2024-02-24 BRK PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE

Refer To：《2024-02-24 BRK PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE》。

Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for \$8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest P/C company in the world as measured by net worth. Insurance is a business of promises, and Berkshire’s ability to honor its commitments is unmatched.

我们的财产/意外险（“P/C”）业务自 1967 年以来一直是推动伯克希尔增长的引擎，那一年我们以 860 万美元收购了 National Indemnity 及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine。如今，按净资产衡量，National Indemnity 已是全球最大的财产/意外险公司。保险是一门承诺的生意，而伯克希尔兑现承诺的能力无人能及。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

我们之所以被财产/意外险业务所吸引，其中一个原因是该行业的商业模式：财产/意外险公司先收取保费，后支付理赔。在极端情况下，例如因接触石棉或严重工伤事故而产生的索赔，赔付可能持续数十年。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

这种“先收后付”的模式使财产/意外险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——最终将支付给他人。与此同时，保险公司可以将这些浮存金用于自身投资。虽然单个保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金金额通常与保费规模保持相对稳定。因此，随着我们的业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。正如下表所示，其增长幅度令人瞩目：

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.

我们的浮存金未来可能会出现下降。如果真的发生，降幅也将非常缓慢——年最大减少幅度不超过3%。我们的保险合同性质确保公司永远不会在短期内面临对现金资源产生重大影响的大额付款要求。这种结构是有意为之，也是我们保险公司无可匹敌的财务实力的关键组成部分。这样的实力绝不会被削弱。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费收入超过支出及最终赔付总额，我们的保险业务就会获得承保利润，为浮存金带来的投资收益再添一笔。当获得这种利润时，我们既能使用“免费的资金”，更妙的是还能因持有这些资金而获利。

For the P/C industry as a whole, the financial value of float is now far less than it was for many years. That’s because the standard investment strategy for almost all P/C companies is heavily – and properly – skewed toward high-grade bonds. Changes in interest rates therefore matter enormously to these companies, and during the last decade the bond market has offered pathetically low rates.

对于整个财产/意外险行业而言，浮存金的财务价值如今远不如多年前。这是因为几乎所有财产/意外险公司的标准投资策略都严重而合理地偏向高等级债券。因此，利率变化对这些公司至关重要，而过去十年债券市场提供的利率低得可怜。

Consequently, insurers suffered, as year by year they were forced – by maturities or issuer-call provisions – to recycle their “old” investment portfolios into new holdings providing much lower yields. Where once these insurers could safely earn 5 cents or 6 cents on each dollar of float, they now take in only 2 cents or 3 cents.

因此，保险公司蒙受损失，因为每年到期或发行人赎回条款迫使他们将“旧”投资组合转换为收益更低的新持仓。曾经，这些保险公司可以安全地从每一美元浮存金中赚取5至6美分，如今却只能获得2至3美分。

Some insurers may try to mitigate their loss of revenue by buying lower-quality bonds or non-liquid “alternative” investments promising higher yields. But those are dangerous games and activities that most institutions are ill-equipped to play.

一些保险公司可能试图通过购买低评级债券或流动性差、承诺更高收益的“另类”投资来弥补收入损失。但这些都是危险的游戏，大多数机构并不具备相应能力。

Berkshire’s situation is more favorable than that of insurers in general. Most important, our unrivaled mountain of capital, abundance of cash and a huge and diverse stream of non-insurance earnings allow us far more investment flexibility than is generally available to other companies in the industry. The many choices open to us are always advantageous – and sometimes have presented us with major opportunities.

伯克希尔的处境比一般保险公司更有利。最重要的是，我们无与伦比的雄厚资本、充裕现金，以及庞大且多元化的非保险收益，使我们拥有远超行业其他公司的投资灵活性。这些多样的选择始终对我们有利，有时甚至带来重大机遇。

Our P/C companies have meanwhile had an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 18 of the last 20 years, the exceptions being 2017 and 2022. In 2017 our pre-tax loss was a whopping \$3.2 billion. In 2022 the loss was minimal. For the entire 20-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled \$29.2 billion.

与此同时，我们的财产/意外险公司拥有出色的承保纪录。在过去20年里，伯克希尔有18年实现了承保盈利，例外的是2017年和2022年。2017年，我们的税前亏损高达32亿美元；2022年的亏损则微不足道。在整个20年期间，我们的税前承保收益累计达到292亿美元。

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the rewards of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

这一业绩绝非偶然：我们的保险管理者每日都专注于严格的风险评估，他们深知糟糕的承保结果足以淹没浮存金带来的回报。所有保险公司都口头宣称这一点，而在伯克希尔，这是一种“旧约式”的信仰。

As I have repeatedly done in the past, I will emphasize now that happy outcomes in insurance are far from a sure thing: Danger always lurks.

如我过去屡次强调，保险业务的好结果绝非板上钉钉：风险始终潜伏其中。

Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years – even decades – to surface and ripen. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Ian will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as wind or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, Berkshire will get its share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, handling the loss will not come close to straining our resources, and we will be eager to add to our business the next day.

评估保险风险的错误可能巨大，而且需要多年甚至数十年才会浮现并发酵。（想想石棉。）一场远超卡特里娜和伊恩飓风的大灾难终将发生——也许就在明天，也许在数十年后。“大灾难”可能源自传统因素，如风灾或地震，也可能是完全出乎意料的事件，例如造成灾难性后果的网络攻击，超出保险业当前的想象。一旦这种特大灾难降临，伯克希尔将承担相应份额的损失，规模会很大——非常大。然而，与许多其他保险公司不同，处理这些损失远不足以给我们的资源带来压力，我们第二天仍会积极拓展业务。

* Reproduced from Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2019 Annual Report and updated through 2023

2024-02-24 BRK PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE

2024-02-24 BRK PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE

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