2023-03-14 Elizabeth Warren.A scathing letter to Silicon Valley Bank’s CEO.

2023-03-14 Elizabeth Warren.A scathing letter to Silicon Valley Bank’s CEO.


Gregory W. Becker Former President and CEO Silicon Valley Bank
格雷戈里·W·贝克 前总裁兼首席执行官 硅谷银行
3003 Tasman Drive Santa Clara, CA 95054

Dear Mr. Becker: 尊敬的贝克先生：

I write following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank Financial Group (SVB) to seek additional information about your successful efforts to roll back banking regulations and exempt your bank from the protections Congress enacted with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 (“Dodd-Frank”) in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. These rules were designed to safeguard our banking system and economy from the negligence of bank executives like yourself – and their rollback, along with atrocious risk management policies at your bank, have been implicated as chief causes of its failure.
我在硅谷银行金融集团（SVB）倒闭后写信，寻求有关您成功努力撤销银行监管并使您的银行免于国会在 2008 年金融危机后通过的《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法》（“多德-弗兰克”）保护的更多信息。这些规则旨在保护我们的银行系统和经济免受像您这样的银行高管的疏忽影响——而这些规则的撤销，以及您银行糟糕的风险管理政策，被认为是其失败的主要原因。

In 2015, you submitted a statement to the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee calling on Congress to reduce safety standards for “mid-sized” banks like your own.2 At the time, SVB was approaching $40 billion in assets – making it the 36th-largest bank in the U.S.3 – and expected to cross the $50 billion threshold that would subject it to stronger rules under Dodd-Frank.4 In your statement, you categorically indicated that “SVB … does not present systemic risks,” telling lawmakers that since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, “[you had] made meaningful investments to [y]our risk systems, hired additional highly skilled risk professionals, and established a stand-alone, independent Risk Committee of [y]our Board of Directors,” and that you were “conducting a range of different stress tests designed to measure and predict the risks associated with [y]our business in different economic scenarios.”5
2015 年，您向美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会提交了一份声明，呼吁国会降低对像您这样的“中型”银行的安全标准。当时，SVB 的资产接近 400 亿美元——使其成为美国第 36 大银行——并预计将突破 500 亿美元的门槛，从而受到多德-弗兰克法案下更严格的规则约束。在您的声明中，您明确表示“SVB……不构成系统性风险”，告诉立法者自多德-弗兰克法案颁布以来，“您已对您的风险系统进行了有意义的投资，聘请了更多高技能的风险专业人员，并在您的董事会中设立了一个独立的风险委员会”，并且您正在“进行一系列不同的压力测试，以衡量和预测在不同经济情景下与您的业务相关的风险。”

You urged lawmakers to raise the threshold at which Dodd-Frank’s Enhanced Prudential Standards, which provide regulators with enhanced monitoring capabilities over banks and require that banks have resolution plans, or “living wills,”6 to ensure that regulators and banks have plans in place for orderly liquidation in the event of a bank failure are triggered.7 You derided these standards as “unnecessary compliance measures.”8 You argued that SVB was engaged in “low risk activities”9 and that it and other banks of its size were capable of independently safeguarding against risk. These assurances were questionable at the time you made them, and in the wake of SVB’s failure, they now look nefarious.
您敦促立法者提高触发多德-弗兰克法案的增强审慎标准的门槛，该标准为监管机构提供了对银行的增强监控能力，并要求银行制定解决计划或“生前遗嘱”，以确保监管机构和银行在银行倒闭时有序清算的计划。您嘲讽这些标准为“不必要的合规措施”。您认为 SVB 从事“低风险活动”，并且它和其他同等规模的银行有能力独立防范风险。在您做出这些保证时，这些保证是值得怀疑的，而在 SVB 倒闭后，它们现在看起来很不妙。

But years of lobbying for weaker bank regulations by the banking industry, including SVB’s own revolving-door hires,10 culminated in the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA), the rollback of Dodd-Frank rules you were seeking, passed with support from both parties and signed into law by former President Trump in 2018.11 Notably, this law raised the asset threshold at which a bank is considered and regulated as a “systemically important financial institution” (SIFI) from $50 billion to $250 billion, exempting SVB and other mid-sized banks from regular stress testing and enhanced liquidity, risk management, and living will requirements.12 Despite being the 16th largest bank in the country, amassing approximately $209 billion in assets by the end of 2022,13 SVB remained below this new threshold.
但银行业多年来游说放松银行监管，包括 SVB 自身的旋转门聘用，最终促成了《经济增长、监管救济和消费者保护法》（EGRRCPA）的出台，这是你们寻求的多德-弗兰克规则的回滚，该法案在两党支持下通过，并于 2018 年由前总统特朗普签署成为法律。值得注意的是，该法律将被视为“系统重要性金融机构”（SIFI）并受到监管的银行资产门槛从 500 亿美元提高到 2500 亿美元，使 SVB 和其他中型银行免于定期压力测试和增强的流动性、风险管理和生前遗嘱要求。尽管到 2022 年底，SVB 已成为全国第 16 大银行，资产约为 2090 亿美元，但仍低于这一新门槛。

Despite your assurances to Congress that SVB was sufficiently protected from risk because of your various efforts, it is now clear that SVB was wholly unequipped to independently assess its business’s risk. SVB failed – while its Chief Risk Officer position sat vacant for eight months as its financial standing deteriorated14 – because it failed to address two key risks: concentration in your client base, and rising interest rates. This is a failure of “Banking 101” – what one analyst called “sheer incompetence.”15 Had SVB been subject to Dodd-Frank rules undone by EGRRCPA the bank would have been required to maintain stronger liquidity and capital requirements and conduct regular stress tests that would have required SVB to shore up its business to weather the type of stress it experienced last week. But because you fought to exempt SVB from those stronger rules, the bank was in a much weaker position to withstand the bank run.
尽管你向国会保证，由于你的各种努力，SVB 已充分防范风险，但现在显然 SVB 完全没有能力独立评估其业务风险。SVB 失败了——在其首席风险官职位空缺八个月、财务状况恶化的情况下——因为它未能解决两个关键风险：客户基础的集中度和利率上升。这是“银行业 101”的失败——一位分析师称之为“纯粹的无能”。如果 SVB 受到 EGRRCPA 推翻的多德-弗兰克规则的约束，该银行将被要求维持更强的流动性和资本要求，并进行定期压力测试，这将要求 SVB 加强其业务以应对上周经历的压力。但因为你争取将 SVB 排除在那些更严格的规则之外，该银行在抵御银行挤兑方面处于更弱的地位。

SVB executives were doing just fine as the bank unraveled: you were awarded over $9.9 million in compensation last year, including a $1.5 million cash bonus,16 and you even paid out bonuses just hours before your bank was taken over by federal regulators.17 Rather than making the safety and soundness of your bank your primary priority, you spent the weeks in the lead up to SVB’s failure securing yourself $3.6 million by selling off company shares.18
在银行瓦解时，SVB 高管们过得很好：去年你获得了超过 990 万美元的补偿，包括 150 万美元的现金奖金，甚至在银行被联邦监管机构接管的几个小时前还发放了奖金。你没有把银行的安全和稳健作为首要任务，而是在 SVB 倒闭前的几周内通过出售公司股份为自己赚取了 360 万美元。

While you and company executives appear to have been successful in cashing out before the crash, SVB’s customers were not as lucky. Many depositors were unable to access their funds last week, leaving small businesses and nonprofits questioning how they were going to make payroll in time,19 and leaving those businesses’ workers wondering whether they would still have a job in the coming weeks.20 The consequences of SVB’s failure triggered concerns about contagion spreading to other parts of the financial system – forcing the federal government to backstop depositors and protect the economy.21
虽然你和公司高管似乎在崩溃前成功套现，但 SVB 的客户就没那么幸运了。许多存款人上周无法取用他们的资金，使得小企业和非营利组织质疑他们如何能及时支付工资，并让这些企业的员工担心在接下来的几周内他们是否还能有工作。SVB 的失败引发了对金融系统其他部分蔓延的担忧，迫使联邦政府为存款人提供支持并保护经济。

You have nobody to blame for the failure at your bank but yourself and your fellow executives. You lobbied for weaker rules, got what you wanted, and used this opportunity to abdicate your basic responsibilities to your clients and the public – facilitating a near-economic disaster.
对于银行的失败，除了你自己和你的高管同事之外，没有其他人可以责怪。你们游说要求更宽松的规则，得到了你们想要的，并利用这个机会放弃了对客户和公众的基本责任——导致了一场近乎经济灾难。

There is much work to be done to understand the failure of SVB – and these efforts must start with understanding your role in the rollback of banking regulations that facilitated this failure. Given your efforts to undermine those rules, and to better understand how those efforts and your severe incompetence in bank risk management led to the failure of SVB, I request answers to the following questions no later than March 28, 2023:
要了解 SVB 的失败还有很多工作要做——这些努力必须从了解您在放宽银行监管中所扮演的角色开始，这些放宽措施促成了此次失败。鉴于您破坏这些规则的努力，以及为了更好地理解这些努力和您在银行风险管理方面的严重失职如何导致 SVB 的失败，我要求在 2023 年 3 月 28 日之前回答以下问题：

1. Please describe the full scope of your efforts to roll back Dodd-Frank regulations in Congress.
1. 请详细描述您在国会中撤销多德-弗兰克法规的全部努力范围。
a. How many meetings did you and/or SVB lobbyists have with lawmakers regarding your desire for the Dodd-Frank asset threshold to be raised prior to the enactment of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act?
a. 在《经济增长、监管放松与消费者保护法》颁布之前，您和/或 SVB 的说客与立法者就您希望提高多德-弗兰克资产门槛进行了多少次会面？

b. How much time do you estimate was spent on this lobbying effort?
b. 您估计在这次游说活动上花费了多少时间？

c. How much money do you estimate was spent on this lobbying effort?
c. 您估计在这次游说活动中花费了多少钱？

d. Where did the funds the bank use for these lobbying efforts come from? Which company officials approved this spending?
d. 银行为这些游说活动使用的资金来自哪里？哪些公司官员批准了这笔开支？
2. Did SVB contribute resources indirectly to efforts to roll back Dodd-Frank, including through industry groups like the American Bankers Association? If so, please describe all such efforts.
2. SVB 是否通过美国银行家协会等行业团体间接为撤销多德-弗兰克法案的努力提供了资源？如果是，请描述所有这些努力。

3. Did you discuss these lobbying efforts, their expenses, and their goals, with the Bank’s Board of Directors? If so, please provide transcripts of all such discussion.
3. 您是否与银行董事会讨论过这些游说活动、其费用及其目标？如果有，请提供所有此类讨论的记录。

a. Did the Board formally approve these efforts?
a. 董事会是否正式批准了这些努力？

4. In your 2015 statement, you described various risk management protocols independently implemented by SVB. Please explain why those protocols failed to adequately asses risks associated with the following:
4. 在您 2015 年的声明中，您描述了 SVB 独立实施的各种风险管理协议。请解释为什么这些协议未能充分评估与以下相关的风险：
a. Impact of interest rate hikes
a. 利率上调的影响

b. A highly concentrated technology and venture capital customer base
b. 高度集中的技术和风险投资客户群
5. Which bank executives have held primary responsibility for risk management since passage of the EGRRCPA?
5. 自《EGRRCPA》通过以来，哪些银行高管对风险管理负有主要责任？
a. Please list all such officials, their title, and the time period in which they served.
a. 请列出所有此类官员，他们的职务以及他们任职的时间。

b. How much did they receive in total compensation, including annual salary, bonuses, and stock options?
b. 他们总共获得了多少补偿，包括年薪、奖金和股票期权？

c. How much of these bonuses were related to employing effective risk management practices?
这些奖金中有多少与采用有效的风险管理实践有关？
6. How much money was paid out in bonuses on March 10, 2023?
6. 2023 年 3 月 10 日支付了多少奖金？
a. Did you receive a bonus? If so, how much money did you receive?
a. 你收到奖金了吗？如果是，你收到多少钱？

b. Which other company executives received bonuses, and how much were they?
b. 哪些其他公司高管获得了奖金，他们的奖金是多少？
7. Please list all instances in which you sold SVB stock between March 1, 2022, and the present. At the time of any of these sales, were you aware of any concerns or problems with the bank’s balance sheet, its risk management practices, or any other matters affecting the bank’s ability to remain in business?
7. 请列出您在 2022 年 3 月 1 日至今出售 SVB 股票的所有情况。在这些销售的任何时候，您是否知道有关银行资产负债表、其风险管理实践或任何其他影响银行继续经营能力的问题或担忧？

8. Please provide a detailed list of all compensation and bonuses you received in each of the last 10 years.
8. 请提供过去 10 年中每年收到的所有补偿和奖金的详细清单。
a. For each bonus, please describe the specific metric that you achieved to obtain the bonus.
a. 对于每个奖金，请描述您为获得奖金而实现的具体指标。

b. Did you receive any bonuses related to success in your efforts to limit regulation of SVB?
b. 您是否因成功限制 SVB 的监管而获得任何奖金？

c. Given the failure of SVB, will you agree to return any bonuses or compensation that you have received in the last five years?
鉴于 SVB 的失败，您是否同意退还过去五年中收到的任何奖金或补偿？
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203.
多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案，公共法 111-203。
2 Written testimony of Greg Becker to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, March 24, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94375/pdf/CHRG-114shrg94375.pdf?ref=the-lever. 
格雷格·贝克尔于 2015 年 3 月 24 日向美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会提交的书面证词，https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94375/pdf/CHRG-114shrg94375.pdf?ref=the-lever.
3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Large Commercial Banks,” March 31, 2015, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20150331/default.htm.
美国联邦储备系统理事会，“大型商业银行”，2015 年 3 月 31 日，https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20150331/default.htm.
4 Id.
5 Written testimony of Greg Becker to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, March 24, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94375/pdf/CHRG-114shrg94375.pdf?ref=the-lever. 
格雷格·贝克尔于 2015 年 3 月 24 日向美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会提交的书面证词，https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94375/pdf/CHRG-114shrg94375.pdf?ref=the-lever.
6 Federal Reserve Board, “Living Wills (or Resolution Plans),” https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm#:~:text=Each%20plan%2C%20commonly %20known%20as,both%20public%20and%20confidential%20sections.
6 联邦储备委员会，“生前遗嘱（或解决计划）”
7 12 CFR 252.
8 Written testimony of Greg Becker to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, March 24, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94375/pdf/CHRG-114shrg94375.pdf?ref=the-lever. 
格雷格·贝克尔于 2015 年 3 月 24 日向美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会提交的书面证词，https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94375/pdf/CHRG-114shrg94375.pdf?ref=the-lever.
9 Id.
10 The Intercept, “Silicon Valley Bank Used Former McCarthy Staffers to Weaken Regulations, Lobby FDIC,” Ken Klippenstein, March 11, 2023, https://theintercept.com/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-used-former-mccarthy-staffers-to-weaken-regulations-lobby-fdic/.
10 The Intercept，“硅谷银行利用前麦卡锡员工削弱监管，游说 FDIC”，Ken Klippenstein，2023 年 3 月 11 日，https://theintercept.com/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-used-former-mccarthy-staffers-to-weaken-regulations-lobby-fdic/.
11 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 115-174.
11 经济增长、监管放松和消费者保护法案，公共法 115-174。
12 Forbes, “How Trump’s Deregulation Sowed The Seeds for Silicon Valley Bank’s Demise,” Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, March 12, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2023/03/12/how-trumps-deregulation-sowed-the-seeds-for-silicon-valley-banks-demise/?sh=2af4a6273432.
12 福布斯，“特朗普的放松管制如何为硅谷银行的倒闭埋下了种子”，Mayra Rodriguez Valladares，2023 年 3 月 12 日，https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2023/03/12/how-trumps-deregulation-sowed-the-seeds-for-silicon-valley-banks-demise/?sh=2af4a6273432.
13 Reuters, “SVB is largest bank failure since 2008 financial crisis,” David French, Echo Wang, and Alun John, March 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/global-markets-banks-wrapup-1-2023-03-10/.
路透社，“SVB 是自 2008 年金融危机以来最大的银行倒闭案”，大卫·弗伦奇、王艾可和阿伦·约翰，2023 年 3 月 11 日，https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/global-markets-banks-wrapup-1-2023-03-10/.
14 Fortune, “Silicon Valley Bank had no official chief risk officer for 8 months while the VC market was spiraling,” Prarthana Prakash, March 10, 2023, https://fortune.com/2023/03/10/silicon-valley-bank-chief-risk-officer/.
14 财富杂志，“硅谷银行在风险投资市场急剧下滑的 8 个月里没有正式的首席风险官，”Prarthana Prakash，2023 年 3 月 10 日，https://fortune.com/2023/03/10/silicon-valley-bank-chief-risk-officer/.
15 Seeking Alpha, “SVB Financial: Incompetence Allowed By Flawed Regulations,” IP Banking Research, March 12, 2023, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4586805-svb-financial-incompetence-allowed-by-flawed-regulations.
15 Seeking Alpha，“SVB Financial：不完善的法规导致的无能”，IP Banking Research，2023 年 3 月 12 日，https://seekingalpha.com/article/4586805-svb-financial-incompetence-allowed-by-flawed-regulations.
16 SVB Financial Group, “Preliminary Proxy Statement,” March 3, 2023, https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000719739/7d992e5b-9272-4bc8-a5cf-5a8c6b8c5251.pdf.
16 SVB 金融集团，“初步委托书声明”，2023 年 3 月 3 日，https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000719739/7d992e5b-9272-4bc8-a5cf-5a8c6b8c5251.pdf。
17 NBC News, “Silicon Valley Bank employees received annual bonuses hours before government takeover,” Hugh Son and Bertha Coombs, March 11, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/silicon-valley-bank-employees-received-annual-bonuses-hours-government-rcna74508.
17 NBC 新闻，“硅谷银行员工在政府接管前数小时收到年度奖金”，Hugh Son 和 Bertha Coombs，2023 年 3 月 11 日，https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/silicon-valley-bank-employees-received-annual-bonuses-hours-government-rcna74508.
18 Forbes, “SVB Financial CEO Sold $3.6 Million In Stock Before Bank’s Collapse,” Brian Bushard, March 10, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2023/03/10/svb-financial-ceo-sold-36-million-in-stock-before-banks-collapse/?sh=381d2da94b2a.
18 福布斯，“SVB Financial CEO 在银行倒闭前出售了 360 万美元的股票”，布莱恩·布沙尔德，2023 年 3 月 10 日，https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2023/03/10/svb-financial-ceo-sold-36-million-in-stock-before-banks-collapse/?sh=381d2da94b2a.
19 Financial Times, “SVB collapse leaves founders liable for unpaid wages,” George Hammond, March, 12, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/7adc2b7c-da22-4f13-80ad-f7ebd297b166.
19 金融时报，“SVB 倒闭导致创始人需承担未付工资责任，”乔治·哈蒙德，2023 年 3 月 12 日，https://www.ft.com/content/7adc2b7c-da22-4f13-80ad-f7ebd297b166。
20 The Washington Post, “Silicon Valley Bank collapse leaves start-ups scrambling to pay workers,” Gerrit De Vynck and Rachel Lerman, March 12, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-startups-payroll/.
《华盛顿邮报》，“硅谷银行倒闭导致初创公司争相支付员工工资”，Gerrit De Vynck 和 Rachel Lerman，2023 年 3 月 12 日，https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-startups-payroll/。
21 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC,” press release, March 12, 2023, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20230312b.htm.
21 美国联邦储备系统理事会，“财政部、联邦储备和联邦存款保险公司联合声明”，新闻稿，2023 年 3 月 12 日，https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20230312b.htm。

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