2022-04-27 Ted Weschler.Spoke about his investing career.

2022-04-27 Ted Weschler.Spoke about his investing career.

On April 27, 2022, Berkshire Hathaway investment manager Ted Weschler joined NFM’s i am home podcast and spoke for nearly an hour about his investing career.
2022 年 4 月 27 日,伯克希尔·哈撒韦投资经理泰德·韦施勒参加了 NFM 的我在家播客,并且谈了将近一个小时关于他的投资生涯。

Over the past few weeks, I transcribed (and lightly annotated) his remarks for posterity and future study.
在过去几周,我为后人和未来的研究转录(并稍作注释)了他的讲话。

A few notes: 几点说明:

My main focus is accuracy and readability.
我的主要关注点是准确性和可读性。
Each of these transcripts is done by hand — without any AI or transcription software assistance — so any mistakes are my own.
这些抄本都是手工完成的——没有任何人工智能或转录软件的帮助——因此任何错误都是我自己的。
I summarized some of the questions to save space. All of Ted’s answers are transcribed verbatim.
我总结了一些问题以节省空间。泰德的所有回答都逐字转录。
I added footnotes with additional information at relevant points. Hopefully, these will prove useful to readers.
我在相关部分添加了带有额外信息的脚注。希望这些对读者有所帮助。
The full transcript is available to all paid supporters. Free subscribers have access to the first 2,000-ish words. (That’s longer than the typical Kingswell article.)
完整的文字记录对所有付费支持者开放。免费订阅者可以访问前约 2000 个单词。(这比典型的 Kingswell 文章要长。)
I’ve tried to do my best to ensure that no one feels short-changed.
我尽力确保没有人感到被亏待。
So, without further ado, here is the complete transcript of Ted Weschler’s appearance on NFM’s i am home podcast…
那么,事不宜迟,这里是泰德·韦施勒在 NFM 的我在家播客上的完整文字记录……

Subscribed

NFM: Ted Weschler is one of Berkshire Hathaway’s top two investment managers. You got started at W.R. Grace & Co. as a junior financial analyst and then helped start the private equity firm, Quad-C Management, where you were a partner for ten years. Then, in 1999, he went out on his own — founding Peninsula Capital Advisors, which was a hedge fund that you launched in 2000 above a bookstore in a Charlottesville mall. And, before that shuttered in 2011 when you joined Berkshire Hathaway, your $2 billion fund returned 1,236% for investors. Ted and his wife Sheila live in Charlottesville with your two daughters.
NFM:泰德·韦施勒是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的两位顶级投资经理之一。你在 W.R. Grace & Co.开始担任初级财务分析师,然后帮助创办了私募股权公司 Quad-C Management,在那里你担任了十年的合伙人。然后,在 1999 年,他独立创业——创立了半岛资本顾问公司,这是一个对冲基金,你在 2000 年在夏洛茨维尔的一家书店上方启动了该基金。在 2011 年关闭之前,当你加入伯克希尔·哈撒韦时,你的 20 亿美元基金为投资者带来了 1236%的回报。泰德和他的妻子希拉与他们的两个女儿住在夏洛茨维尔。

How old are your daughters?
你的女儿多大了?

Ted Weschler: One will turn 21 in just a few weeks and the other is 23.
泰德·韦施勒:一个将在几周内满 21 岁,另一个则 23 岁。

NFM: Okay, close to mine — so I know that life. Except I have boys.
NFM:好吧,接近我的生活——所以我知道那种生活。只是我有男孩。

TW: They should meet. (Laughs)
TW: 他们应该见面。(笑)

NFM: This particular time of year, going into the Berkshire Hathaway meeting — with it actually being live and not virtual[1] — it’s just a super exciting time and high energy for us and for the tens of thousands of people that come through.
NFM:每年这个时候,进入伯克希尔·哈撒韦会议——实际上是现场而不是虚拟的[1]——对我们以及成千上万前来的人来说,这真是一个超级激动人心和充满活力的时刻。

What’s it like for you, being on the inside of Berkshire Hathaway? Is it exciting?
你在伯克希尔哈撒韦内部的感觉如何?这令人兴奋吗?

TW: It’s terrific because it’s something that we all draw energy from. And, the closer we get, the more energy we get. The last two years, they were fine. We did the remote thing. But there’s something about bringing tens of thousands of people together.
TW: 这太棒了,因为这是我们所有人都能汲取能量的东西。而且,我们越接近,就获得的能量越多。过去两年还不错。我们进行了远程活动。但将成千上万的人聚集在一起有一种特别的感觉。

I describe it as a big wedding because you’ve got this common link of — one way or another — you’re connected to Berkshire Hathaway. So anybody that you meet during that weekend that’s wearing the credentials, whether it’s up here at the [Nebraska Furniture] Mart or anywhere in town, you’ve got something to talk about.
我把它描述为一场盛大的婚礼,因为你们有一个共同的联系——无论如何,你们都与伯克希尔·哈撒韦有关系。因此,在那个周末你遇到的任何带着证件的人,无论是在[内布拉斯加家具]市场还是城里的任何地方,你们都有话可聊。

It’s just like at a wedding where you know that you’re somehow connected to the bride or groom. [Here], you’re somehow connected to Berkshire — so it’s always fun to meet those people.
就像在婚礼上,你知道自己与新娘或新郎有某种联系。在这里,你与伯克希尔有某种联系——所以见到那些人总是很有趣。

Then, just the energy that builds at the office. I’m always amazed at the amount of paper and phone calls and emails and all the rest that [go into it]. We’ve got a very small staff, but it just flies out of there in a really, really efficient way.
然后,就是在办公室积累的能量。我总是对纸张、电话、电子邮件以及其他所有事务的数量感到惊讶。我们的员工非常少,但一切都以非常高效的方式运转。

And it’s fun. Warren gets progressively [more] excited as well because he both adds energy to it and he draws energy from it. That’s something that’s just contagious for everybody.
而且这很有趣。沃伦逐渐变得更加兴奋,因为他既为此注入能量,又从中汲取能量。这对每个人来说都是一种传染。

NFM: We feel the same way. For us, we have to bring a level of energy — but you definitely come out of it feeling energized and excited.
NFM:我们也有同样的感觉。对我们来说,我们必须带来一种能量水平——但你绝对会感到充满活力和兴奋。

TW: Yeah. 是的。

NFM: I got my credentials this weekend and I’m so excited.
NFM:我这个周末拿到了我的证件,我非常兴奋。

TW: It’s real! Yeah. I was going to wear mine here, too. (Laughs)
TW:这是真的!是的。我本来也打算在这里带我的。(笑)

NFM: I’m going to start with one of my favorite stories — how you had your first lunch meeting with Warren Buffett. You were already running a super-successful firm, so when you went into that meeting… It ended up being life-changing. It was life-changing for your career —
NFM:我将从我最喜欢的故事之一开始——你与沃伦·巴菲特的第一次午餐会议。你已经在经营一家非常成功的公司,所以当你进入那个会议时……结果改变了你的人生。这对你的职业生涯来说是一次改变人生的经历——

TW: I didn’t plan on that, but yeah. (Laughs)
TW: 我没有计划这样,但确实是。 (笑)

NFM: Well, that was my question. Was [working at Berkshire Hathaway] your goal? Did you enter [the meal] thinking I’m going to make this happen? Or did it end up going a whole different direction than you thought?
NFM:嗯,那是我的问题。你在伯克希尔哈撒韦工作是你的目标吗?你在参加这顿饭时是想着“我要让这件事发生”吗?还是说事情的发展完全不同于你的想法?

TW: It’s kind of an involved thing because, first, I went to college in Philadelphia[2]. In 1979, when I started, there was a good friend of mine who — we were both in the business school there — and he said, “If you’re really interested in business, there’s this guy Warren Buffett who you just should read anything that he writes.”
TW:这是一件比较复杂的事情,因为首先,我在费城上大学[2]。在 1979 年,当我开始的时候,有一个好朋友——我们都在那里的商学院——他说:“如果你真的对商业感兴趣,有一个人叫沃伦·巴菲特,你应该阅读他写的任何东西。
非常早的时间。

I had never heard of Warren Buffett in 1979, but I respected this guy and I started reading this stuff. I was like, Wow, there’s tremendous clarity to what he says and it makes sense. Between taking other corporate finance classes and accounting and all that, you had this kind of practical applied experience [in Buffett’s letters]. Here’s a guy who really was a hero of mine from an investing standpoint.
1979年时,我还从未听说过沃伦·巴菲特的名字,但我尊敬这位先生,于是开始阅读他写的东西。我当时心想,哇,他所说的内容非常清晰,而且很有道理。在学习公司财务课程、会计等知识的同时,你也可以在巴菲特的信中获得这种实用的应用经验。从投资的角度来看,他确实是我心目中的英雄。
非常自然的感受,也是极少数人的感受。

NFM: Back when you were in college?
NFM:你上大学的时候吗?

TW: Yeah, from 1979 [as] I’m reading all this stuff.
TW: 是的,从 1979 年开始,我在阅读这些东西。

I experienced some decent success in investing and my fund had a good track record. I knew that Warren did this auction and it benefits GLIDE Foundation in San Francisco — a wonderful charity. I happened to be the chair of a trust that met twice a year — once in San Francisco and once in Shanghai — every year. It gave me a good reason to travel the world and I got to know some folks.
我在投资方面取得了一些不错的成绩,我的基金也有着良好的业绩记录。我知道沃伦举办了一场拍卖活动,收益捐给旧金山的GLIDE基金会——这是一个很棒的慈善机构。碰巧我当时是一个信托的主席,这个信托每年开两次会——一次在旧金山,一次在上海。这给了我一个环游世界的好理由,并且让我结识了一些人。

But I wanted to understand more about GLIDE before I bid anything that was a big ticket that I was going to write if I was going to do something like this. So I was out at a trust meeting and my assistant had reminded me that I wanted to visit the people at GLIDE and understand the thing. She set the thing up, I finished my trust work, and I spent half the day with the folks at GLIDE — and it just happened to be the last day of the auction that year. It was going on while I was there.
但在出价之前,我想更多地了解GLIDE,特别是如果我要做这样的事情,投入一笔可观的金额。所以,我在一次信托会议期间,我的助理提醒我,我想去拜访GLIDE的工作人员,了解他们的情况。她安排好了,我完成了信托的工作,然后在GLIDE那里与他们的人一起度过了半天。碰巧那一年拍卖的最后一天正是我在那里访问的那天,拍卖正在进行。

They invited me down to the closing thing — they didn’t know I was registered to bid on it — and I actually ended up winning the thing. It was like, Wow, this is something!
他们邀请我去参加闭幕活动——他们不知道我已经注册竞标——结果我真的赢得了这个东西。感觉就像,哇,这真是太棒了!

And, after I had spent half the day with the folks at GLIDE, it’s just a great, great operation there, so that was terrific.
而且,在我和 GLIDE 的工作人员共度了半天后,那里的运作真是非常棒,所以这真是太好了。

NFM: What is the organization?
NFM:这个组织是什么?

TW: GLIDE. They give hope to the otherwise hopeless. It’s a wonderful organization, hundreds of volunteers that run both a soup kitchen and a healthcare clinic in the toughest part of San Francisco. It’s known to everybody in the city, very efficiently run, and it touches a lot of lives. Warren’s wife Susie had been very active in the thing, so that was where the interest came from.
TW: GLIDE。他们给那些原本绝望的人带来了希望。这是一个了不起的组织,有数百名志愿者在旧金山最困难的地区经营一个施粥所和一个医疗诊所。这个组织在整个城市都很有名,运作得非常高效,触及了许多人的生活。沃伦的妻子Susie在这个项目中非常活跃,所以这也是他们对这个组织感兴趣的原因。

But I ended up winning this thing[3] — and I wasn’t sure what was going to happen.
但我最终赢得了这个东西[3] — 我不确定接下来会发生什么。

I’m back at my office and I get this phone call on a Tuesday morning. I pick up my phone and it’s Warren on the other end. It’s like, Oh, jeez, this is really something! This is my hero! He was terrific.
我回到办公室,星期二早上接到了这个电话。我接起电话,另一头是沃伦。感觉就像,哦,天哪,这真是太棒了!这是我的英雄!他真是太棒了。

I had said, the one thing that I wanted was I wanted it to be anonymous. I didn’t want my name attached to it. I also wanted to do it in Omaha instead of New York. It was set up to be a New York lunch[4] at Smith & Wollensky, a great steakhouse in New York.
我曾说过,我想要的唯一一件事就是希望它是匿名的。我不想让我的名字与之相关。我还想在奥马哈而不是纽约进行。原本计划是在纽约的午餐[4],在纽约一家很棒的牛排馆 Smith & Wollensky。

NFM: But very public. NFM:但非常公开。

TW: Yeah. He said, “That’s fine,” and then he said, “When would you like to do it?”
TW: 他回答说:“没问题。”然后他说:“你想什么时候做?”

I said, “Your schedule will dictate, Mr. Buffett.”
我说:“您的日程将决定,一切都在于您,巴菲特先生。”

He really was unbelievable because then he said, “Well, I can do tomorrow night, I can do Wednesday, I can do Thursday…” He rattled off four days in a row.
他真是不可思议,因为接着他说:“好吧,我可以做明天晚上,我可以做星期三,我可以做星期四……”他连续说了四天。

I think I picked the day two days later.
我想我选择了两天后的那一天。

NFM: That’s fast. NFM:那真快。

TW: I flew out to Omaha and met him in his office and it clicked. It really clicked.
TW: 我飞往奥马哈,在他的办公室见了他,一切都很合拍。真的很合拍。

It’s kind of interesting because there are bookends to my career. My first job at W.R. Grace, I was an analyst and then I happened to have a job as the aide to the CEO there, who was a guy by the name of Peter Grace. Peter and I had a great relationship, but I viewed him more as a monarch than a CEO. He had all the trappings of being the high-and-mighty CEO of a Fortune 50 company. You had to go through six doors to get to his office. Everything was maximum intimidation and all the rest of that.
这有点有趣,因为我的职业生涯有两个极端。我在 W.R. Grace 的第一份工作是分析师,然后我恰好担任了那里的首席执行官助理,首席执行官名叫彼得·格雷斯。彼得和我关系很好,但我更把他视为一个君主,而不是首席执行官。他拥有作为一家财富 50 强公司的高高在上的首席执行官的所有特权。你必须经过六扇门才能到达他的办公室。一切都充满了最大程度的威慑和其他一切。

And then Warren’s just like, I show up at headquarters and he bounces out in the hallway and says, “Great to meet you, Ted! Come on in. Grab a seat on the couch.” And [he] immediately put me at ease. It was just great — we visited at the office for maybe 45 minutes or an hour.
然后沃伦就像是,我到总部时,他在走廊里跳出来说:“很高兴见到你,泰德!进来吧。坐在沙发上。”他立刻让我感到放松。真是太好了——我们在办公室聊了大约 45 分钟到一个小时。

There were a number of connections. He had actually met Peter Grace a couple of times, so we had some Peter Grace stories that we connected over. And, then, we ended up having like a three-hour dinner at Piccolo’s[5] — and it really, really clicked[6].
有很多联系。他实际上见过彼得·格雷斯几次,所以我们有一些关于彼得·格雷斯的故事可以交流。然后,我们在皮科洛餐厅吃了大约三个小时的晚餐[5] — 真的非常合拍[6]。

Then, I actually bid on it the following year — and won it again for $1 more[7]. This time, I had a little bit more time to think about questions.
然后,我实际上在第二年出价——并且又以多出 1 美元的价格赢得了它[7]。这次,我有更多的时间来思考问题。

NFM: The first time, you only had a few days and you didn’t expect to win. How do you plan questions for Warren Buffett?
NFM:第一次,你只有几天时间,而且你并没有期待能赢。你是如何为沃伦·巴菲特准备问题的?

TW: Yeah, my mind was kind of racing. But, again, he’s got this wonderful way of putting you at ease. It was just conversational.
TW:是的,我的脑子有点乱。不过,他有一种奇妙的方式让你感到放松。这只是一次对话。

I had a lot of questions about investing, lessons learned, philanthropic dispositions, that kind of thing. [There were] a lot of natural topics that came out. I wish I would have had more time to buff and polish, but that’s okay.
我对投资、经验教训、慈善倾向等方面有很多问题。[有]很多自然的话题浮现出来。我希望我能有更多时间来打磨和润色,但这没关系。

NFM: It still worked out. (Laughs)
NFM:这还是有效的。(笑)

TW: Yeah. But, another year later, I’ve got it again — and, that one, I did have a few weeks to think about. I put together a legal pad of dozens and dozens of things that I wanted to hit on. We did the same deal, we went to Piccolo’s, and it was terrific[8]. But I had probably three pages of questions.
TW:是的。但是,一年后,我又得到了它——而且,那次我确实有几周的时间来思考。我整理了一张法律便签,上面列出了我想要讨论的几十件事情。我们做了同样的事情,去了 Piccolo's,真是太棒了[8]。但我大概有三页的问题。

Toward the end of the dinner, I said, “I think I’ve hit everything just naturally off of my checklist, but I just want to look at my notes. Do you mind? And you can ask me anything, if you want, Warren.”
晚餐快结束时,我说:“我想我已经自然地完成了清单上的所有事项,但我想看看我的笔记。你介意吗?如果你想的话,沃伦,你可以问我任何问题。”

And, as I’m looking down at my notes, checking stuff off, he says, “I think you’d be a pretty good fit out here. Do you have any interest in working at Berkshire?”[9]
而当我低头查看我的笔记,勾选内容时,他说:“我觉得你在这里会很合适。你有兴趣在伯克希尔工作吗?”[9]

I just absolutely panicked. This was absolutely not what I was thinking.
我简直完全慌了。这绝对不是我所想的。

NFM: So it didn’t come up the first year?
NFM:所以第一年没有出现吗?

TW: No, not at all. Not at all. My immediate reaction was [that] there’s no way this works. I’ve got this good gig back in Charlottesville, Virginia. I’m running a $2 billion fund — it’s just me and two other people[10] — but you can’t just dismiss it. This is your hero. I was like, “Wow, that’s not what I expected, but thank you. I’ve got to think about that.”
TW:不,完全不是。完全不是。我的直接反应是[这]根本不可能。我在弗吉尼亚州的夏洛茨维尔有一份不错的工作。我在管理一个 20 亿美元的基金——只有我和另外两个人[10]——但你不能就这样否定它。这是你的英雄。我当时想,“哇,这不是我预期的,但谢谢你。我得考虑一下。”

So he drives me to the airport right after dinner and he drops me off. We both get out and he says, “You know, that thing I mentioned at dinner…”
所以他在晚餐后立刻开车送我去机场,然后把我放下。我们都下了车,他说:“你知道,我在晚餐时提到的那件事……”

NFM: In case you had forgotten. (Laughs)
NFM:如果你忘记了的话。(笑)

TW: Yeah. (Laughs) He said, “You don’t have to decide now. If you feel it in two, three, five years, just let me know.” I’m like, Wow!
TW: 是的。(笑)他说:“你不必现在决定。如果你在两年、三年、五年后有感觉,告诉我就行。”我想,哇!

At the time, he had just turned 80, and I’m like, That’s really something to have [an offer] like that. I really was still like there’s no way [to make it work]. This just does not make sense.
那时,他刚满 80 岁,我心想,这真是个了不起的[提议]。我真的还是觉得根本不可能[实现]。这实在是没有道理。

I got back to Charlottesville and I gave a lot of thought to it. I sent him a note that basically said it just doesn’t work because my kids, at the time, were in grade school and my family had roots in Charlottesville. And I was running a large bankruptcy, actually for W.R. Grace[11]. It was one of my investments in Peninsula and it was a bankruptcy that I had worked on for ten years, so I said that I really need to see this through. There’s probably another three years [in it].
我回到夏洛茨维尔后,仔细考虑了很多。我给他发了一条信息,基本上说这行不通,因为当时我的孩子还在上小学,我的家族在夏洛茨维尔扎根。而且我正在处理一个大型破产案,实际上是为 W.R. Grace[11]。这是我在半岛的一个投资,这是我花了十年时间处理的破产案,所以我说我真的需要把这件事做完。可能还需要三年时间。

So I sent him a carefully-worded letter, sent it off, and — within an hour — I’ve got this response from him. It’s an email letter on his letterhead that says, “Thanks for the note,” and something to the effect of: “You can manage money from the moon as far as I’m concerned, so you can stay in Charlottesville. I like the fact that you want to finish up this bankruptcy. You can do that on our watch. That’s not a problem.”
所以我给他发了一封措辞谨慎的信,寄出后——不到一个小时——我就收到了他的回复。这是一封他信头上的电子邮件,内容是:“谢谢你的来信”,还有类似的意思:“在我看来,你可以在月球上管理资金,所以你可以留在夏洛茨维尔。我喜欢你想要完成这次破产的事实。你可以在我们的监督下做到这一点。这不是问题。”

It’s like, Oh. (Laughs) I started thinking more and more and, a day later, he sent me a proposal that kind of laid out how the mechanics would work and all the rest.
这就像,哦。(笑)我开始越来越多地思考,一天后,他给我发了一份提案,详细说明了机制是如何运作的,以及其他所有内容。

Then, I thought, you know, I’ve been doing this fund at Peninsula for twelve years[12] and, once in a while, you just want to scrape the plate clean and do something new. So I decided, yeah, that will work.
然后,我想,你知道,我在半岛做这个基金已经十二年了[12],偶尔你就是想把盘子刮干净,做点新东西。所以我决定,是的,这样做可以。

The only thing I asked was that I wanted to commit that I would come out to Omaha two days a week and be part of the team in Omaha. So I’d commute from Charlottesville, but Charlottesville would still be my home. It’s worked out beautifully. I’ve been doing that for a little over ten years now.
我唯一要求的是我想承诺每周去奥马哈两天,成为奥马哈团队的一部分。所以我会从夏洛茨维尔通勤,但夏洛茨维尔仍然是我的家。这一切进行得非常顺利。我已经这样做了十多年了。

NFM: So you still come out two days a week?
NFM:所以你每周还是出来两天吗?

TW: Yeah. Two or three sometimes.
TW: 是的。有时候两到三个。

NFM: Do you have a place here?
NFM:你在这里有地方吗?

TW: Yeah, I’ve got a condo in Midtown Crossing — fully outfitted by NFM. Absolutely! (Laughs) Every piece. It’s beautiful. It’s perfect.
TW: 是的,我在中城交汇处有一套公寓——完全由 NFM 装饰。绝对是的!(笑)每一件都很美。完美无瑕。

NFM: Did you agonize over what to wear going into this meal with Warren Buffett?
NFM:你在与沃伦·巴菲特共进晚餐之前是否为穿什么而苦恼过?

TW: I did. Yeah. It’s funny — I absolutely did.
TW: 我做了。是的。真有趣——我确实做了。

I remember it well. I decided that I should go in with a suit coat and open shirt — and, of course, he’s wearing a tie. I was like, Ugh… (Laughs)
我记得很清楚。我决定我应该穿着西装外套和敞开的衬衫——当然,他是系着领带的。我当时想,唉……(笑)

I fumbled it right out of the block. But it’s okay. (Laughs)
我一开始就搞砸了。但没关系。(笑)

NFM: Obviously, it worked out.
NFM:显然,这成功了。

TW: Yeah. 是的。

NFM: Was it dessert at Dairy Queen afterwards?
NFM:之后在冰雪皇后吃了甜点吗?

TW: We had the root beer floats[13] [at Piccolo’s], which was terrific.
TW: 我们喝了根啤酒漂浮饮料[13] [在 Piccolo’s],非常棒。

NFM: Both times? NFM:两次都吗?

TW: Yeah. Absolutely. Both times.
TW: 是的。绝对是。两次。

NFM: How fast was that in between the second meeting [and you accepting Buffett’s offer]? It sounds like it moved pretty quickly.
NFM:在第二次会议和你接受巴菲特的报价之间,这个过程有多快?听起来进展得相当迅速。

TW: It was no more than three weeks after that second dinner that I said yes. Then I had to send a letter to all of my investors[14] that I was going to shut down shop and send them their capital back. Yeah, it came together very quickly.
TW:在第二次晚餐后的三周内,我答应了。然后我不得不给所有投资者写信[14],告诉他们我将关闭公司并退还他们的资本。是的,一切进展得非常快。

NFM: Can we jump back a little bit?
NFM:我们能回到之前一点吗?

TW: Yeah, we can go anywhere you want.
TW: 好的,我们可以去你想去的任何地方。

NFM: We’re going to flip back to your first job. You’re coming right out of school and you were a junior financial analyst —
NFM:我们要回到你的第一份工作。你刚从学校毕业,担任初级财务分析师——

TW: That’s indeed what my title was. (Laughs)
TW: 这确实是我的头衔。(笑)

NFM: You start at an entry-level position in the company and, then, within seven years, you’re leaving with the vice chair to start a company.
NFM:你在公司从一个入门级职位开始,然后在七年内,你将与副主席一起离开,创办一家公司。

TW: That’s good research.
TW: 那是很好的研究。

NFM: Talk about a career path — to have that sort of visibility and trajectory to your career that quickly. How did you prove yourself that quickly? What would you recommend to people?
NFM:谈谈职业道路——能够如此迅速地获得职业的可见性和发展轨迹。你是如何如此快速地证明自己的?你会给人们什么建议?

TW: Lucky, lucky, lucky. Life is so funny with that stuff.
TW: 运气,运气,运气。生活中有这些东西真有趣。

I joke about the junior financial analyst, but that was a big deal because I was hired in as a test case into this department that did mergers and acquisitions at W.R. Grace. I was the first undergraduate that they hired. It was, otherwise, just MBAs and they were all called financial analysts, so I had the business card that said “Junior Financial Analyst”. (Laughs) And that’s fine.
我开玩笑说关于初级财务分析师,但这件事很重要,因为我作为一个试点案例被聘入 W.R. Grace 的并购部门。我是他们聘用的第一个本科生。否则,都是 MBA,他们都被称为财务分析师,所以我有一张写着“初级财务分析师”的名片。(笑)这没问题。

It was a good gig. I didn’t make much money, but if you stayed until 8 o’clock [at night] working you got a free taxi home and free dinner — and that made a big difference. So you know I was there until at least 8:00 every night and it was fun. I liked working a lot more than studying.
这是一个不错的工作。我赚的不多,但如果你工作到晚上 8 点,你就可以免费打车回家和享用免费晚餐——这差别很大。所以你知道我每晚至少待到 8 点,而且这很有趣。我更喜欢工作而不是学习。

Through happenstance, I worked there for two years and had never even seen Peter Grace, the CEO of the company. I had been working on a transaction, a leveraged buyout of a medical company, and I had been working on it for probably two months. I get this phone call and it’s one of Mr. Grace’s assistants saying, “Mr. Grace wants to be briefed on the National Medical Care acquisition. Your boss’s boss isn’t in the building and your boss isn’t in the building.”
通过偶然的机会,我在那里工作了两年,甚至从未见过公司的首席执行官彼得·格雷斯。我一直在处理一笔交易,一家医疗公司的杠杆收购,可能已经工作了两个月。我接到一个电话,是格雷斯先生的一个助理说:“格雷斯先生想要了解国家医疗保健收购的情况。你老板的老板不在大楼里,你的老板也不在大楼里。”

I’m like, “Oh, no, what does that mean?”
我想,“哦,不,这是什么意思?”

He said, “We’d like you to come up to the 48th floor” — that was the top floor — “and brief Mr. Grace on this project.”
他说:“我们希望你能到 48 楼来”——那是顶楼——“向格雷斯先生简要介绍一下这个项目。”

I’m like, “No, I can’t do that.” I’m 23 and I look like I’m 12. This is not what I signed up for. [Nevertheless], I go up there — I had no choice — and, again, I get ushered through door after door after door and then into this conference room that is this enormous horseshoe that could sit probably 55-60 people. There’s a dozen other people there and I get ushered into the center of the horseshoe —
我心想:“不,我做不到。”我 23 岁,看起来像 12 岁。这不是我所期望的。[尽管如此],我还是上去了——我别无选择——然后,我又被引导着穿过一道又一道门,最后进入一个巨大的会议室,那个会议室是一个巨大的马蹄形,能容纳大约 55-60 人。那里还有十几个其他人,我被引导到马蹄形的中心——

NFM: All these senior leaders.
NFM:所有这些高级领导。

TW: All of the top people at the company. And then, once we’re all seated, this door opens and His Holiness comes through. (Laughs)
TW: 公司里的所有高层人士。然后,当我们都坐好后,这扇门打开,圣人走了进来。(笑)

He always smoked a pipe and he looks down at me and he says, “Who are you?”
他总是抽烟斗,他俯视着我说:“你是谁?”

“I’m Ted Weschler. I’m here to brief you on National Medical Care.”
“我是泰德·韦施勒。我在这里向您简要介绍国家医疗保健。”

You could see him getting a little bit agitated. He had never met me and he didn’t know anything about this. He said, “Where do you go to school?”
你可以看到他有点激动。他从未见过我,也不知道这件事。他说:“你上哪个学校?”

I said, “I went to the University of Pennsylvania — Wharton undergrad.”
我说:“我去了宾夕法尼亚大学——沃顿本科。”

He went, “You don’t have an MBA?” and he said it in a really biting way.
他问:“你没有 MBA 吗?”他说这话时语气非常尖刻。

I’m like, This has not started out well. (Laughs)
我觉得,这开始得不好。(笑)

His pipe starts to shake a little bit and he really was getting quite worked up. He just starts going off about “This is the biggest acquisition we’ve ever done! My grandfather founded this company! You’re sending this kid up to brief me on this thing!?!”
他的烟斗开始微微颤抖,他真的变得相当激动。他开始大声说:“这是我们做过的最大收购!我的祖父创办了这家公司!你竟然派这个小子来给我简报这件事!?!”

And then he starts going down the line. “Chuck, where did you go to graduate school?”
然后他开始逐个询问。“查克,你在哪里读的研究生?”

“Yale, Peter.” “耶鲁,彼得。”

I’m like, I’m going to join the Peace Corps.
我想,我打算加入和平队。

All: (Laughs) 大家: (笑)

TW: It was just horrible. Absolutely horrible. (Laughs)
TW: 太可怕了。简直太可怕了。(笑)

It was actually Chuck, who was the vice chairman, he said, “Peter, just let the young man at least answer some of your questions.” Peter listened to him and he starts asking me questions. I’ve been doing 100-hour weeks on this deal and I knew the deal well. It ended up being like an hour-and-a half meeting. It was painful to start — but, once it got rolling, I felt like I did okay.
实际上是查克,他是副主席,他说:“彼得,至少让年轻人回答你的一些问题。”彼得听了他的话,开始问我问题。我在这个交易上已经工作了 100 个小时一周,我对这个交易非常了解。最后开了一个一个半小时的会议。开始的时候很痛苦——但一旦开始顺利进行,我觉得我表现得还不错。

NFM: You were prepared.
NFM:你已经准备好了。

TW: I felt like I did okay. And, at the end of it, Mr. Grace looks over and he says, “There’s two people in this room who don’t have an MBA. You and me.”
TW: 我觉得我做得还不错。最后,格雷斯先生看过来,说:“这个房间里有两个人没有 MBA。你和我。”

I was like, Hmmm. Huh. I still felt like hell, but that’s okay.
我当时想,嗯哼。哈。我还是感觉很糟,但没关系。

Then, literally the next day, I got a phone call. Peter always had three assistants that traveled the world with him as either his advance people or financial types to do analysis while we were traveling. She said, “He let one of his assistants go this morning and he’d like you to join him in Boston tonight — and pack for three weeks.”
然后,字面上说,第二天我接到了一个电话。彼得总是有三个助手陪伴他周游世界,作为他的前期人员或财务人员,在我们旅行时进行分析。她说:“他今天早上让一个助手离开了,他希望你今晚能和他一起去波士顿——并且准备三周的行李。”

It’s like, “Uhh, let me talk to my boss…” and she said, “No, you don’t have to talk to your boss. Just be in Boston.”
就像,“呃,让我跟我的老板谈谈……”她说,“不,你不需要跟你的老板谈。只要在波士顿就行。”

NFM: “That is your boss.”
NFM:“那是你的老板。”

TW: Yeah. (Laughs) So, in the next two years, I was the traveling aide to Mr. Grace, which was really fascinating. He was one of these guys, you really couldn’t say much when you were in the room with him in business meetings, but you were the proverbial fly on the wall. He’d let you sit in on anything.
TW: 是的。(笑)所以,在接下来的两年里,我是格雷斯先生的旅行助手,这真的很吸引人。他是那种在商务会议上你几乎不能说太多话的人,但你就像是墙上的苍蝇。他会让你旁听任何事情。

NFM: So you could learn by listening.
NFM:所以你可以通过听来学习。

TW: That was really, really powerful — and just very interesting. His management style was a little bit different, but it was interesting and a ton of fun and I guess I did a decent job on that.
TW: 这真的非常强大——而且非常有趣。他的管理风格有点不同,但很有趣,也非常好玩,我想我在这方面做得还不错。

Then, 1987 came along and there was this crash in October[15]. At that point — just before the crash — I had accepted a job with an arbitrage shop that did investments in takeovers.
然后,1987 年来临,十月份发生了这场崩盘[15]。在那时——就在崩盘之前——我接受了一家进行收购投资的套利公司的工作。

Mr. Grace was very upset that I was leaving — until the crash happened — and then he called me and he said you’re basically an idiot — he used much rougher language than that — for leaving. (Laughs)
Grace先生对我离开感到非常不满——直到事故发生——然后他给我打了电话,说我基本上是个傻瓜——他用的语言比这粗俗得多——因为我离开了。(笑)

“There’s got to be some way that you’d like to stick around here,” [he said]. So he starts sending in these senior folks with different ideas for me and what have you — and I ended up becoming the aide to the next heir apparent to Peter.
“总得有一些方法让你想留在这里,”[他说]。于是他开始派一些高级人员带着不同的想法来找我,结果我最终成为了彼得的下一个继承人的助手。

Peter was, at that time, maybe 75 and this was probably heir apparent #4 or #5. There had been several people who looked like they might take over for him. So I did that because this is a guy I had a great relationship with and I worked with and we had done some leveraged buyouts. That was another great experience, but that’s the gentleman that I started the private equity firm with.
彼彼当时大约 75 岁,这可能是继承人#4 或#5。曾经有几个人看起来可能会接替他。所以我这样做是因为这是一个我与之关系很好的人,我和他一起工作过,我们做过一些杠杆收购。这是另一个很棒的经历,但这位绅士是我创办私募股权公司的合作伙伴。

He and I set up a completely new company. I was going to leave Grace[16] and start a money management firm. He wasn’t sure what he was going to do. Over a dinner, we hatched this idea of setting up our own private equity firm. He was a gray-haired guy with gravitas and I was the maniac in the backroom who knew the tax code and knew how to use a computer — and it worked.
他和我一起创办了一家全新的公司。我打算离开Grace[16],开始一家资产管理公司。他当时还不确定自己要做什么。在一次晚餐中,我们萌生了创办一家私人股权公司的想法。他是一个有着丰富经验和威望的老手,而我是那个在后方了解税法并懂得使用计算机的狂热者——这让我们的合作非常成功。

That firm is still very successful in Charlottesville. It’s got thirty professionals [and] manages several billion dollars. That was a good thing, but then I wanted to set up, truly, my own shop — and that’s what took me to setting up my hedge fund.
那家公司在夏洛茨维尔仍然非常成功。它有三十名专业人士,管理着数十亿美元。这是件好事,但我想真正建立自己的公司——这就是我成立对冲基金的原因。

NFM: There was the bit of luck with getting the exposure, but then your preparation [won the day]. I’d be curious about your reputation within the company, because I think that would be interesting watching someone take that move.
NFM: 能够获得这个机会有一定的运气成分,但最终是你的准备工作起了决定性作用。我很好奇你在公司内部的声誉,因为我认为看到有人做出这样的决定会很有趣。

TW: It was an odd time. Big corporations tend to be very political and I wasn’t political because I didn’t know anything about corporate life. I didn’t know that it wasn’t right to CC this person or CC that person. I think I got a lot of byes because of that. People didn’t view me as some clever —
TW: 那是一个奇怪的时期。大公司往往非常政治化,而我并不政治化,因为我对企业生活一无所知。我不知道抄送这个人或抄送那个人是不对的。我想我因此得到了很多宽容。人们并不把我视为一个聪明的人——

NFM: Like you’re maneuvering.
NFM:就像你在操控一样。

TW: Yeah. It was just like, I’m here to do a job. I want to make this company better, if I can, and it worked out.
TW: 是的。我只是想,我在这里是为了工作。我想让这家公司变得更好,如果可以的话,结果也如我所愿。

NFM: You sort of started talking about this, but you were at Quad-C — which still exists to this day. You were there ten years and built it. What was the impetus for doing your own thing? Was that always the ultimate goal?
NFM:你有点开始谈论这个,但你在 Quad-C 工作——这个公司至今仍然存在。你在那里待了十年并建立了它。你自己创业的动力是什么?这一直是最终目标吗?

TW: It’s interesting because when we first set up Quad-C, it was this amalgamation of my partner’s idea that he wanted it to have control investments where we actually bought companies and my preference was that I wanted to do investing in publicly-traded securities.
TW: 这很有趣,因为当我们第一次成立 Quad-C 时,这是我合伙人的想法的结合,他希望它能够进行控制性投资,即我们实际购买公司,而我的偏好是我想投资于公开交易的证券。

NFM: Are those two typically different worlds?
NFM:那两个通常是不同的世界吗?

TW: Yeah. One is buying things listed on the stock exchange — where, in effect, you own a small percentage of the business. Whereas the other stuff, that he was good at, was actually owning the businesses and making the operational decisions.
TW: 是的。一种是购买在证券交易所上市的东西——在这种情况下,实际上你拥有企业的一小部分。而他擅长的另一种则是实际拥有企业并做出运营决策。

So we created this hybrid where we said, okay, we’re going to set up a vehicle where we’ll ask folks that we know that have some money to put money in and I would invest it in public securities while we were looking for control investments.
所以我们创建了这个混合模式,我们说,好吧,我们要建立一个平台,邀请我们认识的一些有钱人投资,而我会将这些资金投资于公共证券,同时寻找控股投资。

I kind of wore both hats. If somebody shows you a business that’s in furniture manufacturing, the first thing you’re going to do is look at everybody in furniture manufacturing and how they’re valued in the marketplace. And, once in a while, you’ll see something and say, “Boy, this doesn’t make sense. This is really cheap.” There might be an opportunity to invest a little bit in this publicly-traded company and maybe we’ll do the acquisition as well — or not. That was fun. I liked that.
我有点像是两种角色。如果有人向你展示一个家具制造的业务,你首先会查看家具制造行业的所有公司,以及它们在市场上的估值。偶尔你会看到一些东西,心想:“哇,这真不合理。这真的很便宜。”这可能是一个投资这个上市公司的小机会,也许我们还会进行收购——或者不收购。那很有趣。我喜欢这样。

NFM: You liked finding these companies?
NFM:你喜欢找到这些公司吗?

TW: Yeah, because I could look at it from both angles. There’s a pretty high bar for doing something in public securities, so it wasn’t like I was a trader. It’s like, Is there something really compelling?
TW: 是的,因为我可以从两个角度来看待这个问题。在公共证券领域,门槛相当高,所以我并不是一个交易员。我的想法是,有没有什么真正吸引人的东西?

There’s a great quote[17] of Warren’s about we’d all be better investors if we had a punchcard that, every time we made an investment, we had to click it and that punchcard had only twenty punches available to you — so you really had to have this high bar to make an investment.
有一句很好的名言[17],沃伦说如果我们每次投资都需要点击一个打卡机,而这个打卡机只有二十次机会可用——所以你真的必须设定一个很高的标准来进行投资,我们都会成为更好的投资者。

Well, lo and behold, in the six years that we did this, I made exactly twenty [investments]. Exactly. Which is really weird how that worked out. And nineteen of the twenty worked out really well and I had a nice track record because of that.
好吧,瞧瞧,在我们做这件事的六年里,我正好进行了二十次投资。正好。真是奇怪,结果竟然是这样。而这二十次投资中有十九次都非常成功,因此我有了不错的业绩记录。

But, at the six year mark at Quad-C, we reached this point where we wanted to raise money — not just from individuals, but from institutions. Like the Harvard endowment and Brown University and what have you. They are wonderful investors, but they tend to have checklists that they want to see. They want you to be exactly this slot or that slot. They don’t want you to be a hybrid that does both control investments and little things off to the side.
但是,在 Quad-C 成立六年时,我们达到了一个想要筹集资金的阶段——不仅仅是来自个人的资金,还有来自机构的资金。比如哈佛捐赠基金、布朗大学等等。他们是很棒的投资者,但他们往往有一份想要看到的清单。他们希望你恰好符合这个类别或那个类别。他们不希望你是一个同时进行控制投资和一些小项目的混合体。

I worked on setting up the private placement memorandum and working with the investment bank on how to put this thing together — and I concluded that, Boy, I’ve got this nice track record but it’s not going to fit in this institutional model.
我致力于制定私募备忘录,并与投资银行合作,了解如何将这件事情整合在一起——我得出的结论是,哇,我有这个不错的业绩记录,但它不适合这个机构模型。

I said, “Okay, fine, we’ll just take that out and we’ll raise this institutional fund.” Which we did and it was a successful raise — we got a ton of money — but then I realized that it wasn’t exactly what I loved. The firm had grown a bit and it was doing more people management than investing in businesses.
我说:“好吧,没问题,我们就把那个去掉,我们会筹集这个机构基金。”我们确实这样做了,而且筹集得很成功——我们得到了很多资金——但后来我意识到这并不是我真正热爱的事情。公司发展了一些,更多的是在进行人员管理,而不是投资于企业。

The thing is, I’m an analyst. If I had a business card, I’d want it to say “Analyst” — not “Junior Financial Analyst” (Laughs) — and I was getting away from that.
事情是,我是一名分析师。如果我有名片,我希望上面写着“分析师”——而不是“初级财务分析师”(笑)——而我正在摆脱这个身份。

How many employment agreements can you negotiate? That’s what it came down to. The learning curve had just flattened out.
你能谈判多少份雇佣协议?这就是关键所在。学习曲线刚刚趋于平坦。

I saw a window of opportunity — if I could take the private equity mindset, where you’re buying the business and you expect to own it for 5-10 years, and do that with publicly-traded securities, where I’d buy 3-4% of a business but I’d have a very long-term view. I thought that might be something that would work and would be appealing to some investors.
我看到了一个机会窗口——如果我能采用私募股权的思维方式,购买企业并期望拥有它 5 到 10 年,然后将这种方式应用于公开交易的证券,我会购买企业的 3-4%,但我会有一个非常长期的视角。我认为这可能是一个可行的方案,并且会吸引一些投资者。

NFM: Is turnover typically quicker [than that]?
NFM:周转通常更快吗?

TW: Yeah. The average holding period for a share of stock on the New York Stock Exchange is less than a year. There are far more people who are trading than are actually buying a piece of the business and holding it for the long term.
TW: 在纽约证券交易所,股票的平均持有期不到一年。进行交易的人远远超过实际购买并长期持有企业股份的人。

I wanted to do it in a way that I wasn’t, in any way, hostile or negative towards management. But if you’re in something with a 5-10 year view, you’ve got a better chance to build a relationship with the management team and have credibility. There were several of these things — they were small companies, but they didn’t necessarily have a great connection to Wall Street or to capital markets. And not that I necessarily did, but I at least knew the way around.
我想以一种不对管理层表现出敌意或负面的方式来做这件事。但如果你有 5 到 10 年的视角,你就有更好的机会与管理团队建立关系并获得信誉。这些事情有好几件——它们都是小公司,但不一定与华尔街或资本市场有很好的联系。虽然我不一定有,但我至少知道如何应对。

I would never go in and say that I know this stuff better than you. I’d just say here’s some ideas and it may be helpful to you. I call it MAD investing — Make A Difference investing — if you can potentially change the outcome by being actively involved in some part of the process.
我从不会走进去就说“我比你更了解这些”。我会说,这里有一些想法,可能对你有帮助。我称之为MAD投资——“Make A Difference”(有所作为)投资——如果你能够通过积极参与某个过程的某个部分,来潜在地改变结果,那就是有所作为的投资。

When this W.R. Grace bankruptcy came along, it was like, Wow, I know this company well. It was in bankruptcy because it had over 100,000 lawsuits against it relating to asbestos exposure [from] some of their products. I had done a lot of work in bankruptcy for whatever reason and I just thought it was something I might be able to make a difference there by getting involved. I bought about 15% of the business and — it took thirteen years — but it ended up being a very successful restructuring that I was involved in.
当W.R. Grace公司破产时,我心想,哇,我非常了解这家公司。它因为一些产品中的石棉暴露问题而面临超过10万起诉讼,导致破产。出于某种原因,我之前在破产领域做了很多工作,我认为通过参与其中,我可能在这里有所作为。我购买了公司大约15%的股份——这花费了十三年时间——但最终我参与的这次重组非常成功。

But the short answer to your question is that I wanted to get back into just investing in public securities. In private equity, where you’re looking at control investments, you’re relying on investment bankers coming to you and giving you a book. That book is 120 pages of all this wonderful stuff about these businesses, but you open it up and on the first page it says Book #132 or something.
但你问题的简短回答是,我想重新投资于公开证券。在私募股权中,当你关注控制投资时,你依赖投资银行家来找你并给你一本书。那本书有 120 页,里面是关于这些企业的所有精彩内容,但你打开它,第一页上写着书号#132 之类的。

NFM: Everybody is getting them.
NFM:每个人都在得到它们。

TW: And then you end up feeling bad if you don’t at least bid on it because, guess what, they stop sending you books [if you don’t bid] and you’ve got to keep the books coming in.
TW: 然后如果你至少不出价,你会感到很糟糕,因为,猜猜看,如果你不出价,他们就不再给你寄书了,而你必须让书继续进来。

But on public securities, if you don’t buy something — guess what — the Wall Street Journal still shows up at your doorstep every day or your computer, as the case may be. You don’t have that, in effect, moral obligation to move on anything. You can just wait for the right opportunity to come along — and that was always appealing to me.
但是在公共证券方面,如果你不买任何东西——猜猜看——华尔街日报仍然每天送到你的门口或你的电脑上,具体情况而定。实际上,你并没有那种道德义务去采取行动。你可以静静等待合适的机会出现——这对我来说一直很有吸引力。

NFM: Alright, I have to ask you this. You got 19/20 — what was the one you missed?
NFM:好的,我必须问你这个。你得了 19/20——你错了哪一个?

All: (Laughs) 大家: (笑)

I know you know it.
我知道你知道。

TW: I do. (Laughs) It’s funny because it went by the name of TW Holdings at the time — and my initials are TW, so — of course — I should have stayed away from it. It was a big restaurant operator. At the time, it owned Denny’s and several other things. Sometimes things don’t work out — but it did not work out[18]. (Laughs)
TW:我愿意。(笑)这很有趣,因为当时它的名字是 TW Holdings——而我的名字缩写是 TW,所以——当然——我应该远离它。那是一家大型餐饮运营商。当时,它拥有 Denny's 和其他几家餐厅。有时候事情并不顺利——但它确实没有成功[18]。(笑)

NFM: There had to be something you thought in your original assumptions —
NFM:在你最初的假设中,肯定有你认为的某些东西——

TW: Uh, it was… 呃,那是……

NFM: It was the initials.
NFM:这是缩写。

TW: Yeah. (Laughs) Vanity took me.
TW: 是的。(笑)虚荣心让我如此。

NFM: I saw an interview with Warren Buffett and he said that you are one of the few people he’s met that reads[19] as much as he does.
NFM:我看到了一段沃伦·巴菲特的采访,他说你是他见过的少数几个阅读[19]的人之一,和他一样多。

TW: Ooh, I didn’t see that! (Laughs)
TW: 哦,我没看到那个!(笑)

NFM: And I read something else where you said that your job really is reading. We’d just love to hear kind of what you read and how that informs [your investment process]? A lot of times you think people are all reading the same thing — you’re reading the trade journals.
NFM:我还读到你说过你的工作实际上就是阅读。我们很想听听你读些什么,以及这些如何影响[你的投资过程]?很多时候你会觉得人们都在读同样的东西——你在阅读行业期刊。

Is your success more that you’re able to interpret it [better] or that you’re reading more so you’re pulling more information?
你的成功是因为你能够更好地解读它,还是因为你阅读更多,从而获取更多信息?

TW: You hit on it. It’s a great question and the way you ask it is just right because I think one of the great mistakes of investing is that people do end up reading the same thing. Really, the only way you’re going to have success in the stock market is if you’ve got what’s referred to as a variant perception. Something that’s different from the masses. If everybody says, “Wow, this Facebook is hot!” — well, everybody jumps in. I’m speaking ten years ago, not right now.
TW: 你提到了关键问题,这是个很棒的问题,你的提问方式也非常到位,因为我认为投资中一个很大的错误就是人们最终都会读到同样的信息。实际上,在股市中取得成功的唯一方法是你拥有一种所谓的“不同的观点”(variant perception),也就是与大众不同的看法。如果大家都在说,“哇,Facebook很火!”——那么所有人都会蜂拥而至。我说的是十年前的情况,而不是现在。

One of the things — Warren and I have this in common — is we both love newspapers. I really enjoy newspapers. I grew up with them in the house and there was kind of always a morning competition with my mother because she always read it before I did and it was like who picked up more from the newspaper? All in good fun, but it’s one of those habits that you get into.
我和沃伦有一个共同点,那就是我们都喜欢报纸。我真的很喜欢报纸。我从小就在家里接触报纸,早上总是和我母亲有一种竞争,因为她总是在我之前读报纸,谁从报纸上获取的信息更多。这都是出于好玩,但这就是你养成的习惯之一。

What’s really great about newspapers, though, is there’s a randomness about them. Just by definition, there are different sections to it. I read a bunch of different ones, but it’s a random set of stories that come together because an editor says, “Jeez, this might be interesting,” or it is top of mind [at any given time].
报纸真正伟大的地方在于它们的随机性。根据定义,它们有不同的版块。我读了很多不同的报纸,但它们是因为编辑说:“天哪,这可能很有趣,”或者在任何给定时刻是人们关注的焦点,而随机组合在一起的一组故事。

It’s very interesting to see how a given political story is portrayed in USA Today versus the New York Times. What will be front page, above the fold, in the New York Times may be on page three of USA Today. Much deeper reporting in the New York Times, but you really want to understand where it’s positioned.
观察同一个政治新闻在《今日美国》和《纽约时报》上的报道方式是非常有趣的。在《纽约时报》上可能会出现在头版折叠线以上的新闻,在《今日美国》上可能只会出现在第三页。《纽约时报》的报道通常更深入,但你真的需要理解它在报纸上的位置。

How is the Financial Times in London gonna play the thing? Because you do need to keep all the different perspectives and take them into account — but it is random.
伦敦的金融时报将如何处理这个事情?因为你确实需要保持所有不同的观点并考虑它们——但这很随机。

If I can come up with one decent investment idea a year, boy, that is great. I call it a game of connect the dots, where you want to build up a terrific dataset and maybe you’ll be able to say, “Ooh, I read this here, I read this here, I read this here,” and make a connection such that you’ve got a little bit different perception of where a business is going to be five years from now than where the market does.
如果我每年能想出一个不错的投资点子,那真是太好了。我把这称为连点成线的游戏,你想要建立一个出色的数据集,也许你能说:“哦,我在这里读到这个,我在这里读到那个,我在这里读到这个,”并建立一个联系,这样你对一个企业五年后会在哪里的看法就会与市场的看法有所不同。

A game I always like to play is to work on a company without knowing what the price is in the stock market. You study [it] and say, This is where I think it will be, and then you do the uncovering and say, I think this should trade at $82 a share — and it’s like, Ooh, it’s at $40. Ooh, this is interesting! It usually means that I missed something really bad (Laughs) — but it’s always been a game that I’ve played and it keeps it interesting.
我一直喜欢玩的一个游戏是研究一家公司,而不知道它在股市上的价格。你研究[它]并说,“我认为它会在这里”,然后你进行揭示并说,“我认为它应该以每股 82 美元交易” — 然后就像,“哦,它在 40 美元。哦,这很有趣!” 通常意味着我错过了一些非常糟糕的事情(笑) — 但这一直是我玩的一个游戏,让它保持有趣。
有些刻意,越紧张越容易锚定。

But, then, trade journals. They’re really powerful — and there’s a lot of investors that don’t subscribe to those. Actually, Furniture Today. I’ve been a Furniture Today subscriber for over thirty years now. It’s interesting because it is one of those things that it’s a ten minute read once a week, but if you read it with regularity you do see the different names and how they’re evolving and who’s doing what. That’s where I got to know [about] the Nebraska Furniture Mart. I actually didn’t even make that connection with Berkshire, but I used to always read about that. I’ve been involved with furniture a bunch of different ways over the years.
然后是行业期刊。它们真的非常有影响力——而且有很多投资者并没有订阅这些期刊。实际上,我已经订阅《Furniture Today》超过三十年了。这很有趣,因为这是每周花十分钟读的东西,但如果你经常读,你会看到不同的名字,看到他们的发展以及谁在做什么。这就是我了解到内布拉斯加家具市场的地方。我当时其实还没有把它和伯克希尔联系起来,但我以前总是会读到关于它的内容。这些年来,我通过各种方式参与了家具行业。
不同时期不同的名字,仅这一点有些价值,这些材料的噪音很高。

But I always do want to be able to look myself in the mirror and say that I’m reading enough weird stuff that nobody else is reading the same stuff that I am. If you’re just reading the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, there’s no way you’re going to beat other people. You’re just reading the same thing.
但我总是希望能够照镜子时对自己说,我正在阅读一些别人没在读的“奇怪”材料。如果你只是读《纽约时报》和《华尔街日报》,你是无法超越别人的,因为你只是读了同样的东西。
基本可以确认Ted Weschler不如Todd Combs,并且没有办法改进。

I read Furniture Today and Uranium Weekly. I’m not sure there’s a lot of people who subscribe to both of those, but you’re looking at one of ‘em. (Laughs)
我读《Furniture Today》和《Uranium Weekly》。我不确定有多少人同时订阅这两本期刊,但你现在就看到了其中之一。(笑)

NFM: Are the investments you’re doing at Berkshire different than what you were doing at Peninsula?
NFM:你在伯克希尔的投资与在半岛的投资有什么不同吗?

TW: Well, yes and no. They are different in that it’s a much bigger pool of capital [at Berkshire] — and that’s a not-insignificant factor because we do have a very large pool of capital. When I was running Peninsula, at its largest it was $2 billion. I typically would have that invested in ten different ideas20, which would be about $200 million per idea — and there are thousands of companies out there that would let you deploy $200 million in them that are big enough to do that.
TW:嗯,是的,也不是。他们的不同之处在于伯克希尔的资本池要大得多——这不是一个微不足道的因素,因为我们确实拥有一个非常大的资本池。当我在半岛公司时,最大的时候是 20 亿美元。我通常会将这笔资金投资于十个不同的想法20,每个想法大约是 2 亿美元——而且有成千上万的公司可以让你在其中投入 2 亿美元,足够大可以做到这一点。

But when you get up into the Berkshire size, I essentially need ideas that I can deploy at least $1 billion into.
但是当你达到伯克希尔的规模时,我基本上需要可以投入至少 10 亿美元的想法。

NFM: Which narrows it. NFM:这使其变得更窄。

TW: It narrows it. And, except in exceptional cases, I generally don’t want to own more than 10% of a business because once you go over 10%, you have additional filing requirements with the SEC. In effect, every trade you do you need to publicly declare it within 72 hours of making the trade — and that’s a hassle.
TW: 这会使其变得狭窄。除非在特殊情况下,我通常不想拥有超过 10%的企业股份,因为一旦超过 10%,你就需要向证券交易委员会(SEC)提交额外的备案要求。实际上,你每进行一次交易,都需要在交易后 72 小时内公开声明,这很麻烦。

So you work into the math and if you’ve got to put $1 billion to work and you don’t want to be more than 10%, it means you’ve got to only invest in companies that have at least a $10 billion market capitalization. That cuts out a big chunk of the market.
所以你要考虑数学,如果你必须投入 10 亿美元,并且不想超过 10%,这意味着你只能投资于市值至少为 100 亿美元的公司。这排除了市场中的一大部分。

My primary job is looking for ideas like that, public securities, but I also work on acquisitions. If deals come along that might be interesting to buy 100% of — similar to what I did in my Quad-C days or at W.R. Grace — it’s something I’m very comfortable with[21]. I’ve been doing those kinds of analyses for a lot of years.
我的主要工作是寻找像这样的想法,公共证券,但我也从事收购。如果有可能有趣的交易出现,可能会考虑 100%收购——类似于我在 Quad-C 或 W.R. Grace 时所做的——这是我非常熟悉的事情[21]。我已经做了很多年的这种分析。

Again, I’m just here to help out wherever I can.
我只是来这里尽我所能地提供帮助。

NFM: Any books that you have read recently that you’d recommend highly?
NFM:最近你读过的书中,有哪些是你特别推荐的?

TW: Let’s think about that. I must say, the vast majority of stuff I read are the periodicals.
TW: 让我们考虑一下。我必须说,我阅读的大多数内容都是期刊。

I’m in the middle of one that is quite good — it’s called Trillion Dollar Triage — detailing, in effect, the bailout of the system from Covid in March of 2020.
我正在读一本相当不错的书——它的名字叫《Trillion Dollar Triage》——实际上是在详细描述 2020 年 3 月系统因新冠疫情而进行的救助。

It’s a gripping read because it really goes through how quickly Covid became a global issue and the ramifications for the global economy and the U.S. economy and how interdependent the U.S. economy is with the rest of the world — and what very brave people like Jay Powell had to do on a moment’s notice to make sure the wheels didn’t fly off the train. It is quite the read.
这是一部引人入胜的读物,因为它详细描述了新冠疫情是如何迅速成为全球性问题的,以及对全球经济和美国经济的影响,以及美国经济与世界其他地区的相互依赖性——以及像杰伊·鲍威尔这样非常勇敢的人在瞬息之间所做的努力,以确保火车的轮子不会脱轨。这真是一部值得一读的作品。

NFM: How did Covid affect your day-to-day at Berkshire Hathaway from an investment standpoint?
NFM:从投资的角度来看,Covid 如何影响了你在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的日常工作?

TW: There’s the humanistic side, where all of a sudden everybody is at home. I think Warren and I had in common, we were like, This is not going to work. I like sitting at my desk — it’s a space that I’m comfortable with — whether it’s Charlottesville or Omaha. I think Warren worked out of his house for maybe a week or two and was like, This ain’t gonna work. (Laughs)
TW:人性的一面是,突然间每个人都在家。我认为沃伦和我有一个共同点,我们都觉得,“这行不通。”我喜欢坐在我的桌子前——这是我感到舒适的空间——无论是在夏洛茨维尔还是在奥马哈。我认为沃伦在家工作了大约一两周,然后就觉得,“这行不通。”(笑)

There’s only 26 people at headquarters and most of the folks went remote. We were very careful with masking. I did come out pretty much every week, though, and took a test every time I came out. I didn’t want to be the one who was bringing a nasty bug from Virginia to Omaha. So that was a big impact.
总部只有 26 个人,大多数人都远程工作。我们在戴口罩方面非常小心。不过,我几乎每周都会出来,并且每次出来时都进行了检测。我不想成为那个把来自维吉尼亚州的病毒带到奥马哈的人。所以这影响很大。

But, then, it was a tough one from an investing standpoint because all of us — Warren, Todd Combs (who is the other investment manager) — we looked at each other and were like, Wow, we’ve not seen anything like this. We’re not sure how this is going to play out. We had a lot of very good information, but we didn’t have a relative edge.
但是,从投资的角度来看,这确实很困难,因为我们所有人——沃伦、托德·科姆斯(另一位投资经理)——我们互相看着,像是哇,我们从未见过这样的情况。我们不确定这将如何发展。我们有很多非常好的信息,但我们没有相对的优势。

NFM: Did you have those conversations — like what you just said there — about how is this going to play out?
NFM:你们有没有进行过那些对话——就像你刚才说的——关于这将如何发展?

TW: Oh, yeah. We were sitting there over Quarter Pounders with Cheese saying, “What do we think?” And it was like, “Jeez, I just don’t know.”
TW: 哦,是的。我们坐在那里吃着芝士四分之一磅汉堡,问道:“我们觉得怎么样?”然后就像,“天哪,我真的不知道。”

It was brilliant work on the part of the Fed and Jay Powell in fixing everything, but the moment they came in — I think it was March 20 of 2020 — the Fed effectively put a floor under everything. The moment they did that, the opportunities that would have been there for Berkshire weren’t there anymore.
这是美联储和杰伊·鲍威尔出色的工作,他们修复了一切,但他们一进场——我认为是 2020 年 3 月 20 日——美联储实际上为一切设定了底线。就在他们这样做的那一刻,本来会为伯克希尔提供机会的机会不再存在了。

NFM: What does that mean?
NFM:那是什么意思?

TW: Historically, the best times for Berkshire have been when there have been difficulties out there — where people needed capital and banks weren’t lending because there was a banking crisis going on. So we’d say, “Wow, we like your business. We’ll effectively lend you money or we’ll buy 15% of your business in a negotiated transaction — good for you and good for us.”
TW: 历史上,伯克希尔表现最佳的时刻往往是在外部环境困难的时候——人们需要资本,而银行由于金融危机而不愿放贷。因此我们会说:“哇,我们喜欢你的业务。我们将有效地借给你钱,或者我们将在谈判交易中购买你业务的 15%——这对你有利,对我们也有利。”

In 2000, Warren did several of those kinds of trades that were very, very good. They built on Berkshire’s reputation and they helped the companies involved. We did one with General Electric[22], one with Harley-Davidson Motorcycles[23], one with Tiffany’s[24] —  just a bunch of these. They all were very good transactions and relatively low risk. And we thought, Ooh, maybe we can do this [again] this time around [during Covid]. But the window closed very quickly.
在 2000 年,沃伦进行了几笔非常非常好的交易。这些交易建立在伯克希尔的声誉之上,并帮助了相关公司。我们与通用电气做了一笔交易[22],与哈雷-戴维森摩托车做了一笔交易[23],与蒂芙尼做了一笔交易[24]——就是这样一堆。这些交易都非常好,风险相对较低。我们想,哦,也许这次我们可以再做一次[在疫情期间]。但机会很快就关闭了。

The view was that the banking system was going to effectively shut down and there wasn’t going to be lending available for institutions. But, in actual fact, there was plenty of money available. The Fed came in and said, “Open the vault, whatever you need.”
观点是银行系统将有效关闭,机构将无法获得贷款。但实际上,有大量资金可用。美联储介入并表示:“打开金库,您需要什么就拿什么。”

NFM: Which closes the door [for Berkshire].
NFM:这为伯克希尔关上了大门。

TW: Even Berkshire can’t compete with that.
TW: 即使是伯克希尔也无法与之竞争。

NFM: How was that transition versus where we are now?
NFM:那次过渡与我们现在的情况相比如何?

TW: Then you get to kind of watch the cards play out. It really was quite interesting because one of the indirect beneficiaries was NFM [with] the nesting phenomenon. All of a sudden people are spending a lot more time at their house —
TW: 然后你可以看到事情的发展。这真的很有趣,因为间接受益者之一是 NFM [与] 巢穴现象。突然间,人们在家里花费的时间多了很多——

NFM: And they didn’t like their sofa.
NFM:他们不喜欢他们的沙发。

TW: Yeah. It’s like, “It’s time for a new one!”
TW: 是的。就像,“是时候换一个新的了!”

It has played out very differently in the different businesses — but, on balance, it’s actually played out very, very well. We’ve got just a great mix of operating businesses that make up Berkshire. It was rocky for that March-April, but all of a sudden then it was like, Wow, this could work out.
在不同的业务中情况发展得非常不同——但总体而言,实际上发展得非常非常好。我们拥有一个很好的经营业务组合,构成了伯克希尔。三月到四月的时段很艰难,但突然之间就像是,哇,这可能会成功。

People have gotten into the cadence of a different way of doing business, but it really has been all good. We’ve found some ideas in the public marketplace.
人们已经适应了一种不同的商业运作节奏,但这实际上都是好的。我们在公共市场中发现了一些想法。

This last go-round, the tragedy of Russia-Ukraine, that really did rattle the markets. That’s the sort of thing that I think we’re in a better position to assess because there has been similar things that have happened in the last 125 years that you can say, “How does this play out? And, probability adjusted, what sort of outcomes can you have?”
这最后一轮,俄罗斯-乌克兰的悲剧确实震动了市场。这种事情我认为我们更有能力去评估,因为在过去的 125 年里发生过类似的事情,你可以说:“这将如何发展?经过概率调整,你能得到什么样的结果?”

And we’ve made some public announcements in the last thirty days of things that we’re investing in[25]. We’ve moved some money in the last couple of months.
在过去的三十天里,我们做了一些关于我们投资的公开声明[25]。在过去的几个月里,我们转移了一些资金。

NFM: What are you thinking a lot about right now?
NFM:你现在在想很多什么?

TW: Oh, wow. (Weschler pauses to think.)
TW: 哦,哇。(韦施勒停下来思考。)

NFM: Besides Uranium Today.
NFM:除了Uranium Today。

TW: I feel weird, actually. I let that lapse. I’m feeling bad. I’ve got to resubscribe. (Laughs)
TW: 我其实感觉很奇怪。我让那件事拖延了。我感觉不好。我得重新订阅。(笑)

The thing that I think a lot about — but I don’t have any influence over — is inflation. It’s real. How long is it going to last? How does it impact different businesses?
我经常思考的事情——但我没有任何影响力——就是通货膨胀。它是真实存在的。它会持续多久?它对不同的企业有什么影响?

[I also think about] the strength of the U.S. dollar — or the weakness — on any given month. China-U.S. relations. These are all big-picture things that are gonna impact the long term and they shape our thinking — but they’re all background things.
我也考虑到美元的强势——或者弱势——在任何一个特定的月份。中美关系。这些都是会影响长期的宏观因素,它们塑造了我们的思维——但它们都是背景因素。

But, again, what’s interesting about this business is you kind of have to have a little bit of background knowledge on all this stuff to have the right lens to look at investment opportunities.
但是,再次强调,这个行业有趣的地方在于,你必须对所有这些事情有一点背景知识,才能以正确的视角看待投资机会。

NFM: Are you feeling positive?
NFM:你感觉积极吗?

TW: Yes, I’m feeling positive. I always feel positive. It’s a system that works. There’s always going to be some negativity out there — but, again, in the world of investing, as long as you take a long-term view, we’ve got the right incentives, particularly in the United States. Entrepreneurs are encouraged [and] new technology is developed. New things and positive things happen every day, every week, every year. So, yeah, I can’t help but be optimistic.
TW: 是的,我感到积极。我总是感到积极。这是一个有效的系统。外面总会有一些消极因素——但在投资的世界里,只要你采取长期观点,我们就有正确的激励,特别是在美国。企业家受到鼓励,新技术不断发展。每天、每周、每年都有新的积极事物发生。所以,是的,我无法不感到乐观。

NFM: Thinking about your point earlier about reading and consuming all of this information, I imagine that’s the best way to stay informed.
NFM:考虑到你之前提到的关于阅读和获取所有这些信息的观点,我想这就是保持信息灵通的最佳方式。

TW: Yeah, it is — because it’s not just one specific thing. It’s all these different flows of information. And it’s also why it’s important to read a paper from Europe and a paper from Canada and a bunch of stuff in between because it does give you a little bit different perspective.
TW: 是的,确实如此——因为这不仅仅是一个特定的事物。这是所有这些不同的信息流。这也是为什么阅读来自欧洲的论文、来自加拿大的论文以及介于两者之间的许多资料是重要的,因为这确实能给你带来一些不同的视角。

NFM: And rather than be overwhelmed by all of the information, just view it as another opinion or perspective on it. Invariant perception.
NFM:与其被所有信息压倒,不如将其视为另一种观点或看法。不变的感知。

TW: There you go! 那就好!

NFM: It’s all coming together. (Laughs)
NFM:一切都在逐渐成型。(笑)

We always like to come back and talk about home to kind of re-center on what we do. You’ve moved a few times and you’ve got your place here and in Charlottesville. What makes a house feel like home to you? Are there key pieces or things you have to have?
我们总是喜欢回到家里谈论家,以重新聚焦我们所做的事情。你搬过几次家,现在在这里和夏洛茨维尔都有了自己的地方。对你来说,什么让房子感觉像家?有没有一些关键的物品或东西是你必须拥有的?

TW: It’s interesting. Growing up, my father was with A&P food stores[26] and we moved pretty much every three or four years from when I was zero, four, eight, twelve[27].
TW:这很有趣。长大后,我父亲在 A&P 食品商店工作[26],从我出生时开始,我们几乎每三到四年就搬一次家,四岁、八岁、十二岁[27]。

NFM: So your parents had to build homes.
NFM:所以你父母必须建造房屋。

TW: Yeah. There are those pieces that always moved house to house that defined the house. I have a —
TW: 是的。有那些总是搬来搬去的物品,它们定义了这个家。我有一个——

Do they still sell Naugahyde? Does that name ring a bell?
他们还在卖 Naugahyde 吗?这个名字听起来熟悉吗?

NFM: The name sounds familiar.
NFM:这个名字听起来很熟悉。

TW: It was one of the first faux leathers. It was very popular in the ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s.
TW: 它是最早的仿皮革之一。在 20 世纪 40 年代、50 年代和 60 年代非常受欢迎。

NFM: Branded faux leather.
NFM:品牌仿皮革。

TW: And it was called Naugahyde. In the ‘60s, they had a very successful — well, I thought it was funny as a kid — advertising campaign about how Naugahyde came from the “Nauga”, which is this mythical animal, and they said the nice thing about the “Nauga” is that it shed its skin and they didn’t have to… you know.
TW: 它被称为 Naugahyde。在 60 年代,他们有一个非常成功的——好吧,我小时候觉得很有趣——广告活动,讲述 Naugahyde 来自“纳乌加”,这是一种神话中的动物,他们说“纳乌加”的好处在于它会脱皮,所以他们不需要……你知道的。

Behold the mighty Nauga.
看啊,强大的诺加。

NFM: We need to file that idea away.
NFM:我们需要把那个想法存档。

TW: Basically, it’s vinyl on top of fabric. It cleaned up nice and was great in the house with kids. I got my father’s Naugahyde “Archie Bunker” chair.
TW: 基本上,它是布料上面覆盖了一层乙烯基。清洁起来很方便,在有孩子的家庭中表现很好。我得到了我父亲的 Naugahyde“阿奇·邦克”椅子。

NFM: You still have it?
NFM:你还在吗?

TW: Absolutely! It’s still the same Naugahyde and it’s just beautiful — and this stuff will last forever. I’m sure if an interior designer came in, they’d say you’ve got to get rid of that chair. But, no, I’m not gonna get rid of that chair. That’s my dad’s chair!
TW: 绝对可以!它仍然是同样的 Naugahyde,真是美丽——而且这些东西会永远持久。我敢肯定,如果有室内设计师进来,他们会说你必须把那把椅子扔掉。但不,我不会扔掉那把椅子。那是我爸爸的椅子!

We always did get something new growing up, at each house that we went to. This is interesting because I was always kind of a student of inflation and products — furniture has gotten relatively much less expensive over the last fifty years. The example I use is the couch that my mom and dad bought in 1965, when I was four years old, they would have spent like four weeks of the average earnings of a [typical household]. And that four weeks, now, is closer to one week. This combination of much more efficient manufacturing and much more efficient distribution — something like NFM, it’s really incredible.
我们在成长过程中总能在每个去过的家里发现一些新东西。这很有趣,因为我一直对通货膨胀和产品感兴趣——在过去五十年里,家具的价格相对便宜了很多。我举的例子是我父母在 1965 年买的沙发,那时我四岁,他们大约花了四周的平均收入。而现在,这四周的收入更接近于一周。这种更高效的制造和更高效的分销的结合——像 NFM 这样的公司,真是令人难以置信。

When we bought something, it [meant] going to the neighborhood furniture store. It was nice, it was relationship-driven, but it was very, very expensive. I’ve looked at these numbers recently — inflation for furniture since 1965, when I was four years old, [has been] about 2% a year for the last whatever fifty-five years. And, overall, inflation has been about 4% — and that, over a long period of time, has huge implications. It really is quite something that now you can get fresher stuff and funner stuff and if you get tired of that sofa or what have you… I’m not going to get tired of the Naugahyde, though. (Laughs) Maybe that will come back big.
当我们买东西时,意味着去邻里的家具店。那里的东西很好,关系驱动,但非常非常贵。我最近看了这些数字——自 1965 年以来,家具的通货膨胀率大约是每年 2%,那时我四岁。而总体通货膨胀率大约是 4%——而这在长时间内有着巨大的影响。现在你真的可以得到更新鲜、更有趣的东西,如果你厌倦了那张沙发或其他什么……不过,我不会厌倦 Naugahyde。(笑)也许它会再次流行起来。

But we always did make a point of getting something new — and I still have a lot of fun items from my house growing up.
但我们总是会特别去买一些新东西——我仍然保留着很多我成长过程中家里的有趣物品。

I love my apartment here because it was a chance to just start with a blank slate and get a bunch of stuff. If I was doing it again, there’s probably some things I wouldn’t have bought. It’s funny, I outfitted this probably six years ago and I bought two nice TVs that I don’t think I’ve turned on in the last year. What I want to watch I watch on my iPad now. But that’s also what’s fun about the world — it changes so quickly.
我喜欢我在这里的公寓,因为这是一个从零开始并获得很多东西的机会。如果我再来一次,可能有些东西我不会买。很有趣,我大约六年前就装修了这个地方,买了两台不错的电视,但我觉得我在过去一年里没有打开过它们。我现在想看的东西都是在我的 iPad 上看。但这也是这个世界有趣的地方——变化得如此之快。

NFM: So which daughter is vying for the Naugahyde chair? Or is it the opposite way around?
NFM:那么哪个女儿在争夺 Naugahyde 椅子?还是说情况正好相反?

TW: I don’t think there’s going to be any fighting. (Laughs) I think they might have to buy an extra-large funeral vault just to put that with me.
TW: 我认为不会有任何打斗。(笑)我想他们可能需要买一个特大号的墓穴来和我一起放。

NFM: We’re getting down to the end of our time, so just a couple of final questions. You’re a runner?
NFM:我们的时间快到了,所以只剩下几个最后的问题。你是个跑步者吗?

TW: Yes, I am. 是的,我是。

NFM: A marathon runner[28]. You’ve missed not very many days [of running]. Did you run today?
NFM:一名马拉松跑者[28]。你错过的跑步天数不多。你今天跑了吗?

TW: I did. I’ve missed one day[29] in the last 38 years.
TW: 我做到了。我错过了一天[29] 在过去的 38 年里。
通常有心理上的问题。

NFM: What is it about running? Any lessons that go into your investing from that?
NFM:跑步有什么特别之处?这对你的投资有什么启示吗?

TW: It’s a good question. My mindset is very different when I’m running. There’s some clinical stuff on this — if you have increased blood flow, your brain works a little bit differently. To the extent I hit something that’s a difficult conceptual issue and I’m reading or analyzing something, I mentally like to put it off to the side and say, I want to think about this again when I’m running.
TW:这是个好问题。我的心态在跑步时非常不同。有一些临床研究表明——如果你有增加的血流,你的大脑会以不同的方式运作。在我遇到一些困难的概念问题并且在阅读或分析某些东西时,我喜欢把它暂时放在一边,并说,我想在跑步时再考虑这个。

It’s a great [way to] clear your head. The discipline aspect[30] of doing it every day — it’s a great way to wake up.
这是一个很好的[方法]来清理你的思绪。纪律性[30]每天都这样做——这是一个很好的醒来方式。

NFM: You’re a morning runner?
NFM:你是早晨跑步的人吗?

TW: I used to be a night runner, but now it’s absolutely the first thing I do. It helps me wake up.
TW: 我曾经是一个夜跑者,但现在这是我做的第一件事。这帮助我醒来。

I’ve never felt worse after a run. I can have the flu, feel awful, and I’m like, How am I going to get out running? But I always feel better — I may still feel bad — but I always feel better after going for a run.
我从来没有在跑步后感觉这么糟糕。我可能得了流感,感觉很糟糕,我心里想,我怎么能出去跑步呢?但我总是感觉好一些——我可能仍然感觉不好——但我总是在跑步后感觉好一些。

NFM: What excites you about the future?
NFM:你对未来感到兴奋的是什么?

TW: The investing business, I just find it so interesting. If you’re intellectually curious — and that’s really a common element among Warren and myself and Todd — there’s nothing better. If you’re studying the banking industry in the morning and you say, Jeez, okay, I’ve had enough of this — well, then you can study the home furnishings business and then go back to uranium in the evening. (Laughs) It’s just fun.
TW:投资业务,我觉得非常有趣。如果你有求知欲——这实际上是沃伦、我和托德之间的共同特点——没有什么比这更好的了。如果你早上在研究银行业,然后你说,天哪,好吧,我受够了——那么你可以研究家居用品行业,然后晚上再回到铀的研究中。(笑)这就是乐趣所在。

And the fact that things are [always] changing. Change is a constant. There are always going to be new things out there, so the idea that I didn’t even know what streaming was ten years ago and now it’s just kind of dominating —
事物总是在变化。变化是常态。总会有新的事物出现,所以我十年前甚至不知道什么是流媒体,而现在它几乎主导了一切——

NFM: Now you don’t watch your TVs.
NFM:现在你不看电视了。

TW: Right! That’s the sort of thing that just keeps it interesting.
TW:没错!这就是让事情保持有趣的那种事。

Then you overlay healthcare and these vaccines that they could come up with and the science that got done over the last 24 months — just incredible. Really exciting stuff. To be fortunate enough to be on the Earth while all these things are accelerating and all these new developments.
然后你叠加上医疗保健和他们可能研发的这些疫苗,以及过去 24 个月所取得的科学成果——真是不可思议。真的很令人兴奋。能够在这些事情加速发展和所有这些新进展的同时生活在地球上,真是幸运。

And, yeah, there are some issues and the conflicts are terrible — but, on balance, it’s more than swamped by the good stuff that’s going on out there.
而且,是的,确实存在一些问题,冲突也很糟糕——但总体而言,好的事情远远超过了这些问题。

[1]The Berkshire Hathaway annual meetings in both 2020 and 2021 were virtual due to Covid-19. The 2022 meeting was the first to be held in-person again after the pandemic.
伯克希尔哈撒韦的年度会议在 2020 年和 2021 年因新冠疫情而以虚拟形式举行。2022 年的会议是疫情后首次再次以面对面的方式举行。

[2]Much like his future boss, the young Ted Weschler found creative ways to make money while at school. According to the Wall Street Journal, he purchased a pinball machine and charged other students to play it. (Shades of Warren Buffett’s “Wilson Coin-Operated Machine Company” from his high school days.)
与他未来的老板相似,年轻的泰德·韦施勒在上学期间找到了创造性的方法来赚钱。根据《华尔街日报》,他购买了一台弹球机,并向其他学生收费玩耍。(这让人想起沃伦·巴菲特高中时的“威尔逊投币机公司”。)

[3]Weschler’s winning bid was $2,626,411.
韦施勒的中标价为 2,626,411 美元。

[4]The auction was originally a lunch for eight in New York City, but Weschler instead requested a private meal with Buffett in Omaha.
拍卖最初是在纽约市举行的八人午餐,但韦施勒却要求与巴菲特在奥马哈进行私人用餐。

[5]Piccolo Pete’s, an informal Italian steakhouse in South Omaha, was one of Buffett’s favorites. When Weschler asked to meet with Buffett in Omaha instead of NYC, the Oracle chose Piccolo’s for dinner. His go-to meal there was Chicken Parmesan. Unfortunately, the restaurant closed down in 2016.
皮科洛·皮特(Piccolo Pete’s)是一家位于南奥马哈的非正式意大利牛排馆,是巴菲特的最爱之一。当韦施勒(Weschler)要求在奥马哈与巴菲特会面而不是纽约时,这位神谕选择了皮科洛的餐厅作为晚餐。他在那里的首选餐点是帕尔马鸡(Chicken Parmesan)。不幸的是,这家餐厅在 2016 年关闭。

[6]At the end of their dinner, Weschler said to Buffett, “I really would like to pay for this.” To which Buffett replied, “You already have.”
在晚餐结束时,韦施勒对巴菲特说:“我真的想为这顿饭买单。”巴菲特回答:“你已经付过了。”

[7]Far be it for me to quibble with Ted’s memory, but most contemporary reports indicate that he actually bid $100 more in 2011 — with a winning bid of $2,626,411.
我不想对泰德的记忆提出异议,但大多数当代报道表明,他在 2011 年实际上出价多了 100 美元——最终中标价为 2,626,411 美元。

[8]Donna Sheehan, who co-owned Piccolo’s, said of Weschler: “He’s a very nice man. Very personable.”
唐娜·希汉,皮科洛的共同拥有者,谈到韦施勒时说:“他是个非常好的人。非常和蔼。”

[9]Carol Loomis later wrote that “Buffett almost apologetically sounded out Weschler about the possibility of his joining Berkshire”.
卡罗尔·卢米斯后来写道:“巴菲特几乎是带着歉意地向韦施勒探询他加入伯克希尔的可能性。”

“I very much wanted him to do it, but I didn’t expect to get very far with the idea,” he told Loomis. “Ted will no doubt make a lot of money at Berkshire, but he was already making a lot of money with his fund. You can get an idea of that from the size of his GLIDE bids — so money wasn’t a reason for him to come.”
“我非常希望他能做到,但我没指望这个想法能走得很远,”他对卢米斯说。“泰德无疑会在伯克希尔赚很多钱,但他已经通过他的基金赚了很多钱。从他的 GLIDE 出价的规模可以看出这一点——所以钱并不是他来的原因。”

[10]Weschler ran Peninsula Capital Advisors out of a small office — that he shared with a receptionist and one analyst — above the New Dominion Bookshop in Charlottesville.
韦施勒在夏洛茨维尔的新德米尼翁书店上方的一间小办公室里经营半岛资本顾问公司——他与一名接待员和一名分析师共享该办公室。

[11]In 2001, W.R. Grace & Co. declared bankruptcy after facing claims for damages associated with asbestos. Weschler amassed a huge stake in the distressed Grace stock when it dropped as low as $2 per share. By the time he closed Peninsula in 2011, these shares traded for between $30-40.
在 2001 年,W.R. Grace & Co.因面临与石棉相关的索赔而宣告破产。Weschler 在 Grace 股票跌至每股 2 美元时积累了大量股份。到 2011 年他关闭半岛基金时,这些股票的交易价格在 30 到 40 美元之间。

Weschler played a pivotal role in brokering a settlement with plaintiffs that would not wipe out shareholders. “He understood the issues for my clients were not all dollars and cents,” said Joe Rice, an attorney who represented the injured plaintiffs. “He was a catalyst.”
韦施勒在与原告达成一项不会抹去股东权益的和解中发挥了关键作用。“他明白我客户面临的问题不仅仅是金钱,”代表受伤原告的律师乔·赖斯说。“他是一个催化剂。”

[12]Jimmy Wheat, one of the original investors in Peninsula, describes Weschler’s process as a “total immersion” approach to research. “[He educates] himself on every available bit of public information and then digs in much deeper with management and people throughout the industry. There’s very little emotion in his investment decisions. I don’t think you’ll see working for Warren Buffett going to his head, either.”
吉米·维特,半岛公司的原始投资者之一,形容韦施勒的研究过程是一种“全面沉浸”的方法。“[他会]自己了解所有可用的公开信息,然后与管理层和行业内的人深入交流。他的投资决策中几乎没有情感。我认为你也不会看到为沃伦·巴菲特工作会让他自满。”

[13]Piccolo’s actually added a root beer float to its menu at Buffett’s request. The man holds a lot of sway in the Omaha food scene.
皮克罗实际上应巴菲特的要求在菜单上添加了一款根啤酒漂浮饮料。这位男士在奥马哈的美食界拥有很大的影响力。

[14]The Wall Street Journal reported that Weschler told his investors that $100 invested at the fund’s inception on January 14, 2000, had grown to $1,134 — after fees — by the time he announced the fund would be closing. Over that same period, $100 invested in the S&P 500 grew to only $104.08.
《华尔街日报》报道,韦施勒告诉他的投资者,2000 年 1 月 14 日基金成立时投资的 100 美元,到他宣布基金将关闭时已经增长到 1,134 美元(扣除费用)。在同一时期,投资于标准普尔 500 指数的 100 美元仅增长到 104.08 美元。

[15]On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted by 508 points (22.6%). This infamous day has since been immortalized as “Black Monday”.
1987 年 10 月 19 日,道琼斯工业平均指数暴跌 508 点(22.6%)。这个臭名昭著的日子因此被铭记为“黑色星期一”。

[16]When Weschler decided to leave, Peter Grace once again asked him to stay. “It was the disappointment of the year for my father,” said Patrick Grace, the CEO’s son. But, this time, Weschler could not be dissuaded and left with Terry Daniels to start Quad-C Management.
当韦施勒决定离开时,彼得·格雷斯再次请求他留下。“这是我父亲一年的失望,”首席执行官的儿子帕特里克·格雷斯说。但这一次,韦施勒无法被劝阻,和特里·丹尼尔斯一起离开,创办了 Quad-C 管理公司。

[17]In 1994, Charlie Munger mentioned this Buffett strategy during a commencement address at USC. According to Munger, Buffett often tells college students, “I could improve your ultimate financial welfare by giving you a ticket with only 20 slots in it, so that you had 20 punches — representing all the investments that you got to make in a lifetime. And once you’d punch through the card, you couldn’t make any more investments at all.”
在 1994 年,查理·芒格在南加州大学的毕业典礼上提到了巴菲特的这一策略。根据芒格的说法,巴菲特常常对大学生说:“我可以通过给你一张只有 20 个孔的票来改善你最终的财务状况,这样你就有 20 次机会——代表你一生中可以进行的所有投资。一旦你把这张卡上的孔打完,你就不能再进行任何投资。”

“You’d really have to think carefully about what you did, and you’d be forced to load up on what you really think about — so you’d do much better.”
“你真的需要仔细考虑你所做的事情,并且你会被迫认真思考你真正的想法——这样你会做得更好。”

[18]For more on TW Holdings, here’s a New York Times article from 1997 that details some of the company’s struggles.
有关 TW Holdings 的更多信息,请参阅一篇纽约时报的文章,该文章详细介绍了该公司的部分挣扎。

[19]Fred Festa, CEO of W.R Grace, once told the Wall Street Journal that “an exciting weekend for Ted” likely includes “spending time with his family and reading 10-Ks”. Weschler also reportedly brings 10-Ks and 10-Qs with him on vacation. A kindred spirit to Buffett.
W.R. Grace 的首席执行官 Fred Festa 曾告诉《华尔街日报》,“对 Ted 来说,一个令人兴奋的周末”可能包括“和家人共度时光以及阅读 10-K 表”。据报道,Weschler 在度假时也会带上 10-K 和 10-Q 表。与巴菲特志同道合。

[20]Some of the names in Weschler’s portfolio at Peninsula included DirecTV, Davita, Liberty Media, Valassis Communications, Cincinnati Bell, and Cogent Communications. It’s probably no coincidence that a few of these popped up at Berkshire shortly after Ted joined.
韦施勒在半岛的投资组合中包括了一些公司,如 DirecTV、Davita、自由媒体、Valassis 通讯、辛辛那提贝尔和 Cogent 通讯。几家公司在泰德加入后不久出现在伯克希尔,这可能并非巧合。

In 2009, Weschler also pounced on Bank of America when it sank during the GFC. The stock more than doubled over the following year and he sold for a tidy profit.
在 2009 年,韦施勒也在美国银行在全球金融危机期间下跌时出手。该股票在接下来的一年中翻了一番多,他以可观的利润卖出。

[21]This is an underreported aspect of Weschler’s work at Berkshire. He played a big role in the acquisition of Detlev Louis Motorradvertriebs GmbH in 2015 and other operations like buying dozens of newspapers from Media General and bidding on Residential Capital.
这是韦施勒在伯克希尔工作中一个被低估的方面。他在 2015 年收购德特勒夫·路易斯摩托车销售有限公司以及其他操作中发挥了重要作用,比如从媒体总公司购买数十家报纸和竞标住宅资本。

“He has a background in broad capital management — including private equity, mergers and acquisitions, owning businesses, and being directly involved in their management,” author Alice Schroeder told Bloomberg in 2012. “Warren keeps describing him as an investment manager, but the reality is [that] his skills are more comparable to those of Warren himself.”
“他在广泛的资本管理方面有背景——包括私募股权、并购、拥有企业以及直接参与其管理,”作者爱丽丝·施罗德在 彭博社 2012 年表示。“沃伦一直将他描述为投资经理,但现实是[他的]技能更可与沃伦本人相提并论。”

[22]In 2008, Berkshire agreed to buy $3 billion of perpetual preferred stock from General Electric. These high-yielding shares paid a 10% dividend. Berkshire also received warrants for $3 billion of common stock at a strike price of $22.25 per share, exercisable at any time over a five-year term. GE redeemed the shares in 2011 (at a 10% premium and after paying $900 million in dividends) and Berkshire sold off the common stock in 2017.
在 2008 年,伯克希尔同意以 30 亿美元购买通用电气的永久优先股。这些高收益的股票支付 10%的股息。伯克希尔还获得了价值 30 亿美元的普通股认股权证,行使价格为每股 22.25 美元,可在五年内的任何时间行使。通用电气在 2011 年赎回了这些股票(以 10%的溢价,并支付了 9 亿美元的股息),而伯克希尔在 2017 年出售了普通股。

[23]Berkshire bought $300 million of unsecured senior notes from the motorcycle maker — which paid an eye-popping 15% interest rate.
伯克希尔从这家摩托车制造商那里购买了 3 亿美元的无担保高级票据,利率高达惊人的 15%。

[24]Buffett picked up another double-digit yield from Tiffany’s — agreeing to purchase $250 million worth of eight-year and ten-year notes at a 10% interest rate.
巴菲特从蒂芙尼获得了另一个两位数的收益——同意以 10%的利率购买价值 2.5 亿美元的八年期和十年期债券。

[25]During this timeframe, Berkshire announced a large stake in HP (which has since been reduced) and additional purchases of Occidental Petroleum common stock.
在此期间,伯克希尔宣布对惠普的重大投资(此后已减少)以及对西方石油公司普通股的额外购买。

[26]Weschler’s father was an executive with A&P and, as a result, had to move his family from one major Midwestern city to another during Ted’s childhood.
韦施勒的父亲是 A&P 的高管,因此在泰德的童年时期,他不得不将家人从一个主要的中西部城市搬到另一个城市。

[27]For his twelfth birthday, Weschler’s aunt bought him twelve shares of stock in Litton Industries. “From that point, he was hooked on markets, thumbing through financial pages to follow Litton’s every move.”
在他十二岁生日时,韦施勒的姑姑给他买了十二股利顿工业公司的股票。“从那时起,他就对市场产生了浓厚的兴趣,翻阅财经页面,关注利顿的每一个动态。”

[28]He finished the 2007 New York City Marathon in 3:30:02.
他在 2007 年纽约市马拉松中以 3 小时 30 分 02 秒的成绩完赛。

[29]According to the Wall Street Journal, Weschler had amassed a record of running every day — no matter the weather — for over 25 years. He then took a day off just to prove to himself that he didn’t have to do it every single day.
根据《华尔街日报》,韦施勒已经连续超过 25 年每天跑步——无论天气如何。他随后休息了一天,只是为了向自己证明他并不需要每天都这样做。

[30]By all accounts, Ted Weschler is one of the most disciplined people that you could ever hope to meet. From running to investing, he goes all in — and never cuts any corners. “I can see why Warren Buffett would warm to him,” said Edwin Burton of the University of Virginia. “ He’s self-effacing, he takes his time … and he sees the world a little differently from others.”
据说,泰德·韦施勒是你可能遇到的最有纪律性的人之一。从跑步到投资,他全力以赴——从不走捷径。“我能理解沃伦·巴菲特为什么会对他产生好感,”弗吉尼亚大学的埃德温·伯顿说。“他谦逊,耐心……而且他看待世界的方式与众不同。”

Patrick Grace agrees. “Ted will spend months quietly in the corner trying to understand a particular issue, then he emerges like a quiet reporter of what he’s learned. Ted could be living in Tahiti doing what he’s doing. He’s so mentally disciplined.”
帕特里克·格雷斯同意。“泰德会在角落里安静地花几个月时间试图理解一个特定的问题,然后他像一个安静的记者一样呈现他所学到的东西。泰德完全可以在塔希提岛过着这样的生活。他的心理纪律性太强了。”

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