2022-05-04 Ed Mierzwinski.Credit Card Competition Act
Testimony of U.S. PIRG at a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Excessive Swipe Fees and Barriers to Competition in the Credit and Debit Card Systems 4 May 2022
美国公共利益研究集团在参议院司法委员会关于信用卡和借记卡系统中过高刷卡费和竞争壁垒的听证会上的证词 2022 年 5 月 4 日
Thank you, Chair Durbin, Senator Grassley and members of the Judiciary Committee.
感谢杜宾主席、格拉斯利参议员和司法委员会的成员。
My name is Ed Mierzwinski. I am senior director for federal consumer programs at the U.S. Public Interest Research Group. U.S. PIRG is an advocate for the public interest. We speak out for a healthier, safer world in which we’re freer to pursue our own individual well-being and the common good. U.S. PIRG serves as the national office of the nonprofit state Public Interest Research Groups.
我叫 Ed Mierzwinski。我是美国公共利益研究小组联邦消费者项目的高级主任。美国 PIRG 是公共利益的倡导者。我们为一个更健康、更安全的世界发声，在这个世界中，我们可以更自由地追求个人幸福和共同利益。美国 PIRG 是非营利性州公共利益研究小组的国家办公室。
As a consumer advocacy group, we have long supported credit and debit interchange (or swipe) fee reform and the Durbin amendment, which made debit interchange markets fairer.1
作为一个消费者权益倡导团体，我们长期支持信用卡和借记卡的互换费（或刷卡费）改革以及使借记卡互换市场更公平的杜宾修正案。
All consumers pay more at the store and more at the pump because of unfair, nonnegotiable, nontransparent merchant interchange fees imposed by the card networks.
由于卡网络施加的不公平、不可协商、不透明的商户交换费，所有消费者在商店和加油站支付更多。
These fees impose the greatest hardship on the most vulnerable consumers—the millions of American consumers without credit cards or banking relationships. These consumers, as cash customers, subsidize card usage by paying inflated prices for many goods and services. These prices are inflated by the billions of dollars of anticompetitive interchange fees, which are used to subsidize rewards programs, promotions, and riskier credit underwriting for credit card users.
这些费用对最脆弱的消费者——数百万没有信用卡或银行关系的美国消费者——造成了最大的困难。这些消费者作为现金客户，通过支付许多商品和服务的高价来补贴卡的使用。这些价格因数十亿美元的反竞争性交换费而被抬高，这些费用用于补贴奖励计划、促销活动以及信用卡用户的风险较高的信用承销。
And unfortunately, credit card interchange fees continue to accelerate, because there is nothing to restrain Visa and Mastercard from charging merchants, and their customers, even more.2 Just a few days ago, Visa and Mastercard raised interchange rates, despite the economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic and inflation.3 I believe that the big banks are happy with inflation --when gas prices double, their percentage-based interchange revenue doubles -- without the banks making anything or doing anything.
不幸的是，信用卡交换费继续加速上涨，因为没有什么能阻止 Visa 和 Mastercard 向商家及其客户收取更多费用。就在几天前，尽管疫情和通货膨胀带来了经济不确定性，Visa 和 Mastercard 仍然提高了交换费率。我相信大银行对通货膨胀感到满意——当油价翻倍时，它们基于百分比的交换收入也翻倍——而银行无需做任何事情或付出任何努力。
We commend this committee for its series of hearings and actions on making markets more competitive. Visa and Mastercard are classic examples of anti-competitive platforms that control two-sided markets.
我们赞扬该委员会为使市场更具竞争力而进行的一系列听证会和行动。Visa 和 Mastercard 是控制双边市场的反竞争平台的经典例子。
The interchange “market” represents a market failure. Merchants pay too much and cannot negotiate. Interchange rates are set, not by the banks that profit, but by Visa and Mastercard. Consumers bear the brunt of the higher prices as merchants are forced by payment networks rules to bake the swipe fee costs into the prices of the products they sell, yet are forbidden by card network rules from offering price signals to consumers to choose lower cost options for payment. Other jurisdictions, including Canada and the European Union, have imposed much more significant restrictions on interchange practices to correct the market failure.
“市场”互换代表了一种市场失灵。商家支付过多且无法协商。互换费率不是由获利的银行设定，而是由 Visa 和 Mastercard 设定。消费者承受更高价格的负担，因为商家被支付网络规则迫使将刷卡费成本纳入其销售产品的价格中，但又被卡网络规则禁止向消费者提供价格信号以选择更低成本的支付选项。包括加拿大和欧盟在内的其他司法管辖区已经对互换做法施加了更为显著的限制，以纠正市场失灵。
Of course, ever-rising swipe fees that defy gravity act as a form of reverse competition to convince more banks to join the payment networks that set them. A rising interchange tide raises all bank boats, but it drowns merchants and consumers.
当然，不断上涨的刷卡费违背常理，作为一种反向竞争的形式，促使更多银行加入设定这些费用的支付网络。上涨的交换费潮水抬高了所有银行的船，但却淹没了商家和消费者。
We present the following main points:
我们提出以下要点：
I.The Durbin amendment was a well-thought-out approach to the payment networks’ market failure but the Federal Reserve must act to improve compliance:
I.杜宾修正案是对支付网络市场失灵的深思熟虑的方法，但美联储必须采取行动以改善合规性：
The Durbin amendment provided the Federal Reserve Board with the authority to cap certain, but not all, fees for debit interchange under rules that require the fees be “reasonable and proportional” to the cost of conducting the transaction, rather than based on what the card networks call ‘‘value’’ which really means ‘‘whatever they want and they can get.’’
杜宾修正案赋予联邦储备委员会权力，根据要求费用“合理且与交易成本成比例”的规则，限制某些（但不是所有）借记卡交换费用，而不是基于卡网络所谓的“价值”，实际上意味着“他们想要什么就是什么，他们能得到什么就是什么”。
没有提到信用卡。
The Durbin amendment also took steps to improve competition in debit card network routing. More needs to be done to improve this provision, especially since the bulk of innovation in this space is in those networks not controlled by Visa and Mastercard. Merchants would like to choose from these other innovative networks, which Federal Reserve Board action could enable.
杜宾修正案还采取措施改善借记卡网络路由的竞争。需要做更多工作来改进这一条款，特别是因为该领域的大部分创新都在不受 Visa 和万事达卡控制的网络中。商家希望能够选择这些其他创新网络，美联储委员会的行动可以实现这一点。
Much of the bank, credit union and card network complaining about the Durbin amendment, especially during the implementation of Regulation II, had focused on its supposed government price-fixing – its cap on certain debit card swipe fees. Now, they defend their defiance of the Durbin amendment’s also- important routing requirements.
许多银行、信用社和卡网络抱怨杜宾修正案，尤其是在实施《条例二》期间，主要集中在其所谓的政府定价——对某些借记卡刷卡费的上限。现在，他们为自己无视杜宾修正案同样重要的路由要求进行辩护。
The Durbin amendment was always about more than stopping excessive rent-seeking. It was also designed to promote the development of a competitive payment network marketplace. The Fed’s recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on debit routing sends an important signal that conduct inconsistent with the Durbin amendment will not be tolerated. The Federal Reserve’s NPR makes simple clarifications that protect the Section 920 routing provisions required by the Durbin amendment that promote competition.
杜宾修正案一直不仅仅是为了阻止过度的寻租行为。它还旨在促进竞争性支付网络市场的发展。美联储最近关于借记卡路由的拟议规则制定通知发出了一个重要信号，即不符合杜宾修正案的行为将不被容忍。美联储的 NPR 做出了简单的澄清，以保护杜宾修正案要求的第 920 节路由条款，从而促进竞争。
In particular, the NPR would make clearer that EFTA4 Section 920 and its regulations:
特别是，NPR 将更清楚地表明 EFTA4 第 920 节及其法规：
1) “forbid issuers and payment card networks from restricting the number of such networks to fewer than two unaffiliated networks (“prohibition on network exclusivity”)” and
“禁止发行人和支付卡网络将此类网络的数量限制为少于两个无关联网络（“禁止网络排他性”）”和
2) “forbid issuers and payment card networks from directly or indirectly inhibiting any person that accepts debit cards for payment from directing the routing of an electronic debit transaction over any network that may process that transaction (“prohibition on routing restrictions”).
2) “禁止发行人和支付卡网络直接或间接阻止任何接受借记卡付款的人通过任何可以处理该交易的网络引导电子借记卡交易的路由（“禁止路由限制”）。
Importantly, in its comments on these draft rules, the U.S. DOJ said:
重要的是，美国司法部在对这些草案规则的评论中表示：
“Consumers of financial services, like all consumers, benefit from competition. […] Increasing the competitiveness of the debit payment market is particularly important given that competition in the debit market is very limited today. The debit payment market is highly concentrated—over 75% of transactions are processed by two firms, Visa and Mastercard. The online debit payment market is even more concentrated with Visa and Mastercard collectively accounting for over 90%, and Visa alone accounting for approximately 70%. This gives incumbent debit networks a significant amount of leverage when negotiating with merchants over the price charged to merchants for the use of their respective debit networks. Lacking competitive alternatives, merchants must pay higher transaction fees that are passed on to consumers in the price of goods and services.”5 [emphasis added]
“金融服务的消费者，和所有消费者一样，从竞争中受益。[…] 鉴于今天借记卡市场的竞争非常有限，提高借记支付市场的竞争力尤为重要。借记支付市场高度集中——超过 75%的交易由两家公司处理，Visa 和 Mastercard。在线借记支付市场更加集中，Visa 和 Mastercard 合计占据超过 90%，而 Visa 单独占据约 70%。这使得现有的借记网络在与商家谈判使用其各自借记网络的价格时具有显著的影响力。由于缺乏竞争性替代方案，商家必须支付更高的交易费用，这些费用通过商品和服务的价格转嫁给消费者。”
We support the rules under consideration at the Federal Reserve to improve debit card routing choices for merchants as required by the Durbin amendment.6 We note that the Department of Justice7 and the FTC,8 our two government competition cops, have also offered supportive comments to the Fed.
我们支持美联储正在考虑的规则，以改善商家在借记卡路由选择方面的选择，正如杜宾修正案所要求的那样。我们注意到，司法部和联邦贸易委员会这两个政府竞争监管机构也向美联储提供了支持性意见。
II. The banks have spent years developing and promoting false counter-factual narratives about the impacts of consumer protection rules and the Durbin amendment specifically on both the declining number of banks and the fees bank customers pay:
II. 银行多年来一直在开发和宣传关于消费者保护规则及杜宾修正案对银行数量减少和银行客户支付费用的影响的虚假反事实叙述：
The decline in the number of financial institutions began many years ago. The reason is two-fold, according to a study by the St. Louis Fed: there are fewer “de novo” banks and there are more bank mergers.9 Also, according to this study, “A large number of banks failed during the 1980s and early 1990s, and again during and after the 2007-09 financial crisis.”10 The Durbin amendment, which was enacted in 2010 and didn’t take effect until 2011, should not be blamed for a trend that largely predated it.
金融机构数量的下降始于多年前。根据圣路易斯联邦储备银行的一项研究，原因有两个：一是“新设”银行减少，二是银行合并增多。此外，根据这项研究，“大量银行在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代初期倒闭，并在 2007-09 年金融危机期间及之后再次倒闭。”2010 年颁布并于 2011 年生效的杜宾修正案不应被归咎于这一大多早于其出现的趋势。
The Durbin amendment has neither forced nor caused banks to raise other consumer fees. The reality is that banks raise fees whenever they can and often cite the latest regulation, especially the Durbin amendment, as their excuse.11 Banks raised consumer fees whenever they could before the Durbin amendment and they raised fees whenever they could after the Durbin amendment. High bank fees remain a problem; we strongly support the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s inquiry12 into “junk fees.13 The banks, in their propaganda to the Congress, cite a recent GAO study that is largely based on anecdotal votes of a few bank stakeholders to impugn the Durbin amendment.14
杜宾修正案既没有强迫也没有导致银行提高其他消费者费用。现实情况是，银行总是尽可能提高费用，并且经常以最新的法规，尤其是杜宾修正案，作为借口。在杜宾修正案之前，银行在可能的情况下提高了消费者费用，在杜宾修正案之后，他们也在可能的情况下提高了费用。高额银行费用仍然是一个问题；我们强烈支持消费者金融保护局对“垃圾费用”的调查。银行在向国会宣传时，引用了一项最近的政府问责办公室研究，该研究主要基于少数银行利益相关者的轶事性投票，以抨击杜宾修正案。
Along with other consumer groups, U.S. PIRG has long been concerned that despite all the taxpayer benefits provided to the insured banking system—from taxpayer-guaranteed deposit insurance to the Federal Reserve discount window and even to bailouts—banks have either chosen to ignore or been unwilling to provide the un- and under-banked with reasonably-priced accounts. Consequently, many have become victims of the fringe banking system—payday lenders, rent-to-own stores, check cashers, etc. But this was true both before and after the Durbin Amendment took effect. While the FDIC notes that the number of unbanked households has dropped in recent years, it finds that “An estimated 5.4 percent of U.S. households (approximately 7.1 million) were “unbanked” in 2019, meaning that no one in the household had a checking or savings account at a bank or credit union (i.e., bank).”15 As mentioned earlier, cash customers, such as unbanked consumers, are hurt the most by the inflated retail prices that result from high interchange fees.
美国公共利益研究集团（U.S. PIRG）与其他消费者团体一样，长期以来一直担心，尽管投保银行系统从纳税人担保的存款保险到美联储贴现窗口甚至救助中获得了所有纳税人利益，银行要么选择忽视，要么不愿意为未开户和开户不足的人提供价格合理的账户。因此，许多人成为边缘银行系统的受害者——发薪日贷款公司、租购商店、支票兑现商等。但这一情况在杜宾修正案生效前后都是如此。虽然联邦存款保险公司指出，近年来无银行账户家庭的数量有所下降，但其发现“2019 年，估计有 5.4%的美国家庭（约 710 万）是‘无银行账户’的，这意味着家庭中没有人在银行或信用社（即银行）拥有支票或储蓄账户。”正如前面提到的，现金客户，如无银行账户的消费者，受到高交换费导致的零售价格上涨的最大伤害。
III. Interchange fees represent a broken market, and all consumers, even those who pay with cash and checks, pay more at the store and more at the pump when interchange fees go up.
III. 交换费代表了一个失灵的市场，所有消费者，即使是用现金和支票支付的消费者，当交换费上涨时，在商店和加油站都要支付更多。
The significant increases in interchange fees signal a broken market. Courts have held that Visa and Mastercard have market power, which allows them to dictate the terms of trade: merchants have no choice but to accept Visa and Mastercard products on the sellers’ terms.16 In the absence of broader regulation, including on credit interchange, interchange fees have increased significantly and are much higher in the United States than other countries.
交换费的大幅增加表明市场失灵。法院认为 Visa 和 Mastercard 拥有市场力量，这使他们能够决定交易条款：商家别无选择，只能接受 Visa 和 Mastercard 产品的卖方条款。在缺乏更广泛的监管（包括信用交换）的情况下，交换费显著增加，并且在美国远高于其他国家。
In 2021, according to the Nilson Report, Visa and Mastercard charged merchants a total of $105.54 billion in credit and debit card fees. U.S. merchants paid out a staggering $77.48 billion in credit card fees and $28.06 billion in debit card fees imposed by Visa and Mastercard.17 And just last week, Visa and Mastercard further increased many of their interchange fee rates. I am sure that the merchant witnesses today will offer details on how the purported accompanying “decreases” in some fees are largely illusory.
根据尼尔森报告，2021 年，Visa 和 Mastercard 向商家收取的信用卡和借记卡费用总计为 1055.4 亿美元。美国商家支付了惊人的 774.8 亿美元信用卡费用和 280.6 亿美元借记卡费用，这些费用由 Visa 和 Mastercard 收取。就在上周，Visa 和 Mastercard 进一步提高了许多的交换费率。我相信今天的商家证人将提供详细信息，说明所谓的某些费用“减少”在很大程度上是虚幻的。
The card associations’ rules prevent merchants from informing consumers on the costs of payment and limit the ability of merchants to direct consumers to the safest, lowest cost and most efficient forms of payment. If markets are non-transparent and consumers cannot receive price signals, then they cannot take actions to restrain unfair practices.
卡组织的规则阻止商家告知消费者支付成本，并限制商家引导消费者使用最安全、成本最低和最有效的支付方式的能力。如果市场不透明，消费者无法接收到价格信号，那么他们就无法采取行动来遏制不公平的做法。
IV. The interchange market has prices that are set not by the acquiring or issuing banks, but by the card networks. Neither the card-issuance or card network markets are competitive.
IV. 交换市场的价格不是由收单行或发卡行设定的，而是由卡网络设定的。无论是发卡市场还是卡网络市场都没有竞争性。
The card-issuance market is highly concentrated. The Top Ten card issuers “controlled 81% of the credit card market based on receivables and 85% based on purchase transactions in 2019.18” This oligopolistic concentration has allowed issuers to engage in a variety of unfair and anti-consumer practices.
发卡市场高度集中。十大发卡机构“在 2019 年基于应收账款控制了 81%的信用卡市场，基于购买交易控制了 85%的市场。”这种寡头垄断的集中使发卡机构能够从事各种不公平和反消费者的行为。
For example, the “honor all cards” rule means what it says. U.S. merchants (but not European merchants) must accept all cards branded Visa or Mastercard, despite wide ranges of interchange (unknown to the merchant or consumer).19
例如，“接受所有卡片”规则就是字面意思。美国商家（但不是欧洲商家）必须接受所有带有 Visa 或 Mastercard 标志的卡片，尽管存在广泛的交换费率（商家或消费者未知）。
Further, merchants cannot signal consumers to pay with cards that carry lower interchange fee rates, and as the network offers more and more rewards cards with higher and higher interchange fees, the merchants are compelled to raise overall prices to pay for the fees associated with the cards.
此外，商家不能暗示消费者使用具有较低交换费率的卡支付，并且随着网络提供越来越多的具有更高交换费的奖励卡，商家被迫提高整体价格以支付与这些卡相关的费用。
The enormity of the interchange fee competition problems is perhaps best shown by the massive antitrust lawsuit that Visa and Mastercard have offered to settle with thousands of merchants for over $6 billion dollars, said to be the largest antitrust settlement ever.20 Why would they offer to settle for such a sum?
交换费竞争问题的严重性可能最好地体现在 Visa 和万事达卡提出与数千家商户以超过 60 亿美元和解的大规模反垄断诉讼，据说这是有史以来最大的反垄断和解。为什么他们会提出以如此巨额和解？
In fact, most merchants, large and small, have opted out and objected to the settlement and it is still not decided. Other than the cash to merchants, the settlement’s terms do little to end the unfair conduct that the networks are accused of. In fact, the settlement would bar any merchants, including future merchants, from suing Visa or Mastercard, even for future illegal payment network practices. Such a settlement does not protect merchants or consumers, nor does it promote innovation or choice.
事实上，大多数大大小小的商家都选择退出并反对和解，目前尚未决定。除了向商家支付现金外，和解条款对结束网络被指控的不公平行为几乎没有帮助。事实上，该和解将禁止任何商家，包括未来的商家，起诉 Visa 或 Mastercard，即使是针对未来的非法支付网络行为。这样的和解既不能保护商家或消费者，也不能促进创新或选择。
V. Other jurisdictions have done far more to rein in the debit and credit card market failures.
V. 其他司法管辖区在遏制借记卡和信用卡市场失灵方面做得更多。
Canada’s non-profit Interac system sets low fixed prices for certain debit fees and no fee for debit interchange.21
加拿大的非营利组织 Interac 系统为某些借记费用设定了低固定价格，并且借记交换不收取费用。
The European Union’s Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR) is an exemplar of government action. A study looking at the results of this regulation found the following:
欧盟的《跨行手续费条例》（IFR）是政府行动的典范。一项研究调查了该条例的结果，发现如下：
Overall, it can be concluded that major positive results have been achieved through the implementation of the IFR (Cf. Part A), including but not limited to reduced merchants' charges resulting ultimately in improved services to consumers or lower consumer prices and enhanced market integration.22
总的来说，可以得出结论，通过实施 IFR（参见 A 部分）取得了重大的积极成果，包括但不限于降低商家的费用，最终改善了消费者服务或降低了消费者价格，并加强了市场整合。
U.S. interchange fees have a complex schedule set by Visa and Mastercard but merchants indicate that they generally pay 2-3% in interchange.23 European fees, then, are only 10% of those U.S. interchange fees. As the EU announced upon implementing this regulation:
美国的交换费由 Visa 和 Mastercard 设定了复杂的收费标准，但商家表示他们通常支付 2-3%的交换费。欧洲的费用仅为美国交换费的 10%。正如欧盟在实施这一规定时宣布的：
“As a general rule, the Regulation will cap interchange fees at 0.2% of the transaction value for consumer debit cards and at 0.3% for consumer credit cards. […] Furthermore, the Regulation removes major obstacles to technological innovation in payment options. Technologies that allow consumers to pay with their debit or credit cards online or using their mobile phones (with apps, fingerprints, contactless "swipes", etc.), are readily available. However, uncertainty on the rules regarding interchange fees has been one of the factors holding up the use of these technologies. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, in charge of competition policy, said: "For too long, uncompetitive and hidden bank interchange fees have increased costs of merchants and consumers. Today's vote has brought us another step closer to putting an end to this. This legislation will put a cap on interchange fees, make them more transparent and remove a hurdle to rolling out innovative payment technologies. It is good for consumers, good for business and good for innovation and growth in Europe. As cards are the most widely used means of online payment, this Regulation is also an important building block to complete the European Digital Single Market."24
根据一般规则，法规将把消费者借记卡的交易价值的互换费上限设定为 0.2%，消费者信用卡的上限设定为 0.3%。[…]此外，法规消除了支付选项中技术创新的主要障碍。允许消费者在线或使用手机（通过应用程序、指纹、非接触式“刷卡”等）使用借记卡或信用卡支付的技术已经广泛可用。然而，关于互换费规则的不确定性一直是阻碍这些技术使用的因素之一。负责竞争政策的专员玛格丽特·维斯塔格表示：“长期以来，不具竞争力且隐蔽的银行互换费增加了商家和消费者的成本。今天的投票使我们更接近于结束这一现象。这项立法将对互换费设定上限，使其更加透明，并消除推出创新支付技术的障碍。这对消费者、对企业以及对欧洲的创新和增长都是有利的。” 由于银行卡是最广泛使用的在线支付方式，因此该法规也是完成欧洲数字单一市场的重要组成部分。
欧洲管理的这么出色，为什么Visa、Mastercard都是美国公司？
VI. Actions by the FTC and DOJ over the last decade have also helped improve competition.
在过去十年中，联邦贸易委员会和司法部的行动也有助于改善竞争。
For example, a 2016 FTC investigation forced Visa to improve merchants’ ability to offer price signals to consumers.25 The market is still non-transparent. Consumers need to see their choices to act on them.
例如，2016 年 FTC 的一项调查迫使 Visa 改善商家向消费者提供价格信号的能力。市场仍然不透明。消费者需要看到他们的选择才能采取行动。
The Department of Justice filed a lawsuit to block Visa from acquiring nascent competitor Plaid and the merger was later dropped. From the DOJ release:
美国司法部提起诉讼，阻止 Visa 收购新兴竞争对手 Plaid，合并案随后被放弃。根据司法部的声明：
“Millions of American consumers and merchants depend on debit services to transact business online. The complaint alleges that Visa has dominated online debit for years and has protected its monopoly with exclusionary tactics that have prevented rivals, including Mastercard, from expanding or entering. The lawsuit alleges that Visa’s proposed acquisition of Plaid is a violation of both Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”26
“数百万美国消费者和商家依赖借记服务进行在线交易。投诉称，Visa 多年来一直主导在线借记卡，并通过排他性策略保护其垄断地位，阻止了包括万事达卡在内的竞争对手扩展或进入。诉讼称，Visa 拟议收购 Plaid 违反了《谢尔曼法》第 2 条和《克莱顿法》第 7 条。”
VII. Other Marketplace Problems Are Enabled by the Lack of Competition in Interchange
VII.其他市场问题因交换缺乏竞争而得以助长
Most importantly, the most vulnerable consumers, those without credit cards, receive nothing from interchange, and subsidize the supposedly ‘‘free gift’’ of rewards programs for more affluent consumers.
最重要的是，最脆弱的消费者，即那些没有信用卡的人，从交换中得不到任何东西，并补贴了所谓的“免费礼物”——为更富裕的消费者提供的奖励计划。
Further, any system that allows sellers to control the terms of trade in anti-competitive ways— prohibiting discounts or prohibiting advising customers so that they can understand the differences between the costs of a rewards credit, plain old classic credit, debit, check or cash transaction—is a non-transparent system. Consumers always benefit from transparency. Is there a situation where they have not?
此外，任何允许卖方以反竞争方式控制交易条款的系统——禁止折扣或禁止向客户提供建议以便他们了解奖励信用、普通经典信用、借记、支票或现金交易之间的成本差异——都是不透明的系统。消费者总是从透明中受益。有没有他们没有受益的情况？
Since interchange is highest for rewards cards, especially rewards credit cards, that means cash customers and checking account customers with low-cost debit cards are subsidizing the most affluent credit card customers.
由于奖励卡，尤其是奖励信用卡的交换费最高，这意味着现金客户和使用低成本借记卡的支票账户客户正在补贴最富裕的信用卡客户。
Recommendations: 建议：
Urge the FRB to complete the debit card routing rule discussed in Section I above.
敦促美联储完成上文第一节中讨论的借记卡路由规则。
Expand the Durbin amendment – both its placing of reasonable limits on network-established interchange fees and its other pro-competition improvements to marketplace practices - to credit cards.
扩大杜宾修正案——包括对网络设定的交换费的合理限制及其对市场行为的其他促进竞争的改进——至信用卡。
Conclusion
Despite the successes of the Durbin amendment, swipe or interchange fees are non-negotiable, rising in the U.S. and harming consumers as well as merchants. Merchants and consumers are angry. And as we found out in 2010 at your previous hearing, Chair Durbin, even the U.S. government cannot negotiate its interchange fees.27 It is not just consumers. It is not just merchants. It is also the Federal Government that pays too much in nonnegotiable, nontransparent interchange fees. It is time for more to be done. I look forward to working with you and the committee on solutions to the broken card network market.
尽管杜宾修正案取得了成功，但刷卡或交换费是不可协商的，在美国不断上涨，损害了消费者和商家。商家和消费者都很愤怒。正如我们在 2010 年您之前的听证会上发现的那样，杜宾主席，即使是美国政府也无法协商其交换费。不仅仅是消费者。不仅仅是商家。联邦政府也支付了过高的不可协商、不透明的交换费。是时候采取更多措施了。我期待与您和委员会合作，解决破碎的卡网络市场问题。
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