2025-02-22 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.
这封信作为伯克希尔年度报告的一部分送达给您。作为一家上市公司，我们定期有义务向您披露许多具体的事实和数据。
“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.
然而，“报告”意味着更大的责任。除了强制披露的数据外，我们认为还应该向您提供有关您所拥有的资产以及我们的思考方式的更多评论。我们的目标是以一种如果角色互换时您会希望我们使用的方式与您沟通——也就是说，如果您是伯克希尔的首席执行官，而我和我的家人是被动投资者，信任您管理我们的储蓄。
This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”
这种方法使我们每年都会列举您通过伯克希尔股票间接拥有的众多业务中的好事与坏事。然而，在讨论某些子公司问题时，我们会尽力遵循60年前汤姆·墨菲给我的建议：“表扬单个人，批评一类人。”
Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire
错误——是的，我们在伯克希尔会犯错误
Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies.
有时，我在评估我为伯克希尔收购的业务未来经济情况时会犯错误——每一次都是资本配置错误的案例。这种情况既发生在对可上市股票的判断上——我们将这些视为对业务的部分所有权——也发生在对公司100%收购上。
At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.
在其他时候，我在评估伯克希尔所聘用管理者的能力或忠诚度时也会犯错误。这种忠诚度的失误所带来的伤害不仅限于财务影响，其痛苦程度甚至可以媲美失败婚姻的伤痛。
A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.
在人员决策上，只有取得不错的命中率才能令人满意。最大的罪过在于拖延纠正错误，或者正如查理·芒格所说的那样“吸手指”。他会告诉我，问题是无法用愿望来消除的，它们需要采取行动，不管这种行动多么让人不舒服。
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During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.
在2019至2023年期间，我在给您的信中使用“错误”或“失误”这两个词共计16次。许多其他大公司在这段时间内从未使用过这两个词。我必须承认，亚马逊在其2021年的信中做出了一些极为坦率的观察。而在其他地方，通常都是欢乐的言辞和图片。
I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)
我也曾在一些大型上市公司的董事会中任职，而在那里，“错误”或“不对”是禁止使用的词汇。这种禁忌，暗示管理层必须完美无缺，总是让我感到紧张（尽管有时可能存在法律问题，使得讨论受限是明智的。我们生活在一个非常喜欢诉讼的社会中）。
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At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.
到了94岁，我很快就会被Greg Abel接替CEO职位，由他来撰写年度信件。Greg秉承伯克希尔的信条，认为“报告”是伯克希尔CEO每年对股东应尽的责任。他也明白，如果你开始愚弄你的股东，你很快就会相信自己的胡说八道，并且也在愚弄自己。
Pete Liegl – One of a Kind
皮特·利格尔——独一无二的人
Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.
让我暂停一下，讲述皮特·利格尔这位非大多数伯克希尔股东所熟知的人物的非凡故事，他为股东的整体财富贡献了数十亿美元。皮特在11月去世时仍在80岁时工作。
I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.
我第一次听说Forest River——这家由皮特创立并管理的印第安纳州公司——是在2005年6月21日。那天，我收到了一封中介发来的信，信中详细列出了这家休闲车（“RV”）制造商的相关数据。信的作者说，作为Forest River的100%所有者，皮特特别希望将公司出售给伯克希尔，并告知了他期望获得的价格。我非常喜欢这种直截了当的做法。
I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.
我联系了一些RV经销商，了解后觉得情况不错，于是安排了6月28日在奥马哈的一次会面。皮特带来了他的妻子Sharon和女儿Lisa。会面时，皮特向我保证，他希望继续经营公司，但如果能为家人提供财务保障，他会感到更安心。
Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.
接着，我们讨论了另一个需要澄清的问题。我问皮特他的薪酬应该是多少，并补充说无论他说什么，我都会接受。（我应补充，这并不是我建议普遍采用的做法。）
Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)
随后，皮特提到他拥有一些租给Forest River的房地产，而这些并未在6月21日的信中提及。几分钟内，我们便就这些资产达成了价格，因为我表示伯克希尔无需进行评估，只需接受他的估值。
Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.
皮特停顿了一下，当时我、他的妻子和女儿都在倾听。然后他给了我们一个惊喜：“我看了伯克希尔的委托书，我不想比我的老板赚得更多，所以请支付我每年10万美元。”我从地上爬起来后，皮特补充道：“但我们今年将赚取X（他报了一个数字），对于公司现有业绩之外的任何额外收益，我希望获得10%的年终奖金。”我回答说：“好的，皮特，但如果Forest River进行任何重大收购，我们将对因此投入的额外资本作出适当调整。”我并未定义“适当”或“重大”，但这些模糊的词汇从未造成问题。
The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.
随后，我们四人一起在奥马哈的Happy Hollow Club共进晚餐，从此过上了幸福生活。在接下来的19年中，皮特表现出色，无人能及。
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Every company doesn’t have an easy‑to‑understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m dealing.
并非每个公司都有易于理解的业务，也很少有像皮特这样出色的所有者或经理。当然，我也预计自己会在伯克希尔收购的业务中犯下一些错误，有时在评估与我打交道的那类人时也会出错。
But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one‑of‑a‑kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.
但在业务潜力以及经理人的能力和忠诚度方面，我也曾获得许多惊喜。我们的经验表明，一个成功的决策可以随着时间的推移带来惊人的差异。（想想GEICO作为一项商业决策、Ajit Jain作为一次管理决策，以及我能找到查理·芒格——那位独一无二的合作伙伴、私人顾问和坚定的朋友——的幸运。）错误会逐渐消逝；而成功者则能永远绽放。
Let’s take a look at the major moves made by Buffett in the last decade or so, and how they have performed1:
让我们来看看巴菲特在过去十年左右所做的主要投资，以及它们的表现：
1.Kraft Heinz — Berkshire got ~25% ownership of Kraft Heinz in 2015 after Kraft Foods merged with H.J. Heinz. But over the next 5 years, the stock fell 50% and had a $15 billion write-down in 2019. Buffett himself admitted, “We overpaid for Kraft,” calling the investment a mistake.
卡夫亨氏——伯克希尔在 2015 年通过卡夫食品与 H.J.亨氏的合并获得了卡夫亨氏约 25%的股份。但在接下来的 5 年里，股票下跌了 50%，并在 2019 年进行了 150 亿美元的减记。巴菲特本人承认：“我们为卡夫支付了过高的价格，”称这项投资是一个错误。
2.Precision Castparts — In 2016, Berkshire paid $32 billion to acquire Precision Castparts Corp. (PCC), a manufacturer of aerospace and industrial components. Just 4 years later, Buffett conceded that he had paid too much for the company. Berkshire had to take a $10 billion goodwill write-down in 2020 due to plunging aerospace demand.
精密铸件公司 — 2016 年，伯克希尔支付了 320 亿美元收购精密铸件公司（PCC），这是一家航空航天和工业组件制造商。仅仅 4 年后，巴菲特承认他为这家公司支付了过高的价格。由于航空航天需求暴跌，伯克希尔在 2020 年不得不进行 100 亿美元的商誉减值。
3.Airline Stocks — Buffett surprised everyone in 2016 by taking a stake in four major U.S. airlines, a sector he once called a “deathtrap” for investors. He spent an estimated $8 billion by 2017 to become the top shareholder in Delta, United, American, and Southwest Airlines. Once again, airlines performed terribly, and Buffett exited these positions at the beginning of the 2020 pandemic, taking a loss of approximately $4 billion.
航空公司股票——巴菲特在 2016 年让所有人感到惊讶，他在四家主要的美国航空公司中持有股份，这个行业曾被他称为投资者的“死亡陷阱”。到 2017 年，他估计花费了 80 亿美元，成为达美、联合、美国和西南航空的最大股东。航空公司再次表现糟糕，巴菲特在 2020 年疫情初期退出了这些头寸，损失约 40 亿美元。
4.Apple — In 2016, Todd Combs (CEO of GEICO) finally convinced Buffett to start buying Apple. Buffett quickly understood how strong the brand was and how well it locked customers into its ecosystem. Berkshire spent ~$31 billion (less than what they paid for PCC) in the next 2 years, acquiring ~5% of Apple. Apple went on a tear and rose by more than 700% in the next 7 years. By the end of 2023, just this one position had grown to over $175 billion, representing an unrealized gain of $140 billion.
苹果——在 2016 年，托德·科姆斯（GEICO 的首席执行官）终于说服巴菲特开始购买苹果。巴菲特很快意识到这个品牌有多强大，以及它如何将客户锁定在其生态系统中。伯克希尔在接下来的两年里花费了约 310 亿美元（少于他们为 PCC 支付的金额），收购了约 5%的苹果。苹果在接下来的 7 年里大幅上涨，涨幅超过 700%。到 2023 年底，仅这一笔投资的价值就超过了 1750 亿美元，代表着 1400 亿美元的未实现收益。
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One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!
再谈一个关于CEO选择的要点：我从不关注候选人毕业于哪所学校，绝不！
Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)
当然，也有一些优秀的经理人毕业于最著名的学校。但像皮特这样的人也很多，他们可能通过就读较不著名的学校甚至不完成学业而受益。看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨，他认为进入一个即将改变世界的爆炸性行业比拿到一张可以挂在墙上的文凭更为重要。（读读他的新书《Source Code》）
Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited.
不久前，我通过电话与Jessica Toonkel交谈，她的继祖父Ben Rosner曾经为我和查理经营过一家公司。Ben是一位零售天才，在为这份报告做准备时，我向Jessica核实了Ben的学历，我记得他的学历有限。
Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”
Jessica回答说：“Ben小学六年级之后就没有继续上学。”
I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate—with nature swamping nurture.
我很幸运能在三所优秀的大学接受教育，我也热切相信终身学习。然而，我观察到，相当大一部分商业才能是天生的，自然远胜于后天培养。
Pete Liegl was a natural.
皮特·利格尔天赋异禀。
Last Year’s Performance
去年业绩表现
In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.
在2024年，伯克希尔的表现超出了我的预期，尽管我们189家运营业务中有53%报告收益下降。由于国库券收益率上升，我们获得了可预见的大幅投资收入增长，并大幅增加了这些高流动性短期证券的持仓量，从而获得了帮助。
Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.
我们的保险业务同样实现了收益的大幅增长，这主要归功于GEICO的表现。在过去五年中，Todd Combs极大地重塑了GEICO，提高了效率并使承保实践现代化。GEICO一直是一颗被长期珍视但亟需重整的宝石，而Todd一直不懈努力完成这一任务。尽管改造尚未完成，2024年的改善依然十分出色。
In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.
总体而言，2024年财产与意外险（“P/C”）的定价趋于上扬，反映了对流风暴造成的损失大幅增加。气候变化可能正在宣告其到来。然而，2024年并未发生任何“巨型”事件。未来某一天，真正惊人的保险损失将会出现——而且无法保证每年仅发生一次。
The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter.
财产与意外险业务对伯克希尔至关重要，这一点将在本信后续部分进一步讨论。
Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.
伯克希尔的铁路和公用事业业务——这是除保险之外我们最大的两项业务——整体收益有所改善。然而，这两项业务仍有很大提升空间。
Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares.
年底时，我们将公用事业业务的持股比例从约92%提高到100%，花费约39亿美元，其中29亿美元以现金支付，其余部分以伯克希尔“B”股支付。
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All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.
总体而言，2024年我们的营业收益为474亿美元。我们经常——有些读者可能会叹息——强调这一指标，而不是第K-68页上报告的GAAP规定的收益。
Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.
我们的这一指标不包括我们持有的股票和债券的资本收益或损失，无论是已实现的还是未实现的。随着时间推移，我们认为收益很可能会占上风——否则我们为何要购买这些证券？——尽管每年的数字可能会剧烈且难以预测。对于此类投资，我们的视角几乎总是远超一年，往往以几十年计。这些长期投资有时会让现金流像教堂钟声般响起。
Here’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.
以下是我们对2023至2024年收益的分解。所有计算均在扣除折旧、摊销和所得税后得出。EBITDA，虽然是华尔街偏爱的一个缺陷指标，但对我们来说并不适用。
* Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.
包括伯克希尔持有20%至50%股权的部分业务，例如Kraft Heinz、Occidental Petroleum和Berkadia。
** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and approximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated debt.
包括因使用非美元计价债务而在2024年产生的约11亿美元外汇收益以及2023年约2.11亿美元的外汇收益。
Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed
意外，意外！一项重要的美国记录被打破了
Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.
六十年前，现任管理层接管了伯克希尔。这一举动是个错误——我的错误——并且困扰了我们二十年。查理，我必须强调，他立刻发现了我明显的失误：虽然我为伯克希尔支付的价格看起来很低，但其业务——一个大型北方纺织企业——正走向灭亡。
The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.
美国财政部，众多机构中最为出人意料的一个，早已收到了关于伯克希尔命运的无声警告。1965年，该公司一分钱所得税也未缴纳，这种尴尬情况在公司中持续了整整十年。这种经济行为对于光鲜亮丽的初创企业来说或许可以理解，但当这种情况发生在美国工业中举足轻重的支柱上时，就如同闪烁的黄灯警告一般。伯克希尔正走向破产的边缘。
Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.
快进六十年，想象一下美国财政部的惊讶：那家仍以伯克希尔·哈撒韦之名运营的公司，缴纳的企业所得税远远超过美国政府曾从任何公司收到的金额——即便是那些市值数万亿美元的美国科技巨头也无法相比。
To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)
准确地说，去年伯克希尔向国税局支付了四笔款项，总计268亿美元。这大约占整个美国企业支付所得税总额的5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府和44个州缴纳了大量所得税。）
Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)
请注意一个促成这一创纪录缴税的重要因素：在1965年至2024年期间，伯克希尔股东仅收到过一次现金分红。1967年1月3日，我们发放了唯一的一次分红——总额101,755美元，即每股A股10美分。（我已经记不清当初为什么建议伯克希尔董事会采取这一行动了。如今看来，这简直像一场噩梦。）
For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, minuscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.
六十年来，伯克希尔的股东支持持续再投资，这使公司得以不断积累应纳税收入。最初十年中缴纳给美国财政部的现金所得税微不足道，而如今累计已超过1010亿美元……而且还在不断增加。
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Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year. If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.
庞大的数字往往难以直观感受。让我重新描述一下我们去年支付的268亿美元：如果伯克希尔在整个2024年（记住2024年是闰年，共366天）每20分钟向财政部寄出一张100万美元的支票，那么年末我们仍然欠联邦政府一笔可观的金额。实际上，直到明年一月，财政部才会告诉我们可以稍作休息、睡个好觉，然后准备2025年的纳税。
Where Your Money Is
你的钱在哪里
Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.
伯克希尔的股权活动可谓双管齐下。一方面，我们控制着许多业务，持有被投资企业至少80%的股份，通常是100%。这189家子公司在某种程度上类似于可交易的普通股，但又远非完全相同。这个组合价值数千亿美元，既包括少数稀有的瑰宝，也包括许多不错但远未达到卓越水平的企业，以及一些表现令人失望的落后者。我们没有持有任何严重拖累的业务，但也有一些我本不该收购的。
In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca‑Cola and Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial‑ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.
另一方面，我们持有少量份额于十几家规模巨大且极为盈利的知名企业，如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪。这些公司中的许多在其运营所需的净有形股本上获得了极高的回报。截至年末，我们的部分所有权持股价值为2720亿美元。可以理解的是，真正出色的企业很少会整体出售，但这些瑰宝的少量股份可以在华尔街的周一至周五交易，有时甚至以低价出售。
We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee‑deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.
我们在选择股权工具时保持公正，根据我们能最有效部署您（以及我家人）的储蓄的情况进行投资。通常，没有什么看起来特别吸引人；只有在非常少数的情况下，我们会深陷于各种机会之中。Greg就像查理一样，生动地展示了他在这种时刻采取行动的能力。
With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.
对于可交易的股票，当我犯错时转变方向较为容易。但必须强调，伯克希尔目前的规模削弱了这一宝贵选择。我们无法轻易进出市场，有时需要一年或更长时间来建立或剥离一项投资。此外，对于少数股权，我们如果需要更换管理层或者对资本流动不满，也无法掌控决策。
With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.
而对于受控公司，我们可以左右这些决策，但在处理错误时则缺乏灵活性。实际上，除非遇到我们认为永无止境的问题，否则伯克希尔几乎从不出售受控业务。相对的好处是，一些企业主因我们的坚定行为而主动寻求与伯克希尔合作，这有时对我们来说是一个明显的优势。
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Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to $272 billion, the value of our non‑quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio. Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash‑equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.
尽管一些评论人士认为伯克希尔的现金持有量异常充裕，但您大部分的资金依然投向了股权。这一偏好不会改变。去年，我们在可交易股权中的持股价值从3540亿美元下降到2720亿美元，而我们非上市受控股权的价值则有所上升，并远高于可交易投资组合的价值。伯克希尔股东可以放心，我们将永远把大部分资金用于股权投资——主要是美国股权，尽管其中许多企业在国际上也具有重要业务。伯克希尔绝不会优先持有现金等价资产，而是持有优秀企业的股权，无论是受控的还是部分持有的。
Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed‑coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency. Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.
如果财政愚蠢占上风，纸币的价值可能会迅速蒸发。在某些国家，这种不计后果的做法已成为习惯，而在我们这个历史短暂的国家——美国，也曾濒临崩溃。固定息票债券无法防止货币暴跌。然而，只要一个国家的公民对某项商品或服务有需求，企业以及具有所需才华的个人通常总能找到应对货币不稳定的方法。个人技能亦然。如果缺乏诸如运动才能、优美嗓音、医学或法律技能或其他特殊才能这样的资产，我这一生只能依靠股权。实际上，我依赖于美国企业的成功，并将继续如此。
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One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever‑growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.
无论如何，公民理性——更准确地说，富有想象力地——配置储蓄是推动社会不断增长的优质商品和服务产出的必要条件。这一体系被称为资本主义。它存在缺陷和滥用——在某些方面现在比以往更为严重——但它也能创造出其他经济体系无法比拟的奇迹。
America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.
美国是典型案例。仅仅235年的存在时间内，我们国家取得的进步，连1789年宪法制定、国家活力被激发时最乐观的殖民者也难以想象。
True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.
的确，我们国家在初期有时会向海外借款以补充国内储蓄，但与此同时，我们需要大量美国人持续储蓄，并需要这些储蓄者或其他美国人明智地配置因此获得的资本。如果美国将所生产的一切都消费掉，国家的发展就会停滞不前。
The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist.
美国的发展过程并非总是光鲜亮丽——我们国家历来都有许多无赖和推销员试图利用那些错误地信任他们储蓄的人。但即使存在这种不正之风（至今依然猖獗）以及由于激烈竞争或颠覆性创新而最终失败的大量资本配置，美国人的储蓄依然带来了超出任何殖民者梦想的数量和质量的产出。
From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.
美国起初只有400万人口——尽管早期经历了一场残酷的内战，让美国人彼此对立——但美国在短短一瞬间便改变了世界。
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In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.
在极小的层面上，伯克希尔的股东通过放弃分红、选择再投资而非消费，从而参与了美国奇迹的创造。起初，这种再投资微不足道，几乎毫无意义，但随着时间推移，它迅速膨胀，体现了持续储蓄文化与长期复利魔力的结合。
Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.
伯克希尔的经营活动如今影响着我国的每个角落，而我们的工作还远未结束。企业灭亡有多种原因，但与人类不同，单纯的老化并非致命因素。如今的伯克希尔比1965年要年轻得多。
However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.
然而，正如查理和我一直承认的那样，伯克希尔不可能在美国以外的任何地方取得这样的成就，而即使伯克希尔从未存在，美国依然会取得同样的成功。
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So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.
所以，谢谢你，山姆大叔。未来某一天，伯克希尔的侄女和侄子希望能向你支付比2024年更高的税款。请明智地使用这笔钱，照顾那些因非自身过错而命运多舛的人，他们应得到更好的生活。也请永远记住，我们需要您来保持货币稳定，而这需要您既具备智慧又保持警惕。
Property-Casualty Insurance
财产与伤害保险
P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.
财产与伤害保险仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。这个行业遵循着一种非常罕见——非常罕见的——金融模式，在大型企业中尤为少见。
Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.
通常，企业在销售其产品或服务之前——或同时——会承担劳动力、原材料、库存、工厂和设备等成本。因此，他们的首席执行官能很好地掌握产品在销售前的成本。如果销售价格低于成本，管理者很快就会发现问题。现金的大量流失是难以忽视的。
When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. (We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)
在承保财产与伤害保险时，我们先收取保费，而在很久之后才会了解到我们的产品究竟花费了多少——有时这种真相的揭示会延迟长达30年甚至更久。（我们至今仍在就50年前或更早的石棉暴露事件支付巨额赔偿。）
This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.
这种运作模式的优点在于，财产与伤害保险公司在承担大部分费用之前便能获得现金，但同时也存在风险，即在首席执行官和董事们意识到问题之前，公司可能已经亏损——有时亏损数额巨大。
Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.
某些保险种类可以减少这种不匹配，例如作物保险或冰雹损害，这些险种的损失能被迅速报告、评估和赔付。然而，其他险种则可能使高管和股东在公司濒临破产时感到欣喜。比如医疗事故保险或产品责任险。在“长尾”险种中，财产与伤害保险公司可能会向其所有者和监管机构报告多年来——甚至几十年——的巨额但虚构的利润。如果首席执行官是个乐观主义者或骗子，这种会计处理可能尤为危险。这些情况并非虚构：历史上就有大量这样的例子。
In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.
在最近几十年中，这种“先收钱，后赔付损失”的模式使伯克希尔得以投资大量资金（即“浮存金”），同时通常实现了我们认为仅仅微薄的承保利润。我们会对“意外情况”进行估计，到目前为止，这些估计都足够准确。
We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.
我们不会因业务中出现的剧烈且不断增长的赔付而却步。（在我写下这段文字时，请联想到野火。）我们的工作是定价以吸收这些损失，并在意外情况出现时冷静地承担损失。同时，我们的任务还包括对抗“失控”的判决、虚假的诉讼以及公然的欺诈行为。
Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.
在阿吉特的领导下，我们的保险业务已从一家默默无闻、总部位于奥马哈的公司成长为世界领先者，以其对风险的偏好和如直布罗陀般稳固的财务实力闻名。此外，格雷格、我们的董事以及我本人在伯克希尔的投资相对于我们获得的任何薪酬来说都非常巨大。我们不使用期权或其他单边补偿形式；如果你亏损，我们也同样亏损。这种方式鼓励谨慎，但并不能确保预见性。
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P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance.
财产与伤害保险的增长依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险——就没有保险需求。
Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.
回想135年前的世界，那时没有汽车、卡车或飞机。而现在仅在美国就有3亿辆汽车，这支庞大的车队每天都在造成巨大损失。飓风、龙卷风和野火引起的财产损失规模巨大，不断增加，其模式和最终成本也越来越难以预测。
It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.
为这些险种承保十年期保单简直愚蠢——不，如此做简直疯狂，但我们认为，一年期承保此类风险通常是可行的。如果我们改变主意，也会更换我们提供的合同。在我有生之年，汽车保险公司通常放弃了一年期保单，转而采用六个月期的。这一变化减少了浮存金，但使承保工作更加合理。
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No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.
没有任何私人保险公司愿意承担伯克希尔能够提供的风险量。在某些时候，这种优势可能非常重要。但当价格不足时，我们也需要缩减规模。为了维持竞争，我们绝不能承保定价不足的保单。那样做无异于企业自杀。
Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”
合理定价财产与伤害保险既是一门艺术，也是一门科学，绝对不是乐观主义者的生意。招募阿吉特的伯克希尔高管迈克·戈德堡说得最好：“我们希望我们的承保人每天上班时紧张，但不要瘫痪。”
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All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.
综上所述，我们喜爱财产与伤害保险业务。伯克希尔能够在财务和心理上从容应对极端损失。我们也不依赖再保险公司，这赋予了我们显著且持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有杰出的管理团队（非乐观主义者），并且在利用财产与伤害保险所提供的巨额资金进行投资方面处于特别有利的位置.
Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.
在过去二十年中，我们的保险业务通过承保获得了320亿美元的税后利润，相当于每销售一美元产生3.3美分的税后利润。与此同时，我们的浮存金已从460亿美元增长到1710亿美元。随着时间的推移，浮存金可能还会略有增长，并且凭借明智的承保（加上一些运气），有望实现成本为零。
Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments
伯克希尔增加其在日本的投资
A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan.
在我们以美国为中心的战略之外，一个小但重要的例外是我们在日本不断增长的投资。
It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world.
自从伯克希尔开始购买五家日本公司的股票以来，已经接近六年，这些公司运营方式与伯克希尔颇为相似且非常成功。这五家公司按字母顺序分别是伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友。这些大型企业各自拥有广泛的业务利益，许多业务基于日本，但也有一些在全球范围内运作。
Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.
伯克希尔于2019年7月首次购买了这五家公司的股票。我们仅仅查看了它们的财务记录，就对其低廉的股价感到惊讶。随着时间的推移，我们对这些公司的钦佩不断增长。格雷格多次与他们会面，而我也经常关注他们的进展。我们都欣赏它们的资本运作、管理层以及对待投资者的态度。
Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.
这五家公司在适当的时候会增加分红，在合适的时候回购股票，而且它们的高管在薪酬计划上远不如美国同行激进。
Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10% of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five increase somewhat.
我们对这五家公司的持股是长远投资，我们致力于支持它们的董事会。从一开始，我们就同意将伯克希尔在每家公司中的持股比例保持在10%以下。但是，当我们接近这一限制时，这五家公司同意适度放宽这一上限。随着时间的推移，您可能会看到伯克希尔对这五家公司的持股有所增加。
At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.
截至年末，伯克希尔的总成本（以美元计）为138亿美元，而我们持股的市值总计为235亿美元。
Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality. We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.
与此同时，伯克希尔一直在持续——但并非按照任何公式——增加以日元计价的借款。所有借款均为固定利率，没有“浮动利率”。格雷格和我对未来的外汇汇率没有看法，因此我们追求接近货币中性的头寸。然而，根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP），我们必须定期在收益中确认所借日元的汇兑损益，截至年末，由于美元走强，我们计入了23亿美元的税后收益，其中8.5亿美元发生在2024年。
I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future.
我预期格雷格及其最终的继任者将在未来几十年内持有这项日本投资，并且伯克希尔将在未来找到与这五家公司高效合作的其他方式。
We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.
我们也很看好当前我们日元平衡策略的计算效果。就在我写这段话时，预计2025年日本投资的年分红收入将达到约8.12亿美元，而我们以日元计价债务的利息成本约为1.35亿美元。
The Annual Gathering in Omaha
奥马哈年度聚会
I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.
我希望您能在5月3日加入我们在奥马哈的聚会。今年我们的日程安排有所调整，但基本内容保持不变。我们的目标是为您解答众多疑问，让您与朋友相聚，并让您对奥马哈留下美好印象。这座城市期待着您的到访。
We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.
我们将有一批几乎相同的志愿者，为您提供各种各样的伯克希尔产品，让您的钱包轻松、心情愉快。和往常一样，我们将在周五中午至下午5点开放，届时会有可爱的 Squishmallows 毛绒玩具、 Fruit of the Loom 内衣、 Brooks 跑鞋以及众多其他诱人商品供您挑选。
Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.
同样，我们只出售一本书。去年我们主推《穷查理年鉴》，在周六营业结束前5000册便全部售罄。
This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.
今年我们将推出《伯克希尔哈撒韦60年》。2015年，我请负责年度会议诸多事务的 Carrie Sova 尝试撰写一本轻松诙谐的伯克希尔历史。我给予她充分的想象空间，她很快就制作出一本凭借独创性、内容和设计让我惊叹不已的书。
Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.
随后，Carrie 离开伯克希尔专注于家庭，现在她已经有三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔的员工都会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队与三级联盟对手的棒球比赛。我邀请了几位校友加入我们，而 Carrie 通常也会带着家人出席。今年的活动上，我大胆地问她是否愿意推出一版60周年纪念刊，收录查理不常公开的照片、语录和故事。
Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.
尽管需要照顾三个年幼的孩子，Carrie 还是立即答应了。因此，我们将在周五下午以及周六早7点至下午4点期间提供5000册新书出售。
Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.
对于她在新版“查理”版上所做的大量工作，Carrie 拒绝接受任何报酬。我建议她和我共同签署20册，赠送给向南奥马哈救助无家可归的成人和儿童的 Stephen 中心捐赠5000美元的股东。长期以来，由我多年的朋友、Carrie 的祖父 Bill Kizer Sr. 率领的 Kizer 家族一直在支持这一有价值的机构。通过销售这20本签名书所筹得的款项，我将予以匹配。
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Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.
Becky Quick 将负责报道我们周六那场经过重新策划的聚会。Becky 对伯克希尔了如指掌，总能安排与管理者、投资者、股东以及偶尔的名人进行有趣的访谈。她和她的 CNBC 团队在全球传播我们的会议以及归档大量与伯克希尔相关资料方面表现出色。请为我们董事 Steve Burke 的归档创意给予认可。
We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.
今年我们不会播放电影，而是会提前一点，于早上8点召开会议。我将作几句开场白，随后我们将迅速进入问答环节，由 Becky 和现场观众轮流提问。
Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.
格雷格和阿吉特将与我一同回答问题，我们将在上午10:30休息半小时。当我们在11:00重新集合时，将只有格雷格与我同台。今年我们将在下午1:00解散，但展区购物将持续开放至下午4:00。
You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)
有关周末活动的全部详细信息，请参见第16页。请特别注意每周日早晨备受欢迎的 Brooks 跑步活动。（我会睡觉的。）
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My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)
我那既聪明又漂亮的妹妹 Bertie（我去年曾写到过她）将会和她的两个同样漂亮的女儿一同出席会议。观察者们一致认为，造就这一惊人美貌的基因仅来自家族的女性一侧。（啜泣声）
Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.
Bertie 现已91岁，我们每周日都会用老式电话定期通话。我们讨论老年的乐趣，并探讨诸如拐杖优劣等令人兴奋的话题。就我而言，拐杖的作用仅限于帮助我避免脸朝下摔倒。
But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have no data to counter her assertion.
然而，Bertie 经常胜过我，她主张自己享有一项额外好处：她告诉我，当女性使用拐杖时，男人就不会再去“搭讪”她。Bertie 解释说，男性的自尊心使得拄拐的老太太根本就不是合适的对象。目前，我没有数据来反驳她的说法。
But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will bring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.
但我有所怀疑。在会议上，我从舞台上看不清太多情况，如果与会者能留意一下 Bertie 我将不胜感激。请告诉我拐杖是否真正在发挥作用。我敢打赌她会被男性包围。对于某些年纪的人来说，这一情景会让人联想到《乱世佳人》中斯嘉丽·奥哈拉及其众多男追求者的往昔情景。
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The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.
伯克希尔的董事和我非常欢迎您前来奥马哈，我预言您将度过愉快时光，并有可能结识新朋友。
February 22, 2025 Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Warren Buffett had never heard of the man who would become one of his favorite CEOs—until he decided to buy his company.
沃伦·巴菲特在决定收购他的公司之前，从未听说过这位后来成为他最欣赏的首席执行官之一的人。
Berkshire Hathaway’s BRK.B 2.27%increase; green up pointing triangle leader was in his office in Omaha, Neb., one day 20 years ago when he received a two-page fax out of the blue pitching his next acquisition: an RV manufacturer called Forest River. At the time, Buffett didn’t know the first thing about the business of recreational vehicles. Which meant he didn’t know the name Pete Liegl.
20 年前的一天，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）BRK.B 上涨 2.27%的领导人在他位于内布拉斯加州奥马哈的办公室里，突然收到了一份两页的传真，推荐他下一笔收购：一家名为 Forest River 的房车制造商。当时，巴菲特对休闲车行业一无所知，这也意味着他并不知道 Pete Liegl 这个名字。
And he really didn’t know that he was dealing with “the George Washington on the Mount Rushmore of the RV industry,” as one friend described Liegl.
而且他确实不知道自己正在与“一位朋友口中房车行业拉什莫尔山上的乔治·华盛顿”打交道，这位朋友如此形容利格尔。
But the world’s most famous investor liked what he read and especially liked that Liegl came to him with a price in mind: $800 million. So he did some basic diligence. The next day, Buffett made an offer. The next week, Liegl came to Omaha. They met for 20 minutes and shook hands on a deal.
但这位全球最著名的投资者喜欢他所读到的内容，尤其欣赏利格尔带着明确的价格前来洽谈：8 亿美元。于是他做了一些基本的尽职调查。第二天，巴菲特提出了报价。接下来的一周，利格尔来到奥马哈。他们会面了 20 分钟，握手达成了交易。
“It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license,” Liegl said at the time.
“卖掉我的公司比更新驾照还容易，”Liegl 当时说道。
Berkshire has owned his RV company ever since—even if Buffett himself says most of the company’s shareholders don’t know that Berkshire owns it.
自那以后，伯克希尔一直拥有他的房车公司——尽管巴菲特本人表示，公司大多数股东并不知道伯克希尔拥有这家公司。
Or at least they didn’t until this past weekend, when Buffett’s latest annual letter included a long remembrance of Liegl, who recently died at the age of 80.
或者至少在上个周末之前他们并不知道，直到巴菲特在最新的年度信函中长篇回忆了最近去世、享年 80 岁的利格尔。
Over the years, Buffett praised him as “a remarkable entrepreneur” who “runs a terrific operation.” This time, he recognized Liegl as “a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders, but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth.”
多年来，巴菲特称赞他是“一位非凡的企业家”，并且“经营着一家出色的企业”。这一次，他认可利格尔是“一位大多数伯克希尔股东都不认识的人，但他为他们的整体财富贡献了数十亿美元。”
And the ultimate compliment for Liegl is that Berkshire has owned Forest River for two decades—and Buffett has never once visited the company’s offices.
对利格尔的最大褒奖是，伯克希尔已拥有 Forest River 二十年，而巴菲特却从未造访过该公司的办公室。
These days, the business that Liegl founded in 1996, sold in 2005 and kept running for the rest of his life is one of America’s leading RV manufacturers. At Berkshire, it’s part of the consumer-products division with companies that make sneakers, underwear and Squishmallows. And this company that makes RVs now generates roughly $6 billion of annual revenue—which means Forest River takes in about as much money each year as Ferrari.
如今，Liegl 于 1996 年创立、2005 年出售并在其余生持续经营的这家公司，已成为美国领先的房车制造商之一。在伯克希尔，它隶属于消费品部门，与生产运动鞋、内衣和 Squishmallows 玩具的公司并列。这家生产房车的公司目前每年营收约 60 亿美元，这意味着 Forest River 每年的收入与法拉利大致相当。
Liegl may have been unknown outside the world of RVs. But inside that world, everyone knew him.
Liegl 在房车行业之外可能鲜为人知，但在该行业内，他无人不晓。
After he made a fortune and established himself as an industry legend, he still kept his hands on the wheel of his company and fingers on the pulse of his customers. He worked seven days a week and kept hours that he called half days: 7 a.m. till 7 p.m. Even his vacations included stops at RV dealerships. And when he was asked to explain his success, he always offered the same deceptively simple answer.
在他赚取财富并成为行业传奇之后，他仍然亲自掌控公司运营，密切关注客户需求。他每周工作七天，每天工作时间被他称为“半天”：从早上 7 点到晚上 7 点。即使度假，他也会顺道拜访房车经销商。当被问及成功的秘诀时，他总是给出同样一个看似简单的答案。
“The best product at the best price is everything,” Liegl told RV Business, an industry publication, after closing the Berkshire deal. “No matter what the product is.”
“以最好的价格提供最好的产品就是一切，”Liegl 在完成伯克希尔交易后对行业刊物《RV Business》表示，“无论产品是什么。”
It’s a formula for success in the business of RVs, campers, trailers, fifth-wheels, buses and pontoon boats—or really any business.
这是房车、露营车、拖车、第五轮拖挂车、巴士和浮筒船业务，乃至任何业务的成功秘诀。
Just ask Brad Gerstner. Before he worked with the CEOs of the world’s most valuable companies as a prominent tech investor in Silicon Valley, Gerstner was a teenager near Elkhart, Ind., the RV capital of the world—and one of his first jobs was working for Liegl.
问问布拉德·格斯特纳就知道了。在成为硅谷知名科技投资人，与全球最具价值公司的首席执行官们合作之前，格斯特纳还是印第安纳州埃尔克哈特附近的一名少年，那里是世界房车之都，而他的第一份工作之一就是为利格尔工作。
The experience was so formative that he refers to his degree from Harvard Business School as his second business education.
这段经历对他的影响如此深远，以至于他将自己在哈佛商学院获得的学位称为第二次商业教育。
“I earned an M.B.A. from Pete before I graduated from high school,” said Gerstner, the founder of Altimeter Capital, a firm with $9 billion under management.
“在我高中毕业前，我就已经从皮特那里获得了工商管理硕士学位，”管理着 90 亿美元资产的 Altimeter Capital 公司的创始人格斯特纳说道。
Liegl taught him the kinds of lessons that he couldn’t have learned in a classroom. That’s because he learned them by crawling through dumpsters.
利格尔教给他的那些经验是在课堂上学不到的，因为他是通过钻进垃圾箱学到的。
When Liegl feared he was overpaying for waste management, he made Gerstner measure the inside of dumpsters to calculate the cubic feet of garbage. With that data, he renegotiated the deal and saved money on literal excess waste.
当利格尔担心自己在垃圾处理上支付过高费用时，他让格斯特纳测量垃圾箱内部，以计算垃圾的立方英尺。有了这些数据，他重新谈判了合同，并在实际的垃圾过量问题上节省了资金。
He understood the value of being resourceful, practical—and frugal. When he took RV dealers for dinner, they went to Elkhart’s hole-in-the-wall spots.
他深知足智多谋、务实和节俭的价值。当他带房车经销商去吃饭时，他们会去埃尔克哈特那些不起眼的小餐馆。
“You would never know that you were sitting in there with a master of the universe,” said Jarrod McGhee, the owner of a dealership called Fun Town RV.
“你绝不会想到，和你坐在一起的是一位行业巨头，”名为 Fun Town RV 经销店的老板贾罗德·麦基说道。
It’s a dirty secret of the RV business that not everyone in the business RVs. Liegl was always RVing. Even when he brought his family to Disney World, they drove for 17 hours.
房车行业有个不为人知的秘密：并非所有从业者都会开房车旅行。但利格尔却一直热衷于房车旅行，即使带家人去迪士尼乐园，他们也会开车 17 个小时。
And if he took a company RV on vacation, he wouldn’t let his wife or daughter use its bathroom or shower. After all, he still wanted to sell that RV.
如果他开着公司的房车去度假，他也不会让妻子或女儿使用车内的卫生间或淋浴设施。毕竟，他还想把那辆房车卖掉。
Liegl wasn’t the sort of CEO who answered emails around the clock. In fact, he only answered emails when his assistant printed them so he could handwrite responses—and he refused to put a computer on his desk.
Liegl 并不是那种全天候回复电子邮件的 CEO。事实上，他只有在助手将邮件打印出来后才会回复，并亲手书写回复内容，而且他拒绝在办公桌上放置电脑。
But he was driven by a work ethic that he developed in childhood. As a young boy, Liegl had a nasty case of spinal meningitis and came so close to death that he was read last rites. He survived. And by the age of 6, he was selling chicken eggs to neighbors. After studying accounting at Northern Michigan and getting an M.B.A. from Western Michigan, he remained in sales and entered the RV industry.
但他受到自童年起培养的职业道德所驱使。小时候，利格尔曾患上严重的脊髓脑膜炎，一度濒临死亡，甚至接受了临终祈祷。他幸存下来。到 6 岁时，他已经开始向邻居出售鸡蛋。在北密歇根大学学习会计并在西密歇根大学获得工商管理硕士学位后，他继续从事销售工作，并进入了房车行业。
He eventually co-founded a manufacturer that he sold to investors who took it public in 1993—and fired him. Soon afterward, the company went broke. Liegl bought its assets out of bankruptcy and renamed the company Forest River.
他最终与人合伙创立了一家制造公司，并将其出售给了投资者，投资者于 1993 年将公司上市后解雇了他。不久之后，这家公司破产了。利格尔从破产中买下了公司的资产，并将公司更名为 Forest River。
Within a decade, he would sell the rebuilt company to Warren Buffett.
不到十年，他便将重建后的公司卖给了沃伦·巴菲特。
There was a reason Buffett forked over so much money for a business he knew so little about.
巴菲特为一个他所知甚少的企业支付如此高昂的金额，是有原因的。
Actually, there were six.
实际上，有六个。
When he evaluated companies to acquire, they had to meet a half-dozen criteria, including management in place (“we can’t supply it”), an offering price (“we don’t want to waste our time”) and a simple business (“if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it”). The process was designed to be so easy that Buffett could promise swift responses—usually within five minutes.
当他评估要收购的公司时，这些公司必须满足六个标准，包括已有管理团队（“我们无法提供管理团队”）、明确的报价（“我们不想浪费时间”）以及业务简单（“如果技术含量太高，我们就无法理解”）。这一流程被设计得非常简单，以至于巴菲特可以承诺迅速做出回应——通常在五分钟内。
That’s basically how long it took for him to look at Forest River and see that this RV company was a perfect fit.
基本上他只花了这么点时间，就看出 Forest River 这家房车公司非常合适。
“Pete and Berkshire are made for each other,” Buffett has written.
巴菲特曾写道：“皮特和伯克希尔天生就是绝配。”
Liegl thought so, too. He was selling the company to ensure long-term stability, but he wasn’t going to sell to just anyone. After his experience with private equity, he wanted to maintain control of his business after the sale. And he specifically targeted Buffett because Liegl admired the way Berkshire maintained companies without meddling. “The important thing is that it’s his company,” Buffett once said. “I couldn’t run an RV company.”
Liegl 也是这么想的。他出售公司是为了确保长期稳定，但他不会随便卖给任何人。在经历了与私募股权的合作后，他希望在出售后仍能保持对公司的控制。他特别选择了巴菲特，因为 Liegl 欣赏伯克希尔在收购公司后不插手经营的方式。“重要的是，这是他的公司，”巴菲特曾说，“我可经营不了房车公司。”
Even today, he owns an RV company but doesn’t own an RV. The one Forest River product that Buffett does have is a pontoon boat—designed by Jimmy Buffett.
即使在今天，他拥有一家房车公司，却并未拥有一辆房车。巴菲特唯一拥有的一件 Forest River 产品是一艘浮筒船，由吉米·巴菲特设计。
Besides his reputation, Liegl had another reason for choosing Warren Buffett. He believed that being a subsidiary of a much, much bigger company would be a massive competitive advantage in his cyclical business. And it wasn’t long before he looked prescient. He sold the company in 2005 only to watch RVs crash with the rest of the economy in 2008. But because it was protected by Berkshire, Forest River was in position to gobble up rivals and market share.
除了声誉之外，利格尔选择沃伦·巴菲特还有另一个原因。他相信，成为一家规模大得多的公司的子公司，将在他周期性的业务中带来巨大的竞争优势。不久之后，他的远见便得到了验证。他在 2005 年出售了公司，随后在 2008 年目睹了房车行业随整体经济一同崩溃。但由于受到伯克希尔的保护，Forest River 得以迅速吞并竞争对手并扩大市场份额。
巴菲特不排斥周期性行业，比如，OXY。
In fact, it was during that industry downturn when Liegl was inducted into the RV industry’s Hall of Fame. Buffett congratulated him with a gigantic mock telegram that he framed.
事实上，正是在那次行业低迷期间，利格尔入选了房车行业名人堂。巴菲特用一封巨大的仿制电报向他表示祝贺，他将其装裱了起来。
His latest tribute to Liegl came in the form of Buffett’s annual letter, when he told the full story of the Forest River deal—and the one part of the negotiation that floored him.
他最近一次对利格尔的致敬出现在巴菲特的年度信函中，他讲述了 Forest River 交易的完整故事，以及谈判中令他震惊的一幕。
When it was time to discuss Liegl’s compensation, Buffett asked him to name his salary and he would pay it. Liegl felt it would be awkward to make a penny more than his boss, so he suggested Buffett’s modest salary of $100,000, plus an annual performance bonus.
当讨论到利格尔的薪酬时，巴菲特让他自己提出薪资数额，并表示会照付。利格尔觉得如果自己的薪水比老板多哪怕一分钱都会很尴尬，于是他提出了与巴菲特相同的 10 万美元的适中薪资，再加上年度绩效奖金。
Once the deal was done, there was just one last thing to do before they “lived happily ever after,” as Buffett put it.
正如巴菲特所说，交易完成后，在他们“从此幸福地生活下去”之前，只剩下一件事要做。
That night, they went for a celebratory dinner at the Happy Hollow country club where Liegl toasted with a Bud Light and Buffett ordered his cheeseburger and Coke. Then he gave the Liegl family a ride back to the airport and they flew home with nothing but the open road ahead.
那天晚上，他们前往快乐谷乡村俱乐部庆祝晚餐，利格尔用百威淡啤酒敬酒，巴菲特则点了芝士汉堡和可乐。随后，他载着利格尔一家返回机场，他们飞回家，前方只有一片开阔的道路。
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