2023-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2023-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.
查理·芒格，我长期的搭档，与我肩负着管理众多个人储蓄的职责。我们感激他们持久的信任，这种关系常常贯穿其成年大部分岁月。正是这些忠诚的储蓄者在我写这封信时最先浮现在脑海。

A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.
一种普遍看法是，人们在年轻时选择储蓄，从而期望在退休后维持生活水平。该理论认为，去世时剩余的任何资产通常会留给家人，或者可能留给朋友和慈善事业。

Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.
我们的经历则有所不同。我们认为，伯克希尔的个人持有人大多属于“一旦储蓄，终身储蓄”类型。虽然这些人生活优渥，但他们最终会将大部分资金捐赠给慈善组织。这些组织再通过支出将资金重新分配，以改善许多与最初捐赠者毫无关系的人的生活。有时，成效非凡。

The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.
金钱的处置揭示人性。查理和我欣喜地看到，伯克希尔创造的大量资金流向公共需求，同时，我们的股东很少选择炫耀性资产或打造家族王朝。

Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?
有谁不乐意为像我们这样的股东工作呢？

What We Do
我们的工作

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.
查理和我在伯克希尔将您的储蓄分配到两种相关的所有权形式之间。首先，我们投资于我们能够控制的企业，通常是购买其100%的股份。伯克希尔负责这些子公司的资本配置，并挑选负责日常经营决策的首席执行官。当管理大型企业时，信任和规章都必不可少。伯克希尔对前者的强调达到非同寻常——有人甚至认为是极端——的程度。失望在所难免。对于业务失误，我们可以理解；对个人不当行为，我们的容忍度为零。

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.
在第二类所有权中，我们购买上市公司股票，通过这种方式被动持有企业的一部分股权。持有这些投资时，我们对管理层没有任何发言权。

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
在这两种所有权形式中，我们的目标都是在具有持久良好经济特性并且管理者值得信赖的企业中进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有上市公司股票是基于我们对其长期经营表现的预期，而不是把它们视为灵活买卖的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是“选择股票”，而是“选择企业”。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”
多年来，我犯过许多错误。因此，我们庞大的企业组合目前包括少数真正拥有卓越经济特性的企业，许多具有非常良好经济特性的企业，以及一大批边缘型企业。与此同时，我曾投资过的其他企业已经消亡，它们的产品不再为公众所需。资本主义有两面性：这个体系在不断制造越来越多的失败者的同时，也源源不断地提供更好的商品和服务。熊彼特将这一现象称为“创造性毁灭”。

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.
我们的上市投资板块有一个优势——在某些时点，买入优秀企业的股份并以极佳价格成交会变得轻而易举。必须明白的是，股票经常以极其愚蠢的价格交易，无论高低。“有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，流通股票和债券的表现令人费解，其行为通常只能在事后才能解释。

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.
受控企业则是另一种类型。它们有时会被赋予远高于合理价值的荒谬价格，但几乎从不会以便宜的估值出售。除非迫不得已，受控企业的所有者绝不会考虑以恐慌式估值出售。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)
此时，给自己打一份成绩单再合适不过：在伯克希尔58年的管理生涯中，我的大多数资本配置决策只能算平平。有些情况下，我的失误是靠着天大的运气才得以挽回。（还记得我们在 USAir 和所罗门公司险些酿成的灾难最终侥幸脱身吗？我可记得清清楚楚。）

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.
我们令人满意的成绩来自大约十来个真正出色的决策——大约每五年一个——以及一个常被忽视却对伯克希尔这类长期投资者颇为有利的优势。让我们揭开帷幕一探究竟。

The Secret Sauce
秘诀所在

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was \$1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.
1994年8月——是的，就是1994年——伯克希尔完成了历时七年的收购，买下了我们如今持有的4亿股可口可乐股份。总成本为13亿美元——在当时对伯克希尔而言是一笔相当可观的金额。

The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was \$75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to \$704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.
1994年，我们从可口可乐收到的现金股息为7,500万美元。到了2022年，这项股息已增至7.04亿美元。增长年年如期而至，就像生日一样确定。查理和我需要做的只是兑现可口可乐的季度股息支票。我们预计这些支票极有可能继续增加。

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost \$1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from \$41 million to \$302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.
美国运通的故事大体相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的买入基本在1995年完成，巧合的是成本同样为13亿美元。从这项投资获得的年度股息已从4,100万美元增长到3.02亿美元。那些支票看起来也极有可能继续增加。

These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at \$25 billion while Amex was recorded at \$22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.
这些股息的增长虽令人欣喜，却并非惊天动地。但它们伴随着股价的显著提升。年末，我们在可口可乐上的投资价值250亿美元，而美国运通则记为220亿美元。两项持仓如今各占伯克希尔净值的约5%，与多年前的权重相仿。

Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its \$1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged \$80 million or so of annual income.
假设我在1990年代犯下了一笔规模相当的投资错误，该投资一路横盘，到2022年仍只值13亿美元。（例如一只高评级30年期债券。）那笔令人失望的投资如今只占伯克希尔净值的0.3%，每年也仅为我们带来约8,000万美元、毫无增长的收益。

The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.
给投资者的启示：当鲜花绽放，杂草便失去存在感。随着时间推移，只需少数赢家便能创造奇迹。当然，早点开始并活到九十多岁也大有裨益。

The Past Year in Brief
年度简报

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at \$30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:
2022年伯克希尔表现良好。公司的经营利润——我们根据公认会计准则（“GAAP”）计算并剔除股权投资资本收益或损失后的收益指标——创下了308亿美元的纪录。查理和我着重关注这一经营性数字，并建议您也如此关注。未经我们调整的GAAP数据在每个报告日期都会剧烈且随意地波动。请注意其在2022年的“杂技表演”，这绝非罕见：


The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
从季度甚至年度的角度来看，GAAP 收益具有 100% 的误导性。诚然，资本收益在过去几十年对伯克希尔极为重要，我们也预期在未来几十年将继续带来显著贡献。但它们按季度的剧烈波动经常被媒体不加思索地当作头条，这完全误导了投资者。

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
伯克希尔去年取得的第二个积极进展是我们收购了Alleghany Corporation，这是一家由乔·布兰登掌舵的财产保险公司。我过去与乔共事过，他既了解伯克希尔也精通保险。Alleghany为我们带来特殊价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够采取几乎所有竞争对手都无法实现的宝贵且持久的投资策略。

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from \$147 billion to \$164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
在Alleghany的助力下，我们的保险浮存金在 2022 年从 1,470 亿美元增至 1,640 亿美元。通过审慎的承保，这些资金有相当机会随着时间推移实现零成本。自 1967 年收购我们的第一家财产保险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮存金已通过并购、经营和创新增长了 8,000 倍。尽管在我们的财务报表中未被列示，这笔浮存金对伯克希尔来说是一项非同寻常的资产。新股东可以通过阅读我们在 A-2 页每年更新的浮存金说明来了解其价值。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
在2022年，通过伯克希尔回购股份以及苹果和美国运通——我们两家重要被投资公司——采取的类似行动，每股内在价值出现了轻微提升。在伯克希尔，我们通过回购公司已发行股份的1.2%，直接提高了您在我们独特业务组合中的持股比例。而在苹果和美国运通，因为它们的回购，伯克希尔的持股比例也略有上升，且我们无需付出任何成本。

The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
这其中的数学原理并不复杂：当股份数量减少时，您在我们众多业务中的权益就会上升。如果回购是在增值价格进行，那么任何一点点都能带来帮助。同样确定的是，当一家公司为回购支付过高价格时，留下的股东就会受损。在这种情况下，收益只会流向出售股票的股东以及那位友好但收费昂贵、建议进行愚蠢回购的投行人士。

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?
需要强调的是，增值回购带来的收益在各个方面都惠及所有所有者。请设想，某家本地汽车经销商有三位信息充分的股东，其中一位负责经营。再设想，其中一位被动股东希望以对剩余两位股东具有吸引力的价格，将其股份卖回给公司。交易完成后，这是否伤害了任何人？经理人是否因此比留下的被动股东获得特殊利益？公众是否受损？

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
如果有人告诉你所有回购都会伤害股东或国家，或者特别有利于首席执行官，那么你听到的要么是经济文盲的言论，要么是能言善辩的煽动者（这两类身份并不互斥）。

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.
伯克希尔2022年的运营细节几乎无穷无尽，详列于K-33至K-66页。查理和我，以及许多伯克希尔股东，都喜欢仔细研读该部分列出的众多事实和数字。然而，这些页面并非必读材料。有许多伯克希尔的亿万富豪，甚至十亿富豪，从未研究过我们的财务数据。他们只知道查理和我——以及我们的家人和亲密朋友——依然在伯克希尔持有极为可观的投资，并且他们信任我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的资金。

And that is a promise we can make.
这正是我们能够许下的承诺。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.
最后，一个重要的警示：即便是我们偏好的经营收益指标，也很容易被有意为之的管理者操纵。此类篡改常被 CEO、董事及其顾问视为“高明之举”。记者和分析师也欣然接受其存在。超越“预期”被吹嘘为管理层的胜利。

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
这种做法令人作呕。操纵数字无需才能：只需强烈的欺骗欲望即可。“大胆而富想象力的会计”，正如一位 CEO 曾向我描述他的欺诈行为，已成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

58 Years – and a Few Figures
58 年——以及少许数字

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.
1965 年，伯克希尔只是一匹单一业务的小马——一家历史悠久却注定失败的新英格兰纺织企业的所有者。随着该业务步入死亡行军，伯克希尔迫切需要重新起步。回头看，我当时对问题严重性的认识过于迟缓。

And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.
随后幸运降临：1967 年，National Indemnity 可供收购，我们将资源转向保险及其他非纺织业务。

Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.
于是，我们开启了通往 2023 年的征程，这是一条颠簸之路，融合了所有者的持续储蓄（即保留盈余）、复利威力、我们避免重大错误以及——最重要的——“美国顺风”。没有伯克希尔，美国依然会表现良好；反之则不然。

Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S\&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.
如今，伯克希尔在一系列无可匹敌的庞大而多元化企业中拥有重要权益。让我们首先看看每日在纳斯达克、纽交所以及相关市场交易的大约 5,000 家上市公司。标普 500 指数成员——一批美国大型知名企业——便位列其中。

In aggregate, the 500 earned \$1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned \$3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.
整体来看，这 500 家公司在 2021 年赚取了 1.8 万亿美元。我目前尚未获得 2022 年的最终数据。因此，沿用 2021 年数字，在这 500 家企业中，仅有 128 家（包括伯克希尔本身）赚取了 30 亿美元或更多。实际上，有 23 家出现亏损。

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.
截至 2022 年底，伯克希尔是以下八家巨头的最大股东：美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普公司、穆迪、西方石油以及派拉蒙全球。

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the \$3 billion mark noted above (\$5.9 billion at BNSF and \$4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.
除了这八家被投资公司外，伯克希尔还拥有 BNSF 100% 股权和 BH Energy 92% 股权，两者的收益均超过上述 30 亿美元门槛（BNSF 为 59 亿美元，BHE 为 43 亿美元）。假如这些公司公开上市，它们将取代现有标普 500 成员中的两席。总体而言，我们控制和非控制的十家巨无霸使伯克希尔与国家经济未来的契合度高于任何其他美国公司。（此计算未包含养老基金、投资公司等“受托”型业务。）此外，伯克希尔的保险业务虽通过众多独立管理的子公司运营，其价值可与 BNSF 或 BHE 比肩。

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.
展望未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，并保持多元化的业务组合。我们也会避免任何可能在不合时宜的时刻造成现金短缺的行为，包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失。我们的首席执行官将永远兼任首席风险官——这项任务委派给他人是不负责任的。此外，我们未来的首席执行官将把其净资产的重要部分投入伯克希尔股票，而且必须用自有资金购买。是的，我们的股东将继续通过保留盈余来储蓄并实现财富增长。

At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.
在伯克希尔，没有终点线。

Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes
关于联邦税收的一些令人意外的事实

During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about \$32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent \$43.9 trillion.
在截至2021年的十年里，美国财政部共收到约32.3万亿美元的税收收入，而支出达到43.9万亿美元。

Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.
尽管经济学家、政治人物以及许多公众对这一巨大失衡的后果各抒己见，查理和我自认并不清楚其影响，而且坚信短期的经济和市场预测不仅无用，甚至有害。我们的职责是以能够在长期取得理想结果的方式管理伯克希尔的运营和财务，并在金融恐慌或全球严重衰退发生时，保持公司无可匹敌的持久力。伯克希尔还对失控的通胀提供有限的防护，但这一属性并不完美。庞大且根深蒂固的财政赤字终将产生后果。

The \$32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (34½%), corporate income tax payments (8½%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was \$32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.
这32万亿美元的收入来自个人所得税（48%）、社会保障及相关收入（34½%）、公司所得税（8½%）以及各种较小税项。伯克希尔在该十年通过公司所得税贡献了320亿美元，几乎正好占财政部征收总额的千分之一。

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.
这意味着——请做好心理准备——如果美国大约有1,000个纳税者的税款与伯克希尔持平，那么其他企业及全国1.31亿户家庭都无需向联邦政府缴纳任何税款——一分钱也不用。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:
百万、十亿、万亿——我们都熟知这些词，但其中蕴含的金额几乎难以想象。让我们用直观的物理尺度来呈现这些数字：

• If you convert \$1 million into newly-printed \$100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
• 如果把100万美元换成崭新的100美元纸币，那么这叠钞票能堆到你胸口那么高。

• Perform the same exercise with \$1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3⁄4 of a mile into the sky.
• 若把10亿美元也如此堆叠——事情开始变得刺激！——纸币塔将高达约3/4英里（约1.2公里）。

• Finally, imagine piling up \$32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.
• 最后，想象一下把320亿美元——伯克希尔在2012至2021年期间缴纳的联邦所得税总额——堆成纸币塔。那么，这座钞票塔将突破21英里（约34公里）的高度，大约是商业飞机常规巡航高度的三倍。

When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”
谈到联邦税，持有伯克希尔的个人可以毫不含糊地说：“我已经在公司交过了。”

* * * * * * * * * * * *
At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.
在伯克希尔，我们希望并预计在未来十年缴纳更多税款。我们对国家理应如此：美国的活力为伯克希尔取得的每一点成功都作出了巨大贡献——这份助力伯克希尔永远需要。我们仰赖“美国顺风”，虽偶有无风时刻，但其推动力总会归来。

I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.
我已经投资了80年——占到我们国家历史的三分之一多。尽管国人倾向甚至热衷于自我批评和自我怀疑，但我从未见过长期押注美国衰落有任何意义的时候。我也极其怀疑这封信的读者在未来会有不同的体会。

Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner
拥有伟大的伙伴无可匹敌

Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.
查理和我几乎思维一致。但我需要写一整页才能说明的，他一句话就能概括。而且，他的表述总是更逻辑清晰，也更巧妙——有人会说更直白。

Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:
以下是他的几点思考，许多摘自最近一期播客：

• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
• 这个世界充斥着愚蠢的赌徒，他们永远不如耐心的投资者表现好。

• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
• 如果你不能如实看世界，那就像透过扭曲的镜片评判事物。

• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
• 我只想知道我会在哪里死，这样我就永远不会去那里。相关一点：早点写下你理想的讣告——然后按那个标准去行事。

• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
• 如果你不在乎自己是否理性，就不会去改进。结果你将持续非理性并得到糟糕回报。

• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
• 耐心可以培养。长时间专注并持续聚焦一件事是一大优势。

• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
• 你可以向逝者学到很多。阅读那些你敬佩或厌恶的已故人物。

• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
• 如果你能游到一艘完好的船上，就别在沉船里拼命舀水。

• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
• 伟大的公司在你离开后仍能运转；平庸的公司则不行。

• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
• 沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找优质的长期投资并长期坚守。

• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
• 本·格雷厄姆说：“短期来看，股市是投票机；长期来看是称重机。”如果你持续提升事物价值，总会有明智之士注意并买入。

• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
• 投资不存在百分百确定的事。因而使用杠杆很危险。再漂亮的数字乘以零仍等于零。别指望能两次发大财。

• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
• 然而，你并不需要拥有很多东西才能致富。

• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.
• 若想成为伟大的投资者，就得不断学习。世界改变时，你也必须改变。

• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
• 数十年来，沃伦和我都讨厌铁路股，但世界变了，美国最终只剩下四家对经济至关重要的大型铁路公司。我们认识得慢，但迟到总比不到好。

• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”
• 最后，我补充查理数十年来拍板决策的两句话：“沃伦，再多想想。你很聪明，但我是对的。”

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.
事情就是这样。我每次与查理通话都能学到东西。他让我思考的同时，也让我开怀大笑。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.
我也要在查理的清单上补充一条自己的规则：找一个非常聪明、层次很高的伙伴——最好比你年长一点——然后非常认真地倾听他所说的一切。

A Family Gathering in Omaha
奥马哈的家庭聚会

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.
查理和我丝毫不知羞耻。去年，在我们三年来首次举办的股东聚会上，我们以一贯的商业热情迎接了大家。

From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?
开场钟一响，我们就直奔你的钱包而去。短短时间内，我们的 See’s 糖果售货亭便卖出了十一吨营养丰富的花生脆和巧克力。在我们如巴纳姆般的推销中，我们向你许诺长寿。毕竟，除了 See’s 的糖果，还有什么能让查理和我分别活到 99 岁和 92 岁呢？

I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.
我知道你迫不及待想听听去年这场“忽悠”的具体细节。

On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 6½ of the 9½ operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.
周五从中午到下午五点，我们的糖果柜台完成了 2,690 笔单独销售。周六上午七点到下午四点半之间，See’s 又录得 3,931 笔交易，尽管 9 个半小时的营业时间中有 6 个半小时因播放影片和问答环节而限制了商业流量。

Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up \$400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.
算一算：在黄金营业时段，See’s 平均每分钟成交约十单，两天内实现了 400,309 美元的销售额；所有商品都在同一地点售出，这些产品 101 年来几乎没有实质性改变。亨利·福特 T 型车时代对 See’s 有效的方法，如今依然奏效。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.
查理、我，以及整个伯克希尔团队期待在5月5日至6日在奥马哈与你相见。我们会玩得很开心，你也一样。

February 25, 2023
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

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