To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.

我和我的长期搭档查理·芒格，我们的工作就是管理大量股东的储蓄，能获得大家长久以来的信任，且这种信任往往能贯穿一生中的大部分时间，我感到非常荣幸。当我在写这封信的时候，脑海中浮现的是那些专注的股东们。

A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.

一般来说，人们的普遍观念是，年轻时进行储蓄，希望以此维持退休后的生活水平。去世后，遗留的所有资产通常会留给家人，也可能是朋友或慈善机构。

Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.

但我们的观点有所不同，我们认为，伯克希尔的股东基本上是“储蓄一次，储蓄一世”的类型。尽管这些人生活优渥，但他们最终会将大部分资产捐献给慈善机构。反过来，慈善机构又会用来改善许多与原始捐助者无关的人的生活，从而重新分配资金。有时，产生的结果是惊人的。

The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.

一个人如何对待金钱，暴露了他是个怎样的人。查理和我很高兴地看到，伯克希尔产生的大量资金流向公众需求，以及我们的股东很少关注伯克希尔资产和帝国建设。

Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?

谁会不喜欢为我们这样的股东工作呢？

What We Do

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

查理和我将股东在伯克希尔的储蓄分配成两种相关的所有权形式。首先，投资于我们的全资控股企业，通常购买公司100%的股权。伯克希尔在这些子公司进行资本配置，并挑选负责日常运营决策的首席执行官。当管理大型企业时，信任和规则都是缺一不可的。伯克希尔对前者的强调达到了不同寻常——以至于有人会说是极端的程度。失望是不可避免的，我们可以理解商业错误，但我们对个人不当行为的容忍度为零。

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.

在我们的第二类所有权中，我们购买公开交易的股票，通过购买这些股票，我们被动地拥有部分业务。持有这些投资时，我们在管理方面没有发言权。

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

我们在这两种所有权形式中的目标都是，对具有长期良好经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有股票是基于我们对企业长期经营业绩的预期，而不是将其视为熟练买卖的工具。这一点很关键：查理和我不是选股高手，我们是选择商业模式的人。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

这些年来，我犯了很多错误。因此，我们广泛的业务集合目前包括少数真正具有非凡经济效益的企业，许多企业具有非常好的经济特征，以及一群庞大的边缘企业。在这一过程中，我投资的其他企业已经消亡，它们的产品被公众抛弃。资本主义具有两面性：一方面制度造就了越来越多的失败者，但同时也带来了大量改进的商品和服务。熊彼特称这种现象为“创造性破坏”（creative destruction）。

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

我们的公开交易部门的一个优势是，偶尔可以很容易地以极好的价格买到非常优秀的企业。重要的是要明白，股票会不时地以愚蠢的价格交易，可能是高也可能是低。“有效市场”只存在于教科书中。事实上，有市场的股票和债券令人困惑，它们的行为通常只有在回顾时才能理解。

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.

被控股企业是另一种类型，有时它们的价格比合理价格高得离谱，但几乎永远不会以低价出售。除非受到胁迫，否则控股企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌性估值出售。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

在这一点上，我的成绩单是合适的：在伯克希尔58年的管理中，我的大部分资本配置决策都不过马马虎虎。此外，在某些情况下，我没走好的棋也靠着很大的运气得以挽救。（还记得我们在美国航空和所罗门公司险些发生的灾难中逃生的故事吗？我当然记得。）

（译者注：美国航空USAir和所罗门公司是巴菲特投资史上两个著名的失败案例）

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

我们令人满意的结果是十几个真正睿智决定的产物——大约每五年一个——以及一个有时被遗忘的优势，它有利于像伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们来窥探一下幕后的情况。

The Secret Sauce

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.

1994年8月——是的，1994年——伯克希尔完成了为期7年的收购，购买了我们现在拥有的4亿股可口可乐股票，总成本为13亿美元——这对伯克希尔来说是一笔非常大的数目。

The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.

1994年我们从可口可乐公司收到的现金股利为7500万美元，到2022年，股利增加到7.04亿美元。这样的增长每年都在发生，就像生日一样确定。我和查理所要做的就是兑现可口可乐的季度股利支票。我们预计这笔金额很可能会增加。

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.

美国运通的情况大致相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的收购基本在1995年完成，巧合的是，也花费了13亿美元。从这项投资中获得的年度股利已从4100万美元增长到3.02亿美元。这笔金额似乎也很有可能增加。

These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.

这些股利收益虽然令人高兴，但远非壮观。但它们推动了股价的重要上涨。今年（2022年）底，我们对可口可乐的投资价值为250亿美元，而美国运通的投资价值为220亿美元。现在这两只股票约占伯克希尔净资产的5%，与很久以前的权重相当。

Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.

假设我在上世纪90年代犯了一个类似规模的投资错误，这笔投资在2022年仍然价值13亿美元(比如30年期高等级债券)。这笔令人失望的投资现在只占伯克希尔净资产的微不足道的0.3%，但仍将为我们带来大约8000万美元的年收入。

The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.

给投资者的教训：野草会在鲜花盛开的时候枯萎，这同样意义重大（The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom.）。随着时间的推移，只需少数胜利就能创造奇迹。而且，是的，早点开始也有帮助，还能帮助你活到90多岁。

The Past Year in Brief

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:

伯克希尔在2022年表现不错。公司调整后的营业利润（operating earnings）——我们使用公认会计原则（“GAAP”），不包括持有股票的资本利得——创下了308亿美元的历史新高。查理和我专注于这个实际数字，并建议你也这样做。不过，如果没有我们的调整，GAAP数据在每个报告日都会剧烈波动。请注意它在2022年的波动，这并不罕见：

Earnings in $ billions

GAAP Earnings We

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

按季度甚至按年度查看GAAP利润具有100%的误导性。可以肯定的是，在过去几十年里，资本利得对伯克希尔来说非常重要，我们预计在未来几十年里，资本利得将显著增加。但是，媒体经常无意识地报道它们每个季度的波动，这完全误导了投资者。

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

伯克希尔去年的第二个积极进展是我们收购了由乔·布兰登(Joe Brandon)担任董事长的财产意外保险公司Alleghany Corporation。我过去曾与乔共事，他对伯克希尔和保险都很了解。Alleghany为我们带来了特殊的价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够采用几乎所有竞争对手都无法遵循的、有价值且持久的投资策略。

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

在Alleghany的帮助下，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。通过严格的承销，随着时间的推移，这些款项有相当大的机会实现零成本。自1967年收购第一家财产意外险公司以来，通过收购、运营和创新，伯克希尔的浮存金增长了8000倍。虽然在我们的财务报表中没有得到确认，但这笔浮存金对伯克希尔来说是一笔非凡的资产。新股东可以通过阅读A-2文件，看到我们每年更新的浮存金解释来了解其价值。

（译者注：保险浮存金指保户向保险公司交纳的保费。保户交纳的保费并非保险公司的资产，在财务报表中应列入“应付账款”中，属于公司的债务，当保户出险时，须支付给保户进行理赔。在巴菲特的投资中，伯克希尔的浮存金是其投资相当重要的“融资”来源。）

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.

2022年，由于伯克希尔哈撒韦与我们重仓的苹果、美国运通公司都进行了股票回购，伯克希尔的每股内在价值略微增长。在伯克希尔哈撒韦，通过对公司已发行股份的 1.2%进行回购，我们直接提高了您在我们独特的持仓组合中的权益。苹果和美国运通的回购也增加了伯克希尔的持股比例，而我们没有增加任何成本。

The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

这里的计算并不复杂：当股本数量减少时，您持有的众多企业中的股权占比就会增加。如果回购价格低于公司内在价值，那么每一分钱回购对股东都有益处。当然，若公司以过高价格回购股票，继续持有的股东会遭受损失。在这种时候，收益只会流向抛售股票的投资者，以及那些热情推荐愚蠢购买行为但却收费高昂的投资银行家。

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

值得强调的是，如果回购价格低于公司内在价值，那么公司所有股东将全方面受益。如果您愿意，可以思考下面的例子：一家当地汽车经销商有三个完全知情的股东，其中一个负责企业管理。进一步想象一下，其中一位消极的股东，希望将他的权益卖回给公司，而且价格对另外两位继续持有的股东有吸引力。交易完成后，是否对任何人的利益造成了伤害？经理是否比持续消极的股东更受青睐？公众是否受到了伤害？

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).

当有人告诉你，所有的回购行为都对股东或国家有害，或者对CEO特别有利时，那么你要么是在听一个经济文盲说话，要么是在听一个能言善辩的煽动家说话(这两个角色并不相互排斥)。

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.

伯克希尔2022年的所有运营细节几乎被概述在 K-33 到 K-66 页上。芒格和我，以及许多伯克希尔哈撒韦股东，都喜欢仔细研究这部分列出的诸多事实和数据。不过，这几页也不是必读的。伯克希尔有很多百万富翁，没错，还有一些亿万富豪，他们从来没有研究过我们的财务数据。

他们只是知道，芒格和我——以及我们的家人和亲密的朋友——继续在伯克希尔有大量投资，他们相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。

And that is a promise we can make.

这也是我们可以做出的承诺。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

最后，一个重要的警告：财务报表中的“运营利润”是我们非常关注的，但这些数字很容易经理人操纵，只要他们想要这样做。通常，首席执行官、董事和他们的顾问们也认为，这种篡改行为是久经世故的。记者和分析师也把这一行为当做家常便饭。毕竟，打破“预期”也是管理上的一次胜利。

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

（不过，）这种行为真的很恶心。操纵数字不需要天赋，只需要强烈的欺骗欲望。一位首席执行官曾对我说，“大胆而富有想象力的会计”（Bold imaginative accounting）已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

58 Years – and a Few Figures

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.

1965年，伯克希尔还只是一匹“只懂一种戏法的小马”（即业务组成简单），拥有一家历史悠久、但注定要倒闭的新英格兰纺织企业。随着这项业务走向死亡，伯克希尔需要立即有一个新的开始。回过头来看，我当时迟迟没有意识到问题的严重性。

And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.

但随后，我们就迎来了一次好运：1967 年，国民保险（National Indemity）成立，我们将资源转向保险和其他非纺织业务。

Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.

就这样，我们开启了通往2023年的旅程，这是一条崎岖坎坷的道路，包括我们所有者不断的储蓄（即通过他们的留存收益）、复利的力量、避免重大错误，以及最重要——搭上“美国顺风”（American Tailwind）。没有伯克希尔哈撒韦，美国也会过得不错。反之则不然。

Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.

现在，伯克希尔拥有“无与伦比的庞大和多元化业务”的主要所有权。让我们先看看每天在纳斯达克、纽约证券交易所和相关交易场所交易的大约5000家上市公司。在这一群体中，有标准普尔500指数的成员。“标准普尔500指数”是一个由大型知名美国公司组成的精英集合。

In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.

总体而言，这500家上市公司在2021年赚了1.8万亿美元。目前我还没有2022年的最终数据。因此，使用2021年的数据，这500家公司中只有128家（包括伯克希尔）赚了30亿美元或更多。事实上，还有23家公司亏损。

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.

截至2022年底，伯克希尔是其中八家巨头的最大股东：美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普股份、穆迪、西方石油和派拉蒙全球。

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and

$4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.

除去8家标的外，伯克希尔还持有伯灵顿北圣太菲铁路运输公司（简称伯灵顿北，BNSF）100%的股份和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）92%的股份，每个公司的收益都超过了上述30亿美元的标准（伯灵顿北为59亿美元，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源为43亿美元）。如果这两家公司公开上市，它们将被收录进那500强公司中。总体而言，我们的控股和非控股的10家巨头，使伯克希尔公司比任何其他美国公司都更广泛地与本国的经济未来保持一致。（这一计算不考虑养老基金和投资公司等“信托”业务。）此外，伯克希尔的保险业务虽然通过许多单独管理的子公司进行，但其价值与伯灵顿北或伯克希尔哈撒韦能源相当。

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.

至于未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及其他各种更加广泛业务。我们还将避免任何会在关键时刻导致现金流紧缺的鲁莽行为，哪怕是在金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失的时刻。我们的首席执行官将永远是首席风险官——尽管他（她）本不必承担这项责任。此外，我们未来的CEO将有相当一部分的净资产收益是用自己的钱购买伯克希尔股票而获得的。是的，我们的股东将通过持续的获得收益来保证储蓄和繁荣。

At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.

伯克希尔，不会有终点线。

Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes

在截至2021年的十年间，美国财政部的税收为32.3万亿美元，而支出却达到43.9万亿美元，出现了严重的财政赤字。

Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.

众多经济学家、政治家及名人均对财政失衡的现状发表了自己的看法 ，但查理和我却自认对此知之甚少，但我们坚信如此庞大的财政赤字的糟糕的程度或许远超市场所想。

我们负责管理伯克希尔哈撒韦的运营和财务，希望公司能长期维持比较高的收益，并在金融风险加剧及全球经济出现衰退时依旧保持活力。

为了能避免持续高企的通胀问题，伯克希尔哈撒韦对冲了部分风险，来给投资者们提供一定保护，但这层保护远非完美，美国财政如此庞大且根深蒂固的赤字会带来严重后果。

The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (3412%), corporate income tax payments (812%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.

根据数据来看，美国财政部的税收包括个人所得税（48%）、社会保障和相关收入 (34.5%）、企业所得税支付(8.5%） 和各种较小的征收项目获得了32万亿美元的收人。伯克希尔公司在这十年间通过贡献了320亿美元的所得税，几乎为财政部所有收入的千分之一。

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.

这也意味着，美国仅需1000个伯克希尔实力相当的纳税企业，那么其他企业和全国1.31亿个家庭都不需要向联邦政府支付任何税收。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:

几百万、几十化、几万亿——我们都知道这些词，但往往无法理解所涉及的庞大金额，让我们给这些数字加上直观的尺寸。

• If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
  

• 

  如果你把100万美元兑换成新印制的100美元钞票，你会有一叠达到你胸口高度的钞票。

• Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 34 of a mile into the sky.
  

• 

  如果是10亿美元——这时美元现金可以堆叠至3/4英里（约1207米）的天空。

• Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.

  

  最后想象320亿美元，这也是伯克希尔在2012至2021年所缴纳的所有联邦所得税，现在，这堆钱达到了超21英里以上（约3.3万米）的高度，大约是商业飞机通常巡航高度的三倍。

  When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”

  

  因此，每次涉及到联邦税时，伯克希尔可以毫不含糊地表示"我们给了”。

  * * * * * * * * * * * *

  At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.

  

  对于伯克希尔而言，我们希望且期待着在未来十年可以为美国缴纳更多税款，做出更大的贡献。美国的经济活力赋能了伯克希尔取得的所有成功。

• Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner
  

  
  

  Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.

  

  查理·芒格和我的想法很相似，但我往往需要一页纸来解释的内容，他却可以用一句话总结，且逻辑清晰，直抒胸臆。

  Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:

  

  以下是他的一些想法，很多都是从最近的播客中截取的：

• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
  

• 

  世界上有很多愚益的赌徒，他们远不如有耐心的投资者。

• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
  

• 

  当你还未看清世界的本来面目，便只能通过扭曲的镜头来判断。

• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
  

• 

  我想知道的是我将在哪里死去，那我永远不会去那里。还有一个相关的想法：尽早写下你想要的讣告——然后据此行事

• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
  

• 

  如果你不关心自己是否理性，你就不会在这方面下功夫。那么你就会一直不理性，得到最差的结果。

• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
  

• 

  耐心是可以学习的，拥有长时间的注意力且可以长时间集中于一件事的能力是巨大的优势。

• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
  

• 

  你可以从死去的人身上学到很多东西，阅读你所崇拜和厌恶的死者的文章。

• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
  

• 

  如果你能游到一艘适航的船，就不要在下沉的船上跳走。

• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
  

• 

  一个伟大的公司会在你不在之后继续工作；一个平庸的公司则不会。

• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
  

• 

  沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫，我们一直寻找长期投资机会，并坚持长期持有。

• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
  

• 

  本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）曾说："从短期看，市场是一台投票机，但从长远来看，它是一台称重机。"如果你不断地制造更有价值的东西，那么一些聪明的人就会注意到它并开始购买，仔细权衡长期价值会比试图猜测短期热点更能创造出卓越的业绩。

• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
  

• 

  投资是没有100%的把握，因此，使用杠杆是危险的。一串美妙的数字乘以零，永远等于零。不要指望一夜暴富。

• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
  

• 

  然而，你不需要拥有很多东西就能致富。

• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes,

  you must change.
  

• 如果你想成为一个伟大的投资者，你必须不断学习。当世界发生变化时，你必须改变。

• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
  

• 

  十年来，沃伦和我一直痛恨铁路股，但世界发生了变化，美国终于拥有了四条对美国经济至关重要的大型铁路。我们迟迟没有意识到这一变化，但迟到总比不到好。

• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”

最后，我要补充查理的两句话，这句话是他几十年来做决定的关键：“沃伦，多考虑一下吧。你很聪明，但我是对的。”

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.

我和查理通话时，总能学到很多，且他让我思考时，他也让我笑。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.

我会在查理的名单上添加一条我自己的规则：找一个非常聪明的高级合作伙伴——最好比你年长一点，并认真地听取他的意见。

A Family Gathering in Omaha

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.

查理和我都很无耻。去年，在我们三年来的第一次股东会上，我们一如既往地以繁忙的商业活动迎接大家。

From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?

开市铃一响，我们就直奔你们的钱包。很快，我们的喜诗糖果铺卖掉了11吨富含营养的花生糖和巧克力。在我们P.T.巴纳姆（注：一位著名的大骗子）式的演讲里，我们保证过吃它会长寿。毕竟，除了喜诗糖果，还有什么可以解释查理和我能活到99岁和92岁呢?

I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.

我知道你们迫不及待地想听去年聚会的细节。

On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 612 of the 912 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.

我们从周五中午一直营业到下午5点，喜诗糖果铺记录了2690笔交易。周六午7点到下午4点半，喜诗糖果铺又记录了3931笔交易，这9个半小时里有6个半小时是我们的电影放映和问答时间。

Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.

算一算：喜诗糖果铺在黄金时段每分钟能卖掉10批糖果（两天内累计销售额达40万美元），101年以来，消费的模式没有发生本质变化。在福特T型车时代卖喜诗糖的方法，今天一样管用。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.

查理、我和整个伯克希尔公司期待着在5月5日至6日在奥马哈和你们见面。我们会玩得很开心，你也会。

February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board