I.H.225.Right People.Andy Jassy.Primitives
Primitives（原子化），这项技术由来已久，软件编程中用过（面向对象的编程技术，最早出现在1960年代的Simula），企业管理中用过（稻盛和夫在1964独创阿米巴的经营方式），现在被Amazon应用于企业的内部管理，把企业拆成一个个最小的原子单元，在此基础上再进行各种组合。
1、《1994-06-16 Steve Jobs.The Rolling Stone Interview》
Is that the period you’re emerging from now?
你现在正从那个时期走出来吗？
I hope so. I’ve been there before, and I’ve recently been there again.
我希望如此。我以前去过那里，最近又去了一次。
As you know, most of what I’ve done in my career has been software. The Apple II wasn’t much software, but the Mac was just software in a cool box. We had to build the box because the software wouldn’t run on any other box, but nonetheless, it was mainly software. I was involved in PostScript and the formation of Adobe, and that was all software. And what we’ve done with NEXTSTEP is really all software. We tried to sell it in a really cool box, but we learned a very important lesson. When you ask people to go outside of the mainstream, they take a risk. So there has to be some important reward for taking that risk or else they won’t take it
正如你所知，我职业生涯中大部分工作都是软件。Apple II 的软件不多，但 Mac 完全是一个装在酷盒子里的软件。我们必须构建这个盒子，因为软件无法在其他盒子上运行，但无论如何，它主要还是软件。我参与了 PostScript 和 Adobe 的成立，这一切都是软件。我们在 NEXTSTEP 上所做的也完全是软件。我们试图将其放在一个非常酷的盒子里出售，但我们学到了一个非常重要的教训。当你要求人们走出主流时，他们会冒险。因此，必须有一些重要的回报来激励他们冒险，否则他们就不会去冒险。
What we learned was that the reward can’t be one and a half times better or twice as good. That’s not enough. The reward has to be like three or four or five times better to take the risk to jump out of the mainstream.
我们了解到，奖励不能只是好一倍半或两倍。这还不够。奖励必须好三倍、四倍或五倍，才能冒险跳出主流。
The problem is, in hardware you can’t build a computer that’s twice as good as anyone else’s anymore. Too many people know how to do it. You’re lucky if you can do one that’s one and a third times better or one and a half times better. And then it’s only six months before everybody else catches up. But you can do it in software. As a matter of fact, I think that the leap that we’ve made is at least five years ahead of anybody.
问题是，在硬件方面，你无法再制造出比其他人好两倍的计算机。太多人知道怎么做。如果你能做出一个好一又三分之一倍或好一又二分之一倍的计算机，那你就算幸运了。而且过不了六个月，其他人就会赶上来。但在软件方面你可以做到。事实上，我认为我们所取得的飞跃至少领先其他人五年。
Let’s talk about the evolution of the PC. About 30 percent of American homes have computers. Businesses are wired. Video-game machines are rapidly becoming as powerful as PCs and in the near future will be able to do everything that traditional desktop computers can do. Is the PC revolution over?
让我们谈谈个人电脑的演变。大约 30%的美国家庭拥有电脑。企业已经联网。电子游戏机正在迅速变得与个人电脑一样强大，并且在不久的将来将能够完成传统台式电脑所能做的一切。个人电脑革命结束了吗？
No. Well, I don’t know exactly what you mean by your question, but I think that the PC revolution is far from over. What happened with the Mac was — well, first I should tell you my theory about Microsoft. Microsoft has had two goals in the last 10 years. One was to copy the Mac, and the other was to copy Lotus’ success in the spreadsheet — basically, the applications business. And over the course of the last 10 years, Microsoft accomplished both of those goals. And now they are completely lost.
不。我不太清楚你问题的确切意思，但我认为个人电脑革命远未结束。关于 Mac 发生的事情——首先我应该告诉你我对微软的理论。微软在过去 10 年中有两个目标。一个是复制 Mac，另一个是复制 Lotus 在电子表格方面的成功——基本上是应用程序业务。在过去的 10 年中，微软实现了这两个目标。现在他们完全迷失了方向。
They were able to copy the Mac because the Mac was frozen in time. The Mac didn’t change much for the last 10 years. It changed maybe 10 percent. It was a sitting duck. It’s amazing that it took Microsoft 10 years to copy something that was a sitting duck. Apple, unfortunately, doesn’t deserve too much sympathy. They invested hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars into R&D, but very little came out They produced almost no new innovation since the original Mac itself.
他们能够复制 Mac，因为 Mac 在时间上被冻结。过去 10 年里，Mac 变化不大，可能只变化了 10%。它就像一只待宰的鸭子。令人惊讶的是，微软花了 10 年时间来复制这样一只待宰的鸭子。不幸的是，苹果并不值得太多同情。他们在研发上投资了数亿甚至数亿美元，但几乎没有什么成果。自原始 Mac 以来，他们几乎没有产生任何新的创新。
So now, the original genes of the Macintosh have populated the earth. Ninety percent in the form of Windows, but nevertheless, there are tens of millions of computers that work like that. And that’s great. The question is, what’s next? And what’s going to keep driving this PC revolution?
所以现在，Macintosh 的原始基因已经遍布地球。90%以 Windows 的形式存在，但无论如何，仍然有数千万台计算机以那种方式运作。这很好。问题是，接下来是什么？是什么将继续推动这场个人电脑革命？
If you look at the goal of the ’80s, it was really individual productivity. And that could be answered with shrink-wrapped applications [off-the-shelf software]. If you look at the goal of the ’90s — well, if you look at the personal computer, it’s going from being a tool of computation to a tool of communication. It’s going from individual productivity to organizational productivity and also operational productivity. What I mean by that is, the market for mainframe and minicomputers is still as large as the PC market And people don’t buy those things to run shrink-wrapped spreadsheets and word processors on. They buy them to run applications that automate the heart of their company. And they don’t buy these applications shrink-wrapped. You can’t go buy an application to run your hospital, to do derivatives commodities trading or to run your phone network. They don’t exist. Or if they do, you have to customize them so much that they’re really custom apps by the time you get through with them.
如果你看看 80 年代的目标，那确实是个人生产力。而这可以通过包装软件来解决。如果你看看 90 年代的目标——好吧，如果你看看个人电脑，它正从计算工具转变为沟通工具。它正从个人生产力转向组织生产力和运营生产力。我所说的意思是，大型机和小型机的市场仍然和个人电脑市场一样大。而人们购买这些东西并不是为了运行包装好的电子表格和文字处理软件。他们购买它们是为了运行能够自动化公司核心业务的应用程序。而且他们并不是购买这些包装好的应用程序。你无法购买一个应用程序来管理你的医院、进行衍生商品交易或运营你的电话网络。这些应用程序并不存在。或者如果存在，你必须对它们进行如此多的定制，以至于在你完成后，它们实际上已经变成了定制应用程序。
最终被Salesforce和CRM实现了。
These custom applications really used to just be in the back office — in accounting, manufacturing. But as business is getting much more sophisticated and consumers are expecting more and more, these custom apps have invaded the front office. Now, when a company has a new product, it consists of only three things: an idea, a sales channel and a custom app to implement the product. The company doesn’t implement the product by hand anymore or service it by hand. Without the custom app, it doesn’t have the new product or service. I’ll give you an example. MCI’s Friends and Family is the most successful business promotion done in the last decade — measured in dollars and cents. AT&T did not respond to that for 18 months. It cost them billions of dollars. Why didn’t they? They’re obviously smart guys. They didn’t because they couldn’t create a custom app to run a new billing system.
这些定制应用程序曾经只存在于后台——在会计、制造等领域。但随着商业变得越来越复杂，消费者的期望也越来越高，这些定制应用程序已经侵入了前台。现在，当一家公司推出新产品时，它只包含三样东西：一个想法，一个销售渠道和一个实施产品的定制应用程序。公司不再手动实施或服务产品。没有定制应用程序，就没有新产品或服务。我给你举个例子。MCI 的“朋友与家人”是过去十年中最成功的商业促销——以美元和分为衡量标准。AT&T 对此没有反应长达 18 个月。这让他们损失了数十亿美元。为什么他们不回应？显然，他们是聪明人。他们之所以没有，是因为他们无法创建一个定制应用程序来运行新的计费系统。
So how does this connect with the next generation of the PC?
那么这与下一代个人电脑有什么关系？
I believe the next generation of the PC is going to be driven by much more advanced software, and it’s going to be driven by custom software for business. Business has focused on shrink-wrapped software on the PCs, and that’s why PCs haven’t really touched the heart of the business. And now they want to bring them into the heart of the business, and everyone is going to have to run custom apps alongside their shrink-wrapped apps because that’s how the enterprise is going to get their competitive advantage in things.
我相信下一代个人电脑将由更先进的软件驱动，并且将由针对商业的定制软件驱动。商业一直专注于个人电脑上的包装软件，这就是为什么个人电脑并没有真正触及商业的核心。而现在，他们希望将其引入商业的核心，每个人都将不得不在使用包装软件的同时运行定制应用程序，因为这就是企业在各方面获得竞争优势的方式。
For example, McCaw Cellular, the largest cellular provider in the world, runs the whole front end of their business on NEXTSTEP now. They’re giving PCs with custom apps to the phone dealers so that when you buy a cellular phone, it used to take you a day and a half to get you up on the network. Now it takes five minutes. The phone dealer just runs these custom apps, they’re networked back to a server in Seattle, and in a minute and a half, with no human intervention, your phone works on the entire McCaw network.
例如，世界上最大的移动通信服务提供商McCaw通信现在在其业务的整个前端运行 NEXTSTEP。他们向手机经销商提供配备定制应用程序的个人电脑，这样当你购买一部手机时，以前需要一天半的时间才能连接到网络。现在只需五分钟。手机经销商只需运行这些定制应用程序，它们通过网络连接到西雅图的服务器，经过一分钟半的时间，无需人工干预，你的手机就可以在整个McCaw网络上使用。
In addition to that, the applications business right now — if you look at even the shrink-wrap business — is contracting dramatically. It now takes 100 to 200 people one to two years just to do a major revision to a word processor or spreadsheet. And so, all the really creative people who like to work in small teams of three, four, five people, they’ve all been squeezed out of that business. As you may know, Windows is the worst development environment ever made. And Microsoft doesn’t have any interest in making it better, because the fact that its really hard to develop apps in Windows plays to Microsoft’s advantage. You can’t have small teams of programmers writing word processors and spreadsheets — it might upset their competitive advantage. And they can afford to have 200 people working on a project, no problem.
除了这一点，当前的应用程序业务——即使是收缩包装业务——也在急剧收缩。现在需要 100 到 200 人花费一到两年时间才能对文字处理器或电子表格进行一次重大修订。因此，所有喜欢在三、四、五人小团队中工作的真正创造性人才都被挤出了这个行业。正如您所知，Windows 是有史以来最糟糕的开发环境。微软对改善它没有任何兴趣，因为在 Windows 中开发应用程序非常困难，这对微软来说是有利的。您不能让小团队的程序员编写文字处理器和电子表格——这可能会影响他们的竞争优势。而且他们可以负担得起 200 人同时在一个项目上工作，毫无问题。
With our technology, with objects, literally three people in a garage can blow away what 200 people at Microsoft can do. Literally can blow it away. Corporate America has a need that is so huge and can save them so much money, or make them so much money, or cost them so much money if they miss it, that they are going to fuel the object revolution.
凭借我们的技术，三个在车库里的人可以轻松超越微软 200 人的工作。真的可以轻松超越。美国企业有一个如此巨大的需求，能够为他们节省大量资金，或者为他们赚取大量资金，或者如果错过了将花费他们大量资金，因此他们将推动面向对象革命。
That may be so. But when people think of Steve Jobs, they think of the man whose mission was to bring technology to the masses — not to corporate America.
这可能是对的。但是当人们想到史蒂夫·乔布斯时，他们想到的是那个将技术带给大众而不是美国企业。
Well, life is always a little more complicated than it appears to be.
生活总是比看起来要复杂一些。
What drove the success of the Apple II for many years and let consumers have the benefit of that product was Visi-Calc selling into corporate America. Corporate America was buying Apple IIs and running Visi-Calc on them like crazy so that we could get our volumes up and our prices down and sell that as a consumer product on Mondays and Wednesdays and Fridays while selling it to business on Tuesdays and Thursdays. We were giving away Macintoshes to higher ed while we were selling them for a nice profit to corporate America. So it takes both.
推动Apple II多年成功的因素之一，是Visi-Calc在美国企业市场的热销。美国企业疯狂购买Apple II并运行Visi-Calc，这让我们的销量得以提升，价格得以降低，从而能够在周一、周三和周五将其作为消费产品销售，同时在周二和周四向企业销售。我们在向高等教育赠送Macintosh的同时，也在向美国企业以可观的利润出售。因此，这两者都是必不可少的。
What’s going to fuel the object revolution is not the consumer. The consumer is not going to see the benefits until after business sees them and we begin to get this stuff into volume. Because unfortunately, people are not rebelling against Microsoft. They don’t know any better. They’re not sitting around thinking that they have a giant problem that needs to be solved — whereas corporations are. The PC market has done less and less to serve their growing needs. They have a giant need, and they know it. We don’t have to spend money educating them about the problem — they know they have a problem. There’s a giant vacuum sucking us in there, and there’s a lot of money in there to fuel the development of this object industry. And everyone will benefit from that
推动面向对象革命的动力不是消费者。消费者在商业看到好处之前是不会看到这些好处的，而我们开始将这些东西投入到大规模生产中。因为不幸的是，人们并没有反抗微软。他们并不知道更好的选择。他们并没有坐在那里思考自己有一个需要解决的巨大问题——而企业却在思考。个人电脑市场越来越无法满足他们日益增长的需求。他们有一个巨大的需求，他们知道这一点。我们不需要花钱去教育他们关于这个问题——他们知道自己有问题。那里有一个巨大的真空在吸引我们，里面有很多资金可以推动这个产业的发展。每个人都将从中受益。
I visited Xerox PARC in 1979, when I was at Apple. That visit’s been written about — it was a very important visit. I remember being shown their rudimentary graphical-user interface. It was incomplete, some of it wasn’t even right, but the germ of the idea was there. And within 10 minutes, it was so obvious that every computer would work this way someday. You knew it with every bone in your body. Now, you could argue about the number of years it would take, you could argue about who the winners and losers in terms of companies in the industry might be, but I don’t think rational people could argue that every computer would work this way someday.
我在 1979 年访问了施乐 PARC，当时我在苹果公司。那次访问已经被写过很多次——这是一次非常重要的访问。我记得他们向我展示了他们初步的图形用户界面。它还不完整，有些地方甚至不正确，但这个想法的雏形已经存在。而在 10 分钟内，显而易见的是，未来每台计算机都将以这种方式工作。你全身的每一个细胞都知道这一点。现在，你可以争论需要多少年，你可以争论行业中谁会是赢家和输家，但我认为理性的人不会争论未来每台计算机都将以这种方式工作。
I feel the same way about objects, with every bone in my body. All software will be written using this object technology someday. No question about it. You can argue about how many years it’s going to take, you can argue who the winners and losers are going to be in terms of the companies in this industry, but I don’t think a rational person can argue that all software will not be built this way.
我对面向对象有同样的感觉，发自我身体的每一个骨头。总有一天，所有软件都将使用这种技术编写。毫无疑问。你可以争论这需要多少年，你可以争论在这个行业中哪些公司会是赢家和输家，但我认为理性的人无法争辩所有软件不会以这种方式构建。
Would you explain, in simple terms, exactly what object-oriented software is?
你能用简单的术语解释一下什么是面向对象的软件吗？
Objects are like people. They’re living, breathing things that have knowledge inside them about how to do things and have memory inside them so they can remember things. And rather than interacting with them at a very low level, you interact with them at a very high level of abstraction, like we’re doing right here.
面向对象就像人一样。它们是有生命、有呼吸的事物，内部蕴含着关于如何做事的知识，并且有记忆，可以记住事情。与其在非常低的层面上与它们互动，不如在一个非常高的抽象层面上与它们互动，就像我们现在所做的那样。
Here’s an example: If I’m your laundry object, you can give me your dirty clothes and send me a message that says, “Can you get my clothes laundered, please.” I happen to know where the best laundry place in San Francisco is. And I speak English, and I have dollars in my pockets. So I go out and hail a taxicab and tell the driver to take me to this place in San Francisco. I go get your clothes laundered, I jump back in the cab, I get back here. I give you your clean clothes and say, “Here are your clean clothes.”
这是一个例子：如果我是你的洗衣对象，你可以把脏衣服给我，并发一条消息说：“请你帮我洗衣服。”我恰好知道旧金山最好的洗衣店在哪里。我会说英语，口袋里有美元。所以我出去叫了一辆出租车，告诉司机带我去旧金山的这个地方。我去把你的衣服洗了，跳回出租车，回到这里。我把你的干净衣服给你，说：“这是你的干净衣服。”
You have no idea how I did that. You have no knowledge of the laundry place. Maybe you speak French, and you can’t even hail a taxi. You can’t pay for one, you don’t have dollars in your pocket. Yet I knew how to do all of that. And you didn’t have to know any of it. All that complexity was hidden inside of me, and we were able to interact at a very high level of abstraction. That’s what objects are. They encapsulate complexity, and the interfaces to that complexity are high level.
你不知道我是怎么做到的。你对洗衣店一无所知。也许你会说法语，但连叫出租车都不会。你不能支付，因为口袋里没有美元。然而我知道怎么做这一切。而你不需要知道任何这些。所有的复杂性都隐藏在我里面，我们能够在一个非常高的抽象层次上互动。这就是面向对象的意义。它们封装了复杂性，而与这些复杂性交互的接口是高层次的。
基于等于企业软件（即CRM）的定义。
2、《2019-10-11 Marc Benioff.The Lesson I Learned from Steve Jobs》
I first met Steve Jobs in 1984 when Apple Inc. hired me as a summer intern.
我第一次见到史蒂夫·乔布斯是在 1984 年，当时苹果公司聘请我作为暑期实习生。
The fact that I’d landed this gig in the first place was something of a fluke; as a college student at the University of Southern California, I’d reached out to the company’s Macintosh team to complain about a bug in its software and somehow parlayed that conversation into a job. While I’d done my best to impersonate a seasoned developer, at 19 years old, the sum total of my programming experience was writing a dozen arcade and adventure games in high school. Working at Apple was the big leagues, and while I felt profoundly underqualified, nobody tossed me out the door that summer. In fact, every time Steve Jobs passed my cubicle, I somehow summoned the nerve to strike up a conversation.
我能得到这个工作的事实有些偶然；作为南加州大学的大学生，我曾联系过公司的 Mac 团队，抱怨他们软件中的一个 bug，并不知怎么地把这次对话转变成了一份工作。虽然我尽力模仿一名经验丰富的开发者，但在 19 岁时，我的编程经验总共也只是高中时写过十几个街机和冒险游戏。在苹果工作是大联盟，尽管我感到极其不够资格，但那个夏天没有人把我赶出门。事实上，每当史蒂夫·乔布斯经过我的隔间时，我总能鼓起勇气与他攀谈。
It wasn’t much, but through those small interactions, a bond would eventually form. Steve and I shared a love for technology and science as well as a passion for meditation and Eastern philosophy. In addition to being a brilliant executive and peerless innovator, he was a spiritual, intuitive person who had a gift for seeing the world through many perspectives at once. I saw that he had a willingness to share his wisdom, and I wasn’t afraid to ask for it.
这虽然不算多，但通过这些小互动，最终会形成一种纽带。史蒂夫和我都热爱科技和科学，同时对冥想和东方哲学充满热情。除了是一位杰出的高管和无与伦比的创新者，他还是一个富有灵性和直觉的人，能够从多个角度看待世界。我看到他愿意分享他的智慧，而我也不怕去请求。
Even once my internship ended, we stayed in touch, and as my career progressed he became a mentor of sorts. Which is why, one memorable day in 2003, I found myself pacing anxiously in the reception area of Apple’s headquarters.
即使我的实习结束后，我们仍然保持联系，随着我的职业发展，他成了某种意义上的导师。这就是为什么在 2003 年的一个难忘的日子里，我发现自己在苹果总部的接待区焦虑地踱步。
By then, I was CEO of Salesforce, one of the first companies to deliver enterprise software to customers as a subscription over the internet. In the four years since Salesforce opened for business, we’d hired 400 employees, generated more than $50 million in annual revenue, and were laying the groundwork for an IPO the following year. We were justifiably proud of our progress, but I’d learned enough about the technology business to know that pride is a dangerous state of mind.
到那时，我已经是 Salesforce 的首席执行官，Salesforce 是第一批通过互联网向客户提供企业软件订阅的公司之一。在 Salesforce 开业的四年里，我们雇佣了 400 名员工，年收入超过 5000 万美元，并为第二年的首次公开募股奠定了基础。我们对自己的进展感到理所当然的自豪，但我在科技行业的经验让我明白，自豪是一种危险的心态。
Truth be told, I was feeling stuck. To catapult the company into the next phase of growth, we needed to make a bold move. We’d survived the scary startup phase where so many companies crash and burn, but I was struggling to imagine how I’d navigate the pressure of running a public company that has to lay itself bare to Wall Street every quarter.
说实话，我感到很困惑。为了将公司推向下一个增长阶段，我们需要做出大胆的举动。我们已经度过了许多公司崩溃的可怕创业阶段，但我很难想象如何应对每个季度都要向华尔街公开透明的上市公司所带来的压力。
Sometimes seeking guidance from mentors is the only sure way to survive these bouts of inertia. That is why I decided to make a pilgrimage to Cupertino, Calif.
有时候，向导师寻求指导是克服这些惰性发作的唯一可靠方法。这就是我决定朝圣前往加利福尼亚州库比蒂诺的原因。
As Steve’s staff ushered me into Apple’s boardroom that day, I felt a rush of excitement coursing through my jangling nerves. In that moment, I remembered what it had felt like to be an inexperienced intern mustering up the courage to say a few words to the big boss. After several minutes, Steve charged in, predictably dressed in his standard attire of jeans and a black mock turtleneck. I hadn’t settled on precisely what I wanted to ask him, but I knew I’d better cut to the chase. He was a busy man, and was legendary for his directness, and ability to quickly zero in on what’s important.
当史蒂夫的员工那天把我带进苹果的董事会会议室时，我感到一阵兴奋在我紧张的神经中涌动。在那一刻，我想起了作为一个没有经验的实习生，鼓起勇气对大老板说几句话的感觉。几分钟后，史蒂夫走了进来，照例穿着他标志性的牛仔裤和黑色高领衫。我还没有完全决定想问他什么，但我知道我最好直截了当。他是个忙碌的人，以直率和迅速抓住重点的能力而闻名。
So I showed him a demo of the Salesforce customer relationship management service on my laptop and, true to form, he immediately had some thoughts. After unleashing a torrent of rapid-fire suggestions on our software’s basic functionality, down to the shape and color of its navigation tabs, Steve sat back, folded his hands together, and got to the larger point. Salesforce had created a “fantastic enterprise website,” he told me. But both he and I knew that that alone wasn’t enough.
所以我在我的笔记本电脑上给他演示了 Salesforce 客户关系管理服务，果然，他立刻有了一些想法。在对我们软件的基本功能提出了一连串快速的建议后，包括导航标签的形状和颜色，史蒂夫坐回去，双手交叉，开始谈论更大的问题。他告诉我，Salesforce 创建了一个“出色的企业网站”。但他和我都知道，仅此还不够。
“Marc,” he said. “If you want to be a great CEO, be mindful and project the future.”
“马克，”他说。“如果你想成为一位伟大的首席执行官，就要有远见并展望未来。”
I nodded, perhaps a bit disappointed. He’d given me similar advice before, but he wasn’t finished.
我点了点头，也许有些失望。他之前给过我类似的建议，但他还没有说完。
Steve then told me we needed to land a big account, and to grow “10 times in 24 months or you’ll be dead.” I gulped. Then he said something less alarming, but more puzzling: We needed an “application ecosystem.”
史蒂夫接着告诉我，我们需要争取一个大客户，并在“24 个月内增长 10 倍，否则你就完了。”我吞了吞口水。然后他说了一些不那么令人震惊但更让人困惑的话：我们需要一个“应用生态系统。”
I understood that to hit the big leagues, we needed a huge marquee customer win. But what would a Salesforce “application ecosystem” look like? Steve told me that was up to me to figure out.
我明白，要进入大联盟，我们需要一个巨大的标志性客户胜利。但 Salesforce 的“应用生态系统”会是什么样子呢？史蒂夫告诉我，这要我自己去弄清楚。
We tripled in size over the next three years, topping $300 million in revenue, but the puzzle posed by Steve remained unresolved. The more innovative products and features we released, the more our customers expected from us. Privately, I started to worry about whether we could cope with the pressures of scaling up.
在接下来的三年里，我们的规模增长了三倍，收入超过了 3 亿美元，但史蒂夫提出的难题仍未解决。我们发布的创新产品和功能越多，客户对我们的期望就越高。私下里，我开始担心我们是否能够应对扩张带来的压力。
In previous eras, a company in our position would have tapped its most brilliant scientists and squirreled them away behind a triple-bolted door with top secret painted on it. These appointed geniuses would have spent long days in isolation, wrenching together prototypes and puzzling over clay models, walled off from any ambient noise.
在以前的时代，像我们这样的公司会召集最杰出的科学家，把他们藏在一扇上面写着“绝密”的三重锁门后面。这些被任命的天才会在孤立的环境中度过漫长的日子，拼凑原型，琢磨泥土模型，与外界的噪音隔绝。
At the end of the process, these scientists would emerge from their lairs, likely over caffeinated and unkempt, and would wheel out a gurney containing some new product, the likes of which nobody had ever seen. Then it was up to customers to determine whether it was a game changer. Too often, it wasn’t.
在这个过程的最后，这些科学家会从他们的巢穴中走出来，可能过度饮用咖啡，衣衫不整，并推着一张担架，上面放着一些前所未见的新产品。然后就由顾客来决定这是否是一个改变游戏规则的产品。太多时候，它并不是。
We had subscribed to this outdated model too, in the early years of the company. Then, in 2006, the approach to innovation at Salesforce started to change. To innovate on a truly massive scale, we realized that we couldn’t simply demand more of our already overworked engineering department. The only possible way to scale up our innovation efforts was to start recruiting outsiders.
我们在公司早期也曾订阅过这种过时的模式。然后，在 2006 年，Salesforce 的创新方法开始发生变化。为了在真正大规模上进行创新，我们意识到不能仅仅要求我们已经超负荷工作的工程部门付出更多。扩大我们的创新努力的唯一可能方法就是开始招募外部人才。
One evening, over dinner in San Francisco, I was struck by an irresistibly simple idea. What if any developer from anywhere in the world could create their own application for the Salesforce platform? And what if we offered to store these apps in an online directory that allowed any Salesforce user to download them? I wouldn’t say this idea felt entirely comfortable. I’d grown up with the old view of innovation as something that should happen within the four walls of our offices. Opening our products to outside tinkering was akin to giving our intellectual property away. Yet, at that moment, I knew in my gut that if Salesforce was to become the new kind of company I wanted it to be, we would need to seek innovation everywhere.
一个晚上，在旧金山的晚餐上，我被一个不可抗拒的简单想法所打动。如果来自世界任何地方的开发者都可以为 Salesforce 平台创建自己的应用程序，那会怎么样？如果我们提供一个在线目录来存储这些应用，让任何 Salesforce 用户都可以下载它们，那又会怎么样？我不能说这个想法让我感到完全舒适。我从小就接受了创新应该在我们办公室四面墙内发生的旧观念。让外部人员对我们的产品进行改动就像是把我们的知识产权拱手相让。然而，在那一刻，我在内心深处知道，如果 Salesforce 要成为我想要的那种新公司，我们就需要在各处寻求创新。
So I sketched out my idea on a restaurant napkin. And the very next morning, I went to our legal team and asked them to register the domain for “AppStore.com” and buy the trademark for “App Store.”
所以我在餐厅的餐巾纸上勾勒出了我的想法。第二天早上，我去找我们的法律团队，请他们注册“AppStore.com”的域名，并购买“App Store”的商标。
Shortly thereafter, I learned that our customers didn’t like the name “App Store.” In fact, they hated it. So I reluctantly conceded and about a year later, we introduced “AppExchange”: the first business software marketplace of its kind.
不久之后，我得知我们的客户不喜欢“应用商店”这个名字。事实上，他们非常讨厌这个名字。因此，我勉强让步，大约一年后，我们推出了“应用交换”：首个此类商业软件市场。
These decisions gained added relevance when I returned to Apple’s Cupertino headquarters in 2008 to watch Steve unveil the company’s next great innovation engine: the sprawling, boundaryless digital hub where millions of customers, developers, and partners could create their own applications to run on Apple devices. Steve was a master showman, and this presentation didn’t disappoint. At the climactic moment, he said five words that nearly floored me: “I give you App Store!”
这些决定在我 2008 年回到苹果库比蒂诺总部观看史蒂夫揭幕公司下一个伟大的创新引擎时变得更加重要：一个广阔、无边界的数字中心，数百万客户、开发者和合作伙伴可以在苹果设备上创建自己的应用程序。史蒂夫是一位出色的表演者，这场演示没有让人失望。在高潮时刻，他说了五个几乎让我震惊的话：“我给你们 App Store！”
All of my executives gasped. When I’d met with Steve Jobs in 2003, I already knew he was playing a hundred chess moves ahead of me. None of us could believe that Steve had landed on the same name I’d originally proposed for our business software exchange.
我所有的高管都惊呆了。当我在 2003 年与史蒂夫·乔布斯会面时，我已经知道他在我前面下了上百步棋。我们都无法相信史蒂夫竟然选择了我最初提议的我们商业软件交流的名称。
For me, it was exciting and humbling. And Steve had unwittingly given me an incredible opportunity to repay him for the prescient advice he’d given me five years earlier. After the presentation, I pulled him aside and told him we owned the domain and trademark for “App Store” and that we would be happy and honored to sign over the rights to him for free.
对我来说，这既令人兴奋又令人谦卑。史蒂夫无意中给了我一个难以置信的机会，让我能够回报他五年前给我的深刻建议。演讲结束后，我把他拉到一边，告诉他我们拥有“应用商店”的域名和商标，我们很高兴也很荣幸能够免费将权利转让给他。
Steve helped me understand that no great innovation in business ever happens in a vacuum. They’re all built on the backs of hundreds of smaller breakthroughs and insights—which can come from literally anywhere. AppExchange now has more than 5,000 apps, ranging from sales engagement and project management tools to collaboration aids.
史蒂夫帮助我理解，商业中的伟大创新从来不是在真空中发生的。它们都是建立在数百个较小的突破和见解的基础上——这些突破和见解可以来自任何地方。AppExchange 现在拥有超过 5,000 个应用程序，涵盖销售参与、项目管理工具到协作辅助工具。
Building an ecosystem is about acknowledging that the next game-changing innovation may come from a brilliant technologist and mentor based in Silicon Valley, or it may come from a novice programmer based halfway around the world. A company seeking to achieve true scale needs to seek innovation beyond its own four walls and tap into the entire universe of knowledge and creativity out there.
建立生态系统就是要承认，下一个颠覆性创新可能来自硅谷的一位杰出技术专家和导师，也可能来自世界另一端的一位新手程序员。寻求实现真正规模的公司需要超越自身的四面墙，挖掘外面整个知识和创造力的宇宙。
From “Trailblazer: The Power of Business as the Greatest Platform for Change” by Marc Benioff and Monica Langley, to be published on Oct. 15 in the U.S. by Currency, an imprint of Random House, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, and in the U.K by Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. Copyright © 2019 by Salesforce.com, Inc. Mr. Benioff is the chairman and co-chief executive officer of Salesforce.com.
来自马克·贝尼奥夫和莫妮卡·兰利的《开拓者：商业作为改变的最大平台的力量》，将于 10 月 15 日在美国由随机之家旗下的货币出版社出版，在英国由西蒙与舒斯特英国有限公司出版。版权 © 2019 Salesforce.com, Inc. 贝尼奥夫先生是 Salesforce.com 的董事长兼联合首席执行官。
3、《2024-04-11 Andy Jassy’s Letters to Amazon Shareholders》
We spend enormous energy thinking about how to empower builders, inside and outside of our company. We characterize builders as people who like to invent. They like to dissect a customer experience, assess what’s wrong with it, and reinvent it. Builders tend not to be satisfied until the customer experience is perfect. This doesn’t hinder them from delivering improvements along the way, but it drives them to keep tinkering and iterating continually. While unafraid to invent from scratch, they have no hesitation about using high-quality, scalable, cost-effective components from others. What matters to builders is having the right tools to keep rapidly improving customer experiences.
我们投入大量精力思考如何赋能公司内外的建设者。我们将建设者定义为喜欢创新的人。他们喜欢剖析客户体验，评估其中的问题，并重新设计。建设者往往在客户体验达到完美之前不会满足。这并不会妨碍他们在过程中持续提供改进，但会驱使他们不断地调整和迭代。虽然他们不惧怕从零开始创新，但也毫不犹豫地使用来自他人的高质量、可扩展且经济高效的组件。对建设者而言，重要的是拥有合适的工具，以持续快速地改善客户体验。
赋能是向外扩散的力量，是可能导致碎片化的原始动力。
The best way we know how to do this is by building primitive services. Think of them as discrete, foundational building blocks that builders can weave together in whatever combination they desire. Here’s how we described primitives in our 2003 AWS Vision document:
我们所知的最佳方法是构建原始服务。可以将它们视为独立的、基础的构建模块，开发人员可以根据自己的需求任意组合。这是我们在 2003 年 AWS 愿景文档中对原始服务的描述：
“Primitives are the raw parts or the most foundational-level building blocks for software developers. They’re indivisible (if they can be functionally split into two they must) and they do one thing really well. They’re meant to be used together rather than as solutions in and of themselves. And, we’ll build them for maximum developer flexibility. We won’t put a bunch of constraints on primitives to guard against developers hurting themselves. Rather, we’ll optimize for developer freedom and innovation.”
Primitives是软件开发人员使用的原始组件或最基础级别的构建模块。它们是不可分割的（如果能在功能上拆分成两个，就必须拆分），并且专注于做好一件事。它们旨在相互配合使用，而不是单独作为解决方案。此外，我们将构建它们以实现开发人员的最大灵活性。我们不会对Primitives施加大量限制来防止开发人员犯错，而是会优化开发人员的自由度和创新空间。
Of course, this concept of primitives can be applied to more than software development, but they’re especially relevant in technology. And, over the last 20 years, primitives have been at the heart of how we’ve innovated quickly.
当然，这种Primitives的概念不仅适用于软件开发领域，但在技术领域尤为重要。在过去的 20 年里，Primitives一直是我们快速创新的核心。
One of the many advantages to thinking in primitives is speed. Let me give you two counter examples that illustrate this point. First, we built a successful owned-inventory retail business in the early years at Amazon where we bought all our products from publishers, manufacturers, and distributors, stored them in our warehouses, and shipped them ourselves. Over time, we realized we could add broader selection and lower prices by allowing third-party sellers to list their offerings next to our own on our highly trafficked search and product detail pages. We’d built several core retail services (e.g. payments, search, ordering, browse, item management) that made trying different marketplace concepts simpler than if we didn’t have those components. A good set of primitives? Not really.
以基础元素的方式思考的众多优势之一是速度。我举两个反例来说明这一点。首先，在亚马逊的早期阶段，我们建立了一个成功的自营库存零售业务，我们从出版商、制造商和分销商那里购买所有产品，将其存储在自己的仓库中，并自行发货。随着时间推移，我们意识到，通过允许第三方卖家在我们流量巨大的搜索和产品详情页面上与我们自己的商品并列展示，我们可以提供更广泛的选择和更低的价格。我们已经构建了几个核心零售服务（例如支付、搜索、订购、浏览、商品管理），这些服务使我们尝试不同的市场模式变得比没有这些组件时更简单。但这算是一套好的基础元素吗？并不是。
It turns out that these core components were too jumbled together and not partitioned right. We learned this the hard way when we partnered with companies like Target in our Merchant.com business in the early 2000s. The concept was that target.com would use Amazon’s ecommerce components as the backbone of its website, and then customize however they wished. To enable this arrangement, we had to deliver those components as separable capabilities through application programming interfaces (“APIs”). This decoupling was far more difficult than anticipated because we’d built so many dependencies between these services as Amazon grew so quickly the first few years.
事实证明，这些核心组件过于混杂，没有正确地进行分割。我们是在 2000 年代初与 Target 等公司合作开展 Merchant.com 业务时，才艰难地意识到这一点。当时的设想是，target.com 将使用亚马逊的电子商务组件作为其网站的基础架构，然后根据自身需求进行定制。为了实现这一安排，我们必须通过应用程序接口（API）将这些组件作为可分离的功能提供出去。然而，这种解耦的难度远超预期，因为在亚马逊最初几年快速增长过程中，我们在这些服务之间建立了太多的依赖关系。
This coupling was further highlighted by a heavyweight mechanism we used to operate called “NPI.” Any new initiative requiring work from multiple internal teams had to be reviewed by this NPI cabal where each team would communicate how many people-weeks their work would take. This bottleneck constrained what we accomplished, frustrated the heck out of us, and inspired us to eradicate it by refactoring these ecommerce components into true primitive services with well-documented, stable APIs that enabled our builders to use each other’s services without any coordination tax.
这种耦合关系在我们过去使用的一种名为“NPI”的繁重机制中尤为突出。任何需要多个内部团队协作的新项目，都必须经过这个 NPI 小组的审查，每个团队都要说明他们的工作需要多少人周。这种瓶颈限制了我们的成就，让我们极为沮丧，并促使我们通过将这些电子商务组件重构为真正的基础服务，配备文档完善、稳定的 API，使开发人员能够在无需额外协调成本的情况下使用彼此的服务，从而彻底消除这种瓶颈。
In the middle of the Target and NPI challenges, we were contemplating building a new set of infrastructure technology services that would allow both Amazon to move more quickly and external developers to build anything they imagined. This set of services became known as AWS, and the above experiences convinced us that we should build a set of primitive services that could be composed together how anybody saw fit. At that time, most technology offerings were very feature-rich, and tried to solve multiple jobs simultaneously. As a result, they often didn’t do any one job that well.
在应对 Target 和 NPI 挑战的过程中，我们曾考虑构建一套新的基础设施技术服务，以便亚马逊能够更快地行动，同时也让外部开发者能够构建他们所设想的任何东西。这套服务后来被称为 AWS，上述经验使我们确信，我们应该构建一系列基础服务，让任何人都可以根据自己的需求自由组合。当时，大多数技术产品都功能繁多，试图同时解决多个问题，因此往往无法很好地完成任何单一任务。
Our AWS primitive services were designed from the start to be different. They offered important, highly flexible, but focused functionality. For instance, our first major primitive was Amazon Simple Storage Service (“S3”) in March 2006 that aimed to provide highly secure object storage, at very high durability and availability, at Internet scale, and very low cost. In other words, be stellar at object storage. When we launched S3, developers were excited, and a bit mystified. It was a very useful primitive service, but they wondered, why just object storage? When we launched Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (“EC2”) in August 2006 and Amazon SimpleDB in 2007, people realized we were building a set of primitive infrastructure services that would allow them to build anything they could imagine, much faster, more cost-effectively, and without having to manage or lay out capital upfront for the datacenter or hardware. As AWS unveiled these building blocks over time (we now have over 240 at builders’ disposal—meaningfully more than any other provider), whole companies sprang up quickly on top of AWS (e.g. Airbnb, Dropbox, Instagram, Pinterest, Stripe, etc.), industries reinvented themselves on AWS (e.g. streaming with Netflix, Disney+, Hulu, Max, Fox, Paramount), and even critical government agencies switched to AWS (e.g. CIA, along with several other U.S. Intelligence agencies). But, one of the lesser-recognized beneficiaries was Amazon’s own consumer businesses, which innovated at dramatic speed across retail, advertising, devices (e.g. Alexa and Fire TV), Prime Video and Music, Amazon Go, Drones, and many other endeavors by leveraging the speed with which AWS let them build. Primitives, done well, rapidly accelerate builders’ ability to innovate.
我们的 AWS 基础服务从一开始就被设计成与众不同。它们提供了重要、高度灵活但专注的功能。例如，我们的第一个主要基础服务是 2006 年 3 月推出的亚马逊简单存储服务（“S3”），旨在以互联网规模、极低的成本提供高度安全的对象存储，具有极高的耐用性和可用性。换句话说，就是在对象存储方面做到卓越。当我们推出 S3 时，开发人员感到兴奋，也有些困惑。这是一个非常有用的基础服务，但他们疑惑，为什么只提供对象存储？当我们在 2006 年 8 月推出亚马逊弹性计算云（“EC2”）以及 2007 年推出亚马逊 SimpleDB 时，人们意识到我们正在构建一系列基础设施服务，使他们能够更快、更经济地构建任何他们能想象的东西，而无需提前管理或投入资金建设数据中心或硬件。 随着 AWS 逐步推出这些构建模块（目前我们已为开发者提供超过 240 个模块，远超其他任何供应商），许多公司迅速在 AWS 之上建立起来（例如 Airbnb、Dropbox、Instagram、Pinterest、Stripe 等），一些行业在 AWS 上实现了自我重塑（例如 Netflix、Disney+、Hulu、Max、Fox、Paramount 等流媒体服务），甚至一些关键的政府机构也转向了 AWS（例如 CIA 以及其他几个美国情报机构）。但较少被注意到的受益者之一是亚马逊自身的消费者业务，它们通过利用 AWS 提供的快速构建能力，在零售、广告、设备（例如 Alexa 和 Fire TV）、Prime 视频和音乐、Amazon Go、无人机以及许多其他领域实现了高速创新。基础模块若设计得当，将极大地加速开发者的创新能力。
So, how do you build the right set of primitives?
那么，你该如何构建合适的primitives集合呢？
Pursuing primitives is not a guarantee of success. There are many you could build, and even more ways to combine them. But, a good compass is to pick real customer problems you’re trying to solve.
追求基础元素并不能保证成功。你可以构建许多基础元素，也有更多方式将它们组合起来。但一个好的指南针是选择你试图解决的真实客户问题。
Our logistics primitives are an instructive example. In Amazon’s early years, we built core capabilities around warehousing items, and then picking, packing, and shipping them quickly and reliably to customers. As we added third-party sellers to our marketplace, they frequently requested being able to use these same logistics capabilities. Because we’d built this initial set of logistics primitives, we were able to introduce Fulfillment by Amazon (“FBA”) in 2006, allowing sellers to use Amazon’s Fulfillment Network to store items, and then have us pick, pack, and ship them to customers, with the bonus of these products being available for fast, Prime delivery. This service has saved sellers substantial time and money (typically about 70% less expensive than doing themselves), and remains one of our most popular services. As more merchants began to operate their own direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) websites, many yearned to still use our fulfillment capabilities, while also accessing our payments and identity primitives to drive higher order conversion on their own websites (as Prime members have already shared this payment and identity information with Amazon). A couple years ago, we launched Buy with Prime to address this customer need. Prime members can check out quickly on DTC websites like they do on Amazon, and receive fast Prime shipping speeds on Buy with Prime items—increasing order conversion for merchants by ~25% vs. their default experience.
我们的物流基础模块就是一个很有启发性的例子。在亚马逊成立初期，我们围绕商品仓储建立了核心能力，然后快速可靠地完成拣货、包装和配送给客户。当我们向市场引入第三方卖家时，他们经常要求使用这些相同的物流能力。正因为我们已经建立了这一套初始的物流基础模块，我们才能在 2006 年推出“亚马逊物流（FBA）”，允许卖家使用亚马逊的物流网络存储商品，然后由我们负责拣货、包装并配送给客户，同时这些商品还能享受快速的 Prime 配送服务。这项服务为卖家节省了大量的时间和成本（通常比他们自己操作便宜约 70%），并且至今仍是我们最受欢迎的服务之一。随着越来越多的商家开始运营自己的直面消费者（DTC）网站，许多商家仍然希望使用我们的物流能力，同时也希望利用我们的支付和身份基础模块，以提高他们自己网站上的订单转化率（因为 Prime 会员已经与亚马逊共享了这些支付和身份信息）。 几年前，我们推出了 Buy with Prime，以满足客户的这一需求。Prime 会员可以像在亚马逊上一样，在 DTC 网站上快速结账，并在购买 Buy with Prime 商品时享受 Prime 的快速配送服务，这使商家的订单转化率比默认体验提高了约 25%。
As our Stores business has grown substantially, and our supply chain become more complex, we’ve had to develop a slew of capabilities in order to offer customers unmatched selection, at low prices, and with very fast delivery times. We’ve become adept at getting products from other countries to the U.S., clearing customs, and then shipping to storage facilities. Because we don’t have enough space in our shipping fulfillment centers to store all the inventory needed to maintain our desired in-stock levels, we’ve built a set of lower-cost, upstream warehouses solely optimized for storage (without sophisticated end-user, pick, pack, and ship functions). Having these two pools of inventory has prompted us to build algorithms predicting when we’ll run out of inventory in our shipping fulfillment centers and automatically replenishing from these upstream warehouses. And, in the last few years, our scale and available alternatives have forced us to build our own last mile delivery capability (roughly the size of UPS) to affordably serve the number of consumers and sellers wanting to use Amazon.
随着我们的门店业务大幅增长，供应链也变得更加复杂，我们不得不开发大量能力，以便为客户提供无与伦比的选择、低廉的价格和极快的配送速度。我们已熟练掌握了将产品从其他国家运往美国、清关并运送至仓储设施的流程。由于我们的配送履约中心没有足够空间存放所有库存以维持理想的库存水平，我们建立了一系列成本较低的上游仓库，专门用于存储（不具备复杂的终端用户拣货、包装和配送功能）。拥有这两类库存促使我们开发算法，预测配送履约中心何时会缺货，并自动从这些上游仓库补货。此外，过去几年中，我们的规模和可用的替代方案迫使我们建立了自己的最后一公里配送能力（规模大致相当于 UPS），以经济高效地服务于希望使用亚马逊的众多消费者和卖家。
We’ve solved these customer needs by building additional fulfillment primitives that both serve Amazon consumers better and address external sellers’ increasingly complex ecommerce activities. For instance, for sellers needing help importing products, we offer a Global Mile service that leverages our expertise here. To ship inventory from the border (or anywhere domestically) to our storage facilities, we enable sellers to use either our first-party Amazon Freight service or third-party freight partners via our Partnered Carrier Program. To store more inventory at lower cost to ensure higher in-stock rates and shorter delivery times, we’ve opened our upstream Amazon Warehousing and Distribution facilities to sellers (along with automated replenishment to our shipping fulfillment centers when needed). For those wanting to manage their own shipping, we’ve started allowing customers to use our last mile delivery network to deliver packages to their end-customers in a service called Amazon Shipping. And, for sellers who wish to use our fulfillment network as a central place to store inventory and ship items to customers regardless of where they ordered, we have a Multi-Channel Fulfillment service. These are all primitives that we’ve exposed to sellers.
我们通过构建额外的履约基础设施，既更好地服务亚马逊消费者，也满足外部卖家日益复杂的电子商务活动，从而解决了这些客户需求。例如，对于需要帮助进口产品的卖家，我们提供了利用我们专业知识的 Global Mile 服务。为了将库存从边境（或国内任何地方）运送到我们的仓储设施，我们允许卖家通过我们的合作承运商计划，使用亚马逊自营货运服务或第三方货运合作伙伴。为了以更低成本存储更多库存，确保更高的库存率和更短的交货时间，我们向卖家开放了上游的亚马逊仓储和配送设施（并在需要时自动补货到我们的配送中心）。对于希望自行管理运输的客户，我们开始允许他们使用我们的末端配送网络，将包裹送达终端客户，这项服务称为 Amazon Shipping。 此外，对于希望使用我们的配送网络作为集中存储库存并向客户发货（无论客户从何处下单）的卖家，我们提供了多渠道配送服务。这些都是我们向卖家开放的基础服务。
Building in primitives meaningfully expands your degrees of freedom. You can keep your primitives to yourself and build compelling features and capabilities on top of them to allow your customers and business to reap the benefits of rapid innovation. You can offer primitives to external customers as paid services (as we have with AWS and our more recent logistics offerings). Or, you can compose these primitives into external, paid applications as we have with FBA, Buy with Prime, or Supply Chain by Amazon (a recently released logistics service that integrates several of our logistics primitives). But, you’ve got options. You’re only constrained by the primitives you’ve built and your imagination.
有意义地构建基础组件能够极大地拓展你的自由度。你可以将这些基础组件保留在内部，并在其基础上开发出引人注目的功能和能力，让你的客户和业务从快速创新中获益。你也可以将基础组件作为付费服务提供给外部客户（例如我们推出的 AWS 和近期的物流服务）。或者，你可以将这些基础组件组合成面向外部的付费应用程序，就像我们推出的 FBA、“Buy with Prime”或亚马逊供应链（最近发布的一项物流服务，整合了我们多个物流基础组件）。总之，你拥有多种选择，唯一的限制是你所构建的基础组件和你的想象力。
Take the new, same-day fulfillment facilities in our Stores business. They’re located in the largest metro areas around the U.S. (we currently have 58), house our top-moving 100,000 SKUs (but also cover millions of other SKUs that can be injected from nearby fulfillment centers into these same-day facilities), and streamline the time required to go from picking a customer’s order to being ready to ship to as little as 11 minutes. These facilities also constitute our lowest cost to serve in the network. The experience has been so positive for customers that we’re planning to double the number of these facilities.
以我们门店业务中新建的当日配送设施为例，它们位于美国各大都市区（目前共有 58 个），存放着我们销量最高的 10 万个库存单位（SKU），同时还能从附近的配送中心调入数百万个其他 SKU 到这些当日配送设施中。这些设施将从拣选客户订单到准备发货的时间缩短至最快仅需 11 分钟。此外，这些设施也是我们网络中服务成本最低的部分。由于客户体验非常积极，我们计划将这些设施的数量增加一倍。
But, how else might we use this capability if we think of it as a core building block? We have a very large and growing grocery business in organic grocery (with Whole Foods Market) and non-perishable goods (e.g. consumables, canned goods, health and beauty products, etc.). We’ve been working hard on building a mass, physical store offering (Amazon Fresh) that offers a great perishable experience; however, what if we used our same-day facilities to enable customers to easily add milk, eggs, or other perishable items to any Amazon order and get same day? It might change how people think of splitting up their weekly grocery shopping, and make perishable shopping as convenient as non-perishable shopping already is.
但是，如果我们将这种能力视为一个核心基础模块，我们还能如何利用它呢？我们在有机食品杂货（通过 Whole Foods Market）和非易腐商品（例如日用品、罐头食品、健康和美容产品等）领域拥有规模庞大且不断增长的业务。我们一直在努力打造大规模的实体店（Amazon Fresh），提供出色的生鲜购物体验；然而，如果我们利用当天配送设施，让顾客能够轻松地在任何亚马逊订单中添加牛奶、鸡蛋或其他易腐商品，并实现当天送达，会怎样呢？这可能会改变人们对每周杂货购物分配方式的看法，使购买易腐商品变得像购买非易腐商品一样方便。
Or, take a service that some people have questioned, but that’s making substantial progress and we think of as a very valuable future primitive capability—our delivery drones (called Prime Air). Drones will eventually allow us to deliver packages to customers in less than an hour. It won’t start off being available for all sizes of packages and in all locations, but we believe it’ll be pervasive over time. Think about how the experience of ordering perishable items changes with sub-one-hour delivery?
或者，以一项曾被一些人质疑但正取得重大进展、并被我们视为极具价值的未来基础能力的服务为例——我们的无人机送货服务（称为 Prime Air）。无人机最终将使我们能够在不到一小时内将包裹送达客户手中。虽然最初并非所有尺寸的包裹和所有地点都能享受此服务，但我们相信随着时间推移，它将变得普及。试想一下，不到一小时的送货速度将如何改变订购易腐商品的体验？
The same is true for Amazon Pharmacy. Need throat lozenges, Advil, an antibiotic, or some other medication? Same-day facilities already deliver many of these items within hours, and that will only get shorter as we launch Prime Air more expansively. Highly flexible building blocks can be composed across businesses and in new combinations that change what’s possible for customers.
亚马逊药房也是如此。需要喉糖、布洛芬、抗生素或其他药物吗？当天送达服务已经能在数小时内配送许多此类商品，随着我们更广泛地推出 Prime Air，这一时间还会进一步缩短。高度灵活的基础模块可以跨业务组合，并以新的方式组合，改变客户的可能性。
Being intentional about building primitives requires patience. Releasing the first couple primitive services can sometimes feel random to customers (or the public at large) before we’ve unveiled how these building blocks come together. I’ve mentioned AWS and S3 as an example, but our Health offering is another. In the last 10 years, we’ve tried several Health experiments across various teams—but they were not driven by our primitives approach. This changed in 2022 when we applied our primitives thinking to the enormous global healthcare problem and opportunity. We’ve now created several important building blocks to help transform the customer health experience: Acute Care (via Amazon Clinic), Primary Care (via One Medical), and a Pharmacy service to buy whatever medication a patient may need. Because of our growing success, Amazon customers are now asking us to help them with all kinds of wellness and nutrition opportunities—which can be partially unlocked with some of our existing grocery building blocks, including Whole Foods Market or Amazon Fresh.
有意识地构建基础模块需要耐心。在我们尚未展示这些基础模块如何组合之前，向客户（或广大公众）发布最初几个基础服务，有时可能会显得随意。我之前提到过 AWS 和 S3 作为例子，但我们的健康服务也是如此。在过去 10 年里，我们在不同团队中尝试了几次健康领域的实验，但这些尝试并未遵循我们的基础模块方法。这种情况在 2022 年发生了改变，我们将基础模块思维应用于全球医疗保健领域的巨大问题和机遇。现在，我们已经创建了几个重要的基础模块，以帮助改善客户的健康体验：急性护理（通过 Amazon Clinic）、初级护理（通过 One Medical）以及药房服务，以便患者购买所需的任何药物。由于我们日益增长的成功，亚马逊的客户现在要求我们帮助他们探索各种健康和营养方面的机会，而这些机会可以部分通过我们现有的一些食品杂货基础模块来实现，包括 Whole Foods Market 或 Amazon Fresh。
就是最早的面向对象技术。
4、《2024-12-12 Satya Nadella.Microsoft CEO On The Future of AI & Technology》
Bill Gurley:
Satya, on the enterprise side, obviously the coding space is off into the races and you guys are doing well and there's a lot of venture-backed players there.
比尔·古利：
萨提亚，在企业领域，显然代码开发领域已经进入了竞争，你们做得很好，而且有很多风险投资支持的参与者。
On some of the productivity apps, I have a question about the co-pilot approach and I guess Mark Benioff's been kind of obnoxiously critical on this front and called it Clippy 2 or whatever.
关于一些生产力应用，我有一个关于协同工具（Co-pilot）方法的问题，我猜马克·贝尼奥夫在这方面颇为挑剔，甚至称其为“Clippy 2”之类的东西。
Do you worry that someone might think kind of first principles AI from ground up and that some of the infrastructure, say in an Excel spreadsheet, isn't necessary to know if you did an AI first product?
你是否担心，有人可能会从基础原理的角度重新思考AI，从零开始开发AI第一的产品，并认为某些基础设施，比如Excel表格中的一些功能，并不是必须了解的？
And the same thing, by the way, could be said about the CRM, right? There's a bunch of fields and tasks that may be able to be obfuscated for the user.
顺便说一下，同样的事情也适用于CRM，对吧？有一堆字段和任务可能可以为用户隐去。
Satya Nadella:
Yeah, I mean, it's a very, very, very important question. The SaaS applications or biz apps, so let me just speak of our own dynamics thing.
萨提亚·纳德拉：
是的，我的意思是，这是一个非常非常重要的问题。关于SaaS应用程序或业务应用程序，让我先谈谈我们自己的Dynamics业务。
The approach at least we're taking is, I think the notion that business applications exist That's probably where they'll all collapse, right, in the agent era.
至少我们采取的方法是，我认为商业应用程序存在的这个概念可能会在代理时代全面崩塌，对吧？
Because if you think about it, right, they are essentially CRUD databases with a bunch of business logic. The business logic is all going to these agents. And these agents are going to be multi-repo CRUD, right?
因为如果你仔细想，这些商业应用程序本质上是带有一堆业务逻辑的CRUD数据库。这些业务逻辑都将转移到这些代理中。而这些代理将是多库CRUD，对吧？
So they're not going to discriminate between what the backend is. They're going to update multiple databases and all the logic will be in the AI tier, so to speak.
所以它们不会区分后端是什么。它们将更新多个数据库，所有逻辑都会位于AI层。
And once the AI tier becomes the place where all the logic is, Then people will start replacing the backends.
一旦AI层成为所有逻辑所在的地方，人们就会开始替换后端。
In fact, it's interesting. As we speak, I think we are seeing pretty high rates of wins on Dynamics backends and the agent use.
事实上，这很有趣。正如我们现在讨论的那样，我认为我们在Dynamics的后端和代理使用上取得了很高的成功率。
We are going to go pretty aggressively and try and collapse it all, whether it's in customer service, whether it is in, by the way, the other fascinating thing that's increasing is just not CRM,
我们将采取非常积极的行动，尝试将所有内容整合在一起，无论是客户服务还是其他方面。顺便说一下，另一个非常有趣且正在增长的领域不仅是CRM，
but even what we call finance and operations. Because people want more AI native biz apps, right? That means the logic tier can be orchestrated by AI and AI agents.
还包括我们所说的财务和运营。因为人们想要更多原生的AI业务应用程序，对吧？这意味着逻辑层可以由AI和AI代理来协调。
So in other words, copilot to agent to my business application should be very seamless.
换句话说，从协同工具（copilot）到代理，再到我的业务应用程序应该是非常无缝的。
Now, in the same way, and you could even say, hey, Why do I need Excel?
同样，你甚至可以问，嘿，我为什么需要Excel？
Like interestingly enough, one of the most exciting things for me is Excel with Python is like GitHub with Copilot, right? That's essential.
有趣的是，对我来说最令人兴奋的事情之一是Excel与Python的结合就像GitHub与Copilot的结合，对吧？这非常重要。
So what we have done is when you have Excel, like this, by the way, it would be fun for you guys, right?
所以我们所做的事情是，当你拥有Excel时，比如这样，顺便说一句，这对你们来说会很有趣，对吧？
Which is you should just bring up Excel, bring up Copilot and start playing with it because it's no longer like, oh, you know, it is like having a data analyst.
你应该打开Excel，启动Copilot并开始使用它，因为这已经不再像以前那样，而更像是拥有了一名数据分析师。
And so it's no longer just making sense of the numbers that you have. It will do the plan for you, right?
所以这不仅仅是理解你拥有的数据。它还会为你制定计划，对吧？
It will literally like how GitHub Copilot Workspace creates the plan and then it executes the plan.
它实际上就像GitHub Copilot Workspace那样创建计划，然后执行计划。
This is like a data analyst who is using Excel as a sort of row column visualization to do analysis scratchpad. So it's kind of tools you.
这就像一位数据分析师在使用Excel作为一种行列可视化工具来进行分析。这实际上就是在工具化你。
So the co-pilot is using Excel as a tool with all of its action space because it can generate and it has Python interpreter. That is, in fact, a great way to reconceptualize Excel.
因此，协同工具将Excel作为一种具有完整行动空间的工具，因为它可以生成内容并且内置Python解释器。这实际上是重新定义Excel的一个很好的方式。
At some point, you could say, hey, I'll generate all of Excel. That is also true. After all, there's a code interpreter. Therefore, you can generate anything. Yes, I think there will be disruption.
从某种程度上来说，你可以说，嘿，我会生成整个Excel。这也是对的。毕竟，它有一个代码解释器。因此，你可以生成任何东西。是的，我认为会有颠覆性变革。
The way we are approaching at least our M365 stuff is one is build copilot as that organizing layer, UI for AI. Get all agents, including our own agents.
至少在我们的M365方面，我们的方法是首先将协同工具构建为组织层，即AI的用户界面。将所有代理，包括我们自己的代理，整合起来。
You can say the Excel is an agent through my co-pilot. Word is an agent.
你可以说，通过协同工具，Excel是一个代理，Word是一个代理。
It's kind of specialized canvases, which is I'm doing a legal document. Let me take it into Pages and then to Word and then have the co-pilot go with it.
它就像是一种专用的画布。比如，我正在处理一份法律文档，我会将它放到Pages中，然后转到Word中，并让协同工具跟随完成任务。
Go into Excel and have the co-pilot go with it. And so that's sort of a new way to think about the work and workflow.
进入Excel并让协同工具完成工作。所以，这是思考工作和工作流的一种全新方式。
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