I.H.71.Warren Buffett.A lot of cash and the guts

有钱有胆量。

1、《2007-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

24. Easy decision: stocks over bonds

简单的决定：股票优于债券

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. My name is Frank Martin from Elkhart, Indiana. I’m a shareholder.

观众成员：早上好，沃伦和查理。我叫弗兰克·马丁，来自印第安纳州的埃尔克哈特。我是一名股东。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You’ve written a good book too, Frank. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你也写了一本好书，弗兰克。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks, Warren. I’ll do my best to be succinct with this question. As you know, my long suit is not brevity in the written word.

观众成员：谢谢，沃伦。我会尽量简洁地提出这个问题。如你所知，我在书面表达上不擅长简洁。

Recently, I sequentially read everything that you and Charlie have written, or that has been written about you, since 1999, including your help wanted ad in the annual report, which sought not a Ted Williams, but the consummate defensive player in your forcefully worded quotations in last Monday’s Wall Street Journal.

最近，我连续阅读了自1999年以来你和查理写的所有东西，或者关于你们的所有内容，包括你在年报中的招聘广告，寻找的并非一位“泰德·威廉姆斯”，而是一位完美的防守球员，以及你在上周一《华尔街日报》上的强烈言论。

When contemplating the chronology, I sensed a gradual but unmistakable sea change in your perspective on the investment environment for marketable securities.

当我回顾这一系列变化时，我感受到你对可交易证券投资环境的观点发生了逐渐但明显的转变。你越来越关注风险管理。

The intensification of your preoccupation with managing risk is conspicuous by its absence among the other biggest players at the margin — hedge funds, private equity, mutual funds — who are shamefully mute both about what are likely to be anemic prospective returns and the unconscionable risks assumed to achieve them, all the while charging a king’s ransom for such low value-added services.

而这一点在那些处于市场边缘的最大参与者中几乎没有出现——对冲基金、私募股权、共同基金，他们在面对可能疲软的预期回报和为此承担的无法接受的风险时却保持了沉默，同时还为这些低附加值的服务收取了高昂费用。

When I give free rein to my intuition, the post-1999 Warren Buffett reminds me of the Warren Buffett of post-1969.

当我放任直觉时，1999 年后的沃伦·巴菲特让我想起了 1969 年后的沃伦·巴菲特。

Back then, when Berkshire was a small fraction of its current size, you spoke of the difficulty in playing a game you did not understand, that there was little margin of safety in the equity markets in general.

那时候，当伯克希尔只是现在规模的一小部分时，你谈到了玩一个你不理解的游戏的困难，认为股市总体上几乎没有安全边际。

You weren’t forecasting what in its own time became the bear market of ’73-’74, but you were surely intuitively aware of what [former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan] Greenspan years later has repeatedly warned: the inevitable day of reckoning that follows long periods of low equity risk premium.

您当时并未预测到后来成为 73-74 年熊市的事件，但您肯定直观地意识到了 [前美联储主席艾伦·] 格林斯潘多年后反复警告的：在长期低股票风险溢价之后，总会迎来清算之日。

Imagine yourself, if you are willing, cast overnight into a new role with a clean slate as head of the investment committee of a $10 billion pension fund.

想象一下，如果你愿意的话，自己一夜之间被赋予一个新角色，以一张白纸的身份成为一个 100 亿美元养老金基金的投资委员会主席。

Today, would your decisions reflect the same risk-averse mindset that dominated your behavior in the post-1969 period? And might you anticipate that following all of this might appear opportunities that were as mouthwatering as appeared in ’73-’74?

今天，您的决策是否会反映出与 1969 年后时期主导您行为的同样的风险规避心态？您是否预见到在这一切之后可能会出现像 1973-1974 年那样诱人的机会？

Please explain, and I hope Charlie will weigh in on the subject as well. Thank you.

请解释一下，我希望查理也能对此发表意见。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah Frank, when I closed up to the partnership, if I’d had an endowment fund to run then, the prospective return — and actually, I wrote this in a letter to my partners that I’d be glad to send you a copy of — the prospective return — and I was looking at them as individuals on an after-tax basis — was about the same, I felt, from equities and from municipal bonds over the next decade, and it turned out to be more or less the case.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，弗兰克，当我结束合伙关系时，如果我当时有一个捐赠基金要管理，预期回报——实际上，我在给合伙人的信中写了这个，我很乐意给你寄一份——预期回报——我当时是从税后角度看待他们的，来自股票和市政债券的回报在接下来的十年里大致相同，我觉得，结果也差不多是这样。

I would say that I do not regard that as being the same situation now. If I were managing a very large endowment fund, for one thing it would either be a hundred percent in stocks or a hundred percent in long bonds or a hundred percent in short-term bonds.

我会说，我不认为现在的情况是一样的。如果我在管理一个非常大的捐赠基金，一方面它要么是百分之百投资于股票，要么是百分之百投资于长期债券，要么是百分之百投资于短期债券。

I mean, I don’t believe in layering things and saying I’m going to have 60 percent of this and 30 percent of that. Why do I have the 30 percent if I think the 60 percent makes more sense?

我的意思是，我不相信分层处理事情，并说我要有 60%的这个和 30%的那个。如果我认为 60%更有意义，为什么还要有 30%呢？

So — and if you told me I had to invest a fund for 20 years and I had a choice between buying the index, the 500, or a 20-year bond, you know, I would buy stocks.

所以——如果你告诉我，我必须投资一个基金 20 年，并且我可以选择购买指数、标普 500 或 20 年期债券，你知道的，我会买股票。

You know, that doesn’t mean they won’t go down a lot. But if you — I would rather a have an equity investment — I wouldn’t rather have an equity investment where I paid a ton of money to somebody else that took my stock return down dramatically.

你知道，这并不意味着股票不会大幅下跌。但如果我必须选择，我宁愿拥有股票。我不愿意支付高昂的费用给某个把我股票回报大幅降低的人。

But simply buying an index fund for 20 years of equities or buying a 20-year bond, I would — it would not be a close decision with me.

但仅仅是购买一个 20 年的股票指数基金或购买一只 20 年期债券，对我来说，这不是一个难以抉择的决定。

I would buy the equities. I’d rather buy them cheaper, you know, but I’d rather buy the bond with a bigger yield, too. But in terms of what’s offered to me today, that’s the way I would come down.

我会购买股票。我也希望能以更低的价格买入股票，当然也希望债券的收益率更高，但就目前市场上提供的选择而言，我会做出这样的选择。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t think that was the answer that was expected, but that’s the answer. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我认为这不是人们所预期的答案，但这确实是答案。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It doesn’t have a thing to do with what we think stocks — we don’t think at all — but where stocks could be or bonds could be.

沃伦·巴菲特：这与我们对股票或债券的预期毫无关系。——我们根本不考虑——而是股票或债券可能会在哪里。

We don’t have the faintest idea where the S&P will be in three years, or where the long-term bond will be in three years, but we do know which we would rather own on a 20-year basis.

我们根本不知道三年后的标普500指数或长期债券会怎样，但我们知道在20年内我们更愿意持有哪个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, we’d also expect that the current scene will cause some real disruption, not too many years ahead.

查理·芒格：沃伦，我们也预计当前的局面将在不久的将来引起一些真正的混乱。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s true, but if you go back a hundred years, you could almost say that, you know, in almost any period, you will get disruptions from time to time, and it’s very nice if you have a lot of cash then and you have the guts to do something with it.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实如此，但如果你回到一百年前，你几乎可以说，在几乎任何时期，你都会时不时地遇到一些动荡，如果那时你有很多现金，并且有勇气去做点什么，那就非常好了。

勇气和距离本质的远近有最直接的有关系。

But predicting them or waiting around for them, that sort of thing, is not our game. And I mean, we bought $5 billion worth of equities in the first quarter, something like that.

但预测它们或等待它们之类的事情，不是我们的游戏。我的意思是，我们在第一季度购买了价值约 50 亿美元的股票。

And, you know, we don’t think they’re anything like — well, they aren’t — they’re not — it would be a joke to even compare them to 1974 or a whole bunch of other periods. But we decided we would rather have them than cash, or we would rather have them than sit around and hope that things get a lot cheaper.

而且，你知道，我们不认为它们像——嗯，它们不是——它们不——把它们和 1974 年或其他许多时期相比简直是个笑话。但我们决定宁愿拥有股票而不是现金，或者宁愿拥有股票而不是坐等事情变得便宜得多。

安全边际=对具体企业的了解程度。

We don’t spend a lot of time doing that. It — you can freeze yourself out indefinitely.

我们不会花太多时间去等待。你可以无限期地冻结自己不采取任何行动。

So any time we find something — what we think is intelligent to do, we just do it, and we hope we can do it big.

所以每当我们发现某件事情——我们认为是明智的事情，我们就去做，并且希望能做得很大。

I.H.71.Warren Buffett.A lot of cash and the guts

I.H.71.Warren Buffett.A lot of cash and the guts

1、《2007-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

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