A Conversation with Benjamin GrahamFinancial Analysts Journal - 1976

与 Benjamin Graham 的一次对谈——Financial Analysts Journal，1976 年

In the light of your 60- odd years of experience in Wall Street what is your overall view of common stocks?

鉴于你在 Wall Street 六十多年的经验，你对普通股的总体看法是什么？

Common stocks have one important characteristics and one important speculative characteristic. Their investment value and average market price tend to increase irregularly but persistently over the decades, as their net worth builds up through the reinvestment of undistributed earnings- - incidentally, with no clear- cut plus or minus response to inflation. However, most of the time common stocks are subject to irrational and excessive price fluctuations in both directions, as the consequence of the ingrained tendency of most people to speculate or gamble- - i.e., to give way to hope, fear and greed.

普通股有一个重要的投资特征和一个重要的投机特征。它们的投资价值与平均市场价格在数十年间往往是不规则却持续上升的，因为通过未分配利润的再投资，其净资产会逐步累积——顺带说一句，对通胀并无明确的正面或负面响应。然而，大多数时候，普通股在双向上都容易出现非理性且过度的价格波动，其原因在于大多数人根深蒂固地倾向于投机或赌博——也就是屈从于希望、恐惧与贪婪。

What is your view of Wall Street as a financial institution?

把 Wall Street 视作金融机构，你的看法如何？

A highly unfavorable- - even a cynical- - one. The Stock Exchanges appear to me chiefly as a John Bunyan type of Vanity Fair, or a Falstaffian joke, that frequently degenerates into a madhouse- - “a tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” The stock market resembles a huge laundry in which institutions take in large blocks of each other’s washing- - nowadays to the tune of 30 million shares a day- - without true rhyme or reason. But technologically it is remarkably well- organized.

非常不看好——甚至近乎犬儒的看法。在我看来，证券交易所主要像 John Bunyan 笔下的 Vanity Fair，或一个 Falstaffian 式的笑话，并且常常蜕变成疯人院——“充满喧嚣与愤怒的故事，最终一无所指”。股市像一座巨大的洗衣房，各类机构把彼此的大捆“衣物”拿来清洗——如今每天约 3,000 万股——并无真正的道理或章法。但从技术层面看，它的组织却相当出色。

What is your view of the financial community as a whole?

你对整个金融业群体的看法是什么？

Most of the stockbrokers, financial analysts, investment advisers, etc., are above average in intelligence, business honesty and sincerity. But they lack adequate experience with all types of security markets and an overall understanding of common stocks- - of what I call “the nature of the beast.” They tend to take the market and themselves too seriously. They spend a large part of their time trying, valiantly and ineffectively, to do things they can’t do well.

大多数证券经纪人、金融分析师、投资顾问等，在智力、商业诚信与真诚方面都高于平均水平。但他们缺乏对各类证券市场的充分经验，以及对普通股的整体理解——也就是我所说的“野兽的本性”。他们往往把市场和自己看得过于严肃，把大量时间花在自己并不擅长却仍然竭力去做的事情上，但收效并不理想。

What sort of things, for example?

例如哪些事情？

To forecast short- and long- term changes in the economy, and in the price level of common stocks, to select the most promising industry groups and individual issues- - generally for the near- term future.

去预测经济与普通股价格水平的短期与长期变化，并挑选最有前景的行业板块与个股——通常着眼于近期的表现。

Can the average manager of institutional funds obtain better results than the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the Standard & Poor’s Index over the years?

长期来看，一位普通机构资金经理能否取得优于 Dow Jones Industrial Average 或 Standard & Poor’s Index 的业绩？

No. In effect, that would mean that the stock market experts as a whole could beat themselves- - a logical contradiction.

不能。本质上，那等于说整个股市专家群体能够战胜他们自己——这是逻辑上的矛盾。

Do you think, therefore, that the average institutional client should be content with the DJIA results or the equivalent?

因此，你是否认为普通的机构客户应该满足于DJIA 的结果或相当的表现？

Yes. Not only that, but I think they should require approximately such results over, say, a moving five- year average period as a condition for paying standard management fees to advisors and the like.

是的。不仅如此，我认为他们还应把在一个（比如）滚动五年平均期内取得大致相当的结果，作为向顾问等支付标准管理费的前提条件。

What about the objection made against so-called index funds that different investors have different requirements?

针对所谓指数基金的反对意见——认为不同投资者有不同需求——你怎么看？

At bottom that is only a convenient cliche or alibi to justify the mediocre record of the past. All investors want good results from their investments, and are entitled to them to the extent that they are actually obtainable. I see no reason why they should be content with results inferior to those of an indexed fund or pay standard fees for such inferior results.

归根结底，那只是一个方便的陈词滥调或借口，用来为过去平庸的业绩开脱。所有投资者都希望从投资中获得好结果，并且在现实可获得的范围内理应得到这样的结果。我看不出为什么他们该满足于劣于指数化基金的回报，或为这样的劣等结果支付标准费用。

Turning now to individual investors, do you think that they are at a disadvantage compared with the institutions, because of the latter’s huge resources, superior facilities for obtaining information, etc.?

转到个人投资者的话题，你是否认为，相较拥有庞大资源与更优信息获取设施等的机构，个人处于劣势？

On the contrary, the typical investor has a great advantage over the large institutions.

恰恰相反，典型的个人投资者相对于大型机构反而拥有巨大优势。

Why?

为什么？

Chiefly because these institutions have a relatively small field of common stocks to choose from- - say 300 to 400 huge corporations- - and they are constrained more or less to concentrate their research and decisions on this much over- analyzed group. By contrast, most individuals can choose at any time among some 3000 issues listed in the Standard & Poor’s Monthly Stock Guide. Following a wide variety of approaches and preferences, the individual investor should at all times be able to locate at least one per cent of the total list- - say, 30 issues or more- - that offer attractive buying opportunities.

主要因为这些机构可选择的普通股范围相对狭窄——比如 300 到 400 家特大型公司——多少被迫把研究与决策集中在这一被过度分析的群体上。相比之下，大多数个人可随时在 Standard & Poor’s Monthly Stock Guide 所列的约 3,000 只股票中进行选择。基于多样的研究路径与偏好，个人投资者在任何时候都应能从全部清单中找到至少 1%——比如 30 只或更多——具备吸引力的买入机会。

What general rules would you offer the individual investor for his investment policy over the years?

对于长期的投资政策，你会给个人投资者哪些通用规则？

Let me suggest three such rules: (1) The individual investor should act consistently as an investor and not as a speculator. This means, in sum, that he should be able to justify every purchase he makes and each price he pays by impersonal, objective reasoning that satisfies him that he is getting more than his money’s worth for his purchase- - in other words, that he has a margin of safety, in value terms, to protect his commitment. (2) The investor should have a definite selling policy for all his common stock commitments, corresponding to his buying techniques. Typically, he should set a reasonable profit objective on each purchase- - say 50 to 100 per cent- - and a maximum holding period for this objective to be realized- - say, two to three years. Purchases not realizing the gain objective at the end of the holding period should be sold out at the market. (3) Finally, the investor should always have a minimum percentage of his total portfolio in common

stocks and a minimum percentage in bond equivalents. I recommend at least 25 per cent of the total at all times in each category. A good case can be made for a consistent 50- 50 division here, with adjustments for changes in the market level. This means the investor would switch some of his stocks into bonds on significant rises of the market level, and vice- versa when the market declines. I would suggest, in general, an average seven- or eight- year maturity for his bond holdings.

我提出三条：（1）个人投资者应始终以“投资者”而非“投机者”的方式行事。概而言之，他应能以非个人化、客观的推理来证明每一笔买入与所付价格，确信自己买到的价值超过所付出的金钱——换言之，在价值层面留有“安全边际”以保护投入。（2）投资者对其所有普通股持仓应有明确的卖出政策，与其买入方法相配套。通常，他应为每笔买入设定合理的获利目标——比如 50% 到 100%——并设定实现该目标的最长持有期——比如 2 到 3 年。到期未达成目标的，应按市价卖出。（3）最后，投资者的总资产中应始终设定股票与类债（债券等）两类的最低配置比例。我建议两类各不少于总资产的 25%。也可以长期维持约 50/50 的分配，并随市场水平变化作调整。也就是说，市场显著上行时把部分股票换成债券；市场下跌时反向操作。总体上，我建议其债券持仓的平均到期期限为 7–8 年。

In selecting the common stock portfolio, do you advise careful study of and selectivity among different issues?

在选择普通股投资组合时，你是否建议对不同标的进行细致研究与精选？

In general, no. I am no longer an advocate of elaborate techniques of security analysis in order to find superior value opportunities. This was a rewarding activity, say, 40 years ago, when our textbook “Graham and Dodd” was first published; but the situation has changed a great deal since then. In the old days any well- trained security analyst could do a good professional job of selecting undervalued issues through detailed studies; but in the light of the enormous amount of research now being carried on, I doubt whether in most cases such extensive efforts will generate sufficiently superior selections to justify their cost. To that very limited extent I’m on the side of the “efficient market” school of thought now generally accepted by the professors.

总体而言，不。我已不再主张借助繁复的证券分析技巧去寻找“优越价值”机会。比如在 40 年前，我们的教科书 “Graham and Dodd” 首次出版时，这还是一项回报颇丰的工作；但此后情势已大为不同。过去，任何受过良好训练的证券分析师都能通过详尽研究挑出被低估的标的；但就当下庞大的研究投入而言，我怀疑在多数情况下，这么大的努力是否能产生足够优越的选择来证明其成本是值得的。就这一极其有限的范围而言，我部分站在当下学界普遍接受的“有效市场”学派一边。

What general approach to portfolio formation do you advocate?

你主张怎样的组合构建总体方法？

Essentially, a highly simplified one that applies a single criteria or perhaps two criteria to the price to assure that full value is present and that relies for its results on the performance of the portfolio as a whole- - i.e., on the group results- - rather than on the expectations for individual issues.

本质上，是一种高度简化的方法：对价格应用一项、或至多两项标准，以确保蕴含充分价值；并把结果建立在整个组合的表现之上——也即“组合整体”的结果——而不是建立在对单个标的的预期之上。

Can you indicate concretely how an individual investor should create and maintain his common stock portfolio?

能否具体说明个人投资者应如何建立并维护其普通股组合？

I can give two examples of my suggested approach to this problem. One appears severely limited in its application, but we found it almost unfailingly dependable and satisfactory in 30- odd years of managing moderate- sized investment funds. The second represents a great deal of new thinking and research on our part in recent years. It is much wider in its application than the first one, but it combines the three virtues of sound logic, simplicity of application, and an extraordinarily good performance record, assuming- - contrary to fact- - that it had actually been followed as now formulated over the past 50 years- - from 1925 to 1975.

我可以给出两种我所建议的方法。一种看似适用范围很窄，但在我们管理中等规模投资基金的 30 余年里，几乎总是可靠且令人满意。第二种代表了我们近年来大量的新思考与研究；其适用范围远宽于第一种，同时兼具三重优点：逻辑扎实、易于应用、且在假定——与事实相反——于过去 50 年（1925–1975）严格按如今的表述执行的前提下，拥有异常出色的业绩记录。

Some details, please, on your two recommended approaches.

请介绍一下这两种推荐方法的细节。

My first, more limited, technique confines itself to the purchase of common stocks at less than their working- capital value, or net- current- asset value, giving no weight to the plant and other fixed assets, and deducting all liabilities in full from the current assets. We used this approach extensively in managing investment funds, and over a 30- odd year period

we must have earned an average of some 20 per cent per year from this source. For a while, however, after the mid- 1950’s, this brand of buying opportunity became very scarce because of the pervasive bull market. But it has returned in quantity since the 1973- 74 decline. In January 1976 we counted over 300 such issues in the Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide- - about 10 per cent of the total. I consider it a foolproof method of systematic investment- - once again, not on the basis of individual results but in terms of the expectable group outcome.

第一种、更为受限的技术，仅在价格低于其营运资本价值或净流动资产价值时买入普通股；其中不计入厂房等固定资产，并将一切负债全额自流动资产中扣除。我们在基金管理中广泛采用过这种方法，在 30 余年期间，这一来源应当为我们带来了年均约 20% 的回报。不过，1950 年代中期之后，由于牛市弥漫，这类买入机会一度非常稀缺；但自 1973–1974 年的下跌之后又大量回归。到 1976 年 1 月，我们在 Standard & Poor’s Stock Guide 中统计到此类标的超过 300 只，约占总数的 10%。我认为这是一个几乎不会出错的系统化投资方法——再强调一次，依据的不是个别结果，而是可期待的组合整体结果。

Finally, what is your other approach?

最后，你的另一种方法是什么？

This is similar to the first in its underlying philosophy. It consists of buying groups of stocks at less than their current or intrinsic value as indicated by one or more simple criteria. The criterion I prefer is seven times the reported earnings for the past 12 months. You can use others- - such as a current dividend return above seven per cent or book value more than 120 percent of price, etc. We are just finishing a performance study of these approaches over the past half- century- - 1925- 1975. They consistently show results of 15 per cent or better per annum, or twice the record of the DJIA for this long period. I have every confidence in the threefold merit of this general method based on (a) sound logic, (b) simplicity of application, and (c) an excellent supporting record. At bottom it is a technique by which true investors can exploit the recurrent excessive optimism and excessive apprehension of the speculative public.

其底层理念与第一种相似。做法是：依据一项或多项简单标准，按低于其当前价值或内在价值的价格买入一组股票。我偏好的标准是：过去 12 个月报告盈利的 7 倍。也可以采用其他标准——例如当前股息回报率高于 7%，或账面价值超过价格的 120% 等。我们刚刚完成对这些方法在过去半个世纪（1925–1975）的表现研究。结果显示，它们持续实现每年 15% 或更高的回报，约为该长期内 DJIA 记录的两倍。我对这一通用方法的三重优点充满信心：（a）逻辑扎实，（b）应用简明，（c）有优秀的历史记录作为支撑。归根结底，这是一种让真正的投资者得以利用投机大众反复出现的过度乐观与过度忧虑的技术。

HB: Mr. Graham, I do appreciate so much being able to come and visit with you this afternoon. When Bob Milne learned that Mrs. Butler and I would be in La Jolla, he suggested that I not only visit with you but also bring along my cassette tape recorder. We have much I would like to cover. First, could we start with a topical question—Government Employees Insurance Company—with GEICO being very much in the headlines.

HB：Graham 先生，今天下午能来拜访您我非常感激。当 Bob Milne 得知我和 Mrs. Butler 会到 La Jolla 时，他建议我不仅要来见您，还要把我的盒式录音机带上。我们有很多内容想聊。首先，我们能从一个热门话题开始吗——Government Employees Insurance Company——最近 GEICO 频频登上头条。

Graham: Yes, what happened was the team came into our office and after some negotiating, we bought half the company for () 720,000(. It turned out later that we were worth - - the whole company - - over a billion dollars in the stock market. This was a very extraordinary thing. But we were forced by the SEC to distribute the stock among our stockholders because, according to a technicality in the law, an investment fund was not allowed more than 10 percent of an insurance company. Jerry Newman and I became active in the conduct of GEICO, although we both retired a number of years ago. I am glad I am not connected with it now because of the terrific losses.

Graham：是的，事情是这样的：那支团队来到我们办公室，经过一些谈判，我们用大约 72 万美元买下了公司的一半股权。后来事实证明——整个公司——在股市上的价值超过了 10 亿美元。这非常不同寻常。不过我们被 SEC 强制把这些股票分配给我们的股东，因为按法律中的一个技术性条款，投资基金持有一家保险公司的比例不得超过 10%。Jerry Newman 和我都参与了 GEICO 的经营，只是我们几年前都已退休。鉴于后来发生的巨大亏损，我很庆幸如今已不再与它有牵连。

HB: Do you think GEICO will survive?

HB：你认为 GEICO 能挺过去吗？

Graham: Yes, I think it will survive. There is no basic reason why it won’t survive, but naturally I ask myself whether the company did expand much too fast without taking into account the possibilities of these big losses. It makes me shudder to think of the amounts of money they were able to lose in one year. Incredible! It is surprising how many of the large companies have managed to turn in losses of $) 50million or$  100 million in one year, in these last few years. Something unheard of in the old days. You have to be a genius to lose that much money.

Graham：是的，我认为它会活下来。没有根本性的理由说它活不下去，但我当然会反问自己：公司是否扩张得过于迅速，而没有把这些巨额亏损的可能性考虑进去。一年之内他们竟能亏掉那么多钱，想想就让人不寒而栗。难以置信！令人惊讶的是，这些年有不少大公司在一年内能报出 5,000 万或 1 亿美元的亏损。过去从未听闻。要亏掉这么多钱，你得是个“天才”。

HB: Looking back at your own life in the investment field, what are some of the key developments or key happenings, would you say? You went to Wall Street in 1914?

HB：回顾你在投资领域的一生，你会说有哪些关键发展或关键事件？你是 1914 年去的 Wall Street？

Graham: Well, the first thing that happened was typical. As a special favor, I was paid $12a week instead of$  10 to begin. The next thing that happened was World War I broke out two months later and the stock exchange was closed. My salary was reduced to $10(- that is one of the things more or less typical of any young man’s beginnings. The next thing that was really important to me - - outside of having made a rather continuous success for 15 years - - was the market crash of 1929.$

Graham：嗯，第一件事很典型。出于特别照顾，我的起薪是每周 12 美元，而不是 10 美元。接着两个月后 World War I 爆发，证券交易所被关闭。我的薪水降到每周 10 美元——这在某种程度上对任何年轻人的起步都算典型。接下来对我真正重要的一件事——除了之后 15 年相对持续的成功之外——就是 1929 年的市场崩盘。

HB: Did you see that coming at all- - were you scared?

HB：你当时有预见到吗——害怕吗？

Graham: No. All I knew was that prices were too high. I stayed away from the speculative favorites. I felt I had good investments. But I owed money, which was a mistake, and I had to sweat through the period 1929- 1932. I didn’t repeat that error after that.

Graham：没有。我只知道价格太高了。我避开了投机宠儿。我觉得自己持有的是好投资。但我负了债——那是一个错误——于是 1929–1932 年那段时间我捏着一把汗熬过来。后来我不再犯这个错。

HB: Did anybody really see this coming- - the crash of 1929?

HB：真的有人预见到了吗——1929 年的崩盘？

Graham: Babson did, but he started selling five years earlier.

Graham：Babson 预见到了，但他早在五年前就开始卖了。

HB: Then in 1932, you began to come back?

HB：那么到 1932 年，你开始恢复了吗？

Graham: Well, we sweated through that period. By 1937, we had restored our financial position as it was in 1929. From then on, we went along pretty smoothly.

Graham：嗯，我们咬牙挺过了那段时期。到 1937 年，我们把财务状况恢复到了 1929 年的水平。从那以后，进展就比较顺利了。

HB: The 1937- 1938 decline, were you better prepared for that?

HB：1937–1938 年的下跌，你们准备得更充分了吗？

Graham: Well, that led us to make some changes in our procedures that one of our directors had suggested to us, which was sound, and we followed his advice. We gave up certain things we had been trying to do and concentrated more on others that had been more consistently successful. We went along fine. In 1948, we made our GEICO investment and from then on, we seemed to be very brilliant people.

Graham：嗯，那促使我们按一位董事的建议对流程做了一些调整——建议很稳妥，我们也照做了。我们放弃了一些一直在尝试的做法，把精力更多放在那些更持续成功的事情上。进展良好。1948 年我们做了 GEICO 的投资，从那以后，我们看起来就像非常聪明的人。

HB: What happened in the only other interim bear market- 1940- 1941?

HB：另一次夹在其间的熊市——1940–1941 年——当时发生了什么？

Graham: Oh, that was only a typical setback period. We earned money in those years.

Graham：哦，那只是一个典型的受挫期。那些年我们仍然赚钱。

HB: You earned money after World War II broke out?

HB：World War II 爆发后你们还在赚钱？

Graham: Yes, we did. We had no real problems in running our business. That’s why I kind of lost interest. We were no longer very challenged after 1950. About 1956, I decided to quit and to come out here to California to live.

Graham：是的。我们在经营业务上没有实质性的问题。这也是我有点失去兴趣的原因。1950 年之后我们已不再面临很大的挑战。大约在 1956 年，我决定退出，搬到 California 来生活。

I felt that I had established a way of doing business to a point where it no longer presented any basic problems to be solved. We were going along on what I thought was a satisfactory basis, and the things that presented themselves were typically repetitions of old problems which I found no special interest in solving.

我觉得自己已经把一套经营方式建立到一个不再需要解决基本问题的地步。我们按照我认为令人满意的方式在推进，而眼前出现的问题往往只是旧问题的重复，我对再去解决它们并无特别兴趣。

About six years later, we decided to liquidate Graham- Newman Corporation- to end it primarily because the succession of management had not been satisfactorily established. We felt we had nothing special to look forward to that interested us. We could have built up an enormous business had we wanted to, but we limited ourselves to a maximum of () 15$ million of capital- only a drop in the bucket these days. The question of whether we could earn the maximum percentage per year was what interested us. It was not the question of total sums, but annual rates of return that we were able to accomplish.

大约六年后，我们决定清算 Graham–Newman Corporation——结束它主要是因为管理层的接班安排并不令人满意。我们觉得没有什么特别让我们感兴趣、值得期待的事。若是愿意，我们本可以把业务做得极其庞大，但我们把资本规模上限定在最多约 1,500 万美元——放在今天不过是九牛一毛。我们关心的是每年是否能取得尽可能高的百分比回报。关注点不在总量，而在我们能够实现的年度收益率。

HB: When did you decide to write your classic text, Security Analysis?

HB：你是什么时候决定写下你的经典教材《Security Analysis》的？

Graham: What happened was that in about 1925, I thought that I knew enough about Wall Street after 11 years to write a book about it. But fortunately, I had the inspiration instead to learn more on the subject before I wrote the book, so I decided I would start teaching if I could. I became a Lecturer at the Columbia School of Business for the extension courses. In 1928, we had a course in security analysis and finance- - I think it was called Investments- - and I had 150 students. That was the time Wall Street was really booming.

Graham：事情是这样的：大约在 1925 年，在 Wall Street 待了 11 年之后，我觉得自己已经足够了解，能够写一本书了。但幸运的是，我反而得到一个启发：在写书之前先让自己学得更多，于是我决定如果可以的话就开始教书。我成了 Columbia School of Business 推广课程的讲师。1928 年我们开了一门关于证券分析与金融的课程——我想当时叫 Investments——有 150 名学生。那正是 Wall Street 真正繁荣的时期。

The result was it took until 1934 before I actually wrote the book with Dave Dodd. He was a student of mine in the first year. Dave was then Assistant Professor at Columbia and was anxious to learn more. Naturally, he was indispensable to me in writing the book. The First Edition appeared in 1934. Actually, it came out the same time as a play of mine which was produced on Broadway and lasted only one week.

结果一直到了 1934 年我才真正与 Dave Dodd 合著完成这本书。他在第一年就是我的学生。那时 Dave 是 Columbia 的助理教授，渴望学得更多。很自然地，在写书过程中他对我来说不可或缺。第一版于 1934 年问世。事实上，它与我一部在 Broadway 上演的戏剧同一时间推出，但那部戏只演了一周。

HB: You had a play on Broadway?

HB：你在 Broadway 还有一部戏剧？

Graham: Yes. “Baby Pompadou” or “True to the Marines.” It was produced twice under two titles. It was not successful. Fortunately, Security Analysis was much more successful.

Graham：是的。《Baby Pompadou》或《True to the Marines》。它以两个标题被制作过两次。并不成功。幸运的是，《Security Analysis》成功得多。

HB: That was the book, wasn’t it?

HB：那就是那本书，对吧？

Graham: They called it the “Bible of Graham and Dodd.” Yes, well now I have lost most of the interest I had in the details of security analysis which I devoted myself to so strenuously for many years. I feel that they are relatively unimportant, which, in a sense, has put me opposed to developments in the whole profession. I think we can do it successfully with a few techniques and simple principles. The main point is to have the right general principles and the character to stick to them.

Graham：他们称它为“Bible of Graham and Dodd”。是的，不过如今我对那些多年孜孜以求的证券分析细节大多已失去兴趣。我觉得它们相对并不重要，在某种意义上，这使我与整个行业的发展方向有些相左。我认为只需少数几种技巧和简单原则就能成功。关键在于拥有正确的一般性原则，并具备坚持这些原则的品格。

HB: My own experience is that you have to be a student of industries to realize the great differences in managements. I think that this is one thing an analyst can bring to the solution.

HB：就我个人经验，你必须做各行业的“学生”，才能意识到管理层之间的巨大差异。我认为这是分析师能带给问题解决的一点价值。

Graham: Well, I would not deny that. But I have a considerable amount of doubt on the question of how successful analysts can be overall when applying these selectivity approaches. The thing that I have been emphasizing in my own work for the last few years has been the group approach. To try to buy groups of stocks that meet some simple criterion for being undervalued—regardless of the industry and with very little attention to the individual company. My recent article on three simple methods applied to common stocks was published in one of your Seminar Proceedings.

Graham：嗯，我不否认这一点。但我相当怀疑分析师在整体上运用这些“精选法”时能有多成功。过去几年的工作里，我一直强调的是“组合法”。也就是尽量买入一组满足某些简单低估标准的股票——不论所属行业，也很少关注单个公司。我关于将三种简单方法应用于普通股的最新文章，发表在你们的一本 Seminar Proceedings 上。

I am just finishing a 50- year study—the application of these simple methods to groups of stocks, actually, to all the stocks in the Moody’s Industrial Stock Group.

我刚完成一项 50 年的研究——将这些简单方法应用于一组股票，实际上是应用于所有位于 Moody’s Industrial Stock Group 中的股票。

I found the results were very good for 50 years. They certainly did twice as well as the Dow Jones. And so my enthusiasm has been transferred from the selective to the group approach. What I want is an earnings ratio twice as good as the bond interest ratio typically for most years. One can also apply a dividend criterion or an asset value criterion and get good results. My research indicates the best results come from simple earnings criterions.

我发现 50 年的结果非常好。它们的表现无疑是 Dow Jones 的两倍。于是我的热情从“精选法”转向了“组合法”。我希望获得的收益率在多数年份能达到债券利率的两倍。也可以使用股息标准或资产价值标准，同样能得到不错的结果。我的研究显示，最佳结果来自于简单的盈利标准。

HB: I have always thought it was too bad that we use the price/earnings ratio rather than the earnings yield measurement. It would be so much easier to realize that a stock is selling at a 2.5 percent earnings yield rather than 40 times earnings.

HB：我一直觉得，用市盈率而不是盈利收益率（earnings yield）是件憾事。若说某只股票的盈利收益率是 2.5%，比说它的市盈率是 40 倍更容易让人理解。

Graham: Yes. The earnings yield would be more scientific and a more logical approach.

Graham：是的。盈利收益率更科学，也更合乎逻辑。

HB: Then with roughly a 50 percent dividend payout, you can take half of the earnings yield to estimate a sustainable dividend yield.

HB：那么在大致 50% 的分红支付率下，你可以取盈利收益率的一半来估算可持续的股息率。

Graham: Yes. Basically, I want to double the interest rate in terms of earnings return. However, in most years the interest rate was less than five percent on AAA bonds. Consequently, I have set two limits. A maximum multiple of 10 even when interest rates are under five percent, and a maximum multiple of 7 times even when interest rates are above seven percent as they are now. So typically my buying point would be double the current AAA interest rate with a maximum multiplier between 10 and 7. My research has been based on that.

Graham：是的。基本上，我希望就收益回报而言达到利率的两倍。然而，大多数年份 AAA 债券的利率低于 5%。因此我设定了两个上限：即便利率低于 5%，最高倍数也为 10 倍；而当利率高于 7%（就像现在这样）时，最高倍数为 7 倍。所以通常我的买入点是“当前 AAA 利率的两倍收益率”，同时设定最高倍数介于 10 到 7 之间。我的研究以此为基础。

I received in Chicago last year the Molodovsky Award.

我去年在 Chicago 获得了 Molodovsky Award。

HB: I understand that you have about completed this research.

HB：我了解到你已经差不多完成了这项研究。

Graham: Imagine- there seems to be practically a foolproof way of getting good results out of common stock investment with a minimum of work. It seems too good to be true. But all I can tell you after 60 years of experience, it seems to stand up under any of the tests that I would make up. I would try to get other people to criticize it.

Graham：设想一下——似乎确有一种几乎万无一失的方法，只需最小的工作量就能在普通股投资中取得好结果。听上去好得不可思议。但凭我 60 年的经验，我只能说，它似乎经得起我能设计出的任何检验。我也会尽量请别人来挑毛病。

HB: By some coincidence as you were becoming less active as a writer, a number of professors started to work on the random walk. What do you think about this?

HB：很巧的是，当你逐渐淡出写作时，不少教授开始研究“random walk”。你怎么看？

Graham: Well, I am sure they are all very hardworking and serious. It’s hard for me to find a good connection between what they do and practical investment results. In fact, they say that the market is efficient in the sense that there is no particular point in getting more information than people already have. That might be true, but the idea of saying that the fact that the information is so widely spread that the resulting prices are logical prices—that is all wrong. I don’t see how you can say that the prices made in Wall Street are the right prices in any intelligent definition of what right prices would be.

Graham：我相信他们都非常勤奋且严肃认真。但我很难把他们的研究与实际投资结果建立起良好的联系。事实上，他们说市场是有效的，也就是没有必要去获取超出他人已有的信息。这也许没错，但从“信息广泛分布”就断言“由此形成的价格是合乎逻辑的价格”——这完全错误。按照任何关于“正确价格”的理性定义，我不明白你如何能说在 Wall Street 形成的价格就是正确价格。

HB: It is too bad there have not been more contributions from practicing analysts to provide some balance to the brilliant work of the academic community.

HB：可惜的是，来自一线分析师的贡献不够多，无法对学界的精彩成果形成某种平衡。

Graham: Well, when we talk about buying stocks, as I do, I am talking very practically in terms of dollars and cents, profits and losses, mainly profits. I would say that if a stock with $)50working capital sells at$  32 , that would be an interesting stock. If you buy 30 companies of that sort, you’re bound to make money. You can’t lose when you do that. There are two questions about this approach. One is, am I right in saying if you buy stocks at two- thirds of the working capital value, you have a dependable indication of group undervaluation? That’s what our own business experience proved to us. The second question, are there other ways of doing this?

Graham：好吧，当我们谈论买股票时，正如我所做的，我们谈的是非常实际的“美元与美分”、盈亏得失，主要是盈利。我会说，如果一只拥有 $50的营运资本的股票以 $ 32 的价格交易，那就是一只有意思的股票。如果你买入 30 家这类公司，你注定会赚钱。这样做你不会亏。这个方法有两个问题。其一：我说以营运资本价值的三分之二价格买入股票，就能可靠地表明整个组合被低估，这样的说法是否正确？我们的业务经验证明了这一点。其二：是否还有其他做法？

HB: Are there any other ways?

HB：还有其他方法吗？

Graham: Well, naturally, the thing that I have been talking about so much this afternoon is applying a simple criterion of the value of a security. But what everybody else is trying to do pretty much is pick out the “Xerox” companies, the “3M’s”, because of their long- term futures or to decide that next year the semiconductor industry would be a good industry. These don’t seem to be dependable ways to do it. There are certainly a lot of ways to keep busy.

Graham：当然了，今天下午我反复谈的，就是对一项证券的价值应用一个简单标准。但其他人几乎都在做的，是挑出那些“Xerox”式的公司、“3M’s”，因为它们的长期前景，或者判断明年 semiconductor 行业会是个好行业。这些看起来都不是可靠的做法。当然，有很多办法能让你忙个不停。

HB: Would you have said that 30 years ago?

HB：30 年前你也会这么说吗？

Graham: Well, no, I would not have taken as negative an attitude 30 years ago. But my positive attitude would have been to say, rather, that you could have found sufficient examples of individual companies that were undervalued.

Graham：嗯，不，30 年前我不会持这么消极的态度。但我会积极地说，你可以找到足够多被低估的个别公司作为例证。

HB: The efficient market people have kind of muddied the waters, haven’t they, in a way?

HB：“有效市场”派在某种意义上把水搅浑了，不是吗？

Graham: Well, they would claim that if they are correct in their basic contentions about the efficient market, the thing for people to do is to try to study the behavior of stock prices and try to profit from these interpretations. To me, that is not a very encouraging conclusion because if I have noticed anything over these 60 years on Wall Street, it is that people do not succeed in forecasting what’s going to happen to the stock market.

Graham：他们会声称，如果他们关于“有效市场”的基本主张是正确的，人们应该做的就是研究股价行为，并试图从这些解读中获利。对我而言，这不是一个令人鼓舞的结论，因为在 Wall Street 这 60 年里，如果我观察到什么，那就是人们并不能成功预测股市将发生什么。

HB: That is certainly true.

HB：那确实如此。

Graham: And all you have to do is to listen to “Wall Street Week” and you can see that none of them has any particular claim to authority or opinions as to what will happen in the stock market. They, and economists, all have opinions and they are willing to express them if you ask them. But I don’t think they insist that their opinions are correct, though.

Graham：你只要听听“Wall Street Week”就会发现，他们没有谁能对股市将发生什么提出特别权威的见解或主张。他们以及经济学家都有各自的看法，你问他们也乐于表达。但我不认为他们坚持自己的观点一定正确。

HB: What thoughts do you have on index funds?

HB：你对指数基金有何看法？

Graham: I have very definite views on that. I have a feeling that the way in which institutional funds should be managed, at least a number of them, would be to start with the index concept—the equivalent of index results, say 100 or 150 stocks out of the Standard & Poor’s 500. Then turn over to managers the privilege of making a variation, provided they would accept personal responsibility for the success of the variation that they introduced. I assume that basically the compensation ought to be measured by the results either in terms of equaling the index, say Standard & Poor’s results, or to the extent by which you improve it. Now in the group discussions of this thing, the typical money managers don’t accept the idea and the reason for non- acceptance is chiefly that they say—not that it isn’t practical—but that it isn’t sound because different investors have different requirements. They have never been able to convince me that that’s true in any significant degree—that different investors have different requirements. All investments require satisfactory results, and I think satisfactory results are pretty much the same for everybody. So I think any experience of the last 20 years, let’s say, would indicate that one could have done as well with Standard & Poor’s than with a great deal of work, intelligence, and talk.

Graham：对此我有非常明确的看法。在我看来，机构资金的管理方式——至少其中一些——应当从指数化概念出发，追求等同于指数的结果，比如从 Standard & Poor’s 500 中选取 100 或 150 只股票。然后把做出偏离的权限交给经理，但前提是他们愿为自己引入的偏离成败承担个人责任。我认为，基本上报酬应以结果来衡量，要么达到指数（比如 Standard & Poor’s）的水平，要么看你超越它的幅度。现在，在关于这件事的集体讨论中，典型的资金经理不接受这一理念，主要原因是他们说——并不是认为它不切实际——而是认为它并不稳妥，因为不同投资者有不同需求。他们从未能在任何显著意义上说服我“不同投资者有不同需求”这一点。所有投资都需要令人满意的结果，而我认为“令人满意的结果”对所有人基本相同。所以，我认为拿过去 20 年作例子，任何经验都表明，与其投入大量工作、聪明才智和口舌，不如直接跟随 Standard & Poor’s 也能同样做得不错。

HB:Mr. Graham, what advice would you have to a young man or woman coming along now who wants to be a security analyst and a Chartered Financial Analyst?

HB：Graham 先生，对于如今想成为证券分析师并取得 Chartered Financial Analyst 资格的年轻人，你有什么建议？

Graham: I would tell them to study the past record of the stock market, study their own capabilities, and find out whether they can identify an approach to investment they feel would be satisfactory in their own case. And if they have done that, pursue that without any reference to what other people do or think or say. Stick to their own methods. That’s what we did with our own business. We never followed the crowd, and I think that’s favorable for the young analyst. If he or she reads The Intelligent Investor—which I feel would be more useful than Security Analysis of the two books—and selects from what we say some approach which one thinks would be profitable, then I say that one should do this and stick to it. I had a nephew who started in Wall Street a number of years ago and came to me for some advice. I said to him, “Dick, I have some practical advice to give you which is this. You can buy closed- end investment companies at 15 percent discounts on an average. Get your friends to put “x” amount of dollars a month in these closed- end companies at discounts and you will start ahead of the game and you will make out all right.” Well, he did do that—he had no great difficulty in starting his business on that basis. It did work out all right and then the big bull market came along and, of course, he moved over to other fields and did an enormous amount of speculative business later. But at least he started, I think, on a sound basis. And if you start on a sound basis, you are half- way along.

Graham：我会建议他们研究股市的历史记录，研究自身能力，并弄清楚能否识别一种在自己情境下认为令人满意的投资方法。如果做到了，就不必理会他人做什么、怎么想、怎么说，坚持自己的方法。这也是我们经营自身业务时的做法。我们从不随大流，我认为这对年轻分析师是件好事。如果他或她读 The Intelligent Investor——在这两本书中，我觉得它比 Security Analysis 更有用——并从我们的论述中挑选出一种自认为会带来收益的方法，那么我建议就按此去做并坚持下去。多年前我有个外甥在 Wall Street 入行，来向我请教。我对他说：“Dick，我给你一个实用建议。你可以以平均 15% 的折价买入封闭式投资公司。让你的朋友们每月以折价投入固定金额买这些封闭式公司，你就能先人一步，结果也会不错。”他确实这么做了——以此为基础启动业务并不困难。事实证明确实有效；随后大牛市到来，他当然转向其他领域，后来做了大量投机性业务。但至少我认为，他的起步是稳健的。如果你从稳健的基础开始，你就已经成功一半了。

HB: Do you think that Wall Street or the typical analyst or portfolio managers have learned their lessons of the “Go- Go” funds, the growth cult, the one- decision stocks, the two- tier market, and all?

HB：你认为 Wall Street 或典型的分析师、投资组合经理，从“Go-Go”基金、增长崇拜、一次决策型股票（one-decision stocks）、双层市场（two-tier market）等经历中汲取了教训吗？

Graham: No. They used to say about the Bourbons that they forgot nothing and they learned nothing, and I’ll say about the Wall Street people, typically, is that they learn nothing, and they forget everything. I have no confidence whatever in the future behavior of the Wall Street people. I think this business of greed- the excessive hopes and fears and so on- will be with us as long as there will be people. There is a famous passage in Bagehot, the English economist, in which he describes how panics come about. Typically, if people have money, it is available to be lost and they speculate with it and they lose it- that’s how panics are done. I am very cynical about Wall Street.

Graham：没有。人们曾这样评说 Bourbons：他们什么也不忘，也什么也不学；而我对 Wall Street 的人通常要说的是：他们什么也学不到，却什么都忘掉。我对 Wall Street 人今后的行为毫无信心。我认为关于贪婪这件事——过度的希望与恐惧等等——只要有人类，就会伴随而来。英国经济学家 Bagehot 有一段著名论述，描述恐慌是如何发生的。典型地，人们手里有钱，就有可以亏掉的钱；他们用它去投机，结果把它亏掉——这就是恐慌的生成方式。我对 Wall Street 抱持高度的犬儒态度。

HB: But there are independent thinkers on Wall Street and throughout the country who do well, aren’t there?

HB：但在 Wall Street 以及全国各地，确实也有独立思考者做得很好，对吧？

Graham: Yes. There are two requirements for success in Wall Street. One, you have to think correctly; and secondly, you have to think independently.

Graham：是的。在 Wall Street 获得成功有两个要件：其一，你必须思考得正确；其二，你必须独立思考。

HB: Yes, correctly and independently. The sun is trying to come out now, literally, here in La Jolla. What do you see of the sunshine on Wall Street?

HB：没错，既要正确也要独立。此刻 La Jolla 的太阳正试图露面。从 Wall Street 的“阳光”来看，你看到了什么？

Graham: Well, there has been plenty of sunshine since the middle of 1974 when the bottom of the market was reached. And my guess is that Wall Street hasn’t changed at all. The present optimism is going to be overdone, and the next pessimism will be overdone, and you are back on the Ferris Wheel- whatever you want to call it- - Scesaw, Merry- Go- Round. You will be back on that. Right now, stocks as a whole are not overvalued, in my opinion. But nobody seems concerned with what are the possibilities that 1970 and 1973- 1974 will be duplicated in the next five years. Apparently, nobody has given any thought to that question. But that such experiences will be duplicated in the next five years or so, you can bet your Dow Jones Average on that.

Graham：嗯，自 1974 年中市场触底以来，阳光一直相当充足。而我猜想 Wall Street 丝毫没有改变。当前的乐观会被过度放大，下一轮的悲观也会被过度放大，而你会回到那座摩天轮上——不管你怎么称呼它——跷跷板、旋转木马。你会再次回到那里。在我看来，就当前而言，整体股票并未被高估。但似乎没有人关心这样一种可能性：1970 年和 1973–1974 年的情形会在未来五年内重演。显然，没有人认真想过这个问题。不过，对这些经历将在未来五年左右重演这件事，你可以拿你的 Dow Jones Average 来打赌。

HB: This has been a most pleasant and stimulative visit. We will look forward to receiving in Charlottesville your memoirs manuscript. Thank you so much, Mr. Graham!

HB：这次拜访格外愉快、启发良多。我们期待在 Charlottesville 收到你的回忆录手稿。非常感谢你，Graham 先生！