1.Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner- partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.

1.尽管我们的形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。查理·芒格和我将我们的股东视为所有者合伙人，将我们自己视为管理合伙人。（由于我们持股规模的原因，无论好坏，我们也是控股合伙人。）我们不认为公司本身是我们业务资产的最终所有者，而是将公司视为股东拥有资产的渠道。

Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely, much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family. For our part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.

查理和我希望你不要将自己视为仅仅拥有一张价格每天波动的纸，当某些经济或政治事件使你紧张时就考虑出售。我们希望你将自己视为一个企业的部分所有者，你期望无限期地与之相伴，就像你与家人合伙拥有一个农场或公寓楼一样。就我们而言，我们不将伯克希尔股东视为不断变化的人群中的无名成员，而是视为将资金托付给我们共同冒险的伙伴，这些资金很可能会伴随他们的余生。

The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept. The annual percentage turnover in Berkshire’s shares is a fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations, even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.

证据表明，大多数伯克希尔股东确实接受了这种长期合作伙伴的概念。伯克希尔股票的年度周转率仅为其他美国主要公司股票周转率的一小部分，即使在计算中排除我所拥有的股份。

In effect, our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of, say, Coca-Cola or American Express shares, we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading, or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long- term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to  increase our ownership at an attractive price.

实际上，我们的股东对待他们的伯克希尔股票的方式，与伯克希尔对待其投资的公司的方式非常相似。作为可口可乐或美国运通股票的所有者，我们认为伯克希尔是这两家杰出企业的非管理合伙人，我们通过公司的长期进步而非其股票的月度波动来衡量我们的成功。事实上，即使这些公司的股票几年没有交易或报价，我们也毫不在意。如果我们对长期前景有良好预期，短期价格变动对我们来说毫无意义，除非它们为我们提供了以有吸引力的价格增加所有权的机会。

2.In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a significant portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.

2.与伯克希尔的所有者导向一致，我们大多数董事都将其净资产的相当部分投资于公司。我们吃自己的饭。

Charlie’s family has the majority of its net worth in Berkshire shares; I have more than 98%. In addition, many of my relatives – my sisters and cousins, for example – keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.

查理的家族将其净资产的大部分投资于伯克希尔股票；我的投资比例超过98%。此外，我的许多亲戚——例如我的姐妹和表亲——也将其净资产的大部分投资于伯克希尔股票。

Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.

查理和我对这种"鸡蛋放在一个篮子里"的情况感到完全放心，因为伯克希尔本身拥有各种真正非凡的业务。事实上，我们相信伯克希尔在其拥有控股权益或重要少数股权的企业的质量和多样性方面几乎是独一无二的。

Charlie and I cannot promise you results. But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours  for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner. We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an “edge” over you. We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion. Moreover, when I do something dumb, I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.

查理和我不能向你承诺结果。但我们可以保证，在你选择成为我们的合伙人的任何时期内，你的财务命运将与我们的同步变动。我们对高薪、期权或其他任何能使我们比你占据优势的方式毫无兴趣。我们只想在我们的合伙人赚钱时赚钱，而且比例完全相同。此外，当我做了愚蠢的事情时，我希望你能从我们的财务损失与你的成比例这一事实中得到一些安慰。

3.Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future – a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.

3.我们的长期经济目标（受稍后提及的一些条件限制）是最大化伯克希尔每股内在价值的年均增长率。我们不以公司的规模衡量伯克希尔的经济意义或表现，而是以每股的成长来衡量。我们确信每股成长率未来将会下降，因为资本基数大幅扩大会导致这种结果。但如果我们的成长率未能超过美国大型企业的平均水平，我们将感到失望。

4.Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.

4.我们的首选是通过直接拥有一组多元化的企业来实现我们的目标，这些企业能够产生现金并持续获得高于平均水平的资本回报。我们的第二选择是拥有类似企业的部分所有权，主要通过我们的保险子公司购买可交易的普通股来实现。企业的价格和可获得性以及保险资本的需求决定了任何给定年份的资本分配。

In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past, Berkshire will be well served.

近年来，我们进行了多次收购。虽然会有收获不多的年份，但我们预计在未来几十年将进行更多收购，并且希望它们规模较大。如果这些收购接近我们过去所做收购的质量，伯克希尔将受益匪浅。

The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses – including additional pieces of businesses we already own – at attractive prices. And third, some of those same wonderful businesses are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they, and we, gain from the cheaper prices  at which they can buy.

我们面临的挑战是以与产生现金同样快的速度产生想法。在这方面，低迷的股票市场可能会给我们带来显著优势。首先，股市低迷通常会降低整家公司的收购价格；其次，低迷的市场使我们的保险公司更容易以有吸引力的价格购买优秀企业的小部分——包括我们已经拥有的企业的额外部分；第三，一些优秀企业会持续回购自己的股票，这意味着它们和我们都能从较低的回购价格中获益。

Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets – as it will from time to time – neither panic nor mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire.

总体而言，伯克希尔及其长期股东会从股市下跌中获益，就像经常购买食品的人从食品价格下跌中获益一样。所以当市场暴跌时——这种情况时有发生——无需恐慌或悲伤。这对伯克希尔来说是个好消息。

5.Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.

5.由于我们对企业所有权的双管齐下的方法，以及传统会计的局限性，合并报告的收益可能揭示不了多少关于我们真实经济表现的信息。查理和我，无论是作为所有者还是管理者，几乎忽略这些合并数字。然而，我们也会向你报告我们控制的每个主要业务的收益，这些数字我们认为非常重要。这些数据，连同我们将提供的关于各个业务的其他信息，通常应该有助于你对它们做出判断。

To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter. Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly. We will  also pass along our conclusions to you.

简单地说，我们试图在年度报告中给你提供真正重要的数字和其他信息。查理和我非常关注我们的业务表现如何，我们也努力了解每个业务运营的环境。例如，我们的某个业务是享受行业顺风还是面临逆风？查理和我需要确切知道哪种情况占主导地位，并据此调整我们的期望。我们也会将我们的结论传达给你。

Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments, and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress – for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance “float” – we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.

随着时间的推移，我们的大多数业务都超出了我们的预期。但有时我们也会有失望，我们将尽量坦诚地告知你这些情况，就像我们描述更愉快的经历一样。当我们使用非常规指标来描述我们的进展时——例如，你将在我们的年度报告中读到关于保险"浮存金"的内容——我们将尝试解释这些概念以及为什么我们认为它们很重要。换句话说，我们相信告诉你我们的思考方式，这样你不仅可以评估伯克希尔的业务，还可以评估我们的管理和资本分配方法。

6.Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.

6.会计后果不会影响我们的运营或资本分配决策。当收购成本相似时，我们更倾向于购买在标准会计原则下不需要我们报告的2美元收益，而不是购买可报告的1美元收益。这正是我们经常面临的选择，因为整个企业（其收益将完全可报告）的售价通常是小部分（其收益将大部分不可报告）按比例价格的两倍。总体而言，随着时间的推移，我们预计未报告的收益将通过资本收益完全反映在我们的内在业务价值中。

We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us (and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report). This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.

随着时间的推移，我们发现我们投资对象的未分配收益总体上对伯克希尔的益处，与它们被分配给我们（因此被包含在我们正式报告的收益中）的益处完全一样。这种令人愉快的结果之所以发生，是因为我们大部分被投资企业的业务确实卓越，它们通常能以极大的优势利用增量资本，无论是用于自身业务发展还是回购股票。显然，我们的投资对象做出的每个资本决策并非都使我们作为股东受益，但总体而言，他们为我们保留的每一美元获得了远超一美元的价值。因此，我们认为透视收益能够真实地描绘我们每年从运营中获得的收益。

7.We use debt sparingly. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This  conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)

7.我们谨慎使用债务。我们宁愿拒绝有趣的机会，也不会过度杠杆化我们的资产负债表。这种保守做法虽然影响了我们的业绩，但考虑到我们对保单持有人、贷款人和许多将大部分净资产委托给我们的股权持有人的信托义务，这是唯一让我们感到舒适的行为。（正如一位印第安纳波利斯“500”赛车冠军所言：“要想获得第一，首先你得跑完全程。”）

The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.

查理和我采用的财务计算方法绝不会允许我们为了多几个百分点的回报而牺牲安稳的睡眠。我从不相信为了追求家人和朋友没有且不需要的东西而冒险他们已有且需要的东西。

Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $170 billion.

此外，伯克希尔可以获得两种低成本、无风险的杠杆资金来源，使我们能够安全地拥有远超我们股本所能允许的资产：递延税款和"浮存金"，即我们保险业务持有的他人资金，因为它在需要支付损失前收到保费。这两种资金来源都迅速增长，现在总计约1700亿美元。

Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt – an ability to have more assets working for us – but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.

更好的是，这种资金来源迄今为止通常是免费的。递延税负债不承担利息。只要我们能在保险承保业务上保持收支平衡，从该业务产生的浮存金成本就为零。当然，这两项都不是股权；它们是真实的负债。但它们是没有契约或到期日的负债。实际上，它们给我们带来了债务的好处——让更多资产为我们工作的能力——但没有任何债务的缺点。

Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.

当然，我们不能保证将来能够以零成本获得浮存金。但我们认为，我们实现这一目标的机会与保险业中的任何人一样好。我们不仅在过去达到了这个目标（尽管你的董事长犯了一些重要错误），我们1996年对GEICO的收购还大大改善了我们未来实现这一目标的前景。

In our present configuration we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroad businesses, loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire. Here, we will favor long-term, fixed-rate loans.

在我们目前的配置中，我们预计额外的借款将集中在我们的公用事业和铁路业务上，这些贷款对伯克希尔没有追索权。在这里，我们将偏好长期、固定利率的贷款。

8.A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.

8.管理层的"愿望清单"不会以股东为代价来满足。我们不会为了多元化而以控制权价格收购整个企业，而忽视对股东的长期经济后果。我们只会像对待自己的资金一样对待你们的资金，并充分考虑你们通过直接在股票市场购买股票进行投资组合多元化所能获得的价值。

Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.

查理和我只对我们相信能提高伯克希尔股票每股内在价值的收购感兴趣。我们的薪水或办公室的大小永远不会与伯克希尔资产负债表的规模相关。

9.We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.

9.我们认为崇高的意图应该定期与结果进行核对。我们通过评估留存的 1 美元收益是否随时间推移至少能为股东带来 1 美元的市场价值，来检验留存收益的明智性。到目前为止，这一测试已经得到满足。我们将继续在五年滚动的基础上应用它。随着我们净资产的增长，明智地使用留存收益变得更加困难。

I should have written the “five-year rolling basis” sentence differently, an error I didn’t realize until I received a question about this subject at the 2009 annual meeting.

我应该对"五年滚动周期"这句话有不同的表述，这个错误直到我在2009年年度会议上收到关于这个主题的问题时才意识到。

When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has sometimes shrunk. And when that happens, we fail the test as I improperly formulated it. In fact, we fell far short as early as 1971-75, well before I wrote this principle in 1983.

当股市在五年期间大幅下跌时，我们相对于账面价值的市场价格溢价有时会收缩。而当这种情况发生时，我们就无法通过我先前所错误制定的测试。事实上，早在1971-75年，也就是我在1983年写下这一原则之前，我们就远远未能达标。

The five-year test should be: (1) during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P; and (2) did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book, meaning that every $1 of retained earnings was always worth more than $1? If these tests are met, retaining earnings has made sense.

对于这项五年测试，正确的标准应该是：(1)在这段时期内，我们的账面价值增幅是否超过了标准普尔指数的表现；(2)我们的股票是否始终以高于账面价值的价格交易，也就是说每1美元留存收益是否始终价值超过1美元？如果符合这两个标准，那么保留盈余就是合理的。

10.We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance – not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company – and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to – on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.

10.只有当我们获得的业务价值与我们付出的相当时，我们才会发行普通股。这一规则适用于所有形式的发行——不仅是合并或公开发行股票，还包括股票换债务、股票期权和可转换证券。我们不会以与整个企业价值不一致的方式出售你公司的小部分——发行股票的本质正是如此。

When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued – and some people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80¢ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have reported that we did.)

当我们在1996年出售B类股票时，我们曾表示伯克希尔的股票并未被低估——这让一些人感到震惊。这样的反应并没有充分的依据。真正应该引发震惊的情况是，如果我们在股价被低估时仍然发行股票。那些在公开发行中声称或暗示自己股票被低估的管理层，往往要么是在真相上打了折扣，要么就是在损害现有股东的利益：如果管理层故意以80美分出售实际价值1美元的资产，股东就会受损。在我们发行B类股票时，我们没有犯这种错误，并且永远也不会。（不过，我们在出售时并未说我们的股票被高估，尽管许多媒体报道称我们那时是这么说的。）

11.You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.

11.你们应该充分了解我和查理所共同持有的一种态度，这种态度确实会影响我们的财务表现：无论价格如何，我们对出售伯克希尔所拥有的任何优质企业都毫无兴趣。只要我们预期一些表现不佳的企业能够至少产生一定的现金流，并且我们对其管理团队和劳资关系感到满意，我们也非常不愿出售这些企业。我们希望不再重蹈导致我们进入这些表现不佳企业的资本配置错误。在面临有人建议我们通过大规模资本支出使这些欠佳业务恢复盈利能力时，我们会持极其谨慎的态度。（尽管预测会十分吸引人，提出者也会真诚以对，但归根结底，在一个糟糕的行业里投入大量额外资金通常和在流沙中挣扎一样得不偿失。）然而，纸牌游戏式的管理方式（每次都丢掉最没有前景的业务）并不是我们的作风。我们宁愿整体业绩受到一些影响，也不愿采用这种做法。

 

We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after 20 years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag. To clean up some confusion voiced in 2016, we emphasize that the comments here refer to businesses we control, not to marketable securities.

我们继续避免采用纸牌游戏式的管理方式。的确，我们在20年挣扎之后，于上世纪80年代中期关闭了纺织业务，但那是因为我们觉得它注定会陷入无休止的经营亏损当中。然而，对于那些能够卖出高价的业务，我们并没有考虑将其出售；对于那些跟不上步伐的业务，我们也没有一股脑地抛弃，而是集中精力解决它们滞后的根本原因。为了澄清2016年出现的一些误解，我们要强调的是，这里提到的内容是针对我们所控股的业务，而非可在市场上交易的证券。

12.We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.

12.我们在向你们进行报告时会保持坦诚，着重说明在评估企业价值时至关重要的优点和缺点。我们的准则是：如果我们与各位股东的角色互换，我们希望知道哪些经营事实，我们就如实地告诉你们。我们对你的责任不应少于此。此外，作为一家拥有重要传播业务的公司，如果在报告自身情况时所采用的准确性、平衡性和洞察力标准比我们期望新闻人员在报道他人时所采用的还低，这将是不可原谅的。我们也相信，坦诚对于管理者自身有益：在公开场合误导他人的CEO最终可能在私下里误导自己。

At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate,” as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.

在伯克希尔，你不会看到任何“重大洗澡”式的会计手法或重组操作，也不会看到我们为了使季度或年度业绩显得平稳而进行任何的“平滑”处理。我们会始终告诉你们每一洞我们打了多少杆，而且绝不会在记分卡上做手脚。当我们在保险准备金计提等问题上需要做出大致“预估”时，我们会力求在方法上既保持一致，也保持谨慎。

We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value- defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a year is enough). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.

我们会通过多种方式与你们进行沟通。在年度报告中，我会尽力给所有股东提供尽可能多且具有价值定义意义的信息，同时又不会让报告过于冗长。我们还尝试发布在互联网上的季度报告中传达大量经过精简但同样重要的信息，尽管这些报告并非我亲自撰写（一年一场“独奏”就足够了）。在年度股东大会上，我们也会与各位充分交流：查理和我非常乐意花费五个小时或更长时间来回答大家关于伯克希尔的问题。不过，有一种沟通方式我们无法实现：一对一沟通。对拥有成千上万名股东的伯克希尔而言，这在现实中是不可行的。

In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time.

在所有沟通中，我们都尽量确保没有任何一位股东能够获得特殊优势：我们不会像很多公司那样向分析师或大股东提供盈利“指引”或其他有价值的信息。我们的目标是让所有股东同时获得最新情况。

13.Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.

13.尽管我们秉持坦诚的策略，但对于我们在可交易证券上的活动，我们只会在法律要求的范围内进行讨论。就像优秀的产品创意或企业收购想法一样，优质的投资想法也十分难得、珍贵，而且很容易被竞争对手“抢走”。因此，我们通常不会公开谈论我们的投资想法。这个禁令同样适用于我们已经卖出的证券（因为我们可能会再次买入），以及那些被错误传闻称我们正在购买的股票。如果我们否认这些报道但在其他场合说"无可奉告"，那么"无可奉告"就变成了确认。

Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.

尽管我们继续不愿谈论具体股票，但我们自由讨论我们的业务和投资哲学。我从本·格雷厄姆的智力慷慨中获益匪浅，他是金融史上最伟大的老师，我认为将我从他那里学到的东西传递下去是适当的，即使这会为伯克希尔创造新的、有能力的投资竞争对手，就像本的教导对他所做的那样。

14.To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners.

14.在可能的范围内，我们希望每位伯克希尔股东在其持股期间所获得或遭受的市值变动，能与公司在同一持股期间内每股内在价值的涨跌幅度成比例。要实现这一点，伯克希尔股票的内在价值与市场价格之间的关系需要保持稳定，并且我们偏好它们始终保持1:1的对应关系。正如这一点所暗示的，我们宁愿看到伯克希尔的股价处于合理水平，而不是处于高位。很明显，查理和我无法控制伯克希尔的股价。但通过我们的政策和沟通方式，我们可以鼓励股东采取更加明智、理性的行为，从而使伯克希尔的股价也趋于合理。我们秉持的“被高估和被低估同样糟糕”的原则，或许会让部分股东失望。然而，我们相信，这种方式为伯克希尔吸引致力于企业发展而非从他人失误中获益的长期投资者，提供了最佳的前景。

15.We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 79% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.

15.我们会定期比较伯克希尔每股账面价值的增幅与标准普尔500指数的表现。随着时间的推移，我们希望能够超过这个基准。否则，我们的投资者又为何需要我们呢？但这种衡量办法存在一些缺陷，后文将具体说明。此外，与过去相比，现在逐年进行该比较的意义已经减弱。因为，我们持有的股票价值往往会随着标准普尔500指数波动，这部分股票所占我们的净资产比重，已远低于早些年。同时，在计算标准普尔500指数时，该指数所包含的股票所产生的收益会被全额计入，而我们在伯克希尔所持股的收益则要先扣除联邦税，只能按照79%的净收益计算。因此，我们预计在股市表现乏善可陈的年份会跑赢标准普尔500指数，而在股市表现强劲的年份会表现相对逊色。​

INTRINSIC VALUE

内在价值

Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.

现在，让我们关注一个之前提到、并将在以后年度报告中多次出现的术语——“内在价值”。

Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.

内在价值是一个至关重要的概念，它提供了评估投资和企业吸引力的唯一合理方式。所谓内在价值，简单来说，是指在企业剩余存续期内可以从其业务中提取的现金流，经过贴现后得到的现值总和。

The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover – and this would apply even to Charlie and me – will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.

不过，计算内在价值并非易事。正如这一定义所暗示的，内在价值只是一个估算数，而不是一个精确数字。而且，如果利率发生变化或对未来现金流的预测出现调整，这个估算值也必须随之更改。即便是基于同样的数据——这一点适用于查理和我自己——两个人往往也会得出略有不同的内在价值估算结果。这也是我们从不向大家给出具体内在价值数字的原因之一。不过，我们的年度报告会提供我们自己用以计算该价值的各项事实和数据。

Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.

与此同时，我们会定期披露伯克希尔的每股账面价值，这是一个相对容易计算但用途有限的数字。它之所以用途有限，并不是因为我们持有的可交易证券（它们在账面上是按当时市价入账的），而是因为我们控制的一些公司，其账面价值可能与其内在价值要么相差甚远，要么明显低估或高估。

The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.

这种差异可能出现双向偏差。例如，1964年我们可以明确地说，伯克希尔的每股账面价值是19.46美元。然而，这个数字其实大大高估了公司的内在价值，因为当时公司所有的资源都集中在一家利润不足的纺织业务上。这些纺织资产无论是作为持续经营资产还是清算资产，其价值都无法与账面价值相等。可时至今日，伯克希尔的情况恰恰相反：我们的每股账面价值被明显低估了，因为我们所控制的很多企业的真实价值远远高于它们在账面上的记录。

Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.

尽管账面价值并不能充分反映事实，我们仍然会向各位股东披露这一数字，因为目前它可以作为追踪伯克希尔内在价值的大致（但严重低估的）指标。换句话说，在任何特定年份里，账面价值的百分比变化往往能与当年内在价值的变化大致一致。

You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.

要理解账面价值与内在价值之间的差异，可以用大学教育作为一个类比。把一份教育的成本视作它的“账面价值”。如果要准确核算这一成本，还应当包括学生为了上大学而放弃工作的那部分潜在收入。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.

在这里，我们先不考虑上大学带来的重要的非经济收益，只关注它的经济价值。首先，我们要估算一个大学毕业生一生所能获得的收入，然后再减去他如果没有受过大学教育所能获得的收入差额。这产生了一个“超额收益”数字，随后我们需要按合适的贴现率，将其折现回毕业时点。最终得到的金额就是这份教育的“内在经济价值”。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.

有些毕业生会发现，他们的教育成本（账面价值）高于它的内在价值，这意味着支付这笔教育费用的人没有得到“价有所值”的回报。也有一些毕业生，其教育的内在价值远远超过教育成本，这表明资本得到了明智的运用。但无论是哪种情况，显而易见的是，单用账面价值衡量内在价值，是没有意义的。

THE MANAGING OF BERKSHIRE

伯克希尔的管理

I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 377,000 employees, only 26 of these are at headquarters.

我认为，用对伯克希尔当前和未来管理状况的讨论来结束这封信是合适的。正如我们的第一条股东相关原则所述，查理和我是伯克希尔的“管理合伙人”。不过，我们将业务中的所有繁重工作都分包给了子公司经理们。事实上，我们的授权几乎达到了“放弃”的程度：虽然伯克希尔大约有 377,000 名员工，但总部却只有 26 人。

Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of  all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.

查理和我主要做的事情是资本配置，以及照料并激励我们最关键的经理人。大多数经理最快乐的，就是能独立运作他们的业务，我们通常也确实让他们独立经营。这样一来，他们掌管所有运营决策，并将业务产生的盈余现金上缴到总部。通过把这些盈余资金交给我们，他们不会被可能随之而来的各种投资诱惑所分心，因为如果让他们自己支配这些现金，他们就需要在本行业之外做出更多决策。此外，查理和我能够比他们在各自行业中所能了解到的机会，接触到更广泛的投资可能性。

Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to  choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.

我们大多数经理本身就已财务独立，所以关键在于我们如何营造一种氛围，让他们宁愿选择与伯克希尔合作，而不是去打高尔夫或钓鱼。这就要求我们必须公平对待他们，并以我们希望在角色互换后对待自己的方式来对待他们。

 

As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.

至于资本的配置，这正是查理和我都乐在其中、并且有所经验的领域。总体而言，在这个领域里，“白发”并不是什么负担：要“配置”资金并不需要很好的手眼协调能力或强健的体魄（谢天谢地）。只要我们的头脑还保持正常运转，查理和我就能基本像以往那样继续做好我们的工作。

On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years.

在我去世后，伯克希尔的股权结构会有所变化，但不会带来破坏性影响：我名下的伯克希尔股票无需出售来支付任何现金遗赠或税款，我的其他资产足以承担这部分需求。所有伯克希尔股份将留给基金会，这些基金会可能会在大约十几年内以大致相等的分期方式接收股票。

At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I  can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We  will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.

在我去世时，巴菲特家族将不参与业务管理，但作为非常重要的股东，将帮助挑选和监督实际管理者。当然，这些管理者将是谁取决于我去世的日期。但我可以预见管理结构将会是什么样：基本上我的工作将分为两部分。一位高管将成为CEO并负责运营。投资责任将交给一位或多位高管。如果有新业务收购的前景，这些高管将在做出所需决策时合作，当然这些决策需要董事会批准。我们将继续拥有一个非常以股东为中心的董事会，其利益与你们的利益紧密一致。

这个想法已经改变，所有权责会集中于CEO。

Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence. Our managerial roster has never been stronger.

如果我们需要立即实施我刚才描述的管理结构，我们的董事们知道我对这两个职位的建议。所有候选人目前都为伯克希尔工作或可供伯克希尔使用，他们都是我完全信任的人。我们的管理人才队伍从未如此强大。

I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact. As an added assurance that this will be the case, I believe it would be wise when I am no longer CEO to have a member of the Buffett family serve as the non-paid, non-executive Chairman of the Board. That decision, however, will be the responsibility of the then Board of Directors.

我将继续向董事们通报继任问题。由于伯克希尔股票将构成我几乎全部的遗产，并在我去世后相当长一段时间内占据各基金会资产的相似比例，你可以确信董事们和我已经仔细考虑了继任问题，并且我们已做好充分准备。你同样可以确信，我们迄今为止在经营伯克希尔时采用的原则将继续指导接替我的管理者，我们异常强大且定义明确的文化将保持完整。作为这一点的额外保证，我相信当我不再担任CEO时，让巴菲特家族的一名成员担任无薪、非执行董事会主席将是明智的。然而，这一决定将由当时的董事会负责。

Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.

最后，为避免以令人忧虑的基调结束，我还想告诉各位：我从来没有感觉这么好过。我热爱经营伯克希尔，而如果快乐生活有助于延长寿命，那么玛士撒拉（《圣经》中活了 969 岁的人物）的纪录恐怕岌岌可危了。

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman