2020-03-30 Glenn M. Renwick.Innovation & Insurance: How to Break the Status Quo

Refer To：《Glenn Renwick | Segment 3: Innovation & Insurance: How to Break the Status Quo》。

Speaker 1:

Hi again, I'm Vindy from JRNY and in this third segment of my interview with Glenn, we'll be talking about innovation and insurance. One of the things you're known for at Progressive is bringing engineering and data principles on board.

大家好，我是JRNY的Vindy，在我与Glenn的访谈第三部分中，我们将讨论创新与保险。Progressive公司以引入工程和数据原则而著称，这也是你们的一个亮点。

Can you explain a little bit about what that involves?

你能简单解释一下这其中包含哪些内容吗？

Glenn Renwick:

Sure, I'll give you a few examples and that might help fill in even some things that we've talked about previously.

当然，我举几个例子，可能会补充一些我们之前谈到的内容。

I said that we changed our business model from returning cash to a consumer in the event that their car was damaged to returning their car. I won't go into the details of that, but realistically that became a queuing theory issue.

我曾说过，我们将业务模式从在车辆受损时向消费者返还现金，转变为返还他们的车辆。我不会详细展开，但实际上这变成了一个排队论的问题。

And in many respects, which is an engineering discipline, Consumers would take their car to a body shop or a panel beater. Sorry, I got to use New Zealand language here.

在许多方面，这属于工程学范畴，消费者会把车送到修车厂或者钣金修理厂。抱歉，这里我不得不使用新西兰的说法。

And they wouldn't know whether or not there were three or four or five or some number of cars ahead of them. And at least from the environment I'm familiar with, very few businessmen sort of said, no, I can't take it.

而且他们不知道前面排了三辆、四辆、五辆或其他数量的车。至少在我熟悉的环境中，很少有商家会说“不，我受不了了”。

And they would say, the vehicle will be ready Thursday or Friday. That was very common and statistically we actually have support for that. Consumer would call Thursday, Friday and it wasn't going to be ready until the following week.

他们会说，车辆周四或周五可以修好。这非常普遍，统计数据也支持这一点。消费者会在周四、周五打电话，而实际上车辆要到下周才会修好。

Okay, things happen maybe. Surprisingly at large scale we could see that that was happening an extraordinary amount. It is not generally possible for insurance companies to sort of get a car repaired cheaper than a competitor.

好吧，事情就是这样发生的。令人惊讶的是，在大规模操作中，这种情况竟然异常频繁。保险公司通常不可能比竞争对手更便宜地修好一辆车。

There may be some arrangements that are there, but for the most part we want to make sure everything is done absolutely correctly and the cost is the right cost and you want your panel beaters to be very good and they should get paid well.

可能会有一些特殊安排，但大多数情况下，我们希望确保一切都绝对正确地完成，成本合适，并且你希望你的钣金修理厂表现出色，并且获得合理的报酬。

So where do we take the friction costs out of the transaction? Now again, I'm using US examples.

那么我们如何消除交易中的摩擦成本呢？这里我依然使用美国的例子。

Well, that weekend that we now incurred a rental car coverage, so we were adding $75 or thereabouts to each physical damage claim.

因为那个周末我们引入了租车保障，所以每一笔车损理赔都会额外增加大约75美元。

So it was really an issue of, well, why can't we get the car back on that Thursday and Friday, eliminate that friction cost, which is not a cost that anyone values, except the insurance company, but they're not part of this food chain.

所以问题就在于，为什么我们不能在周四或周五就把车修好，从而消除这种摩擦成本，而这种成本除了保险公司之外，没人真正重视，而且他们并不在这个价值链中。

Consumer and panel bidder are all we care about. So we had to really analyze why was this happening. And it was oftentimes a poor distribution of damaged vehicles to potential suppliers that could fix them.

我们只关心消费者和修理厂。因此，我们必须真正分析为何会发生这种情况。通常这是由于损坏车辆分配给有能力修理的供应商不合理所致。

So we had a queuing model that was sort of multi-queue, multi-server. We needed to re-rationalize that and get it so that damaged vehicles were getting to qualified suppliers. But when they have the opportunity to fix them, fix them.

所以我们采用了一个多队列、多服务器的排队模型。我们需要重新理顺这个流程，使得损坏车辆能顺利分配给合格的供应商，而一旦有机会修理，就立即修好。

So we know just-in-time inventory type of models from whatever the 70s.

这类似于我们从70年代就熟悉的“准时制库存”模型。

This leveraged a lot of that thinking and I think that's enough detail for now but it really was a queuing theory just-in-time inventory kind of model yet to the consumer It was, hey, I'm getting my car fixed faster.

这借鉴了很多那时的理念，我认为目前细节已足够，实际上这是一种基于排队论和准时库存模型的应用，对消费者来说，就是“嘿，我能更快地修好我的车”。

That was a good objective and an outcome from the consumer. The how didn't necessarily matter and we decided that it would be for our suppliers, our body shops, panel readers. It was all about quality the first time.

这是一个好的目标和消费者体验，过程如何并不重要，我们决定那部分由我们的供应商、修车厂、钣金修理师来负责。关键在于第一次就做到质量过关。

And the number of times a vehicle had to go back for rework, that was a product defect. And so a lot of the classic models of quality control were implemented into the claims process.

车辆需要返工的次数，反映的是产品缺陷。因此，我们在理赔流程中引入了许多经典的质量控制模型。

But on the surface of things, it doesn't seem like that's where you would use those tools.

但从表面上看，这似乎并不是你通常会使用这些工具的地方。

Something else that we took a different approach to was instead of saying we'll collect a lot of information then we'll tell you what your price is.

我们采取的另一种不同方法是，不是先收集大量信息再告诉你价格。

We turned that around and sort of backwardly engineered and optimized the whole thing by asking, how much can you afford a month?

我们反过来，逆向工程地优化整个流程，直接询问：“你每月能负担多少钱？”

And obviously zero and stupid answers didn't count.

显然，零或者不合理的答案是不被接受的。

But if someone said, I can afford $200 a month just to use a number, then we would backwardly engineer our product. So that we could solve for a $200 a month.

但如果有人说，“我每月能负担200美元”，那么我们就会逆向工程设计我们的产品，使之适应200美元/月的方案。

The but is it had to be a valid and good product that met state requirements and was good for the consumer.

但前提是，这个产品必须合法、优质，符合州的要求，并对消费者有利。

But it gave the consumer a little more power, and we talked about trust previously, that this is about me versus it's about you.

但这让消费者拥有了更多主动权，正如我们之前谈到的信任问题，这关乎“我”而不是“你”。

Because up to that point, it's, gee, I gave you a lot of my information, and now you're just going to tell me a price.

因为在此之前，消费者要交出大量信息，而你仅仅告诉他们一个价格。

This turned that power around but it required sort of reverse engineering and optimization techniques which are sort of common in systems engineering and so on and so forth.

这种方式扭转了权力的平衡，但这需要逆向工程和优化技术，而这些在系统工程中是相当常见的。

And one perhaps last example, and rating can be complex so I won't go into great detail, but it's also, at least in the United States,

再举一个例子，评级可能很复杂，所以我不会详细说明，但至少在美国，

where you file a rate revision and you stay with that price until you file another rate revision and change your price.

你提交费率修订后，会维持那个价格，直到下一次提交费率修订来改变价格。

Well, ironically, when you think in terms of quantums like that, the price is only right on any one, theoretically right on any one day of its lifetime. And that would be the midpoint, arguably.

讽刺的是，从量化的角度来看，理论上某一天的价格才是准确的，可以说那是一个中间值。

So is there a better way of matching inflation or trend With the premium, not for an individual because they will get the price they got on that day, but if someone came three days later, or let's say 30 days later,

那么，是否有更好的方式将通胀或趋势与保费匹配呢？不是针对个体，因为他们会获得当天的价格，但如果有人三天后，或者30天后来购买，

should the price have gone up just a very small amount to match continuous trend.

价格是否应该略微上调，以匹配持续的趋势？

So it was a way of taking something that had all of its genesis in written rate manuals,

这实际上是一种把所有源自书面费率手册的东西，

Which had to be almost by definition fixed and transforming the model to a more variable pricing model so that it was a continuous model and any significant adjustments to that were only where you had missed the trend by an appreciable amount.

本质上必须是固定的，并将其转变为更为可变的定价模型，使之成为连续模型，只有当你明显错过趋势时才进行显著调整。

But it meant much less disruption to the system. And much less what we called rate revisions, which were expensive from a reprogramming point of view.

但这意味着对系统的干扰大大减少，也大大减少了所谓的费率修订，从重新编程的角度来看成本更低。

So we brought that dynamic of variability into our design and it actually was a cheaper way for us to do it, but it also matched the market trending.

因此，我们将这种可变性引入设计中，实际上这对我们来说是一种更经济的做法，同时也符合市场趋势。

And there are times that market trending went negative, which we could also.

而且有时市场趋势会走低，我们也可以应对这种情况.

Speaker 1:

Those sound like quite big innovations. I can imagine there must have been some tough parts of implementation. What would you say was the most difficult thing about innovations like that and how did you overcome them?

听起来这些都是重大创新。我可以想象在实施过程中一定遇到了不少难题。你认为这些创新中最困难的是什么？你们又是如何克服的？

Glenn Renwick:

Well, the most difficult is the obvious, is that status quo is very powerful. And I would say probably for me, I underestimated the power of status quo. Agents were happy with what existed. Consumers were happy with what existed.

最困难的显而易见就是现状的力量非常强大。我觉得我可能低估了现状的力量。代理人对现有状态很满意，消费者也对现有状态很满意。

I mean, they may complain and want something else, but moving to a different model, Well, that's scary, too. Employees were comfortable.

我的意思是，他们可能会抱怨并希望有所改变，但转向另一种模式，也让人感到害怕。员工也习惯了现状。

That's how they learned their contribution to the company and skills, and they were comfortable with that. So changing is really hard.

他们就是这样学会了如何为公司作出贡献以及发展技能，他们对此很适应。所以，变革确实非常困难。

I could comment. I don't know why the United States is not on the metric system,

我可以发表一些看法。我不明白为什么美国没有采用公制，

but you could imagine the level of change that that represents, whereas I think I can I can still remember 10th of July 1967, someone can check that,

但你可以想象那代表着多大的变革，我还记得1967年7月10日，你可以查查这个日期，

that was DC day, we changed to New Zealand and you know a little bit of a issue at the time, but eventually it becomes the norm, but that change point It can be very stressful for a lot of people.

那是DC日，我们改用了新西兰的系统，当时确实有些问题，但最终这成为了常态，而那种变革点对于很多人来说压力非常大。

So status quo, and therefore, how do you break status quo? It's leadership. And it's leadership by going, whether it's to regulators, certainly to employees, and being able to find,

所以现状如此，那么如何打破现状呢？靠的是领导力。无论是对监管者还是对员工，都必须展现领导力，并且能够找到，

from a marketing perspective, a very rational way of relating to the consumer so that they go, oh, that makes sense.

从市场营销的角度来说，要有一种非常理性的方式与消费者沟通，让他们觉得，“哦，这说得通。”

If it's something you have to explain in a very detailed way, you're probably, my opinion, you're probably not going to get past the first sentence.

如果需要非常详细地解释，依我看，你可能连第一句话都说不过去。

So for example, now this is a little bit like age technology by today's standards,

例如，现在按今天的标准来看，这有点像老式技术，

where we said you name your price, we actually had a what we called a price gun,

我们曾提出“你定价”，实际上我们有一种叫做“定价枪”的工具，

which was the old technology where you put the price sticker on products when you go through and if you opened up a box in the supermarket you can put the price on top before barcodes and so on and so forth.

那是一种老技术，你在超市中打开盒子前可以先把价格标签贴上，而不是依赖条形码等等。

And a lot of consumers could still relate to that at the time we used it. So that made it simple. It's kind of like, well, hold it. I get to set the dial and do the pricing. Fine.

而当时很多消费者都能接受这种方式。所以这使得操作简单，就像是，“好吧，我可以调节设定定价，没问题。”

That's good enough for right now, even though it was covering a great deal of technology. So break the status quo. You need leadership. What's in it for me? And it's got to be simple.

目前这样就足够了，尽管这涉及了大量技术。所以，要打破现状，你需要领导力。对我有什么好处？而且必须简单明了。

Make things Einstein said make things as simple as possible, but no simpler. A lot of power in that. So you can't just simplify things, but you can make them as simple as possible, especially for the consumer and employee marketplace.

正如爱因斯坦所说，“尽可能简单，但不能更简单。”这其中蕴含着巨大的力量。所以你不能仅仅是简化，而是要让事情尽可能简单，特别是对消费者和员工市场来说。

Speaker 1:

Was there anything that you wish you had done sooner or better?

有没有什么事情你希望自己早点或更好地做呢？

Glenn Renwick:

Oh, as you get old, the answer to that is everything. I think we got the timing about right on a lot of things, but now that's looking in the rear-vision mirror.

哦，随着年纪增长，这个问题的答案几乎是所有事情。我认为我们在很多事情上时机把握得差不多，但现在回望过去……

At the time, you always feel like you wanted to go faster, but I recognize the market sometimes takes some time to gravitate to that.

当时你总觉得希望能走得更快，但我认识到市场有时需要时间来适应。

I guess I wish we had known the full power of the direct model and how we could incorporate agents into that and why it would ultimately be powerful for them.

我想我希望我们能更早了解直销模式的全部威力，以及如何将代理人融入其中，以及为何这最终会对他们产生巨大影响。

But it's awfully hard to go and sell a story that we're going to create a really powerful brand when we didn't know if our brand would be powerful.

但当我们不确定自己的品牌是否足够强大时，很难去推销“我们将创造一个极具影响力的品牌”这一故事。

I think in general the one thing that I might have been a little slow on, and that's terrible, I mean slow on everything, but as a company we tried our own development of homeowners.

我认为总体来说，有一件事我可能有点慢，那就是，呃，几乎所有事情都慢，但作为一家公司，我们尝试自己开发房主业务。

So we were primarily, as I said earlier, an auto insurer.

正如我之前所说，我们主要是一家汽车保险公司。

One of the things that consumers like to do was bundle their auto and their home together.

消费者喜欢把汽车保险和房屋保险捆绑在一起。

And my only real rational reason for wanting to be in the home insurance marketplace in the United States,

而我唯一真正理性的理由是，希望进入美国的房屋保险市场，

because I don't think it's a great insurance product, not statistically as predictable as auto insurance, was to have a bigger addressable marketplace.

因为我认为它不是一个优秀的保险产品，统计上不如汽车保险那样可预测，目的只是为了拥有更大的潜在市场。

So if about half of the marketplace wanted to bundle, We needed to start finding ways to address that marketplace.

所以如果大约有一半的市场想要捆绑购买，我们就需要开始寻找方法来满足这一市场需求。

Our natural inclination was to develop things ourselves.

我们的自然倾向是自己开发相关产品。

And that was hugely diversionary on a lot of our technology staff and so on and so forth. I wish I had done what we've eventually done,

而这极大地分散了我们许多技术人员的精力等等。我真希望我能早点采取我们最终采取的做法，

and that is go out and find the closest match to progressive culture in a small-ish Homeowner's company and we actually found that and someone that had developed literally their company with, this is not an exaggeration,

那就是去寻找与Progressive文化最为契合的一家规模较小的房屋保险公司，我们确实找到了这样一家，他们建立公司时——这并不夸张，

their culture they had used Progressive as the model including some very specific references in all of their early materials and they had developed a very nice homeowner's company,

其文化以Progressive为模板，在所有早期材料中都有非常具体的引用，并发展出了一家非常出色的房屋保险公司，

a company that We respected in every way from their early development. They were much, much smaller, but it just felt like you were combining with Progressive.

这家公司在各个方面都得到了我们的尊重，尽管规模小得多，但感觉就像是与Progressive的结合。

So the leadership of that company and I basically just did that and we did it somewhat slowly with a little acquisition, a little part of the equity at first and then moved into it.

所以我与那家公司的领导层基本上就是这么做的，我们先以小规模收购、持有部分股权的方式，逐步介入。

Seeing how that opened up the marketplace for us, Arguably, I wish I'd done that a little faster, earlier.

看到这为我们打开了市场，我可以说，我希望自己能更快、更早地采取这种做法。

Speaker 1:

To use your words looking in the rear vision mirror, are you able to single out the most impressive innovation that you saw at your time and also one that was perhaps a dud or just didn't work?

用你自己的话来说，从后视镜中看，你能否挑出你所见过的最令人印象深刻的创新，以及一个可能是失败或根本不起作用的例子？

Glenn Renwick:

There actually are quite a few innovations, but I'm going to choose the first one because it seems so commonplace today, but it wasn't commonplace then.

实际上有不少创新，但我将选择第一个，因为它今天看起来再平常不过，但当时却并不常见。

We were motivated by a change in the laws in California, actually a proposition called Proposition 103. I won't go into the details.

我们的动力来自于加州法律的一项变更，实际上是一项名为“103号提案”的举措。我不会详细介绍细节。

And it was very negative to insurance companies, specifically auto insurance companies in California.

这对保险公司来说非常不利，特别是对加州的汽车保险公司。

Coming from an insurance executive perspective. Now a man by the name of Ralph Nader didn't sort of see it that way.

从保险高管的角度来看，而一个名叫Ralph Nader的人并不这样看待。

Ralph and I are now very good friends and he is a huge advocate of what Progressive did to ultimately respond to this but it took that kind of a awkward catalyst like you're trying to put us out of business.

现在我和Ralph是非常好的朋友，他极力支持Progressive最终对此做出的回应，但那确实是一个尴尬的催化剂，就好像你试图让我们破产一样。

We reverse engineered everybody's rates and put them in the public domain as here's the competitive or the top 10 competitive rates for auto insurance in California.

我们对所有人的费率进行了逆向工程，并将其公开，显示出加州汽车保险竞争力最强的前十个费率。

And ultimately, we extended that nationwide.

最终，我们将这一做法推广到全国。

And while people were very interested in the rates, they were more interested in transparency.

虽然人们对这些费率很感兴趣，但他们更关注的是透明度。

It's like, why are you as an industry so secretive about how you get my premium?

就好像，“为什么你们这个行业对我的保费是如何确定的如此保密？”

And we sort of flipped that around and said, you know, look, there are issues. In fact, this whole proposition passed because the notion was insurance companies aren't competitive.

于是我们反过来说，“你看，问题就在这里。事实上，这个提案之所以通过，是因为大家认为保险公司不具备竞争力。”

That was, from the insurance industry's perspective, an incorrect thesis. There were 300 competitors. How could we not be competitive?

从保险行业的角度来看，这是一个错误的论点。市场上有300家竞争者，我们怎么可能不具备竞争力？

It was one of the most competitive marketplaces.

那是竞争最激烈的市场之一。

From the consumerist, Ralph Nader in this case, perspective, he said, well, the consumers don't have access to that.

而从消费者角度出发，就拿Ralph Nader来说，他认为消费者无法获得这些信息。

So even if you're right, It's not competitive. And he and Harvey Rosenfeld were, you know, very dogmatic about that.

所以即使你说得对，也不会显得竞争充分。他和Harvey Rosenfeld对此非常教条。

And ultimately that proposition passed because they were able to build in, well, consumers will get money back.

最终，这个提案通过了，因为他们设法让消费者能够获得退款。

So people tend to vote for things that will get money back.

因此，人们往往会投票支持那些能返还金钱的措施。

And we took away from that proposition, boy, we've got to change because we're part of that industry.

而我们从这个提案中认识到，“天啊，我们必须改变，因为我们属于这个行业。”

We need to position the industry over here and ourselves over here. So, and I happen to be in California at the time, so we we did what?

我们需要将行业定位于这里，而我们自身则定位于那边。而当时我正好在加州，所以我们做了什么？

It seems to come naturally to our thinking. It's like, well, if that's the problem, we'll solve the problem. You say it's not competitive, we'll make sure it is ultra-competitive.

这似乎与我们的思维方式不谋而合。就是说，“如果问题是这样，我们就解决问题。如果你说它不够竞争，我们就确保它极具竞争力。”

So we'll publish all the rates.

所以我们将公布所有费率。

Some of the competitors in California were not very happy with me. I will point that out.

加州的一些竞争者对此并不满意，我会指出这一点。

But we started to transform Progressive much more to a consumer company. And the fact that our competitors were More than not happy with me.

但我们开始将Progressive转变为一家更注重消费者的公司，而竞争对手对此普遍不满。

I won't go into details. I was like, oh, we are separating from the industry.

我就不再细说，我心想，“哦，我们正在与整个行业拉开距离。”

So it actually created this separation and that transparency has gone through everything that we do,

这实际上形成了这种分离，而这种透明度贯穿了我们所做的一切，

including being very transparent with our financials once a month to Wall Street and I care more about shareholders necessarily than the analysts.

包括每月向华尔街公开我们的财务状况，我更关心股东，而不完全在乎分析师。

But we always took the attitude of, look, if we can make it transparent, we'll do so.

但我们的态度一直是，“看，如果我们能做到透明，我们就会做到。”

And if we can't, we'll say we can't.

如果做不到，我们就会说明做不到。

And were there any innovations that you perhaps started and they were a no-go?

有没有什么创新是你们启动过但最后行不通的？

Glenn Renwick:

One that I still haven't given up on, but I'm no longer in a position to do anything about it, We sort of use the Archimedes principle of buoyancy.

有一个我至今仍未放弃的创新，但我已无力再推动，我们采用了类似阿基米德浮力原理的方式。

Now, specifically in some of our Gulf state coasts, and you've seen it on television, whether it be Houston, Louisiana, or Florida, we get really, really big hurricanes.

具体来说，在我们墨西哥湾沿岸的一些地区，你在电视上见过，无论是休斯敦、路易斯安那州还是佛罗里达，我们都会遭遇非常非常大的飓风。

And oftentimes that is an incredibly damaging situation. Cars flooded.

而且这种情况往往会造成巨大破坏，车辆被淹没。

So I wanted this effectively a big waterproof top hole and we'll call it for now that you drive on to and there are specific places for your wheels to go and then it wraps around the car in your garage because a lot of people had two cars and if there was a forced evacuation they only took one and So you would wrap this wrapper up around the doors and then sort of just anchor the car on the door or some other rafter of the garage,

所以我想设计一种大型防水罩，我们暂且称之为“车顶防水罩”，你可以驾车驶上去，罩子上有专门的轮位，然后它会在你车库内环绕车辆，因为很多人有两辆车，如果强制撤离，他们只带走一辆，于是你就可以把这个罩子围绕车门包裹，然后将车固定在车门或车库的其他横梁上，

whatever. And as the water filled up, the car would actually float.

等等。随着水位上升，车子实际上会浮起来。

So it wouldn't need to be totally watertight all the way up. It would just actually float.

所以这并不需要完全密封，只需要使车子能浮起来即可。

And I have plenty of pictures where we have demonstrated that that actually works just fine.

我有很多照片证明这一方法实际上效果很好。

It became very hard to commercialize it for the consumer and get the product, the material, all of which was possible.

但将这一方案商业化推广给消费者非常困难，而且获取产品和材料也存在问题。

And the idea was that, frankly, if we were going to lose, let's say, 5,000 cars to flood damage and we save them, then it certainly would be worthwhile to produce the materials necessary.

说实话，想法是，如果我们能挽救因水灾损失的，比如说5000辆车，那么制造所需材料绝对是值得的。

And not to mention the fact that the brand value of someone having their car when they got back was positive.

更不用说，消费者在事故后还能取回自己车辆的品牌价值也是正面的。

Let's just say that doesn't happen today and so put that down in the category of good idea just didn't quite get there.

可以说，这种情况今天已经不存在了，因此这只能归为一个好点子，但未能真正落地。

And I've got another one that sort of would protect the cars in the event of hail which is really bad for sheet metal and so on and so forth.

我还有另一个创意，旨在在冰雹袭击时保护车辆，因为冰雹对钣金损害极大，等等。

And I hope somewhere in Progressive, I just got a couple of notes from some folks today but not on this, I hope somewhere that that idea hasn't been lost because Loss prevention is so much better than paying higher premiums.

我希望在Progressive内部，我今天收到一些同事的反馈，没有完全放弃这个创意，我希望这个想法还未被遗忘，因为防损比支付更高保费要好得多。

要逆转“忙着求死”的状态是不可能的。

And I don't think loss prevention was the primary motivation for a lot of insurance companies. We just increased the premium to match whatever our costs were.

我认为对于很多保险公司来说，防损并不是主要动机，而只是通过提高保费来覆盖成本。

And at some point, if you can actually reduce those costs in very real and meaningful ways, like taking out rental car coverage or something by getting claims sold faster,

而如果你能以非常实际且有效的方式降低这些成本，比如通过更快处理理赔来取消租车保障等，

Then you have a huge competitive advantage.

那么你就获得了巨大的竞争优势。

Speaker 1:

Interesting, there's a few themes that I've noticed cropping up over a couple of segments and I think communicating the why has popped up in the context of culture, change and trying to enforce an innovation.

有趣的是，我注意到在几个部分中出现了几个共同主题，我认为在文化、变革以及推动创新的过程中，阐释“为什么”这一点显得尤为重要。

So that's really interesting, thank you. Next up in the following fourth segment we'll be playing a game of true or false where I'll be pressing Glenn for his brutally honest opinions on some industry cliches.

这真是非常有趣，谢谢。接下来的第四部分，我们将进行一个真假游戏，我会就一些行业陈词滥调向Glenn提出他直言不讳的看法。

2020-03-30 Glenn M. Renwick.Innovation & Insurance: How to Break the Status Quo

2020-03-30 Glenn M. Renwick.Innovation & Insurance: How to Break the Status Quo

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