2024-05-29 American International Group, Inc. (AIG) Bernstein's 40th Annual Strategic Decisions Conference (Transcript)

American International Group, Inc. (NYSE:AIG) Bernstein’s 40th Annual Strategic Decisions Conference May 29, 2024 11:00 AM ET

美国国际集团 (NYSE: AIG) 伯恩斯坦第 40 届年度战略决策会议美国东部时间 2024 年 5 月 29 日上午 11:00

Company Participants 公司参与者

Peter Zaffino - Chairman, Chief Executive Officer

彼得-扎菲诺 - 主席、首席执行官

Conference Call Participants

电话会议与会者

Ryan Tunis - Autonomous

Ryan Tunis - 自主

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Thanks for joining us. I'm Ryan Tunis, I'm the insurance analyst at Autonomous. I'm happy to have with us Peter Zaffino, Chairman and CEO of AIG. I think AIG is one of the more interesting stories in insurance for sure. We're going to have a conversation but first Peter wanted to leave off with prepared remarks.

感谢您加入我们。我是Ryan Tunis，Autonomous公司的保险分析师。很高兴邀请到 AIG 董事长兼首席执行官 Peter Zaffino。我认为 AIG 肯定是保险业最有趣的故事之一。我们将进行对话，但首先，彼得想先说几句准备好的话。

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Thanks, Ryan. I thought it would be just easier if I got up and maybe spoke behind the podium for a few minutes. One is, I really appreciate the opportunity to be with you today, Ryan and everybody here today. The AIG story is a unique one, and I hope to unpack it a little bit more with some detail.

谢谢，瑞安。我想，如果我站起来，也许在讲台后面讲几分钟会容易些。首先，我非常感谢今天能有机会和大家在一起，瑞安和今天在座的各位。AIG 的故事是一个独特的故事，我希望能更详细地解读一下。

We've done the hard work of repositioning the company in terms of its underwriting standards and underwriting results, and it's been a significant heavy lift. We now are delivering terrific underwriting results, especially when we compare where we started our journey, which was a very unprofitable portfolio. If I switch to today, our top priorities remain Corebridge, Corebridge deconsolidation and continue to sell down AIG shares. We can talk about that in the session.

我们在承保标准和承保结果方面对公司进行了艰苦的重新定位，这是一项重大而繁重的工作。我们现在的承保业绩非常出色，尤其是与我们起步时的情况相比，当时我们的投资组合非常不赚钱。今天，我们的首要任务仍然是Corebridge、取消Corebridge的合并以及继续抛售AIG的股票。我们可以在会议上讨论这个问题。

We want to position AIG for the future. There's what we call AIG Next, which is really an expense initiative to start to take a company that was a conglomerate and put it into a single company. So that will save a significant amount of money for us as we get to focus on our ROE and the company for the future.

我们希望为 AIG 的未来定位。我们称之为 "AIG Next"，这是一项真正的开支计划，目的是开始将一家联合公司转变为一家单一公司。因此，这将为我们节省大量资金，因为我们将专注于我们的 ROE 和公司的未来。

A few statistics on the underwriting, I think are just important. I wrote in the shareholders letter this year that I thought 2023 was our best year yet. And we've had some really good relative years when we started in 2017 and '18. Just to level set. I've said this before, the portfolio from 2008 to 2018 lost $30 billion. That has not been done in our industry and you survived. I mean, so the reason why I say that is not to provide the statistic, but for everyone to have a clear understanding of the portfolio in which we had to remediate was a highly unprofitable portfolio. We also had within that, a ton of volatility. So CAT '17 became a really active year. If you look at the last 6 out of 7 years, it's been over $100 billion of insurable loss. But our CAT ratio in '17 was 16%, and this past year in 2023 is 4.7%.

一些关于承保的统计数据我认为非常重要。我在今年的股东信中写道，我认为2023年是我们迄今为止最好的一年。我们在2017年和2018年开始的时候也有一些真正好的相对年份。只是为了设定水平。我以前说过，从2008年到2018年的投资组合损失了300亿美元。在我们的行业中还没有这样做过，你们幸存了下来。我的意思是，我这样说的原因不是为了提供统计数据，而是为了让大家清楚地了解我们不得不补救的投资组合是一个非常不盈利的投资组合。我们在这个投资组合中也有大量的波动性。所以，2017年的CAT成为一个非常活跃的年份。如果你看看过去的7年中的6年，保险损失超过了1000亿美元。但我们2017年的CAT比率是16%，而在过去一年的2023年是4.7%。

So not only have we improved the underwriting, we've dramatically reduced the volatility and that continues to be evident in our results. We also did in normal companies, we don't have as much to do, AIG 200, which is really what we use to transform the operational capabilities of the company would be a big story and there are so many other things to talk about. But we actually tackle this simultaneously with the underwriting turnaround. It was $1 billion of savings, but what I'd like to leave you with is more importantly is it was really a big improvement in terms of data, data ingestion, workflow, digital workflow, cloud migration and just improving the core foundation for AIG in the future. So that's done but a big accomplishment.

因此，我们不仅提高了承保能力，还大幅降低了波动性，这一点在我们的业绩中继续得到体现。在普通公司，我们没有那么多事情要做，AIG 200 就是我们用来改造公司运营能力的工具，这将是一个大故事，还有很多其他事情要谈。但实际上，我们是与承保转型同时进行的。虽然节省了 10 亿美元，但更重要的是，我们在数据、数据摄取、工作流程、数字工作流程、云迁移以及改善 AIG 未来的核心基础方面取得了巨大进步。所以，这已经完成了，但也是一个很大的成就。

From 2018 to '23, the calendar year Commercial Lines combined ratio improved by 2,600 basis points, which is dramatic. The accident year combined ratio, which is just really the results in that year with no effect of catastrophe or prior year reserve development was 1,900 basis points. So that -- again, you can see what we've done, the evidence through the financial results. We also shaped the portfolio with divestitures that were all purposeful. We divested the reinsurance business, which had an inherent amount of volatility. Its size and scale wasn't big enough to sort of drive outcomes in the marketplace to become an index.

从2018年到2023年，按日历年计算的商业保险综合比率提高了2600个基点，这是显著的。事故年度综合比率，也就是那一年的实际结果，没有受到灾害或往年准备金发展的影响，提高了1900个基点。所以，再次，你可以看到我们所做的，通过财务结果的证据。我们还通过有目的的剥离来塑造投资组合。我们剥离了再保险业务，该业务具有固有的波动性。它的规模和规模不足以在市场上产生结果，成为指数。

We did that with RenRe. We did the same thing with Crop Risk Services, which was a crop business and sold that to Great American. So we continue to prune the portfolio. I don't think there's a lot more to do, but getting the core businesses focused on where we want to have differentiation in the market and be able to grow.

我们对 RenRe 也是这样做的。我们对农作物风险服务公司（Crop Risk Services）也采取了同样的做法，将其出售给了大美国公司（Great American）。因此，我们将继续调整业务组合。我不认为还有很多事情要做，但我们要把核心业务集中在我们希望在市场上实现差异化并能够增长的地方。

Corebridge, we continue to work really hard on sort on the final stages of sell-downs. We have done a lot there. We started with Blackstone with an equity investment. We outsourced fixed income to BlackRock, flip to the Aladdin platform. We used the AIG 200 transformational program as a foundation to do Corebridge's operational Corebridge Forward. We did 3 secondary offerings last year that generated $2.9 billion of proceeds. Divested 2 businesses, Laya, U.K. Life, which is $1.2 billion of proceeds for Corebridge. And we just announced a Nippon Life, 20% sale for $3.8 billion.

Corebridge，我们继续非常努力地进行最后的减持阶段。我们已经在这方面做了很多工作。我们从黑石集团开始进行股权投资。我们将固定收益外包给了贝莱德，并转向了阿拉丁平台。我们以AIG 200转型计划为基础，进行了Corebridge的运营Corebridge Forward。去年我们进行了3次二级发行，产生了29亿美元的收益。剥离了两个业务，Laya，英国人寿，这为Corebridge带来了12亿美元的收益。我们刚刚宣布了日本生命保险公司20%的出售，价值38亿美元。

All this has led to our financial flexibility in the capital management. This multiyear repositioning the portfolio has allowed us to significantly strengthen the balance sheet and give us financial flexibility for the future.

所有这一切都提高了我们在资本管理方面的财务灵活性。通过多年来对投资组合的重新定位，我们大大加强了资产负债表，并为我们的未来提供了财务灵活性。

All of our Tier 1 insurance company subsidiaries are at or above whatever the target levels we've set. So we have more capital in the subsidiaries for the writings we have today so we can grow in to business and to the capital position without additional capital. So that gives us a lot of flexibility to grow.

我们所有的一级保险公司子公司都达到或超过了我们设定的目标水平。因此，我们在子公司中拥有更多的资本，以满足我们今天的写作需要，这样我们就可以在不增加资本的情况下发展业务和资本状况。因此，这给了我们很大的发展灵活性。

We've significantly reduced our debt, when we deconsolidate, we'll be sub $10 billion. And so that was really $12 billion of retirement since 2001. I mean a lot of it was from what we did in Corebridge, but we've been really disciplined on when we've done some leverage with Corebridge that we took off that with AIG. So our debt-to-capital ratio upon deconsolidation, including AOCI or excluding we'll be doing 15% and 20%.

我们已经大幅减少了债务，当我们不再合并时，我们的债务将低于 100 亿美元。因此，自 2001 年以来，我们的债务已经减少了 120 亿美元。我的意思是，其中很多债务来自于我们在 Corebridge 所做的事情，但我们在 Corebridge 的杠杆作用方面一直很有节制，我们在 AIG 的杠杆作用也是如此。因此，我们的债务与资本比率在非并表（包括 AOCI 或不包括 AIG）后将达到 15%至 20%。

Board support us with a share authorization program of $10 billion. That really reflects the liquidity that we have, plans. Again, of course, it depends on when we deconsolidate and sell down further Corebridge. But I think about that through '24 and '25. We said we should do about $6 billion this year, probably around $4 billion in '25, depends on the timing of the deconsolidation, but gives us a lot of financial flexibility. We increased the dividend again, 10-plus percent second year in a row, returning capital to shareholders.

董事会支持我们 100 亿美元的股份授权计划。这确实反映了我们拥有的流动资金和计划。当然，这也取决于我们何时将 Corebridge 剥离并进一步出售。但我认为，到 24 年和 25 年。我们曾说过，今年我们应该出售约 60 亿美元，25 年可能会出售约 40 亿美元，这取决于合并的时间安排，但这给了我们很大的财务灵活性。我们再次增加了股息，连续第二年增加了 10%，将资本返还给股东。

So I think if I leave you with one thing today, I hope I leave you with more, but I'll leave you with one is like this is a different company. There's really no way to look into the past of anything of relevance to today, although we got a great brand. We have good global presence and we have the ability to continue to grow. And I think our position and voice in the marketplace is significant. So we're really proud of what we've accomplished, the growing reputation and delivering high-quality outcomes quarter after quarter to be able to position AIG for the future. So I just want to just open with those comments, and then Ryan, we can go to Q&A.

所以我想，如果我今天给你们留下一件事，我希望能给你们留下更多，但我会给你们留下一件事，那就是这是一家不同的公司。虽然我们有一个伟大的品牌，但我们真的没有办法回顾过去的任何与今天相关的事情。我们有良好的全球影响力，我们有能力继续增长。我认为我们在市场上的地位和话语权非常重要。因此，我们对所取得的成就感到非常自豪，我们的声誉不断提高，并且每个季度都能取得高质量的成果，从而为 AIG 的未来发展奠定了基础。因此，我只想先发表这些评论，然后瑞安，我们可以进行问答。

Question-and-Answer Session

问答环节

Q - Ryan Tunis

So yes, thanks for those comments. So yes, it seems like the major theme here is a lot of years, we're fixing the underwriting. That's fixed, and now it's more of a discussion around a pivot to growth. So I guess as you're shifting that focus, how do you ensure that there's still a good level of underwriting discipline.

是的，谢谢你的评论。是的，多年来，我们一直在解决承保问题。这已经解决了，现在更多的是围绕转向增长展开讨论。所以我想，在你们转移重点的同时，如何确保承保纪律仍然保持良好的水平？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Underwriting discipline is really driven by the culture and the framework and who you have leading the businesses. And so you'll hear thematically throughout our conversation of all the changes that we made. AIG, again, I don't spend a lot of time. I knew AIG really well. I was at Marsh & McLennan for 17 years, and they were the biggest trading partner. So I knew the company from the outside as well as you can know it. It was known as a growth company, not necessarily a great underwriting company.

承保纪律实际上是由企业文化和框架以及领导企业的人推动的。因此，在我们的谈话中，你会听到我们所做的所有变革的主题。AIG，我花的时间不多。我对 AIG 非常了解。我在 Marsh & McLennan 工作了 17 年，他们是最大的贸易伙伴。因此，我对这家公司的了解不亚于你对它的了解。众所周知，它是一家成长型公司，但不一定是一家出色的承保公司。

And when we need to really position the portfolio, we had to have a culture of underwriting excellence, have a cheap underwriting office that was not a tick the box, but actually was setting standards, monitoring growth and also profitability and having underwriting guidelines that we're going to be aligned with how we want to shape the portfolio.

当我们需要对投资组合进行真正的定位时，我们必须要有一种卓越的承销文化，要有一个廉价的承销办公室，它不是一个 "勾选框"，而是真正在制定标准、监控增长和盈利能力，并制定承销准则，使其与我们想要塑造的投资组合相一致。

Out of 20 -- the 20 top underwriting positions, and I'm talking about from the most senior on down, so our Chief Underwriting Officer, Chris Schaper, leader of international is John Hancock, and our leader in North America is Don Bailey. So those would be 3. And in the top 20 positions, 17 out of the 20 have less tenure at the company than I do. So it means like less than 6 years.

在 20 个最高级别的承保职位中，我指的是从最高级别往下的职位，所以我们的首席承保官是 Chris Schaper，国际部的领导是 John Hancock，北美地区的领导是 Don Bailey。一共是 3 位。在前 20 个职位中，有 17 个职位的任职年限比我短。也就是说，他们的任职时间都不到 6 年。

And what we were trying to do is drive those leadership positions with underwriting practitioners. They can still manage. They can still lead, but not having general managers overseeing underwriting businesses was really important. They focus on underwriting profitability. That is the primary objective. We are also set up very differently than other companies in terms of how reinsurance is purchased. It's not done by any of the businesses. It's not done by the CFO's office. The head of our reinsurance purchasing Charlie Fry, I think he's the best in the world. He comes directly to me.

而我们所要做的，就是让承保从业人员担任领导职务。他们仍然可以管理。他们仍然可以领导，但不让总经理监督承保业务真的很重要。他们专注于承保盈利能力。这是首要目标。在购买再保险的方式上，我们也与其他公司有很大不同。这不是由任何一家公司完成的。也不是由首席财务官办公室负责。我们的再保险采购负责人查理-弗莱（Charlie Fry），我认为他是世界上最棒的。他直接来找我。

We set all the underwriting standards in terms of what we buy for reinsurance based on our volatility, appetite and risk appetite for AIG, not-for-profit centers. So that's very different. So the underwriters are focused on gross underwriting. They don't really look at net underwriting as an outcome. It becomes the outcome every time we have a quarterly income statement we had to produce for the Street. But by and large, that culture is very strong. Underwriting expertise is very strong, and we will not sacrifice underwriting profitability for growth.

我们根据AIG的波动性、盈利中心的风险承受能力来设定所有再保险购买的承保标准，这与非盈利中心的做法非常不同。因此，承保人专注于总承保。他们并不会真正将净承保视为结果。每次我们为市场制作季度收益报表时，它就会成为结果。但总体而言，这种文化非常强大。承保专业知识非常强大，我们不会为了增长而牺牲承保盈利能力。

这个问题非常关键，但这样的回答是不够清晰的，没有说清楚白纸签出去了钱就进来的诱惑怎么解决？平常心是最终的答案，平常心不常有，PGR的案例说明软件技术不等于平常心，但是软件技术可以解决很多噪音。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Got it. So I guess it's interesting because from your standpoint, you've been advocating that this pivot to growth happened a couple of years ago. But I think there's been a bit of a lag from an investor standpoint. I think count us in that camp, we wanted to see just a little bit more -- let's see the underwriting bear out. But I think investors, most people, I think we now share the same mindset, we're on the same page. So now that growth is more of a focus, and you've been doing this for 2 years. And I guess we haven't been paying as careful attention as we should have. Can you talk a little bit about the progress you've made or the challenges you've encountered trying to shift that mindset back to growth?

知道了我想这很有趣，因为从你的角度来看，你一直主张几年前就应该转向增长。但我认为，从投资者的角度来看，这有点滞后。我认为，就我们这个阵营而言，我们希望看到更多一点 -- 让我们看看承销情况。但我认为，投资者、大多数人，我认为我们现在的心态是一致的，我们在同一起跑线上。所以，现在增长是更多关注的焦点，你已经做了两年了。我想我们并没有像我们应该做的那样仔细关注。你能谈谈你在尝试将思维方式转回增长方面取得的进展或遇到的挑战吗？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

When we talked about it two years ago, not to caveat it, but I think we're really talking about like on a written basis, we feel like we've had a lot of remediation done. So as it earns in, it just takes a little bit of time and repositioning the portfolio to where we thought the best risk-adjusted returns would exist. We have been very focused. There's businesses today. When you're doing turnarounds, you manage them as an indexed because you have to drive profitability for the entire portfolio. We've really been focused on those last two years in terms of getting disproportionate amount of the investment into areas of high growth potential and really strong combined ratios, while still remediating always the bottom portion of the portfolio.

两年前，我们曾讨论过这个问题，我并不是想强调这一点，但我认为我们真正讨论的是书面上的问题，我们觉得我们已经做了很多补救措施。因此，我们需要一点时间，重新定位投资组合，使其达到我们认为的最佳风险调整回报。我们一直非常专注。现在有很多业务。当你进行扭亏为盈时，你要把它们作为一个指数来管理，因为你必须提高整个投资组合的盈利能力。在过去的两年里，我们一直专注于将过多的投资投入到具有高增长潜力、综合比率非常高的领域，同时还一直在对投资组合的底层部分进行补救。

So I think you've seen evidence in areas where we think we can grow very profitably like Lexington, like the syndicate that we have, Talbot, Global A&H, which has been de minimis, but we've had a little bit of -- we have been exiting China. So that's been a little bit masking some of the growth in A&H.

所以我认为你已经看到了一些领域的证据，我们认为我们可以非常有利地增长，比如莱克星顿，比如我们拥有的辛迪加，塔尔博特，全球意外伤害和健康保险，这一直是微不足道的，但我们已经有了一些——我们已经退出了中国市场。所以这在一定程度上掩盖了意外伤害和健康保险的增长。

Our global specialties were the biggest global specialty rider and think that there's ample opportunity for growth there and want to continue to make sure that we have a focus on those areas. And they've been performing exceptionally well. When I look at the portfolio, I always start at like what clients do you retain? What's the new business pipeline? Are we able to look at different areas of business in many different geographies.

我们的全球特色产品是全球最大的特色产品，我们认为这些产品有大量的增长机会，并希望继续确保我们对这些领域的关注。这些领域的表现一直非常出色。当我审视公司的业务组合时，我总是会问，你们保留了哪些客户？新业务管道是什么？我们是否能够在许多不同的地区开展不同领域的业务。

So like, if you think about property, not all properties created equal. There's definitely different risk-adjusted returns depending on where you are in the world, what's happening with CATs and also what's the underlying profitability. But AIG is 6 or 7 points of entry into property so we can scale it back or scale it up depending on those risk-adjusted returns. I think it's very thoughtful, really driven by portfolio work and how we actually drive that through to the underwriter.

因此，如果你考虑房地产，并不是所有的房地产都是一样的。风险调整后的回报肯定是不同的，这取决于你所处的位置、CAT 的情况以及基本的盈利能力。但 AIG 有 6 或 7 个点进入房地产领域，因此我们可以根据风险调整后的回报率来缩小或扩大规模。我认为这是非常周到的，真正的驱动力来自于投资组合工作以及我们如何真正将其传递给承保人。

So I think the growth will be there. I believe like the retentions are very strong now, where in the past, that remediation still affected the current portfolio and new business has been just terrific. So I still think there's a lot of momentum and a lot of opportunities for growth.

因此，我认为增长还会继续。我相信现在的保有量非常大，而在过去，补救措施仍然影响着当前的投资组合，新业务也非常出色。因此，我仍然认为增长势头强劲，增长机会很多。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Is it -- you guys are obviously different size than you were 10 years ago. Does that pose any challenges in terms of the growth you can do?

你们的规模显然与十年前不同。这对你们的发展是否构成了挑战？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

No. I mean, again, if you go back in time, when AIG was at its peak, probably $65 billion of top line, it squandered that opportunity. I mean, because it was -- it's not the way it is today because AIG at that point in time was bigger than any broker in terms of what it plays in the market now, Marsh and Aon if you say we're $35 billion gross top line, they place 3 to 4x that in the market today.

不，我的意思是，再说一遍，如果你回到过去，当 AIG 处于顶峰时，可能有 650 亿美元的收入，但它浪费了这个机会。我的意思是，因为当时的情况与今天不同，因为当时的 AIG 比现在市场上的任何经纪公司都要大，如果说 Marsh 和 Aon 的最高销售额是 350 亿美元，那么他们现在的市场销售额是我们的 3 到 4 倍。

So I mean what AIG had as an unbelievable advantage at that time, just wasn't taking advantage of. Now the size matters, but I think what matters more is like where you trade? Like I mean, so when you look at the point of sale, which is through the brokers to clients, are you setting the underwriting terms? Are you setting the pricing? Are you the one that has the lead capabilities, which means you have the underwriting expertise. And that's the businesses we trade. So we're not a capacity player that tries to find risks through an open market and best price wins. That's a failed strategy. The businesses that we are in and the global locations, I think, give us tremendous advantages to differentiate ourselves compared to other companies.

所以，我的意思是，AIG 在当时拥有的令人难以置信的优势，并没有得到充分利用。现在，规模很重要，但我认为更重要的是在哪里交易？就像我的意思是，当你看销售点，也就是通过经纪人向客户销售时，你是否设定了承保条款？定价是你定的吗？你是否拥有领先的能力，这意味着你拥有承保方面的专业知识。这就是我们的交易业务。因此，我们不是一个试图通过公开市场寻找风险并以最优价格取胜的能力参与者。这是一个失败的战略。我认为，我们所从事的业务和遍布全球的分支机构为我们提供了巨大的优势，使我们能够与其他公司相比脱颖而出。

这个回答仍然是模糊不清的。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Got it. So you mentioned Lexington. That's your wholesale division in a place where you've executed extremely well. But listen, you've kind of been in the camp, you've been a believer that there's sort of a secular shift of market volumes into the E&S market. So I guess just to play the devil's advocate scenario, if E&S turns out to run a little bit more of a classic cycle, it's good in hard markets, tough in soft markets. how much of an impediment would that be for AIG?

明白了。所以您提到了莱克星顿。这是您的批发部门，您在这方面执行得非常好。但听着，您一直是那种认为市场交易量正在发生长期转变，进入E&S市场的人。所以我想扮演一下魔鬼的代言人，如果E&S最终呈现出更多经典周期性，即在硬市场表现良好，在软市场表现艰难。这对AIG会有多大的阻碍呢？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

It won't be an impediment at all. One is I don't believe it. It's a complicated market. I'll try to explain it is that E&S has grown substantially over the last 20 years. So I'll give you one statistic first is that if you went back to 2003 and '04, the entire E&S market was about $34 billion. Today, it's $114 billion. So it's grabbing market share. There's no doubt about it. Their capabilities are broadening and their ability to actually drive outcomes is substantial because their organic growth versus retail and they have the momentum.

不会成为阻碍。首先，我不相信这一点。市场很复杂。我试着解释一下，E&S在过去20年中已经大幅增长。首先给你一个统计数据，如果你回到2003年和2004年，整个E&S市场大约是340亿美元。今天，它是1140亿美元。所以它正在夺取市场份额。这毫无疑问。他们的能力正在扩大，他们实际上推动结果的能力是巨大的，因为他们的有机增长与零售相比，他们有势头。

The other piece is that they are able to break their models into really 3 categories to oversimplify. One is a pure E&S market, which is maybe hard to place risks, you have to be very focused on going into E&S markets to be able to do that. The other is they become placement engines for independent agents about 40,000 independent agents in the United States. They have access usually to two or three markets. They're the more traditional and middle markets, they don't have access to middle markets, they have to use a wholesaler to get to those markets.

另一部分是他们能够将他们的模式简化为三个类别。一个是纯粹的E&S市场，这可能是难以安置风险的地方，你必须非常专注于进入E&S市场才能做到这一点。另一个是他们成为独立代理人的投放引擎，大约有40,000名独立代理人在美国。他们通常可以接触到两三个市场。他们更传统的和中等市场，他们没有接触到中等市场，他们必须使用批发商来进入这些市场。

And then the third is what we call delegated authority or MGUs where they underwrite on behalf of insurance company paper or risk assumption, where they're growing and they're putting the most investment in those three buckets. So they have broader capabilities. What happened is -- and this is not intuitive, but the old Lexington had a strategy that it would take retail so think about Marsh, Aon, Willis or wholesale business. And that would have been Ryan Specialty, AmWINS or CRC. That is a terrible strategy and one that ends up getting adverse selection everywhere.

第三个是所谓的委托权限或MGUs（管理总代理单位），他们代表保险公司的文件或风险承担进行承保，他们正在增长，并且正在这三个领域中投入最多的投资。因此，他们拥有更广泛的能力。发生的情况是——这并不直观，但旧的莱克星顿有一个策略，它会接零售业务，想想马什（Marsh）、Aon、Willis或批发业务。那将是Ryan Specialty、AmWINS或CRC。这是一个糟糕的策略，最终会在各地产生不利选择。

Retail brokers don't want to go to excess and surplus lines markets. And you don't have to believe what they -- I ran Marsh, and I'm telling you, I didn't want to go to Lexington. It would be the market of last resort in every instance. Wholesale doesn't want to use a market that will use retail. So they give you the adverse selection. So it ended up becoming a giant business of adverse selection, plus why not just like issue the largest limits you can to make sure that the results are even worse. That's where we started.

零售经纪人不想去超额和盈余线路市场。你不必相信他们所说的——我经营过马什（Marsh），我告诉你，我不想去莱克星顿。在每一种情况下，它将是最后的选择市场。批发商不想使用会使用零售的市场。所以他们给你不利选择。所以最终它变成了一个巨大的不利选择业务，再加上为什么不发行尽可能大的限制，以确保结果更糟。这就是我们开始的地方。

And if I look at the market share under that strategy, it was 3 times the size that we are today. So I would argue that we have plenty of room to grow, number one. The other statistic that's very interesting to me, and I'll say the catalyst was AIG, you could ask around and determine if that's right or not. But in 2017, as I said, when I came in, I had this retail wholesale distribution strategy, and we said we're not doing that either, we're going to like run the business off or we're going wholesale only because it's the only way we're going to get like very strong business.

如果我回顾那个策略下的市场份额，它当时是我们今天规模的3倍。所以我认为我们有很大的增长空间，这是第一点。另一个对我来说非常有趣的统计数据，我会说催化剂是AIG，你可以四处打听，确定这是否正确。但在2017年，正如我所说，当我加入时，我有这种零售批发分销策略，我们说我们也不这么做了，我们打算像关闭业务一样运营，或者我们只做批发业务，因为这是我们获得非常强大业务的唯一方式。

From 2017 and '18, once we decided, which means we had to basically non-renew most of the portfolio and turn it over and go through wholesale. The compound annual growth rate from '17 to '23 is 20% in wholesale. It's never been that large. And we're talking off a bigger bases now. So I don't think it's really driven by this hard market, soft market. I'll age myself out because I've been doing this for a while.

从 2017 年和 18 年开始，一旦我们做出决定，这意味着我们必须基本上不再续约大部分投资组合，并将其转为批发。从 17 年到 23 年，批发业的复合年增长率为 20%。从来没有这么大。我们现在谈论的是更大的基数。所以我不认为这是市场疲软或市场疲软的结果。因为我干这行已经有一段时间了，所以我就不多说了。

I always -- I don't like hard market, soft market. But if I was to define a hard market, I'd say it's a supply issue. Hard markets, [indiscernible], they were driven by no supply, and therefore, pricing becomes a direct correlation to capacity that could be deployed. There's no shortage of capacity in the marketplace. We could write billions of dollars of premium if they have the right risk-adjusted returns as could many of our competitors. This is a choice in terms of going to a market.

我一直不喜欢硬市场和软市场。但如果让我来定义硬市场，我会说这是一个供应问题。硬市场，[无法辨别]，它们是由无供应驱动的，因此，定价与可部署的产能直接相关。市场上并不缺乏产能。如果有合适的风险调整回报，我们可以承保数十亿美元的保费，我们的许多竞争对手也可以做到这一点。这是进入市场的一种选择。

And by the way, back to what we talked around how much premium goes into the market. I mean, AmWINS is now north of $30 billion. I think Ryan Specialty is very close to that and CRC is not too far behind. So it's going to be a similar dynamic that we saw in retail like Marsh, Aon, Willis for a while were the big three and then there was everyone else, but everyone else is caught up. I mean, they're not the same size, they have strong organic growth and they have a lot more relevance. I think you'll see that in wholesale as well.

顺便说一下，回到我们讨论的有多少保费进入市场的话题。我的意思是，AmWINS现在已经超过300亿美元。我认为Ryan Specialty非常接近这个数字，CRC也紧随其后。所以这将是一个与我们在零售领域看到的类似动态，比如Marsh、Aon、Willis有一段时间是三大巨头，然后是其他所有人，但其他人已经赶上了。我的意思是，他们不是同样的规模，他们有强劲的有机增长，他们有更多的相关性。我认为你也会在批发领域看到这一点。

So it's a dynamic shift. There was only 8 wholesale-only markets, maybe 9 when AIG decided to make a change with Lexington, I think today, don't ask me to name them, but I think there's north of 80 today. Some are doing funny. So that market is -- I don't see it. If you go back to that period of time, when I said it was back to $33 billion, it lost a little bit of market share in the more traditional hard market, soft market. But it's not going to give a lot back this time. So I just -- and my last like this will be a plug, I'm not a wholesale only market. It goes in a minute. I've got plenty of Medicaid bill.

所以这是一个动态的转变。当AIG决定对莱克星顿进行改变时，只有8个或者可能9个仅限批发的市场，我认为今天，不要让我说出它们的名字，但我认为今天有超过80个。有些做得很有趣。所以那个市场——我看不到它。如果你回到那个时期，当我说它回到了330亿美元时，它在更传统的硬市场、软市场中失去了一些市场份额。但这次它不会大量归还。所以我只是——我的最后一个像这样的将是一个插入，我不是一个仅限批发的市场。它在一分钟内就结束了。我有很多医疗补助账单。

I'm not like plugging for it. I just think that's where the market is. And so if it doesn't work, I got like other businesses that can pick up the opportunities. This is not we're wholesale only, and we're betting in the farm. I just think there's plenty of opportunities for Lexington to grow. I think that market is going to grow. And look at submission count when you're talking to brokers and the wholesale brokers are breaking records every quarter, like I can't believe how much submission activity is coming into them after massive growth than what we've seen over the last two to three years.

我并不是在为此做广告。我只是认为市场就是如此。所以如果这不起作用，我还有其他的业务可以抓住机会。我们并不是仅限于批发，我们也不是把所有的赌注都押在这上面。我只是认为莱克星顿有很大的增长机会。我认为市场将会增长。而且当你和经纪人交谈时，看看提交的数量，批发经纪人每个季度都在打破记录，我不敢相信在经历了过去两三年的大规模增长之后，有多少提交活动涌入他们那里。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Got it. So I -- I get like aside from, I guess, growth re-underwriting, AIG has been an excess capital story, and a lot of that's kind of been tied to the sell-down of the Corebridge stake. I guess we'd argue that even post deconsolidation and deployment of Corebridge proceeds, you guys still look like an excess capital story. I think one of the -- one of the really interesting stat I think is your tangible equity base is actually not that different than Chubb's, and Chubb has about twice the premium.

明白了所以我觉得，除了重新承保增长之外，AIG一直是一个资本过剩的公司，而这很大程度上与出售Corebridge股份有关。我想我们可以说，即使在取消合并和部署 Corebridge 的收益后，你们看起来仍然是一个资本过剩的公司。我认为其中一个非常有趣的数据是，你们的有形股权基础实际上与丘博的差别不大，而丘博的溢价大约是你们的两倍。

CB所有者权益610.38亿美元，AIG最新报表是491.10亿，2021年是689.12亿美元，是差不多，AIG需要从破产中重生，估值低一些是正常的。

So that looks like a lot of under lever from a premium standpoint, should we think of organic growth as kind of the most likely deployment of that residual excess capital? And I think you mentioned that you have a $35 billion gross book, I want to say $25 billion net, something like that. Should we think about, I guess, the opportunity to deploy that capital coming more from keeping more business net or from just writing more business?

因此，从保费的角度看，这似乎是一个很大的杠杆，我们是否应该把有机增长作为剩余过剩资本最可能的部署方式？我想你提到过，你有 350 亿美元的总保单，我想说 250 亿美元的净保单，类似这样。我想，我们是否应该考虑，部署这些资本的机会更多地是来自于保持更多的净业务，还是来自于承保更多的业务？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Are you worried I'm going to give a long answer like the Lexington?

你是担心我会像莱克星顿那样给出一个冗长的答案吗？

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

No. 不

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Okay. I would think of it as both. We definitely have excess capital to grow into and believe that we have ample opportunities, park reinsurance for a side, is that there's plenty of opportunities for organic growth in the portfolio. And again, it will be market specific, it will be market dependent, but believe that is the first priority in terms of usage to grow into the capital base. The second why I mentioned like reinsurance is that again, you have to go back to why I kind of made some of the opening statements, it's like AIG got unfairly punished, subsequent to -- it's one of the things that really frustrated me was that I brought in a lot of people with tremendous track records of driving profitability through all market cycles, yet we still had to live with the past of what we were doing with AIG's past.

我们确实拥有多余的资本来实现增长，并且相信我们有大量的机会，在把再保险放在一边的情况下，投资组合中有很多有机增长的机会。再说一次，这将是市场特定的，将取决于市场，但我相信这是使用资本基础进行增长的首要优先事项。我提到再保险的第二个原因是，你不得不回到为什么我做了一些开场白的原因，就像AIG在之后受到了不公平的惩罚——这是我非常沮丧的事情之一，我引进了很多有着在所有市场周期中推动盈利性的卓越记录的人，但我们仍然不得不忍受AIG过去的所作所为。

引进外面的人才来解决企业内部的问题，在巴菲特的眼里重生是几乎不可能的。

And so like I recognize pretty early on, like we can't have the same volatility as some of our peers for now. And so therefore, that needs to be done through the gross portfolio as well as through reinsurance. And when you look at our just use like it's what's in the K and everything else on the one in 100 return periods for PMLs, which is probable maximum loss for natural perils. Our PML relative to shareholders' equity is the lowest of any of our peer group by literally like -- I think we're like one-third of the next one and then maybe even one-fourth of the next one after that. So I think we'll be able to take more volatility. We may not choose to do that, but we certainly can take a little bit more on CAT because we have very low attachment points and we want them to not have any volatility while we're doing the deconsolidation with Corebridge and preserve capital and earnings for that matter.

所以我很早就意识到，我们现在不能像我们的一些同行那样有同样的波动性。因此，这需要通过总组合以及再保险来实现。当你看看我们的K表格和所有其他东西，在100年一遇的回报期的PML上，也就是自然危险的可能最大损失。相对于股东权益，我们的PML是所有同行中最低的，真的就像是——我认为我们是下一个的三分之一，然后可能是下一个的四分之一。所以我认为我们可以承受更多的波动性。我们可能不会选择这样做，但我们肯定可以承受更多的CAT，因为我们有非常低的附加点，我们希望他们在我们与Corebridge脱离的过程中没有波动性，同时保留资本和盈利。

The dynamics in the reinsurance market. We're the only industry that like declares what the CAT season is going to be like before CAT season starts. So like we have a lot of forecasts with, I don't know, I mean, I'm not a meteorologist, but everyone is saying it's going to be a more active CAT season, meaning in terms of severity as well as frequency, name storms, severe storms, landfall, I have no idea. But people were predicting that it wasn't going to be that, it ended up being a lot worse. So I think this is the new norm. And I'm not prepared to run a business that's going to lose $1 billion a quarter on CAT because I want to take massive net retentions.

再保险市场的动态。我们是唯一一个在灾害季节开始之前就宣布灾害季节将会如何的行业。所以我们有很多预测，我不知道，我的意思是，我不是气象学家，但大家都说这将是一个更活跃的灾害季节，也就是说在严重性和频率方面，命名风暴，严重风暴，登陆，我不知道。但人们曾预测情况不会是这样，结果情况更糟。所以我认为这是新常态。我并不打算经营一个每季度因灾害损失10亿美元的业务，因为我要进行大规模的净保留。

Having said that, there are things that we can do that will be driven by choices. We saw a little bit of that in the first quarter where we had a lot of proportional reinsurance, which is basically just ground up. So let's just think about we're writing a business. And if you do proportional and you said a 50%, that means 50% of the premium goes to the reinsurer and they pay you an override, usually get anywhere from 300 to 500 basis points of override based on the quality of the book. That consumes a lot of premium. It may not be a great choice going forward. We did that to reduce volatility and re-underwrite the portfolio.

话虽如此，我们有一些可以通过选择来驱动的事情。我们在第一季度就看到了一点，我们有很多比例再保险，基本上就是基础损失。所以让我们想想我们正在写一项业务。如果你做比例再保险，比如说50%，那意味着50%的保费归再保险公司，他们会支付你一个额外的费用，通常会得到300到500个基点的额外费用，这取决于账簿的质量。这消耗了很多保费。这可能不是未来的最佳选择。我们这样做是为了减少波动性，重新承保投资组合。

But if you flip that to just what we call excess of loss, which attaches above a certain level, that's not going to be driving premium growth. It will result in that, but it will be restructuring how we buy reinsurance based on the maturity of the portfolio and where we think the market is.

如果您将比例再保险转换为所谓的超额损失再保险，它在超过一定水平时开始生效，那将不会推动保费增长。它将导致这种情况，但我们将根据投资组合的成熟度以及我们对市场的看法，重新构建我们购买再保险的方式。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Yes, I don't know if there's a way that you benchmark it in your head. But do you think -- would you say at AIG, your business on average is more -- I guess I'm thinking more the quota share of the ground up, is it more heavily reinsured than most competitors or kind of just what you'd expect for the type of business you're writing? I'm just trying to assess if would it be taking disproportionately high risk to write more on that basis? Or would you just be --

是的，我不知道你是否有办法在头脑中设定基准。但你是否认为--你是否会说，在 AIG，你的业务平均而言更--我想我是在想更多的配额份额，是否比大多数竞争对手的再保险更多，或者只是你对你所承保的业务类型的预期？我只是想评估一下，如果在此基础上承保更多，是否会承担过高的风险？或者你只是

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

No, the answer to the first question is we buy more reinsurance, particularly on property than our peers do. But that's an appetite of volatility than it is anything else. So we don't have to do that. We did 5 years ago, we don't today. And the property portfolio with no reinsurance was massively unprofitable, north of 130 combined in certain parts of the portfolio now is in the 70, 80s combined with fully loaded reinsurance. So reinsurance shouldn't be looked at as a cost that is going to be detrimental. It's a cost that is a clearing price of that capacity. It needs to be priced into the original risk.

不，对第一个问题的回答是，我们购买的再保险，特别是财产保险，比我们的同行要多。但这是对波动性的接受程度，而不是其他。所以我们不必这样做。我们在5年前这样做了，现在不再这样做。没有再保险的财产投资组合在某些部分的综合比率超过130，现在是在70到80的综合比率，这是在完全装载再保险的情况下。因此，再保险不应被视为一种将有害的成本。这是能力的清算价格。它需要被定价到原始风险中。

I think what happened -- this is my own view, it doesn't need to be right, is that what I would look at for reinsurance, if you ever like trying to figure out like what companies are doing, I couldn't care less what they did from 2023 to 2024. I want to know what they did from 2022 to 2024 because people took massive net positions and change their portfolio. We didn't make any changes. And that's why I think we're a little bit of an outlier because we chose not to increase retentions because pricing, capacity whatever was available that we decided to pass on. So I would think of it that way.

我认为所发生的事情——这是我自己的观点，不一定正确，但当我试图弄清楚公司在做什么时，我不会关心他们在2023年到2024年之间做了什么。我想知道他们在2022年到2024年之间做了什么，因为人们采取了大规模的净持仓并改变了他们的投资组合。我们没有做任何改变。这就是为什么我认为我们有点与众不同，因为我们选择不增加保留，因为定价、容量或其他任何可用的东西，我们决定放弃。所以我就是这样想的。

不够自信，CB的CEO是自信过头。

The other one we don't talk a lot about is casualty. I mean we had a portfolio that, again, needed to be remediated, was done for different purposes before all the inflation jury awards that have been evident in portfolios across the industry now by reducing sort of our limit capacity. So one example would be when I came in, AIG could have a $100 million net loss on a single account. Today, the most we could add, we put out the same $100 million policy in North America would be like $12 million. And so -- it's just a dramatically different portfolio and I don't believe in certain lines of business like casualty that you take massive vertical risk if you're going to put out gross limits. I just don't think it's prudent.

我们不太常谈论的是意外伤害保险。我的意思是，我们有一个需要补救的投资组合，之前因为通货膨胀导致的陪审团裁决而在全行业各公司的投资组合中变得明显，通过减少我们的限额容量来完成。所以一个例子是，当我加入时，AIG在单一账户上可能面临1亿美元的净损失。今天，我们最多只能增加，我们在北美发布的同样的1亿美元保单，可能只有1200万美元。所以——这是一个截然不同的投资组合，我不相信在某些业务领域，比如意外伤害保险，如果你要发布总限额，你会承担巨大的垂直风险。我只是认为这并不审慎。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Makes sense. So I wanted to shift gears to I guess the news from a couple of weeks ago with Corebridge, you guys -- of 20% of your 52% stake in Nippon Life. I guess first question is when should we expect from a timing perspective, the financial deconsolidation of that? Is that a -- how we can expect this quarter as there are things that have to happen from a Board standpoint? And then also how are you thinking about the timing of the remaining sell-down of that corporate stake?

有道理所以，我想把话题转移到几周前 Corebridge 的新闻上，你们 -- 你们持有日本生命 52% 的股份中的 20%。我想第一个问题是，从时间的角度来看，我们应该在什么时候期待财务上的脱钩？从董事会的角度来看，有些事情必须要发生，我们能预计本季度会发生吗？还有，你们如何考虑剩余公司股权的出售时间？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

I think those are 3 questions, right? Maybe 4. So first of all, Nippon Life is an outstanding life insurance company. I mean, the most reputable one in Japan, all respected across -- as a 20% owner for Corebridge is going to be very strategic, and I think the benefits will be short, medium and long term, really, really pleased to be able to announce that. And again, another strategic positioning for Corebridge that's going to really benefit a long time. I believe Blackstone was very good.

我想这是 3 个问题，对吗？也许是 4 个。首先，日本生命保险公司是一家杰出的人寿保险公司。我的意思是，它是日本最有声望的寿险公司，在整个日本都备受尊敬--作为Corebridge 20%股权的拥有者，它将具有非常重要的战略意义，我认为这将带来短期、中期和长期的利益，能够宣布这一点真的非常高兴。同样，Corebridge 的另一个战略定位也将长期受益。我相信 Blackstone 非常出色。

I mentioned BlackRock, what we did with Accenture in terms of getting better end-to-end processing capabilities, Nippon is going to be very important for them long term. So I think that was very strategic and AIG decided based on our relationship with Nippon is it stands at 9.9% 2 years after closing, just to demonstrate partnership and make the transition easier and still be active participants on the board. Until we close that, it does nothing for deconsolidation.

我提到了贝莱德，我们与埃森哲在获得更好的端到端处理能力方面所做的工作，从长远来看，日本将对他们非常重要。因此，我认为这是非常具有战略意义的，AIG 根据我们与日本的关系决定，在交易完成两年后，日本的持股比例为 9.9%，以证明我们的合作关系，使过渡更加容易，并仍然是董事会的积极参与者。在我们完成这一交易之前，这对取消合并没有任何作用。

So I would think of it -- now I'll answer the second question in a second. For Nippon, nothing happens until we close. So if we close in the first quarter, fourth quarter, that would trigger deconsolidation if we did nothing else in terms of other sell-downs. In terms of guidance I gave, we'll see. I said we would do something in the second quarter. If you go back to what I said in the fourth quarter, that we expect in the second quarter. I don't know Nippon was going to be available at that time. So we were thinking about a marketed deal or a block or something of that nature. But bringing something like Nippon, we want to be patient. We've got to go below 47% to deconsolidate. We're at 53% now.

因此，我认为 -- 现在我马上回答第二个问题。对于日本公司来说，在我们完成交易之前，什么都不会发生。因此，如果我们在第一季度或第四季度关闭日本公司，那么如果我们没有采取任何其他出售措施，就会触发非合并。关于我给出的指导意见，我们拭目以待。我说过我们会在第二季度有所行动。如果你回到我在第四季度所说的话，我们预计会在第二季度采取行动。我不知道 Nippon 在那个时候是否会上市。因此，我们考虑的是市场化交易或分块交易或类似性质的交易。但是，像日本这样的交易，我们需要耐心等待。我们必须低于 47% 才能取消合并。我们现在的比例是 53%。

So whatever trade we do, that's the math. I mean, so if we did a 10% block in the next week, then we would deconsolidate irrespective of what happened with Nippon and then we will continue to do consecutive sell-downs after that. Now we've committed with Nippon, we would do up to a max of 15% in this particular calendar year. And then after 1/1/25, we can sell down the rest at 9.9%.

无论我们进行什么交易，那就是数学问题。我的意思是，如果我们在下周进行了10%的股份出售，那么无论与日本的情况如何，我们都会进行非合并，然后我们将继续进行连续的减持。现在我们已经向日本承诺，我们将在本年度最多减持15%。然后在2025年1月1日之后，我们可以以9.9%的比例出售剩余股份。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Okay. That's -- they're all helpful. So yes, I guess one observation. So we've seen a number of expense saving plans rolled out and successfully implemented. I guess, under your stewardage, most recently, AIG next actions $500 million of cost saves by the end of 2025. I guess I'm just curious, when you got to AIG, did you know early on there's going to be this type of runway for cost save plans? Or has it been more of a thing that's evolved over time as you've improved things, you've kind of figured out, hey, we can -- here's something I wasn't thinking about. Curious how that's --

好的 Okay.他们都很有帮助。是的，我想有一点意见。我们已经看到许多节省开支的计划出台并成功实施。我想，在你的领导下，最近，AIG 下一步的行动是在 2025 年底之前节约 5 亿美元的成本。我想我只是好奇，当你来到 AIG 时，你是否很早就知道会有这样的成本节约计划？还是说，随着时间的推移，随着你对事情的改进，你发现，嘿，我们可以 -- 这是我没有想到的。很好奇你是怎么做到的

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

I think both, Ryan. I mean it was evident that we had way too much expense relative to the size business we were. I mean that became evident within 30, 60 days. How to get it out was a little bit more time-consuming which is really how we led to AIG 200 is that there were so many different processes. Even if you think about something simple like shared services as having 10 different work streams from shared services into AIG that wouldn't integrate at all. We didn't have single definitions of data.

我觉得都有，瑞安。我的意思是，很明显，相对于我们的业务规模，我们的支出太多了。我的意思是，这在 30 天或 60 天内就能看出来。如何解决这个问题则需要更多的时间，而这也正是 AIG 200 的真正原因，因为有太多不同的流程。即使你把共享服务这样简单的事情想成有 10 个不同的工作流从共享服务进入 AIG，也根本无法整合。我们没有单一的数据定义。

And so that was the work that was done there. I really strongly believe with AIG 200. The expense savings became a product in the work. It wasn't the effort that we were trying to achieve because we just needed to, whether it's cloud, as I said, computing or end-to-end process. It was a very broken process within the underwriting, how you get submissions, how you actually work through the rating mechanisms totally inconsistent and so we got very disciplined built a tremendous team.

那里完成的工作就是这样。我真的非常相信AIG 200。费用节省成为了工作的产物。这并不是我们试图实现的努力，因为我们只是需要，无论是云计算，正如我所说，还是端到端的流程。在承保过程中，这是一个非常破碎的流程，如何获得提交，你实际上如何通过评级机制完全不一致，所以我们非常有纪律地建立了一个了不起的团队。

机构越大存量数据越多，比起改造重新做一个的效率更高。

In many ways, I think that was more cultural shock to AIG than underwriting, which we had underwriters, it wasn't very good, but like there was underwriting going on in operations, there was nothing. So we had nothing to compare it to. So I think we really built a lot of foundational work that's enabled us to continue to make improvements. We have focused on AIG next, which is just taking -- if you're skeptical of the combined ratios with an AIG just point to the other operations at the parent companies, well, you just keep a lot of expenses there. And so your combined ratio isn't really as strong. It's going to get rid of all that. And that's what we're really trying to drive is duplication again, still trying to improve processes and the functions as well as in underwriting and making sure that where there's excess and duplicative cost that comes out of the system.

在很多方面，我认为这比承保对AIG的文化冲击更大，我们有承保人员，虽然不是很好，但至少有承保业务在运营中进行，而其他方面则什么都没有。所以我们没有什么可以比较的。所以我认为我们真的做了很多基础工作，使我们能够继续进行改进。我们专注于AIG的下一步，这只不过是——如果你对AIG的综合比率持怀疑态度，只要指向母公司其他业务的运营情况，你就会保留很多费用在那里。因此，你的综合比率实际上并不那么强。它将摆脱所有这些。这就是我们真正努力推动的，再次消除重复，仍然努力改进流程和功能，以及在承保中，确保系统中任何多余的和重复的成本都能被剔除。

But as you look at AIG in the future, how I'd look at it is that what's the parent expenses going to be? And we basically said whatever the 1% to 1.5% of net premium earned or right now, like we said, $325 million, $350 million whatever else is in parent like has to go into the business. And so if you don't get the expenses out, the combined ratios are going up. But I don't really want to get on earnings calls and explain that. So we're going to get the expenses out.

当您展望未来的AIG，我的看法是，母公司的费用将会是多少？我们基本上说的是，无论是净保费收入的1%到1.5%，还是现在我们所说的，比如3.25亿美元、3.5亿美元，无论是母公司中还有什么其他费用，都必须投入到业务中。所以如果您不将费用剔除，综合比率就会上升。但我并不想在盈利电话会议上解释这一点。所以我们将剔除这些费用。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Fair enough. I guess I have to ask you this. But just market conditions overall. How are you thinking about the sustainability of -- you don't like to term but the current hard market for lack of a better word?

很公平我想我得问你这个问题。我想我必须问你这个问题。你是如何看待当前市场（你不喜欢这个词）的可持续性的？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

I think we asked you what ends up happening, not with you, but other sell side is that when you look at consecutive -- if you're still getting rate increases, but you may not have got rate increases as much as you got last quarter. It's like who cares like I don't -- like I'd like to have it. But what I want to make sure that we continue to develop margin, we retain the book of business. And that if I got it like a 30% last year and a 10% this year, if 10% is above the loss cost increase, that's a good outcome. So I just don't want to look at like the sequential rate increases in some of our businesses and quite frankly, a lot of them we've got north of 100% rate increases over the past four to five years.

我认为我们问的不是你，而是其他卖方会发生什么，当你看到连续性——如果你仍然在获得费率增长，但你可能没有获得上个季度那么多的费率增长。就像谁在乎，我不在乎——就像我想拥有它。但我想做的是确保我们继续发展利润空间，保留业务账簿。如果我去年获得了30%，今年获得了10%，如果10%高于损失成本的增长，那就是一个好结果。所以我并不想只关注我们一些业务中的连续费率增长，坦率地说，在过去四到五年中，我们的许多业务费率增长已经超过了100%。

这样的通胀水平跟S&P500或者房价的上涨幅度是差不多的。

I want to like hold on to that book and defend it and try to add things that have similar characteristics. Casualty is a problem in the marketplace is going to become, I think, more of an issue over time. And so people have the right portfolio, companies that are positioned well, understand the underlying economics and what's driving the outcomes and don't have excessive volatility will win. I hate to go back to property in the CAT, but like it's a fragile market.

我想要保留并捍卫这本书，并尝试添加具有相似特征的内容。我认为，随着时间的推移，意外伤害保险将成为市场上越来越严重的问题。因此，拥有正确投资组合、定位良好、理解潜在经济因素以及推动结果的因素，并且没有过度波动性的公司将会获胜。我不想再次回到财产和灾害（CAT）问题上，但这是一个脆弱的市场。

And we declare unless like wind season has changed in the United States from like June to November. Like I don't really look at CAT in the first quarter as being a key indicator. So yes, the property rates were off from the year prior. But it's still a good business, maybe the more commoditized layers and financial lines or upper layers of property placements. I don't think casualty get a little bit of price competition for sure.

我们声明，除非像风季在美国从六月变到了十一月。我并不真正将第一季度的CAT视为关键指标。所以是的，财产费率与前一年相比有所下降。但它仍然是一个好的业务，可能是更多的商品化层次和金融线或财产放置的上层层次。我认为意外伤害保险肯定会有一些价格竞争。

But I think the market is very stable. It's not driven by supply issues. I think lead underwriters are generally disciplined and new capacities coming in is not terribly relevant. So I think the market is going to be stable. Let's see what happens with the reinsurance implications for CAT because, again, it's being driven by collateralized -- reinsurers -- I'm no longer in the business, so I'll give you my opinion, doesn't really affect us other than how we purchase it. But paper like so admitted reinsurers, in 1/1/23 moved away from risk dramatically, like I mean they just did. And so those risk-adjusted terms that they have given you is as much about taking away coverage and moving attachment points to being higher in PML attachments.

但我认为市场非常稳定。它不是由供应问题驱动的。我认为主承销商一般都很守规矩，新的承销能力并不重要。因此，我认为市场将保持稳定。让我们看看 CAT 再保险的影响会发生什么变化，因为这同样是由抵押的再保险公司驱动的，我不再从事这项业务，所以我可以告诉你我的看法，除了我们如何购买之外，对我们并没有真正的影响。但纸张就像如此被接纳的再保险人，在 1/1/23 年急剧远离风险，就像我的意思是他们刚刚做的那样。因此，他们给你的那些风险调整条款，就像拿走承保范围一样，把附加点移到更高的 PML 附加点上。

So it would take a lot of vertical loss for them to get hit pretty hard. And the way collateralized markets work, and the reason why I just mentioned that is that you hear a little bit more about ILS, lot of it is CAT bonds. CAT bonds have enormous basis risk, so you don't always get everything you want when you buy it. And then the collateralize is one limit. So when you buy reinsurance, typically from a pick RenRe is a great partner, so I'll pick on them, is that if you blow out a limit, it's automatically reinstated, you have a second limit.

因此，需要大量的纵向损失，它们才会受到重创。抵押市场的运作方式，也是我刚才提到的原因，你会听到更多关于 ILS 的信息，其中很多是 CAT 债券。CAT 债券有巨大的基础风险，所以你在购买时并不总能得到你想要的一切。此外，抵押也是一个限制。因此，当你购买再保险时，通常会选择 RenRe，因为 RenRe 是一个很好的合作伙伴，所以我会选择他们。

Collateralized reinsurance doesn't work that way. It's a single limit. It blows out, it's gone and you have no reinsurance left. And so there's going to be you have a lot of nets that are taken in the industry by primary insurance companies. And then you have a lot of the buydowns that were done in order to supplement those attachment points done by collateralized reinsurance can blow out with one major loss. Again, I don't know what's going to happen this year, but if it's very active, you're going to have big net positions in the business. And that's going to affect how capital is deployed, in my opinion.

抵押再保险并非如此。它只有一个限额。一旦出险，就没有再保险了。因此，在这个行业中，会有很多由主保险公司承保的险种。然后，为了补充抵押再保险的附着点而进行的大量买断，也会因一次重大损失而消失。同样，我不知道今年会发生什么，但如果再保险非常活跃，你就会在业务中出现大量净头寸。在我看来，这将影响资本的配置。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Yes, it makes sense. I mean yes, we really have not ever had that event that really tested those CAT bonds, but --

是的，这是有道理的。我的意思是，是的，我们确实没有遇到过那种真正考验CAT债券的事件，但是 --

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Not going to all age myself out, but like when I was running Guy Carpenter, it'd be hard to find a model loss that was -- Category 5 is going in wherever, north of $100 billion. But Category 5 in Miami is $350 billion now. So like this is the world has changed. And like there's more density, more total insured value. The problem in Florida that you had before COVID got exacerbated by 3 times, 4 times. When you think about TIVs all driven up, a lot of reconstruction, more density, models are starting to catch up. I don't put a whole lot of weight into the deterministic and probabilistic sets. However, they're better. And so I think we're just more realistic that you get big losses. I'm not saying that's what's going to happen. But getting north of $100 billion loss is not a far stretch.

我不会让自己显得太老，但是当我在运营盖伊·卡彭特时，很难找到损失模型——5级飓风无论在哪里，超过1000亿美元。但现在迈阿密的5级飓风是3500亿美元。所以就像这个世界已经变了。就像有更多的密度，更多的总保险价值。佛罗里达州在COVID之前的问题被加剧了3倍、4倍。当你考虑到总保险价值都被推高，大量的重建，更多的密度，模型开始跟上。我并不过分重视确定性和概率集合。然而，它们更好了。所以我认为我们只是更加现实地认为你会遭受巨大损失。我并不是说那将会发生。但是损失超过1000亿美元并不是一个很大的伸展。

保险抗通胀的另一个说法。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Got it. Yes. I mean, I guess that makes me think a little bit about your other business, consumer personal lines. You've also done a lot there. There would seem to be opportunities to write homeowners in the United States on a non-admitted basis at somewhat attractive terms, although you would have to take some of that CAT risk. If you were to increase some of your CAT exposure, would it -- is that how we should think about it would be probably more on the personal line side? Or is that a business you're focused on --

知道了好的我的意思是，我想这让我想到了你的其他业务，消费者个人业务。你们在这方面也做了很多。在美国，似乎有机会以非承保方式承保房主保险，而且条件还有点吸引人，尽管你们必须承担一些CAT风险。如果你们要增加一些CAT风险，会不会--我们是不是应该这样想--可能更多的是在个人业务方面？还是说这是你们重点关注的业务？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Yes. I would say, first, it would be non-admitted first because what happens in the non-admitted market, think of 3 things: one, is you have freedom of form, which means you were issued the policy that you want. And if it's not your exclusions, wind deductibles, whatever you want to put in there, you have more flexibility than you do on a admitted basis. The other is you have freedom of rate like so you can price it however you'd like. And then you have like the freedom of limit. So like if you do high net worth business, which we're in, on an admitted basis, any replacement cost, it's got a lot of risk in terms of understanding what the total like cost of a CAT would be because replacement cost, replacement cost, and you can't really do a whole lot in terms of changing the policy limits or how you actually structure that.

是的，我想说的是，首先是非准入市场，因为在非准入市场会发生什么，请考虑三件事：第一，你有形式自由，这意味着你被签发了你想要的保单。如果不是你的免责条款、免赔额，不管你想把什么写进去，你都比投保人有更大的灵活性。另外，你还可以自由定价，你想怎么定价就怎么定价。然后，你还有限额自由。所以，如果你做的是高净值业务，我们也是做高净值业务的，在承保基础上，任何重置成本，在理解CAT的总成本方面都有很大的风险，因为重置成本，重置成本，在改变保单限额或实际结构方面，你真的不能做很多事情。

On a non-admitted basis, you can take a $30 million homeowners replacement cost value and say, I'm going to give you $10 million with a 20% wind deductible or whatever it is. So I think that's a really good place to grow. Now on the non-admitted basis and high net worth, distribution has to catch up on the wholesale side, it will. That one, I will allow us to call a hard market because there's no supply. I mean, the barrier to entry in high net worth is significant because you need to have unbelievably good claims, unbelievably good loss control, policy forms, expertise, know how to underwrite, know how to do CAT aggregation. So the barrier to entry is tough. And so there's no real supply coming in.

在非承保的基础上，您可以将 3,000 万美元的房主重置成本价值与 20% 的风灾免赔额或其他免赔额相比较，然后说，我给您 1,000 万美元。因此，我认为这是一个很好的发展机会。现在，在非准入基础和高净值方面，分销必须跟上批发方面的步伐，这一点将会实现。我允许我们称其为 "硬市场"，因为没有供应。我的意思是，进入高净值市场的门槛很高，因为你需要有好得令人难以置信的理赔、好得令人难以置信的损失控制、保单形式、专业知识，知道如何承保，知道如何进行 CAT 合计。因此，进入门槛非常高。因此，没有真正的供应进入。

这是CB擅长的领域。

Reinsurance, if there's more will be more through collateralized vehicles. So the best way to grow in the future, which we'd like to, will be through non-admitted. So I think of our portfolio as 10% today. I'd love to see it over time, and I won't specify how long it will take us, but I'd love to see that more 30% to 40%. And that we will not be deploying capacity in the same way for the high net worth for admitted versus non-admitted. We're going to give a lot more to the non-admitted space to be able to grow. And so I do think of it that way.

如果有更多的再保险，将更多地通过抵押工具。因此，未来增长的最佳途径，也是我们所希望的，将是通过非承保方式。因此，我认为我们现在的投资组合占 10%。随着时间的推移，我很希望看到这个比例能提高到 30% 到 40%，我不会具体说明需要多长时间。而且，我们不会以同样的方式为高净值客户部署接纳和非接纳的能力。我们将把更多的精力放在非准入领域，以便能够实现增长。所以我是这么想的。

And then personal insurance outside the United States, Japan is our biggest business and one that we -- if I think about one area where digital front end and digital workflow matter for business is Japan. So I think the cycle time in terms of getting quotes out, building capabilities within your own agency distribution and being able to scale that a little quicker is a great opportunity for us and optimizing that portfolio. There's going to be massive organic growth, no, but will it be organic growth that could be sustainable, we believe it is. So I think in terms of property businesses, I would think of excess and surplus lines and probably Japan on the personal insurance side that we would grow more.

个人保险在美国以外，日本是我们最大的业务，也是我们——如果我考虑一个数字前端和数字工作流程对业务至关重要的领域，那就是日本。所以我认为在获取报价、在您自己的代理分销中构建能力以及能够更快地扩展这方面的周期时间是一个很好的机会，以及优化那个投资组合。将会有大规模的有机增长，不，但这将是可持续的有机增长，我们相信它是。所以我认为在财产业务方面，我会考虑超额和盈余线，可能还有日本在个人保险方面，我们会有更多的增长。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Do you have to spend a lot of your time on Japan? I'm just thinking about it's kind of just -- from a geographic standpoint out there?

你需要花很多时间在日本吗？我只是在想，从地理的角度来看，日本是个什么样的地方？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

I mean, I do, but I've been doing Japan for 20 years. So I know the market really well. I know all of our competitors very well, know the regulators well and know the way that business is conducted. So I do spend a fair amount of time there and also in India. I mean we have -- we don't talk a lot about India. It's a phenomenal place today, and we have a joint venture with Tata, where we own 26% of the company with them. And it's a big business, and it's $2 billion of top line organic growth, if you speak to the Chairman of Tata, who I interact with a lot, we think we can do 20% organic growth over the next 5 years. That will double the size of that business to between $3.5 billion and $4 billion top line.

我是这么想的，但我在日本工作了 20 年。因此，我对市场非常了解。我非常了解我们所有的竞争对手，非常了解监管机构，也非常了解开展业务的方式。所以我在那里和印度都花了不少时间。我的意思是，我们很少谈及印度。今天，印度是一个了不起的地方，我们与塔塔成立了一家合资企业，我们拥有塔塔公司26%的股份。这是一个很大的企业，它有 20 亿美元的一线有机增长，如果你和塔塔的董事长（我经常和他交流）谈谈，我们认为未来 5 年我们可以实现 20% 的有机增长。这将使该业务的规模翻番，达到 35 亿至 40 亿美元。

是不是因为在本土缺少竞争力，CB同样有这方面的问题。

The complexity in the Indian market that regulators have become, I would say, more commercial, it's a hard place to enter. You got to have the best joint venture partner that you can and there's nobody better than Tata. And so that's going to be a big area. We don't consolidate it, but it's an area that's going to build real value for AIG over time. And it's 80% personal insurance is how you should think about it, but a lot of opportunities in accident health. Digital capabilities in India are as good as anywhere in the world. It's just a matter of continuing to refine underwriting, continuing to refine products and find ways to enhance distribution. But middle class is growing substantially and the focus on economic growth there is substantial. So it's another big business we have that we don't talk too much about because we don't consolidate it.

我认为，印度市场监管机构的复杂性已经变得更加商业化，因此很难进入印度市场。你必须拥有最好的合资伙伴，而塔塔是最好的选择。因此，这将是一个很大的领域。我们不会对其进行整合，但随着时间的推移，这个领域将为 AIG 创造真正的价值。个人保险占 80%，这是你应该考虑的，但意外健康领域也有很多机会。印度的数字化能力不亚于世界上任何地方。这只是一个继续完善承保、继续完善产品并找到加强分销的方法的问题。但是，中产阶级正在大幅增长，当地对经济增长的重视程度也很高。因此，这是我们拥有的另一项大业务，我们没有过多地谈论它，因为我们没有整合它。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Got it. So I guess just one last one for you. Just on the financial lines business, it's…

知道了最后一个问题吧关于金融业务，这是...

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

You got to have one more after financial lines…

你得在财务线后再加一条...

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Yes. We'll go to M&A, I guess. So financial lines is a one market that's been somewhat irrational in the last couple of years, which is a little bit weird because it's like not had good returns for the past decades. I don't know why that was the market that decided to act bad. But I guess this one observation is like the global corporate, the big underwriters that write big corporations, I'm thinking of like you and Chubb, you're also the biggest financial lines underwriters so I'm guessing it's not a coincidence. So I guess like how belted into your overall client product suite is this line? Is most -- is this the type of book you can walk away from? Or is it really the cost of doing business with these larger accounts?

是的我想，我们还是谈并购吧。金融行业是一个在过去几年里有些不理性的市场，这有点奇怪，因为在过去的几十年里，这个市场一直没有好的回报。我不知道为什么这个市场会变得如此糟糕。但我想，这一点可以从全球企业、承保大企业的大型承保人身上看出，我想到的是你们和丘博，你们也是最大的金融险承保人，所以我猜这不是巧合。那么，我想这条线在你们整个客户产品系列中的地位如何？大多数情况下，你是否可以放弃这本书？或者说，这真的是与这些大客户做生意的成本吗？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Well, the first thing is sell side should be grilling any company that's growing in financial lines, like that should be the first thing. So I'm going to put that on the right to figure it out. But financial lines, you have to understand like where you play. And so there's only like three or four lead markets that drive U.S. primary and we're one of them. And so you set terms, you set pricing. That's been a benign marketing effort in terms of its pricing, it's been a slight headwind. But that's where you want to be.

首先，卖方应该对财务状况不断增长的公司进行调查，这应该是第一件事。所以我要把它放在右边，以便弄清楚。但金融业务，你必须了解你的业务范围。因此，只有三四个主要市场推动美国的主要业务，我们是其中之一。因此，你要设定条款，设定价格。在定价方面，这一直是一个良性的营销努力，它是一个轻微的逆风。但这正是你想要的。

Now when the market was changing four or five years ago, we weren't going to just do primarily. We did some of the excess layers because they were attractive, and now we've had new entrants into the market. And the more commoditized, the higher you go up on excess, the more competition, that will end in tears at some point in time. But yes, we'll ride that down on excess as much as we need to if it's going to affect what we think of the combined ratios and the balance of the portfolio.

当市场在四五年前发生变化时，我们不仅仅要专注于主要业务。我们做了一些超额层次的业务，因为它们很有吸引力，现在我们有新进入者进入市场。你越是商品化，越是上升到超额层次，竞争就越激烈，这在某个时候将以泪水告终。但是，是的，如果这将影响我们对综合比率和投资组合平衡的看法，我们将尽可能地降低超额层次。

We have a very big financial lines business this is equally balanced in international. Those are not the dynamics that are happening there. It's much more of a U.S. phenomenon. We've seen some headwinds on pricing in financial lines and international. But the cumulative rate increases even in U.S. D&O would be north of 50%. But it's a line that we've seen a lot more competition in excess, and we'll continue to shrink if we have to, if the returns are not there.

我们的金融业务规模很大，在国际业务方面也同样平衡。这些并不是那里的动态。这更多是美国的现象。我们在金融业务和国际业务的定价方面遇到了一些阻力。但即使在美国，D&O 的累计费率增幅也将在 50%以上。但是，我们已经看到这个领域的竞争越来越激烈，如果有必要，如果回报率不高，我们会继续收缩。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Got you. All right. So I guess I will try on one more. I think it's going to be a little bit of a tough one for you because you like detail, but it's going to be the opposite of going into detail. If you could only get one metric, over the next couple of years to help you evaluate how the company is performing, which one would it be? Would it be premium growth? What you've talked about loss ratio, including CATs, would it maybe be underlying combined? What's, I guess, the first metric you'd go to?

知道了好吧我再试一件 All right.我想我再试一次我想这个问题对你来说有点难，因为你喜欢细节，但这个问题却与细节相反。如果在未来几年里，你只能用一个指标来评估公司的表现，你会选择哪个指标？是保费增长吗？你刚才谈到的损失率，包括公估损失率，会是基本合并损失率吗？我猜，你会首先考虑哪个指标？

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Only one? 只有一个？

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Yes, you only get one. And it will be hard for you.

是的，你只有一次机会。这对你来说很难。

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

It will be underlying profitability, including CAT because it's like it's -- your premium out the door to us and then you got losses going out to pay losses, and we want to drive profitability in the company. So that's always where I start.

这将是包括 CAT 在内的基本盈利能力，因为这就像 -- 你的保费交给我们，然后你有损失要赔付，我们希望提高公司的盈利能力。所以，这一直是我的出发点。

Ryan Tunis 瑞安-突尼斯

Great. Well, thanks, Peter, I appreciate it.

好极了谢谢，彼得，我很感激。

Peter Zaffino 彼得-扎菲诺

Ryan, thanks a lot. I really appreciate it.

瑞安，非常感谢。我真的很感激。

2024-05-29 American International Group, Inc. (AIG) Bernstein's 40th Annual Strategic Decisions Conference (Transcript)

2024-05-29 American International Group, Inc. (AIG) Bernstein's 40th Annual Strategic Decisions Conference (Transcript)

Article Comments Update

热门标签

Related Articles

2024-04-16 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. (IBKR) Q1 2024 Earnings Call Transcript

2023-10-17 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. (IBKR) Q3 2023 Earnings Call Transcript

2023-07-18 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. (IBKR) Q2 2023 Earnings Call Transcript

2024-01-16 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. (IBKR) Q4 2023 Earnings Call Transcript

2024-10-15 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. (IBKR) Q3 2024 Earnings Call Transcript