Carl C. Icahn Issues Open Letter to Occidental Petroleum Stockholders

卡尔·C·伊坎致西方石油股东的公开信

Recent Actions by OXY’s Management and Board Indicate a Lack of Checks and Balances

西方石油管理层与董事会的近期举措显示缺乏制衡机制

Stockholder Action is Required Immediately to Hold the Board Accountable and Prevent Further Value Destruction

股东必须立即采取行动，对董事会追责并防止进一步的价值毁损

Stockholder Representation on the Board and Corporate Governance Changes Needed Immediately

董事会需立即加入股东代表并进行公司治理改革

New York, New York, July 22nd, 2019 — Today, Carl C. Icahn released the following open letter to stockholders of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

纽约，纽约，2019年7月22日——今日，卡尔·C·伊坎向西方石油公司股东发布了以下公开信。

July 22nd, 2019

2019年7月22日

Dear Fellow Occidental Stockholders:

亲爱的西方石油股东：

We own over 33 million shares of Occidental Petroleum and we believe what recently happened in the OXY Boardroom is reprehensible. In over 50 years on Wall Street I have seen many management teams and boards callously disregard stockholder rights to protect their jobs, and in some cases, build corporate empires at the expense of shareholders, but I have only rarely seen a situation such as the one at Occidental, where the Board and Vicki Hollub, OXY’s President and CEO, entered into an extremely risky transformational merger, without a stockholder vote. In my opinion, OXY’s massive and risky Anadarko bet that gambles the Company’s future without the approval of shareholders will prove to be grossly negligent and might possibly cause the Company to lose its valuable listing on the New York Stock Exchange.

我们持有超过三千三百万股西方石油股票，认为近期在西方石油董事会发生的事情令人愤慨。在华尔街五十余年，我见过许多管理层和董事会为了保住职位而冷酷无情地漠视股东权利，有时甚至以牺牲股东利益来打造企业帝国，但像西方石油这样，由董事会和公司总裁兼首席执行官维姬·霍勒布在未经股东投票的情况下，推进极具风险且颠覆性的并购的情形却极为罕见。在我看来，西方石油对阿纳达科的大规模、高风险押注在未获股东批准的情况下赌上了公司的未来，这将被证明是严重渎职，并可能导致公司失去在纽约证券交易所的宝贵上市资格。

OXY has lost over \$12 billion in market value since its interest in buying Anadarko was first reported. But regardless, Hollub, the architect of the plan, will not suffer financially as she was paid \$40 million over the past 3 years and will most certainly be paid at least another \$14 million in 2019. Hollub is paid \$270,000 per week, which is more than 113x OXY’s median employee compensation of \$2,387 per week. Think about that, the median OXY employee has to work over 2 years to earn what Hollub makes in a week. OXY’s Board Chairman, Eugene Batchelder, makes \$490,000 a year, which is 4 times the median OXY employee’s annual pay. Further, the median OXY employee works a full-time job; Batchelder attended six Board meetings in 2018, for which he was paid \$81,600 per meeting.  No matter how badly shareholders suffer, OXY’s CEO and Chairman will continue to be among the most highly paid in the world.

自西方石油被曝出有意收购阿纳达科以来，公司市值已蒸发逾120亿美元。但无论如何，作为该计划的设计者，霍勒布并不会在经济上受损——过去三年她已获得4000万美元薪酬，2019年肯定还将获得至少1400万美元。霍勒布每周薪酬达27万美元，是西方石油员工每周平均薪酬2387美元的113倍以上。想想看，一名普通西方石油员工需要工作两年多才能赚到霍勒布一周的收入。董事会主席尤金·巴切尔德年薪49万美元，是公司员工年薪中位数的4倍。此外，员工需要全职工作，而巴切尔德2018年仅参加了6次董事会会议，每次会议酬劳达8.16万美元。不论股东遭受多大损失，西方石油的首席执行官与董事长仍将继续跻身全球最富薪之列。

Management’s Abysmal Record

管理层糟糕透顶的成绩单

No management or board should be scrambling around to prevent a stockholder vote on a dangerous transformational transaction, but what makes OXY’s actions even worse is management’s egregious track record. When Hollub became CEO in April 2016, OXY’s stock closed at \$77 per share, while oil was \$45 a barrel. Today, at \$52 per share, the stock is 33% lower, even though the price of oil is almost 25% higher. On a relative basis over that same timeframe, OXY has underperformed its peers by over 30%. To make matters even worse, Hollub has completely destroyed Wall Street analysts’ expectations of OXY. When she was appointed CEO, OXY had 52% buy ratings; today OXY has 14% buy ratings even though the stock is 33% cheaper and oil is higher.

任何管理层或董事会都不应为了一项危险且彻底改变公司命运的交易而四处奔忙、阻止股东投票，但让西方石油（OXY）的做法更糟糕的是其管理层骇人听闻的往绩。2016年4月霍勒布出任首席执行官时，OXY股价收于每股77美元，而油价为每桶45美元；如今股价仅为52美元，下降了33%，而油价却高出近25%。在同一时期，OXY的表现相对同行落后30%以上。更糟糕的是，霍勒布彻底摧毁了华尔街分析师对OXY的预期。她上任时，OXY获得52%的买入评级；如今这一比例仅剩14%，即使股价便宜了33%，油价也更高。

Since taking over, Hollub put OXY’s cherished dividend at risk by selling cash-producing assets, overspending on drilling and acquiring non-cash producing assets. In fact, in 2016 and 2017, the Company was forced to divest assets at what we believe to be cheap values and use balance sheet cash to pay the dividend, which is neither a sustainable nor a prudent strategy. While we are told Hollub is a somewhat competent operator, she has admitted that she has limited M\&A experience, yet she just orchestrated one of 2019’s biggest M\&A transactions and that limited experience sure does show! She also arranged the financing for the acquisition in a 90-minute meeting with Warren Buffett. I believe Hollub learned that negotiating a deal with Buffett, one of the country’s canniest operators, is not the optimal way to get M\&A experience. In my opinion, Buffett figuratively took her to the cleaners.  Not only did he get a \$10 billion preferred paying 8% but he also amazingly received a bonus of 80 million warrants worth approximately \$1.2 billion simply for providing the financing.  At least one large investor that I know of would have been happy to provide the financing without the warrants. The Buffett deal was like taking candy from a baby and amazingly she even thanked him publicly for it! But you can’t blame Warren, if Hollub was arrogant enough to negotiate a deal with Buffett of this magnitude despite her admittedly limited experience in M\&A and the Board was misguided enough to rubber stamp it, then one might say in Warren’s defense that it was almost his fiduciary duty to Berkshire Hathaway to accept it. Speaking of the Board, where was our Chairman Eugene Batchelder in all of this?  Presumably if Batchelder has M\&A experience, how could he have permitted this giveaway of \$1.2 billion of shareholder funds?  More importantly how could he, the leader of the Board, have sanctioned this whole Anadarko deal which was done in such feverish haste?  We have our theories about why he did it, but hopefully more facts will be learned from our Section 220 demand to inspect the Company’s books and records which should shed more light on this matter and others at OXY.

自上任以来，霍勒布通过出售产现资产、过度支出钻探成本并收购不产现资产，令OXY引以为傲的股息面临风险。实际上，2016及2017年，公司被迫以我们认为的低价出售资产，并动用资产负债表现金支付股息，这既不可持续，也不明智。虽然有人称霍勒布是“尚称合格”的运营者，但她自己承认并购经验有限，却策划了2019年最大规模收购之一，其经验不足可见一斑！她还在与沃伦·巴菲特的一次90分钟会议中为该收购敲定融资。我相信霍勒布已深刻体会到，与美国最精明的企业家之一巴菲特谈判并非获取并购经验的最佳方式。在我看来，巴菲特可谓“轻松洗劫”了她——不仅获得年息8%的100亿美元优先股，还神奇地额外拿到8,000万份、价值约12亿美元的认股权证，仅仅因为提供融资。我认识的至少一名大型投资者愿意在没有认股权证的情况下提供这笔资金。巴菲特的交易简直是“从婴儿手中夺糖”，而令人惊讶的是，霍勒布还公开感谢他！但谁也不能责怪沃伦——如果霍勒布自恃有限并购经验仍傲慢地与巴菲特做这种规模的交易，董事会又愚昧地盖章批准，那么从“受托责任”角度，为伯克希尔股东争取此交易几乎成了巴菲特的职责。说到董事会，我们的主席尤金·巴切尔德在其中扮演了什么角色？若他确有并购经验，怎会允许将12亿美元股东资金白白送人？更重要的是，作为董事会领袖，他如何能批准如此仓促达成的整个阿纳达科交易？我们对其动机自有猜测，但希望通过我们基于《特拉华州公司法》第220条提出的查阅公司账簿记录申请，能够获得更多事实，为此事及OXY其他问题提供更多线索。

Before the Anadarko acquisition, the Company had committed that it would maintain a prudent balance sheet and not take undue risks, but then blatantly broke this commitment by acquiring Anadarko. Perhaps even more egregious, in order to make this acquisition, in an absolute abrogation of good corporate governance, OXY’s Board, led by Eugene Batchelder, in my view intentionally restructured the Anadarko deal to avoid a stockholder vote which they knew they would not obtain.  Hollub and Batchelder implied that they did all this because they know what’s best for shareholders when in fact we believe just the opposite is true. In my mind, the Anadarko acquisition is an attempt to create a de facto poison pill to ensure OXY remains a stand-alone company, thus ensuring Hollub and Batchelder keep their jobs, power, and lucrative compensation. I do believe that Hollub and Batchelder know what’s good for them and their personal agendas but do not particularly care what’s good for shareholders. The surrounding facts raise the disturbing possibility that, with OXY weakened and doing poorly, Hollub and Batchelder were fearful there would be a bid for the company which shareholders would accept. If that is correct then it would be logical to conclude that this fear made Hollub and Batchelder willing to go to any lengths, including this value destroying transaction, in order to keep their positions of power.

在收购阿纳达科之前，公司曾承诺保持审慎的资产负债表并避免不必要的风险，但随后却公然违背承诺并购阿纳达科。更为恶劣的是，为了促成该收购，OXY董事会（在尤金·巴切尔德领导下）彻底践踏良好公司治理，在我看来故意重组交易结构以规避本应进行、却注定通不过的股东投票。霍勒布和巴切尔德暗示此举是为股东利益着想，而我们认为事实恰恰相反。在我看来，收购阿纳达科是企图制造事实上的“毒丸”，保证OXY继续独立运作，从而确保霍勒布和巴切尔德的职位、权力及丰厚报酬。我相信他们非常清楚什么对自己和个人议程有利，却并不在乎什么对股东有利。相关事实令人不安地表明：在OXY疲弱表现不佳之际，霍勒布和巴切尔德担心公司会出现收购要约并被股东接受。若属实，则合理推断这种恐惧促使二人不惜一切，包括实施此种毁值交易，只为保住权位。

Unfortunately, when it comes to Occidental, accountability is severely lacking. That is why Hollub and Batchelder are quintessential examples of a CEO and Chairman that think they can get away with anything.  For example, since OXY’s value has deteriorated by over \$18 billion since she took over, you would think Hollub would be working 20-hour days to turn the ship around. However, Hollub seems to have the time to serve on at least six outside boards and advisory committees. This might be tolerable if OXY were outperforming but that certainly is not the case. Another example is the egregious salary Hollub and Batchelder earn with virtually no accountability or supervision. Over the last few years it appears to me that the Board has rubber stamped any actions that Hollub and Batchelder propose no matter how problematic and risky. I therefore can now understand why they appear to be so afraid to allow us to get representation on this Board.

不幸的是，在西方石油的问题上，问责几乎荡然无存。霍勒布和巴切尔德正是那种认为自己可以为所欲为的首席执行官和董事长的典型。举例而言，自她上任以来，OXY市值已蒸发逾180亿美元，按理说霍勒布应日以继夜、20小时工作以扭转局面；然而她仍抽得出时间在至少六个外部董事会和咨询委员会任职。如果OXY表现优异，这或许还能勉强接受，但事实并非如此。再如，霍勒布和巴切尔德拿着惊人高薪，却几乎没有任何问责或监督。近年来，董事会似乎对霍勒布和巴切尔德提出的任何举措都盲目盖章，无论这些举措多么成问题、多么冒风险。因此，我完全理解他们为何如此害怕让我们在董事会中获得代表席位。

Something Must be Done and Done Quickly;

必须立即采取行动，刻不容缓；

The Way Forward

前进之路

Unfortunately, we recognize that the Anadarko deal and the off-market financing arrangements that enabled it cannot be undone. We know that, in a few months, we will own a highly-levered combined company that will be in immediate need of a strong board and good, thoughtful decision-making that prioritizes stockholder value; a board with at least four members that understand they serve on behalf of the stockholders, not the CEO; and that can and will stand up to management when necessary. In our opinion, Occidental’s Board, the same Board that stood by and allowed a CEO to agree to an expensive transformational merger without regard for stockholder rights and that knowingly modified a deal structure, at great cost, to avoid a stockholder vote, will not, and cannot, provide the type of strong leadership required at this time. Under the circumstances, we believe Hollub and Occidental’s Board must be held accountable, and new directors must be added, if only to ensure the operating success and balance sheet management that will be required to achieve the Board and management’s stated goals for the Anadarko transaction. To us, it’s obvious that the future of Occidental and your investment depends on these changes. One example is if the price of oil decreases meaningfully there must be new members of the Board to oppose another value-debilitating transaction made by a panicked board whose leaders serve more than one agenda.

遗憾的是，我们认识到阿纳达科交易及其非公开市场融资安排已无法撤回。几个月后，我们将持有一家高杠杆合并公司，这家公司亟需一个强有力的董事会，以及以股东价值为先、深思熟虑的决策；董事会中至少应有四名成员明确知道他们代表的是股东而非首席执行官，并且在必要时能够且愿意对管理层说“不”。在我们看来，现任董事会——正是这个董事会袖手旁观，允许首席执行官不顾股东权利敲定一笔昂贵且颠覆性的并购，并明知代价高昂仍修改交易结构以规避股东投票——既不会也无法提供当前所需的强力领导。在这种情况下，我们认为必须追究霍勒布及董事会的责任，并增补新董事，哪怕仅仅为了确保实现董事会和管理层为阿纳达科交易设定的运营成功和资产负债表管理目标。对我们而言，西方石油的未来以及你们的投资取决于这些变革。举例来说，一旦油价大幅下跌，董事会中必须有新成员能够反对惊慌失措的董事会领导层再次发起的破坏价值的交易。

We have commenced the process to remove and replace directors. It will be a long and expensive process for us, which is fine, insofar as we are concerned. But what is not fine, is how difficult this Board is making it for you to simply “cast your vote.” Occidental’s corporate governance regime empowers and entrenches management and the Board at the expense of stockholder rights. It is anything but stockholder democracy.

我们已启动罢免并替换董事的程序。这对我们来说将是一条漫长且耗资巨大的道路，但我们无所畏惧。真正令人无法接受的是，现任董事会竟让股东“投票表态”变得如此困难。西方石油的公司治理制度赋权并固化了管理层和董事会的地位，却牺牲了股东的权利，这与股东民主背道而驰。

The Company requires us to use a two-step process. First, we must obtain the support of 20% of the outstanding shares to “demand” that the Board set a record date. Once we satisfy that step, we can then solicit stockholders, as of that record date, to support our agenda to remove and replace directors and fix the Company’s corporate governance. Unfortunately, for you to support us, the Company requires you to complete a lengthy and intrusive questionnaire, as well as to comply with other cumbersome steps, which undermine your ability to exercise your voting franchise, these encumbrances have no apparent benefits for Occidental or its stockholders and are simply there to dissuade you from voting. Although it will take extra time and effort on your part to comply with the Company’s arduous and unnecessary requirements, we implore you to do so. (Detailed information explaining these requirements is included in the Solicitation Statement of the Icahn Participants (the “Icahn Solicitation Statement”), filed with the SEC on July 18, 2019).

公司强制我们采取“两步走”程序：首先，我们必须获得流通股中20%的支持，才能“要求”董事会设定记录日；完成此步后，我们才可向该记录日的股东征求意见，支持我们的提案——罢免并替换董事、修正公司治理。遗憾的是，为了让您支持我们，公司要求您填写冗长且具窥探性的问卷，并遵守其他繁琐步骤，这些障碍削弱了您行使投票权的能力，对西方石油或其股东毫无明显益处，只是用来劝阻您投票。尽管遵从公司繁重且不必要的要求将耗费您更多时间和精力，我们仍恳请您配合。（关于这些要求的详细信息载于伊坎参与方于2019年7月18日向美国证监会提交的《伊坎征求说明书》）。

YOUR SUPPORT IS IMPORTANT FIRST, WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT TO DEMAND THAT THE COMPANY SET A RECORD DATE FOR

OUR PROPOSED CONSENT SOLICITATION.

您的支持至关重要 首先，我们需要您支持要求公司为

我们拟议的书面同意征集设定记录日。

SECOND, WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT TO: REMOVE FOUR OCCIDENTAL DIRECTORS, ELECT FOUR NEW DIRECTORS TO PROVIDE BOARDROOM OVERSIGHT, AND FIX OCCIDENTAL’S BYLAWS TO PROVIDE BASIC STOCKHOLDER RIGHTS.

其次，我们需要您支持：罢免四名西方石油董事，选举四名新董事以加强董事会监督，并修订公司章程，为股东提供基本权利。

Please refer to the Icahn Solicitation Statement and follow the steps necessary to demand that the Company set a record date for our proposed consent solicitation.

请参阅《伊坎征求说明书》，并按照其中步骤要求公司为我们拟议的书面同意征集设定记录日。

Additional Information and Where to Find it;

附加信息及获取方式；

Participants in the Solicitation

征求行动参与方

CARL C. ICAHN AND THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE SOLICITATION (TOGETHER, THE “PARTICIPANTS”) FILED A DEFINTIVE SOLICITATION STATEMENT ON JULY 18, 2019 WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (THE “SEC”) TO BE USED TO SOLICIT WRITTEN REQUESTS FOR FIXING A RECORD DATE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED ACTIONS BY WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE STOCKHOLDERS OF OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (“OCCIDENTAL”). SECURITY HOLDERS ARE ADVISED TO READ THE SOLICITATION STATEMENT AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE SOLICITATION BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH SOLICITATION. THESE MATERIALS AND OTHER MATERIALS FILED BY THE PARTICIPANTS WITH THE SEC ARE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE AT THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT [HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV](HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV). INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH SOLICITATION IS CONTAINED IN THE SOLICITATION STATEMENT. EXCEPT THROUGH THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SHARES OF COMMON STOCK, PAR VALUE \$0.20 PER SHARE, OF OCCIDENTAL OR AS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED IN THE SOLICITATION STATEMENT, THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE NO INTEREST IN OCCIDENTAL

卡尔·C·伊坎及此次征求行动的其他参与方（统称“参与方”）已于2019年7月18日向美国证券交易委员会（“SEC”）提交了最终版征求说明书，用于就西方石油公司（“西方石油”）股东书面同意拟议事项的记录日期征求书面请求。建议证券持有人阅读该征求说明书及其他相关文件，因为其中包含重要信息，包括与上述征求行动参与方相关的信息。上述材料及参与方向SEC提交的其他材料可通过SEC网站[HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV免费获取。关于此次征求行动参与方的信息载于征求说明书中。除通过持有西方石油每股面值0.20美元普通股的实益所有权，或征求说明书中另有披露外，参与方与西方石油不存在任何利益关系。](HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV免费获取。关于此次征求行动参与方的信息载于征求说明书中。除通过持有西方石油每股面值0.20美元普通股的实益所有权，或征求说明书中另有披露外，参与方与西方石油不存在任何利益关系。)

Other Important Disclosure Information

其他重要披露信息

SPECIAL NOTE REGARDING THIS LETTER:

关于本函的特别说明：

THIS LETTER CONTAINS OUR CURRENT VIEWS ON THE VALUE OF OCCIDENTAL SECURITIES AND CERTAIN ACTIONS THAT OCCIDENTAL’S BOARD MAY TAKE TO ENHANCE THE VALUE OF ITS SECURITIES. OUR VIEWS ARE BASED ON OUR OWN ANALYSIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS WE BELIEVE TO BE REASONABLE. THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE INFORMATION WE CONSIDERED AND ANALYZED IS ACCURATE OR COMPLETE. SIMILARLY, THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT OUR ASSUMPTIONS ARE CORRECT. OCCIDENTAL’S ACTUAL PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS MAY DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM OUR ASSUMPTIONS AND ANALYSIS.

本函载有我们对西方石油证券价值及其董事会可采取的提升措施之最新观点。我们的观点基于对公开信息的分析及我们认为合理的假设。无法保证我们所考虑和分析的信息准确或完整，同样也无法保证我们的假设正确。西方石油的实际表现和结果可能与我们的假设和分析存在重大差异。

WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT, NOR HAVE WE RECEIVED, PERMISSION FROM ANY THIRD-PARTY TO INCLUDE THEIR INFORMATION IN THIS LETTER. ANY SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS INDICATING THE SUPPORT OF SUCH THIRD PARTY FOR THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN.

我们未曾亦未获得任何第三方的许可在本函中引用其信息。任何此类信息不应被视为该第三方支持本函所述观点的表示。

THIS LETTER ALSO REFERENCES THE SIZE OF OUR RESPECTIVE CURRENT HOLDINGS OF OCCIDENTAL SECURITIES RELATIVE TO OTHER HOLDERS OF SUCH SECURITIES. OUR VIEWS AND OUR HOLDINGS COULD CHANGE AT ANY TIME. WE MAY SELL ANY OR ALL OF OUR HOLDINGS OR INCREASE OUR HOLDINGS BY PURCHASING ADDITIONAL SECURITIES. WE MAY TAKE ANY OF THESE OR OTHER ACTIONS REGARDING OCCIDENTAL WITHOUT UPDATING THIS LETTER OR PROVIDING ANY NOTICE WHATSOEVER OF ANY SUCH CHANGES (EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE REQUIRED BY LAW).

本函亦提及我们当前持有的西方石油证券规模相对于其他持有者的情况。我们的观点及持仓可能随时变化。我们可能出售部分或全部持仓，或通过增持进一步扩大持仓。我们可能就西方石油采取上述或其他任何行动，而无需更新本函或就任何此类变化提供通知（法律另有规定者除外）。

FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS:

前瞻性声明：

Certain statements contained in this letter are forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, statements that are predications of or indicate future events, trends, plans or objectives. Undue reliance should not be placed on such statements because, by their nature, they are subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance or activities and are subject to many risks and uncertainties. Due to such risks and uncertainties, actual events or results or actual performance may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of the future tense or other forward-looking words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “estimate,” “should,” “may,” “will,” “objective,” “projection,” “forecast,” “management believes,” “continue,” “strategy,” “position” or the negative of those terms or other variations of them or by comparable terminology.

本函中某些陈述属于前瞻性声明，包括但不限于对未来事件、趋势、计划或目标的预测或指示。请勿过度依赖此类声明，因为其本质上受已知及未知风险和不确定性影响。前瞻性声明并不保证未来业绩或活动，且面临诸多风险和不确定性。受此影响，实际事件、结果或表现可能与前瞻性声明中反映或预期的情况存在重大差异。前瞻性声明可通过使用将来时态或其他前瞻性词汇识别，例如“相信”“预期”“预计”“打算”“计划”“估计”“应当”“可能”“将”“目标”“预测”“管理层相信”“继续”“战略”“定位”等词汇或其否定形式、其他变体或类似术语。

Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from the expectations set forth in this letter include, among other things, the factors identified in Occidental’s public filings. Such forward-looking statements should therefore be construed in light of such factors, and the Participants are under no obligation, and expressly disclaim any intention or obligation, to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

导致实际结果与本函中预期有重大差异的重要因素包括但不限于西方石油公开文件中所列因素。因此，应结合这些因素解读前瞻性声明。除法律另有要求外，参与方无义务且明确拒绝承担因新信息、未来事件或其他原因更新或修订任何前瞻性声明的意图或责任。