2001-02-28 Warren Buffett.Real Estate

Refer To：《2001-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Furthermore, we completed two significant acquisitions that we negotiated in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases have cost us about $8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock. The eight businesses we’ve acquired have aggregate sales of about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases, and our shares outstanding have increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.

此外，我们完成了两项在 1999 年谈妥的重要收购，并启动了另外六项收购。合计来看，这些收购大约花费了我们 80 亿美元，其中 97% 用现金支付，3% 用股票支付。我们收购的这八家企业合计销售额约 130 亿美元，雇佣 58,000 名员工。尽管如此，我们在这些收购中没有新增债务，流通股数量仅增加了 1/3 个百分点。更妙的是，我们仍然拥有充裕的流动资产，对更大规模的收购既渴望也随时准备好了。

I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But I will tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to control your excitement.

我会在报告下一部分详细介绍这些收购。但我现在就先告诉你：我们已经拥抱 21 世纪，进入了诸如砖块、地毯、保温材料和油漆这类“尖端行业”。请尽量控制住你的兴奋。

2003年，Building Products税前利润：5.59亿美元+Shaw Industries税前利润：4.36亿美元，合计：9.95亿美元；

2009年，跌到谷底，四者合计税前利润 2.27亿美元，较2006年的 12.95亿美元下降 82.5%，但巴菲特强调“竞争地位未受损”；

2024年，已经走回正常，披露的“Building products”组税前利润约 41.34亿美元。

*****

Acquisitions of 2000

2000 年的收购

Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer the phone. I’m also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now, because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire. Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page 23, and the number to call is 402-346-1400.

Berkshire 的收购方法简单到不能再简单：我们接电话。我也很高兴地报告：现在电话响得更频繁了，因为越来越多的所有者和/或经理人希望把他们的公司与 Berkshire 结成一体。我们的收购标准列在第 23 页，联系电话是 402-346-1400。

Let me tell you a bit about the businesses we have purchased during the past 14 months, starting with the two transactions that were initiated in 1999, but closed in 2000. (This list excludes some smaller purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and that, in most cases, will be integrated into their operations.)

让我介绍一下过去 14 个月里我们买下的企业，先从两笔在 1999 年启动、但在 2000 年完成交割的交易说起。（这份清单不包括一些由我们子公司经理人完成的小型收购；在多数情况下，这些收购会被整合进他们现有的运营中。）

• I described the first purchase — 76% of MidAmerican Energy — in last year’s report. Because of regulatory constraints on our voting privileges, we perform only a “one-line” consolidation of MidAmerican’s earnings and equity in our financial statements. If we instead fully consolidated the company’s figures, our revenues in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we reported, though net income would remain the same.

我在去年的报告里描述过第一笔收购——收购 MidAmerican Energy 的 76% 股权。由于监管对我们投票权的限制，我们在财务报表中只对 MidAmerican 的盈利和权益做“一行式”合并（one-line consolidation）。如果我们改为把该公司全面并表，那么我们 2000 年的收入将比报告中披露的数字多 50 亿美元，但净利润会保持不变。

• On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.

1999 年 11 月 23 日，我收到 Bruce Cort 发来的一页传真，附了一篇《The Washington Post》的文章，内容是关于 CORT Business Services 一桩被迫中止的收购案。尽管他也姓 Cort，Bruce 和 CORT 并无关联。他是一名飞机经纪人，1986 年曾卖给 Berkshire 一架喷气式飞机；在这份传真之前，他与我已有大约十年没有联系。

I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29, and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made sense.

我对 CORT 一无所知，但我立刻打印了它向 SEC 提交的文件，看完后很喜欢。当天下午我就告诉 Bruce：我可能有兴趣，并请他安排我与 CORT 的 CEO Paul Arnold 见面。我和 Paul 在 11 月 29 日见了面，我马上就知道，我们具备了一次收购所需的正确要素：一家不错但并不“光鲜”的企业；一位杰出的经理人；以及一个合理的价格（参照那笔失败交易中的价格）。

Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in “rent-to-rent” furniture, primarily used in offices but also by temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be noted, has no similarity to “rent-to-own” operations, which usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to people having limited income and poor credit.

CORT 通过 117 家展厅运营，是全国“rent-to-rent（租来再租）”家具业务的领导者，主要服务办公室，也为公寓的短期居住者提供家具。需要特别说明的是：这种业务与 “rent-to-own（租购）” 完全不同；后者通常是把家用家具和电子产品卖给收入有限、信用不佳的人群。

We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.

我们很快让 Wesco（我们持股 80% 的子公司）收购了 CORT，支付现金约 3.86 亿美元。关于 CORT 运营的更多细节，你可以在 Wesco 的 1999 与 2000 年年度报告中看到。Charlie 和我都很喜欢与 Paul 共事，而且 CORT 看起来很有希望跑赢我们当初的预期。

跟住房有关的资产配置。

• Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks — “excess and surplus lines” in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.

去年年初，General Re 的 Ron Ferguson 牵线让我认识了 Bob Berry；Bob 的家族已经持有 U.S. Liability 49 年。这家保险公司连同两家姊妹公司，是一家中等规模、备受尊敬的“特殊风险”承保人——用保险业行话说，就是承做“excess and surplus lines（超额与剩余险种）”。我和 Bob 取得联系后，我们在电话里就谈妥了一笔交易：一半用股票支付，一半用现金支付。

In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU national tournament.

近几年里，Tom Nerney 代表 Berry 家族管理这项业务，实现了罕见的组合：增长优秀、盈利异常出色。Tom 在其他方面也同样是个“狠角色”。除了有四个领养孩子（其中两个来自 Russia），他还有一个“大家庭”：Philadelphia Belles——一支由 Tom 执教的青春期前后女孩篮球队。去年这支队伍战绩 62 胜 4 负，并在 AAU 全国锦标赛中获得亚军。

Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to the collection.

优秀的财产与意外险公司并不多。我们手里这种好公司已经远超“应得份额”，而 U.S. Liability 让这套收藏更添光彩。

• Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a deal, again half for cash and half for stock.

Ben Bridge Jeweler 是我们通过电话完成的另一笔收购——在我与管理层任何面对面会谈之前就敲定了。管理这家西海岸 65 家门店零售商的是 Ed Bridge 以及他的堂兄 Jon。Ed 是 Barnett Helzberg 的朋友；我们在 1995 年从 Barnett 那里收购了 Helzberg Diamonds。Barnett 得知 Bridge 家族打算出售公司后，强烈向 Berkshire 推荐。随后 Ed 来电向我介绍业务，并寄来一些数据，我们又达成了一笔交易：同样是一半现金、一半股票。

Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family— including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed — enjoy extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by 9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a truly remarkable record.

Ed 和 Jon 是第四代家族持股经营者，这门生意 89 年前创立于 Seattle。无论公司还是家族——包括 Jon 与 Ed 的父亲 Herb 和 Bob——都享有极高声誉。过去七年，同店销售分别增长 9%、11%、13%、10%、12%、21% 和 7%，这是非常惊人的成绩单。

It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they knew I could be believed: After all, it’s obvious that your Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned black belts as purchasers).

对家族而言，关键在于：未来公司仍要像过去一样运作。没人希望另一家珠宝连锁进来，拿所谓“协同效应”和“降本增效”的想法把组织折腾得面目全非（这些点子虽然永远不会奏效，但肯定会被尝试）。我告诉 Ed 和 Jon：他们将继续掌舵，他们也知道我说到做到。毕竟，你们的董事长如果真的去经营门店或卖珠宝，显然会是一场灾难——尽管他家里确实有人在“买货”这件事上练到了黑带级别。

In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-workers who had helped the company achieve its success. We’re proud to be associated with both the family and the company.

Bridge 家族一如既往地体面：他们把出售所得中的相当一部分分配给数百位同事——正是这些同事帮助公司取得成功。我们很自豪能与这个家族及这家公司结缘。

• In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western boots — including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa brands — and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five neighboring states.

7 月，我们收购了 Justin Industries——它是 Western boots（西部靴）领域的龙头制造商，旗下品牌包括 Justin、Tony Lama、Nocona 和 Chippewa；同时也是 Texas 及其周边五个州最顶尖的砖块生产商。

Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity. On May 4th, I received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to me, proposing that Berkshire join a group to acquire an unnamed company. I faxed him back, explaining that with rare exceptions we don’t invest with others, but would happily pay him a commission if he sent details and we later made a purchase. He replied that the “mystery company” was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to meet John Roach, chairman of the company and John Justin, who had built the business and was its major shareholder. Soon after, we bought Justin for $570 million in cash.

这一次，我们的收购同样带有“机缘巧合”的味道。5 月 4 日，我收到 Mark Jones（我此前并不认识他）发来的一份传真，提议 Berkshire 与一个团体联合收购一家未具名的公司。我回传真解释：除极少数例外，我们不与他人联合投资；但如果他把细节发来，且我们后来完成了收购，我们很乐意支付他佣金。他回复说，这家“神秘公司”就是 Justin。随后我去了 Fort Worth，会见了公司董事长 John Roach 以及打造了这门生意并持有主要股份的 John Justin。不久之后，我们以 5.7 亿美元现金收购了 Justin。

John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in late February). John was a class act — as a citizen, businessman and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously.

John Justin 非常热爱 Justin Industries，但因严重的健康问题被迫退休（遗憾的是，这也在 2 月底导致了他的去世）。John 是个“有格局的人”——无论作为公民、商人还是作为一个人本身。幸运的是，他培养了两位杰出的经理人：负责 Acme 的 Harrold Melton，以及负责 Justin Boot 的 Randy Watson；两人都以高度自治的方式管理各自公司。

Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the industry’s national output. The brick business, however, is necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn’t have named a brand of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due to Acme’s product quality, but also reflects many decades of extraordinary community service by both the company and John Justin.

Acme 是两项业务中规模更大的那一个：它在 22 家工厂每年生产超过 10 亿块砖，约占全美行业产量的 11.7%。不过，砖块生意必然是区域性的；在其覆盖区域内，Acme 拥有毋庸置疑的领导地位。问 Texas 人能说出一个砖块品牌时，75% 会回答 Acme，而排名第二的品牌只有 16%。（在我们收购之前，我连一个砖块品牌都说不上来。你能吗？）这种品牌认知不仅来自 Acme 的产品质量，也反映了公司与 John Justin 数十年来在社区服务方面做出的卓越贡献。

I can’t resist pointing out that Berkshire — whose top management has long been mired in the 19th century — is now one of the very few authentic “clicks-and-bricks” businesses around. We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet, and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat in Silicon Valley.

我忍不住要指出：Berkshire 的高层管理长期“陷在 19 世纪的泥潭里”，而现在我们已经成为少数真正意义上的“clicks-and-bricks（点击与砖头）”企业之一。我们在 2000 年开局时，GEICO 已经在互联网做了相当规模的业务，随后我们又把 Acme 加进来。你可以打赌：Berkshire 这一招，肯定让 Silicon Valley 的人出了一身汗。

• In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world’s largest carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these being eliminated through insurance.

6 月，Shaw Industries 的 CEO Bob Shaw（全球最大的地毯制造商）与他的合伙人 Julian Saul，以及另一家正在与 Shaw 考虑合并的公司的 CEO 一起来见我。不过，这个潜在合并对象因过去业务而背负巨额石棉（asbestos）责任诉讼，任何交易都必须以“通过保险把这些责任消除”为前提。

The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though we could write an exceptionally large policy — far larger than any other insurer would ever think of offering — we would never issue a policy that lacked a cap.

来访的高管们希望 Berkshire 提供一份保单，承担未来所有石棉相关成本。我解释说：我们确实可以承保一份规模极其巨大的保单——大到任何其他保险公司都不会考虑提供——但我们绝不会签发一份没有上限（cap）的保单。

Bob and Julian decided that if we didn’t want to bet the ranch on the extent of the acquiree’s liability, neither did they. So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian’s record: Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining forces in 1998.

Bob 和 Julian 认为：如果我们都不愿意把整座牧场押在被收购方责任规模的未知数上，那他们也不愿意。于是这笔合并交易就告吹了。但我因此对 Shaw 产生了兴趣；几个月后，Charlie 和我与 Bob 会面，开始谈 Berkshire 收购 Shaw 的方案。交易的一个关键条款是：Bob 与 Julian 继续各自持有 Shaw 至少 5% 的股权。这使得我们能与行业里最优秀的人“绑在一起”——从 Bob 与 Julian 的履历就能看出：在 1998 年他们联手之前，两人各自都曾打造出规模庞大且成功的地毯企业。

Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won’t mind.

Shaw 年销售额约 40 亿美元，我们持有该公司 87.3% 的股权。若不算保险业务，Shaw 远远是我们最大的企业。现在，就算别人每天都从我们身上踩来踩去，我们也不会介意了。

• In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer was “Tell me more.”

7 月，Benjamin Moore Paint 的董事 Bob Mundheim 来电，问 Berkshire 是否有兴趣收购该公司。我在 Salomon 时就认识 Bob——那段艰难时期他担任总法律顾问——我非常敬重他，所以我的回答是：“多讲讲。”

In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them; we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we completed it in December. Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our product for your next paint job.

8 月下旬，Charlie 和我与 Benjamin Moore 的前任与现任 CEO——Richard Roob 与 Yvan Dupuy——见了面。我们喜欢他们；喜欢这门生意；并当场开出 10 亿美元的现金报价。10 月，他们的董事会批准了交易，我们在 12 月完成收购。Benjamin Moore 已经生产涂料 117 年，并拥有成千上万家独立经销商——这是其业务至关重要的资产。你下一次刷漆时，务必指定使用我们的产品。

• Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about $1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the last few decades — too multifaceted to be chronicled here — was shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos products. The much-publicized health problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring bankruptcy in 1982.

最后，在 12 月下旬，我们同意以约 18 亿美元收购 Johns Manville Corp.。这家公司在过去几十年经历了一段不可思议的“奥德赛”——复杂到无法在此完整叙述——其走向深受其长期生产石棉制品历史的影响。石棉暴露导致的、广为人知的健康问题影响了许多人，最终使 JM 在 1982 年申请破产。

Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO group was unable to obtain financing.

随后，破产法院为受害者设立了一只信托基金，其最重要的资产是对 JM 的控股权。这个信托基金（非常理性地）希望分散资产，于是去年 6 月同意将该企业出售给一家 LBO（杠杆收购）买方。但最终，LBO 团队未能获得融资。

Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted tentatively to accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract.

因此，这笔交易在 12 月 8 日（星期五）被取消。紧接着的下周一，Charlie 和我给信托基金主席 Bob Felise 打电话，提出一份“全现金、无融资条件”的报价。第二天，受托人们初步投票同意接受我们的报价；一周后，我们签署了合同。

JM is the nation’s leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of engineered products. The company’s sales exceed $2 billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM’s CEO, had announced his retirement plans a year ago, but I’m happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around.

JM 是美国商业与工业保温材料的领先生产商，同时在屋顶系统以及多种工程化产品上也占据重要位置。公司销售额超过 20 亿美元，业务回报不错，尽管具有周期性。JM 的 CEO Jerry Henry 早在一年前就宣布了退休计划，但我很高兴地告诉你：Charlie 和我说服他继续留下来。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw near-term slowdowns in their businesses — and, in fact, we purchased several companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all of our businesses to now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don’t care about the bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us.

去年我们之所以出现一波收购活动高峰，背后可能有两个经济因素在起作用。第一，许多经理人和企业主预见到他们的业务在短期内会放缓——事实上，我们收购的几家公司，其盈利几乎肯定会在今年从 1999 或 2000 年的峰值回落。对我们而言，这种回落无关紧要，因为我们预期所有企业都会时不时经历起伏。（只有在投行的销售演示里，盈利才会永远向上。）我们不在乎这些颠簸；重要的是整体结果。但其他人的决策有时会受到短期前景影响：这既会刺激卖方更愿意出售，也会让原本可能与我们竞争的买方降低热情。

A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, “financial” buyers of businesses — those who wish to buy using only a sliver of equity — became unable to borrow all they thought they needed. What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price. Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their bidding when businesses came up for sale last year. Because we analyze purchases on an all-equity basis, our evaluations did not change, which means we became considerably more competitive.

第二个帮助我们在 2000 年成功出手的因素是：垃圾债市场在那一年逐渐枯竭。在此前两年里，垃圾债买家放松了标准，用不恰当的价格去买越来越弱的发行人债务。去年，这种松懈的后果体现为违约率的膨胀。在这样的环境中，那些“金融型”买家——也就是只想拿很少的自有资金、靠大量借债来买企业的人——发现自己借不到他们以为需要的那么多钱。即使还能借到，成本也非常高。因此，当企业在去年挂牌出售时，LBO 操作方在出价上变得不那么激进。我们则是用“全权益（all-equity）”视角来分析收购，因此估值没有变化——这意味着我们变得显著更具竞争力。

周期性行业的优点，行业周期和金融周期叠在一起了。

Aside from the economic factors that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn’t assure a deal — sellers have to like our price, and we have to like their business and management — but it does help.

除了这些对我们有利的经济因素之外，我们在收购方面现在还有一个重大且日益增强的优势：我们往往是卖方“首选的买家”。当然，这并不保证成交——卖方必须喜欢我们的价格，我们也必须喜欢他们的业务与管理层——但它确实有帮助。

We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale will bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities will likely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense of direction. The reverse is apt to be true, also. When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the seller is a “financial owner.” And if owners behave with little regard for their business and its people, their conduct will often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the company.

当企业主在意“把公司卖给谁”时，我们觉得这很有意义。我们喜欢和那种热爱自己公司的人做生意，而不是只爱出售能带来的钱的人（当然，我们也完全理解他为什么也喜欢钱）。当这种情感依附存在时，往往意味着企业内部也可能拥有重要品质：诚实的会计、对产品的自豪感、对客户的尊重，以及一群忠诚、方向感强的同事。反过来通常也成立：当企业主把公司拿去拍卖，对未来毫不在意时，你常会发现这家公司为了出售被“精心打扮”过，尤其当卖方是“金融所有者”时更是如此。而如果企业主对公司及其员工缺乏敬意，他们的行为往往会污染整家公司的态度与做法。

可以作为Attention的解释。

When a business masterpiece has been created by a lifetime — or several lifetimes — of unstinting care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history. Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home. We take our obligations to the people who created a business very seriously, and Berkshire’s ownership structure ensures that we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth, or assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises to the bank.

当一件商业杰作，是靠一生——甚至几代人——毫无保留的用心与卓越才华打造出来时，对企业主而言，把这段历史托付给哪家公司延续，理应是重要的。Charlie 和我相信，Berkshire 提供了一个几乎独一无二的归宿。我们非常认真地对待对企业创造者及其人群所负的责任，而 Berkshire 的所有权结构确保我们能够兑现承诺。当我们告诉 John Justin：公司总部将继续留在 Fort Worth；或向 Bridge 家族保证：其业务不会与另一家珠宝商合并时，这些卖方可以把我们的承诺当成银行存款一样可靠。

How much better it is for the “painter” of a business Rembrandt to personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their business creations. We’ll leave the auctions to others.

让一位“画出商业版 Rembrandt”的创作者亲自为其作品选择永久归宿，远比让信托官员或漠不关心的继承人把它拿去拍卖要好得多。多年来，我们与那些认识到这一点、并把这种认识落实到自己商业创造上的人合作，经历非常愉快。拍卖这种事，就留给别人去做吧。

2001-02-28 Warren Buffett.Real Estate

2001-02-28 Warren Buffett.Real Estate

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