I.H.59.Warren Buffett.Floats
Refer To：《Flirting with Floats》。
Posted on July 9, 2012 by fundooprofessor
There is a company which has the world’s strangest bond outstanding. Strange, because this bond has no maturity date. Stranger, because the bond issuer pays no interest on it. Strangest, because year after year, the issuer gets paid to have this bond on its balance sheet.
有一家公司拥有世界上最奇怪的未偿还债券。奇怪，是因为这种债券没有到期日。更奇怪，因为债券发行人不支付利息。最奇怪的是，年复一年，债券发行人都能拿到钱，让这笔债券出现在资产负债表上。
What better source of financing is there than one in which neither do you have to return the borrowed money, nor are you charged any interest to use it? In fact, you are paid to use it!
还有什么比既不用归还借来的钱，又不收取任何利息的融资渠道更好的呢？事实上，使用这些资金是有偿的！
This is not a small bond issue in some obscure little country. As of end December 2011, this bond had a book value of about $71 billion and the issuer is an American company having a current market cap of $205 billion.
这可不是在某个不起眼的小国家发行的小债券。截至 2011 年 12 月底，这笔债券的账面价值约为 710 亿美元，发行人是一家美国公司，目前市值为 2 050 亿美元。
I am, of course, referring to the “float” enjoyed by the insurance businesses of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. “Float” in the insurance business, says Buffett, “arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.”
当然，我指的是沃伦-巴菲特（Warren Buffett）的伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）的保险业务所享有的 "浮动"。巴菲特说，保险业务中的 "浮动"，"产生的原因是大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，保险公司通常需要时间来听取和解决损失索赔"。
This float, which has grown from $17 million in 1967 to an astounding $71 billion by the end of 2011, is a key reason behind Warren Buffett’s fame and fortune.
这笔资金从 1967 年的 1,700 万美元增长到 2011 年底的 710 亿美元，这也是巴菲特名利双收的重要原因。
OPM: As Addictive As Opium（像鸦片一样令人上瘾）
Float, as he explains is “money we hold but don’t own,” which, by the way, is how one would describe “other people’s money” or “OPM”, of which debt is the most common form.
他解释说，"浮动 "是 "我们持有但并不拥有的钱"，顺便说一下，这就是人们对 "别人的钱 "或 "OPM "的描述，其中债务是最常见的形式。
The problem with plain-vanilla debt, however, is that its quite onerous for borrowers. When you borrow money conventionally you have to: (1) pay back the loan by some definite date; (2) pay the lender interest on the money borrowed over the course of the loan period; and (3) put up adequate collateral until full repayment of loan has been made. How very onerous!
然而，普通债务的问题在于，它对借款人的要求相当苛刻。按照传统借贷方式，你必须(1) 在某个确定的日期之前偿还贷款；(2) 在贷款期间向贷款人支付借款利息；(3) 在全额偿还贷款之前提供足够的抵押品。多么繁琐啊！
Over the last 45 years, Berkshire’s insurance float enabled the company to effectively borrow huge amounts of cash, with no set repayment date, and with no tangible collateral put up. Even more astonishing is the fact that this money cost Berkshire less than nothing.
在过去的 45 年里，伯克希尔公司的保险浮存金使得该公司能够有效地借入巨额现金，没有固定的还款日期，也没有有形的抵押品。更令人吃惊的是，这笔钱让伯克希尔公司几乎不花一分钱。
How did this happen? 怎么会这样？
For a typical insurer, the premiums it takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss” – the cost of float – which is the functional equivalent of interest on conventional debt. An insurance business is profitable over time if the cost of its float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to borrow funds. The business will have a negative value if the cost of its float turns out to be higher than market rates for money.
对于一家典型的保险公司来说，它所收取的保费不足以弥补它必须支付的损失和费用。这就造成了 "承保亏损"，即浮动成本，在功能上相当于传统债务的利息。如果浮动成本低于公司借贷资金所需的成本，那么保险业务就会长期盈利。如果浮动成本高于市场货币利率，则保险业务的价值为负。
For Berkshire, the cost of its float, over the long term, has been less than zero. The net result of all this is that Berkshire has not only been able to borrow funds at a cost which is less than that of the U.S Treasury, it has been been paid to borrow that money.
对伯克希尔公司而言，其长期浮动成本一直低于零。所有这一切的最终结果是，伯克希尔不仅能够以低于美国财政部的成本借入资金，而且还获得了借入资金的报酬。
It’s already well-known that the value of this large float with a negative cost has been huge for Berkshire’s owners. After all, access to tens of billions of dollars of less-than-free capital in the hands of one of the world’s greatest allocators-of-capital, has to be winning combination, isn’t it?
众所周知，对于伯克希尔的所有者来说，这种负成本的巨额浮动收益价值巨大。毕竟，世界上最伟大的资本配置者之一掌握着数百亿美元的不那么自由的资本，这一定是一个成功的组合，不是吗？
However, no matter how good an allocator-of-capital Warren Buffett is, that has little to do with the value of Berkshire’s insurance float to its owners. That’s because of a principle of finance (MM on Capital Structure) according to which the value of a firm’s assets have little to do with how they are financed. So, we mustn’t let Buffett’s brilliant track record in capital allocation influence us on how we should think about Berkshire’s insurance float. But we do need to understand just how does that float create value for Berkshire’s owners. That’s because, once we have understood how to evaluate Berkshire’s float, we will use that knowledge to understand other types of floats in a variety of business models.
然而，无论沃伦-巴菲特是多么优秀的资本分配者，这与伯克希尔公司的保险浮存金对其所有者的价值关系不大。这是因为根据金融学原理（《资本结构》），公司资产的价值与融资方式关系不大。因此，我们不能因为巴菲特在资本配置方面的辉煌业绩而影响我们对伯克希尔保险浮动收益的看法。但我们确实需要了解，浮动资金是如何为伯克希尔的所有者创造价值的。这是因为，一旦我们了解了如何评估伯克希尔的浮存金，我们就会利用这些知识来了解各种商业模式中的其他类型浮存金。
Berkshire’s cost-less float can be best understood by comparing it with other forms of financing. When compared with plain-vanilla debt, it is obvious that borrowed funds which cost money, require posting of collateral, and which have to be repaid by a definite date are vastly inferior to Berkshire’s float which suffer from none of these disadvantages.
将伯克希尔公司的无成本浮动利率与其他融资形式进行比较，可以最好地理解它。与普通债务相比，借贷资金显然要花费资金、需要抵押、必须在确定的日期前偿还，而伯克希尔的浮动资金则没有这些缺点，因此要逊色得多。
Warren Buffett on Insurance Floats 沃伦-巴菲特谈保险浮动
It’s when we compare Berkshire’s insurance float with equity, things gets really interesting. Buffett explained this point in his 1995 letter:
当我们将伯克希尔公司的保险浮存金与股票进行比较时，事情就变得非常有趣了。巴菲特在 1995 年的信中解释了这一点：
“Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years, it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true equity in that it doesn’t belong to us. Nevertheless, let’s assume that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of 1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during 1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net result – more shares, equal assets and lower earnings – would have materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand why float wonderfully benefits a business – if it is obtained at a low cost.”
"由于多年来这些保险浮存金几乎没有成本，所以它们实际上等同于股本，当然不同于真正的股本，这些资金并不真正属于我们。尽管如此，假设在1994年我们持有的不是34亿美元的浮存金，而是34亿美元的股本的话，在这种情况下，我们拥有的总资产并不会增加，但我们的收益却可能下滑很多，因为去年浮存金的成本是负的，也就是说浮存金产生了额外的贡献。当然，资本的增加代表着伯克希尔必须额外再发行许多新股，所以，更多的股份代表着更低的资本收益率，等于大大降低了我们股票的价值，所以大家应该理解，为什么浮存金对于保险公司如此的重要，尤其是当它们取得的成本极低之时。"。
He explained it again in his 1997 letter:
他在 1997 年的信中再次解释了这一点：
“Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had.”
"自 1967 年进入保险业以来，我们的浮存金年均复合增长率达到 21.7%。更妙的是，它不仅没有给我们带来任何损失，实际上还为我们赚了钱。这就是会计上的一个讽刺：虽然我们的浮存金在资产负债表上显示为负债，但它对伯克希尔公司的价值却超过了同等数额的净资产"。
And again in his 2007 letter:
在 2007 年的信中也是如此：
“Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average break-even results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.”
"保险浮存金--我们在保险业务中暂时持有的不属于我们的资金--为我们 590 亿美元的投资提供资金。只要保险承保实现收支平衡，即我们收到的保费等于我们的损失和支出，这笔浮存金就是 "免费 "的。当然，保险承保是不稳定的，在盈利和亏损之间摇摆不定。不过，在我们的整个历史中，我们一直是盈利的，而且我预计我们未来的平均业绩将达到或超过收支平衡。如果我们做到了这一点，我们的投资就可以被看作是伯克希尔股东的一个无担保的价值来源。
And finally in his 2011 letter:
最后，在他 2011 年的信中
“So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.”
"那么，这种诱人的浮存金如何影响内在价值的计算呢？在计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的浮存金被作为负债全额扣除，就好像我们明天就必须支付浮存金，而且无法补充一样。但这是看待浮存金的错误方式，浮存金应该被视为一种循环基金。如果浮存金既无成本又长期存在，那么这项负债的真实价值就会远远低于会计负债"。
General Principles 一般原则
The lessons in these four excerpts from Buffett’s letters are just about all we need to know to evaluate not just quality of Berkshire’s float, but that of just about any other float. Here, then, are a few general principles:
从巴菲特的这四封书信摘录中，我们不仅可以了解到伯克希尔浮存金的质量，还可以了解到其他任何浮存金的质量。下面是一些一般原则：
1.Floats are wonderful if they cost less than nothing. They are also wonderful if they are free;
1.如果浮存金的费用低于零，那就太好了。如果是免费的，那也很好；
2.Perpetual floats are better than non-perpetual ones;
2.永久浮存金比非永久浮存金好；
3.Funds provided by free, or less-than-free floats, are more attractive than those raised through conventional debt or even equity; and
与通过传统债务甚至股票筹集的资金相比，通过免费或低于免费的浮存金提供的资金更具吸引力；以及
4.The true value of a liability represented by an attractive float is far lower than its accounting value.
4.有吸引力的浮动负债所代表的负债真实价值远远低于其会计价值。
Invert, Always Invert 反转，始终反转
One way to see how the true value of an attractive float is far lower than its accounting value is to use the “inversion” trick often used by Charlie Munger by looking at the problem from the float provider’s viewpoint.
要想知道有吸引力的浮存金的真实价值如何远远低于其会计价值，一种方法是使用查理-芒格（Charlie Munger）经常使用的 "反转 "技巧，从浮存金提供者的角度看问题。
Imagine that you subscribe to a bond issued by a company at Rs 100. Imagine further that this bond carries no interest, and has no definite repayment date. For the moment, suspend your disbelief and ignore the question “Why the hell would I ever buy subscribe to such bond?” Just assume that you did.
假设你以 100 卢比认购了一家公司发行的债券。再想象一下，这种债券没有利息，也没有明确的偿还日期。请暂时放下你的怀疑，忽略 "我为什么要购买认购这种债券？就假设你买了。
How would you value this “perpetual, zero coupon bond?” What price would any rational person pay you for your bond? Almost nothing, isn’t it?
你会如何估价这张 "永久零息债券"？任何理性的人会为你的债券付多少钱？几乎没有，不是吗？
Now let’s invert the situation again and at look at this example from the viewpoint of the bond’s issuer. The bond appears as a liability on the issuer’s balance sheet at Rs 100. Now, if the corresponding asset on your balance sheet is almost worthless, should not the true value of this liability also be almost worthless from the issuer’s viewpoint? Of course it should!
现在让我们再次反过来，从债券发行人的角度来看这个例子。在发行人的资产负债表中，债券作为负债出现，价值为 100 卢比。现在，如果你的资产负债表上相应的资产几乎一文不值，那么从发行者的角度来看，这笔负债的真实价值是不是也应该几乎一文不值呢？当然应该！
Now let’s add a twist. Imagine that for some reason the company must pay back Rs 100 it owes you, but that it can find someone else to give money to it on identical terms so that even if you get paid, the company’s overall liability on account of the float remains unchanged. In effect, the company gets to use OPM to retire a liability represented by OPM. Even if some of the older providers of OPM have to be made whole, they are paid through refinancing on identical terms by newer providers of OPM. If this sounds like a ponzi scheme (without its derogatory connotation), then you’re right on spot!
现在让我们来增加一个转折点。想象一下，出于某种原因，公司必须偿还欠你的 100 卢比，但它可以找到其他人以相同的条件给它钱，这样，即使你得到了钱，公司在浮存金方面的总体负债也不会改变。实际上，公司可以利用 OPM 来清偿 OPM 所代表的债务。即使一些较老的 OPM 提供者必须得到补偿，他们也可以通过较新的 OPM 提供者以相同条件进行再融资而得到补偿。如果这听起来像庞氏骗局（没有贬义），那你就说对了！
A Revolving Fund 循环基金
That’s precisely what Buffett meant when he wrote the above-mentioned extract in his 2011 letter, which I am reproducing here with emphasis on key words:
这正是巴菲特在 2011 年的信中写下上述摘录的意思，我在此转载时强调了关键词：
“Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.”
"在计算伯克希尔公司的账面价值时，我们的浮存金作为负债被全额扣除，就好像我们明天必须支付浮存金而又无法补充一样。但这是一种错误的观点，浮存金应该被视为一种循环基金。如果浮存金既无成本又长期存在，那么这项负债的真实价值就会远远低于会计负债"。
Unencumbered Source of Value 未支配价值来源
So long as one is certain that the size of a free float will not diminish over time because it resembles a “revolving fund,” one should value such a book liability at virtually nothing. And when that happens, then assets financed by such a float become “unencumbered.” This is what Buffett meant in his above-mentioned 2007 quote which I reproduce again with emphasis on key words:
只要我们确信浮存金的规模不会因其类似于 "循环基金 "而随着时间的推移而减少，我们就应该对这种账面负债进行估值，使其几乎不值一提。当这种情况发生时，由这种浮动负债融资的资产就变成了 "无担保 "资产。这就是巴菲特在 2007 年引用的那段话中的意思，我再次引用这段话，并强调其中的关键词：
“Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average break-even results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.”
"保险浮存金--我们在保险业务中暂时持有的不属于我们的资金--为我们 590 亿美元的投资提供资金。只要保险承保实现收支平衡，即我们收到的保费等于我们的损失和支出，这笔浮存金就是 "免费 "的。当然，保险承保是不稳定的，在盈利和亏损之间摇摆不定。不过，在我们的整个历史中，我们一直是盈利的，而且我预计我们未来的平均业绩将达到或超过收支平衡。如果我们做到了这一点，我们的投资就可以被看作是伯克希尔股东的一个无担保的价值来源。
This insight – as to how do assets, when financed with cost-less floats become unencumbered, will be instrumental in our understanding the role of floats in evaluating the economics of businesses outside of the insurance industry.
这种洞察力--即资产在使用无成本浮存金融资时如何成为无担保资产--将有助于我们理解浮存金在评估保险业以外企业的经济性方面所起的作用。
While cheaper-than-free float provided by astute insurance underwriting is the kind of float Buffett loves the most, there are other floats he has “flirted” with during the course of his long career.
虽然巴菲特最喜欢的是精明的保险承保所提供的比免费还便宜的浮存金，但在他漫长的职业生涯中，他还 "调戏 "过其他浮动收益。
Perhaps it started with American Express.
也许这要从美国运通说起。
The American Express “Don’t Leave Home Without Them” Float Story 美国运通 "不带它们就别出门 "浮存金故事
Between 1964 and 1966, Warren Buffett bet 40% of his partnership’s capital on American Express’ (Amex) stock, which had been battered down by the company’s involvement in the then infamous Salad Oil Scandal. Buffett’s investment of $13 million gave his partnership a 5% stake in the company, implying a total market cap of about $260 million at that time.
1964 年至 1966 年间，沃伦-巴菲特将其合伙公司 40% 的资金押在了美国运通（Amex）的股票上，该公司因卷入当时臭名昭著的色拉油丑闻而股价暴跌。巴菲特投资的 1300 万美元使他的合伙企业持有该公司 5%的股份，这意味着当时该公司的总市值约为 2.6 亿美元。
I searched for and found out Amex’s annual report for 1964. I urge you to read it. Apart from the fact that both its main businesses (travelers’ checks and credit cards) were doing extremely well, you will notice three additional points by studying its balance sheet on page 27: (1) The presence of $263 million of cash; (2) absence of interest-bearing debt; and (3) Travelers’ checks outstanding totaling to $525 million (a liability).
我搜索并找到了运通 1964 年的年度报告。我建议您读一读。除了它的两项主营业务（旅行支票和信用卡）都做得非常好之外，通过研究第 27 页的资产负债表，你还会注意到另外三点：（1）有 2.63 亿美元的现金；（2）没有有息债务；（3）未兑现的旅行支票总额达 5.25 亿美元（负债）。
Those $525 million travelers’ checks represent float. People pay for travelers’ checks upfront and cash them later. The lag between purchase and their subsequent cashing may last a few days or even a few years (and sometimes they never get cashed). In the meantime, Amex gets to use the float for its business – free funds which otherwise it would have had to pay for.
这 5.25 亿美元的旅行支票是浮存金。人们先付款购买旅行支票，然后再兑现。从购买到兑现之间的时间差可能会持续几天甚至几年（有时甚至从未兑现）。在此期间，美国运通可以利用这些浮存金开展业务--如果没有这些浮动资金，美国运通就必须支付成本。
Even though the Salad Oil Scandal had decimated the company’s stock price, as it did not have any interest-bearing debt, and had substantial cash to pay for the losses arising out of the scandal, all that Buffett needed to examine was the probability of it’s float disappearing. That, of course, would have happened only if the millions of holders of Amex’s travelers’ checks lost the trust behind the “American Express” brand.
尽管 "色拉油丑闻 "使该公司的股价一落千丈，但由于该公司没有任何有息债务，而且拥有大量现金来支付丑闻造成的损失，巴菲特需要研究的只是该公司的浮存金消失的可能性。当然，这只有在数百万运通旅行支票持有者失去对 "美国运通 "品牌的信任时才会发生。
In Buffett’s biography, “Snowball,” the author, Alice Schroeder, writes:
在巴菲特的传记《雪球》中，作者爱丽丝-施罗德写道：
“The company’s value was its brand name. American Express sold trust. Had the taint to its reputation so leaked into customers’ consciousness that they no longer trusted the name? Buffett started dropping in on Omaha restaurants and visiting places that took American Express cards and Travelers Cheques. He put Henry Brandt on the case. Brandt scouted Travelers Cheque users, bank tellers, bank officers, restaurants, hotels, and credit-card holders to gauge how American Express was doing versus its competitors, and whether use of American Express Travelers Cheques and cards had dropped off. Back came the usual foot-high stack of material. Buffett’s verdict after sorting through it was that customers were still happy to be associated with the name American Express. The tarnish on Wall Street had not spread to Main Street.”
"公司的价值在于它的品牌。美国运通卖的是信任。美国运通的声誉是否已经受到损害，以至于客户不再信任这个名字？巴菲特开始走访奥马哈的餐馆，参观那些使用美国运通卡和旅行支票的地方。他让亨利-勃兰特负责这个案子。勃兰特对旅行支票用户、银行出纳员、银行职员、餐馆、酒店和信用卡持有者进行了调查，以了解美国运通与其竞争对手的对比情况，以及美国运通旅行支票和旅行卡的使用量是否有所下降。巴菲特照例带回了一英尺高的一叠材料。巴菲特整理后得出的结论是，客户仍然乐于与美国运通这个名字联系在一起。华尔街的污点并没有蔓延到大街小巷"。
Despite the scandal, Buffett had figured out that Amex’s float was not going away. Without mentioning the investment, he hinted to his partners what he had done, by writing:
尽管丑闻缠身，但巴菲特已经意识到运通的浮存金不会消失。他没有提及这笔投资，而是在信中向他的合伙人暗示了他所做的一切：
“We might invest up to forty percent of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and our reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment.”
"在我们的事实和推理正确的可能性极高，而任何事情都可能极大地改变投资的基本价值的可能性极低的条件下，我们可能将我们净资产的百分之四十投资于单一证券"。
I would speculate that if, instead of $525 million of cost-less float given to Amex by millions of its customers, American Express had $525 million of bank debt, Buffett would have stayed away from the stock. Bankers, he would have reasoned, could have easily recalled their loans from the scandal-ridden company resulting in a death spiral. But all of the customers holding travelers’ checks wouldn’t line up outside the company’s offices to cash them all. For them, the scandal was a non-event.
我推测，如果美国运通拥有的不是数百万客户给予运通的 5.25 亿美元无成本浮存金，而是 5.25 亿美元的银行债务，巴菲特就会远离这只股票。他的理由是，银行家们可以轻而易举地从这家丑闻缠身的公司收回贷款，从而导致公司陷入死亡漩涡。但是，所有持有旅行支票的客户都不会在公司办公室外排队，将支票全部兑现。对他们来说，丑闻根本不算什么。
Buffett was right. Amex’s stock price trebled within the next two years as Wall Street slowly figured out what Buffett already had.
巴菲特是对的。随着华尔街慢慢发现巴菲特已经拥有的东西，运通的股价在接下来的两年里翻了三倍。
There is an important lesson about floats from the examples of Blue Chip Stamps and Amex: Float provided by millions of small customers can be quite enduring.
从蓝筹印花公司和运通银行的例子中，我们可以学到关于浮存金的重要一课：由数以百万计的小客户提供的浮存金是相当持久的。
Amex’s float is similar to that enjoyed by banks on funds of customers they get to keep for free. Bankers are known to fight each other over floats represented by “non interest bearing current accounts” of large corporate customers. Free money, even for just a few days is worth fighting for, isn’t it? And then, of course, there is the case of very large sums of unclaimed deposits lying with India’s public sector banks. That’s float too.
美国运通的浮存金与银行免费保留客户资金的收益类似。众所周知，银行家们为了争夺大公司客户的 "无息活期账户 "所代表的浮存金而互相争斗。免费的钱，哪怕只有几天，也值得争夺，不是吗？当然，还有印度公共部门银行的巨额存款无人认领的情况。这也是浮存金。
What’s fascinating is how Amex’s float on travelers’s checks – something that attracted Buffett to the stock- became almost inconsequential over time, even though its dollar amount soared. As of the end of 1964, Amex had a total of about $525 million worth of Travelers’ checks outstanding, or 445% of its $118 million revenue for that year. That’s a big number. By the end of 2011, the company’s revenues had soared to $25 billion, while total travelers’ checks outstanding as of that year’s close were $5 billion, or just 20% of revenues. Paradoxically, the company’s credit and charge card businesses overtook the traveler’s checks business, which is now in terminal decline. Even so, Amex marched on and its the tag line for its travelers’ checks commercials (“Don’t leave home without them”) was altered to suit the commercials for its charge card. The new tag line became: “Don’t leave home without it.”
吸引巴菲特的是，随着时间的推移，运通在旅行支票上的浮存金几乎变得无足轻重，尽管其金额在不断飙升。截至 1964 年底，运通公司的未兑现旅行支票总价值约为 5.25 亿美元，占其当年 1.18 亿美元收入的 445%。这是一个不小的数字。到 2011 年底，该公司的收入已飙升至 250 亿美元，而截至当年年底，旅行支票未兑现总额为 50 亿美元，仅占收入的 20%。矛盾的是，公司的信用卡和扣账卡业务超过了旅行支票业务，而后者目前正处于极度衰退之中。即便如此，运通仍在继续前进，其旅行支票广告的标语（"没有旅行支票就别出门"）也被改成了适合其扣账卡广告的标语，新的广告语变成了："没有它，别离开家"。
By 1968, Buffett sold out his 5% stake, which cost him $13 million for about $33 million. Many years later, he got back in the stock. By the end of 2004, Berkshire had bought a 10% stake costing it $1.4 billion. (That’s a good example of opportunity cost!).
到 1968 年，巴菲特以大约 3300 万美元的价格卖掉了他所持有的 5%的股份，花费了 1300 万美元。许多年后，他又买回了这只股票。到 2004 年底，伯克希尔买入了 10%的股份，花费 14 亿美元。(这就是机会成本的一个很好的例子！）。
The big problem for Buffett with Amex’s float was that he could only get a passive stake in it by buying his 5% stake. He could never control it.
对于巴菲特来说，运通银行的最大问题在于，他只能通过购买 5%的股份来被动地持有运通银行的股份，他永远无法控制美国运通。
All of that that changed when he, along with his friends bought Blue Chip Stamps.
当他和朋友们一起购买了蓝筹印花后，这一切都改变了。
The Blue Chip Stamps’ Float Story 蓝筹印花的浮存金故事
In her excellent book, “Damn Right!: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger,” the author, Janet Lowe, relates the 1967 story:
作者珍妮特-洛维在其出色的著作《Damn Right!: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger》。
“An early precursor to frequent flyer miles in the 1950s and 1960s, trading stamps, such as Green Stamps, Blue and Gold, and Blue Chip, were handed out as a customer incentive by merchants. Retailers deposited money at Blue Chip in return for their stamps, then the money was used to operate the stamp company and to purchase the merchandise handed out when stamps were redeemed. Shoppers were given a certain number of stamps for each dollar spent in a store, which they pasted into books, then redeemed for prizes such as toddler toys, toasters, mixing howls, watches, and other items. Because it took time to accumulate enough stamps to redeem merchandise-and because some customers tossed the stamps in the back of a drawer, forgot them, and never did redeem them-the float built up.”
"20世纪50年代和60年代，作为飞行里程的早期前身，交易印花，有绿色、蓝色和金色印花，以及蓝筹印花，这些都是商家给予顾客的激励，零售商在蓝筹印花存入资金换取印花，公司会运作这笔资金，用于购买人们集齐印花后来兑换的商品。消费者在店内每消费一美元都会得到相应数量的印花，他们把印花贴在本子里，集齐后去换些奖品，比如说玩具、烤面包机、搅拌碗、手表以及其他各色物品。顾客通常要花较长的时间，才能够集齐足够数量的印花来换取商品，而有些人就把印花随手丢在抽屉里遗忘，从来不去兑换，于是就会产生浮存金。"。
Lowe explains how Buffett ended up buying into Blue Chip:
Lowe 解释了巴菲特最终是如何买入蓝筹股的：
“Charlie and I talked a lot about investment ideas,” said Rick Guerin. “I’d react about Blue Chip Stamps in the newspaper, and I had an idea,” Charlie said, ‘I’ll take you to my friend who knows more about float than anyone.’” When Guerin was introduced to Warren Buffett, Rick realized, as he had when he first met Munger, that he was talking to someone exceptional. Rick was pleased when Buffett immediately saw the same potential value of Blue Chip’s float that he had seen. Just by investing the float alone, the company could amount to something. Buffett, Munger, and Guerin slowly began accumulating shares, with Buffett buying the stock both for his personal account and for the Buffett Partnership.”
"查理和我谈了很多关于投资的想法，"里克-杰林说。"查理说：'我带你去见我的朋友，他比任何人都了解浮存金。当 Guerin 被介绍给沃伦-巴菲特（Warren Buffett）时，里克意识到，就像他第一次见到芒格时一样，他正在与一位杰出人士交谈。令里克感到高兴的是，巴菲特立即看到了蓝筹印花浮存金的潜在价值，而他也看到了这一点。光是投资浮存金，这家公司就大有作为。巴菲特、芒格和格林慢慢开始积累股票，巴菲特为自己的个人账户和巴菲特合伙公司购买股票。
I couldn’t help but notice one of the comments in this video:
我不禁注意到这段视频中的一条评论：
“Thank you so much for posting this. My mother died about a year ago and in one of her cookie jars I found a stash of S&H green stamps. She never redeemed enough for so much as a plastic pitcher, but it was always fun saving them up. Ah, memories.”
"非常感谢你发布这个消息。我母亲大约一年前去世了，我在她的一个饼干罐里发现了一批 S&H 绿色邮票。她从来没有兑换过足够的邮票来买一个塑料水壶，但攒起来总是很有趣。啊，回忆"。
The green stamp capitalist would respond with nostalgia: “Ah, Float.”
绿色印花资本家会怀旧地回应："啊，浮存金"。
There’s a fascinating aspect to the Blue Chip story. The company, which was later merged into Berkshire, acquired See’s Candy for $25 million in 1972 at a time when See’s total capital employed was $8 million. Revenues for that year were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $ 5million. By 2007, as Buffett proudly noted in his letter for that year’s performance, See’s revenues had grown to $383 million, and pre-tax earnings were $82 million and yet the capital employed to run that business was just $40 million.
蓝筹印花公司的故事有一个引人入胜的方面。该公司后来并入伯克希尔公司，1972 年以 2,500 万美元的价格收购了 See's 糖果公司，当时 See's 公司的总资本为 800 万美元。当年的收入为 3,000 万美元，税前利润不到 500 万美元。到 2007 年，正如巴菲特在为当年业绩所写的信中自豪地指出的那样，See's 的收入已增长到 3.83 亿美元，税前利润为 8,200 万美元，而经营该业务所动用的资本仅为 4,000 万美元。
This means, wrote Buffett, “we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us.”
这意味着，巴菲特写道，"这意味着从1972年以来，我们只需再投资区区3200万美元，以适应业务的适度实际增长，和稍许过度的财务增长。同时税前收益总计是13.5亿美元，扣除3200万美元后，所有这些收益都流到伯克希尔(或早些年的蓝筹印花公司)。利润在缴纳公司税后，我们用余下的钱购买了其他有吸引力的公司。就像从亚当和夏娃最初喜好的活动，带来了60亿人一样，喜诗糖果开启了我们后来的许多滚滚而来的新财源。"。
Buffett used Blue’s Chip’s float to acquire See’s and See’s float (as I shall explain later) to buy more businesses. He discovered that an enduring but free float, is a financial fountain that keeps pouring out cash.
巴菲特利用蓝筹印花的浮存金收购了 See's，又利用 See's 的浮盈（我稍后会解释）收购了更多企业。他发现，一个持久但自由的浮存金，是一个不断涌出现金的金融喷泉。
But the really big (after insurance) attractive float that Buffett found, was given to him by the U.S. Treasury.
但是，巴菲特发现的真正大的（除保险之外的）有吸引力的浮存金，是美国财政部给他的。
The Deferred Taxes Float Story 递延税款浮动的故事
Berkshire owns marketable securities having market values far in excess of their acquisition prices. Taxes on gains realized on sale are payable only after the sale is made. If Buffett was to sell these securities, Berkshire would have to pay a very large tax bill. However, if he refuses to sell, and their market values continues to rise over time, then taxes not-due-but-which-would-have-been-due-if-he-had-sold-today would still need to be estimated and recorded as “deferred taxes” on Berkshire’s balance sheet. As of end 2011, these liability totaled to a staggering $ 38 billion.
伯克希尔公司拥有的有价证券的市场价值远远超过其收购价格。只有在出售后才需要缴纳出售利得税。如果巴菲特出售这些证券，伯克希尔公司将不得不支付一大笔税款。但是，如果他拒绝出售，而这些证券的市值随着时间的推移继续上升，那么仍需要估算未缴纳但如果他今天出售会缴纳的税款，并将其作为 "递延税款 "记入伯克希尔公司的资产负债表。截至 2011 年底，这些负债总额达到了惊人的 380 亿美元。
For Berkshire, this $38 billion is also a form of float – functional equivalent to an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury. Buffett explained this power of delayed taxes by giving a wonderful example in his 1989 letter:
对于伯克希尔公司来说，这 380 亿美元也是一种浮存金，其功能相当于从美国财政部获得的无息贷款。巴菲特在 1989 年的信中举了一个绝妙的例子来解释这种延迟纳税的力量：
“Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000. The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments.”
"设想伯克希尔公司只有 1 美元，我们把这 1 美元投入一种证券，这种证券到年底翻了一番，然后卖出。再设想一下，我们用税后收益在接下来的 19 年里每年重复这个过程，每次都能翻一番。在这 20 年结束时，我们将为每次出售的利润支付 34% 的资本利得税，政府将获得约 13,000 美元，我们将剩下约 25,250 美元。还不错。但是，如果我们进行了一次梦幻般的投资，而这项投资本身在 20 年中翻了 20 倍，那么我们的美元就会增长到 1,048,576 美元。如果我们将其套现，我们将支付大约 356,500 美元的 34% 税款，剩下大约 692,000 美元。造成这种惊人结果差异的唯一原因就是纳税的时间"。
Is this “float” which appears as a liability on Berkshire’s balance sheet really worth its value as calculated by accountants? No, it isn’t. Just as was the case with insurance float, where fair value of the liability was much lower than its book value, Buffett explained:
在伯克希尔公司的资产负债表上作为负债出现的 "浮存金"，其价值真的如会计师计算的那样吗？事实并非如此。巴菲特解释说，就像保险浮存金的情况一样，负债的公允价值远远低于其账面价值：
“We would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not – despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.
"如果我们按年终市值出售所有证券，我们将欠税 11 亿多美元。这 11 亿美元的负债与年末 15 天后应付给贸易债权人的 11 亿美元负债是否相等，甚至相似？显然不是--尽管这两个项目对经审计净资产的影响完全相同，都是减少 11 亿美元。
On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
另一方面，这种递延税款负债是否是一种毫无意义的会计虚构，因为只有在出售股票时才会触发其支付，而在很大程度上，我们并不打算出售这些股票？答案还是否定的。
In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election…”
从经济学角度看，这笔债务类似于美国财政部的一笔无息贷款，只有在我们选择时才会到期......"
To summarize, neither the insurance float, nor the float represented by deferred taxes on the liability side of Berkshire’s balance sheet are worth their book values. In his “Owner’s Manual” Buffett explains this again:
总而言之，无论是伯克希尔资产负债表负债端的保险浮存金，还是递延税款所代表的浮存金，都不值它们的账面价值。巴菲特在其《所有者手册》中再次解释了这一点：
“Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $100 billion.
"伯克希尔有两个低成本、无风险的杠杆来源，使我们能够安全地拥有远远超过仅靠股权资本所能拥有的资产：递延税款和 "浮存金"，即我们的保险业务在需要赔付损失之前收到保费而持有的他人资金。这两种资金来源都增长迅速，目前总额约为 1,000 亿美元。
Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt – an ability to have more assets working for us – but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.”
更妙的是，这笔资金迄今为止往往是无成本的。递延税款负债不产生利息。而且，只要我们的保险承保业务能够实现收支平衡，那么该业务所产生的浮存金成本就是零。当然，这两项都不是股本；这些都是实实在在的负债。但这些负债没有附带契约或到期日。实际上，它们给我们带来了债务的好处--能够有更多的资产为我们工作，但却没有任何债务的弊端"。
As of the end of 2011, Berkshire’s balance sheet carries assets having an aggregate book value of $392 billion. About $100 billion of these assets have been financed by the best form of OPM which either costs Berkshire nothing (deferred taxes), or it pays Berkshire for having it (insurance float)!
截至 2011 年底，伯克希尔资产负债表上的资产账面价值总计 3920 亿美元。这些资产中约有 1000 亿美元是通过最佳形式的 OPM 融资的，OPM 要么不会给伯克希尔带来任何损失（递延税款），要么会为拥有 OPM 向伯克希尔支付费用（保险浮存金）！
For me, it’s very instructive to observe how Buffett has flirted with various kinds of floats throughout his career. The seductive appeal of free (or less-than-free) money is all too alluring. He explained the logic in his 1995 letter:
对我来说，观察巴菲特在其职业生涯中如何与各种浮存金调情是非常有启发性的。免费（或不太免费）资金的诱惑力太诱人了。他在 1995 年的信中解释了其中的逻辑：
“Any company’s level of profitability is determined by three items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost; and (3) its utilization of “leverage” – that is, the degree to which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity. Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly – to a degree that is not generally well-understood – because our liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms.“
"任何公司的盈利水平都取决于三个方面：(1) 资产收益；(2) 负债成本；(3) "杠杆 "的使用，即资产由负债而非股本提供资金的程度。多年来，我们在第 1 点上做得很好，资产回报率很高。但我们也从中受益匪浅，因为我们的负债成本很低，这一点一般人还不太了解。成本低的一个重要原因是，我们以非常有利的条件获得了浮存金"。
Buffett hasn’t stopped looking for attractive floats. He once denounced derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction” but when he became aware that some of the esoteric derivative contracts could be a source of attractive float, he embraced them.
巴菲特一直在寻找有吸引力的浮存金。他曾一度斥责衍生品是 "大规模杀伤性金融武器"，但当他意识到一些深奥的衍生品合约可以成为有吸引力的浮存金来源时，他接受了它们。
The Derivatives Float Story 衍生产品浮存金的故事
In his 2008 letter, Buffett disclosed that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivative contracts consisting of equity puts, credit default swaps, and others. Describing these contracts, Buffett noted:
巴菲特在 2008 年的信中披露，伯克希尔是 251 份衍生品合约的一方，这些合约包括股票看跌期权、信用违约掉期等。巴菲特在描述这些合约时指出
“As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid – our derivatives “float,” so to speak – totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.”
"截至年底，向我们支付的款项减去我们已经支付的损失--可以说是我们的衍生品 "浮存金"--共计 81 亿美元。这种浮存金类似于保险浮存金：如果我们在相关交易中实现了收支平衡，我们将长期享受免费资金的使用。我们的预期是，我们的业绩将好于收支平衡，而我们从这些资金中获得的可观投资收益将是锦上添花，"。
Aha! We get to see the same combination we saw in Berkshire’s insurance float – an underwriting profit (implying less-than-free float), and freedom to invest that float in buying undervalued assets.
啊哈！我们看到了与伯克希尔保险浮存金相同的组合--承保利润（意味着浮存金不那么自由），以及将浮存金投资于购买低估资产的自由。
In his 2010 letter, Buffett again emphasized these points:
在 2010 年的信中，巴菲特再次强调了这些观点：
“The thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk.”
"我们在这些衍生品交易中使用的思维过程与我们在保险业务中使用的思维过程完全相同。您还应该明白，我们在签订合同时会预收款项，因此不存在交易对手风险"。
“In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float…”
"我们为这些合同总共收取了 34 亿美元的保费。我最初在 2007 年年度报告中向大家介绍这些合同时说，我预计这些合同将为我们带来 "承保利润"，这意味着我们的损失将低于我们收到的保费。此外，我还说我们将从浮存保费的使用中获益......"
“It appears almost certain that we will earn an underwriting profit as we originally anticipated. In addition, we have had the use of interest-free float that averaged about $2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago…”
"现在看来，我们几乎可以肯定，我们将按照最初的预期获得承保利润。此外，在合同有效期内，我们还使用了平均约 20 亿美元的无息浮动资金。总之，我们收取了适当的保费，这在三年前经营状况变得糟糕时保护了我们......"
“What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining “float” of $4.2 billion for an average of about 10 more years. (Neither this float nor that arising from the high-yield contracts is included in the insurance float figure of $66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.”
"可以肯定的是，我们将在平均约 10 年的时间里使用 42 亿美元的剩余 "浮存资金"（这笔浮存资金和高收益合同产生的浮存资金均未计入 660 亿美元的保险浮存资金）。(这部分浮存金和高收益合同产生的浮存金都不包括在 660 亿美元的保险浮存金中）。由于资金是可替代的，因此可以将这些资金的一部分用于收购 BNSF"。
Money is fungible, says Buffett. As I described in Part I, if Buffett can figure out a way to borrow money for free or even less than that, and if he can get to keep that money for a long long time without putting up collateral, then the fair value of those liabilities on Berkshire’s balance sheet are far below their book values. Under those conditions, as Buffett himself put it in his 2007 letter, “our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.”
巴菲特说，钱是可替代的。正如我在第一部分中所描述的，如果巴菲特能想出办法免费借到钱，甚至以更低的价格借到钱，如果他能在不提供抵押的情况下长期持有这些钱，那么伯克希尔资产负债表上这些负债的公允价值就会远远低于其账面价值。在这种情况下，正如巴菲特本人在 2007 年的信中所说，"我们的投资可以被视为伯克希尔股东的一个无担保价值来源"。
Attractive floats, then, are “unencumbered sources of value” for shareholders of companies which get to enjoy them.
因此，对公司股东来说，有吸引力的流通股是 "无担保的价值来源"，他们可以享受这些价值。
Are there other business models which have access to cheap floats? Yes indeed, there are, and they go by the name of “moats.”
还有其他商业模式可以获得廉价的浮存金吗？是的，确实有，它们的名字叫 "护城河"。
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