2018-10-30 Howard Marks.Mastering the Market Cycle

2018-10-30 Howard Marks.Mastering the Market Cycle


Ashok Varadhan:  

It's such an honor and a privilege to be able to be joined by Howard Marks, the legendary investor and co-founder of Oak Tree Capital Management. In addition to running a firm that manages $120 billion, Howard is quite an author.  
能与传奇投资人、橡树资本管理公司的联合创始人霍华德·马克斯一起出席，实在是一种荣幸和特权。除了经营一家管理着1200亿美元的公司外，霍华德还是一位颇有成就的作家.

His newsletters and memos about markets and economics are read all around the industry and are often across a variety of different trading desks. And he just released his latest book, Mastering the Market Cycle.  
他关于市场和经济的简讯及备忘录在业内广为流传，经常被不同的交易部门阅读。而他刚刚出版了新书《掌握市场周期》.

Howard, welcome to Goldman Sachs.  
霍华德，欢迎来到高盛.
  
Howard Marks:  

Thank you, Ashok. Great to be here.  
谢谢你，Ashok。很高兴来到这里.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

So before we get into the book, you know, start a little bit with sort of your background and history. What sparked your curiosity in finance?  
在谈论这本书之前，请先介绍一下您的背景和经历。是什么激发了您对金融的好奇心?
  
Howard Marks:  

Well, I'm a kid from Queens and I went to the public schools in Queens. As odd as it may seem, my education, high school education, included accounting. I liked accounting.  
我是皇后区的孩子，就读于皇后区的公立学校。虽然听起来有些奇怪，我的高中教育中包含了会计课程，我很喜欢会计.

My dad was an accountant so I figured I'd be an accountant and I went off to Wharton to take a degree in accounting. But when I got there I was introduced to finance and I found that more interesting so I switched my major to finance.  
我父亲是一名会计师，所以我本以为自己也会成为会计师，并因此前往沃顿商学院攻读会计学位。但到了那里后，我接触了金融，并发现它更有趣，于是我转而主修金融.

Then I wanted to get an MBA. In those days you could get an MBA right from college and so I I applied to the good business schools and some of them,  Harvard, Stanford, for example, required experience and University of Chicago didn't.  
之后我想获得MBA学位。当时可以直接从大学申请MBA，所以我申请了几所优秀的商学院，其中一些，比如哈佛、斯坦福，需要工作经验，而芝加哥大学则不要求.

So I went there and I had a summer job at Citibank in 68 in the investment research department and then when I was getting out, I still didn't know what I wanted to do.  
于是我去了芝加哥大学，并于1968年在花旗银行的投资研究部门找到了一份暑期工作，当我离开时，我仍然不知道自己想做什么.

I applied for six different jobs in six different fields but on the strength of the experience that I had, I went back to Citibank. Into the investment research department.  
我曾申请过六个不同领域的六份工作，但凭借已有的经验，我又回到了花旗银行，进入了投资研究部门.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

And so in 1995, you started Oaktree.  
于是，在1995年，您创立了橡树资本.
  
Howard Marks:  

Right.  
是的.

Ashok Varadhan:  

Why?  
为什么?
  
Howard Marks:  

You know, what we said at the time was that we wanted to have A firm that ran our way. We had ideas on what the right investment philosophy was for us, not necessarily for everybody, but for us.  
你知道，我们当时的想法是要创办一家按照我们方式运作的公司。我们有一套认为适合自己的正确投资理念，并非适合所有人，但适合我们.

You know, we were in the aggressive risk-oriented asset classes like high yield bonds and convertibles and distressed debt and opportunistic real estate and emerging markets, so forth.  
你知道，我们涉足的是那种激进的、以风险为导向的资产类别，比如高收益债券、可转换债券、困境债务、机会性房地产以及新兴市场等.

And our approach was to be the controlled risk option In some risky asset classes and that was a big part of our philosophy and everything we do at Oaktree now runs according to the same philosophy.  
我们的策略是在某些高风险资产类别中，成为受控风险的选择，这正是我们理念的重要部分，现在橡树资本的所有运作都遵循这一理念.

It's implemented differently because markets are different but the underlying philosophy is the same and it fits with our personality,  it fits with our values, it fits with what our clients want and so it's very holistic.  
虽然由于市场各异，具体执行方式有所不同，但根本理念相同，与我们的个性、价值观以及客户需求都十分契合，因此这一理念十分全面.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

Did you ever envision Oaktree becoming what it is today?  
您曾经预见过橡树资本会发展成今天的规模吗?
  
Howard Marks:  

The alternative investment category, which is where I place us,  went from being an oddball sideshow that you might put a little into to spice up your portfolio, to a respectable component of investing,  number one.  
我认为另类投资这一类别，也就是我们所在的领域，从最初那种你或许会略微配置一点以调剂投资组合的边缘项目，发展成如今备受尊重的投资重要组成部分。

And so, you know, we started, we started in 95. At the end of 95, we had 5 billion under management. And at the end of 97, we had 10 billion under management. And that I would say that at the end of 06, we probably had 35.  
所以，你知道，我们是在1995年起步的。到95年末，我们管理的资产规模为50亿美元；到97年末已达100亿美元；而我认为到06年末，大概达到了350亿美元.

But One of the things that really changed is that in order to pull the world out of the global financial crisis,  the central banks pulled down the risk-free rate from let's say three or four to zero or minus.  
但真正改变局面的其中一件事是，为了帮助世界走出全球金融危机，央行将无风险利率从比如说三、四个百分点降到了零甚至负值.

And most institutional investors have the concept of a required return. Pension funds basically need seven and a half or eight.  
而大多数机构投资者都有一个必要收益率的概念。养老基金基本上需要7.5到8个百分点的回报.

Most endowments need eight in order to pay out five to support the institution, earn two to cover inflation and one to cover administration. So most US institutions need seven to eight.  
大多数捐赠基金需要8个百分点，以支付5个百分点支持机构运作、赚2个百分点抵消通胀、1个百分点用于管理费用。所以大多数美国机构需要7到8个百分点.

And today for example, and by the way remember that rates have come up a great deal in relative terms.  
例如，如今，顺便说一句，请记住，利率在相对意义上已经大幅上升.

So today cash pays one, five-year pays two, the 10-year pays three, high grades pay four, high yield pay six, stocks are expected to return five or six.  
所以今天，现金的回报为1%，五年期债券为2%，十年期为3%，高等级债券为4%，高收益债券为6%，而股票的预期回报为5%或6%.

And so the investors I have had to turn to alternative investing to get the returns they need in a low return world. And my late father-in-law would call these people handcuff volunteers.  
因此，我不得不引导投资者转向另类投资，以在低回报的世界中获得他们所需的收益。而我已故的岳父会称这些人为“镣铐志愿者”.

They're not doing what they necessarily want to do, they're doing what they have to do to get the returns they need. And so that has produced enormous cash inflows to all alternative investment firms.  
他们并非出于个人偏好，而是不得不采取行动以获得所需回报，这也为所有另类投资公司带来了巨额现金流入.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

If you look at really probably up until July 2016, maybe after Brexit,  if you want to mark an inflection point,  you know, we've been in this sort of disinflationary bull market run in bonds for really close to 30 years.  
如果你观察，到2016年7月之前，也许是在英国脱欧之后，如果要标志一个拐点，你知道，我们在债券市场经历了近30年的通缩性牛市.

And so if we are again, no longer in a bull bond market, you know, forget about calling it a bear bond market. How do you think about that?  
因此，如果我们再次不再处于债券牛市中，你知道，就别再称之为债券熊市了。您怎么看待这种情况?

How do you think about, you know, the impact on Oaktree, but more specifically the impact on how you would invest?  
您如何看待这对橡树资本的影响，更具体地说，是对您投资方式的影响?
  
Howard Marks:  

Where are we? First of all, if you look at history, history says that zero or even where we are today is unnaturally low relative to the strength of the economy and inflation.  
我们现在处于何种状态？首先，回顾历史，历史告诉我们，零利率甚至是现今的水平，相对于经济实力和通胀来说都是异常低的.

So that says that rates should have been higher than zero and probably higher than where they are today.  
这意味着利率本应高于零，甚至应该高于当前的水平.

Number two, most people who work in the investment business, and I assume all of you, believe that the free market is the best allocator of resources. And that's the value of capitalism and laissez-faire economics and so forth.  
其次，大多数从事投资业务的人（我相信你们所有人）都认为自由市场是资源配置的最佳机制，这正是资本主义和自由放任经济的价值所在.

And clearly we haven't had a free market in money. So we have not had good Asset allocation and you know borrowers have been subsidized and savers and lenders have been penalized.  
而显然，我们没有享受到真正自由的货币市场，因此无法实现良好的资产配置，借款人得到了补贴，而储户和贷款人则受到了惩罚.

So you know I would assume that the Fed would like to get out of the idea of administering rates and let them float freely and we have to get from Bargain rates for stimulus purposes to free market rates.  
所以，我认为美联储应该放弃干预利率的想法，让利率自由浮动，我们必须从为刺激目的而提供的低利率转向自由市场利率.

And then finally, well maybe not finally, but the Fed considers it very important to have the ability to cut rates in order to bail out the economy if it starts to weaken. That's the prime tool. And if the rate is zero, you can't cut it.  
最后，也许不算最后一点，但美联储认为，若经济开始走弱，拥有降息以拯救经济的能力至关重要，这是其主要工具；而若利率已为零，就无法降息.

So I think if I was running the Fed, it would be a high priority to get rates high enough so that you can cut them meaningfully when needed. They want to raise rates to prevent the economy from overheating and lapsing into hyperinflation.  
因此，我认为如果我掌管美联储，我会优先将利率提高到足以在需要时进行有效降息的水平。他们希望提高利率，以防经济过热并陷入恶性通胀.

So it has been clear that eventually rates would start going up. How could that have come to a surprise? To anybody who could have been in the investment world or in the financial world and been surprised by rising rates.  
所以，很明显，利率最终会开始上升。对于任何曾在投资或金融领域工作的人来说，利率上升怎会令人意外呢?

It's just that, you know, short rates rose for a long time without long-term rates rising. That doesn't make any sense. And eventually long-term rates started to rise and everybody freaked out.  
只是，你知道，短期利率长时间上升，而长期利率却没有跟上，这实在说不通。最终长期利率开始上升，结果所有人都惊慌失措了.

The failure of people to anticipate rising rates and the ability to be surprised by rising rates earlier this month just shows you how myopic and blind the markets can be.  
人们未能预见利率上升，以及本月初对利率上升的惊讶，正显示出市场是多么近视和盲目.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

Given that you now, you know, that Oaktree is now 120 billion and I understand, you know, not all pools of money are the same.  
鉴于您知道，橡树资本现管理着1200亿美元，我明白，不同的资金池各不相同.

Realistically, given the size of that tanker, how much time would you really need to meaningfully adjust the portfolio?  
实际上，考虑到那艘巨轮的规模，您真正需要多长时间才能有意义地调整投资组合?

Howard Marks:  
 
Well, first of all, I appreciate your use of the word adjust because a lot of people who are less astute than you would say, how long would it take to go to cash? And the answer is going to cash.  
首先，我赞赏您使用“调整”这个词，因为很多不如您敏锐的人会说，转为现金需要多长时间？而答案就是转为现金.

We don't go to cash and going to cash under almost all circumstances is stupid. Because among other things when you go to cash, You have to be right, right away. Because if you go to cash and prices keep going up for a while,  
我们不会转为现金，而且在几乎所有情况下转为现金都是愚蠢的。因为其中一个原因是，一旦转为现金，你必须立刻判断正确；如果你转为现金，而价格在一段时间内持续上涨，

as they invariably will, and returns continue to be positive,  you fall so far behind by being in cash that you may even jeopardize your business's stay in business. And you'll certainly jeopardize a lot of your client accounts.  
正如必然会那样，而收益也继续为正，那么你因持有现金而落后得如此之多，甚至可能危及公司存续，并且肯定会影响许多客户账户.

But you use the term adjust portfolios. If you read the book, as I hope you will, you'll see that we don't think about when is the turn going to come or when is the bottom going to come.  
但您使用“调整投资组合”这个说法。如果您读这本书，我希望您能看到，我们并不考虑何时转折或何时触底.

In fact, when is one of the words I reject in our business because we sometimes have an idea what's going to happen and we never know when. The terms that matter, you see, the market is a little bit volatile.  
事实上，“何时”是我在业务中拒绝使用的词，因为我们有时会预感某事将发生，但从来不知道具体何时。关键在于，市场本身就有些波动.

I mean, the economy is a little bit volatile. Sometimes it's up three and sometimes it's up one and sometimes it's down one. Company profits are more volatile because companies are leveraged, operating and financial.  
我的意思是，经济也有些波动。有时上涨3，有时上涨1，有时下跌1。公司的利润波动更大，因为公司在运营和财务上都有杠杆作用.

But market prices do this because they're driven by people, by people's emotion, by what we call human nature. So to figure out when things are going to happen, you would have to be able to predict emotion. Which is impossible.  
但市场价格之所以波动，是因为它们受人、受人们情绪和所谓人性的驱动。所以要预测事态何时发生，你必须能够预测情绪，而这是不可能的.

And so we don't ever think about when at Oaktree. And one of my mottos is we never know where we're going but we sure as hell ought to know where we are. What's going on around us? What does that imply about the future?  
因此，我们在橡树从不考虑“何时”。我的座右铭之一是，我们永远不知道将去向何方，但我们绝对应该清楚自己所处的位置。我们周围发生了什么？这对未来意味着什么?

And if we conclude that the present developments justify a more defensive position, Then there's no time like the present. So we start and we do what we can and hopefully we do enough before this stuff hits the fan.  
如果我们得出结论，当前局势需要采取更防御性的立场，那么再没有比现在更好的时机了。所以我们开始采取措施，并希望在局势恶化前做足充分准备.
Idea
这一段对“when”的解释比较好，做足充分准备的不是当时的当下，而应该是每一个当下，这是需要积累的。
Ashok Varadhan:  

And you talked about, you know, sort of the pain associated with going to cash. And then if you engage in abstention and the market keeps going up, then obviously you underperform.  
您提到了转为现金所带来的痛苦，而且如果您选择观望，而市场继续上涨，那么显然您的表现会落后.
  
Howard Marks:  

And let's point out the most important, one of the most important adages in investing that being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong.  
让我们强调一个投资中的重要格言：走得太早与犯错无异.

Ashok Varadhan:  

Absolutely. Early is wrong. Sure. But along those lines, has that, And I'm here to talk to you about how the market has changed over the course of the last, you know, again, call it 25 years.  
完全正确。过早总是错误的。当然。但在这方面，我想讨论市场在过去大约25年中的变化.
  
Howard Marks:  

No, no, because in order to predict and work toward and game for a relative return now,  now, not only do you have to know what's going to happen,  
不，不是这样的，因为要预测、追求并博取当前的相对收益，你不仅得知道将会发生什么，

but you have to know how other people are going to behave in response to what's going to happen. And you have to set your game for that. Maybe impractical. All we try to do is the right thing.  
还必须知道其他人会如何应对这些变化，并据此制定策略。也许这不切实际，但我们所做的只是力求正确.

If prices are too high, if risks are too high, if interest rates are too low, then we, if the economy seems to be getting old, then we try to reduce our risk.  
如果价格过高、风险过大、利率过低；如果经济似乎步入衰退，我们就会努力降低风险.

Ashok Varadhan:  

And obviously we came through Pretty formidable financial crisis and ensuing recession.  
显然，我们经历了一场相当严峻的金融危机及其引发的衰退.

Where do you think the market is with respect to remembering the financial crisis of 08? And how much do you think that is manifesting itself in investor behavior?  
您认为市场在对2008年金融危机的记忆上处于什么状态？您觉得这种记忆在投资者行为上表现得多明显?
  
Howard Marks:  

John Kenneth Galbraith said in his book, A Short History of Financial Euphoria, that one of the outstanding characteristics of financial markets is shortness of memory. Now, it's not that people are stupid or their brains don't work.  
约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯在其著作《金融狂热简史》中指出，金融市场的一个显著特征是记忆短暂。并不是说人们愚蠢或脑子不好使，

But what it is, is that sitting here on this shoulder, you have memory of the past and resulting prudence. And you say, well, you know, the last time the market went up this much and this fast and this far, bad things happened.  
而是因为，当你站在这里时，肩上承载着对过去的记忆和由此产生的谨慎。你会说，你知道，上一次市场上涨到如此程度、如此迅速、如此幅度后，坏事就会发生.

And the last time the P.E. ratio was 20 and so forth and the spread was inverted or whatever you want to look at. Bad things happen. So I'm going to cut my risk. That's sitting here. On this shoulder you have greed. Greed wins.  
上一次当市盈率达到20等等指标出现，息差倒挂或其他你所观察到的现象时，坏事发生了。所以我会削减风险。而在这肩上，贪婪占据了上风，贪婪总是取胜.

Now under the rubric of greed I would put you know fear of missing out, fear of trailing the competition, etc. But these emotions Overcome old-fashioned prudence. So, you know,  
在贪婪的范畴下，我把害怕错过、害怕落后于竞争对手等情绪都归为一类，但这些情绪最终会战胜传统的谨慎。所以，

I put out a memo three weeks ago today entitled the seven worst words in the world and I believe they are too much money chasing too few deals and because when there is too much money chasing too few deals and the money is in the hands of people who are too eager to put it to work and who are too driven by fear of missing out and too and not afraid enough of losing money,  
三周前的今天，我发布了一份题为“世界上最糟糕的七个词”的备忘录，我认为那就是“钱太多，追逐的交易太少”，因为当资金过剩追逐的交易太少，而资金又掌握在那些过于急于出手、太过害怕错过且又不够担心亏钱的人手中，

Then they bid too aggressively for securities which takes the form of driving down prospective returns and driving up risk.  
他们便会过于激进地竞价购买证券，从而导致预期收益下降和风险上升.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

So when you decided to write a book what was the story that you wanted to tell?  
那么，当您决定写书时，您想讲述的故事是什么?
  
Howard Marks:  

First of all, I started writing the memos in 1990 and I always thought that when I retired, I would pull them together into a book.  
首先，我从1990年开始写备忘录，我一直认为退休后会把这些备忘录整理成一本书.

Then in 2009, I think it was, I got a letter from Warren Buffett and he said, if you'll write a book, I'll give you a blurb for the jacket. That catalyzed my thinking. You don't pass up an opportunity like that.  
然后，大概是在2009年，我收到了一封来自沃伦·巴菲特的信，他说：“如果你写书，我会为你的封面写推荐语。”这激发了我的思考。你绝不会错过这样的机会.

So, you know, the first book was called The Most Important Thing and it has 21 chapters and each chapter says the most important thing is and then it's a different thing.  
所以，你知道，第一本书叫《最重要的事》，共有21章，每章都以“最重要的事是……”开头，而每一章的内容各不相同.

Because, you know, I would find myself sitting in a client's office and I would say the most important thing is controlling risk. And five minutes later, I'd say the most important thing is buying cheap.  
因为，你知道，我曾在客户办公室里说，“最重要的事是控制风险。”五分钟后，我又会说，“最重要的事是低价买入.”

And five minutes later, I'd say, you know, the most important thing is knowing where we stand in the cycle or something like that. So I wrote this first a memo around 0.2.3 called The Most Important Thing and then this book. And, you know,  
再过五分钟，我可能会说，“最重要的事是了解我们在周期中的位置”之类的话。所以我最初写了一份编号为0.2.3的备忘录，题为《最重要的事》，随后便写了这本书，而你知道，

there are so many things that you have to juggle At the same time to be a good investor that I wanted to share that with people,  you know, and I think I said in the introduction that I am not writing to make investing easy.  
作为一名优秀的投资者，必须同时兼顾诸多因素，我希望与大家分享这一点，我在序言中也说过，我写书并非为了让投资变得简单.

I would rather write to show how hard it is because there are so many things that have to be juggled simultaneously. But if you take an area like investing and you Try to make it seem easy. You're really doing people a disservice.  
我更愿意写出投资有多么艰难，因为必须同时应对太多挑战。但如果你试图把投资看得很简单，那实际上是在对人们视而不见.

If we said to people, you know, if you really spent some time on it,  you could do your own dentistry or your own legal work or fix your own car,  you know, we wouldn't be doing people a favor. And the same is true with investing.  
如果我们告诉人们，“你知道，如果你真的花时间研究，你可以自己做牙科、法律工作或者修车”，那我们实际上并不是在帮人们什么忙。投资亦然.

For some reason, while nobody does their own dentistry or auto repairs,  Everybody thinks they can be an investor and if they're going to try,  I'm at least going to give them some of the considerations.  
不知为何，虽然没人自己做牙科或汽车维修，但每个人都认为自己能做投资，如果他们尝试，我至少会给他们一些建议.

So one of the things in that 21 was knowing where we stand in the cycle. Now I think there are two, among the 21 most important things, I think two are really the most important. Except for the others.  
因此，在那21个最重要的事中，我认为有两项是真正最关键的，其他的相形见绌.

And they are number one risk and controlling risk because I think that controlling risk is the mark of a professional. Anybody can make money when the market goes up and most of the time the market goes up.  
那就是风险以及控制风险，因为我认为控制风险是专业人士的标志。市场上涨时，任何人都可以赚钱，而且大多数时候市场都会上涨.

And anybody who takes above average risk can do above average when the market rises. So, achieving returns is not a point of distinction in good times.  
而任何承担高于平均风险的人在市场上涨时都能赚取高于平均的回报，因此，在好时光中获取收益并不能体现出独特之处.

In my opinion, the distinction of a superior investor is achieving returns in good times with the risk under control. Because you never know when the environment is going to shift from favorable to unfavorable.  
在我看来，优秀投资者的区别在于在经济顺境中实现收益的同时能控制风险，因为你永远不知道环境何时会从有利转为不利.

And the question is, are you prepared? You know, somebody who, if the market's up 10 and you're up 12 and the market's down 10 and you're down 12, you didn't accomplish anything.  
问题在于，你是否做好了准备？你知道，如果市场上涨10%而你上涨12%，市场下跌10%而你下跌12%，那你其实什么也没实现.

The question is, can you make more in the good times than you give back in the bad times? And then I think the other thing that's most important is the cycle and where we stand in it. I don't believe in predicting the future.  
关键是，你能否在好时光中赚得比在坏时光中亏得更多？我认为，另一个最重要的方面是周期以及我们在其中所处的位置。我不相信能预测未来.

We never know where we're going. We should understand the present and where we are in the present, where the market is relative to its cycle, tells you something about the odds that govern the future.  
我们永远不知道将走向何方，我们应当了解当前，以及我们在当下所处的位置，市场相对于周期的位置能告诉你一些关于未来概率分布的信息.

It doesn't tell you what's going to happen tomorrow,  but I believe that we can only understand,  since the world is an uncertain place filled with randomness,  we can't know what's going to happen in the future.  
这并不能告诉你明天会发生什么，但我相信，由于这个世界充满不确定性和随机性，我们无法知道未来会发生什么.

But those of us who see the world more clearly than others can have a superior understanding for the probability distribution that governs the future.  
但那些比别人看得更清楚的人，能对决定未来的概率分布有更深刻的理解.

What things can happen, which are most likely, which are somewhat likely, which are unlikely. If you have that consistently, you are a superior understander and you can be a superior investor.  
哪些事情可能发生，哪些最有可能，哪些有点可能，哪些不太可能。如果你能始终把握这一点，你就是一个优秀的洞察者，也能成为一名优秀的投资者.

So I think the question is, what today is the probability distribution that governs the future?  
所以我认为，问题在于，今天的概率分布如何决定未来?

And one of the things I say in the book, which I Which I'm happy with is that the future investment performance in particular for me is like a bowl full of lottery tickets. You never know which ticket's going to be chosen.  
我在书中提到的一点，我很满意的观点是，未来的投资表现，尤其对我来说，就像一碗满是彩票，你永远不知道哪张票会被抽中.

Sometimes the bowl has 70% winning tickets and 30% losing tickets. Sometimes it has 70% losing tickets and 30% winning tickets. Wouldn't it be nice to know the difference? I think it's possible.  
有时这碗中70%是中奖票，30%是未中奖票；有时则相反。知道两者的区别不是很好吗？我认为这是可能的.

But when it's 70% winners and 30% lose, you want to go all in. You want to invest heavily in aggressive securities and you reach into the bowl or maybe the gods of fate reach into the bowl and they pull out a ticket and it's a loser.  
但当70%是赢家而30%是输家时，你就会想全力以赴，大举投资于积极型证券，然后你伸手去摸彩票，或者命运之神伸手去摸彩票，抽出了一张输家的票.

So, you know, as my best friend Bruce Newberg says out in California when we play backgammon, which is a game that's dominated by dice, there are probabilities and outcomes.  
所以，你知道，就像我在加州的好朋友布鲁斯·纽伯格在我们玩以骰子为主的双陆棋时所说的，那里充满了概率和结果.

We can get the probabilities on our side that does not ensure a favorable outcome, but it's the only thing we can try to do so and that's what the book is all about.  
我们可以让概率站在我们这一边，这虽不能确保结果有利，但这是我们唯一能尝试做的，而这正是这本书的核心内容.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

How did being a writer and author make you a better professional? And specifically, how has it accrued to Oaktree to basically have you out in the public domain as an author?  
成为作家和作者是如何使您成为更优秀的专业人士的？具体来说，您作为公众人物出现在外，对橡树资本又有什么裨益？
  
Howard Marks:  

When I write the memos, I always think of something that I didn't have in mind before I started the memo. I'll give you a simple example, since we've been talking about risk and probabilities. In 06, I wrote a memo with a clever title, Risk.  
当我写备忘录时，总会想到一些在动笔前并未意识到的事情。举个简单的例子，既然我们一直在谈论风险和概率，2006年我写了一份标题巧妙的备忘录《风险》.

And I tried to put down everything that I could think of about risk that I knew. And so I'm sitting there typing it out. And I wrote that you can't measure risk in advance. You can't quantify risk in advance. And I think that's true.  
我试图把我所知道的一切关于风险的看法都写下来。所以我坐在那里打字，写道：你无法事先衡量风险，无法预先量化风险。我认为这话很对.

You can't measure risk even after the fact. You buy something for $100, a year later you sell it for $200. Was it risky? Maybe.  
事后也无法准确衡量风险。你花100美元买入一项资产，一年后以200美元卖出，那样做风险大吗？也许吧.

The point is, in my opinion, you can't measure risk even after the fact and that's something that I literally hadn't thought about it before I sat down. In the book, when I was writing about psychology,  
重点是，在我看来，即使事后也无法衡量风险，而这是我在动笔前从未想到的。在书中，当我写到心理学部分时,

I realized that there was something that deserved,  that I hadn't planned to write about, that deserved its own chapter and that was the cycle in attitudes towards risk.  
我意识到有一个值得写成独立章节的主题，那就是人们对风险态度的周期性变化.

Because I think that the way people think about risk has an enormous impact on the market and it changes volatilely.  
因为我认为，人们对风险的看法对市场有着巨大影响，并且这种看法变化极为剧烈.

And people are supposed to be these computers who look at risk-adjusted returns and make intelligent decisions on that basis and nothing could be further from the truth.  
而人们本该像计算机那样，根据风险调整后的回报做出理性决策，但现实远非如此.

When the market is doing well, the economy is thriving and companies are reporting good profits and the media are telling good stories and everybody feels good, what do they say? Risk is my friend.  
当市场表现良好、经济繁荣、公司利润丰厚、媒体传递好消息、大家心情愉快时，他们会说：“风险是我的朋友.”

The more risk you take, the more money you make. And I feel entirely comfortable taking risks today. And by the way, I don't see any risks on the horizon. So bring it on. And then for the next year or two, the economy suffers.  
风险越大，赚的钱就越多。如今，我对承担风险感到十分自信。顺便说一句，我预见不到前方有任何风险。所以，尽管来吧。但接下来的一两年，经济将陷入困境.

Corporation profits disappoint. The media now turned into telling scare stories. The prices are cascading down and the motion goes through the floor. And now what do people say? Risk-bearing is just another way to lose money.  
企业利润令人失望。媒体开始报道恐慌性消息。价格一路下跌，交易接连不断。那么现在人们说什么呢？承担风险只是另一种亏钱的方式.

I don't care if I ever make a penny in the market again. I just don't want to lose anymore. Get me out at any price.  
我不在乎以后是否还能在市场上赚一分钱，我只是不想再亏钱了。无论价格如何，都要让我退出.

And this fluctuation in attitudes towards risks probably does more than any other one thing to influence the swings of the market. And again this is an idea that I had no thought that I would write a chapter about that.  
而这种对风险态度的波动可能比其他任何因素更能影响市场波动。同样，这也是我从未想过会专门写一章讨论的观点.

The great thing about writing is you have to think things through. You can't have some rough, unformed, imprecise view.  
写作的妙处在于，你必须把事情思考透彻，不能有粗糙、未成熟、模糊不清的观点.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

It has to be crisp.  
必须要清晰明了.
  
Howard Marks:  

It has to be crisp.  
必须要清晰明了.

Ashok Varadhan:  

Yeah.  
是的.
  
Howard Marks:  
 
In order to convince others, you have to convince yourself.  
为了说服别人，你必须先说服自己.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

Sure.  
当然.
  
Howard Marks:  

Thank you for having me here today. Thank you for doing such an interesting job, Ashok. And I look forward to coming back.  
感谢您今天邀请我。感谢您精彩的主持工作，Ashok。期待再次回来.
  
Ashok Varadhan:  

Yeah. Thank you very much, Howard.  
是的，非常感谢您，Howard.

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