1994-03-01 Warren Buffett.A beta purist

Refer To：《1994-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Considering the similarity of this year’s list and the last, you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an interest in a business that is both understandable and durably wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to replace.

鉴于今年的名单与去年几乎一样，你也许会觉得管理层已经“昏迷不醒”。但我们依然认为：把自己在一家“既容易理解、又长期卓越”的企业中的权益卖掉，通常是愚蠢的。因为这类企业权益实在太难被替代。

Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price. “Why,” the CEO would ask, “should I part with my crown jewel?” Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will offhandedly—and even impetuously—move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of these is perhaps, “You can’t go broke taking a profit.” Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.

有趣的是，公司经理人在经营自己实际控制的业务时，对这一点一点也不难理解：一家母公司如果拥有一家长期经济性极佳的子公司，几乎不可能因为“价格合适”就把它卖掉。“为什么，”CEO 会问，“我要把我的皇冠上的宝石卖出去？”然而同样一个 CEO，在管理自己的个人投资组合时，却可能因为经纪人给出的几句肤浅理由，就轻率甚至冲动地从一个生意跳到另一个生意。其中最糟糕的说法之一，可能就是：“落袋为安，赚了就不会破产（You can’t go broke taking a profit）。”你能想象一个 CEO 用这句话去劝董事会卖掉一家明星子公司吗？在我们看来，生意上讲得通的道理，用在股票上也同样讲得通：投资者通常应当以与“全资拥有者”同样的韧性，去持有一家杰出企业的一小部分股权。

Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938, more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the writer reported: “Several times every year a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola’s record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before him.”

前面我提到过：如果在 1919 年用 40 美元投资 The Coca-Cola Co.，长期下来会得到怎样的财务结果。1938 年，在 Coke 推出已经超过 50 年、而且早已成为美国标志性产品很久之后，Fortune 曾写过一篇关于这家公司的优秀报道。该文第二段写道：“一年之中会有好几次，一位举足轻重、严肃认真的投资者，会长久地、怀着深深敬意地凝视 Coca-Cola 的历史记录，但最终只能遗憾地得出结论：他看得太晚了。‘饱和’与‘竞争’的幽灵，在他面前升起。”

Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But it’s worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the 192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend 1993.

是的，1938 年有竞争，1993 年同样有竞争。但值得注意的是：1938 年 The Coca-Cola Co. 卖出了 2.07 亿箱软饮料（如果把当时按加仑计量的销量换算成今天使用的 192 盎司/箱的口径），而 1993 年它卖出了约 107 亿箱——实体销量增长了 50 倍。要知道，1938 年这家公司在其极为重要的行业里就已经处于主导地位了。对投资者而言，“派对”在 1938 年也远未结束：1919 年投入在一股股票上的 40 美元（股息再投资）到 1938 年底已变成 3,277 美元；而如果在 1938 年再投入一笔新的 40 美元买 Coca-Cola 股票，到 1993 年底会增长到 25,000 美元。

I can’t resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story: “It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola’s.” In the 55 years that have since passed, Coke’s product line has broadened somewhat, but it’s remarkable how well that description still fits.

我忍不住还想再引一句 1938 年 Fortune 那篇文章的话：“要举出一家与 Coca-Cola 规模相当的公司很难，而像 Coca-Cola 这样销售一种几乎不变的产品、却能展示出类似 Coca-Cola 那样的十年纪录的公司，就更难了。”此后过去了 55 年，Coke 的产品线确实有所扩展，但令人惊讶的是，这段描述直到今天仍然高度贴切。

国内有一家做冰淇淋的，叫“野人先生”，参考：《对话野人先生：野蛮生长的中国冰淇淋》，这个店在新加坡刚开了分店：《Sweet Arrival: YEAH GELATO 野人先生 Opens in Singapore!》。

Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it’s just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire’s capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart—and not too smart at that—only a very few times. Indeed, we’ll now settle for one good idea a year. (Charlie says it’s my turn.)

Charlie 和我很早就认定：在一生的投资生涯里，做出几百个“聪明决定”实在太难了。随着 Berkshire 的资本规模像蘑菇一样膨胀，而能对我们结果产生显著影响的投资标的范围急剧收缩，这个判断变得更加有说服力。因此，我们采用了一种策略：它要求我们只需要在极少数时候聪明——而且不必聪明过头。事实上，现在我们一年能有一个好点子就满足了。（Charlie 说轮到我了。）

The strategy we’ve adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as “the possibility of loss or injury.”

我们采用的策略，决定了我们不可能遵循标准的“分散化教条”。因此，许多评论家会说：这种策略必然比更传统投资者的做法风险更高。我们不同意。我们认为：如果投资组合的集中能像它应当做到的那样——同时提升投资者思考一家企业的强度，以及在买入之前对其经济特征必须达到的“舒适程度”——那么集中持仓的政策反而可能降低风险。在这里，我们按字典的含义来定义风险：即“发生损失或伤害的可能性”。

Academics, however, like to define investment “risk” differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks—that is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the “beta” of a stock—its relative volatility in the past—and then build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.

然而，学者们喜欢用另一种方式定义投资“风险”：他们认为风险就是股票或股票组合的相对波动性——也就是相对于一个大型股票集合而言的波动程度。借助数据库与统计技能，这些学者会精确计算一只股票的 “beta”（过去的相对波动性），并围绕这一计算建立起晦涩的投资与资本配置理论。但在他们渴望用一个单一统计指标来衡量风险时，却忘了一个基本原则：大致正确胜过精确地错误（It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong）。

For owners of a business—and that’s the way we think of shareholders—the academics’ definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market—as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973—becomes “riskier” at the lower price than it was at the higher price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?

对于一家企业的所有者——而我们正是这样看待股东的——学者们对风险的定义偏离得太远了，远到会推导出荒谬结论。比如，在以 beta 为基础的理论下，一只相对于大盘大幅下跌的股票——就像我们 1973 年买入时的 Washington Post——在更低的价格反而会被判定为“更高风险”，而不是在更高的价格更高风险。对一个被以大幅折价报价“整家公司”的人来说，这样的描述当时能有什么意义？

In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he introduced “Mr. Market,” an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That’s true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly.

事实上，真正的投资者欢迎波动。Ben Graham 在《The Intelligent Investor》第 8 章解释了原因：他在那里介绍了“Mr. Market”——一个每天都会出现的热心人，随时准备按你希望的方向，要么向你买入，要么向你卖出。这个家伙越是躁狂抑郁，投资者可得的机会就越大。原因很简单：剧烈波动的市场意味着，理性上很扎实的企业会周期性地被贴上非理性低价。对于一个完全自由、既可以忽略市场、也可以利用市场愚蠢行为的投资者而言，很难理解为什么“能以这种价格买到好公司”会被认为是在增加风险。

In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to know the company’s name. What he treasures is the price history of its stock. In contrast, we’ll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company’s business. After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two. We don’t need a daily quote on our 100% position in See’s or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?

在评估风险时，一个 beta 纯粹主义者会不屑于研究公司生产什么、竞争对手在做什么、企业用了多少借款。他甚至可能更愿意不知道公司的名字。他珍视的是股票的价格历史。相比之下，我们宁可完全不了解价格历史，而去寻找一切能增进我们对企业经营理解的信息。因此，买入股票后，即便市场关闭一两年，我们也不会因此不安。我们并不需要 See’s 或 H. H. Brown 这类我们 100% 持股的企业每天给个报价来证明我们过得很好。那我们又为什么需要对我们仅持有 7% 的 Coke 每天看一个报价呢？

In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:

在我们看来，投资者必须评估的真正风险，是：在他预期持有期内，一项投资为他带来的税后总回款（包括出售时收到的款项）是否至少能给他带来——（1）不低于起初那笔投入的购买力；并且（2）在这笔初始投入之上再加上一点温和的利息回报。尽管这种风险无法用工程学那样的精度去计算，但在某些情况下，它能以对决策有用的准确度被判断出来。影响这一判断的主要因素包括：

1.The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated;

对一家企业长期经济特征能够被评估的确定性；

2.The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;

对管理层能够被评估的确定性——既包括其实现企业全部潜力的能力，也包括其明智运用现金流的能力；

3.The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;

对管理层是否可以被指望把企业回报导向股东、而非导向自身的确定性；

4.The purchase price of the business;

企业的买入价格；

5.The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor’s purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.

未来将经历的税收与通胀水平——它们将决定投资者的“购买力回报”相对于名义回报会被削减到何种程度。

These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, “I know it when I see it,” so also can investors—in an inexact but useful way—”see” the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.

这些因素在许多分析师看来，恐怕会“模糊得让人受不了”，因为它们无法从任何数据库中提取出来。但无法精确量化，并不意味着这些问题不重要；也不意味着困难不可克服。就像 Justice Stewart 认为他无法为“淫秽”制定一个可操作的测试标准，却仍然断言：“我一看就知道（I know it when I see it）。”同样，投资者也可以在不精确但有用的意义上，在不依赖复杂方程或价格历史的前提下，“看见”某些投资中内含的风险。

Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.

真的有那么难得出这样的结论吗：从长期看，Coca-Cola 和 Gillette 的商业风险远远小于任何一家电脑公司或零售商？在全球范围内，Coke 卖出了约 44% 的所有软饮料，而 Gillette 在刀片市场的份额（按价值计）超过 60%。如果不算 Wrigley 主导的口香糖业务，我不知道还有哪一个重要行业里，龙头企业能长期享有如此强大的全球统治力。

刀片的“注意力密度”更高：每天在脖子上做决策，鞋的“注意力密度”通常更低、更分散，巴菲特可能真的认为刀片上的承诺更有确定性。

Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: “Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth.”

此外，Coke 与 Gillette 近些年实际上还提高了它们在全球市场的份额。它们品牌名称的威力、产品属性，以及分销体系的强大，使它们拥有巨大的竞争优势——在其经济城堡周围挖出了一条保护性的护城河。相比之下，普通公司每天都在没有任何这种防护手段的情况下作战。正如 Peter Lynch 所说：销售“近似大宗商品”产品的公司股票，应该贴上一张警示标签——“竞争可能对人类财富有害（Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth）。”

The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured? Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company—its stock—is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense.

像 Coke 或 Gillette 这样的竞争优势，即便是随意观察商业的人也能看得很清楚。然而，它们股票的 beta 却与许多平庸公司相差无几，而那些公司几乎没有竞争优势。我们是否应当从这种相似性得出结论：当用来衡量商业风险时，Coke 与 Gillette 的竞争优势并没有带来任何好处？或者我们是否应当得出结论：持有一家公司的“一部分”——也就是它的股票——其风险不知怎么地与该公司经营中内含的长期风险脱钩了？我们认为这两种结论都不合理；把 beta 等同于投资风险同样不合理。

The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it’s quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness. Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.

一个在 beta 理论中长大的人，并没有机制来区分这样两类风险：比如，一家只有单一产品的玩具公司，卖的是 pet rocks（宠物石头）或 hula hoops（呼拉圈），与另一家玩具公司，唯一产品却是 Monopoly（大富翁）或 Barbie（芭比娃娃）。但只要对消费者行为以及决定长期竞争强弱的因素有合理理解，普通投资者完全可以作出这种区分。当然，每个投资者都会犯错。但如果把研究范围限制在少数几个容易理解的案例上，一个相对聪明、信息充分、且勤勉的人，就能以对决策有用的准确度去判断投资风险。

这里点到了生理性的问题：对现实世界基本不信任、遇到问题时第一反应是逃避，最终导致大脑里的想法和现实之间缺少联系、想法和想法之间也没有联系；因为和所以变成语言游戏；现象和本质都只是表面上的、自我解释的东西（缺少根据的幻觉）。

In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can’t determine whether we are dealing with a “pet rock” or a “Barbie.” We couldn’t solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.) Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We’ll stick instead with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?

当然，在许多行业里，Charlie 和我并不能判断我们面对的究竟是“pet rock”还是“Barbie”。即便我们花上几年时间深入研究这些行业，也未必能解决这个问题。有时是我们自身智识上的短板妨碍理解；另一些时候，则是行业本身的性质构成障碍。比如，一个必须应对快速技术变迁的行业，就很难让人对其长期经济性做出可靠评估。三十年前，我们能预见电视制造业或计算机行业会发生什么吗？当然不能。（多数当年热情进入这些行业的投资者与企业管理者也不能。）既然如此，我们又为什么现在会认为自己能预测其他快速演化行业的未来？我们宁愿坚持做那些“容易的案例”。当一根针就明晃晃地放在眼前时，何必去找一根埋在草堆里的针？

Of course, some investment strategies—for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years—require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a risky investment—one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury—if you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.

当然，有些投资策略——例如我们多年进行的套利——需要广泛分散。如果单笔交易本身存在显著风险，那么把它作为许多相互独立承诺中的一笔，就能降低整体风险。因此，如果你相信：按概率加权后的潜在收益显著高于按概率加权后的潜在损失，并且你能够做出若干类似但彼此无关的承诺，那么你可以有意识地买入一项“高风险投资”——它确实有显著的可能导致损失或伤害。多数风险投资人采用的就是这种策略。如果你选择走这条路，你应当采取一种“赌场思维”：赌场拥有轮盘赌，它希望看到大量下注，因为赔率对它有利；但它会拒绝接受一笔单一的、巨额的赌注。

类似于再保险，需要考虑最坏的情况（不至于重头再来），除分散以外有一个封顶的损失，整体上只能作为补充而不是主干的商业模式，这类业务做多了可能会影响Attention的偏离。

Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases. By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals. Paradoxically, when “dumb” money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.

另一种需要广泛分散的情形是：当一位投资者并不理解具体企业的经济特征，但仍认为自己做美国工业的长期所有者符合自身利益时。这位投资者应当同时做到两点：持有大量股票，并把买入分散在时间上（分批买入）。例如，通过定期投资指数基金，这位“什么都不懂”的投资者，实际上可以跑赢大多数投资专业人士。悖论在于：当“笨钱”承认自己的局限时，它就不再是笨钱了。

On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices—the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”

另一方面，如果你是“懂一些”的投资者——能够理解商业经济性，并能找到 5 到 10 家价格合理、且具备重要长期竞争优势的公司——那么传统意义上的分散化对你就毫无意义。它往往只会伤害你的结果，并增加你的风险。我无法理解：这类投资者为什么要把钱投向自己“第 20 喜欢”的生意，而不是把这笔钱继续加到自己最看好的选择上——那些他最理解、风险最小、同时利润潜力最大的企业。用“女先知” Mae West 的话说：“好东西太多，可能会更美妙（Too much of a good thing can be wonderful）。”

1994-03-01 Warren Buffett.A beta purist

1994-03-01 Warren Buffett.A beta purist

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