The second part is the deteriorating quality of too many businesses within the Berkshire conglomerate, particularly in their MSR (Manufacturing, Service and Retailing) division. Outside of the recent addition of Clayton Homes in this segment, it is easy to conjecture that this group barely earns its cost of capital. We would know for sure if Mr. Buffett would provide a balance sheet for this segment. That said, the other key parts of the conglomerate are better than the average business. Again, BNSF is good, but under-performing Union Pacific. GEICO's is good, but underperforming Progressive. Berkshire Energy is fantastic, particularly on the tax credit side and their continued policy of reinvesting all of their earnings – quite unlike other large utilities. But here's the rub, you don't need Berkshire Hathaway or Mr. Buffett to get the ‘best of Berkshire.’ Who doesn’t own Apple these days? Instead of GEICO you can get Progressive on your own. Instead of Burlington Northern you can get Union Pacific on your own.  Replacing Berkshire Energy would be difficult because they're reinvesting in all their earnings, they don't pay a dividend and they have all of these tax credits. In a tax-exempt account, you can maybe buy a utility ETF and reinvest the dividends as a replacement proxy of Berkshire Energy.  

第二点问题在于伯克希尔集团内部过多业务的质量正在恶化，尤其是其 MSR（制造、服务及零售）部门。除最近将 Clayton Homes 纳入该板块外，不难推测该部门几乎只能勉强赚到资本成本。如果巴菲特先生能为这一板块单独披露资产负债表，我们就能确切得知情况。话虽如此，集团的其他关键板块仍优于平均企业。再说一遍，BNSF 不错，但跑输 Union Pacific；GEICO 不错，但跑输 Progressive；伯克希尔能源非常出色，尤其在税收抵免方面，以及其持续将全部利润再投资——这与其他大型公用事业公司截然不同。但问题在于，要获得“伯克希尔精华”，你并不需要伯克希尔或巴菲特先生。如今谁还没有持有苹果？不买 GEICO，你可以自己买 Progressive；不买 Burlington Northern，你可以自己买 Union Pacific。要替代伯克希尔能源会比较困难，因为他们把全部利润再投资、不分红，且拥有大量税收抵免。在免税账户中，你或许可以购买公用事业 ETF 并将股息再投资，以此作为伯克希尔能源的替代品。  

The third, quite honestly, I think as the years go by now, there's significant management risk, succession risk. Mr. Buffett’s and Mr. Munger’s cognitive abilities and stamina continues to amaze, but unfortunately Father Time won’t be denied.  

第三，说实话，随着岁月流逝，管理风险和继任风险正变得显著。巴菲特先生和芒格先生的认知能力与精力仍令人惊叹，但遗憾的是时光不饶人。  

Maybe one last thought on Mr. Buffett; I've have the greatest respect for Mr. Buffett.  I wouldn’t be in this business since 1986 without him as a guiding light. Mr. Buffett chooses his words carefully, both spoken and written. And I've certainly noticed, it's been remarked by many others too, it wasn't long ago, a few years ago, where he stated at annual meetings, essentially, ‘We think we have a collection of businesses that should do better against the S&P 500.’ Those words are gone. More recently the verbiage was ‘Maybe we'll keep pace with the S&P 500.’  Those words seem to be gone too. Even after the strong run of Berkshire stock versus the market since last June, the stock is still considerably behind the S&P 500 over the past three and five years. There's probably less downside in the stock relative to the S&P 500, maybe. But quite frankly, the people who hire us, want us to beat the S&P 500 and I don't think Berkshire, particularly at current valuations and its collection of businesses, will. The S&P 500, it's tough to beat, even for the best of us. I think it's going to be much tougher for an overdiversified conglomerate that isn't growing that much more than GDP. Mr. Buffett warned shareholders long ago the performance deadening perils of size. Shareholders will never again see examples of Mr. Munger’s ‘lollapalooza’ dynamism at Berkshire such as the brilliant transaction path of ABC/CapCities/Disney/GEICO/Coca-Cola.  

再谈巴菲特先生最后一点看法；我对巴菲特先生怀有至高敬意。若无他作为指路明灯，我自 1986 年起不会从事这份工作。巴菲特先生言谈与书写皆斟词酌句。我确实注意到，也有许多人指出，不久前，他在年度大会上还曾说过：“我们认为，我们所拥有的企业组合应该能跑赢标普 500。” 这句话已不再出现。最近的表述变成：“也许我们能跟上标普 500。” 这句话似乎也消失了。即便自去年六月以来伯克希尔股价表现强劲，但过去三年和五年该股仍明显落后于标普 500。相较标普 500，该股下行风险或许更小，但坦率地说，雇佣我们的人希望我们跑赢标普 500，而我认为伯克希尔，尤其在当前估值和其业务组合下，做不到。标普 500 难以战胜，即便对最优秀的投资者亦然。我认为，对于一家增长幅度仅略高于 GDP、且过度多元化的大型集团而言，要想战胜标普 500 更是难上加难。巴菲特先生早已警告股东，规模过大会削弱业绩。股东们再也不会见到芒格先生所称的伯克希尔那种“ lollapalooza”式活力，例如 ABC/CapCities/Disney/GEICO/Coca‑Cola 的精彩操作路径。  

After an incredible two decades in the stock for our clients, too many of the former competitive advantages of Buffett & Co. at Berkshire later, in our view, became disadvantages. That’s why we sold.  

在为客户持有伯克希尔长达二十年的辉煌之后，我们认为巴菲特团队昔日的众多竞争优势后来都转化成了劣势。这就是我们卖出的原因。