴菲特先生，您多次表达了对美国未来的乐观态度，并且常常指出美国的经济体系优越。”

“But my question” — and this is from Christopher Gottchio (PH) of New York City — “my question concerns the risk of chemical, nuclear, biological, and cybersecurity problems and the audience should reflect on the initial letters of those words when I tell you that Mr. Buffett has sometimes dubbed that C-N-B-C.” Sorry, Becky. (Laughter)
“但是我的问题”——这是来自纽约市的克里斯托弗·戈奇奥（PH）——“我的问题涉及化学、核、生物和网络安全问题，听众在我告诉你巴菲特先生有时称之为 C-N-B-C 时，应该反思这些词的首字母。”抱歉，贝基。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I just do that to tease people, but the —
沃伦·巴菲特：我这样做只是为了逗人开心，但——

CAROL LOOMIS: Wait a minute. One more. “How do these threats affect your outlook?”
卡罗尔·卢米斯：等一下。再来一个。“这些威胁如何影响你的前景？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they are the great threat to the United States. The — we will have — we have, and will have, a wonderful economic system.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，他们是对美国的重大威胁。我们将拥有一个美好的经济体系。

You know, your children are going to live better than you do, and your grandchildren are going to live better than they do. That is — there are fits and starts and ups and downs. But just go outside or — as you fly home, just imagine what you’re flying over looked like in 1776, and everything since then is profit.
你知道，你的孩子们将过得比你更好，而你的孙子孙女们将过得比他们更好。也就是说——生活中有起有落，有波折。但只需走出去，或者在你飞回家的时候，想象一下 1776 年你所飞越的地方是什么样子，从那时起的一切都是收益。

I mean, the farms are incredibly more productive. The cities have grown. It’s all here, you know, and that’s all come from unleashing the energies and brains of the American people and the system that has worked quite well despite all the deficiencies that we talk about all the time. So that hasn’t been lost at all.
我的意思是，农场的生产力大大提高了。城市也在不断发展。所有这一切都在这里，你知道，这一切都来自于释放美国人民的能量和智慧，以及尽管我们一直谈论的所有缺陷，这个系统运作得相当好。所以这一切并没有丢失。

And, you know, people get upset because we’re having 2 percent growth. Well, 2 percent growth with 1 percent population growth means 20 percent gain in a generation, and 20 percent on 54,000 of GDP per capita is another 10,000 of GDP per capita coming in the next generation.
而且，你知道，人们会因为我们只有 2%的增长而感到不满。好吧，2%的增长加上 1%的人口增长意味着在一代人中获得 20%的增长，而在每人 54,000 的 GDP 基础上再增加 20%就是下一代人均 GDP 再增加 10,000。

This country has a wonderful future, but as the questioner pointed out, that can all be nullified by either madmen, or rogue states, or religious fanatics, or sociopaths, or whatever it may be, who have — who wish to have — access to weapons of mass destruction.
这个国家有一个美好的未来，但正如提问者所指出的，这一切都可能被疯狂的人、流氓国家、宗教狂热分子、反社会者或其他任何想要获得大规模杀伤性武器的人所否定。

And to nuclear, which, as I used to think was the primary one, you know, you can now add biological and chemical and cyber.
而对于核能，我曾经认为这是主要的，现在你可以再加上生物、化学和网络。

And there will be an increasing number — there already are a huge number — of people that would wish harm, and particularly on the United States, although on others as well.
将会有越来越多的人——已经有大量的人——希望对他人造成伤害，特别是对美国，尽管也包括其他国家。

And those people aren’t going to go away, and they’re going to look for more ingenious ways of utilizing the raw materials that they have access — or might get access to — and better delivery systems.
那些人不会消失，他们会寻找更巧妙的方法来利用他们可以获取的原材料——或者可能获得的原材料——以及更好的交付系统。

And we need an extremely vigilant security operation in the United States, and we will have threats. I can’t — I do a little bit about those things in a few ways — but that’s something we live with.
我们需要在美国进行极其警惕的安全行动，我们将面临威胁。我不能——我在某些方面对这些事情了解一点——但这是我们必须面对的现实。

But we also live in a country that is going to do extraordinarily well. And if we successfully ward off those threats, or at least minimize their impact on us, I still maintain that the luckiest person ever born in history, on a probabilistic basis, is the baby being born in the United States today. (Applause)
但我们也生活在一个将会表现得非常出色的国家。如果我们成功地抵御这些威胁，或者至少将它们对我们的影响降到最低，我仍然认为，历史上最幸运的人，从概率上来说，就是今天在美国出生的婴儿。（掌声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, we were a favored place, and we’ve had a favored outcome, and we’ve been lucky too.
查理·芒格：当然，我们是一个受宠的地方，我们也有一个受宠的结果，我们也很幸运。

I think I probably lived in the most ideal era that any man in human history could have been born into. I think you have, too, Warren.
我认为我可能生活在任何人类历史上最理想的时代。我认为你也是，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But I don’t think we should get too smug. China has come up a lot faster than any other big nation ever came up, and —
查理·芒格：但我认为我们不应该过于自满。中国的发展速度比任何其他大国都要快得多，——

WARREN BUFFETT: But that’s good for us.
沃伦·巴菲特：但这对我们有好处。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think — I can hardly think of anything more important than future close collaboration between the United States and China.
查理·芒格：哦，我认为——我几乎想不到比未来美国和中国之间的紧密合作更重要的事情。

I think you’re talking about the two most important nations in the world going forward. And I think it is very important that we like and trust one another, and have very good relations, and work together to avoid bad consequences that come from other people’s mistakes and misbehavior.
我认为你在谈论未来世界上两个最重要的国家。我认为我们彼此喜欢和信任，保持良好的关系，并共同努力避免因他人的错误和不当行为而带来的不良后果是非常重要的。

So I’m — (Applause) 所以我——（掌声）

I think both China and the United States would be crazy not to collaborate and increase trust.
我认为中国和美国如果不合作并增加信任，那将是疯狂的。

I don’t think there’s anything more important that we could do for our respective safety and for the general benefit of the world. (Applause)
我认为我们能为各自的安全和世界的整体利益做的事情没有比这更重要的了。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If you had your choice, would you rather be born now with all the qualities you’ve got, or when you were born?
沃伦·巴菲特：如果让你选择，你是希望现在出生，拥有你所有的品质，还是希望在你出生的时候出生？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I must say it’s very interesting now, but it was always interesting.
查理·芒格：嗯，我必须说现在非常有趣，但它一直都很有趣。

And I think that’s too tough a question. I don’t like these very theoretical questions. (Laughter)
我认为这是一个太难的问题。我不喜欢这些非常理论性的问题。（笑声）

I’d rather think about something where I might gain some advantage or help somebody else to gain an advantage.
我宁愿考虑一些我可能获得优势或帮助别人获得优势的事情。

39. Unlikely that one person will run both investments and operations

不太可能由一个人同时负责投资和运营。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Then we’ll move on to Jonathan. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。那我们继续谈乔纳森。(笑)

JONATHAN BRANDT: Warren, you have up to this point said that Berkshire in the future will have a chief executive officer and one or more chief investment officers.
乔纳森·布兰特：沃伦，到目前为止你说过，伯克希尔未来将有一位首席执行官和一位或多位首席投资官。

You haven’t explicitly said that a chief investment officer cannot be the CEO, but that has, for me at least, been implied.
您没有明确说首席投资官不能担任首席执行官，但对我来说，这已经是暗示了。

Berkshire has been successfully managed for 50 years by a chairman and vice chairman whose principal experience was in allocating capital amongst a number of businesses and industries with which they were familiar and whose attributes they could compare.
伯克希尔在过去 50 年里成功地由一位董事长和一位副董事长管理，他们的主要经验是在他们熟悉的多个企业和行业之间分配资本，并能够比较这些企业和行业的特征。

Since capital allocation is the key skill needed for a company structured the way Berkshire is, why couldn’t the company’s principal decision maker in the future also be someone who is experienced in choosing among different reinvestment options, with perhaps a second outstanding person expert in operations acting as chief operating officer, albeit a route of the hands-off one, given Berkshire’s extreme decentralization?
既然资本配置是像伯克希尔这样结构的公司所需的关键技能，那么为什么未来公司的主要决策者不能是一个在选择不同再投资选项方面有经验的人，同时也许有第二个在运营方面非常出色的专家担任首席运营官，尽管这是一个不干涉的路线，鉴于伯克希尔的极端去中心化？

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a very good question.
沃伦·巴菲特：这是个非常好的问题。

It’s not inconceivable. It’s very unlikely, Jonny, that — but as you say, the — a chief investment officer has a — will have — or should have — a significant array of skills that would be useful, also, for a chief executive officer.
这并非不可想象。乔尼，这种可能性非常小，但正如你所说，首席投资官应该具备一系列对首席执行官也有用的重要技能。

But I would say, also, that I would not want to move — if I were voting on it — I would not want to vote to put somebody whose sole experience had been investments in charge of an operation like Berkshire, who had not had any, also, significant operating experience.
但我也想说，如果我在投票的话，我不想投票让一个唯一的经验是投资的人负责像伯克希尔这样的运营，因为他也没有任何显著的运营经验。

I’ve said that I’m a better investment manager because I’ve been an operating manager, and I’m a better operating manager because I’ve been the investment manager.
我说过，我是一个更好的投资经理，因为我曾是一个运营经理，而我也是一个更好的运营经理，因为我曾是投资经理。

But the — you — operations — I’ve learned a lot through operations that I wouldn’t have learned if I’d stayed in investments all my life. I would not have been equipped to run it.
但是——你——的运营——我通过运营学到了很多，如果我一辈子都待在投资领域，我就不会学到这些。我不会有能力去管理它。

I learned a lot of things about operations by being in operations. So if you had somebody that had the dual experience and was very good at investments, but had a lot of experience in operations, that would be conceivable. Otherwise, I wouldn’t vote that way.
我通过在运营部门工作学到了很多关于运营的知识。因此，如果有一个人同时具备投资和丰富的运营经验，那是可以想象的。否则，我不会这样投票。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, every year at Berkshire, as now constituted, the owned and controlled businesses get more and more important, and the measurable securities are relatively less important.
查理·芒格：每年在伯克希尔，目前的结构下，拥有和控制的业务变得越来越重要，而可衡量的证券相对不那么重要。

So, I think it would be crazy not to go with the tide to some extent.
所以，我认为不去顺应潮流有点疯狂。

And we need more — we need expertise beyond that of a typical portfolio analyst.
我们需要更多——我们需要超越典型投资组合分析师的专业知识。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But the CEO should have some real understanding of investments and investment alternatives and all that.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但是首席执行官应该对投资、投资替代方案以及所有这些有一些真正的理解。

I’ve seen a lot of businesses run by people that really don’t understand the math of investing or capital allocation very well. So having a dual background is useful, but actually our operating managers know — some of them know — a lot about investing.
我见过很多企业由那些对投资或资本配置的数学了解不深的人管理。因此，拥有双重背景是有用的，但实际上我们的运营经理知道——他们中的一些人知道——很多关于投资的知识。

40. Weschler and Combs are good investors and good people

韦施勒和科姆斯是优秀的投资者和好人。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10,
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站，

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. Warren, Charlie, it’s a pleasure to be here. My name is Douglas Coburn. I’m originally from Caracas, Venezuela, but I’m here with a large group from Columbia Business School. (Cheers)
观众成员：你好。沃伦，查理，很高兴来到这里。我叫道格拉斯·科本。我来自委内瑞拉的加拉加斯，但我和哥伦比亚商学院的一大群人一起在这里。（欢呼）

My question — 我的问题——

Thank you. 谢谢。

My question is regarding Ted Weschler. Can you please share your views regarding his investment philosophy, his investment process, and the qualities that he brings to Berkshire?
我想问的是关于泰德·韦施勒的事情。您能分享一下您对他的投资哲学、投资过程以及他为伯克希尔带来的品质的看法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, both Ted and Todd [Combs], the two investment managers, aside from myself, at Berkshire, are very, very smart about businesses and investments.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。除了我之外，伯克希尔的两位投资经理泰德和托德（科姆斯）对商业和投资非常聪明。

I mean, they understand the reality of business operations. They understand what makes for competitive strength, and all of the things that you’d learn in business school or learn through investing.
我意思是，他们理解商业运作的现实。他们明白什么构成竞争优势，以及你在商学院学习或通过投资所学到的所有东西。

And on top of that, they have qualities of character which are terribly important to me and Charlie.
而且，他们具有对我和查理来说非常重要的品格特质。

We have seen dozens and dozens and dozens of investment managers with great records over the years. We used to drop in and see some of those guys, you know, that were running — I’m talking back in the 1960s and ’70s.
多年来，我们见过许多投资经理，他们都有着优秀的业绩记录。我们以前常常去拜访这些人，你知道的，我说的是1960年代和70年代的那些人。

And when I gave up my partnership, I knew probably 20 people with great records from the previous six or eight years, but I picked Bill Ruane to handle the funds of my partners going forward.
当我放弃我的合伙关系时，我大概认识 20 个在过去六到八年里有着优秀业绩的人，但我选择了比尔·鲁安来管理我合伙人的资金。

And he set up a fund called Sequoia Fund, and 10,000 put in that fund has become over $4 million now.
他设立了一个名为红杉基金的基金，投入的 1 万美元现在已经变成超过 400 万美元。

Well, Bill was a terrific investment manager, but he was a terrific human being. And we really want people where they do more than their share, where they don’t claim credit for things they don’t do, where they — you know, they — just every aspect of their personality is such that you want to be around them, and you want to hand responsibility over to them.
比尔是一位出色的投资经理，但他也是一位出色的人。我们真的希望找到那些不仅仅完成自己份内工作的人的人，他们不会为自己没有做的事情索取功劳，他们的个性各个方面都让你想和他们在一起，并且你愿意把责任交给他们。

And Ted and Todd fit that bill, and there’s plenty of investment managers in Wall Street with great records that don’t fit that bill, in our view. So that’s about all I can tell you.
而泰德和托德符合这个条件，在我们看来，华尔街有很多业绩优秀的投资经理并不符合这个条件。所以我能告诉你的就这些。

Charlie met — he met Todd first. I met Ted first. And we both — when we talked about them, we talked about their record and the kind of stocks they owned, but we talked a whole lot more about what kind of people they were and we haven’t been disappointed.
查理见到了——他先见到了托德。我先见到了泰德。我们俩——当我们谈论他们时，我们谈论了他们的记录和他们拥有的股票，但我们谈论的更多的是他们是什么样的人，而我们并没有失望。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think the whole thing is working pretty well. And I think those people will be constructive around Berkshire for reasons apart from their expertise in handling securities. In fact, they already are.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为整个事情运作得相当不错。我认为这些人会在伯克希尔周围发挥建设性作用，原因不仅仅是他们在处理证券方面的专业知识。事实上，他们已经在这样做了。

WARREN BUFFETT: They already very are.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们已经非常是了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh. They’re — they’ve just — each one has helped buy a business recently.
查理·芒格：哦。他们每个人最近都帮助购买了一项业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And they will help oversee it, too, the businesses. They’re smart about business, and they know just exact — they know the right touch to apply in terms of how much they get involved.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们也会帮助监督这些业务。他们对商业很聪明，知道确切的——他们知道在多大程度上参与是合适的。

I mean, Todd worked on Charter Brokerage. He worked on an acquisition we made from Phillips.
托德曾参与了Charter Brokerage的工作。他参与了我们从菲利普斯公司收购的项目。

Ted just worked on this operation over in Germany, went over there a couple of times.
特德刚刚在德国的一个项目中工作过，去过那里几次。

And he’s just smart. You know, he’s got good sense. He knows how to deal with people. You know, if a deal is to be made, he’ll get it made.
他很聪明。你知道，他很有眼光。他知道如何与人打交道。你知道，如果有交易要达成，他会让它达成。

And we — Charlie and I run into more dysfunctional people with 160 IQs, probably, than anybody alive.
查理和我遇到的功能失调的人，可能比任何在世的人都要多，即使他们的智商高达160。

But Salomon gave us a head start on that, as a matter of fact. Wouldn’t you say that —?
但实际上，所罗门给了我们一个开端。你不觉得吗——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve specialized in it.
查理·芒格：我们在这方面有专门研究。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve absolutely specialized in it.
查理·芒格：我们绝对专注于此。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve seen — take the Salomon — we’ve seen a group of people whose IQs far surpassed those of people at Berkshire, and we’ve seen them self-destruct to make money they didn’t need, when they were already rich. You know, I mean, see, that’s madness.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们看到——以所罗门为例——我们看到一群人的智商远远超过伯克希尔的人，但我们也看到他们自我毁灭，去赚取他们并不需要的钱，而他们本来就已经很富有。你知道，我的意思是，这简直是疯狂。

But a lot of people are just incapable of functioning well day after day, even though they’re capable of brilliance from time to time.
但很多人每天都无法正常运作，尽管他们偶尔能够展现出卓越的才华。

And we’re looking — we’ve got very solid people in Ted and Todd. They’re very bright and they identify with Berkshire and not with themselves, and that’s a — it’s a huge factor over time.
我们寻找的是——我们在特德和托德身上找到了非常可靠的人。他们非常聪明，他们认同伯克希尔，而不是只关注自己，这在长期来看是一个巨大的因素。

Any more, Charlie, on that?
查理，还有其他的事情吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah. And that trustworthiness is more important than the brains. It’s not that they don’t have the brains, but we wouldn’t hire anybody, no matter how able, if we didn’t trust them.
查理·芒格：嗯，是的。信任比智力更重要。他们并不是没有智力，但如果我们不信任他们，我们就不会雇佣任何人，无论他们多么能干。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Very occasionally — (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。非常偶尔——（掌声）
习惯性的精确和诚实。
Yeah. We’ll get disappointed on that occasionally, but not very often.
是的。我们偶尔会对此感到失望，但并不常见。

41. Update on Buffett’s hedge fund wager

关于巴菲特对冲基金赌注的最新消息

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re approaching noon. We’ll come back at 1:00.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们快到中午了。我们将在 1 点钟回来。

I promised — seven years ago I made this bet, which was originally to produce a million dollars for the charity of the winner, and another fellow who was in the hedge fund business — and I offered this bet to anybody. Only one person took me up on it.
我承诺过——七年前我下了这个赌注，最初是为了为获胜者的慈善事业筹集一百万美元，还有另一个在对冲基金行业的人——我把这个赌注提供给任何人。只有一个人接受了我的提议。

And we made this bet where a million dollars goes to the winner’s charity, as to whether a group of five hedge funds, the funds would beat the S&P Vanguard fund.
我们做了一个赌注，即一百万美元将捐给赢家的慈善机构，赌的是五只对冲基金的表现是否会超过标普500 Vanguard基金。

And my point being that the fees would not overcome — would not be overcome — by managerial brilliance and that the hedge funds would fall short.
我的观点是，这些费用不会被管理才能所弥补，对冲基金的表现会逊色。

And the other fellow betting, essentially, that paying people 2-and-20, and having an override to the fund of funds, was nothing to pay for the brilliance of getting Wall Street to manage your money.
而另一个人则在打赌，基本上认为支付人们 2 和 20 的费用，以及对基金的超额收益，是为了让华尔街管理你的资金而付出的微不足道的代价。

And I promised that every year I would report the update.
我承诺每年都会报告一次进展。

And the first year I fell far behind, but we reported it then.
而在第一年我落后得很远，但我们当时报告了这一点。

So we’ll put that slide up. And as you can see, seven years into it, it’s interesting that just buying Vanguard fund, you know, with no — nothing but putting the S&P 500 in there, has now given a cumulative return of 63 1/2 percent, and the hedge funds are at 19 percent.
所以我们会把那张幻灯片放上去。正如你所看到的，七年过去了，有趣的是，仅仅购买先锋基金，也就是把标准普尔 500 放进去，现在的累计回报率达到了 63.5%，而对冲基金的回报率只有 19%。

The interesting thing is, some of that is underperformance, but the hedge fund managers have done very well during that period. If they were managing a billion dollars, for example, at 2-and-20, you get $20 million a year just for coming to the office.
有趣的是，其中一些是表现不佳，但对冲基金经理在这一期间表现非常好。例如，如果他们管理十亿美元，按照 2 和 20 的收费标准，仅仅是来办公室就能每年获得 2000 万美元。

It’s — you know, it’s been — the hedge funds haven’t done bad. It’s the investors in the hedge funds have paid a very big price. And the — (Applause)
这——你知道，情况是——对冲基金表现还不错。投资对冲基金的投资者付出了很大的代价。然后——（掌声）

We originally funded this with zero-coupon bonds. We each bought about 350,000 of zero-coupon bonds that would be worth 500,000 at the end of the period.
我们最初通过零息债券来资助这个赌注。我们每人购买了约35万美元的零息债券，到期时价值50万美元。

We converted it to Berkshire Hathaway stock — so — a few years ago, the fellow on the other side of the bet did it with me. So now it now looks like the winner will get appreciably more than a million dollars.
我们将其转换为伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票——所以——几年前，赌注另一方的人和我一起做了这个转换。所以现在看起来，赢家将获得比一百万美元多得多的金额。

And if you want to entertain yourself, you can go to Long Bets — on search, just put in Long Bets, and you’ll find this organization out in Washington that sort of acts as the stakeholder, sets the rules for these long bets.
如果你想找点乐子，你可以去Long Bets网站——在搜索中输入Long Bets，你会找到这个组织在华盛顿，它充当这种长期赌注的利益相关者，设定这些长期赌注的规则。

And now there’s hundreds of them up there, and they’re on all kinds of predictions, and you can go there, and if you want to disagree with one of the parties on there, you can make these bets that pay off in 50 years or 25 years.
现在那里有数百个赌注，涵盖各种预测，你可以去那里，如果你想与其中的一方意见不合，你可以做这些在50年或25年后兑现的赌注。

42. Didn’t get Clayton Homes question in advance

没有提前得到克莱顿房屋的问题

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Everybody will settle down, we’ll move right along.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。大家安静下来，我们继续前进。

I want to clear up one thing. My daughter told me that because we had all those — I had — all those slides that were in answer to Carol’s first question, that Carol [Loomis] and I had discussed it ahead of time.
我想澄清一件事。我的女儿告诉我，因为我们有那么多——我有——那些是对卡罗尔第一个问题的回答的幻灯片，所以卡罗尔（卢米斯）和我事先讨论过这个。

I will guarantee you that I’ve discussed no questions with anyone on the panel, and they will tell you the same thing.
我向你保证，我没有和小组中的任何人讨论过问题，他们也会告诉你同样的事情。

But I knew I was going to be asked questions about Clayton, so I prepared the slides.
但我知道我会被问到关于克莱顿的问题，所以我准备了幻灯片。

It was an accident that it turned out to be the first question, but it was certain to be in the first few.
这成为第一个问题是个意外，但它肯定会在前几个问题中。

So, Carol did not — Carol in 60 years has never tipped me off on anything, nor have the other panelists.
所以，卡罗尔从来没有——在过去 60 年里，卡罗尔从来没有给我任何提示，其他评委也是如此。

And everything — but we were — but I was — prepared for the fact that people would be asking questions about Clayton.
而一切——但我们——但我——已经准备好人们会问关于克莱顿的问题。

OK. Let’s move right along, and we’ll go to Becky.
好的。我们继续前进，接下来我们去找贝基。

43. Businesses that do best in high inflation

在高通胀中表现最好的企业

BECKY QUICK: OK. This is a question — oops, that’s not the question. Hold on.
贝基·奎克：好的。这是一个问题——哦，那不是问题。等一下。

Here it is. This is a question from John Wells, right here in Omaha, and he says, “You’ve described inflation as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. Which of Berkshire’s businesses are best suited to thrive during a period of high inflation and why? Which will suffer the most and why?”
在这里。这是来自约翰·威尔斯的问题，他就在奥马哈，他说：“你把通货膨胀形容为一个巨大的企业寄生虫。伯克希尔的哪些业务最适合在高通货膨胀时期蓬勃发展，为什么？哪些业务将遭受最大的损失，为什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the best businesses during inflation are usually the best — they’re the businesses that you buy once and then you don’t have to keep making capital investments subsequently.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在通货膨胀期间，最好的企业通常是最好的——它们是你一次购买后就不需要再进行后续资本投资的企业。

So you get — you do not face the problem of continuous reinvestment involving greater and greater dollars because of inflation.
所以你就不会面临由于通货膨胀而导致的持续再投资问题，这涉及到越来越多的资金。

That’s one reason real estate, in general, is good during inflation. If you built your own house 55 years ago like Charlie did, or bought one 55 years ago like I did, it’s a one-time outlay, whereas if you’re — and you get the — you get an inflationary expansion in replacement capital without having to replace yourself.
这也是为什么房地产在通货膨胀期间通常表现良好的原因之一。如果你像Charlie一样在55年前建造了自己的房子，或者像我一样在55年前购买了一套房子，这就是一次性支出，而如果你——你会看到——你会在不需要自己替换的情况下获得通货膨胀带来的资本扩张。

And if you’ve got something that’s useful to someone else, it tends to be priced in terms of replacement value over time, so you really get the inflationary kick.
如果你拥有对别人有用的东西，它的价格往往会随着时间的推移而以替代价值来定价，因此你确实会感受到通货膨胀的影响。

Now, if you’re in a business such as the utility business or the railroad business, it just keeps eating up more and more money, and your depreciation charges are inadequate and you’re kidding yourself as to your real economic profits.
现在，如果你从事的是公用事业或铁路行业，这些行业只会不断消耗更多的钱，而你的折旧费用不足，你对自己真实的经济利润自欺欺人。
这是很严重的缺陷。
So, any business with heavy capital investment tends to be a poor business to be in in inflation and often it’s a poor business to be in generally.
因此，任何需要大量资本投资的企业在通货膨胀时期往往是一个不好的行业，通常来说，这也是一个不好的行业。

And the business where you buy something once — a brand is a wonderful thing to own during inflation.
而那些一次性购买的业务——品牌在通货膨胀期间是非常有价值的。

You know, See’s Candy built their brand many years ago. Now, we’ve had to nourish it as we’ve gone along, but the value of that brand increases during inflation, just as the value of, really, any strongly branded goods.
你知道，See’s Candy 多年前就建立了他们的品牌。现在，我们在发展过程中不得不不断滋养它，但在通货膨胀期间，那个品牌的价值会增加，就像任何强势品牌商品的价值一样。

Gillette bought the entire radio rights to the World Series in 1939. And as I remember, it cost them $100,000, and for that they got to broadcast the Yankees, I think, versus the Reds in 1939.
Gillette在1939年购买了整个世界大赛的无线电广播权。根据我记得的情况，它花费了他们10万美元，他们获得了广播1939年洋基队对红人队的比赛。

And think of the number of impressions they made on minds in 1939 dollars for $100,000, and they were getting in the minds of young guys like myself. I was eight or nine. And millions of people — and they did it in those dollars then.
想想他们在 1939 年用 10 万美元对人们心灵产生的影响，以及他们在像我这样的年轻人心中留下的印象。我那时八九岁。还有数百万人——他们当时就是这样做到的。

And, of course, if you were going to go out and try out and do — have similar impressions on millions of minds now, it’d cost a fortune. And part of that is due to inflation. Part of it’s due to other things.
当然，如果你打算出去尝试并在数百万人的心中产生类似的印象，这将花费一大笔钱。这部分是由于通货膨胀，另一部分则是由于其他因素。

But it was a great investment, which could be made in 1939 dollars that paid off, in terms of selling razors and blades in 1960 and 1970 and 1980 dollars.
但这是一个很好的投资，使用 1939 年的美元进行投资，最终在 1960 年、1970 年和 1980 年的美元中获得了回报，体现在剃须刀和刀片的销售上。
软件企业的工资费用没有真的消失，钱付了，软件更好了。
So that’s the kind of business you want to own.
所以这就是你想拥有的那种生意。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, but if the inflation ever goes completely out of control, you have no idea how it’s going to end up.
查理·芒格：嗯，是的，但如果通货膨胀完全失控，你根本不知道结果会怎样。

If it weren’t for the Weimar inflation, we might never have had Adolf Hitler. It was the twosome of the great German inflation followed by the Great Depression that brought us Hitler. And think of the price that the world paid for that one.
如果不是魏玛通货膨胀，我们可能永远不会有阿道夫·希特勒。正是伟大的德国通货膨胀和随之而来的大萧条的双重影响带来了希特勒。想想世界为此付出的代价。

We don’t want inflation because it’s good for See’s Candy. (Laughter)
我们不想要通货膨胀，因为这对See’s糖果有好处。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t quite realize I was —
沃伦·巴菲特：我并没有完全意识到我正在——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I wasn’t criticizing you.
查理·芒格：不，我并不是在批评你。

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s good for See’s Candy is good for the United States. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：对 See's Candy 有利的事情对美国也是有利的。（笑声）

44. Organic growth vs. acquisitions

有机增长与收购

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。加里？

GARY RANSOM: Three years ago you noted that you had looked at a large commercial lines insurance company as a possible acquisition, and now you’ve started up Berkshire Specialty, which seems to be off to a good start.
加里·兰索姆：三年前你提到你曾考虑过收购一家大型商业保险公司，而现在你已经成立了伯克希尔专业公司，似乎进展顺利。

What are your thoughts on whether that has replaced the idea of taking over — of buying or acquiring a large company, or is Berkshire Specialty doing well enough that you’re content with that —
你对这是否取代了收购大型公司的想法有什么看法，还是伯克希尔专业公司做得足够好，让你对此感到满意？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

GARY RANSOM: — organic growth?
加里·兰索姆：—— 有机增长？

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say that it’s almost certain that we — I don’t want to say 100 percent certain — but it’s almost certain we will not take over a large commercial insurance company.
沃伦·巴菲特：我可以说，我们几乎可以肯定——我不想说百分之百肯定——但我们几乎可以肯定我们不会收购一家大型商业保险公司。

We’ve got the ideal operation, in my view, in Berkshire Hathaway Specialty.
在我看来，伯克希尔哈撒韦专业公司是理想的运营。

We’ve got the right people running it. We’ve got Ajit overseeing it. We’ve got more capital than any commercial insurance company in the world so that our securities are — and, therefore, our policies — are really better than anyone else’s.
我们有合适的人在管理它。我们有 Ajit 在监督。我们的资本比世界上任何商业保险公司都要多，因此我们的证券——因此，我们的保单——实际上比其他任何公司的都要好。

So, we’ve got all these things going for us. And if we bought a big operation, we would have paid a very substantial nondeductible acquisition premium, and this way we’ve actually made money while we’re in the building stage.
所以，我们有这么多优势。如果我们收购一个大型企业，我们将支付一笔非常可观的不可扣除的收购溢价，而通过这种方式，我们实际上在建设阶段赚了钱。

And I think it can be a very, very big operation five or 10 years from now. So it’s almost zero probability that we’ll buy somebody else.
我认为五年或十年后这可能会是一个非常非常大的业务。因此，我们几乎没有可能会收购其他公司。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with you.
查理·芒格：我当然同意你的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. The — that’s how he keeps his job. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。这就是他保持工作的方式。（笑声）

We’ll go to — incidentally, all the overflow rooms, including at the Hilton, got filled. I’m not sure where a couple — where station 11 is — but we always lose a fair number at lunchtime.
我们会去——顺便提一下，所有的分会场，包括希尔顿的，都已满员。我不太确定第 11 站在哪里——但我们总是在午餐时间失去相当一部分人。

So I’m sure everybody can find a seat, but we do apologize to those who could not find a seat this morning.
所以我相信大家都能找到座位，但我们对今天早上找不到座位的人表示歉意。

45. Munger on reputation and behaving well

芒格谈声誉和良好行为

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 11?
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Hey, Warren and Charlie. How are you guys? Congratulations on 50 years.
观众成员：是的。嘿，沃伦和查理，你们好吗？恭喜你们 50 周年。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, in this year’s annual letter, Charlie wrote about the peculiar attributes that made the Berkshire system, and the leader of the system, a historically organizing entity — organizational entity.
观众成员：所以，在今年的年报中，Charlie谈到了使Berkshire系统及其领导者成为历史性组织实体的特殊属性。

So, my question to both of you is what practical mental model or mental models would you impress upon a young, enterprising individual at the infancy of their career to build an important enduring enterprise of that particular distinction and impact?
所以，我想问你们俩的是，您会向一位刚开始职业生涯的年轻有为的个人传授什么实用的思维模型，以帮助他们建立一个具有重要持久影响的企业？

And if you could give, like, maybe some contrasting examples, like why is a Microsoft able to build itself into a dominating monolithic company, versus a See’s Candy, which can be a great enterprise to spin off cash flow but not necessarily be an enduring — or not necessarily enduring — but an impactful enterprise to the level of a Berkshire or Microsoft?
如果你们能提供一些对比性的例子，比如为什么微软能够发展成一家主导性的垄断公司，而See’s Candy可能是一个很好的现金流企业，但不一定能成为像Berkshire或微软那样持久或具有影响力的企业？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you, Warren. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：谢谢你，沃伦。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re the guy that wrote it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你就是写这个的人。（笑声）

This is pineapple juice, incidentally. People were questioning that. (Laughter)
顺便说一下，这个是菠萝汁。有人对这个有疑问。（笑声）

They say it’s good for your throat if you’re going to talk a long time.
他们说如果你要长时间说话，这对喉咙有好处。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Well, of course, reputation you get over a long period of time.
查理·芒格：是的。当然，声誉是经过很长时间积累起来的。

Very few people are like Charles Lindbergh where you just suddenly have a great reputation.
很少有人像Charles Lindbergh那样，突然间就拥有了极高的声誉。

Most of us have to acquire one very slowly, and that was true in Berkshire’s case.
我们大多数人必须非常缓慢地获得一个，这在伯克希尔的案例中也是如此。

And any individual you just have to get the best reputation you can in the years you’re allotted and the time available.
而任何个人都必须在分配给你的年份和可用时间内尽可能获得最佳声誉。

And it may work out well, it may work out poorly. But it’s a wise investment.
这可能会有好的结果，也可能会有不好的结果。但这是一个明智的投资。

I see, all the time, opportunities come to people where it’s the credibility they’ve gotten in the past that causes them to have the new opportunity.
我经常看到，人们获得的机会往往是由于他们过去获得的信誉，这使他们有了新的机会。

So, I think hardly anything is more important than behaving well as you go through life.
所以，我认为在生活中表现得体几乎是最重要的事情。

And — I think we actually try to behave better as we got more prosperous, and I think you’d be crazy if you didn’t.
而且——我认为随着我们变得更加繁荣，我们实际上会努力表现得更好，我认为如果你不这样做，那你就是疯了。

So, I’d certainly recommend that you follow those old-fashioned principles.
所以，我肯定会建议你遵循那些老式原则。

And I don’t think there’s any way of guaranteeing a total powerhouse brand, nor can — if a result is a one in 50 million-type result, you’re probably not going to get it.
而且，我认为没有任何方法可以保证一个完全强大的品牌，如果结果是50万分之一的结果，你可能不会得到它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Gianni Agnelli of Fiat, back in — I think it was 1988 — I was at dinner with him one time, and he said something to me that stuck with me. He said, “When you get old,” he says, “You’ll have the reputation you deserve.” He says, “For a while you can” —
沃伦·巴菲特：菲亚特的贾尼·阿涅利，回想起来——我想是 1988 年——我曾和他共进晚餐，他对我说了一句话让我记忆犹新。他说：“当你变老时，”他说，“你会拥有你应得的声誉。”他说，“有一段时间你可以”——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Fool people.
查理·芒格：愚弄人们。

WARREN BUFFETT: — “fool people,” but he says, “When” — he was talking about himself at the time — but he said, “When you get to be my age,” he said, “Whatever reputation you have, it’s probably the one you deserve.”
沃伦·巴菲特：“愚弄人们，”但他说，“当”——他当时在谈论自己——但他说，“当你到我这个年纪，”他说，“无论你有什么名声，那可能就是你应得的。”

And I think the same is true of companies. And, frankly, you know, it has helped Berkshire a whole lot that it has gotten a reputation to be a somewhat different sort of company.
我认为公司也是如此。坦率地说，伯克希尔获得了一个有些不同的公司声誉，这对它帮助很大。

I mean, I don’t think we set out to do that, exactly, but it has worked out that way.
我的意思是，我并不认为我们一开始就是这样做的，但结果却是这样。

46. Climate change risk for insurance subsidiaries

保险子公司的气候变化风险

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren, you have said that global warming has not increased Berkshire’s payouts for weather-related events. Yet, other insurers, including Travelers, have cited climate change as a risk factor that they use.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦，你曾说过全球变暖并没有增加伯克希尔因天气相关事件的赔付。然而，包括旅行者在内的其他保险公司则将气候变化视为他们使用的风险因素。

Are Berkshire’s models different and, if so, how?
伯克希尔的模型是否不同？如果是的话，具体有什么不同？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No. I’ve seen the — of course, the SEC requires you put in all these risk factors, and the lawyers will tell you to put in, you know, everything possibly you can think of, you know, that you’ll develop Alzheimer’s or whatever it may be.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有。我见过——当然，证券交易委员会要求你列出所有这些风险因素，律师会告诉你尽可能列出所有你能想到的事情，比如你可能会得阿尔茨海默病或其他任何事情。

They just want you to have a laundry list so that it’s all been covered in case of later litigation or something of the sort.
他们只是希望你有一份清单，以便在后来的诉讼或类似情况下都能涵盖所有内容。

So people do put in weather risk, and maybe they put it in because they’ve got some model that shows it. But, you know, we price our business — basically, we price it every year.
所以人们确实会把天气风险列进去，也许他们这样做是因为他们有一些模型显示了这一点。但你知道，我们的业务定价——基本上是每年定价。

It’s not like a life insurance company. A life insurance company you make a contract that — so much a thousand. And if you buy whole life insurance, you’ve set a price for — if you’re 20, you may have set a price for 60 or 70 years in the future. But that is not the property casualty insurance business, which we’re in.
这并不像人寿保险公司。人寿保险公司你会签订一个合同——每千元多少。如果你买了终身保险，你可能为20岁时定下了未来60或70年的价格。

We set it one year at a time. And I see nothing that tells me that on a yearly basis that global warming is something that should cause me to change my prices a lot, or even a small amount.
我们每年设定一次。我没有看到任何迹象表明，全球变暖每年都应该让我大幅度或甚至小幅度地调整价格。

That doesn’t mean that it isn’t a threat to humanity or — you know, and terribly important. It just means that if I’m going to sell a one-year insurance policy, and I’m going to sell it on a $1 billion plant, I may care enormously about the fire protection, and other various other kinds of protection, within that plant.
这并不意味着它对人类不是一种威胁，或者说它不重要。这只是意味着，如果我要出售一份为期一年的保险单，而这份保险是针对一个价值 10 亿美元的工厂，我可能会非常关心该工厂内的消防保护以及其他各种保护措施。

I may care about what’s going on adjacent to that plant, and all kinds of things, but I am not thinking about global warming. It does not change the situation, in a material way, in any one-year period of time, in my judgment.
我可能关心那家工厂附近发生的事情，以及各种各样的事情，但我并没有考虑全球变暖。在我看来，这在任何一年内都不会在实质上改变情况。

And, you know, it — if I was writing a 50-year wind storm policy in Florida, I would think very hard about what global warming might do in that case to the incidence and the intensity of potential hurricanes.
而且，你知道，如果我在佛罗里达州撰写一份 50 年的风暴政策，我会非常认真地考虑全球变暖在这种情况下可能对潜在飓风的发生率和强度产生的影响。

But I do not think it has any material effect on the likelihood of — or the intensity — of a hurricane in Florida or Louisiana or Texas or — next year.
但我认为这对明年佛罗里达、路易斯安那、德克萨斯州或其他地方的飓风发生的可能性或强度没有任何实质性的影响。

So, it is not a — it’s not something I would put in the 10-K as a threat.
所以，这不是一个——我不会把它作为威胁放在 10-K 报告中。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s totally clear what the effects of global warming will be on extremes of weather. I think there’s a lot of guesswork in that field, and a lot of people like howling about calamities that are by no means sure.
查理·芒格：我认为全球变暖对极端天气的影响并不完全明确。我认为这个领域有很多猜测，很多人喜欢对那些并不确定的灾难大声嚷嚷。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Do you think — would it change your one-year prediction as to what the rate should be?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你认为——这会改变你对价格应如何设定的一年预测吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. It wouldn’t change mine either, so I don’t really understand why they put that in there.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。这也不会改变我的看法，所以我不太明白他们为什么要把这个放进去。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of people get very invested. It’s like a crazy ideology.
查理·芒格：很多人投入得非常深。这就像一种疯狂的意识形态。

It’s not that global warming isn’t happening. It’s just that you can get so excited about it you make all kinds of crazy extrapolations that aren’t necessarily correct.
全球变暖确实在发生。只是你可能会对此感到非常兴奋，以至于做出各种不一定正确的疯狂推断。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Look at it this way. Would you change the rate for tomorrow on insurance because — from the rate today — for global warming? I doubt it very much.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这样看待这个问题。你会因为全球变暖而改变明天的保险费率吗？我对此非常怀疑。

Now, you know, would you change it for 50 years? Might very well.
现在，你知道吗，你会为了 50 年而改变它吗？很可能会。

But I think that one year is much closer to one day than it is to 50 years, in terms of focusing on that factor.
但我认为一年在关注这个因素时，更接近于一天，而不是 50 年。

So, I do not want our underwriters to sit there thinking a lot about — in terms of writing a risk or the price at which to write that risk — I do not want them thinking about global warming. I want them thinking about whether there’s a moral risk involved and who owns the property.
所以，我不希望我们的承保人坐在那里考虑很多关于——在承保风险或承保该风险的价格方面——我不希望他们考虑全球变暖。我希望他们考虑是否涉及道德风险以及谁拥有该财产。

I mean, that can be very significant. There used to be one fellow called “Marvin the Torch,” that if you insured “Marvin the Torch,” global warming didn’t really make much difference. His building was going to go. (Laughter)
我的意思是，这可能是非常重要的。以前有一个叫“Marvin the Torch”的家伙，如果你给“Marvin the Torch”投保，全球变暖实际上没有多大区别。他的建筑物肯定会被毁坏。（笑声）

Marvin had a marvelous way of looking at it, though. He said, “I don’t burn buildings; I create vacant lots.” (Laughter)
不过，Marvin对这个问题有一种独特的看法。他说：“我不是烧建筑物，我是创造空地。”（笑声）

47. More oil & gas investments possible despite poor record

尽管记录不佳，仍可能有更多的石油和天然气投资。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: When we look back at some of your bigger stock purchases during the past decade, two names actually stand out: ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil.
格雷格·沃伦：当我们回顾过去十年中你的一些大额股票购买时，有两个名字实际上脱颖而出：康菲石油和埃克森美孚。

In the first instance, you bought shares near the height of the spike in oil prices in 2008, later acknowledging that this was a mistake given how dramatically oil prices fell during the crisis.
首先，您在 2008 年油价飙升的高峰期购买了股票，后来承认这是一个错误，因为在危机期间油价大幅下跌。

While you’ve been able to swap some of those holdings, post a spinoff of Phillips 66 into operating assets, most of what you sold the last six years, by our estimates, has been at a loss.
虽然你已经能够在Phillips 66拆分后交换了一些这些持股，但根据我们的估计，你在过去六年中出售的大部分股票都是亏损的。

Given that experience, it surprised some of us to see you take a meaningful position in ExxonMobil during the summer of 2013.
鉴于这种经历，我们感到惊讶的是，你在2013年夏天对ExxonMobil采取了重要的投资。

While it looks like you were able to eliminate that stake at cost as oil prices fell last year, these types of investments, which can be negatively impacted by the volatility in oil prices, don’t really seem to fit well with the other types of investments in your stock portfolio, many of which are built on strong franchises with unique competitive advantages.
虽然看起来你能够在油价下跌时以成本价格消除这一股份，但这些类型的投资，可能会受到油价波动的负面影响，似乎不太适合你股票组合中的其他类型投资，许多投资是基于强大的品牌和独特的竞争优势。

With that in mind, and given the track record that Greg Abel and his team at Berkshire Hathaway Energy have had acquiring and investing in energy assets, does it make more sense to leave future energy-related investments in their hands?
考虑到这一点，鉴于Greg Abel及其团队在Berkshire Hathaway Energy收购和投资能源资产方面的记录，是否更有意义将未来的能源相关投资留给他们处理？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s nothing we like better than to back up Greg in buying utility properties.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们最喜欢的就是支持格雷格购买公用事业物业。

And — but they — we call it energy, but it’s not oil and gas in Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and they’re really in a dramatically different business than ConocoPhillips or ExxonMobil.
但是——我们称之为能源，但Berkshire Hathaway Energy并不是石油和天然气，它们实际上与ConocoPhillips或ExxonMobil的业务完全不同。

But we are looking, constantly, for opportunities for Berkshire Hathaway Energy to spend big money, and it will.
但我们一直在寻找伯克希尔哈撒韦能源大举投资的机会，而它会这样做。

Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we paid $35.05 per share in 1999 to buy the stock.
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源，我们在 1999 年以每股 35.05 美元的价格购买了该股票。

I was at $35, and I don’t change my prices and Berkshire — the company was then called MidAmerican — they hired some investment bankers to come out from New York, and investment bankers spent a week here doing nothing.
我当时是35美元，我不改变价格，而Berkshire——那时候公司叫MidAmerican——他们请了一些投资银行家从纽约过来，投资银行家在这里待了一周什么都没做。

But they felt — before they went home, they said, you know, “You’ve got to give us something because we’re going to send a big bill.” And I said, “Well, in that case, we’ll pay $35.05 and you can say you got the last nickel out of me.” (Laughter)
但他们觉得——在回家之前，他们说，你知道，“你得给我们点什么，因为我们要寄一张大账单。”我说，“那好吧，我们就付35.05美元，你们可以说你们从我这里拿到了最后一分。”（笑声）

So my ambition ever since has been to have Berkshire Hathaway Energy earn $35.05 per share. It’s never paid a dividend.
所以我从那时起的雄心就是让伯克希尔哈撒韦能源每股赚取 35.05 美元。它从未支付过股息。

It will probably earn about $30 a share this year, which is a great tribute to Greg and his management. But we will get the 35 or better because he will make some good deals.
它今年可能每股赚取约 30 美元，这对格雷格和他的管理团队是一个很大的赞誉。但我们会获得 35 美元或更高，因为他会达成一些好的交易。

It’s not at all analogous to the ConocoPhillips or ExxonMobil investments. As it turned out, we wrote ConocoPhillips down because we were required by the auditors to do it.
这与康菲石油或埃克森美孚的投资完全不同。结果是，我们将康菲石油的价值下调，因为审计师要求我们这样做。

We actually, by the time we got all through, we made some money in it, and we made a little money in ExxonMobil, too.
实际上，当我们完成所有事情时，我们在这方面赚了一些钱，我们在埃克森美孚也赚了一点钱。

But we will not be buying, very often, oil and gas stocks, but we will — we probably haven’t bought the last one.
但我们不会很频繁地购买石油和天然气股票，但我们会——我们可能还没有买最后一只。

In the end, we look at the cash, we look at available opportunities, both in investments and businesses, and we make decisions, occasionally, on buying something and sometimes we change our mind.
最后，我们查看现金，查看可用的机会，包括投资和商业，然后我们做出决策，有时会购买某些东西，有时我们会改变主意。

And that will continue that way. It’s been going on that way for a lot of years.
这将继续这样下去。这种情况已经持续了很多年。

And we have not distinguished ourselves, at all, in the oil and gas field, although we’ve made a little money, and we passed up one or two where we could have made a lot of money.
我们在石油和天然气领域并没有表现出色，尽管我们赚了一些钱，但我们放弃了一两个本可以赚很多钱的机会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And with interest rates being so low and the dividend on ExxonMobil being the size it was, it was not a bad cash substitute, if you think only in those terms.
查理·芒格：是的。考虑到利率如此之低，以及埃克森美孚的股息如此之大，从这个角度来看，它并不是一个坏的现金替代品。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It worked out OK. There were other things we could have done a lot better, but that’s always been true and will continue to be true.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。结果还不错。还有其他事情我们可以做得更好，但这一直是这样，并将继续如此。

48. No “tears” for corporations on taxes

对企业的税收没有“眼泪”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, my name is Andy Peake, and I’m from New York City.
观众成员：主席先生，副主席先生，我叫安迪·皮克，来自纽约市。

First, congratulations to you on a remarkable 50 years, and second, thank you for hosting a one-of-a-kind annual meeting where you patiently answer questions from shareholders. I believe you are both — (Applause)
首先，祝贺你们50年非凡的成就，其次，感谢你们主持了这样独特的年度会议，并耐心解答股东的问题。我相信你们两位都是——（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I believe you are two of the most knowledgeable and authoritative people on planet Earth on the U.S. tax code.
观众成员：我认为你们两位是地球上对美国税法最有见解和权威的人。

Our tax code is obviously broken at both the individual and the corporate levels.
我们的税法在个人和企业层面显然存在问题。

Today, we have 2.1 trillion in offshore corporate cash sitting there not being brought home. We have the highest corporate tax rates in the world, and for high-income earners in the U.S., other than hedge fund managers, in states like New York and California, an all-in rate greater than 50 percent.
如今，我们有2.1万亿美元的企业资金滞留在海外没有带回。我们有全球最高的企业税率，而在纽约和加州等州，除了对冲基金经理以外的高收入者，综合税率超过50%。

What can be done to effect real change to bring about a simpler, more rational tax code? Thank you.
为了实现真正的改变，如何才能使税法变得更简单、更合理？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it takes 218 members of the House of Representatives and 51 U.S. senators, and a president that will sign the bill.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，这需要 218 名众议院议员和 51 名美国参议员，以及一位愿意签署法案的总统。

The question is: how much you think the country should spend and then from whom do you get it?
问题是：你认为国家应该花多少钱，然后从谁那里获得这些资金？

And I would point out that despite the tax rates that all the corporate chieftains complain about, the share of earnings — share of GDP — accounted for by corporate profits is at a record.
我想指出，尽管所有企业首席执行官都抱怨税率，但企业利润所占的收益份额——国内生产总值的份额——达到了历史最高水平。

Corporate taxes 40 years ago were 4 percent of GDP. They’re now running about 2 percent. They’ve decreased significantly while payroll taxes have increased.
企业税在 40 年前占 GDP 的 4%。现在大约为 2%。它们显著减少，而工资税则增加了。

You know, it’s a real question.
你知道，这真是个问题。

And once you get special provisions in the code, it is really hard to get rid of them, absent a major revision of the code.
一旦你在法规中获得了特殊条款，除非进行重大修订，否则很难将其去除。

I actually think — I may be an optimist on this, but I’m — I think both Ron Wyden and Orrin Hatch, the two ranking members, Senate Finance Committee, I think they’re capable of working out something that they — neither one of them likes — but they both like it better than what exists now, and I think it can be made considerably more rational.
实际上，我可能是个乐观主义者，但我认为参议院财政委员会的两位高级成员，罗恩·怀登和奥林·哈奇，有能力达成一个双方都不喜欢的方案，但他们会比现在的状况更满意，我认为这可以变得更加合理。

But in the end, if we’re going to spend 21 or 2 percent of GDP, we should probably raise 19 percent of GDP.
但最终，如果我们要花费GDP的21%或22%，那么我们大概应该筹集GDP的19%。

We can take a gap of a couple percent without getting further into debt as a proportion of GDP than we are, so we’ve got that leeway.
我们可以承受几个百分点的差距，而不会使债务占 GDP 的比例进一步上升，所以我们有这个余地。

But, you know, you take 19 percent of 17 1/2 trillion, or thereabouts, and you’re talking, as Senator [Everett] Dirksen said one time, real money.
但是，你知道，拿 17.5 万亿的 19%来算，或者差不多这个数，你就会发现，正如参议员[埃弗雷特]·迪克森曾经说过的，那是真正的钱。

And how much you get from corporations, how much you get from individuals, how much you get from estate taxes, you know, it’s a fight up and down the line.
你从企业获得多少，个人获得多少，遗产税获得多少，你知道，这是一场上下的斗争。

So I — and in terms of the cash abroad, basically you can bring it back, you just have to pay tax at U.S. corporate rates. And our corporate rates are 35 percent.
所以我——在海外现金方面，基本上你可以把它带回来，只需按照美国企业税率缴税。我们的企业税率是 35%。

Charlie and I, a good bit of our life, operated with corporate rates of 52 percent, later at 48 percent, and the country grew well. American business prospered during that period.
查理和我，在我们生活的很大一部分时间里，运营的公司税率为 52%，后来降至 48%，国家发展良好。在那段时间里，美国商业繁荣。

I don’t shed any tears for American business, in terms of the tax rate overall. I think there could be a much more equitable code, in terms of the corporate tax, but I do not think that the 2 percent of GDP that’s being raised from corporate taxes, which is far lower than was the percentage 30 or 40 years ago, I do not think that’s an onerous number.
我对美国企业的整体税率并不感到悲伤。我认为在企业税方面可以有一个更公平的税法，但我认为目前从企业税中征收的占 GDP 的 2%远低于 30 或 40 年前的比例，我认为这个数字并不沉重。

And for people who are getting 1/4 or 1/2 percent on their CDs, who have retired, and with American business earning, on tangible equity, which is the way they measure it, you know, probably averaging close to 15 percent, I think equity holders are getting treated extraordinarily well compared to debt holders in this economy. (Scattered applause)
对于那些退休后从存款证中仅能获得1/4或1/2利息的人来说，考虑到美国企业在有形权益上，按他们衡量的方式，大约平均接近15%的回报率，我认为在这个经济环境下，股权持有人比债权持有人受到的待遇好得多。（稀疏掌声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you, and I don’t die over these little differences in the tax code, either.
查理·芒格：我同意你的观点，我也不会因为税法中的这些小差异而感到沮丧。

I live in California, of course, where — there’s, like, a 13 1/2 percent tax on long-term capital gains, nondeductible for federal purposes. That’s a ridiculous kind of a tax to have in California because it drives rich people out.
我住在加利福尼亚，当然，这里对长期资本收益征收大约 13.5%的税，联邦税务上不可抵扣。这种税在加利福尼亚是荒谬的，因为它驱赶了富人。

Hawaii and Florida have enough sense to know that rich people don’t commit a lot of crimes, they don’t burden the schools, and they provide a whole lot of medical expenditures that are good for everybody else’s income.
夏威夷和佛罗里达州足够明白，富人不会犯很多罪，他们不会给学校带来负担，并且他们提供了大量对其他人收入有益的医疗支出。

I think California has a really stupid tax policy. But I don’t think the U.S. — but I don’t think the U.S. policy is — (applause) — I don’t think the U.S. policy is bad at all.
我认为加利福尼亚的税收政策非常愚蠢。但我认为美国的政策——我认为美国的政策一点也不好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And it’s nondeductible because of the alternative income tax —
沃伦·巴菲特：这不可扣除，因为替代所得税——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, exactly.
查理·芒格：是的，正是如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That really wasn’t the case before, but it —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。之前确实不是这样，但它——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it’s always —
查理·芒格：不，总是——

WARREN BUFFETT: — kind of slipped in.
沃伦·巴菲特：——有点不经意地说出来了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, they did it on purpose. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，他们是故意的。（笑声）

No, they did it on purpose.
不，他们是故意的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Early stages of paranoia. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：偏执的早期阶段。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But it is — it’s amazing. The idea of driving the rich people out, Florida is so much smarter than California on that subject. And it is really demented.
查理·芒格：是的。但这真是令人惊讶。把富人驱逐出去的想法，佛罗里达在这个问题上比加利福尼亚聪明得多。这真的很疯狂。

Who in the hell doesn’t want rich people coming in and spending in their state?
谁会不想让有钱人来他们的州消费呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. Remember that as you come here to Nebraska for the meeting. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。记住这一点，当你们来到内布拉斯加州参加会议时。（笑声）

I would say I really do think there’s some chance this year — and not a tiny chance.
我认为今年确实有一些机会——而且不是微不足道的机会。

I know both Ron Wyden and Orrin Hatch. They’re patriotic, they’re smart, they want to do the right thing. They’ve got different ideas about what the right thing is, there’s no question about that, but they also know they can’t get any place without cooperating.
我认识罗恩·怀登和奥林·哈奇。他们爱国，聪明，想做正确的事情。他们对什么是正确的事情有不同的看法，这毫无疑问，但他们也知道如果不合作就无法取得任何进展。

But I think the real opportunity is if they work out of the public eye in doing — in working on something — and I wouldn’t be surprised if they are. I think that’s the way to get it done.
但我认为真正的机会在于他们在公众视线之外进行工作——在做某件事情上——我不会感到惊讶如果他们确实如此。我认为这就是完成工作的方式。

Charlie has always pointed out, what would have happened if the Constitutional Convention back there in Philadelphia had been held with every delegate running out immediately to tell the TV cameras how right he was and how wrong everybody else was.
查理一直指出，如果费城的制宪会议上，每位代表都立即跑出去告诉电视摄像机他是多么正确，而其他人是多么错误，那会发生什么。

It doesn’t accomplish much to dig in on positions, and not be in a position to compromise, because it takes a lot of compromise to write something when you have two different — fundamentally different — views on some important aspects of the tax code.
在立场上固执己见而不愿妥协并没有太大意义，因为在税法的一些重要方面存在两种根本不同的观点时，撰写某些内容需要大量的妥协。

But those are two good guys, and I would not — I don’t think it’s impossible that we have a new corporate tax code within a year.
但那两个人都是好人，我不认为——我认为在一年内我们有一个新的企业税法并不是不可能的。

49. Buffett on Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations”

巴菲特谈亚当·斯密的《国富论》

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question, which is a little bit offbeat, comes from Jordan Shopof (PH) of Melbourne, Australia.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题有点不寻常，来自澳大利亚墨尔本的乔丹·肖波夫（PH）。

“Mr. Buffett, in the forward to the sixth edition of Benjamin Graham’s ‘Security Analysis,’ you identified four books that you particularly cherish.
“巴菲特先生，在本杰明·格雷厄姆的《证券分析》第六版的前言中，您提到了四本您特别珍视的书籍。”

“Three of these books were authored by Graham himself, and their influence on you is well-known.
这三本书是格雷厄姆本人撰写的，它们对你的影响是众所周知的。

“The contributions of the fourth book to your thinking, however — that book was Adam Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations,’ published in 1776 — what that book meant to you is seldom discussed.
然而，第四本书对你思维的贡献——那本书是亚当·斯密的《国富论》，于 1776 年出版——这本书对你的意义很少被讨论。

“So my question is, what did you learn from “The Wealth of Nations” and how did it shape your investment and business philosophy?”
“所以我的问题是，你从《国富论》中学到了什么，它是如何影响你的投资和商业哲学的？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it doesn’t shape my investment philosophy, but I certainly learned economics from it. And my friend Bill Gates gave me an original copy of it. I was able to study this.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这并没有影响我的投资哲学，但我确实从中学到了经济学。我的朋友比尔·盖茨给了我一份原版。我能够研究这个。

Adam Smith wrote it in 1776. It’s — you know, there’s just — if you read Adam Smith and if you read Keynes, Ricardo, and then — and if you also read that little book we’ve got out there called “Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?” you will have a lot of wisdom.
亚当·斯密在 1776 年写了这本书。你知道，如果你读亚当·斯密，再读凯恩斯、李嘉图，然后——如果你还读那本我们外面有的小书《顾客的游艇在哪里？》，你将获得很多智慧。

I forgot to mention, I was supposed to mention, too: we didn’t want to put it on sale earlier because it would have given away the movie, but we do have “Berkshire Bomber” underwear out there, or sweatshirts, or whatever it may be, so Fruit of the Loom has those.
我忘了提到，我本来应该提到的：我们不想早点把它出售，因为那会泄露电影的内容，但我们确实有“伯克希尔轰炸机”内衣，或者卫衣，或者其他什么，所以 Fruit of the Loom 有这些。

And we have Fred Schwed’s “Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?” book, which contains an incredible amount of wisdom and very few pages and very entertaining.
我们有弗雷德·施韦德的《顾客的游艇在哪里？》一书，书中蕴含了大量智慧，页数很少，而且非常有趣。

But if you want to go for — if you want to not only get a lot more wisdom but appear more erudite, you should read “The Wealth of Nations,” also.
但如果你想不仅获得更多智慧，还想显得更博学，你也应该阅读《国富论》。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Adam Smith is one of those guys that has really worn well. I mean, he is rightly recognized as one of the wisest people that ever came along.
查理·芒格：亚当·斯密是那些真正经得起时间考验的人之一。我的意思是，他被公认为有史以来最聪明的人之一，这是理所当然的。

And, of course, the lessons that he taught way back then were taught again when communism failed so terribly, and places like Singapore and Taiwan and China, and so forth, came up so fast.
当然，他在那时教授的课程在共产主义惨败后再次被教授，而新加坡、台湾和中国等地方迅速崛起。

The productive power of the capitalist system is simply unbelievable, and he understood that fully and early, and he’s done a lot of good.
资本主义制度的生产力简直令人难以置信，他对此早已充分理解，并且他做了很多好事。

WARREN BUFFETT: I took an idea of his on the specialization of labor, you know, and he talked about people making pins or something, but I applied that, actually, to philanthropy.
沃伦·巴菲特：我借鉴了他关于劳动分工的想法，你知道，他谈到人们制作针或其他东西，但我实际上将其应用于慈善事业。

You know, I mean, the idea that you let other people do what they’re best at and stick with what you’re best at, I’ve carried from mowing my lawn to philanthropy, and it’s a wonderful thing to just shove off everything and say somebody else is better than I am at that, and then work in the field that’s most productive for you.
你知道，我的意思是，让其他人做他们擅长的事情，而自己专注于自己擅长的事情，这个想法我从修剪草坪一直带到慈善事业。这是一件美好的事情，能够把所有事情都推给别人，承认他们在某些方面比我更优秀，然后在对我来说最有成效的领域工作。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You didn’t do your own bowel surgery, either.
查理·芒格：是的。你也没有自己做肠道手术。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不。（笑声）

I’m not sure I have any reply to that. (Laughter)
我不确定我对此有什么回应。（笑声）

50. Subsidiaries aren’t too focused on short term

子公司并不太关注短期。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Warren, you have told the managers of your businesses to think of their businesses as something they will own forever and that their first priority should be to widen the moat and take care of their customers.
乔纳森·布兰特：沃伦，你告诉你的企业经理们要把他们的企业视为永远拥有的东西，他们的首要任务应该是拓宽护城河并照顾好客户。

In more than one case, according to people I’ve spoken to, Berkshire’s subsidiaries that were formally publicly traded have run into trouble by — now this is on the margin, mind you — trying to maximize calendar year earnings and dividends to the parent, as opposed to focusing on the long-term health of the business.
据我与之交谈过的人所说，在不止一个案例中，伯克希尔旗下那些曾经是上市公司的子公司，遇到了这样的问题——我要强调这是个边际问题——即它们试图最大化当年的利润和向母公司分红，而不是专注于企业的长期健康发展。

Do you find that managements of formally public companies, through force of habit, perhaps, have more trouble making decisions with only minimal concern for short-term results than would be the case for formally private companies?
你是否发现，正式上市公司的管理层由于习惯使然，可能在做决策时更难以仅对短期结果保持最小关注，而这在正式私营公司中则不太可能出现？

If this dynamic is a real one, is there something more that can be done to combat it?
如果这种动态是真实的，还有什么更多的措施可以采取来应对它吗？

And I’m curious, are most of Berkshire’s compensation structures based on 12-month results or are they already based over multiyear periods?
我很好奇，伯克希尔的大多数薪酬结构是基于 12 个月的业绩，还是已经基于多年的周期？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think we’ve had any particular problem with public companies versus private companies that we’ve bought.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为我们在购买上市公司与私营公司方面没有遇到任何特别的问题。

I mean, if you took the aggregate of the public companies we bought and matched them up against the private companies, I don’t know which group I would rather own or which has delivered the greater returns.
我的意思是，如果你把我们购买的上市公司总和与私营公司进行比较，我不知道我更愿意拥有哪个集团，或者哪个集团带来的回报更高。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know where he gets the idea.
查理·芒格：我不知道他从哪里得到这个想法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not apparent to us.
查理·芒格：这对我们来说并不明显。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, you’ve heard Charlie. And I can’t think of it myself.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你听到了查理的观点。我自己也想不出其他的。

And, you know, if we tell them to think about 100 years, we mean think about 100 years, and I think they know we mean it. They certainly know we run Berkshire, you know, in terms of our own decisions that way.
而且，你知道，如果我们告诉他们考虑 100 年，我们的意思就是考虑 100 年，我认为他们知道我们是认真的。他们当然知道我们以这种方式管理伯克希尔，你知道，在我们自己的决策方面。

So, I think we set the right example, and I think we use the words to convey that belief as strongly as we can, and we try to reinforce — we try to put it in the annual report, we try to talk about it in meetings like this.
所以，我认为我们树立了正确的榜样，我认为我们尽可能强烈地用语言传达这种信念，并且我们努力强化——我们试图把它放在年度报告中，我们试图在这样的会议上谈论它。

We believe in sort of hammering the same message out there over and over again.
我们相信不断重复传达相同的信息。

Now, we don’t ignore yearly results at all, it’s just we don’t live by them. But I get figures every month on virtually every business, and I read them with great interest, and, you know, I’m thinking about them all the time.
现在，我们并不忽视年度业绩，只是我们不以此为生。但我每个月都会收到几乎所有业务的数字，我对此非常感兴趣，并且你知道，我一直在思考这些。

I don’t think they’re unimportant, but we don’t live by them. And I think what really counts, you know, is where we’re going to be three years, five years, or 10 years from now.
我不认为它们不重要，但我们并不依赖它们。我认为真正重要的是，我们在三年、五年或十年后会在哪里。

But I also — I wouldn’t — if we’re subpar in some area, I wouldn’t accept the fact that we’re working to maximize things in 10 years mean that we should be throwing away money, or anything like that, in the short run, or not paying attention to the business.
但我也不会——如果我们在某些方面表现不佳，我不会接受为追求十年后的最大化而在短期内浪费资金或忽视业务的做法。
不能失去当下的权重。
But I’d have to say what Charlie has, I don’t really agree with the premise.
不过，我必须说，和查理一样，我并不认同这个前提。

51. Buffett’s interest in German companies

巴菲特对德国公司的兴趣

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Warren, dear Charlie. Thank you for 50 great years. I’m a happy shareholder and hope to have you continue long.
观众成员：亲爱的沃伦，亲爱的查理。感谢你们 50 年的伟大成就。我是一名快乐的股东，希望你们能继续下去。

My name is Victoria Von Tropp (PH). I’m from Bonn in Germany.
我的名字是维多利亚·冯·特罗普（PH）。我来自德国的波恩。

And my question is, you own companies both here in the U.S. as well as in Germany. What differences in corporate culture and in performance do you see between German and U.S. starter companies?
我的问题是，您在美国和德国都有公司。您认为德国和美国初创公司在企业文化和表现上有什么不同？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? 沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Differences between what —
查理·芒格：之间的差异是什么——

WARREN BUFFETT: I know the question. I’m just looking to you for the answer, not the question. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我知道这个问题。我只是想向你寻求答案，而不是问题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now that he can hear so much better, he —
查理·芒格：现在他听得更清楚了，他——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we — we’ve had a hard time buying things in Europe. It’s been quite rare.
查理·芒格：嗯，我们在欧洲买东西一直很困难。这种情况非常罕见。

And I think the traditions, and the family traditions, are different in Europe than they are in the United States, and in some other countries.
我认为，欧洲的传统和家庭传统与美国以及其他一些国家的传统是不同的。

And Germany, of course, has a long tradition of being very good at technology and capitalism, and that’s been a godsend to Germany. And we’ve always admired the way the Germans have performed.
德国当然在技术和资本主义方面有着悠久的传统，这对德国来说是个天赐之福。我们一直钦佩德国人的表现。

The Germans actually work fewer hours than a lot of other people and produce a lot more and, of course, Warren and I are pretty good at that. (Laughter)
德国人实际上工作时间比很多其他人少，但生产的却多得多，当然，沃伦和我在这方面也相当不错。（笑声）

So we’re — we admire the Germans, particularly the engineering side, and — but we’ve been thinking about owning good German companies for a long time and we finally bought one.
所以我们——我们钦佩德国人，特别是工程方面，但我们考虑拥有优秀的德国公司已经很久了，最终我们买下了一家。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But I’ll make a prediction. I will predict we buy at least one German company in the next five years.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但我会做一个预测。我预测我们在未来五年内至少会收购一家德国公司。

I think that — I think we are far more on the radar screen than we were just a few years ago in Germany. I think we now have a woman over there who brought, through somebody else as well, but brought Louis to our attention.
我认为——我认为我们在德国的关注度比几年前高得多。我觉得我们现在有一位女性通过其他人将路易斯引起了我们的注意。

I think she is going to hear about more things because of her association with us on the transaction and the fact that we tried to get the word out as to her help with us.
我认为由于她在这笔交易中的参与，以及我们努力宣传她的帮助，她将听到更多关于潜在机会的消息。

So, I would really be surprised if we don’t make at least one deal in Germany in the next five years, and I would look forward to it. I mean, we’ll be very, very happy with — you know, we have to get a business, we understand.
所以，如果我们在未来五年内没有在德国达成至少一笔交易，我会感到非常惊讶。而且我很期待这件事。我的意思是，我们必须找到一个合适的业务，这一点我们很清楚。

I’ve had, probably, four or five letters in the last couple months, ever since the Louis deal was announced, but they’ve been very small businesses in practically each case.
在过去几个月里，自从路易斯交易宣布以来，我大概收到了四五封信，但几乎每次都是非常小的企业。

But we’ll get one. We’re eager, we’ve got the money, and we do fit the family situation, occasionally.
但我们会找到一个合适的。我们很积极，我们有资金，而且我们有时确实适合这种家族企业的情况。

And prices may be a little more attractive there than in the United States, although I haven’t seen anything yet that we’ve bought.
价格在那里可能比在美国更具吸引力，尽管我还没有看到我们购买的任何东西。

But I would say that there’s a reasonable chance that the price of something we’re offered over there might catch my attention more than U.S. prices, currently.
但我认为我们在那边所提供的某样东西的价格有合理的机会引起我的注意，超过目前美国的价格。

52. Why competitors sometimes underprice GEICO

为什么有时竞争对手的保费比GEICO低

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question caught my attention not because I think it’s a complaint, but I think it’s an actual question about the actuarial models that you use at GEICO.
贝基·奎克：这个问题吸引了我的注意，不是因为我认为这是个抱怨，而是我觉得它实际上是关于GEICO使用的精算模型的问题。

It comes from Stan Zion (PH). And he says, “My wife and I are stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway. I’m 78 and she’s 74. We have a long-time accident-free driving record.
这来自斯坦·齐昂（PH）。他说：“我和我的妻子是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东。我 78 岁，她 74 岁。我们有长期无事故的驾驶记录。”

Yet, when we applied to GEICO with our stockholder discount, GEICO was unable to beat our rates for comparable coverage with other fine companies. Why?”
然而，当我们以股东折扣申请 GEICO 时，GEICO 无法提供与其他优秀公司相当的保险覆盖范围的更优惠价格。为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s the reason that we probably can beat the rate maybe 40 percent of the time with people who contact us and 60 percent of the time we can’t.
沃伦·巴菲特：原因是我们大概能在40%的情况下提供比其他公司更低的价格，而在60%的情况下则无法做到。

No company is going to be the lowest in all cases. And we have our own underwriting criteria that involves many variables, one of which is age, but it wouldn’t be a dominant one at that age.
没有任何公司在所有情况下都会是最低的。我们有自己的承保标准，涉及许多变量，其中之一是年龄，但在那个年龄段这并不是一个主导因素。

But we have many, many variables. And we make our calculations, and very good competitors like State Farm and Allstate, USAA, and so on, they have somewhat different underwriting weightings and sometimes they come in below us.
但我们有很多变量。我们进行计算，而像State Farm、Allstate、美国汽车协会等非常优秀的竞争对手，他们的承保权重有所不同，有时他们的报价低于我们。

But I don’t think any company, of size, will be the lowest more often than GEICO.
但我不认为有哪家大公司能比GEICO更频繁地提供最低价。

We give out quotes on the telephone to many, many thousands of people every week. I get the figures every week, and I get the number of quotes, and I get the number of policies sold.
我们每周通过电话向成千上万的人提供报价。我每周都会收到数据，包括报价数量和售出保单的数量。

And I can tell you the percentages are very substantial that we sell. And we’re not selling them if we’re charging them more than the people before them. So it — different people have different weightings for different variables.
我可以告诉你，我们的销售比例非常可观。如果我们比其他公司收的多，我们就不会卖出这么多。因此——不同的人对不同变量的权重不同。

And the couple you referred to sound like they should get a very good rate from somebody, but they apparently got a better rate from somebody else other than us. And that’s going to happen, perhaps 60 percent of the time, and 40 percent of the time we’re going to get the business.
你提到的这对夫妇听起来应该能从某个公司得到一个非常好的价格，但他们显然从其他公司得到了更好的报价。这种情况大概会发生在60%的时间里，而40%的时间我们会拿下业务。

And since we’re only 11 percent of the whole market now, it means we’ve got a lot of policyholders yet to gather.
由于我们现在仅占整个市场的 11%，这意味着我们还有很多保单持有人需要吸引。

The — it’s an interesting question when you’re looking at how to evaluate drivers. You know, we know that 16-year-old boys are about as bad as they get; 16-year-old girls are a better class.
这是一个有趣的问题，当你在考虑如何评估驾驶员时。我们知道，16 岁的男孩驾驶技术差不多是最糟糕的；而 16 岁的女孩则表现得更好。

Does that mean they’re better drivers? Not necessarily.
这是否意味着他们是更好的司机？不一定。

It may mean they don’t have the same tendency to show off. It may mean they don’t drive as many miles. It may mean a whole lot of things.
这可能意味着他们没有同样的炫耀倾向。这可能意味着他们开车的里程没有那么多。这可能意味着很多事情。

So we ask a lot of questions, and other people ask different questions, and we will come up with different rates. But it’s definitely worth 15 minutes to call GEICO. (Laughter)
因此，我们会问很多问题，其他公司则会问不同的问题，最终我们会得出不同的报价。不过，花15分钟打电话给GEICO肯定是值得的。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would say besides if — when you get into the older people’s group and you find you’re not deteriorating as fast as most of your contemporaries, you may be paying an unfair price for the insurance, but it’s a good tradeoff. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我想说的是，当你进入老年群体时，如果你发现自己并不像同时代的人那样快速衰退，你可能为保险支付了不公平的价格，但这是一个不错的交易。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Gary. 沃伦·巴菲特：加里。

I haven’t thought of it that way before. (Laughter)
我以前没有这样想过。（笑声）

53. Reinsurance business getting worse due to “facades”

再保险业务因“外表”而变得更糟。

GARY RANSOM: The reinsurance market has changed dramatically over the last two or three years, a lot of alternative capital coming into the business, making it much harder to make the assumption that there would be a big opportunity after the next big catastrophic event.
加里·兰索姆：再保险市场在过去两三年中发生了剧烈变化，许多替代资本涌入这个行业，这使得在下一个重大灾难事件后会有巨大机会的假设变得更加困难。

What is it that you and Ajit are planning to change, or do, to take advantage of whatever opportunities might be there?
你和 Ajit 计划改变或做些什么，以利用可能存在的机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, wouldn’t our competitors like to know? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们的竞争对手难道不想知道吗？（笑）

The reinsurance business is not as good as it was, and it’s unlikely to be as good as it was.
再保险业务不如以前好，而且不太可能恢复到以前的水平。

There’s a lot of money that’s come into reinsurance, not because they want to reinsure people, but because it’s become either a fashionable asset class for people that are looking for so-called noncorrelated investments and may not know what they’re doing, but it’s something you can sell people, you know, that’s an attractive line to go to pension funds with.
很多资金涌入再保险市场并不是因为他们想要进行再保险，而是因为它已经成为寻找所谓“非相关性投资”的人们眼中的一种时髦资产类别，这些人可能并不真正了解自己在做什么，但它是你可以推销给别人的产品，特别是吸引养老基金。

And then, secondly, it’s a beard for doing — for asset management. So, if you go to Bermuda and start a reinsurance company, you can actually run a hedge fund, and you need a little business to make it look like you’re doing something other than running a hedge fund, and locating it offshore so you don’t pay any tax, but that’s the primary motivation.
然后，第二，这是为了做资产管理而设的幌子。所以，如果你去百慕大开一家再保险公司，你实际上可以经营一个对冲基金，而你需要一些业务来让它看起来你在做的事情不仅仅是经营对冲基金，并且将其设在离岸，以便不缴税，但这就是主要动机。

So when you get a whole lot of people that are bringing money in and they sort of need your facade of reinsurance to cover up what their real motivations are, you’re likely to get less attractive prices in reinsurance.
所以当有很多人带着资金进来，他们需要你的再保险的外表来掩盖他们真正的动机时，你很可能会在再保险中得到不太有吸引力的价格。

And that’s been happening on a fairly large scale, and I would say that I would expect the reinsurance business in the next 10 years to not be as good as it has been — I’m talking about the whole industry — as it has been, you know, in the last 30 or something like that.
这在相当大规模上发生，我会说我预计再保险业务在未来 10 年内不会像过去 30 年那样好——我说的是整个行业。

It’s a business whose prospects have turned for the worse, and there’s not much we can do about it.
这是一个前景已经恶化的行业，我们对此无能为力。

We do find things to do. There are certain things that only Berkshire can do, and we’ve — I mentioned in the annual report that there have been eight—I think it was eight—contracts written with premiums of a billion dollars or more, and we’ve written all eight of them.
我们确实找到事情可做。有些事情只有伯克希尔能做，我在年报中提到过，有八个——我想是八个——合同的保费超过十亿美元，而我们已经签署了所有这八个合同。

So, we do — there’s a certain corner of the world that we’ve got a strong position in, and there’s a few other things we will do, but it’s not as good as it was.
所以，我们确实有——在世界的某个角落，我们有一个强大的地位，还有一些其他事情我们会做，但情况没有以前那么好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think, generally speaking, of course, it’s going to be harder and, of course, this competition from promotional finance is getting more and more intense and they’re more optimistic.
查理·芒格：我认为，总的来说，情况肯定会变得更加困难，特别是来自“金融推销”的竞争日益激烈，他们更加乐观。

They’re searching for a robust narrative. We’re not searching for a robust narrative so we can sell something. We’re playing the game for the long pull and other people just pretend to be doing so.
他们在寻找强有力的故事线来推销产品。我们并不在寻找这种故事线来卖东西。我们是在为长远做准备，而其他人只是在假装这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We could — we’ve had the opportunity over — for a long period of time — to go out and promote reinsurance-type money, and really take advantage, you know, of people on it, because we would have the best reputation in the field, and we could attract a ton of money, and we could get a big overwrite on it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们确实有很长时间的机会去推销再保险资金，并利用人们的需求。因为我们在这个领域有最好的声誉，我们可以吸引大量资金，并从中获得丰厚回报。

But it’s not our game.
但这不是我们的游戏。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we don’t particularly admire the way it’s being played.
查理·芒格：我们并不特别欣赏这种玩法。

54. How to win friends and influence people

如何赢得朋友并影响他人

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is (inaudible) from South Florida, and I’m currently in seventh grade.
观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我的名字是（听不清）来自南佛罗里达，我现在是七年级学生。

My question is how do you make lots of friends and get people to like you and work with you?
我的问题是如何交到很多朋友，让人们喜欢你并与你合作？

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s not a bad question. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：这个问题不错。（掌声）

Very good question. 非常好的问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you know, I was pretty obnoxious when I was your age and asked a lot of impertinent questions, and not everybody liked me.
查理·芒格：你知道，我在你这个年纪的时候也很讨厌，问了很多无礼的问题，并不是每个人都喜欢我。

And so the only way I could get the people to like me a little bit was to get very rich and very generous. (Laughter)
所以我唯一能让人们稍微喜欢我的办法就是变得非常富有和非常慷慨。（笑声）

That will work. 这招确实有效。

WARREN BUFFETT: People will see all kinds of virtues in you if they think you’ll write a check. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果人们认为你会写支票，他们会在你身上看到各种美德。（笑声）

Yeah. The two of us — both Charlie and I were on the obnoxious side early on, but you should get a little smarter about human behavior as you get older.
是的。我们两个——查理和我一开始都很讨厌，但随着年龄的增长，你应该对人类行为变得更聪明一些。

And I turned out to have some pretty good teachers as I went along, in terms of what worked.
我发现自己在学习过程中遇到了一些非常好的老师，他们教会了我什么是有效的。

I mean, I have looked at other people during my lifetime and at these wonderful teachers. They weren’t teachers in the standard definition, but they were people I admired and I thought to myself, “Why do I admire these people?” And if I want to be admired myself, you know, why shouldn’t I take on some of their qualities?
我意思是，我在一生中观察过其他人和这些了不起的老师。他们并不是标准定义上的老师，但他们是我钦佩的人。我心想：“我为什么钦佩这些人？”如果我想要被钦佩，为什么我不应该吸取他们的一些品质呢？

So, it’s not a complicated proposition, you know. If you look around you at the people you like in your school, write down three or four things they do that make you like them, and then look around at the three or four people that turn you off, and write down those qualities, and decide that you’re going to be a person you, yourself, would like, that you’d take on the qualities of the person on the left.
所以，这并不是一个复杂的命题，你知道。如果你看看你在学校里喜欢的人，写下他们让你喜欢的三四件事，然后看看那些让你反感的三四个人，写下那些特质，决定你要成为一个你自己会喜欢的人，去拥有左边那个人的特质。

You’re generous, you’re friendly, you know, you accept things with good humor, you don’t claim credit for things you don’t do, all of these things. And they’re all possible to do.
你很慷慨，你很友好，你知道，你以良好的幽默感接受事物，你不为自己没有做的事情索取功劳，所有这些都是可能做到的。

And if you like that in other people, people are going to like it in you. And if you find things that are kind of obnoxious, you’re always late, you’re always claiming credit for more than you do, and you’re kind of negative on everything, and you don’t like those in other people, get rid of them in yourself and you’ll find out it works pretty well. (Applause)
如果你喜欢别人身上的这些特质，别人也会喜欢你身上的这些特质。如果你发现一些让人厌烦的事情，比如你总是迟到，总是夸大自己的贡献，对一切都持消极态度，而你又不喜欢别人身上有这些特质，那就把这些特质去掉，你会发现这样做效果很好。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And it really works in marriage. If you can change yourself instead of trying to change your spouse, that’s a good idea. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：这在婚姻中真的有效。如果你能改变自己，而不是试图改变你的配偶，那是个好主意。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie has said the most important thing in selecting a marriage partner is that you don’t look for intelligence or humor or character. He says you look for someone with low expectations. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理说，选择婚姻伴侣最重要的事情是你不要寻找智慧、幽默或品格。他说你要寻找一个期望值低的人。（笑声）

55. NetJets wasn’t a mistake despite labor problems

尽管存在劳资问题，NetJets 并不是一个错误。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. This is a question about NetJets. We received several related to NetJets. We’ve combined these two.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的。这是一个关于 NetJets 的问题。我们收到了几个与 NetJets 相关的问题。我们将这两个问题合并在一起。

The first is, can you comment on the lengthy dispute with NetJets’ pilots who are picketing outside, and Whitney Tillson asks, “What type of return on investment do you expect from the billions on order in aircraft for NetJets,” and in a very pointed way, he writes, “Was buying NetJets a mistake?”
第一个问题是：您能评论一下与 NetJets 飞行员之间的长期争议吗？他们正在外面抗议。惠特尼·蒂尔森还问，‘您对为 NetJets 订购的数十亿美元飞机投资预期的回报率是什么？’他直接问道，‘收购 NetJets 是一个错误吗？’

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I don’t think buying NetJets was a mistake. We’ve had a few things where it looked like a mistake for quite a while and some of them turned out to be a mistake.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我认为收购 NetJets 并不是一个错误。我们有一些事情在很长一段时间内看起来像是错误，其中一些最终确实是错误。

But NetJets is a very decent business. We have a good business; the pilots have a good job.
但 NetJets 是一家非常体面的公司。我们有一个良好的业务；飞行员的工作也很好。

And the — it’s not really the right way to look at it, I don’t think, in terms of return on investment in the billions of dollars of orders we have because we resell those planes to owners.
我认为，从我们订购的数十亿美元飞机的投资回报率来看，这不是一个正确的角度，因为我们会将这些飞机转售给机主。

And we do have a core fleet that represents an investment, but the investment is held, in very large part, by the owners themselves. I own — what do I own? Three-sixteenths, or something like that, of one type of plane that my children use. I own an eighth of another plane that I use. But that’s my investment; it’s not the NetJets investment.
我们确实有一个核心机队，它代表了一项投资，但大部分投资是由机主自己持有的。我自己拥有——我拥有多少？可能是某种型号飞机的十六分之三，我的孩子们使用的。我还拥有另一架飞机的八分之一，我自己使用的。但那是我的投资，不是 NetJets 的投资。

The — labor relations — at Berkshire we’ve had hundreds of labor unions over the years, literally hundreds. In fact, we probably have hundreds at the present time.
在伯克希尔，我们多年来有数百个工会，字面上说是数百个。事实上，我们现在可能还有数百个。

And we’ve only had — in 50 years — we’ve had three strikes that I can remember. I don’t think there have been any others. There could have been some one-day walkout, maybe.
在过去的 50 年里，我记得我们只有三次罢工。我认为没有其他的罢工。可能有过一些一天的罢工。

But we had a four-day strike at a Berkshire Hathaway textile operation, we had a four-day or so strike at the Buffalo News 30 years ago, and we had another strike at See’s Candy one time.
但我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦的纺织厂进行了为期四天的罢工，30 年前我们在布法罗新闻社也进行了大约四天的罢工，还有一次在See’s糖果公司也发生过罢工。

So, we have no anti-union agenda whatsoever, and we think we have sensational pilots.
所以，我们完全没有反工会的议程，我们认为我们的飞行员非常出色。

I mean, I’ve flown NetJets, my family has flown NetJets, now for 20 years, and we’ve had nothing but professional pilots and friendly pilots.
我意思是，我已经乘坐过 NetJets，我的家人也乘坐过 NetJets，已经 20 年了，我们遇到的只有专业的飞行员和友好的飞行员。

And it’s not — you know, it’s in human nature to have differences, sometimes, about what people get paid.
这并不是——你知道，人性中有差异，有时人们对薪酬的看法会有所不同。

Our pilots make an average of 145,000 a year. They worked — they work seven — they have options, but one of the options, and the main option, is seven days on and seven days off.
我们的飞行员年均收入为 145,000 美元。他们工作——他们工作七天——他们有选择，但其中一个选择，也是主要选择，是七天工作和七天休息。

We pay for their time to get to where they’re based. They can live anyplace in the country. And compared to our competitors at Flexjets or Flight Options or so on, or in charter, we pay well.
我们支付他们到达所在地点的时间。他们可以在全国任何地方居住。与我们的竞争对手 Flexjets、Flight Options 等，或是包机服务相比，我们的薪酬很高。

But it’s perfectly understandable that employers and employees have some differences from time to time. And we’ll get it worked out, but that doesn’t necessarily come in a day or a week or a month.
但雇主和员工之间偶尔有一些分歧是完全可以理解的。我们会解决这个问题，但这并不一定在一天、一周或一个月内就能完成。

And our volume is up, in terms of flying. Our volume is up, in terms of owners in the United States. Europe is flat. But the United States is the bigger end of it.
我们的飞行量在增加。美国的拥有者数量在增加。欧洲保持平稳。但美国是更大的市场。

So it’s a business I’m very glad we own. I’m proud we own it. It’s a first-class operation. We give our pilots more training, I believe, than anybody else.
所以这是我非常高兴我们拥有的一个业务。我为我们拥有它感到自豪。这是一个一流的运营。我相信，我们给我们的飞行员提供的培训比其他任何人都要多。

I’m flying on NetJets. My kids are all flying on NetJets. Our managers, in many cases, are flying on it, so nobody cares more about safety.
我正在乘坐 NetJets。我的孩子们也都在乘坐 NetJets。我们的经理在很多情况下也在乘坐，所以没有人比我们更关心安全。

This is not a company where the CEO flies on his own jet and other people fly in other ways. So I — and I get the same — I get the same planes that the other people get and the same pilots. I mean, there’s no special arrangements.
这不是一个首席执行官自己乘坐私人飞机而其他人以其他方式出行的公司。所以我——我和其他人一样——我乘坐和其他人一样的飞机，和同样的飞行员。我的意思是，没有特别的安排。

So we’ve got this intense interest in safety, and we’ve got very professional pilots. And at the moment, we’ve got a difference of opinion about a contract, but that will get settled, in my view.
所以我们对安全有着强烈的兴趣，并且我们有非常专业的飞行员。目前，我们在一份合同上有不同的意见，但在我看来，这个问题会得到解决。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have never, in all the years, had a NetJets pilot who didn’t affect me as a wonderful fellow and a very skilled, able, and dutiful, reliable person.
查理·芒格：这么多年，我从未遇到过一位 NetJets 飞行员不让我觉得他是个非常好的人，一个非常有技能、能干、尽职尽责的人。

And I would say most — I can think of no NetJets pilot that has ever in any way indicated that he’s dissatisfied with his life, and a lot of them say they just love it, because of the — I’m not at all sure the union is fairly representing the pilots.
我可以说大多数——我想不出有哪个 NetJets 的飞行员曾以任何方式表示他对自己的生活不满意，很多人说他们非常喜欢这份工作，因为——我并不确定工会是否公正地代表了飞行员。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

He said fellows. Actually, we have a lot of women pilots, too.
他说，伙计们。实际上，我们也有很多女飞行员。

56. Tax code helped Duracell-P&G deal

税法帮助了Duracell-P&G的交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg? 沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, looking at your acquisition of Duracell from Procter & Gamble, at the time of the deal, you noted that Duracell is a leading global brand with top quality products. You’re obviously familiar with the business, which was initially acquired by Gillette in 1996.
格雷格·沃伦：Warren，看一下你从宝洁公司收购Duracell的交易。在交易时，你提到Duracell是一个领先的全球品牌，拥有顶级质量的产品。显然，你对这个业务非常熟悉，该业务最初在1996年被吉列收购。

While Duracell does provide fairly steady cash flows and has a strong brand in market position, its core business is in decline, with advances in technology making alkaline batteries far less relevant than they were 20 years ago.
虽然Duracell提供相对稳定的现金流，并在市场上拥有强大的品牌地位，但其核心业务正在衰退，技术的进步使得碱性电池的相关性远不如 20 年前。

Looking back historically, you’ve been willing to hang onto businesses operating in declining industries as long as they continue to generate some cash for Berkshire overall, so having Duracell in the portfolio is not necessarily out of the ordinary.
回顾历史，您一直愿意保留那些在衰退行业中运营的企业，只要它们继续为伯克希尔整体产生一些现金，因此将Duracell纳入投资组合并不算特别。

The question I have is, how much of a role did tax planning actually play in doing this deal, given the extremely low-cost basis on your P&G shares, some of which you’ve been selling the last several years?
我想问的是，考虑到你在宝洁公司的股票成本极低，且你在过去几年中出售了一部分股票，税务规划在达成这笔交易中实际上发挥了多大作用？

And would you have done this deal without tax considerations? And, if so, at what price?
你会在没有税务考虑的情况下达成这笔交易吗？如果会，价格是多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, both Procter & Gamble and Berkshire Hathaway had tax advantages in doing the deal this way, so they probably wouldn’t have sold it at the price at which the deal took place, and we wouldn’t have bought it at the price, without the tax benefits that each enjoyed.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，宝洁公司和伯克希尔·哈撒韦在以这种方式进行交易时都有税收优势，因此他们可能不会以交易发生时的价格出售，而我们也不会以那个价格购买，若没有各自享有的税收优惠。

And this is something — we had to have held our stock for over five years in Procter & Gamble.
这是一件事——我们在宝洁公司的股票必须持有超过五年。

It’s something that’s been in the code a long time that we’ve had nothing to do with it being in the code, but it’s part of the code.
这是税法中存在已久的一项规定，我们并没有参与将其纳入税法，但它确实是税法的一部分。

And it’s somewhat similar to the real estate exchange arrangement, where you can exchange real estate and defer any tax.
这有点类似于房地产交换安排，您可以交换房地产并延迟任何税款。

And we don’t get a new tax basis on the Duracell; we keep the old lower tax base, just like on — what do they call it? Is it section 1231 or —
我们在Duracell上不会获得新的税基；我们保持旧的较低税基，就像——他们称之为什么？是第 1231 条还是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — real estate exchanges. So it’s analogous to that, and the answer is that there wouldn’t have been a transaction from Procter & Gamble’s standpoint and there wouldn’t have been a transaction, probably, from Berkshire’s standpoint, if it hadn’t been for the fact that we could do an exchange arrangement.
沃伦·巴菲特：——房地产交易。所以这与此类似，答案是，从宝洁的角度来看，如果不是因为我们能够进行交换安排，就不会有交易；从伯克希尔的角度来看，可能也不会有交易。

As to the declining business part, the battery business will be a declining business, but it will be around for a very, very, very long time on a worldwide basis.
至于衰退的业务部分，电池业务将是一个衰退的业务，但在全球范围内，它将存在非常非常非常长的时间。

And Duracell has a very strong position. It’s a very good business. And, like you say, I was familiar with it when I was on the Gillette board.
Duracell的市场地位非常强大。这是一项非常好的业务。正如你所说，我在吉列董事会时对它很熟悉。

But the — you know, it will have unit declines over a period of time, but I think we’ll do fine with the Duracell investment. I’m looking forward to getting the deal complete, which probably won’t take place until the fourth quarter because we have to get it detached from a lot of other things like the IT and distribution centers and everything else that it’s involved in with P&G.
但是，您知道，它在一段时间内会有销量下降，但我认为我们在Duracell的投资会很好。我期待着完成这笔交易，这可能要到第四季度才能进行，因为我们需要将其与许多其他事务分开，比如 IT 和分销中心以及与宝洁公司相关的其他一切。

But P&G has been great to work with. They’re making the transition — you know, they couldn’t be better to work with during that period, and I’ll be very happy when we own it.
但宝洁公司合作起来非常愉快。他们在过渡期间表现得非常好，我会很高兴当我们拥有它的时候。

57. Why I’m giving away most of my wealth

我为什么要捐出我大部分的财富

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren and Charlie. I am Marvin Blum, an estate planning lawyer from Fort Worth, Texas, home to four of your companies.
观众成员：你好，沃伦和查理。我是马文·布卢姆，来自德克萨斯州沃斯堡的遗产规划律师，这里是你们四家公司的所在地。

And by the way, we’re excited about the new Nebraska Furniture Mart and the Berkshire Hathaway Automotive Group in the Dallas/Fort Worth area.
顺便说一下，我们对位于达拉斯/沃斯堡地区的新内布拉斯加家具市场和伯克希尔哈撒韦汽车集团感到兴奋。

Next to Omaha, we hope you think of Fort Worth as your second home.
在奥马哈旁边，我们希望你把沃斯堡视为你的第二个家。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been good to us. And actually, we have five companies down there. MiTek just bought one.
沃伦·巴菲特：这对我们来说很好。实际上，我们在那儿有五家公司。MiTek 刚刚收购了一家。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right. Even better.
观众成员：好的。更好。

At the annual meeting a couple years ago, I asked about your estate plan and your idea of leaving kids enough so they can do anything, but not so much that they can do nothing.
在几年前的年会上，我询问了你的遗产计划，以及你关于给孩子们留足够的财产让他们可以做任何事情，但又不至于让他们什么都不做的想法。

Today, I’d like to ask you about your decision to sign the Giving Pledge, promising to give away at least one-half of your assets to charity.
今天，我想问你关于你决定签署“捐赠承诺”的事，承诺将至少一半的资产捐赠给慈善机构。

Can you talk about your views on philanthropy, and how to balance leaving an inheritance to your family versus assets to charity?
你能谈谈你对慈善事业的看法，以及如何平衡给家人留下遗产和将资产捐给慈善机构吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it depends very much on the individual situation. And actually, I promised to give over 99 percent, in my case. But that still leave plenty left over. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这很大程度上取决于个人情况。实际上，我承诺捐出超过 99%的财富，但这仍然留有很多剩余。（掌声）

As you know, the estate tax exemption has been moved up substantially here in the last couple years, so you — I might have a very different feeling if I’d had a child that worked actively, helped me build the business, and all that sort of thing, and it was a small business, and I wanted to give it to them. But that can be really done without any estate tax these days, particularly if a little planning is used ahead of time.
正如你所知，过去几年遗产税免税额大幅提高，因此，如果我有一个积极工作、帮助我建立企业的孩子，而企业又很小，我想将它留给他们，那我可能会有非常不同的感觉。不过，现在通过一些提前规划，这种情况完全可以在没有遗产税的情况下完成。

It’s a very individual thing. I — as Charlie — you know, when you get to the — figuring out what you do with your money, the options get very — fairly — limited. And as Charlie said the other day, you know, he said where he’s going it won’t do him much good anyway. (Laughter)
这是一件非常个人的事情。我——作为查理——你知道，当你开始考虑如何处理你的钱时，选择变得非常有限。正如查理前几天所说的，他说他要去的地方，这些钱对他也没什么用。（笑声）

There’s no Forbes 400, you know, in the graveyard.
墓地里没有福布斯 400。

So the question is, where does it do the most good? And I think it does limited amounts to do some real good for my children, so I’ll be sure that they have that, or they already have it, to a degree.
所以问题是，它在哪里能发挥最大的作用？我认为它对我的孩子们能产生有限的真正好处，所以我会确保他们拥有这些，或者在某种程度上他们已经拥有了。

And, on the other hand, when I look at a bunch of stock certificates in a safe deposit box that were put there 50 years ago or so, they have absolutely no utility to me, zero. They can’t do anything for me in life.
另一方面，当我看到一个保险箱里放着大约 50 年前的股票证书时，它们对我完全没有用处，零。它们在我的生活中无法为我做任何事情。

I mean, they can’t let me consume 7,000 calories a day instead of 3,000. They can’t — there’s nothing they can do.
我意思是，他们不能让我每天摄入 7000 卡路里而不是 3000 卡路里。他们做不到——他们无能为力。

I’ve got everything in the world I want, and I’ve had it for decades. If I wanted something additionally, I’d go buy it.
我拥有这个世界上我想要的一切，而且已经拥有几十年了。如果我想要额外的东西，我会去买。

So, here these things are that have no utility to me and they have enormous utility to some people in other parts of the world. I mean, they can save lives. They can provide vaccines. They can provide education. There are all kinds of utility.
所以，这些对我没有用处的东西在世界其他地方对某些人却有巨大的用处。我的意思是，它们可以拯救生命。它们可以提供疫苗。它们可以提供教育。各种各样的用途。

So why in the world should they sit there for me or for, you know, some fourth generation down of great-grandchildren or something, when they can do a lot of good now?
那么，他们为什么要在那里等我，或者等某个曾曾孙的后代呢？当他们现在可以做很多好事的时候？

So that’s my own philosophy on it, but I think everybody has to develop their own feelings about it and should follow where they go.
所以这就是我自己的看法，但我认为每个人都必须发展自己对这件事的感受，并应该跟随自己的内心。

I do think — I do think they might ask themselves, what — you know, where will it do the most good?
我确实认为——我确实认为他们可能会问自己，什么——你知道，在哪里会产生最大的好处？

And it can be pretty dramatic between what it can do for millions of people that don’t really have remotely the same shot at having a decent life that I’ve had, or what it, you know, what it can do for me.
这之间的差距可能非常明显，它能为那些无法拥有像我一样体面生活的数百万人带来什么，或者它能为我带来什么。

I mean, if it — I could have 10 houses, but, you know, I could buy a hotel to live in, you know. But would I be happier? It would be crazy.
我的意思是，如果我有 10 栋房子，但你知道，我可以买一家酒店住在里面。但是我会更快乐吗？这太疯狂了。

Charlie and I both like fairly simple lives. But the one thing we do know is we know what we like and what we don’t like, and we don’t judge it by what other people like.
查理和我都喜欢相对简单的生活。但我们唯一知道的是，我们知道自己喜欢什么，不喜欢什么，而我们不会根据其他人喜欢的来评判。

So I don’t have too much advice for anybody, but I would say start thinking about it.
所以我对任何人没有太多建议，但我会说开始考虑一下。

When I call people on the Giving Pledge, you know, some of them — I’ll get some 70-year-old and he says, “You know, I don’t want to think about it yet.” And I always tell him. “Are you going to make a better decision when you’re 95 with some blond on your lap?” (Laughter)
当我打电话给《捐赠承诺》的签署者时，你知道，有些人——我会碰到一些70岁的人，他会说，“你知道，我还不想考虑这个问题。”我总是告诉他们，“当你95岁时，坐在一个金发姑娘的膝盖上，你会做出更好的决定吗？”（笑声）

That actually was tried a few years ago, as you may know. (Laughter)
那实际上在几年前就尝试过，如你所知。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but it does occur to me that that fellow that was complaining about the tax system should remember that when — they recently changed the estate tax rules, so you can leave 5 million to your kids, and so forth. I think that’s a very constructive change in the law.
查理·芒格：不，但我想起那个抱怨税制的人应该记住，最近他们改变了遗产税规则，你可以把 500 万留给你的孩子等等。我认为这是法律上的一个非常建设性的变化。

So I don’t think we should assume that our politicians are always going to be totally crazy. That was a very desirable change, I think.
所以我认为我们不应该假设我们的政治家总是会完全疯狂。我认为这是一个非常可取的变化。

58. Distribute long-term stock holdings to shareholders?

将长期持有的股票分配给股东？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: The questioner’s name is Andre Bartel (PH), and he’s a Berkshire shareholder.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：提问者的名字是安德烈·巴特尔（PH），他是伯克希尔的股东。

“Would it make sense” — and I’m going to add my own edit here to say, and would it be legally permissible — “for Berkshire to distribute, at some time in the future, any or some of the long-term equity investments, for example, Coca-Cola or American Express, to the shareholders in a tax-sufficient way, as Yahoo is planning to do with the Alibaba stake, for example?
“伯克希尔在未来某个时候以税务合规的方式向股东分配任何或部分长期股权投资，例如可口可乐或美国运通，这样做是否合理——我在这里要补充说，是否在法律上可行——就像雅虎计划对阿里巴巴的股份那样？”

“The idea would be to return capital to shareholders using assets that Berkshire is not actively managing, that is, has not bought or sold for some time, and has very low incentive to sell because of income tax implications, while not taking away resources—cash—that could be reinvested by the Berkshire management better than by its shareholders.”
“这个想法是通过使用伯克希尔不积极管理的资产，即已经很长时间没有买卖的资产，且由于所得税的影响几乎没有出售的动力，来向股东返还资本，同时不拿走可以被伯克希尔管理层比股东更好地再投资的资源——现金。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think Yahoo solved it, actually. Charlie, you follow that, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为雅虎并没有解决这个问题。查理，你也在关注这个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think that we can do that with American Express and so forth. It’s a bad example. We’ve got no way of doing that.
查理·芒格：我认为我们无法用美国运通等公司来做到这一点。这是一个坏例子。我们没有办法做到这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. There used to be a way to do that many years ago, and it was done. I don’t mean by us, but I saw other examples of it.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。多年前确实有一种方法可以做到这一点，而且确实有人这样做。我不是说我们这样做的，但我见过其他的例子。

But, under the code, there’s no way to use appreciated securities to redeem your own shares, to — you can do it for something like acquiring, where you’re exchanging it for like asset type thing on the Duracell arrangement, but there’s no way to distribute it to shareholders without paying the full capital gains tax. And —
但是，根据法规，没有办法使用增值证券来赎回自己的股份——你可以在像Duracell的安排中进行类似资产的交换，但没有办法在不支付全部资本利得税的情况下将其分配给股东。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, spinoffs of whole businesses to shareholders, if you held them a long time, but that’s about the only thing you can do.
查理·芒格：是的，将整个业务分拆给股东，如果你持有它们很长时间，但这大概是你能做的唯一事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but even there, I mean, what Yahoo has done has not got rid of the tax.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但即便如此，我的意思是，雅虎所做的并没有消除税收。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know anything about Yahoo.
查理·芒格：我对雅虎一无所知。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No. The — or what they’re planning to do.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不是。或者他们计划做的事情。

It may give them some other option if Alibaba wants to eventually redeem it themselves.
这可能给他们提供一些其他选择，如果阿里巴巴最终想要自己赎回的话。

I mean, there could be something where they could work out a deal with Alibaba. I do not see how that they’ve gotten rid of the tax, unless they do a subsequent transaction of some sort with Alibaba, but maybe they have different tax advice than I’ve seen.
我意思是，他们可能会与阿里巴巴达成某种协议。我看不出他们是如何免除税款的，除非他们与阿里巴巴进行某种后续交易，但也许他们有我没有看到的不同税务建议。

I mean, I know all kinds of cases where people — where corporations — have unrealized — large unrealized — gains in marketable securities, and I have not seen, in recent years — although I did see it early in my career when the law was different, but I’ve not seen in recent years any way that people have gotten that money into the hands of the shareholders without paying a tax at the corporate level.
我知道各种情况，有些公司拥有大量未实现的市场证券收益，而近年来，我没有看到——虽然我在职业生涯早期看到过，当时的法律不同——近年来，我没有看到任何方法可以将这些钱分配给股东而不在公司层面缴税。
腾讯的财务能力很强，美国的税法更加严谨。
Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. That’s — that’s what we say.
查理·芒格：不。这就是我们所说的。

59. Is reduced household formation by young people permanent?

年轻人减少家庭形成是永久的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Jonathan?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Berkshire owns many companies that benefit from single-family home construction: ACME, Johns Manville, Benjamin Moore, MiTek, and Shaw among them, not to mention the railroad.
乔纳森·布兰特：伯克希尔拥有许多从单户住宅建设中受益的公司：ACME、Johns Manville、Benjamin Moore、MiTek和Shaw，当然还有铁路。

After the financial crisis, you said that young adults who are postponing household formation by living with parents or in-laws would eventually get sick of that arrangement and we would start to see normal rates of household formation once the job market improved or even if it didn’t.
在金融危机之后，你说那些通过与父母或岳父母同住而推迟组建家庭的年轻人最终会厌倦这种安排，一旦就业市场改善，甚至即使没有改善，我们就会开始看到正常的家庭形成率。

Jobs are now more plentiful. Yet, household formation still continues to be below rates thought to be normal, whether because of high student debt, a shift in attitudes about homeownership, or stricter mortgage terms for first-time buyers.
就业机会现在更加丰富。然而，家庭形成的速度仍然低于被认为正常的水平，这可能是由于高额的学生债务、对房屋拥有权态度的转变，或是首次购房者面临的更严格的抵押贷款条款。

Could something more secular be going on where household formation rates, relative to the population, could continue to be lower than historical rates?
是否可能存在更世俗的因素，使得家庭形成率相对于人口而言，可能会继续低于历史水平？

Could the U.S. become more like Europe where many adult children live with their parents or in-laws for quite some time, or do you think, still, that the subdued rate of household formation is a mostly cyclical phenomenon, and that the rate will eventually revert to the historical mean, boosting single-family home starts and earnings for this group of companies?
美国会变得更像欧洲吗？在欧洲，许多成年子女会与父母或岳父母同住一段时间。还是说你认为，家庭形成率的低迷主要是一个周期性现象，最终会回归历史平均水平，从而推动单户住宅的开工和这些公司的收益？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know the answer, obviously, but I think the latter is more likely.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我显然不知道答案，但我认为后者更有可能。

I may be wrong. When’s the last set of figures you’ve looked at in that connection? I’ve heard that it’s turned up a fair amount in the last six months, but — have you seen anything on that, Jonny?
我可能错了。你最后一次查看相关数据是什么时候？我听说在过去六个月里，这个数据有了相当大的增长，但——你有没有看到关于这方面的任何信息，乔尼？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Nothing really recently, no.
乔纳森·布兰特：最近没有什么特别的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I should know the figures, but I don’t, for the last six months or nine months. But my impression was they had turned up somewhat.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我应该知道这些数字，但我不知道，过去六个月或九个月的情况。但我的印象是它们有所上升。

I did my best on selling that ring in the movie to that guy, and they’re going to form a household here in another month or two to which I’ve been invited.
我尽力去向那个人推销电影里的戒指，他们将在一两个月内组建家庭，我也受邀参加。

But the truth is I don’t know, the — you know, what’s going to happen on household formation.
但事实是我不知道，您知道的，家庭形成会发生什么。

I would expect — but I expected it earlier than this — I would expect it to turn up. It always turns down in a recession, and you could argue that we’re not all the way back from the recession yet.
我本来期待——但我比这个时候更早就期待了——我期待它会回升。在经济衰退时，它总是会下滑，而你可以说我们还没有完全走出衰退。

Your guess would be as good as mine.
你的猜测和我的一样好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I feel exactly the same way, but I think I speak for a lot of members of the audience when I say I have some grandchildren that I wish would marry somebody suitable promptly. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我完全有同样的感觉，但我想我代表很多观众成员说，我有一些孙子孙女，我希望他们能尽快找一个合适的伴侣。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s the reason for your interest, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你为什么对这个感兴趣？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s healthy for these people to hang around looking for pie in the sky or whatever in hell they’re doing. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我认为这些人待着不动，寻找不切实际的梦想或其他什么东西是不健康的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Are they in attendance today?
沃伦·巴菲特：他们今天在场吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know. Some of them may be. I don’t want to name names. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我不知道。有些可能在场。我不想点名。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I think you’ve already been pointed enough.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。我觉得你已经说得够明确了。

60. Why individual over corporate philanthropy?

为什么选择个人慈善而非企业慈善？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, thank you for a great day.
观众：先生们，谢谢你们带来美好的一天。

My name is Mark Roy (PH), and I am the executive director of the Immanuel Vision Foundation here in Omaha.
我的名字是马克·罗伊（PH），我是位于奥马哈的以马内利愿景基金会的执行董事。

Earlier today, I sat up in the corner and spoke to my son who is working and living in Indonesia, among the poorest of the poor, funded, incidentally, by the Gates Foundation.
今天早些时候，我坐在角落里和我在印度尼西亚工作和生活的儿子交谈，他生活在最贫困的人群中，顺便提一下，这一切都是由比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会资助的。

The contrast between where he is sitting today and where I am sitting could not be more dramatic.
他今天坐的地方和我坐的地方形成了鲜明的对比。

You have been a model of philanthropic caring for the needs of others. You have demonstrated that it’s not how many shares we have but how we share with others.
你一直是关心他人需求的慈善典范。你证明了拥有多少股份并不重要，重要的是我们如何与他人分享。

So following up on the last speaker, I want to ask, how can corporations be encouraged to make an even greater impact in the lives of those who are not shareholders?
那么接着上一个发言者，我想问一下，如何鼓励企业在非股东的生活中产生更大的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I agree, you know, entirely with your motivation about increasing philanthropy.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我完全同意你关于增加慈善事业的动机。

I am much more of a believer, however, in individual philanthropy than corporate philanthropy.
然而，我更相信个人慈善，而不是企业慈善。

I really feel that I’ve got everything I need, but I do also feel that I’m working for the shareholders and they should determine their own philanthropic activities, that it’s their money. (Applause)
我真的觉得我拥有我所需要的一切，但我也觉得我是在为股东工作，他们应该决定自己的慈善活动，因为那是他们的钱。（掌声）

Now, we participate in — I mean, I encourage all our companies to continue the philanthropic behavior that they had before we’ve acquired them, and, you know, we want them to participate in their communities and to help the entities that help their employees and their customers.
现在，我们参与——我的意思是，我鼓励我们所有的公司继续在被我们收购之前所表现出的慈善行为，我们希望他们参与社区，并帮助那些帮助他们的员工和客户的实体。

But I don’t really think it’s my business, ever, to write a check to my alma mater or whatever it may be, and do it on company funds. I just — I don’t feel it’s my money.
但我真的不认为由我来决定用公司资金向我的母校或其他地方捐款。我只是不觉得那是我的钱。

I really look at this as a partnership. We’ve always looked at it as a partnership. And we had a system some years back where all the shareholders could designate contributions, and I felt that was quite a good system. And then we had to give it up for reasons that — I hated to give it up, but we had to do it.
我真的把这看作是一种合作关系。我们一直把它看作是一种合作关系。几年前，我们有一个系统，所有的股东可以指定捐款，我觉得这是一个很好的系统。然后我们不得不放弃这个系统，虽然我很不愿意，但我们必须这么做。

The interesting thing about philanthropy — I mean, I have never given a penny to any organization that has cost me anything in my life. I mean, I’ve never given up a movie, I’ve never given up a trip, I’ve never given up a vacation, I’ve never given up a present to my kids.
有趣的是，关于慈善捐赠——我的意思是，我从未给过任何组织一分钱，这让我在生活中有所损失。我从未放弃过电影、旅行、假期，也从未放弃过给孩子们的礼物。

You know, people give money this Sunday, you know, that really, actually, changes their lifestyle in a small way, and that hasn’t happened with me. Everything I’ve given has been ungodly surplus, you know, and I’m glad I can do it.
你知道，人们在这个星期天捐钱，这实际上在某种程度上改变了他们的生活方式，而我并没有经历过这种改变。我所捐的每一笔都是过剩的，我很高兴我能做到这一点。

But it’s people like your son, you know, that I really admire.
但我真的很欣赏像你儿子这样的人。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my taste for giving away somebody else’s money is also quite restrained. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我对把别人的钱捐出去的兴趣也相当克制。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I was on the board one time of an organization that needed to raise a fair amount of money, and it wasn’t church affiliated or anything like that.
沃伦·巴菲特：我曾在一个需要筹集相当多资金的组织的董事会任职，该组织与教会无关，也不是类似的机构。

And so they asked me to call on four or five corporate chieftains and they said, “Be sure not to ask them to give anything personally, just ask them to give corporate money.”
所以他们让我去找四五位企业首席，他们说：“一定不要要求他们个人捐款，只要他们捐出公司资金就行。”

And just — I said, “I’m not going to do it,” basically. If they’re not — if they won’t put up their own money, why should they write checks on behalf of all their shareholders?
我基本上说，“我不打算这样做。”如果他们不愿意投入自己的资金，为什么要代表所有股东开支票呢？

So I’ve got real reservations about corporate philanthropy for the personal reasons, to some extent, of the CEO, or the directors.
因此，出于某种程度上的个人原因，我对企业慈善捐赠有真正的保留意见，包括CEO或董事们。

61. Euro can survive eurozone changes

欧元能否在欧元区变革中存活？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Felipe, and he asks, “Do Charlie and you think that the euro currency has had a positive or negative effect overall on the eurozone economy, and do you think it would be a good decision for France to quit the euro currency and go back to the franc?
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自费利佩，他问：“查理和你认为欧元对欧元区经济的整体影响是积极的还是消极的？你认为法国退出欧元并回归法郎是个好决定吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s too easy for me to answer, so I’ll give it to Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这对我来说太简单了，我把这个问题交给查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I haven’t got the faintest idea. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我一点儿主意都没有。（笑声）

I think the euro had a noble motivation and had promise of doing a lot of good and it undoubtedly has done a lot of good.
我认为欧元有着崇高的动机，并且承诺能做很多好事，毫无疑问，它确实做了很多好事。

But it’s a flawed system, in some ways, to put countries that are so different together, and it’s straining at the moment. The big strains aren’t in France.
但在某些方面，将如此不同的国家放在一起是一个有缺陷的系统，目前正面临压力。主要的压力并不在法国。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The big strains are in Greece and Portugal and so on.
查理·芒格：主要的压力在希腊、葡萄牙等地。

And I do think they created something that was probably unwise. They got countries in there that shouldn’t have been there.
我确实认为他们创造了一些可能不明智的东西。他们让一些不该在那里的国家参与进来。

You can’t form a business partnership with your frivolous, drunken brother-in-law, you know. (Laughter)
你知道的，你不能和你那个轻浮、醉酒的姐夫建立商业伙伴关系。（笑声）

I mean, you have to make your partnerships with somebody else. And I think they lowered their standards a little and it’s caused strains.
我的意思是，你必须与其他人建立合作关系。我认为他们降低了一些标准，这导致了紧张局势。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think — (laughs) — everything here is off the record, understand. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为——（笑）——这里的一切都是不公开的，明白吗？（笑声）

They — I think it’s a good idea that needs a lot of work, still.
他们——我认为这是一个好主意，但仍需要大量工作。

And I think it has been a good thing, net, to this point.
我认为到目前为止，这是一件好事。

But it — you know, it is flawed and the flaws are appearing, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be corrected.
但它——你知道，它是有缺陷的，缺陷正在显现，但这并不意味着它不能被修正。

I mean, we wrote a Constitution in 1789 that, you know, still took a few amendments, you know, and some of them didn’t happen for a long time in respect to some very important factors.
我意思是，我们在 1789 年写了一部宪法，您知道，这部宪法仍然需要一些修正案，您知道，其中一些修正案在一些非常重要的因素上花了很长时间才发生。

So, I don’t think the fact that it wasn’t perfectly designed initially should condemn it to being abandoned, but I think that if there are flaws, you have to face up to them. And I think that maybe the events that are happening currently will cause that.
所以，我认为最初设计不完美的事实不应该使它被遗弃，但我认为如果存在缺陷，就必须面对它们。我认为，也许目前发生的事件会导致这一点。

We could have had — presumably — we could have had a common currency with Canada and probably have made it work, I mean, if we decided —
我们本可以——可以推测——我们本可以与加拿大拥有共同货币，并可能使其运作，我是说，如果我们决定——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure, we could have made it work.
查理·芒格：当然，我们本可以让它成功。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We could have had a North American currency with Canada and, you know, we’d have worked it out, and it might have even been useful.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们本可以与加拿大共同拥有一种北美货币，你知道，我们会解决这个问题，甚至可能会很有用。

But we couldn’t have had a hemisphere-wide currency with Venezuela in it or —
但我们不可能有一个包括委内瑞拉在内的半球范围的货币，或者——

CHARLIE MUNGER: With Argentina.
查理·芒格：与阿根廷。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

And so — he loves to name names. (Laughter)
所以——他喜欢点名。 （笑声）

Praise by name; criticize by category. (Laughter)
按名字表扬；按类别批评。（笑声）

And I actually think it’s probably desirable to have a euro currency properly designed and enforced so that — you know, that the rules really apply. There were rules, originally, on the euro, which got broken very early on, by not the Greeks, but by the Germans and the French, as I remember. So —
我实际上认为，拥有一个设计合理并得到执行的欧元货币是非常可取的，这样规则才能真正适用。最初关于欧元的规则很早就被打破了，我记得不是希腊人，而是德国人和法国人打破了这些规则。所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The investment bankers let them — they helped them prepare phony financial statements.
查理·芒格：投资银行家们让他们这样做——他们帮助他们准备虚假的财务报表。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They — actually, it was investment banker-aided fraud.
查理·芒格：他们——实际上，这是投资银行家协助的欺诈。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Not exactly novel. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：并不算新颖。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: So, returning to our main point, I think the euro can and probably should survive and I think it’s going to take some real changes and maybe some examples to enable it to do so.
沃伦·巴菲特：所以，回到我们的主要观点，我认为欧元可以并且可能应该存活下来，我认为这需要一些真正的变化，也许还需要一些例子来使其得以实现。

I hope it really — I mean, it’s going to go in the direction of more cohesion or less, and very soon, probably. And I think if it can figure out a way to do it with more cohesion, overall it will be a good thing for Europe.
我希望它真的——我的意思是，它将朝着更多凝聚力或更少凝聚力的方向发展，而且可能很快就会发生。我认为如果它能找到一种方式来实现更多的凝聚力，总体来说这对欧洲来说将是件好事。

But it certainly, you know, in its present form it’s not going to work.
但它显然，在目前的形式下是行不通的。

Charlie? I don’t know why I’m giving you another shot, but — (Laughter)
查理？我不知道为什么我还要给你另一个机会，但——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think I’ve offended enough people.
查理·芒格：我想我已经冒犯了足够多的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：对。（笑声）

There’s two or three in the balcony. (Laughter)
阳台上有两三个。(笑声)

62. Munger: GEICO synergies are “dumb idea”

芒格：GEICO 的协同效应是“愚蠢的想法”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，盖瑞。

GARY RANSOM: With the Van Tuyl acquisition — or now Berkshire Hathaway Automotive — there may be some natural synergies with GEICO, if it’s nothing more than just putting a gecko on the salesman’s desk.
加里·兰索姆：随着Van Tuyl收购——现在是伯克希尔哈撒韦汽车——与 GEICO 之间可能会有一些自然的协同效应，即使这仅仅是把一只壁虎放在销售员的桌子上。

Would you expect to do anything in that regard to encourage getting more customers through that relationship?
你会期待在这方面做些什么来鼓励通过这种关系吸引更多客户吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think so.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不这样认为。

You always have these things that the investment banker will tell you will produce synergy and all that. Most times that doesn’t work.
你总是会听到投资银行家告诉你这些事情会产生协同效应等等。但大多数时候这并不奏效。

And historically, selling auto insurance through dealerships hasn’t been particularly effective. And if we were to do that, we would probably have to compensate people who did the insurance work — or made the insurance sales — out of Van Tuyl. That would add to costs.
历史上，通过经销商销售汽车保险并不是特别有效。如果我们这样做，我们可能需要对在 Van Tuyl 进行保险工作或进行保险销售的人进行补偿。这将增加成本。

I mean, GEICO is a low-cost model, and it’s a wonderful low-cost model. And [CEO] Tony Nicely has done an incredible job of keeping those costs down and our — and you can see it in our expense ratios.
我意思是，GEICO 是一个低成本模型，而且这是一个很棒的低成本模型。[首席执行官]托尼·尼克利做得非常出色，成功地控制了这些成本，你可以在我们的费用比率中看到这一点。

We spend a lot of money on advertising. But its success depends on delivering first-class insurance at a better price than other people can get, and the more people we put in distribution system or anything —
我们在广告上花了很多钱。但它的成功依赖于提供一流的保险，价格优于其他公司，并且我们越多地把人们放在分销系统中或者其他任何地方——

So, I would doubt very much that we do anything along that line. I think that those two companies will do better if run as two independent businesses than if we try to push through something.
所以，我非常怀疑我们会在这方面做任何事情。我认为，如果这两家公司作为两个独立的业务运营，它们会做得更好，而不是我们试图推进什么。
纵向独立比横向更有优势。
We — Charlie and I have seen a lot of things on paper that involve that sort of a proposition and very, very few succeed.
我们——查理和我在纸上看到过很多涉及这种提议的事情，但成功的非常非常少。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. It’s a very dumb idea, and we’re not going to do it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我同意。这是个非常愚蠢的主意，我们不会这样做。（笑声）

63. Buffett doesn’t follow silver market anymore

巴菲特不再关注银市。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, in this environment of quantitative easing, low interest rates, and an overvalued stock market, what value in silver at these prices do you see, and do you still follow the silver market?
观众成员：巴菲特先生，在这种量化宽松、低利率和股票市场被高估的环境下，您认为在这些价格下白银有什么价值？您还关注白银市场吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I really don’t follow it much anymore. But at one time, we owned over 100 million ounces of silver, and I knew a fair amount about the supply and demand for it, and the prospective supply and demand.
沃伦·巴菲特：我现在真的不太关注这个了。但在某个时候，我们拥有超过一亿盎司的白银，我对其供需情况以及未来的供需情况了解得相当多。

But I really don’t — I haven’t paid much attention to it for a long, long time.
但我真的没有——我很久很久没有关注它了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s a very good thing too. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：这也是一件非常好的事情。（笑声）

We didn’t do that well.
我们做得不太好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We made a little money.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们赚了一点钱。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The — you know, photography — the interesting thing about silver is that there are some pure silver mines, but overwhelmingly, silver is produced as a by-product, you know, in terms of copper mining and that.
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，摄影——关于白银有趣的是，确实有一些纯银矿，但绝大多数白银是作为副产品生产的，你知道，这主要是在铜矿开采中。

So it — it doesn’t respond as much to its own supply and demand characteristics — that’s still a factor — as it does in terms of the supply and demand characteristics of the things of which it’s a by-product, like copper.
所以它——它对自身的供需特征反应并不那么强烈——这仍然是一个因素——而是更依赖于作为副产品的那些东西的供需特征，比如铜。

So, it’s a very small market, too. But we came out better than the Hunt brothers, but other than that, we don’t think about silver anymore.
所以，这也是一个非常小的市场。但我们比亨特兄弟的情况要好，不过除此之外，我们不再考虑银了。

64. Could activists take control after Buffett?

激进投资者能在巴菲特之后掌控局面吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Charlie, question about activism.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：查理，关于激进投资者的问题。

Activism continues to grow and, as Charlie stated at the 2014 annual meeting, he sees it getting worse instead of getting better.
激进主义持续增长，正如查理在 2014 年年会上所说，他认为情况变得更糟而不是好转。

So the question is, we hope that Charlie and Warren will both be around forever, but, unfortunately, there will be a time when they’re no longer here to manage the store.
所以问题是，我们希望查理和沃伦能永远在这里，但不幸的是，总有一天他们会离开管理公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: I reject such defeatism. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我拒绝这种失败主义。（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: If Warren is giving away his shares to charity over a ten-year period through his estate plan, and activists become increasingly more powerful, how will Berkshire defend itself from activists in the near and far future?
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：如果沃伦通过他的遗产计划在十年内将他的股份捐赠给慈善机构，而激进投资者的力量越来越强，伯克希尔将如何在近期和远期抵御激进投资者的挑战？

And would you consider it a failure if Berkshire were broken up in the future and shareholders received a significant premium? And for you to consider it success, what would the premium need to be?
如果伯克希尔在未来被拆分，股东获得了显著的溢价，你会认为这是失败吗？那么对于你来说，成功的标准是什么，溢价需要达到多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if it’s run right, there won’t be a premium in breaking it up.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果运作得当，拆分它就不会有溢价。

It may look like it. I mean, people will say there’s subsidiary A that would sell at 20 times earnings and the whole place would sell, like, at 15. But the whole place won’t sell at 15 if you spin off the one at 20.
可能看起来是这样的。我的意思是，人们会说有一家子公司 A 的市盈率是 20 倍，而整个地方的市盈率大约是 15 倍。但如果你将市盈率为 20 的那家分拆出去，整个地方就不会以 15 倍的市盈率出售。

I mean, it — I laid out in the annual report — there are a lot of benefits to Berkshire, in terms of having the companies in the same corporate tax return.
我意思是，这——我在年度报告中列出了——在同一企业税务申报表中拥有这些公司对伯克希尔有很多好处。

So I think it’s unlikely that, on any long-term basis or intermediate-term basis, that the value of the parts will be greater than the value of the whole.
所以我认为，从长期或中期来看，部分的价值大于整体的价值是不太可能的。

The best defense against activism is performance. But lately, there’s been so much money pouring into activist funds, because it’s been easy to raise money for that — I mean, it’s been a successful way of handling money for the last few years, and institutional money then starts flowing into it, and the consultants recommend it, and all of that sort of thing.
对抗激进投资者的最佳防御就是业绩。但最近，很多资金涌入激进投资基金，因为这已经成为一种成功的投资方式，机构资金开始流入，顾问也推荐这种方式等等。

And so, I would say that much of what I see as activism now, people are really reaching, in terms of what they’re — of the kind of companies that they’re talking about and the claims of what they can do and that sort of thing.
因此，我会说，我现在看到的很多激进投资行为，人们实际上是在过度追求他们谈论的公司类型和他们声称能够做的事情。

I think the biggest — you know, if you’re talking about my shares getting dispensed over 10 years after my estate is settled, and the voting power they have, and I think, by the time that gets to be a reality, I think the market value of Berkshire is likely to be so great that even if all the activists gathered together, they wouldn’t be able to do very much about it.
我认为最大的问题是，如果你谈论的是在我的遗产结算后，股份在10年内分配完毕，并且他们的投票权，我认为到那时，伯克希尔的市场价值可能会非常大，即使所有激进投资者汇聚在一起，他们也无法做太多事情。

Berkshire is likely to really be a very, very large organization 10 or 20 years from now.
伯克希尔在未来 10 到 20 年可能会成为一个非常非常大的组织。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Besides, the Buffett super-voting power is going to last a long time.
查理·芒格：此外，巴菲特的超级投票权将持续很长时间。

WARREN BUFFETT: Last a long time, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：持续很长时间，是的。

I always — I’ve got these friends that call me — other companies and they’ve got an activist, and they’re worried about it. I just tell them to send them over to Berkshire. We’ll welcome them.
我总是——我有一些朋友会给我打电话——其他公司遇到了激进投资者，他们很担心。我只会告诉他们把这些激进投资者送到伯克希尔来。我们会欢迎他们。

We’d love to have them buy our stock because they’re not going to get anyplace. And that’s going to be the situation for a long, long time.
我们希望他们购买我们的股票，因为他们不会有任何进展。而且这种情况将会持续很长很长时间。

We should be a place where people can dump their activists. (Laughter)
我们应该成为一个人们可以甩掉激进投资者的地方。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the thing that I find interesting is, in the old days when many — most — stocks sold for way less than they were worth, in terms of intrinsic value, it was very rare to find an American corporation buying the stock in.
查理·芒格：我觉得有趣的是，在过去，当许多——大多数——股票的内在价值远低于其实际价值时，美国公司回购股票的情况非常罕见。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, in many cases, the activists are urging corporations to buy the stock in heavily, even though it’s selling for more than it’s worth.
查理·芒格：现在，在许多情况下，激进投资者敦促公司大量回购股票，即使这些股票的价格高于其内在价值。

This is not a constructive activity, and it’s not a desirable change, and it’s not a very responsible activity for the activists.
这不是一种建设性的活动，也不是一种令人向往的变化，而且对激进投资者来说也不是一种负责任的行为。

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s been more stupid stuff written on such a simple activity as stock repurchase. Both stupid stuff written and stupid stuff done.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于像股票回购这样简单的活动，已经出现了更多愚蠢的言论。既有愚蠢的言论，也有愚蠢的行为。
越是简单的地方越容易出现愚蠢的行为。
I mean, it’s a very simple decision, in my view, as to whether you repurchase your shares. You know, you repurchase them if you’re taking care of the needs of the business and your stock is selling for less than it’s intrinsically worth. That — I don’t see how anything could be more simple.
我的意思是，在我看来，是否回购股票是一个非常简单的决定。如果你满足了业务需求，并且你的股票的价格低于其内在价值，你就回购它。这——我看不到还有什么比这更简单的了。

If you had a partnership and the partner wanted to sell out to you at 120 percent of what the business is worth, you’d say forget it.
如果你有一个合伙关系，而合伙人想以业务价值的 120%将其出售给你，你会说算了。

And if he’d want to sell out to you for 80 percent of what it’s worth, you’d take it. It’s not complicated.
如果他想以价值的 80%卖给你，你会接受。这并不复杂。

But there’s so many other motivations that entered into people’s minds about deciding whether to repurchase shares or not. It’s gotten to be a very contorted and kind of silly discussion in many cases.
但人们在决定是否回购股票时，心中有很多其他动机。这在许多情况下变成了一种非常扭曲和有些愚蠢的讨论。

And Charlie is right. The — if you look at the history of share repurchases, you know, it falls off like crazy when stocks are cheap and it tends to goes up dramatically when stocks get fully priced.
查理是对的。如果你看看股票回购的历史，当股票便宜时，回购量会疯狂下降，而当股票价格达到合理水平时，回购量往往会大幅上升。

But it’s not what we’ll do at Berkshire. At Berkshire, you know, we will presently — you know, we would love to buy it by the bushel basket at 120 percent of book, because we know it’s worth a lot more than that.
但这不是我们在伯克希尔会做的事。在伯克希尔，你知道，我们很乐意以120%的账面价值来回购，因为我们知道它的价值远远超过这个价格。

We don’t know how much more, but we know it’s worth a lot more.
我们不知道还要多少，但我们知道它值更多。

And we don’t get a chance to do that very often. But if we do get a chance, we’ll do it, big time.
我们并不常有机会这样做。但如果有机会，我们会全力以赴。

But we won’t buy it in at 200 percent of book, because it isn’t worth it.
但我们不会以账面价值的 200%购买它，因为这不值得。

You know, it’s not a complicated question, but people that — I’ve been around a lot of managements that announce they’re going to buy X worth and then they buy it regardless of price.
你知道，这不是一个复杂的问题，但我见过很多管理层宣布他们要购买价值 X 的东西，然后无论价格如何，他们都会购买。

And a lot of times the price makes sense. But if it doesn’t, they don’t seem to stop, and nobody tries to — seems to want to stop them.
很多时候，价格是合理的。但如果不合理，他们似乎并没有停下来，没人想要阻止他们。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with you.
查理·芒格：我当然同意你的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s a great age, this age of activism.
查理·芒格：我认为，这个激进投资者的时代并不伟大。

WARREN BUFFETT: Want to expand on that? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：想进一步阐述一下吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — it’s hard for me to think of any activists I want to marry into the family. (Applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，我——很难想象有哪个激进投资者我愿意让他们成为家族的一员。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I better stop before he names names. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我最好在他点名之前停下来。（笑声）

65. American Express & credit card history

美国运通和信用卡历史

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, American Express, which is Berkshire’s third largest stock holding, has relied on powerful network effects and its valuable brand to generate economic profits over the years.
格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，美国运通，伯克希尔的第三大股票持仓，多年来依靠强大的网络效应和宝贵的品牌来产生经济利润。

It has created a virtual cycle with its collection of cardholders being desirable to merchants, who have been willing to pay higher transaction fees with those fees ending up funding rewards programs and services for American Express’s cardholders.
它创造了一个虚拟循环，其持卡人对商家具有吸引力，商家愿意支付更高的交易费用，这些费用最终用于资助美国运通持卡人的奖励计划和服务。

More recently, though, competitors have turned this model against the firm, targeting its cardholder base with ever-increasing levels of rewards and services, while charging merchants lower fees than American Express does.
最近，竞争对手却利用这一模式对抗该公司，针对其持卡人群体提供越来越高的奖励和服务，同时向商家收取比美国运通更低的费用。

The company also saw its image of exclusivity take a bit of a hit earlier this year when Costco ended a 16-year relationship with the firm, a move that affects one in 10 American Express cards in circulation and which will impact results this year and next.
今年早些时候，随着Costco结束了与公司的16年合作关系，该公司的独特形象也受到了一定影响，这一举措影响了10%的美国运通卡，这将对今年和明年的业绩产生影响。

With restrictions on interchange fees and the growth and acceptance of mobile payment technologies likely to impact future revenue streams, and moves by the firm to go down-market in pursuit of transaction volume potentially diminishing the brand, how does American Express defend its moat?
由于对交易费用的限制以及移动支付技术的增长和接受可能会影响未来的收入来源，而公司向低端市场拓展以追求交易量的举措可能会削弱品牌，美国运通如何维护其护城河？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, American Express has been pretty good at that, and particularly when Ken Chenault’s been running it.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，美国运通在这方面做得很好，特别是在肯·陈诺特执掌期间。

The — it will be — you know, it — all aspects of payments will be subject to lots of innovation and various modes of attack.
这——将会是——你知道的，所有支付的各个方面都将受到大量创新和各种攻击方式的影响。

I think that American Express is still a very special company. And like I say, Ken has done a sensational job in anticipating a lot of these trends and guiding it into different markets. As you mentioned, it’s going down in the — into debit cards, effectively, and things of that sort.
我认为美国运通仍然是一家非常特别的公司。正如我所说，肯在预测许多这些趋势并引导公司进入不同市场方面做得非常出色。正如你提到的，它实际上正在向借记卡等方向发展。

I think there’s a lot of loyalty with American Express cardholders. I do think a proprietary card is worth more than a co-branded card, but I think that — I probably shouldn’t get into the specifics of Costco. I’ve got a Costco director sitting next to me.
我认为美国运通卡持有者非常忠诚。我确实认为专属卡的价值高于联名卡，但我想我可能不应该详细讨论 Costco。我旁边坐着一位 Costco 的董事。

But we’re very happy with American Express, but we’d be even happier if the stock goes down and the 4 or 5 billion they spend a year buying in stock buys even more shares.
但我们对美国运通非常满意，但如果股票下跌，他们每年花费的 40 亿或 50 亿美元用于回购股票能买到更多的股份，我们会更高兴。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I like it a little better when they had a little less competition, but that’s life. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我更喜欢他们竞争少一点的时候，但这就是生活。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, you’ll find in this 50-year history of Berkshire, you know, American Express did wonders for us back in the 1960s. And there’s a little history in there on the fact that it was an assessable stock until 1965, which nobody paid any attention to until 1963 on.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便提一下，你会发现，在伯克希尔的 50 年历史中，美国运通在 1960 年代为我们做了很多好事。而且在这里有一点历史，直到 1965 年它还是一只可评估的股票，直到 1963 年才引起人们的注意。

But the company has an incredible history of adapting. I mean, they started out as an express company, you know, move trunks around, and valuables around.
但这家公司有着令人难以置信的适应历史。我的意思是，他们最初是一家快递公司，你知道的，搬运行李和贵重物品。

And then the railroad came around and started doing the same thing, so they went to traveler’s checks as a way to — very handy way — of moving money around the world.
然后铁路也开始做同样的事情，所以他们转向旅行支票作为一种在全球转移资金的非常方便的方式。

And then the credit card came along, Diners Club came along, in the 1950s, and that threatened the traveler’s check and then they moved into the Travel and Entertainment card, as it was called then.
然后信用卡出现了，1950 年代出现了 Diners Club，这对旅行支票构成了威胁，随后他们转向了当时称为旅行和娱乐卡的产品。

And the interesting thing is that Diners Club, who was first — Ralph Schneider and Al Bloomingdale priced their card at, as I remember, $3, and they looked like they were sewing up the market.
有趣的是，Diners Club 的创始人——拉尔夫·施奈德和阿尔·布鲁明戴尔将他们的卡定价为我记得的 3 美元，他们看起来像是在垄断市场。

And American Express came along and did something very interesting. They priced their card, I think, at $5, and actually established a better image.
美国运通出现并做了一件非常有趣的事情。他们将自己的卡定价为 5 美元，并实际上建立了更好的形象。

I mean, people that pulled out their American Express card at a dinner table, they looked like J.P. Morgan.
我指的是，在餐桌上掏出美国运通卡的人，他们看起来像摩根大通。

And the guy that pulled out a Diners Club card, they’d have a whole bunch of flashy things on it, he looked like a guy who was kiting his expense account or something of the sort. So you just automatically felt like a more important person with your American Express card.
那个拿出Diners Club卡的人，卡上有一堆花哨的东西，他看起来像是在虚报费用的家伙。所以你自然会觉得自己拿着美国运通卡就显得更重要。

They have been very nimble, and very smart, and particularly in recent years, under Ken, in terms of meeting all kinds of challenges. And I think they’ll have plenty of challenges in the future, and I’m delighted we own 15 percent of the company.
他们一直非常灵活，非常聪明，尤其是在最近几年，在肯的领导下，面对各种挑战。我认为他们未来会面临很多挑战，我很高兴我们拥有该公司 15%的股份。

66. Why children need good financial habits

为什么孩子们需要良好的财务习惯

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Chang, originally from Seoul, South Korea, and working in Los Angeles, California.
观众成员：你好。我叫张，来自韩国首尔，目前在加利福尼亚州洛杉矶工作。

I’ve been traveling more than 27 countries, and last year I taught financial literacy lesson in one of the local elementary school in (inaudible) city.
已经旅行过27个国家，去年我在一个当地的小学教授了财务素养课程。

Today here, we’re talking about investments in capital markets, but young students in developing countries, they don’t know how to save money, or they don’t know the concept of interest.
今天我们在这里谈论资本市场的投资，但发展中国家的年轻学生不知道如何储蓄，也不了解利息的概念。

So, in order to overcome the educational challenges, I would like to provide volunteer opportunities to talented Americans to teach in South American schools to overcome the — while they are traveling.
因此，为了克服教育挑战，我想提供机会给有才华的美国人去南美洲的学校教学，同时他们还可以旅行。

So, what do you think about my plan or do you have any advice? Thank you.
那么，你对我的计划有什么看法，或者你有什么建议吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, do you have any advice?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你有什么建议吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I failed in this activity with some of my relatives, so I don’t think I can improve South America. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我在这个活动中对一些亲戚失败了，所以我不认为我能改善南美洲。（笑声）

No, I think if you don’t — if you don’t know how to save, I can’t help you. (Laughter)
不，我认为如果你不知道怎么储蓄，我也帮不了你。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No, but the important thing is to get good habits early on.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，但重要的是要尽早养成良好的习惯。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: You really — you know someone said the chains of habit are too light to be felt until they’re too heavy to be broken. And habits really make an enormous difference in your life.
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，有人说习惯的枷锁轻得感觉不到，直到它们重得无法打破。习惯在你的生活中确实会产生巨大的影响。

So Andy and Amy Heyward have developed the “Secret Millionaires Club,” which I’ve helped out with a little, and our goal is to, in an entertaining way, present good habits to young kids through a kind of a comedy series.
所以安迪和艾米·赫伊沃德开发了“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”，我也稍微参与了一些。我们的目标是以娱乐的方式，通过一种喜剧系列向年轻孩子们展示良好的习惯。

And I think that’s — it’s actually having a pretty good effect. And here in a few days, we’re going to have a — here in Omaha — we’re going to have eight finalists in young kids from around the country that have developed businesses of their own, and I’m always enormously impressed with these kids.
我认为这实际上产生了相当好的效果。在接下来的几天里，我们将在奥马哈迎来八位来自全国各地的年轻决赛选手，他们自己创办了企业，我总是对这些孩子们的印象非常深刻。

But the importance of developing good habits yourself, or encouraging good habits in your children very early on, in respect to money, can change their lives.
但培养自己良好的习惯或在孩子们很小的时候就鼓励他们养成良好的财务习惯，对他们的生活有着改变性的影响。

And, you know, I was 9 or $10,000 ahead when I got out of college, and I got married young and had kids very fast.
我大学毕业时赚了 9,000 到 10,000 美元，年轻时结婚并很快就有了孩子。

And if I hadn’t had that start, my life would have been vastly different. So it — you can’t start young enough on working on good money habits.
如果我没有那个开始，我的生活会截然不同。所以——你越早开始培养良好的理财习惯就越好。

And I do think the “Secret Millionaires Club” is very good, but there could be lots of other good ways of teaching those lessons.
我确实认为“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”非常好，但还有很多其他好的方式来教授这些课程。

67. No plans to change debt level

没有计划改变债务水平

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We now have moved solely to the audience, so we’ll go to station 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们现在只关注观众，所以我们将前往第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren, Charlie. My name is Stefano Grasso (PH), and I come from Genova, Italy. It’s great to be here today for the 50th anniversary.
观众成员：你好，沃伦，查理。我叫斯特法诺·格拉索（PH），来自意大利热那亚。今天能在这里庆祝 50 周年真是太好了。

Last year, I asked you what was the right level for leverage at Berkshire Hathaway, and why not to increase it. I argued that increasing liability more at the cheap level would benefit Berkshire, thanks to the investment capabilities of the present management.
去年，我问你在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的杠杆水平应该是多少，以及为什么不增加杠杆。我认为在低成本水平上增加负债将有利于伯克希尔，这要归功于现任管理层的投资能力。

This year, I would like to get your view on the possibility of working on the other side of the balance sheet and using part of the cash sitting on bank chair — bank accounts — to reduce some of the liabilities currently on its balance sheet.
今年，我想听听您对在资产负债表另一侧工作的可能性的看法，以及利用部分存放在银行账户上的现金来减少目前资产负债表上某些负债的想法。

For example, the index puts at Berkshire sold between 2004 and 2008, generated a premium of almost 5 billion.
例如，伯克希尔在2004年至2008年间出售的股指期权产生了近50亿美元的溢价。

Few years down the line, Berkshire benefited from the float. The indexes are higher and the time to maturity of the put got shorter.
几年后，伯克希尔从浮存金中受益。指数上涨，认沽期权的到期时间缩短。

The question is, if the unwinding of the puts were acceptable by the counterparts which bought them, would you consider unwinding them at a reasonable price? Thank you.
问题是，如果购买这些看跌期权的对手方接受解除交易，你会考虑以合理的价格解除它们吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Are you speaking — you’re speaking specifically of the equity put options we have?
沃伦·巴菲特：你是说——你具体指的是我们拥有的股票认沽期权吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m speaking about them, but as just an example. I’m talking also of maybe reducing debts or doing other —
观众成员：我在谈论他们，但只是作为一个例子。我也在谈论可能减少债务或做其他事情——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, what we hope, of course, is that what we call the excess cash, which is cash beyond 20 billion that we can put to work buying a business. But you can’t do, you know, one a week or one a month. So it’s opportunistic.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们希望的当然是我们所称的超额现金，也就是超过 200 亿美元的现金，我们可以用来收购企业。但你不能每周或每月进行一次收购。所以这是一种机会主义。

And I don’t know whether the phone call that’s going to result in the next deal will come in next week or it may come in a year from now.
我不知道下一个交易的电话是下周打来还是一年后才会打来。

We will get calls and we will put money to work. You know, we just — we can’t do it at an even flow. And we have, you know, virtually no debt.
我们会接到电话，并投入资金。你知道，我们无法保持均匀的流入。而且，我们几乎没有债务。

If someone had told the two of us 50 years ago that we’d be able to borrow money in euros with a long duration of 1 percent or something like that, we would have felt we would have ended up with a way different balance sheet than we have today.
如果有人在 50 年前告诉我们两个人，我们能够以 1%的长期利率借欧元，我们会觉得我们的资产负债表会与今天大相径庭。

But, I mean, money is so cheap that it causes people to do almost anything on the asset side, and we try to avoid doing that because we don’t, you know, we don’t want to drop our standards too fast just because the liability side is costing us so little.
但是，我的意思是，钱是如此便宜，以至于人们几乎会在资产方面做任何事情，我们试图避免这样做，因为我们不想，仅仅因为负债方面的成本如此之低，就过快地降低我们的标准。

But I don’t think — obviously, if we can unwind a derivative trade on a basis where we thought we were mathematically ahead by a significant amount, we would do it.
但我认为——显然，如果我们能够在一个我们认为在数学上有显著优势的基础上解除衍生品交易，我们会这样做。

But I think that’s very unlikely with the contracts we have now, so we’ll probably — I think it’s very likely they just run out over time.
但我认为在我们现在的合同下，这种情况非常不可能，所以我们可能——我认为他们很可能会随着时间的推移而到期。

We carry a liability of well over — I think it’s getting somewhere between 3 1/2 and 4 billion — for something that has a settlement value today of 400 million.
我们承担的负债远超过——我认为在35亿到40亿之间——而今天的结算价值为4亿美元。

So it’s very hard for us to — it’s very hard for us on the other side of the contract to arrive at a price that we both would be happy with.
所以我们在合同的另一方很难达成一个双方都满意的价格。

We’re not going to deleverage Berkshire. There isn’t that much leverage to start with.
我们不会削减伯克希尔的杠杆。起初并没有那么多杠杆。

I mean, the float really is, essentially, very close to permanent. I mean, it can decline a couple percent in a year, but it can also increase a few percent.
我的意思是，浮存金实际上非常接近于永久性。我是说，它每年可能会下降几个百分点，但也可能增加几个百分点。

So, I see no drain on funds of any consequence from the float for as far as the eye can see, and we have very little debt out. So I would not want to pay down the debt we have now.
因此，我看不到浮存金对资金的任何实质性消耗，我们的债务也很少。所以我不想偿还我们现在的债务。

Logically, we probably should take on more debt at these prices, but that’s just not something that appeals to us.
从逻辑上讲，我们可能应该在这些价格下承担更多债务，但这并不是我们所感兴趣的事情。

Maybe if we find a really big deal, we might take on a little more. I would like to at least have that as something I was thinking about.
也许如果我们找到一个真正的大交易，我们可能会承担更多。我希望至少能把这个作为我考虑的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d love to have something come along where we actually felt a little capital constrained. We haven’t felt capital constrained for a long time.
查理·芒格：我们希望能有一些机会出现，让我们真正感到有一点资金限制。我们已经很长时间没有感到资金受限了。

It’s a problem we’d love to have, something so attractive that we —
这是我们非常希望遇到的问题，吸引力如此之大，以至于我们——

WARREN BUFFETT: We’d stretch a little.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们会稍微放宽一些。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d stretch a little. That would be glorious.
查理·芒格：我们会稍微放宽一些。这将是辉煌的。

And it could happen, by the way.
顺便说一句，这可能会发生。

WARREN BUFFETT: And it could happen.
沃伦·巴菲特：这可能会发生。

68. No economies of scale for auto dealers

汽车经销商没有规模经济

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is George. I’m translating for my father, (inaudible), from Shanghai, China.
观众：嗨，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫乔治。我正在为我的父亲（听不清），来自中国上海，进行翻译。

Last year it was my father standing here asking his question, and this year it’s me. I feel so lucky.
去年站在这里问问题的是我父亲，今年是我。我感到非常幸运。

I know at the end of last year, you purchased a car sales dealer. This year, you said in your public letter that you are going to continue to buy. The ultimate purpose of investment is to seek the return.
我知道在去年年底，你购买了一家汽车销售经销商。今年，你在公开信中表示你将继续购买。投资的最终目的是寻求回报。

So my question is, whether the rate of return can be necessarily higher with the scale of the dealers?
我的问题是，随着经销商规模的扩大，回报率是否一定会更高？

If so, why we cannot see that happen in China? How come the differences with the dealership business of the same nature in the United States and China? Thank you.
如果是这样，为什么我们在中国看不到这种情况？为什么与美国和中国同类的经销商业务存在差异？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know the dealership situation in China.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不知道中国的经销商情况。

I would say — I think I mentioned this a little earlier — that I don’t think we’re going to get significant benefits of scale as we buy more units in the auto field. I just don’t see where it would come from.
我想我之前提到过，我认为在汽车领域购买更多单位不会带来显著的规模效益。我实在看不出这会从哪里来。

But we don’t need it. What we really need is managers in those individual dealerships that have skin in the game of their own, and that run them, you know, as first-class businesses, independently.
但我们不需要规模经济。我们真正需要的是那些拥有自己利益的个体经销商的经理，他们将这些经销商运营成一流的独立企业。

And that’s what we’ll be looking for. We’ll not be looking for scale. I don’t know the situation in China. Maybe Charlie knows more about that. I think he does.
这就是我们要寻找的。我们不会关注规模。我不知道中国的情况。也许查理对此了解更多。我想他确实知道。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. But I don’t think we’d be very good at running dealerships in China. And I think the people who run Van Tuyl are very good at running the ones here, so —
查理·芒格：不。但我认为我们在中国经营经销商方面不会很出色。我认为经营Van Tuyl 的那些人在这里经营得非常好，所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah with 17,000 here and we’ve got 81 of them, there’s a little room to expand.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这里有 17,000 个，我们有 81 个，还有一点扩展的空间。

The problem is going to be price. Our purchase probably caused people to move up their multiples by one or two — people that have them — and we paid a full, but fair, price for Van Tuyl and we’ll be using that price, more or less, as a yardstick.
问题将是价格。我们的购买可能导致人们将他们的倍数提高了一两倍——那些有这些倍数的人——我们为Van Tuyl支付了一个完整但公平的价格，我们将以这个价格或多或少作为衡量标准。

And we really thought we bought the best there, so, if anything, we would be hoping to buy others, maybe for a bit less.
我们真的认为我们在那里买到了最好的，所以，如果有的话，我们希望能买到其他的，也许价格会便宜一点。

So we will not — we may buy a lot of them, we may buy very few, just depending on price developments.
所以我们不会——我们可能会买很多，也可能只买很少，这完全取决于价格变化。

The — we’re having a big car year and profits are good in the dealership field. But when profits are good, we want to pay a lower multiple.
我们正处于一个汽车销售的丰收年，汽车经销商的利润很好。但当利润良好时，我们希望支付更低的倍数。

I mean, because, if we’re going to be in the car business forever, we’re going to have some good years and we’re going to have some bad years. And we would rather buy at a 10 or 12 times multiple of a bad year than buy at an eight times multiple of a good year.
我的意思是，因为如果我们要永远在汽车行业，我们会有一些好年头，也会有一些坏年头。我们宁愿在坏年头以 10 倍或 12 倍的倍数购买，也不愿在好年头以 8 倍的倍数购买。

And that’s not necessarily the way that sellers think, although they probably understand it, but they don’t want to think that way. So we’ll see what happens.
这不一定是卖家思考的方式，尽管他们可能理解这一点，但他们不想这样思考。所以我们拭目以待。

69. Buffett values internet more than private jet

巴菲特更看重互联网而非私人飞机

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Mr. Buffett and Munger, very excited to be here.
观众：你好。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，很高兴来到这里。

My name is (inaudible), also from Shanghai, China. Because now (inaudible) a company providing wealth management to the high-net wealth individuals in China. The company name is North, from North Ark (PH), listed at (inaudible).
我叫（听不清），也来自中国上海。因为现在（听不清）一家为中国高净值个人提供财富管理的公司。公司名为 North，来自 North Ark（PH），在（听不清）上市。

You two are my idols. What’s your secrets of keeping so young, so energetic, and so quick?
你们俩是我的偶像。你们保持年轻、充满活力和反应迅速的秘密是什么？

Please don’t say because of Coca-Cola. (Laughter)
请不要说是因为可口可乐。（笑声）

And as someone says that old papa could not understand the internet, but I don’t believe that.
有人说老人无法理解互联网，但我不相信这一点。

What’s your opinion? Will you pay more attention to internet? Could I invite both two gentlemen to answer my question? Thank you very much.
你怎么看？你会更关注互联网吗？我可以邀请两位绅士回答我的问题吗？非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I didn’t get all that, so you —
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我没听清楚，所以你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he asked are we going to be using the internet.
查理·芒格：他问我们是否会使用互联网。

Warren is a big internet user compared to me. And — but —
沃伦是一个比我更频繁使用互联网的人。不过——但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: I love it. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我喜欢它。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: He plays bridge on it.
查理·芒格：他在上面打桥牌。

WARREN BUFFETT: I use a lot of — I use search. It’s been a huge change in my life, and it costs me a hundred dollars a year, or something like that.
沃伦·巴菲特：我使用很多——我使用搜索。这对我的生活产生了巨大的变化，费用大约是一年一百美元。

If I had to give up the plane or I had to give up the internet: the plane costs me a million-and-a-half a year, the internet costs me a hundred dollars a year. You know, I wouldn’t want to give up either one of them, but I’d give up the plane.
如果我必须放弃飞机或者放弃互联网：飞机每年花费我一百五十万，互联网每年花费我一百美元。你知道，我不想放弃任何一个，但我会放弃飞机。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Interesting. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：有趣。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s given up both.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理已经放弃了两者。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Are we going to be doing more — I think everybody’s going to be doing more things on the internet. It is growing in importance. And so like it or not, we’re dragged into modern reality.
查理·芒格：我们会做更多的事情吗——我认为每个人都会在互联网上做更多的事情。它的重要性正在增长。因此，无论我们喜欢与否，我们都被拖入了现代现实。

WARREN BUFFETT: Doesn’t sound like he likes it, does it? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：听起来他并不喜欢，是吧？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I don’t like it.
查理·芒格：不，我不喜欢。

I don’t like multitasking. I see these people doing three things at once, and I think, God, what a terrible way that is to think.
我不喜欢多任务处理。我看到这些人同时做三件事，我想，天哪，这真是一种糟糕的思维方式。

I am so stupid, though, I have to think hard about a thing for a long time. And the idea of multitasking my way to glory has never occurred to me. (Laughter)
我真是太笨了，我必须花很长时间认真思考一件事。而通过多任务处理来获得成功的想法从来没有出现在我脑海中。（笑声）

But at any rate, the internet is here and it’s going to be more and more important and everybody’s going to think more about it and do more about it, like it or not. And, of course, the younger people are way more prone to use it than we are.
但无论如何，互联网已经到来了，它将变得越来越重要，每个人都会更加关注它并采取更多行动，无论喜欢与否。当然，年轻人比我们更倾向于使用它。

But Berkshire — you have what, how many Bloombergs now?
但是伯克希尔——你们现在有多少个彭博？

WARREN BUFFETT: In the office?
沃伦·巴菲特：在办公室吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do we have two or three. Mark?
沃伦·巴菲特：我们有两个还是三个？马克？

I don’t know. They don’t tell me about them. They sort of hide them when I come in the room.
我不知道。他们不告诉我关于他们的事。当我进房间时，他们会把这些事藏起来。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re into the modern world.
查理·芒格：我们进入了现代世界。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have — [CFO] Marc Hamburg tells me we have three — but we’ll reevaluate that situation when I get back to the office. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们有——[首席财务官]马克·汉堡告诉我我们有三个——但等我回到办公室后会重新评估这个情况。（笑声）

What’s that? 那是什么？

Oh, we’re not paying for one. I like that. (Laughter)
哦，我们不打算付钱。 我喜欢这个。 （笑声）

Let’s see if we can not pay for two. (Laughter)
让我们看看能否不支付两个的费用。（笑声）

No, the internet — and it’s changed many of our businesses. I mean, it’s changed GEICO’s business very, very dramatically. And it’s affecting — it affects them all, to one degree or another.
不，互联网——它改变了我们许多的业务。我的意思是，它非常非常戏剧性地改变了 GEICO 的业务。而且它影响——在某种程度上影响了所有公司。

It’s amazing to me — I mean, people get pessimistic about America. Just think in the last 20 or 25 years—well, just 20 years on the internet—how dramatically it’s changed your life.
这让我感到惊讶——我的意思是，人们对美国感到悲观。想想过去 20 或 25 年——好吧，过去 20 年在互联网的发展——它是多么戏剧性地改变了你的生活。

You know, the game is not over yet. There’s all kinds of things that are going to happen to make life better.
你知道，游戏还没有结束。还有各种事情会发生，让生活变得更好。

And Charlie may not think the internet makes life better, but when I compare trying to round up three other guys on a snowy day to come over to my house to play bridge, versus snapping the thing on and having my partner in San Francisco there and two other friends, and so on, in 10 or 20 seconds, I think the world has improved.
查理可能不认为互联网让生活变得更好，但当我比较在雪天叫上另外三个人来我家玩桥牌，和打开电脑，10或20秒内就能看到我在旧金山的伙伴和其他两个朋友时，我认为世界已经改善了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if I had your partner, I’d think it had improved, too. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，如果我有你的伙伴，我也会认为生活有所改善。（笑声）

70. Raise earned income tax credit instead of minimum wage

提高所得税抵免而不是最低工资

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 11。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Whitney Tillson, a shareholder from New York.
观众成员：嗨。我是惠特尼·蒂尔森，来自纽约的股东。

Mr. Buffett, I know many shareholders have felt irritation, to put it mildly, when you’ve weighed in on social issues such as tax policy, or endorsed and raised money for a particular candidate, but I, for one, applaud it.
巴菲特先生，我知道很多股东对您在社会问题上发表意见，比如税收政策，或支持并筹集资金给某些候选人，感到不满，但就我个人而言，我对此表示赞赏。

I think everyone, but especially people who’ve achieved wealth and prominence and thus have real ability to effect change, have a duty to try and make the world a better place, not just through charitable donations, but also through political engagement, and I’d say that even to people whose political views are contrary to my own.
我认为每个人，尤其是那些获得财富和声望的人，因此有真正的能力去改变世界，有责任努力使世界变得更美好，不仅通过慈善捐款，还通过政治参与，我甚至会对那些政治观点与我相悖的人这样说。

My question relates to one of the big issues today: rising income inequality, and related to that, the campaign to raise the minimum wage, which has had some recent successes with some of the largest businesses in the country like Walmart and McDonald’s.
我的问题与今天的一个重大问题有关：收入不平等的加剧，以及与此相关的提高最低工资的运动，该运动在一些全国最大的企业如沃尔玛和麦当劳中取得了一些近期的成功。

How concerned are you about income inequality? Do you think raising the minimum wage is a good idea? And do you think these efforts might meaningfully affect the profitability of corporate America?
你对收入不平等有多担忧？你认为提高最低工资是个好主意吗？你认为这些努力可能会对美国企业的盈利能力产生实质性的影响吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think income inequality is — I think it’s extraordinary, in the United States, to see how far we’ve gone.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为收入不平等——我认为在美国，这种现象非常突出。

Well, just go back to my own case. Since I was born in 1930, the average GDP per capita in the United States has gone up six for one.
好吧，回到我自己的案例。自从我在 1930 年出生以来，美国的人均 GDP 已经增长了六倍。

Now, my parents thought they were living in a reasonably decent economy in 1930, and here their son has lived to where the average is six times what it was then.
现在，我的父母认为他们在 1930 年生活在一个相对体面的经济中，而他们的儿子现在的生活水平是当时的六倍。

And if you’d asked them at that time, and they’d known that fact, that it would go from 8 or $9,000 in today’s terms to $54,000, they would have said, “Well, everybody in America is going to be enjoying a terrific life,” and clearly they’re not.
如果你在那个时候问他们，他们知道这个事实，即从今天的 8,000 或 9,000 美元涨到 54,000 美元，他们会说：“好吧，美国每个人都将享受美好的生活，”但显然并不是这样。

So, I think it is a huge factor. There are a million causes for it, and I don’t pretend to know all the answers, in terms of working towards solutions.
所以，我认为这是一个巨大的因素。有无数原因导致这一点，我不假装知道所有的答案，关于解决方案的工作。

But I do think that everybody that is willing to work should have a reasonably decent livelihood in a country like the United States, and — (applause) — how that is best achieved — I’m actually going to write something on it pretty soon.
但我确实认为，在像美国这样的国家，愿意工作的人应该有一个相对体面的生计，——（掌声）——如何最好地实现这一点——我实际上会很快写一些关于它的东西。

I have nothing against raising the minimum wage, but to raise it to a level sufficient to really change things very much, I think, would cost a whole lot of jobs.
我对提高最低工资没有意见，但我认为将其提高到足以真正改变现状的水平，会导致大量失业。

I mean, there are such things as supply and demand curves. And if you were to move it up dramatically, I think you would — it’s a form of price fixing. I think you would change the opportunities available to people very dramatically.
我意思是，确实存在供需曲线。如果你大幅度地将其上移，我认为这是一种价格操控。我认为这会非常显著地改变人们可获得的机会。

So I am much more of a believer in reforming and enlarging the earned income tax credit, which rewards people that work, but also takes care of those whose skills don’t fit well into a market system. So I think you put your finger on a very big problem.
所以我更相信改革和扩大所得税抵免，这奖励那些工作的人，同时也照顾那些技能不太适合市场体系的人。因此，我认为你指出了一个非常大的问题。

I don’t think — I don’t have anything against raising the minimum wage, but I don’t think you can do it in a significant enough way without creating a lot of distortions.
我并不反对提高最低工资，但我认为你不能以足够显著的方式提高它，而不造成很多扭曲。

Whereas, I do think the earned income tax credit makes a lot of sense and I think it can be improved. There’s a lot of fraud in it. It pays out this lump sum, so you get into these payday type loans against — I mean, there’s — a lot of improvements can be made in it.
而且，我确实认为收入所得税抵免是很有意义的，而且我认为它可以改进。它存在很多欺诈行为。它一次性支付这笔款项，所以你会陷入类似发薪日贷款的困境——我的意思是，还有很多改进的空间。

But I think the answer lies more in that particular policy than the minimum wage. And, like I said, I think I’m going to write something on it pretty soon. And if there’s anybody I haven’t made mad yet, you know, I’ll take care of it in the next one.
但我认为答案更多地在于那个特定的政策，而不是最低工资。就像我说的，我想我会很快写一些关于它的东西。如果还有谁我还没有惹怒的话，你知道的，我会在下一个中处理好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve just heard a Democrat speaking and here’s a Republican who says I agree with him.
查理·芒格：好吧，你刚刚听到了一位民主党人的发言，这里有一位共和党人说我同意他的观点。

I think if you raise the minimum wage a lot, it would be massively stupid and hurt the poor, and I think it would help the poor to make the earned income credit bigger. (Applause)
我认为如果大幅提高最低工资，那将是极其愚蠢的，并且会伤害到穷人。我认为扩大所得税抵免会更有利于穷人。（掌声）

71. “Ridiculous argument” that college boosts lifetime earnings

“荒谬的论点”认为大学教育提高终身收入

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to station 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们去 1 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Michael Monahan (PH) from Long Island, New York.
观众成员：嗨。我是来自纽约长岛的迈克尔·莫纳汉。

Warren, Charlie, the higher education system has expanded, covering almost everyone who would like to receive a college education. This demand has translated into rising college costs.
沃伦，查理，高等教育系统已经扩展，几乎覆盖了所有希望接受大学教育的人。这一需求导致了大学费用的上升。

As a high school junior, I’m looking at prestigious institutions such as UPenn, Villanova, NYU, Fordham, and Boston University.
作为一名高三学生，我正在考虑宾夕法尼亚大学、维拉诺瓦大学、纽约大学、福特汉姆大学和波士顿大学等著名院校。

On the other hand, my parents are experiencing sticker shock. All of these schools have a sticker price of over $60,000, with some students, as shown in a businessinsider.com article, can pay over $70,000, as the case at NYU.
另一方面，我的父母正在经历价格震惊。所有这些学校的标价都超过 60,000 美元，正如 businessinsider.com 的一篇文章所示，一些学生的费用超过 70,000 美元，纽约大学就是一个例子。

How will the average American family be able to pay this in the future and, more importantly, how do you two feel about this?
普通美国家庭将如何在未来支付这些费用，更重要的是，你们两位对此有何感想？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? 沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the average American family does it by going to less expensive places and getting massive subsidies from the expensive places.
查理·芒格：嗯，普通美国家庭通过去较便宜的学校和从贵校获得大量补贴来解决这个问题。

If we had to give our college education to only people who could write cash checks for 60 or $70,000 a year, we wouldn’t have that many college students.
如果我们只把大学教育提供给那些能够每年开出 6 万或 7 万美元支票的人，我们就不会有那么多大学生。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So most people are paying less or getting subsidies. And — but I think it is a big problem, that education has just kept raising the price, raising the price, raising the price.
查理·芒格：所以大多数人支付的费用更少或获得补贴。但是我认为这是一个大问题，教育的价格一直在上涨，价格在不断上涨。

And they say, but college educated people do better. It’s a big bargain. But maybe they do better because they were better to start with before they ever went to college, and they never tell you that. (Applause)
他们说，但受过大学教育的人表现更好。这是一个很大的交易。但也许他们表现更好是因为在上大学之前他们就已经更优秀，而他们从来不告诉你这一点。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a ridiculous argument.
沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个荒谬的论点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And so —
查理·芒格：所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s one of the silliest statistics that they publish, I mean, to say that a college education is worth X because people that go to college earn this much more than the ones that don’t. You’re talking about two different universes.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为这是他们发布的最愚蠢的统计数据之一，我的意思是，单纯说大学教育的价值是 X，因为上大学的人比不上的人多赚了这么多。你是在谈论两个不同的世界。

And to attribute the entire difference to the one variable, that they went to college as opposed to the difference between the people who want to go to college and have the ability to get into college —
并将整个差异归因于一个变量，即他们上大学与那些想上大学但没有能力进入大学的人之间的差异——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s completely nutty —
查理·芒格：这完全是疯狂的——

WARREN BUFFETT: — it’s a fraud
沃伦·巴菲特：——这是一个欺诈

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and about 70 percent of the people believe in it. So it gives you a certain hesitation about relying on your fellow man. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：——大约 70%的人相信这一点。这让你对依赖同胞产生了一定的犹豫。（笑声）

So I think most people have to struggle through with the system the way it is.
所以我认为大多数人必须在现有系统下挣扎度过。

There’s a big tendency to have prices rise to what can be collected. And people just rationalize that the service is worth it. And I think a lot of that has happened in education, and, of course — (applause) — a lot is taught in higher education that isn’t very useful to the people who are learning it and, of course, a lot of those people would never learn much from anything.
价格上涨的趋势很大。人们只是合理化这些服务是值得的。我认为教育中发生了很多这种情况，当然——（掌声）——高等教育中教授的很多内容对学习者并没有多大用处，当然，很多这些人从任何事情中也不会学到很多东西。

So it’s really wasting your time, and that’s just the way it works. So I think there’s a lot wrong.
所以这真的在浪费你的时间，这就是事情的运作方式。所以我认为有很多问题。

What I noticed that was very interesting is that when the Great Recession came, every successful university in America was horribly overstaffed and they all behaved just like 3G. They all, with a shortage of money, laid off a lot of people. And the net result was they all worked better when it was all over with the people gone.
我注意到一个非常有趣的现象是，当大萧条来临时，美国每所成功的大学都严重人满为患，它们的行为就像 3G 一样。在资金短缺的情况下，它们都裁掉了很多人。最终的结果是，当所有人离开后，它们的工作效率反而提高了。

And so this right-sizing is not all bad. I don’t think there’s a college in America that wants to go back to its old habits. And — but you put your finger on — it is a real problem to look as those sticker shocks.
因此，这种调整并不全是坏事。我认为美国没有哪所大学想要回到过去的习惯。但是——你指出了——面对这些价格震惊确实是一个真正的问题。

It’s like any other problem in life. You figure out your best option and just live with it.
这就像生活中的其他问题一样。你找出最好的选择，然后就接受它。

We can’t change Villanova or Fordham. They’re going to do what they’re going to do. And as long as it works, they’ll keep raising the prices.
我们无法改变维拉诺瓦大学或福特汉姆大学。他们会按照自己的方式行事。只要有效，他们就会继续提高价格。

WARREN BUFFETT: And it will keep working.
沃伦·巴菲特：这将继续有效。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And that’s pretty much the way the system works.
查理·芒格：是的。这基本上就是系统运作的方式。

When it really gets awful there’s finally a rebellion. In my place in Los Angeles, the little traffic accident got so it cost too much to everybody because of so much fraud, and the chiropractors, and some of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, and so on.
当情况真的变得糟糕时，最终会爆发叛乱。在我位于洛杉矶的地方，小交通事故的费用变得太高，大家都付不起，因为有太多的欺诈行为，还有脊椎按摩师，以及一些原告的律师等等。

And finally, the little accidents were costing so much that they worried about the guy who lived in a tough neighborhood who couldn’t afford to drive out to get a job. And the auto insurance companies thought, my God, with prices going up like this, they’ll have legislation creating state auto insurance or something.
最终，小事故的成本如此之高，以至于他们担心住在困难地区的人无法负担开车去找工作。而汽车保险公司认为，天啊，价格这么上涨，他们将会制定立法创建州立汽车保险或其他措施。

So the net result is they put the plaintiffs’ attorneys to trial in every case, and that fixed it. And maybe something like that will happen in higher education. But without some big incentive, I think higher education will just keep raising the prices.
所以最终的结果是，他们在每个案件中都让原告的律师接受审判，这解决了问题。也许在高等教育中也会发生类似的事情。但如果没有一些大的激励，我认为高等教育只会继续提高价格。

72. Bullish on China

看好中国

WARREN BUFFETT: On that cheerful note, we’ll move to station 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：在这个愉快的音符上，我们将前往第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for taking my question.
观众：谢谢您回答我的问题。

My name is Brendan Chin (PH). I’m form Taipei, Taiwan.
我的名字是布伦丹·陈（PH）。我来自台湾台北。

My question is, China is undergoing a number of structural changes. What do you — when you take the pulse of the Chinese economy, what do you read and what advice would you give? Thank you.
我的问题是，中国正在经历一些结构性变化。当你评估中国经济时，你读到什么，给出什么建议？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s the China expert. I think China’s going to do very fine over a period of time.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理是中国专家。我认为中国在一段时间内会表现得很好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I’m a big fan for what’s happening in China.
查理·芒格：是的。我非常支持中国正在发生的事情。

And as a matter of fact, I’ve just ordered — prepared — a bust of Lee Kuan Yew, the recently deceased ex-prime minister of Singapore, because I think he’s contributed so much to fixing, first Singapore, and then China.
事实上，我刚刚订购了一尊李光耀的半身像，他是新加坡最近去世的前总理，因为我认为他为改善新加坡，随后是中国，做出了巨大的贡献。

And one of the things Lee Kuan Yew did in China — in Singapore — was to stop the corruption, including cashiering some of his close friends.
李光耀在中国——在新加坡——所做的事情之一就是制止腐败，包括罢免一些他的密友。

And China is doing the same thing. And I consider it the smartest damn thing I’ve seen a big country do in a long, long time, and I think that to — it’s hard to set the proper example if the leading political rulers are kleptocrats.
中国也在做同样的事情。我认为这是我见过的大国在很长一段时间内做的最聪明的事情，我认为如果主要的政治统治者是贪污者，就很难树立一个正确的榜样。

You know, you don’t want to be run by a den of thieves. You want responsible people.
你知道，你不想被一群盗贼所控制。你想要负责任的人。

And what Lee Kuan Yew did is he paid the civil servants way better and recruited very good people. And he just created a better system and, of course, China is widely copying him. And it’s a wonderful thing they’re doing.
李光耀所做的是给公务员支付更高的薪水，并招募优秀的人才。他创造了一个更好的系统，当然，中国也在广泛地模仿他。他们所做的事情非常棒。

So I’m very high on what’s going on in China, and I think it’s — I think it’s very likely to work. If you — they’ve actually shot a few people. That really gets people’s attention. (Laughter)
所以我对中国正在发生的事情非常看好，我认为这很可能会成功。如果你——他们实际上处决了一些人。这确实引起了人们的注意。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re starting to get some practical advice here. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们开始得到一些实用的建议了。（笑声）

What has happened in China, you know, over the last 40 or so years, I mean, I — it just strikes me as totally miraculous. I don’t think — I would not have believed that a country could move so far so — a country of that size, particularly — so far so fast. And it’s —
在过去的 40 年左右，中国发生的事情，我觉得简直是奇迹。我不认为——我不会相信一个国家能够如此迅速地发展——尤其是一个如此庞大的国家——如此之快地走得如此远。这是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It never happened before, in the history of the world, that a company so big had come so far. When I was a little boy, 80 percent of the population of China was illiterate and mired in subsistence poverty and agriculture.
查理·芒格：在世界历史上，从未发生过如此庞大的公司走得如此远。当我还是个小男孩时，中国 80%的人口是文盲，陷入生存贫困和农业中。

Now just think — and they’ve been through horrible wars and look at them. It’s one of the most remarkable achievements in the history of the Earth.
现在想想——他们经历了可怕的战争，看看他们。 这是地球历史上最显著的成就之一。

And a few people made an extreme contribution to it, including this Chinese politician in Singapore.
还有一些人对此做出了极大的贡献，包括这位在新加坡的中国政治家。

And I give the Communist Party a lot of credit for copying Lee Kuan Yew.
我非常赞赏共产党模仿李光耀。

That’s all Berkshire does is copy the right people.
伯克希尔所做的就是模仿正确的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. In 1790, the United States had 4 million people. China had 290 million people.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在 1790 年，美国有 400 万人。中国有 2.9 亿人。

They were just as smart as we were. They worked as hard, similar climate, similar soil. And for 200 — close to 200 — years, you know, the United States went with those 4 million people to close to 25 percent of the world’s GDP and China really didn’t go anyplace.
他们和我们一样聪明。他们工作努力，气候相似，土壤相似。在近 200 年里，美国凭借这 400 万人口达到了全球 GDP 的近 25%，而中国实际上并没有什么进展。

And then those same people, in 40 years — and they’re not working harder now than they were 40 years ago — they’re not smarter now than they were 40 years ago, in terms of the basic intelligence — and just look at what’s been accomplished.
然后那些人，40 年后——他们现在并没有比 40 年前更努力工作——在基本智力方面，他们现在也没有比 40 年前更聪明——看看所取得的成就。

I mean, it does show you the human potential when you find a system that unleashes it, and we found a system that unleashed human potential a couple hundred years ago and they found a system that unleashed human potential 40 or 50 years ago.
我想，这确实展示了人类的潜力，当你找到一个能够释放它的系统时。几百年前我们找到了一个释放人类潜力的系统，而四五十年前他们也找到了一个释放人类潜力的系统。

And, you know, when you see that example, you know, it has to have a powerful effect on what happens in the future.
而且，你知道，当你看到那个例子时，你知道它必然会对未来发生的事情产生强大的影响。

And it’s just amazing that you can have people go nowhere, basically, in their lives for centuries and then just — it explodes. And it just blows me away to see it, and you make it — it’s the same human beings, but they’ve — they found a way to unlock their potential and I congratulate them for it.
真是令人惊讶的是，有些人几乎在他们的生活中毫无进展，整整几个世纪，然后突然——一切都爆发了。看到这一切让我感到震惊，他们——找到了释放自己潜力的方法，我为他们感到骄傲。

And as Charlie said earlier, China and the United States are going to be the superpowers for as far as the eye can see. And it is really good for us, in my view, that the Chinese have found the way to unlock their potential.
正如查理之前所说，中国和美国将是未来可见的超级大国。在我看来，中国人找到了释放他们潜力的方法，这对我们来说真的很好。

And I think its imperative for two countries with nuclear weapons that, in this kind of world, that they figure out ways to see the virtues in each other rather than the flaws.
我认为，对于两个拥有核武器的国家来说，在这样的世界中，找到彼此的优点而不是缺点是至关重要的。

We’ll have plenty of disagreements with the Chinese, and they will with us, but remember that on balance, we’re both better off if the other one is doing well. That’s just my own view. OK. (Applause)
我们与中国人会有很多分歧，他们也会与我们有分歧，但请记住，从整体上看，如果对方做得好，我们双方都会更好。这只是我个人的看法。好的。（掌声）

73. “We just kept reading … and went with our instincts”

“我们只是继续阅读……并跟随我们的直觉”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 3, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到 3 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Chander Chawla and I’m from San Francisco. Thank you for the last 50 years of sharing your wisdom and being an exemplar of integrity.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫钱德尔·查瓦拉，来自旧金山。感谢您们在过去 50 年中分享智慧，并成为诚信的典范。

Fifty years ago, when you were starting out or getting into new industries, how did you figure out the operational metrics for a new industry where you did not have previous experience?
五十年前，当你刚开始或进入新行业时，你是如何确定一个你没有经验的新行业的运营指标的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — A) we didn’t have it thought out that well, in a sense, at that time.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们——A）在某种意义上，当时我们并没有想得那么周全。

But we basically looked for companies where we thought we could understand what the future would look like 5 or 10 or 15 years hence. And that didn’t mean we had to do it to four decimal places or anything of the sort, but we had to have a feel for it, and we had to know our limitations. So we stayed away from a lot of things.
但我们基本上寻找那些我们认为能够理解未来五年、十年或十五年后样子的公司。这并不意味着我们必须做到四位小数或类似的事情，但我们必须对其有一种感觉，并且要了解我们的局限性。因此，我们避免了很多事情。

And at that time, prices were different, so we — in terms of knowing we were getting enough for our money, it was a much easier decision than it is currently.
那时，价格不同，所以我们——在知道我们花的钱能得到足够的东西方面，这个决定比现在容易得多。

But it wasn’t — they weren’t elaborate — well, there were no planning sessions or anything of the sort. We just kept reading and we kept thinking and we kept looking at things that came along, as Charlie described it in the movie, and you know, comparing Opportunity A with Opportunity B.
但事实并非如此——它们并不复杂——好吧，没有规划会议或任何类似的东西。我们只是不断阅读，不断思考，不断观察出现的事物，正如查理在电影中所描述的那样，你知道的，将机会 A 与机会 B 进行比较。

And in those days, we were capital constrained, so we usually had to sell something if we were going to buy something else. And that always makes for — you know, that’s the — an interesting challenge, always, when you’re measuring something you hold against something that has come along and to see which is more attractive.
在那些日子里，我们受到资本限制，所以如果我们想买其他东西，通常必须先卖掉一些东西。这总是带来一种有趣的挑战，当你将手中持有的东西与新出现的东西进行比较时，看看哪个更具吸引力。

And we probably leaned very much toward things where we felt we were certain to get a decent result than where we were hopeful of getting a brilliant result.
我们可能更倾向于那些我们确信能获得不错结果的事情，而不是那些我们希望能获得辉煌结果的事情。

Went with our instincts, and kept putting one foot in front of the other.
跟随我们的直觉，一步一步向前走。

Charlie, what would you say?
查理，你会怎么说？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s exactly what we did, and it worked wonderfully well. And part of it is because we were such splendid people and worked so constructively, and part of it is we were a little lucky. We had some good fortune.
查理·芒格：嗯，这正是我们所做的，而且效果非常好。部分原因是我们是如此出色的人，工作得如此建设性，部分原因是我们有点运气。我们有一些好运。

Now, Warren says he was lucky to go to GEICO, but not every 20-year-old was going down to Washington, D.C., and knocking on the doors of empty buildings to try and find something out that he was curious about.
现在，沃伦说他很幸运去到GEICO，但并不是每个20岁的人都会去华盛顿特区，敲空荡荡的建筑物的门，试图找到他好奇的东西。

So we made some of our luck by being curious and seeking wisdom, and we certainly recommend that to anybody else.
所以我们通过好奇和寻求智慧创造了一些运气，我们当然推荐给其他人。

And there’s nothing that produces wisdom more thoroughly than really getting your own nose whacked hard when you make a mistake, and we had a firm amount of that, didn’t we?
而没有什么比在犯错时真正受到严厉惩罚更能产生智慧的了，我们经历了不少这样的事情，不是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: We had plenty of them. If you read this book, you’ll see about a few of them.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们有很多这样的例子。如果你读这本书，你会看到其中的一些。

We thought we knew the department store business in Baltimore and we thought we knew about the trading stamp business.
我们认为我们了解巴尔的摩的百货商店业务，也认为我们了解交易印花业务。

We’ve had a lot of experience with bad businesses, and that makes you appreciate a good one. And to some extent, it sharpens your ability to make distinctions between good and bad ones.
我们在糟糕的企业中有很多经验，这让你更加欣赏好的企业。在某种程度上，这也提高了你区分好坏企业的能力。

And we’ve had a lot of fun along the way. That helps too. If you’re enjoying what you’re doing, you know, you’re likely to get a better result than if you go to work with your teeth clenched every morning.
我们在这个过程中也玩得很开心。这也很重要。如果你喜欢你正在做的事情，你知道，你得到的结果往往会比每天早上咬紧牙关去工作要好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we were helped because we came from families where there was some admirable people, and we tended to identify other admirable people better than we would have coming from a different background.
查理·芒格：我认为我们得到了帮助，因为我们来自一些有值得尊敬的人物的家庭，我们往往比从其他背景来的更能识别其他值得尊敬的人。

So, my deceased wife used to say, you can’t accomplish much in one generation.
所以，我已故的妻子曾经说过，你在一代人内无法完成太多事情。

We owe a considerable amount, both of us, to the families we were raised in. I think the family standards helped us to identify the good people more easily than we would have if we’d had a more disadvantaged background.
我们都很大程度上归功于我们成长的家庭。我认为家庭的标准帮助我们更容易地识别优秀的人，而不是来自更不利背景的话。

Do you agree with that, Warren?
你同意吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Have you still got your father’s briefcase?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你还保留着你父亲的公文包吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve still got it, but I don’t know where it is. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我仍然拥有它，但我不知道它在哪里。（笑声）

Can’t carry it anymore. It’s worn out. It’s got holes in it.
不能再背了。它已经磨损了。上面有洞。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve got my dad’s desk from 75 years ago.
沃伦·巴菲特：我有我父亲 75 年前的桌子。

74. How Buffett found his first investors

巴菲特是如何找到他的第一批投资者的

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. This is Cora and Dan Chen from Talguard in Los Angeles, and we’re thrilled to be here again.
观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我们是来自洛杉矶 Talguard 的科拉和丹·陈，我们很高兴再次来到这里。

Thank you for planting the seeds for which my generation can sit under the shade, and for my children’s generation with “The Secret Millionaires Club,” so that they can sit under the shade. I walk amongst giants.
感谢您为我的一代人种下了可以在阴凉下休息的种子，也为我孩子的一代人种下了“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”，让他们也能在阴凉下休息。我在巨人中行走。

WARREN BUFFETT: Go on. Go on. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：继续。继续。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s all I have. (Laughter)
观众成员：我就这些了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Don’t hold back.
沃伦·巴菲特：不要有所保留。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Seriously though, thank you so much for everything you’ve taught us.
观众成员：说真的，非常感谢您教给我们的所有东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How were you able to persuade — (applause)
观众成员：你是如何说服的——（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How were you able to persuade your early investors, all early on, besides your family and friends, to overcome their doubts and fears and to believe in what you’re doing?
观众成员：除了你的家人和朋友，你是如何说服早期投资者克服他们的疑虑和恐惧，相信你所做的事情的？

There’s a lot of other asset classes out there, such as — a lot of people believe, real estate, bonds, gold. How were you able to get over that? And something I’ve been really dying to ask you —
还有很多其他的资产类别，比如——很多人认为，房地产、债券、黄金。你是如何克服这些的？我一直很想问你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We didn’t do very well until we had a winning record. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：在我们有了胜利的记录之前，我们做得并不好。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Prior to the early winning record, how were you able to get them to buy into what you were trying to do?
观众成员：在早期的胜利记录之前，你是如何让他们相信你所尝试做的事情的？

I mean, no one has ever done what you’re doing, and no one has, still. And I’ve been really wanting to ask you, in the past, you said you’re 90 percent Graham and 10 percent Fisher. Where does that percentage stand today?
我的意思是，没人做过你正在做的事情，至今也没有。我一直想问你，过去你说你是 90%的格雷厄姆和 10%的费舍尔。现在这个比例是什么？

Thank you again from a grateful student of your teachings, and my children love what you do, too. They wrote you a letter.
再次感谢您，一位感激您教导的学生，我的孩子们也喜欢您所做的事情。他们给您写了一封信。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。谢谢。（掌声）

A lot of it — you know, I started selling stocks here when I was 20 years old. I got out of Columbia. And although I was 20, I looked about 16 and I behaved like I was about 12.
很多事情——你知道，我 20 岁的时候在这里开始卖股票。我从哥伦比亚大学毕业。尽管我 20 岁，但我看起来大约 16 岁，行为却像 12 岁。

So I was not — I did not make a huge impression selling stocks. I used to just walk around downtown and call on people, which is the way it was done, and then I went to work for Graham.
所以我并没有在卖股票方面留下深刻的印象。我以前只是到市中心走来走去，拜访人们，这就是当时的做法，然后我去为格雷厄姆工作。

But when I came back, the people that joined me, actually — one of my sisters, her husband, my father-in-law, my Aunt Alice, a guy I roomed with in college, and his mother, and I’ve skipped one — but in any event, those people just had faith in me.
但是当我回来时，和我一起的人，实际上——我的一个姐妹，她的丈夫，我的岳父，我的阿姨爱丽丝，我在大学时的室友，还有他的母亲，我漏掉了一个——但无论如何，这些人对我充满信心。

And my father-in-law, who was a dean at the University — what was then the University of Omaha — he gave me everything he had, you know, and to quite an extent they all did.
我的岳父曾是大学的院长——当时是奥马哈大学——他把自己所有的一切都给了我，你知道，他们在很大程度上都是这样做的。

And so it was — they knew I’d done reasonably well by that time. That would have been 1956, so I’d been investing five or six years. And actually, I was in a position where when I left New York and came back to Omaha, I had about $175,000 and I was retired.
于是，他们知道我那时做得相当不错。那是 1956 年，所以我已经投资了五六年。实际上，当我离开纽约回到奥马哈时，我的资金大约有 175,000 美元，我已经退休了。

So I guess they figured if I was retired at 26, I must be doing something right and they gave me their money.
所以我想他们认为如果我在 26 岁就退休，那我一定做对了什么，于是他们把钱给了我。

And then it just unfolded after that. An ex-stockholder of Graham-Newman, the president of a college came out, Ben Graham was winding up his partnership for his fund and he recommended me.
然后事情就这样展开了。格雷厄姆-纽曼的前股东，一位大学校长出来了，本·格雷厄姆正在结束他的基金合伙关系，他推荐了我。

And then another fellow saw the announcement in the paper that we formed a partnership and he called me and he joined, and just one after another.
然后另一个人看到报纸上的公告，得知我们成立了合伙关系，他给我打了电话，加入了我们，就这样一个接一个。

And then, actually, a year or two later, a doctor family called and they were the ones that ended up with me meeting Charlie.
然后，实际上，一两年后，一个医生家庭打了电话，他们就是让我遇见查理的人。

So a lot of stuff just comes along if you just keep plodding along.
所以如果你继续坚持不懈，很多事情自然会发生。

But the record, later on, of the partnership attracted money, but initially it was much more just people that knew me and had faith in me. But these were small sums of money. We started with 105,000.
但后来这段合作的记录吸引了资金，但最初更多的是那些认识我并信任我的人。但这些都是小额资金。我们开始时有 105,000。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course that’s the way you start, and — but it’s amazing. We’ve now watched a lot of other people start. And the people that have followed the old Graham-Newman path have one thing in common: they’ve all done pretty well. I can hardly think of anybody who hasn’t done moderately —
查理·芒格：当然，这就是你开始的方式，但这很惊人。我们现在已经观察了很多其他人开始。那些遵循老格雷厄姆-纽曼路径的人有一个共同点：他们都做得相当不错。我几乎想不出有什么人没有做到适度的成功——

WARREN BUFFETT: Everybody did well, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：大家都做得很好，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So, if you just avoid being a perfect idiot — (laughter) — and have a good character and just keep doing it day after day, it’s amazing how it will work.
查理·芒格：所以，如果你只是避免成为一个完全的傻瓜——（笑声）——并且保持良好的品格，持续不断地做下去，这真是令人惊奇的效果。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It was accident, to a significant extent.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在很大程度上，这是一场意外。

If a few of those people hadn’t have said to me, you know, “What should I buy?” And I said, “I’m not going to go back in the stock brokerage business, but I will — you know, we’ll form a partnership and, you know, your fate will be the same as mine and I won’t tell you what I’m doing.”
如果那些人中的几个没有问我，“我该买什么？”我说，“我不打算回到股票经纪业务，但我会——你知道，我们将成立一个合作伙伴关系，你的命运将和我一样，我不会告诉你我在做什么。”

And they joined in, and it went from there.
他们加入了进来，然后事情就从那里开始发展。

But it was not — it was not planned out in the least. Zero.
但这并不是——根本没有计划。零。

I met Charlie, and he was practicing law, and I told him that was OK as a hobby, but it was a lousy business. (Laughter)
我遇到了查理，他在从事法律工作，我告诉他这作为爱好还不错，但这是一门糟糕的生意。（笑声）

And so he — 于是他——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Fortunately, I listened. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：幸运的是，我听了。（笑声）

It took a while, however.
不过，这花了一段时间。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

75. Munger: rationality is a moral virtue

芒格：理性是一种道德美德

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5. We’ve got —
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。我们有——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Arthur. I’m from Los Angeles. I want to thank you for having us in your hometown.
观众成员：嗨，我叫亚瑟。我来自洛杉矶。感谢你们在你们的家乡接待我们。

And we’ve all been listening to your business prowess and all your successes. There’s no question that you’re good at business and finance and have fun doing it.
我们都在倾听您的商业才能和所有成功。毫无疑问，您在商业和金融方面很出色，并且乐在其中。

But there are comments that you’ve made on income inequality, giving away 99 percent of your wealth, and I’m led to believe that you’re motivated by more than just amassing wealth or financial gains.
但有评论提到你对收入不平等的看法，捐赠 99%的财富，我相信你受到的动机不仅仅是积累财富或获得经济利益。

So, I’d like to speak to your value core and ask what matters to you most and why?
所以，我想与你的价值核心对话，问问对你来说最重要的是什么，以及为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, what matters to you most?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，什么对你最重要？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that I had an unfortunate channeling device.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我有一个不幸的引导装置。

I was better at figuring things out than I was at everything else. I was never going to succeed as a movie star, or as an athlete, or as an actor, something, so — and I, early, got the idea that — partly from my family, my grandfather, in particular, whose name I bore, had the same idea — that really, your main duty is to become as rational as you could possibly be.
我在解决问题方面比其他任何事情都要强。我永远不会成为电影明星、运动员或演员之类的成功人士，所以——而我很早就明白——部分是来自我的家庭，特别是我祖父，他的名字我也在用，持有同样的想法——那就是，实际上，你的主要责任就是尽可能理性。

I mean, rationality was just totally worshiped by Judge Munger, and my father and others.
我意思是，理性在芒格法官和我父亲以及其他人眼中被完全崇拜。

And since I was good at that and no good at anything else, I was steered in something that worked well for me and — but I do think rationality is a moral duty.
由于我擅长这个而不擅长其他任何事情，我被引导到一个对我来说很合适的方向——但我确实认为理性是一种道德责任。

That’s the reason I like Confucius. He had the same idea all those years ago. And I think Berkshire is sort of a temple of rationality. What’s really admired around Berkshire is somebody who sees it the way it is. Wouldn’t you agree with that, Warren?
这就是我喜欢孔子的原因。他在多年前就有了同样的想法。我认为伯克希尔有点像理性的殿堂。在伯克希尔，真正受到钦佩的是那些看清事物本质的人。你不觉得这样说对吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，那——

CHARLIE MUNGER: More than anything, more than —
查理·芒格：比任何事情都重要，比——

WARREN BUFFETT: You better see it the way it is.
沃伦·巴菲特：你最好如实看待它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Huh? 查理·芒格：嗯？

WARREN BUFFETT: You better see it the way it is.
沃伦·巴菲特：你最好如实看待它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: See it the way it is.
查理·芒格：如实看待事物。

And so, that’s the way I did it.
所以，我就是这样做的。

But that goes beyond a technique for amassing wealth. To me that’s a moral principle.
但这超越了积累财富的技巧。对我来说，这是一种道德原则。

I think if you have some easily removable ignorance and keep it, it’s dishonorable. I don’t think it’s just a mistake or a lack of diligence. I think it’s dishonorable to stay stupider than you have to be, and so that’s my ethos.
我认为，如果你有一些可以轻易去除的无知却保持着，那是不光彩的。我认为这不仅仅是一个错误或缺乏勤奋。我认为保持无知是一种不光彩的行为，这就是我的理念。

And I think you have to be generous because it’s crazy not to be. We’re a social animal, and we’re tied to other people.
我认为你必须慷慨，因为不这样做是疯狂的。我们是社会动物，与他人紧密相连。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say — this doesn’t sound very noble, but the — what matters to me most now, and probably has for some time — I mean, there are things that matter that you can’t do anything about, I mean, in terms of health and the health of those around you and all that — but actually, what matters to me most is that Berkshire does well.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说——这听起来并不高尚，但——对我来说，现在最重要的事情，可能已经有一段时间了——我的意思是，有些事情是你无能为力的，比如健康和你周围人的健康等等——但实际上，对我来说，最重要的是伯克希尔表现良好。

Basically, I’m in a position where we’ve probably got a million or more people that are involved with us, and it just so happens that it’s enormously enjoyable to me so I can rationalize it, the activity.
基本上，我处于一个大约有一百万人与我们相关的情况，而恰好这对我来说非常愉快，所以我可以合理化这项活动。

But I would not be happy if Berkshire were doing poorly. That doesn’t mean whether the stock goes down or whether, you know, the economy has a bad year.
但如果伯克希尔表现不佳，我不会感到高兴。这并不意味着股票下跌或经济出现糟糕的一年。

But if I felt that we weren’t building something every year that was better than what we had the year before, I would not be happy.
但如果我觉得我们每年没有比前一年更好的东西在建设，我就不会感到快乐。

And, you know, I get this enormous fun out of it and I get to work with people I like and —
而且，你知道，我从中获得了巨大的乐趣，我可以和我喜欢的人一起工作——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But that’s very important. Truth of the matter is it’s easy for somebody like Warren or me to lose a little of our own money, because it doesn’t matter that much, but we hate losing somebody else’s.
查理·芒格：但这非常重要。事实是，对于像沃伦或我这样的人来说，失去一点自己的钱很容易，因为这并不那么重要，但我们讨厌失去别人的钱。

It’s — and that’s a very desirable attitude to have in a civilization.
这是一种在文明中非常可取的态度。

Don’t you hate losing Berkshire money?
你不讨厌损失Berkshire的钱吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That would be the only thing that would keep me up at night. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是唯一让我夜不能寐的事情。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We won’t do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不会这样做。

We can lose money on individual things, obviously. We can have bad years in the economy, and we can have years the stock market goes down a lot. That doesn’t bother me in the least.
我们显然可以在个别事物上亏损。我们可能会经历经济不景气的年份，也可能会有股市大幅下跌的年份。这一点对我来说毫不在意。

What bothers me is if I do something that actually costs Berkshire, in terms of its long-term value, and then I feel, you know, I do not feel good about life on that day.
让我烦恼的是，如果我做了一些实际上损害了伯克希尔长期价值的事情，然后我会觉得，嗯，那天我对生活感到不愉快。

But we can avoid most of that, fortunately. We do get to pick our spots. We’re very fortunate with that.
但幸运的是，我们可以避免大部分情况。我们可以选择我们的时机。我们对此非常幸运。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a good doctor doesn’t like it when the patient dies on the table, either, you know. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好医生也不喜欢病人在手术台上死去，你知道的。（笑声）

Not a new thought. (Laughter)
不是一个新想法。（笑声）

76. No help for “the most intelligent question”

对“最聪明的问题”没有帮助

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go to — let’s go to station 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去第六站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Petra Bergman. I’m from Stockholm, Sweden, in northern Europe. I work at something called EFN.SE.
观众成员：嗨，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫佩特拉·伯格曼。我来自北欧的瑞典斯德哥尔摩。我在一个叫 EFN.SE 的地方工作。

I wanted to ask you, from my point of view, what would be the answer to the most intelligent question I could ask you right now? (Laughter)
我想问你们，从我的角度来看，我现在能问你们的最聪明的问题是什么？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Everybody tries that question, and it would be wonderful if that would solve all your problems. But I don’t think it’s a very good question. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：每个人都试过这个问题，如果这个问题能解决你所有的问题，那就太好了。但我认为这不是一个很好问题。（笑声）

Or perhaps I should say —
或者我应该说——

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s phrase that differently, Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们换个说法，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what I mean is, you’re asking too much of somebody when you — you ask him to honestly say what is the most enlightening question he can answer.
查理·芒格：我的意思是，当你要求某人诚实地说出他能回答的最启发性的问题时，你对他要求太高了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I get that asked by the students a lot. And I’ve had a lot of practice in hearing it asked, but I haven’t had very much success in answering it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我经常被学生问这个问题。我已经有很多练习来听到这个问题，但在回答它方面我并没有取得很大的成功。

So I’ll have to beg off on that one.
所以我得在这件事上推辞。

77. Buffett on fun and “the game”

巴菲特谈乐趣和“游戏”

WARREN BUFFETT: How about 7?
沃伦·巴菲特：7 怎么样？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. Congrats on 50 years. My name is Jim and I’m from Brooklyn, New York.
观众成员：下午好，沃伦和查理。恭喜你们庆祝 50 周年。我叫吉姆，来自纽约布鲁克林。

This is kind of a follow-on to a recent question. You both had success in investing, even before Berkshire Hathaway, as investors and as fund managers.
这有点像是对最近一个问题的延续。你们在投资方面都取得了成功，甚至在伯克希尔·哈撒韦之前，作为投资者和基金经理。

While it’s well known you closely followed Graham’s teachings, others, like Walter Schloss and his son, also had success with similar teachings, yet different strategies.
虽然众所周知你密切关注格雷厄姆的教导，但其他人，如沃尔特·施洛斯和他的儿子，也在类似的教导中取得了成功，但采用了不同的策略。

What would you cite as the most important reason for your early success with small amounts of capital, and given hindsight today, what might you have done to improve your strategy with these small funds?
您认为在小额资本的早期成功中最重要的原因是什么？回顾今天，您可能会做些什么来改善您在这些小资金上的策略？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I had a great teacher, I had exceptional focus, and I had the right sort of emotional qualities that would help me in being an investor.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我有一个伟大的老师，我有卓越的专注力，还有适合做投资者的情感品质。

I enjoyed the game. You do give it all back in the end. It wouldn’t make any difference if I — you know, that was not the key thing.
我很享受这个游戏。你最终会把一切都回馈出去。这并不是关键。

The game was enormously fun. And I think Gene McCarthy said about football one time, you know, it’s just about, you know, hard enough to be interesting but not so hard as to be beyond the capabilities of people understanding it, and that’s kind of the way this game is.
这款游戏非常有趣。我记得吉恩·麦卡锡曾经说过关于足球的一句话，你知道的，它就是要足够有趣，但又不能难到超出人们理解的能力，这就是这款游戏的特点。

I mean, it’s not like Henry Singleton, kind of questions he took on. It’s actually a pretty easy game, and it does require a certain emotional stability.
我的意思是，这并不像亨利·辛格尔顿所面对的问题。实际上，这是一款相当简单的游戏，而且确实需要一定的情绪稳定性。

And I went at it hammer and tong. I went through the manuals and everything, but I was enjoying when I did it.
我全力以赴地去做。我翻阅了手册和所有资料，但我在做的时候很享受。

And, like I say, I started out — between ages seven and about 19, I had that same enthusiasm, but I didn’t really have any guiding principle.
而且，就像我说的，我开始的时候——在七岁到大约十九岁之间，我有那种热情，但我并没有真正的指导原则。

And then I ran into “The Intelligent Investor” and Ben Graham. And then at that point, I was able to take all this energy and everything, and enthusiasm for it, and now I had a philosophy that made a lot of sense — total sense — and I found that I could employ, and so the game became even more fun. But it wasn’t really more complicated than that.
然后我遇到了《聪明的投资者》和本·格雷厄姆。在那时，我能够将所有的精力和热情投入其中，现在我有了一种非常合理的哲学——完全合理——我发现我可以运用它，因此游戏变得更加有趣。但其实并没有比这更复杂。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t have anything to add.
查理·芒格：嗯，我没有什么要补充的。

I do think that it’s an easy game if somebody has the temperament for it and keeps at it because he’s — likes it and it’s interesting — interested in it.
我确实认为，如果有人有这种性格并且坚持下去，因为他喜欢这个游戏并且对此感兴趣，那么这是一款简单的游戏。

I have a problem that Warren has less of. I don’t like being too much an example to people who want to get rich by being shrewd and buying and passively holding securities.
我有一个沃伦少有的问题。我不喜欢成为那些希望通过聪明地购买和被动持有证券来致富的人的榜样。

I don’t think that’s enough of a life. If you wrest a fortune from life by being shrewder than other people and buying little pieces of paper, I don’t think that’s an adequate contribution in exchange for what you’re taking.
我认为这并不是足够的生活。如果你通过比其他人更聪明地从生活中获取财富，并购买一些小纸片，我认为这并不足以作为你所获取的东西的合理回报。

So, I like it when you’re investing money for an endowment, or a pension fund, or your relatives, or something, but I never considered it enough of a life to merely be shrewd in picking stocks and passively holding them.
所以，我喜欢当你为捐赠基金、养老金、亲属或其他事情投资时，但我从未认为仅仅通过聪明地挑选股票并被动持有股票是一种足够的生活。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Running Berkshire has been far, far more fun than running, in my case, multiple partnerships, or just an investment fund. I mean, that —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，经营伯克希尔要比经营多个合伙企业或仅仅是一个投资基金有趣得多。我是说，这——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’d be less of a man. If you’d run that partnership —
查理·芒格：如果你经营那个合伙企业，你会变得不那么像个男人。

WARREN BUFFETT: It would be a crazy way to go through life.
沃伦·巴菲特：这将是一个疯狂的生活方式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I mean, it just — you know, Berkshire is incredibly more satisfying.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我的意思是，伯克希尔让人感到无比满足。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So if you’re good at just investing your own money, I hope you’ll morph into doing something more.
查理·芒格：所以如果你擅长投资自己的钱，我希望你能转变为做一些更多的事情。

78. Dow Jones’s big missed opportunity

道琼斯的大错失

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll do 8 and then we’ll move onto the annual meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们先进行第八项，然后再进入年度会议。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is John Boxtose (PH). I’m from South Dartmouth, Massachusetts.
观众成员：我的名字是约翰·博克托斯（音）。我来自马萨诸塞州南达特茅斯。

My question was regarding an interview that you gave, Mr. Buffett, several years ago.
我想问的是几年前您，巴菲特先生，所做的一次采访。

You made a very interesting point. It was about the old Wall Street Journal, if you will, the one before it was purchased by News Corp.
你提出了一个非常有趣的观点。那是关于旧版《华尔街日报》，也就是在被新闻集团收购之前的版本。

You mentioned in the interview that Wall Street Journal, at some point in the past, had very significant competitive advantages, but a number of them were largely unrealized.
你在采访中提到，《华尔街日报》在过去某个时候曾拥有非常显著的竞争优势，但其中许多优势在很大程度上未得到实现。

I was just wondering if you could elaborate on that, what the advantages were, how they were unrealized, et cetera. Thank you.
我只是想知道您能否详细说明一下，具体有哪些优势，为什么没有实现等等。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Dow Jones, which owned the Wall Street Journal, you know, in the ’60s and ’70s, going into the era of the enormous spread of financial information — and value of financial information — you know, they basically, they owned the field.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，道琼斯在 60 年代和 70 年代拥有《华尔街日报》，进入了金融信息大规模传播的时代——金融信息的价值——你知道，他们基本上拥有这个领域。

They had the news ticker and they had the Journal, which, you know, anybody interested in finance in the country identified with.
他们有新闻滚动条，还有《华尔街日报》，你知道，任何对国家金融感兴趣的人都会认同。

And they — starting with that, in what would be an incredible growth industry, finance, you know, for the next 30 or 40 years they — I forget a couple of those ventures they went into, and they bought a chain of small newspapers, I remember, one time — and they just totally missed what was going to happen.
他们——从这一点开始，在接下来的 30 或 40 年里，金融将成为一个令人难以置信的增长行业——我忘记了他们进入的几个项目，他们曾经购买了一连串的小报纸，我记得，有一次——他们完全错过了即将发生的事情。

You know, here comes Michael Bloomberg and, you know, takes away financial information. They had such an advantage. And they didn’t really see various areas that they could have pursued, which could have turned that company into something worth many hundreds of billions of dollars, in all probability.
你知道，迈克尔·布隆伯格来了，带走了财务信息。他们有如此大的优势。他们并没有真正看到可以追求的各种领域，这本可以将那家公司变成价值数千亿美元的东西。

And, you know, they had a situation where a family owned it, and a lawyer essentially controlled the family’s behavior, and they were sitting pretty. You know, they were all getting dividends, but there was nobody there with any imagination as to what could be done in the financial field.
而且，你知道，他们有一个情况，一个家庭拥有它，而一个律师基本上控制了这个家庭的行为，他们过得很好。你知道，他们都在领取红利，但没有人对金融领域可以做些什么有任何想法。

So, starting with this position, they were a trusted name, they were in every brokerage firm in the country with a news ticker.
所以，凭借这个位置，他们是一个受信任的名字，他们的新闻快报出现在全国每一个经纪公司中。

I mean, I went to Walter Annenberg’s house one time and he had the Dow Jones ticker there — it just — or the news ticker.
我的意思是，我曾经去过沃尔特·安能伯格的家，他那里有道琼斯的新闻快报——就这样——或者说新闻快报。

And it was — they couldn’t have been in a better place. They couldn’t have started with a stronger position. They had a very good balance sheet. And they just let the world pass them by.
他们的情况无与伦比。他们的起点非常强大。他们有一个非常好的资产负债表。他们只是让世界从他们身边经过。

Now, Rupert is changing it into a different newspaper. He’s going into — he’s basically going into competition with the — or he’s gone into competition — with the New York Times, so he — but that’s the game he likes. And it makes for a very interesting competitive situation.
现在，鲁珀特正在把它变成另一种报纸。他正在进入——他基本上在与《纽约时报》竞争——但这是他喜欢的游戏。这使得竞争局面非常有趣。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, they did end up with 6 or $7 billion, so they may have blown their opportunities, but they didn’t destroy their fortune.
查理·芒格：嗯，他们最终得到了 60 亿或 70 亿美元，所以他们可能错失了机会，但他们并没有毁掉他们的财富。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you’d had the hand — if Tom Murphy had had the hand —
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你有这个机会——如果汤姆·墨菲有这个机会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yeah.
查理·芒格：哦，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — it would have been in the hundreds of billions, wouldn’t it?
沃伦·巴菲特：——这应该是数千亿，不是吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know. I’m not sure if we had had that hand we would have —
查理·芒格：嗯，我不知道。如果我们有那一手的话，我们会——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not so sure. I’m talking about Murph. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不太确定。我在说的是墨菲。（笑）

There were a lot of opportunities there.
那里有很多机会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think even Murph is more like us than he is like Bill Gates.
查理·芒格：我认为即使是墨菲也更像我们，而不是比尔·盖茨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not sure where that goes, but... (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不确定那会去哪里，但……（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but I think it’s hard to invent new — entirely new — modalities and so on.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为发明全新的——完全新的——方式是很困难的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think Bill would have done well with Dow Jones, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为比尔在道琼斯也会做得很好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. He might —
查理·芒格：是的。他可能——

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to buy into that retroactively.
沃伦·巴菲特：我希望能够追溯到过去参与其中。

79. Q&A concludes

问答结束

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 3:30 has arrived. We’re going to go to the annual meeting in about five minutes. We’ve got a certain amount of formal business to take care of. And I thank you all for coming. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，3:30 到了。我们将在大约五分钟后开始年度会议。我们有一些正式的事务需要处理。感谢大家的到来。（掌声）

80. Berkshire’s formal annual business meeting

伯克希尔的正式年度股东大会

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s reassemble and we’ll conduct the business of the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们重新集合，开始会议的业务。

The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company, and I welcome you to this 2015 annual meeting of shareholders.
会议现在开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席，欢迎您参加 2015 年股东年会。

This morning I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present.
今天早上我介绍了在场的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning the firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对德勤对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题。

Sharon Heck is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway, and she will make a written record of the proceedings.
莎伦·赫克是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书，她将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motion to be voted at this meeting.
贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数和本次会议上将投票的提案进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.
本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股份数量、投票权和出席会议的报告？

SHARON HECK: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 5, 2015, the record date for this meeting, there were 824,920 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,227,069,442 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one ten-thousandth of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
莎伦·赫克：是的，我知道。正如 2015 年 3 月 5 日发送给所有登记股东的会议通知中附带的委托书声明所示，本次会议的记录日期为 2015 年 3 月 5 日，届时共有 824,920 股 A 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权；同时还有 1,227,069,442 股 B 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有万分之一票的投票权。

Of that number, 592,750 Class A shares and 736,403,387 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 30.
在这个数字中，592,750 股 A 类股票和 736,403,387 股 B 类股票通过截至 4 月 30 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Sharon. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，莎伦。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.
会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出一项动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.
我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?
沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并获得支持。有没有任何评论或问题？

We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those if favor say “Aye.”
我们将通过口头表决对这一提案进行投票。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。

AUDIENCE: Aye. 观众：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion is carried.
沃伦·巴菲特：反对？动议通过。

81. Election of Berkshire directors

伯克希尔董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。

If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person on the election of directors and other matters to be considered at this meeting. Please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisle so that you can receive a ballot.
如果有股东在场但未提交代理投票或希望撤回之前提交的代理投票，您可以亲自投票选举董事及本次会议将要考虑的其他事项。请向走道上的会议工作人员自我介绍，以便您能领取选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: Second. 声音：第二。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到支持，选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅里尔·维特默为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? The nominations are ready to be acted upon.
还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？提名已经准备好进行表决。

If are there any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the election of directors and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.
如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Ms. Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
阿米克女士，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 657,744 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票在上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 657,744 票。这个数字远远超过所有流通的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick. Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克女士。沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默已被选为董事。

41. Adjournment of formal Berkshire annual meeting
41. 伯克希尔正式年度会议的休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有人要在这个会议上提出其他事务吗？

If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the moving.
如果没有，我承认斯科特先生提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Second? 沃伦·巴菲特：第二？

VOICE: Seconded. 声音：支持。

WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成者请说“赞成”。

AUDIENCE: Aye. 观众：是的。

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