2023-09-19 Anthropic.The Long-Term Benefit Trust
非金钱目标的想法不值一驳，除非是自己的钱，如果想要别人的钱，别人的钱都和别人的生活是绑定的，投资亏损或者没有收益可能会使生活失去保障，丑话说在前面是可以的，但必须表述的很清楚，“既和又”的表述可能从一开始就埋下问题。
1、《2023-09-19 Anthropic.The Long-Term Benefit Trust》
Today we are sharing more details about our new governance structure called the Long-Term Benefit Trust (LTBT), which we have been developing since the birth of Anthropic. The LTBT is our attempt to fine-tune our corporate governance to address the unique challenges and long-term opportunities we believe transformative AI will present.
今天，我们将分享更多关于我们新治理结构——长期利益信托（LTBT）的细节，该结构自 Anthropic 成立以来一直在开发。LTBT 是我们为优化企业治理而进行的一项尝试，旨在应对我们认为转型性人工智能将带来的独特挑战和长期机遇。
The Trust is an independent body of five financially disinterested members with an authority to select and remove a portion of our Board that will grow over time (ultimately, a majority of our Board). Paired with our Public Benefit Corporation status, the LTBT helps to align our corporate governance with our mission of developing and maintaining advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity.
该信托是由五位在财务上无利益冲突的成员组成的独立机构，拥有选择并逐步罢免我们董事会部分成员的权力（最终占董事会多数）。结合我们作为公共利益公司的地位，LTBT 有助于使我们的企业治理与开发和维护先进人工智能以造福人类长期利益的使命保持一致。
跟OpenAI的想法是一致的，“我们的产品可能会让金钱，甚至人类本身，变得无关紧要”。
Corporate Governance Basics
企业治理基础
A corporation is overseen by its board of directors. The board selects and oversees the leadership team (especially the CEO), who in turn hire and manage the employees. The default corporate governance setup makes directors accountable to the stockholders in several ways. For example:
一家公司的管理由其董事会负责。董事会选举并监督领导团队（尤其是首席执行官），而领导团队又负责招聘和管理员工。默认的企业治理结构使董事会以多种方式对股东负责。例如：
Directors are elected by, and may be removed by stockholders.
董事由股东选举，并可被股东罢免。
Directors are legally accountable to stockholders for fulfilling their fiduciary duties.
董事在法律上对股东负责，必须履行其受托责任。
Directors are often paid in shares of stock of the corporation, which helps to align their incentives with the financial interests of stockholders.
董事通常以公司股票的形式获得报酬，这有助于使他们的激励与股东的财务利益保持一致。
Importantly, the rights to elect, remove, and sue directors belong exclusively to the stockholders. Some wonder, therefore, whether directors of a corporation are permitted to optimize for stakeholders beyond the corporation’s stockholders, such as customers and the general public. This question is the subject of a rich debate, which we won’t delve into here. For present purposes, it is enough to observe that all the key mechanisms of accountability in corporate law push directors to prioritize the financial interests of stockholders.
重要的是，选举、罢免和起诉董事的权利完全属于股东。因此，有人质疑，一家公司的董事是否被允许为除股东之外的其他利益相关者（例如客户和公众）优化决策。这个问题引发了广泛的讨论，但在此我们不再深入探讨。就目前而言，只需观察到企业法中所有关键的问责机制都促使董事优先考虑股东的财务利益。
Fine-tuning Anthropic’s Corporate Governance
优化 Anthropic 的企业治理
Corporate governance has seen centuries of legal precedent and iteration, and views differ greatly on its effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses. At Anthropic, our perspective is that the capacity of corporate governance to produce socially beneficial outcomes depends strongly on non-market externalities. Externalities are a type of market failure that occurs when a transaction between two parties imposes costs or benefits on a third party who has not consented to the transaction. Common examples of costs include pollution from factories, systemic financial risk from banks, and national security risks from weapons manufacturers. Examples of positive spillover effects include the societal benefits of education that reach beyond the individuals being educated, or investments in R&D that boost entire sectors beyond the company making the investment. Many parties who contract with a corporation, such as customers, workers, and suppliers, are capable of negotiating or demanding prices and terms that reflect the full costs and benefits of their exchanges. But other parties, such as the general public, don’t directly contract with a corporation and therefore do not have a means to charge or pay for the costs and benefits they experience.
企业治理经历了数百年的法律先例和不断迭代，人们对于其有效性、优点和缺点的看法存在很大分歧。在 Anthropic，我们的观点是，企业治理产出社会有益成果的能力在很大程度上取决于非市场外部性。外部性是一种市场失灵现象，当两方之间的交易对未同意该交易的第三方造成成本或收益时，就会产生外部性。常见的成本示例包括工厂污染、银行引发的系统性金融风险以及武器制造商带来的国家安全风险。正面溢出效应的例子包括教育对社会带来的利益，这些利益超出了受教育者个人，或者研发投资推动了超出投资公司范围的整个行业。与公司签订合同的许多方，例如客户、员工和供应商，能够协商或要求反映其交易全部成本与收益的价格和条款。但其他方，如公众，则不直接与公司签约，因此无法为其所承受的成本和收益进行收费或支付。
硅谷在思想上的倒退，这些想法以前就有，但最终资本主义成为最有效的办法。
The greater the externalities, the less we expect corporate governance defaults to serve the interests of non-contracting parties such as the general public. We believe AI may create unprecedentedly large externalities, ranging from national security risks, to large-scale economic disruption, to fundamental threats to humanity, to enormous benefits to human safety and health. The technology is advancing so rapidly that the laws and social norms that constrain other high-externality corporate activities have yet to catch up with AI; this has led us to invest in fine-tuning Anthropic’s governance to meet the challenge ahead of us.
外部性越大，我们就越不指望企业治理的默认机制能服务于非合同方（如公众）的利益。我们相信，人工智能可能会产生前所未有的大规模外部性，其范围涵盖国家安全风险、大规模经济中断、对人类的根本性威胁，以及对人类安全和健康的巨大益处。技术进步如此迅速，以至于约束其他高外部性企业活动的法律和社会规范尚未跟上人工智能的发展；这促使我们投资优化 Anthropic 的治理，以应对即将到来的挑战.
To be clear, for most of the day-to-day decisions Anthropic makes, public benefit is not at odds with commercial success or stockholder returns, and if anything our experience has shown that the two are often strongly synergistic: our ability to do effective safety research depends on building frontier models (the resources for which are greatly aided by commercial success), and our ability to foster a “race to the top” depends on being a viable company in the ecosystem in both a technical sense and a commercial sense. We do not expect the LTBT to intervene in these day-to-day decisions or in our ordinary commercial strategy.
需要说明的是，对于 Anthropic 做出的日常决策而言，公共利益与商业成功或股东回报并不冲突，事实上，我们的经验表明二者往往具有强大的协同效应：我们开展有效安全研究的能力依赖于构建前沿模型（这一过程得到了商业成功的巨大支持），而我们推动“争创一流”的能力则依赖于在技术和商业两个层面上成为生态系统中的一个可行公司。我们并不指望 LTBT 会介入这些日常决策或我们常规的商业策略。
Rather, the need for fine-tuning of the governance structure ultimately derives from the potential for extreme events and the need to handle them with humanity’s interests in mind, and we expect the LTBT to primarily concern itself with these long-range issues. For example, the LTBT can ensure that the organizational leadership is incentivized to carefully evaluate future models for catastrophic risks or ensure they have nation-state level security, rather than prioritizing being the first to market above all other objectives.
相反，对治理结构进行细化的必要性最终源于极端事件的潜在风险以及必须以人类利益为重来应对这些风险，我们预期 LTBT 将主要关注这些长期问题。例如，LTBT 可以确保组织领导层获得激励，以便认真评估未来应对灾难性风险的模型或确保他们具备国家级别的安全保障，而不是把抢占市场先机置于所有目标之上。
起点的偏差最终可以导致非常大的偏差，没有利益关系的信托受托人不见得是好人，因为没有深度关系是坏人的可能性非常大。
Baseline: Public Benefit Corporation
基准：公共利益公司
One governance feature we have already shared is that Anthropic is a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation, or PBC. Like most large companies in the United States, Anthropic is incorporated in Delaware, and Delaware corporate law expressly permits the directors of a PBC to balance the financial interests of the stockholders with the public benefit purpose specified in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, and the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct. The public benefit purpose stated in Anthropic’s certificate is the responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity. This gives our board the legal latitude to weigh long- and short-term externalities of decisions–whether to deploy a particular AI system, for example–alongside the financial interests of our stockholders.
我们已分享的一个治理特性是 Anthropic 是一家特拉华州公共利益公司（PBC）。像美国大多数大型公司一样，Anthropic 注册在特拉华州，且特拉华州公司法明确允许 PBC 的董事在衡量股东财务利益的同时，也平衡公司章程中规定的公共利益目标以及那些因公司行为受到重大影响者的最佳利益。Anthropic 章程中规定的公共利益目标是以负责任的方式开发和维护先进人工智能，以造福人类的长期利益。这赋予了我们的董事会法律上的自由裁量权，可以在决策时权衡长期与短期的外部性——例如是否部署某一人工智能系统——同时考虑股东的财务利益。
The legal latitude afforded by our PBC structure is important in aligning Anthropic’s governance with our public benefit mission. But we didn’t feel it was enough for the governance challenges we foresee in the development of transformative AI. Although the PBC form makes it legally permissible for directors to balance public interests with the maximization of stockholder value, it does not make the directors of the corporation directly accountable to other stakeholders or align their incentives with the interests of the general public. We set out to design a structure that would supply our directors with the requisite accountability and incentives to appropriately balance the financial interests of our stockholders and our public benefit purpose at key junctures where we expect the consequences of our decisions to reach far beyond Anthropic.
我们的 PBC 结构所赋予的法律自由裁量权对于使 Anthropic 的治理与我们的公共利益使命保持一致非常重要，但我们认为这不足以应对我们预见到的在转型性人工智能发展中所面临的治理挑战。尽管 PBC 形式在法律上允许董事在平衡公共利益与股东价值最大化之间做出取舍，但它并不使公司董事直接对其他利益相关者负责，也未能使他们的激励与公众利益保持一致。我们着手设计一种结构，旨在为我们的董事提供必要的问责和激励机制，以在关键节点上适当地平衡股东的财务利益和我们的公共利益目标，而这些决策的后果将远远超出 Anthropic 的范围。
LTBT: Basic Structure and Features
LTBT：基本结构与特性
The Anthropic Long-Term Benefit Trust (LTBT, or Trust) is an independent body comprising five Trustees with backgrounds and expertise in AI safety, national security, public policy, and social enterprise. The Trust’s arrangements are designed to insulate the Trustees from financial interest in Anthropic and to grant them sufficient independence to balance the interests of the public alongside the interests of Anthropic’s stockholders.
Anthropic 长期利益信托（LTBT 或简称信托）是一个独立机构，由五名具备人工智能安全、国家安全、公共政策和社会企业背景及专业知识的受托人组成。该信托的安排旨在使受托人与 Anthropic 的财务利益隔离，并赋予他们足够的独立性，以在平衡公众利益与 Anthropic 股东利益方面发挥作用。
吃不饱会出现幻觉，吃太好了也会出现幻觉，深度关系才可能深入了解某个项目，没有深度关系，没有深入了解如何做出正确的决策？
At the close of our Series C, we amended our corporate charter to create a new class of stock (Class T) held exclusively by the Trust.1 The Class T stock grants the Trust the authority to elect and remove a number of Anthropic’s board members that will phase in according to time- and funding-based milestones; in any event, the Trust will elect a majority of the board within 4 years. At the same time, we created a new director seat that will be elected by the Series C and subsequent investors to ensure that our investors’ perspectives will be directly represented on the board into the future.
在我们的 C 轮融资结束时，我们修改了公司章程，创建了一种由信托专有持有的新股类别（T 类股）。[1] T 类股赋予信托选举和罢免 Anthropic 部分董事的权力，这些董事将根据时间和资金的里程碑逐步上任；无论如何，信托将在 4 年内选举出董事会的多数成员。同时，我们还创建了一个新的董事席位，由 C 轮及后续投资者选举产生，以确保投资者的观点能够在未来直接在董事会中得到代表。
The Class T stock also includes “protective provisions” that require the Trust to receive notice of certain actions that could significantly alter the corporation or its business.
T 类股还包含“保护性条款”，要求信托在公司或其业务发生可能产生重大改变的某些行动时获得通知。
The Trust is organized as a “purpose trust” under the common law of Delaware, with a purpose that is the same as that of Anthropic. The Trust must use its powers to ensure that Anthropic responsibly balances the financial interests of stockholders with the interests of those affected by Anthropic’s conduct and our public benefit purpose.
该信托根据特拉华州普通法组织为“目的信托”，其宗旨与 Anthropic 相同。信托必须运用其权力，确保 Anthropic 在负责任地平衡股东财务利益的同时，也兼顾受到 Anthropic 行为影响者的利益以及我们的公共利益目标。
A Different Kind of Stockholder
不同类型的股东
In establishing the Long-Term Benefit Trust we have, in effect, created a different kind of stockholder in Anthropic. Anthropic will continue to be overseen by its board, which we expect will make the decisions of consequence on the path to transformative AI. In navigating these decisions, a majority of the board will ultimately have accountability to the Trust as well as to stockholders, and will thus have incentives to appropriately balance the public benefit with stockholder interests. Moreover, the board will benefit from the insights of Trustees with deep expertise and experience in areas key to Anthropic’s public benefit mission. Together we believe the insights and incentives supplied by the Trust will result in better decision making when the stakes are highest.
通过建立长期利益信托，我们实际上在 Anthropic 中创造了一种不同类型的股东。Anthropic 仍将由其董事会进行监管，我们预期该董事会将在走向转型性人工智能的过程中作出关键决策。在处理这些决策时，董事会中的大多数成员最终将对信托以及股东承担问责，从而获得激励，以适当地平衡公共利益与股东利益。此外，董事会将受益于受托人提供的深厚专业知识和经验，这些都是 Anthropic 公共利益使命的关键领域。我们相信，信托所提供的洞察力和激励机制将在风险最高时促使更优决策的产生.
The gradual “phase-in” of the LTBT will allow us to course-correct an experimental structure and also reflects a hypothesis that, early in a company’s history, it can often function best with streamlined governance and not too many stakeholders; whereas as it becomes more mature and has more profound effects on society, externalities tend to manifest themselves progressively more, making checks and balances more critical.
LTBT 的逐步“引入”将使我们能够对这一试验性结构进行修正，并反映出这样一种假设：在公司初创阶段，精简的治理结构和较少的利益相关者往往能使公司运作得更好；而随着公司逐渐成熟并对社会产生更深远的影响，外部性往往会逐步显现，从而使制衡机制变得更加关键。
A Corporate Governance Experiment
企业治理实验
The Long-Term Benefit Trust is an experiment. Its design is a considered hypothesis, informed by some of the most accomplished corporate governance scholars and practitioners in the nation, who helped our leadership design and “red team” this structure. We’re not yet ready to hold this out as an example to emulate; we are empiricists and want to see how it works.
长期利益信托是一个实验。其设计是一项经过深思熟虑的假设，由全国一些最杰出的企业治理学者和从业者提供意见，他们帮助我们的领导层设计并对这一结构进行了“红队”测试。我们尚未准备好将其作为可供效仿的典范；我们是实证主义者，想看看它如何运作。
One of the most difficult design challenges was reconciling the imperative for the Trust structure to be resilient to end runs while the stakes are high with the reality of the Trust’s experimental nature. It’s important to prevent this arrangement from being easily undone, but it is also rare to get something like this right on the first try. We have therefore designed a process for amendment that carefully balances durability with flexibility. We envision that most adjustments will be made by agreement of the Trustees and Anthropic’s Board, or the Trustees and the other stockholders. Owing to the Trust’s experimental nature, however, we have also designed a series of “failsafe” provisions that allow changes to the Trust and its powers without the consent of the Trustees if sufficiently large supermajorities of the stockholders agree. The required supermajorities increase as the Trust’s power phases in, on the theory that we’ll have more experience–and less need for iteration–as time goes on, and the stakes will become higher.
最难的设计挑战之一是调和这样一个必要性：在风险极高的情况下，信托结构必须具备抵御旁通的韧性，同时又要面对信托本身试验性质的现实。防止这一安排被轻易推翻非常重要，但同样要认识到，第一次尝试就将其设计得完美是十分罕见的。因此，我们设计了一个修订程序，在确保耐用性与灵活性之间实现精心平衡。我们设想，大多数调整将由受托人与 Anthropic 董事会或受托人与其他股东协商一致后作出。然而，鉴于信托的试验性质，我们还设计了一系列“故障保护”条款，允许在获得足够大比例的股东超级多数同意的情况下，在不征求受托人同意的情况下对信托及其权力进行修改。随着信托权力逐步引入，所要求的超级多数比例也会提高，其理论基础是随着时间推移，我们将获得更多经验——迭代需求也会减少——而风险将变得更高。
Meet the Initial Trustees
认识初始受托人
The initial Trustees are:
初始受托人包括：
Jason Matheny: CEO of the RAND Corporation
Kanika Bahl: CEO & President of Evidence Action
Neil Buddy Shah: CEO of the Clinton Health Access Initiative (Chair)
Paul Christiano: Founder of the Alignment Research Center
Zach Robinson: Interim CEO of Effective Ventures US
The Anthropic board chose these initial Trustees after a year-long search and interview process to surface individuals who exhibit thoughtfulness, strong character, and a deep understanding of the risks, benefits, and trajectory of AI and its impacts on society. Trustees serve one-year terms and future Trustees will be elected by a vote of the Trustees. We are honored that this founding group of Trustees chose to accept their places on the Trust, and we believe they will provide invaluable insight and judgment.
Anthropic 董事会在经过长达一年的搜寻和面试过程后选出了这些初始受托人，以遴选出那些展现出深思熟虑、坚强品格以及对人工智能的风险、益处及其对社会影响轨迹有深刻理解的人士。受托人任期为一年，未来的受托人将由现有受托人投票选举产生。我们非常荣幸这批创始受托人选择接受他们在信托中的职位，并相信他们将提供宝贵的见解和判断力。
[1] An earlier version of the Trust, which was then called the “Long-Term Benefit Committee,” was written into our Series A investment documents in 2021, but since the committee was not slated to elect its first director until 2023, we took the intervening time to red-team and improve the legal structure and to carefully consider candidate selection. The current LTBT is the result.
[1] 信托的早期版本，当时被称为“长期利益委员会”，已写入我们2021年 A 轮投资文件中，但由于该委员会直到2023年才计划选举其第一位董事，我们利用这段时间对法律结构进行了红队测试和改进，并仔细考虑了候选人的选择。当前的 LTBT 即为这一成果。
[2] The Trust structure was designed and “red teamed” with immeasurable assistance by John Morley of Yale Law School, David Berger, Amy Simmerman, and other lawyers from Wilson Sonsini, and by Noah Feldman and Seth Berman from Harvard Law School and Ethical Compass Advisors.
[2] 信托结构是在耶鲁法学院的 John Morley、Wilson Sonsini 的 David Berger、Amy Simmerman 以及其他律师，和哈佛法学院与 Ethical Compass Advisors 的 Noah Feldman 与 Seth Berman 的巨大帮助下设计并进行了“红队”测试的。
2、《2023-10-28 Anthropic Long-Term Benefit Trust》
Artificial intelligence promises to be one of the most transformative technologies of our time. Can corporate governance evolve to ensure that it develops safely and responsibly? Anthropic, PBC, one of America’s leading AI labs, offers an innovative answer. This post describes the company’s attempt to fine-tune the levers of corporate governance through a novel arrangement called the “Anthropic Long-Term Benefit Trust.” The Trust brings together a group of experts in AI and ethics and grants them the power over time to elect a majority of Anthropic’s board of directors. We served as outside counsel for Anthropic in designing and drafting this arrangement.[1] This post outlines some of the key components of the Trust and the company’s motives for adopting it.
人工智能有望成为我们这个时代最具变革性的技术之一。公司治理能否发展以确保其安全、负责任地发展？Anthropic, PBC，美国领先的人工智能实验室之一，提供了一个创新的答案。本文介绍了该公司通过一种名为“Anthropic Long-Term Benefit Trust”的新颖安排来优化公司治理杠杆的尝试。该信托汇集了一组人工智能和伦理专家，并赋予他们随时间推移选举 Anthropic 董事会多数成员的权力。我们担任 Anthropic 的外部法律顾问，协助设计和起草了这一安排。[1] 本文概述了该信托的一些关键组成部分以及公司采纳它的动机。
The Trust’s origins began with a deep commitment among Anthropic’s founders to social good. Anthropic’s founders believe that AI may soon become immensely powerful. They also acknowledge, however, that the companies developing AI have yet to be limited from the outside by the sorts of laws and norms that constrain other powerful technologies. The founders further believe that the safety and social benefit of AI technology go hand in hand with profits and commercial success. Anthropic can only be a leader on safety if it is also a leader in technical development and commercialization. Anthropic thus wanted to design a legal architecture that could commit the company to safety and responsibility while also allowing to achieve profits for investors.
该信托的起源源于 Anthropic 创始人对社会公益的深切承诺。Anthropic 的创始人认为，人工智能可能很快会变得极其强大。然而，他们也承认，开发人工智能的公司尚未受到外部法律和规范的限制，而这些法律和规范通常会约束其他强大的技术。创始人进一步认为，人工智能技术的安全性和社会利益与利润和商业成功是相辅相成的。Anthropic 只有在技术开发和商业化方面处于领先地位，才能在安全性上成为领导者。因此，Anthropic 希望设计一种法律架构，使公司能够承诺安全和责任，同时也能为投资者实现利润。
当时在OpenAI的初心没有了？谁跑在最前面就解散自己的团队。
The company’s first step was to organize the company as a Delaware public benefit corporation. The PBC form allows the company’s board of directors to simultaneously pursue the pecuniary interests of stockholders along with the best interests of those materially affected by the company’s conduct and the specific public benefit mission stated in Anthropic’s certificate of incorporation, which is to “responsibly develop and maintain advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity.”
该公司的第一步是将公司组织为特拉华州公益公司。公益公司形式允许公司董事会同时追求股东的经济利益，以及受公司行为实质影响者的最佳利益，并履行 Anthropic 公司章程中规定的特定公益使命，即“负责任地开发和维护先进人工智能，以造福人类的长远利益。”
Anthropic’s main innovation is to take this basic PBC form and fine-tune it by supplementing it with the Long-Term Benefit Trust. The foundation of the Trust is a special class of shares in the company, called the Class T Common Stock. These shares are held by the Trustees of the Trust and they grant the Trustees the power to elect a gradually increasing number of the company’s directors.[2] The number will initially be one out of the company’s five directors, and will increase to two and eventually three—enough to constitute a majority of the board—upon the passage of time or the achievement of certain fundraising milestones. Anthropic’s certificate of incorporation also grants the Trustees, as holders of the Class T Common Stock, the power to receive advance notice of certain key actions by the board that may materially affect the business of the company or its organization.
Anthropic 的主要创新是采用这种基本的 PBC 形式，并通过长期利益信托对其进行微调。该信托的基础是一种公司中特殊类别的股票，称为 T 类普通股。这些股票由信托的受托人持有，并赋予受托人选举公司董事会中逐步增加数量的董事的权力。[2] 最初，该信托将选举公司五名董事中的一名，随后增加至两名，最终达到三名——足以构成董事会的多数——这一变化将随着时间的推移或特定筹资里程碑的达成而发生。此外，Anthropic 的公司章程还赋予受托人（作为 T 类普通股的持有者）提前获知董事会某些可能对公司业务或组织产生重大影响的关键行动的权力。
The Trust additionally has its own internal governance structure. The Trust is a common law trust, governed by the laws of Delaware, with five Voting Trustees.[3] Unlike most common law trusts, the Long-Term Benefit Trust is a “purpose trust” that is managed for the achievement of a purpose rather than the benefit of a particular set of beneficiaries.[4] The purpose of the Trust mirrors the purpose of the company. Like the directors of the company, the Trustees must use their powers to ensure the company combines its pursuit of profit with the achievement of the company’s mission to develop and maintain advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity as well as a commitment to the interests of those materially affected by the company’s conduct.
该信托还拥有自己的内部治理结构。该信托是一个普通法信托，受特拉华州法律管辖，并由五名投票受托人管理。与大多数普通法信托不同，长期利益信托是一个“目的信托”，其管理目的是实现特定目标，而非为了特定受益人群体的利益。该信托的目标与公司的目标一致。与公司的董事一样，受托人必须利用其权力，确保公司在追求利润的同时，实现其发展和维护先进人工智能以造福人类长期利益的使命，并承诺关注受公司行为实质影响者的利益。
The internal governance of the Trust is finely calibrated to maintain both a degree of independence for the Trustees and a close working relationship between the company and the Trust. The initial Trustees were chosen by the company, but subsequent Trustees will be appointed by the Trustees then serving, in a manner akin to the directors of a hospital or other commercial nonprofit. The Trustees remain closely connected to the company by provisions in the Trust’s organizing documents that require the Trustees to consult with the company on certain key matters. The Trustees and the company also entered a carefully structured agreement that allows the Trustees access to the company’s resources and information. Under this agreement, the Trustees hold a broad power to request any information or resources that are reasonably appropriate to the accomplishment of the Trust’s purpose. The company, however, may withhold information or resources for certain purposes, such preserving confidential customer information or avoiding clearly unreasonable expense or effort that manifestly exceeds the benefit to be gained by the Trust.
信托的内部治理经过精细调整，以在保持受托人一定独立性的同时，确保公司与信托之间的紧密合作关系。最初的受托人由公司选定，但后续的受托人将由当时在任的受托人任命，类似于医院或其他商业非营利组织的董事选举方式。信托的组织文件规定，受托人必须就某些关键事项与公司协商，从而使受托人与公司保持紧密联系。此外，受托人与公司签订了一项精心设计的协议，使受托人能够获取公司的资源和信息。根据该协议，受托人拥有广泛的权力，可以请求任何合理适用于实现信托目标的信息或资源。然而，公司可以基于特定目的拒绝提供信息或资源，例如保护客户机密信息，或避免明显超过信托可获得利益的不合理开支或努力。
The Trustees’ independence is further balanced by accountability. The Trustees must consult with and consider the views of the company’s directors and CEO regarding appointments of Trustees. And to ensure the Trustees are frequently reevaluated by their peers, the Trustees serve only one-year terms. As permitted by Delaware’s purpose trust statute,[5] the Trust Agreement also authorizes the Trust to be enforced by the company and by groups of the company’s stockholders who have held a sufficient percentage of the company’s equity for a sufficient period of time.
受托人的独立性通过问责机制进一步平衡。受托人在任命新受托人时，必须与公司董事和首席执行官协商并考虑他们的意见。为了确保受托人经常接受同行的重新评估，受托人的任期仅为一年。根据特拉华州目的信托法规的许可，[5] 信托协议还授权公司及持有公司足够比例股权达足够时间的股东团体对信托进行强制执行。
Because the Trust is so novel, the arrangement builds in mechanisms for flexibility that are consistent with the need for commitment and durability. The Trust Agreement, the certificate of incorporation, and the key agreements between the Trust and the company all use a single, harmonized set of processes to permit amendments that could materially alter the Trust or its rights. These processes permit amendment by consent of the Voting Trustees and the company’s stockholders; by consent of the Voting Trustees and the company’s directors prior to the time the Voting Trustees gain the power to elect a majority of the directors; or by a supermajority of stockholders. Because the last possibility—amendment by a supermajority of stockholders—can be accomplished without the consent of the Voting Trustees, it operates as a kind of failsafe against the actions of the Voting Trustees and safeguards the interests of stockholders. The required supermajority of stockholders grows larger over time to reflect the accumulation of experience and the increasing need for commitment as the company’s technology grows more powerful.
由于该信托非常新颖，该安排内置了灵活性机制，以符合承诺和持久性的需求。信托协议、公司注册证书以及信托与公司之间的关键协议都采用了一套统一的流程，以允许对信托或其权利进行实质性修改。这些流程允许在以下情况下进行修订：经投票受托人和公司股东同意；在投票受托人获得选举董事会多数席位的权力之前，经投票受托人和公司董事同意；或经公司股东的超级多数同意。由于最后一种情况——由超级多数股东修订——可以在未经投票受托人同意的情况下完成，因此它作为一种对投票受托人行为的安全机制，并保障股东的利益。随着时间的推移，所需的超级多数股东比例会逐步增加，以反映经验的积累以及随着公司技术变得更强大而对承诺日益增长的需求。
Anthropic is an empirically oriented company and it recognizes the Long-Term Benefit Trust as a kind of modest experiment. In carefully calibrating the machinery of corporate governance, Anthropic hopes simultaneously to achieve both profit and the public good.
Anthropic 是一家实证导向的公司，并将长期利益信托视为一种适度的实验。在精心调整公司治理机制的同时，Anthropic 希望同时实现利润和公共利益。
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