2001-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2000 was $3.96 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.5%. Over the last 36 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $40,442, a gain of 23.6% compounded annually.*
我们在 2000 年净资产增加了 39.6 亿美元，使 A 类与 B 类股票的每股账面价值均增长 6.5%。在过去 36 年（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 40,442 美元，年复合增长率为 23.6%*。
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于 Berkshire 的 A 类股票；在 1996 年之前，公司仅有这一类股票在外流通，A 类股票是其继承者。B 类股票的经济权益相当于 A 类股票的 1/30。
Overall, we had a decent year, our book-value gain having outpaced the performance of the S&P 500. And, though this judgment is necessarily subjective, we believe Berkshire’s gain in per-share intrinsic value moderately exceeded its gain in book value. (Intrinsic value, as well as other key investment and accounting terms and concepts, are explained in our Owner’s Manual on pages 59-66. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 64.)
总体而言，我们这一年表现不错：账面价值增幅跑赢了 S&P 500。并且，尽管这种判断不可避免带有主观性，我们认为 Berkshire 的每股内在价值增幅略高于其账面价值增幅。（内在价值以及其他关键投资与会计术语和概念，已在《Owner’s Manual》第 59–66 页解释；其中第 64 页讨论了内在价值。）
Furthermore, we completed two significant acquisitions that we negotiated in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases have cost us about $8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock. The eight businesses we’ve acquired have aggregate sales of about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases, and our shares outstanding have increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.
此外，我们完成了两项在 1999 年谈妥的重要收购，并启动了另外六项收购。合计来看，这些收购大约花费了我们 80 亿美元，其中 97% 用现金支付，3% 用股票支付。我们收购的这八家企业合计销售额约 130 亿美元，雇佣 58,000 名员工。尽管如此，我们在这些收购中没有新增债务，流通股数量仅增加了 1/3 个百分点。更妙的是，我们仍然拥有充裕的流动资产，对更大规模的收购既渴望也随时准备好了。
I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But I will tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to control your excitement.
我会在报告下一部分详细介绍这些收购。但我现在就先告诉你：我们已经拥抱 21 世纪，进入了诸如砖块、地毯、保温材料和油漆这类“尖端行业”。请尽量控制住你的兴奋。
On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt as the year progressed. It has become much more expensive to obtain new business. I told you last year that we would get our money’s worth from stepped-up advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong. We’ll examine the reasons later in the report.
不利的一面是：GEICO 的保单持有人增长在一年推进过程中逐渐放缓，最后几乎停滞。获取新业务的成本变得更高了。我去年告诉你，我们在 2000 年加大 GEICO 广告投放会“物有所值”，但我说错了。我们会在报告后面分析原因。
Another negative — which has persisted for several years — is that we see our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive. We own stocks of some excellent businesses, but most of our holdings are fully priced and are unlikely to deliver more than moderate returns in the future. We’re not alone in facing this problem: The long-term prospect for equities in general is far from exciting.
另一个负面因素——而且已持续好几年——是：我们认为自己的股票投资组合仅“略有吸引力”。我们确实持有一些优秀企业的股票，但多数持仓已经被充分定价，未来不太可能带来超过温和水平的回报。我们并非唯一面临此问题的人：总体而言，股票的长期前景并不令人兴奋。
Finally, there is the negative that recurs annually: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are a year older than when we last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse development is the indisputable fact that the age of your top managers is increasing at a considerably lower rate — percentage-wise — than is the case at almost all other major corporations. Better yet, this differential will widen in the future.
最后，还有一个每年都会重演的负面因素：Charlie Munger——Berkshire 的副董事长、我的合伙人——和我，相比上次向你们汇报时，又老了一岁。缓解这一不利变化的、无可辩驳的事实是：你们最高管理层的年龄增长速度（以百分比计）远低于几乎所有其他大型公司。更好的是，这种差距在未来还会扩大。
Charlie and I continue to aim at increasing Berkshire’s per-share value at a rate that, over time, will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P 500. As the table on the facing page shows, a small annual advantage in our favor can, if sustained, produce an anything-but-small long-term advantage. To reach our goal we will need to add a few good businesses to Berkshire’s stable each year, have the businesses we own generally gain in value, and avoid any material increase in our outstanding shares. We are confident about meeting the last two objectives; the first will require some luck.
Charlie 和我仍然致力于：让 Berkshire 的每股价值增长率在长期中略微超过持有 S&P 500 的收益率。正如对页表格所示，只要能够持续，我们每年哪怕只有一点点优势，长期累积下来也会变成“绝不小”的优势。要实现这一目标，我们需要：每年为 Berkshire 的“马厩”增添少数几家好企业；我们已拥有的企业整体上不断增值；并避免流通股数量出现任何实质性增加。对于后两项目标，我们很有把握；第一项则需要一些运气。
It’s appropriate here to thank two groups that made my job both easy and fun last year — just as they do every year. First, our operating managers continue to run their businesses in splendid fashion, which allows me to spend my time allocating capital rather than supervising them. (I wouldn’t be good at that anyway.)
在这里，适合向两个群体致谢——他们让我的工作在去年既轻松又有趣，而且年年如此。首先，我们的经营管理者继续以极佳的方式经营他们的企业，这使我能够把时间用在资本配置上，而不是监督他们。（反正我也不擅长监督。）
Our managers are a very special breed. At most large companies, the truly talented divisional managers seldom have the job they really want. Instead they yearn to become CEOs, either at their present employer or elsewhere. Indeed, if they stay put, they and their colleagues are likely to feel they have failed.
我们的经理人是一群非常特殊的“物种”。在大多数大公司里，真正有才华的事业部经理往往得不到他们真正想要的工作。相反，他们渴望成为 CEO——要么在本公司，要么去别处。事实上，如果他们一直留在原位，他们自己以及同事很可能会觉得这意味着“失败”。
At Berkshire, our all-stars have exactly the jobs they want, ones that they hope and expect to keep throughout their business lifetimes. They therefore concentrate solely on maximizing the long-term value of the businesses that they “own” and love. If the businesses succeed, they have succeeded. And they stick with us: In our last 36 years, Berkshire has never had a manager of a significant subsidiary voluntarily leave to join another business.
而在 Berkshire，我们的全明星拥有的正是他们想要的工作——他们希望并期待在整个职业生涯里一直做下去。因此，他们只专注于最大化他们“拥有并热爱”的业务的长期价值。企业成功，就等于他们成功。并且他们会一直跟我们在一起：在过去 36 年里，Berkshire 从未出现过任何一家重要子公司的经理人自愿离职去加入另一家企业。
The other group to which I owe enormous thanks is the home-office staff. After the eight acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide workforce to about 112,000, Charlie and I went soft last year and added one more person at headquarters. (Charlie, bless him, never lets me forget Ben Franklin’s advice: “A small leak can sink a great ship.”) Now we have 13.8 people.
我还要对另一群体表达巨大的感谢：总部（home-office）的员工。在这八项收购使我们全球员工人数翻倍、达到约 112,000 人之后，Charlie 和我去年“心软”了——在总部又增加了一个人。（Charlie，愿上帝保佑他，总不让我忘记 Ben Franklin 的忠告：“一个小漏洞就能让大船沉没。”）现在，我们总部有 13.8 个人。
This tiny band works miracles. In 2000 it handled all of the details connected with our eight acquisitions, processed extensive regulatory and tax filings (our tax return covers 4,896 pages), smoothly produced an annual meeting to which 25,000 tickets were issued, and accurately dispensed checks to 3,660 charities designated by our shareholders. In addition, the group dealt with all the routine tasks served up by a company with a revenue run-rate of $40 billion and more than 300,000 owners. And, to add to all of this, the other 12.8 are a delight to be around.
这支小队伍堪称奇迹制造者。2000 年，他们处理了与八项收购相关的所有细节；完成大量监管与税务申报（我们的报税文件共 4,896 页）；顺利组织了一场年会，发放了 25,000 张门票；并准确地向 3,660 家由股东指定的慈善机构发放支票。此外，这个团队还处理了一家年化收入达到 400 亿美元、拥有 300,000 多名所有者的公司日常所需的一切例行事务。更何况，在完成所有这些工作的同时，其余 12.8 个人还非常令人愉快、相处起来很舒服。
I should pay to have my job.
我应该倒贴钱来做这份工作。
Acquisitions of 2000
2000 年的收购
Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer the phone. I’m also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now, because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire. Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page 23, and the number to call is 402-346-1400.
Berkshire 的收购方法简单到不能再简单：我们接电话。我也很高兴地报告：现在电话响得更频繁了，因为越来越多的所有者和/或经理人希望把他们的公司与 Berkshire 结成一体。我们的收购标准列在第 23 页，联系电话是 402-346-1400。
Let me tell you a bit about the businesses we have purchased during the past 14 months, starting with the two transactions that were initiated in 1999, but closed in 2000. (This list excludes some smaller purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and that, in most cases, will be integrated into their operations.)
让我介绍一下过去 14 个月里我们买下的企业，先从两笔在 1999 年启动、但在 2000 年完成交割的交易说起。（这份清单不包括一些由我们子公司经理人完成的小型收购；在多数情况下，这些收购会被整合进他们现有的运营中。）
• I described the first purchase — 76% of MidAmerican Energy — in last year’s report. Because of regulatory constraints on our voting privileges, we perform only a “one-line” consolidation of MidAmerican’s earnings and equity in our financial statements. If we instead fully consolidated the company’s figures, our revenues in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we reported, though net income would remain the same.
我在去年的报告里描述过第一笔收购——收购 MidAmerican Energy 的 76% 股权。由于监管对我们投票权的限制，我们在财务报表中只对 MidAmerican 的盈利和权益做“一行式”合并（one-line consolidation）。如果我们改为把该公司全面并表，那么我们 2000 年的收入将比报告中披露的数字多 50 亿美元，但净利润会保持不变。
• On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.
1999 年 11 月 23 日，我收到 Bruce Cort 发来的一页传真，附了一篇《The Washington Post》的文章，内容是关于 CORT Business Services 一桩被迫中止的收购案。尽管他也姓 Cort，Bruce 和 CORT 并无关联。他是一名飞机经纪人，1986 年曾卖给 Berkshire 一架喷气式飞机；在这份传真之前，他与我已有大约十年没有联系。
I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29, and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made sense.
我对 CORT 一无所知，但我立刻打印了它向 SEC 提交的文件，看完后很喜欢。当天下午我就告诉 Bruce：我可能有兴趣，并请他安排我与 CORT 的 CEO Paul Arnold 见面。我和 Paul 在 11 月 29 日见了面，我马上就知道，我们具备了一次收购所需的正确要素：一家不错但并不“光鲜”的企业；一位杰出的经理人；以及一个合理的价格（参照那笔失败交易中的价格）。
Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in “rent-to-rent” furniture, primarily used in offices but also by temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be noted, has no similarity to “rent-to-own” operations, which usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to people having limited income and poor credit.
CORT 通过 117 家展厅运营，是全国“rent-to-rent（租来再租）”家具业务的领导者，主要服务办公室，也为公寓的短期居住者提供家具。需要特别说明的是：这种业务与 “rent-to-own（租购）” 完全不同；后者通常是把家用家具和电子产品卖给收入有限、信用不佳的人群。
We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.
我们很快让 Wesco（我们持股 80% 的子公司）收购了 CORT，支付现金约 3.86 亿美元。关于 CORT 运营的更多细节，你可以在 Wesco 的 1999 与 2000 年年度报告中看到。Charlie 和我都很喜欢与 Paul 共事，而且 CORT 看起来很有希望跑赢我们当初的预期。
• Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks — “excess and surplus lines” in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.
去年年初，General Re 的 Ron Ferguson 牵线让我认识了 Bob Berry；Bob 的家族已经持有 U.S. Liability 49 年。这家保险公司连同两家姊妹公司，是一家中等规模、备受尊敬的“特殊风险”承保人——用保险业行话说，就是承做“excess and surplus lines（超额与剩余险种）”。我和 Bob 取得联系后，我们在电话里就谈妥了一笔交易：一半用股票支付，一半用现金支付。
In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU national tournament.
近几年里，Tom Nerney 代表 Berry 家族管理这项业务，实现了罕见的组合：增长优秀、盈利异常出色。Tom 在其他方面也同样是个“狠角色”。除了有四个领养孩子（其中两个来自 Russia），他还有一个“大家庭”：Philadelphia Belles——一支由 Tom 执教的青春期前后女孩篮球队。去年这支队伍战绩 62 胜 4 负，并在 AAU 全国锦标赛中获得亚军。
Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to the collection.
优秀的财产与意外险公司并不多。我们手里这种好公司已经远超“应得份额”，而 U.S. Liability 让这套收藏更添光彩。
• Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a deal, again half for cash and half for stock.
Ben Bridge Jeweler 是我们通过电话完成的另一笔收购——在我与管理层任何面对面会谈之前就敲定了。管理这家西海岸 65 家门店零售商的是 Ed Bridge 以及他的堂兄 Jon。Ed 是 Barnett Helzberg 的朋友；我们在 1995 年从 Barnett 那里收购了 Helzberg Diamonds。Barnett 得知 Bridge 家族打算出售公司后，强烈向 Berkshire 推荐。随后 Ed 来电向我介绍业务，并寄来一些数据，我们又达成了一笔交易：同样是一半现金、一半股票。
Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family— including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed — enjoy extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by 9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a truly remarkable record.
Ed 和 Jon 是第四代家族持股经营者，这门生意 89 年前创立于 Seattle。无论公司还是家族——包括 Jon 与 Ed 的父亲 Herb 和 Bob——都享有极高声誉。过去七年，同店销售分别增长 9%、11%、13%、10%、12%、21% 和 7%，这是非常惊人的成绩单。
It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they knew I could be believed: After all, it’s obvious that your Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned black belts as purchasers).
对家族而言，关键在于：未来公司仍要像过去一样运作。没人希望另一家珠宝连锁进来，拿所谓“协同效应”和“降本增效”的想法把组织折腾得面目全非（这些点子虽然永远不会奏效，但肯定会被尝试）。我告诉 Ed 和 Jon：他们将继续掌舵，他们也知道我说到做到。毕竟，你们的董事长如果真的去经营门店或卖珠宝，显然会是一场灾难——尽管他家里确实有人在“买货”这件事上练到了黑带级别。
In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-workers who had helped the company achieve its success. We’re proud to be associated with both the family and the company.
Bridge 家族一如既往地体面：他们把出售所得中的相当一部分分配给数百位同事——正是这些同事帮助公司取得成功。我们很自豪能与这个家族及这家公司结缘。
• In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western boots — including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa brands — and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five neighboring states.
7 月，我们收购了 Justin Industries——它是 Western boots（西部靴）领域的龙头制造商，旗下品牌包括 Justin、Tony Lama、Nocona 和 Chippewa；同时也是 Texas 及其周边五个州最顶尖的砖块生产商。
Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity. On May 4th, I received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to me, proposing that Berkshire join a group to acquire an unnamed company. I faxed him back, explaining that with rare exceptions we don’t invest with others, but would happily pay him a commission if he sent details and we later made a purchase. He replied that the “mystery company” was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to meet John Roach, chairman of the company and John Justin, who had built the business and was its major shareholder. Soon after, we bought Justin for $570 million in cash.
这一次，我们的收购同样带有“机缘巧合”的味道。5 月 4 日，我收到 Mark Jones（我此前并不认识他）发来的一份传真，提议 Berkshire 与一个团体联合收购一家未具名的公司。我回传真解释：除极少数例外，我们不与他人联合投资；但如果他把细节发来，且我们后来完成了收购，我们很乐意支付他佣金。他回复说，这家“神秘公司”就是 Justin。随后我去了 Fort Worth，会见了公司董事长 John Roach 以及打造了这门生意并持有主要股份的 John Justin。不久之后，我们以 5.7 亿美元现金收购了 Justin。
John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in late February). John was a class act — as a citizen, businessman and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously.
John Justin 非常热爱 Justin Industries，但因严重的健康问题被迫退休（遗憾的是，这也在 2 月底导致了他的去世）。John 是个“有格局的人”——无论作为公民、商人还是作为一个人本身。幸运的是，他培养了两位杰出的经理人：负责 Acme 的 Harrold Melton，以及负责 Justin Boot 的 Randy Watson；两人都以高度自治的方式管理各自公司。
Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the industry’s national output. The brick business, however, is necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn’t have named a brand of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due to Acme’s product quality, but also reflects many decades of extraordinary community service by both the company and John Justin.
Acme 是两项业务中规模更大的那一个：它在 22 家工厂每年生产超过 10 亿块砖，约占全美行业产量的 11.7%。不过，砖块生意必然是区域性的；在其覆盖区域内，Acme 拥有毋庸置疑的领导地位。问 Texas 人能说出一个砖块品牌时，75% 会回答 Acme，而排名第二的品牌只有 16%。（在我们收购之前，我连一个砖块品牌都说不上来。你能吗？）这种品牌认知不仅来自 Acme 的产品质量，也反映了公司与 John Justin 数十年来在社区服务方面做出的卓越贡献。
I can’t resist pointing out that Berkshire — whose top management has long been mired in the 19th century — is now one of the very few authentic “clicks-and-bricks” businesses around. We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet, and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat in Silicon Valley.
我忍不住要指出：Berkshire 的高层管理长期“陷在 19 世纪的泥潭里”，而现在我们已经成为少数真正意义上的“clicks-and-bricks（点击与砖头）”企业之一。我们在 2000 年开局时，GEICO 已经在互联网做了相当规模的业务，随后我们又把 Acme 加进来。你可以打赌：Berkshire 这一招，肯定让 Silicon Valley 的人出了一身汗。
• In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world’s largest carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these being eliminated through insurance.
6 月，Shaw Industries 的 CEO Bob Shaw（全球最大的地毯制造商）与他的合伙人 Julian Saul，以及另一家正在与 Shaw 考虑合并的公司的 CEO 一起来见我。不过，这个潜在合并对象因过去业务而背负巨额石棉（asbestos）责任诉讼，任何交易都必须以“通过保险把这些责任消除”为前提。
The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though we could write an exceptionally large policy — far larger than any other insurer would ever think of offering — we would never issue a policy that lacked a cap.
来访的高管们希望 Berkshire 提供一份保单，承担未来所有石棉相关成本。我解释说：我们确实可以承保一份规模极其巨大的保单——大到任何其他保险公司都不会考虑提供——但我们绝不会签发一份没有上限（cap）的保单。
Bob and Julian decided that if we didn’t want to bet the ranch on the extent of the acquiree’s liability, neither did they. So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian’s record: Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining forces in 1998.
Bob 和 Julian 认为：如果我们都不愿意把整座牧场押在被收购方责任规模的未知数上，那他们也不愿意。于是这笔合并交易就告吹了。但我因此对 Shaw 产生了兴趣；几个月后，Charlie 和我与 Bob 会面，开始谈 Berkshire 收购 Shaw 的方案。交易的一个关键条款是：Bob 与 Julian 继续各自持有 Shaw 至少 5% 的股权。这使得我们能与行业里最优秀的人“绑在一起”——从 Bob 与 Julian 的履历就能看出：在 1998 年他们联手之前，两人各自都曾打造出规模庞大且成功的地毯企业。
Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won’t mind.
Shaw 年销售额约 40 亿美元，我们持有该公司 87.3% 的股权。若不算保险业务，Shaw 远远是我们最大的企业。现在，就算别人每天都从我们身上踩来踩去，我们也不会介意了。
• In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer was “Tell me more.”
7 月，Benjamin Moore Paint 的董事 Bob Mundheim 来电，问 Berkshire 是否有兴趣收购该公司。我在 Salomon 时就认识 Bob——那段艰难时期他担任总法律顾问——我非常敬重他，所以我的回答是：“多讲讲。”
In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them; we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we completed it in December. Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our product for your next paint job.
8 月下旬，Charlie 和我与 Benjamin Moore 的前任与现任 CEO——Richard Roob 与 Yvan Dupuy——见了面。我们喜欢他们；喜欢这门生意；并当场开出 10 亿美元的现金报价。10 月，他们的董事会批准了交易，我们在 12 月完成收购。Benjamin Moore 已经生产涂料 117 年，并拥有成千上万家独立经销商——这是其业务至关重要的资产。你下一次刷漆时，务必指定使用我们的产品。
• Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about $1.8 billion. This company’s incredible odyssey over the last few decades — too multifaceted to be chronicled here — was shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos products. The much-publicized health problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM’s declaring bankruptcy in 1982.
最后，在 12 月下旬，我们同意以约 18 亿美元收购 Johns Manville Corp.。这家公司在过去几十年经历了一段不可思议的“奥德赛”——复杂到无法在此完整叙述——其走向深受其长期生产石棉制品历史的影响。石棉暴露导致的、广为人知的健康问题影响了许多人，最终使 JM 在 1982 年申请破产。
Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO group was unable to obtain financing.
随后，破产法院为受害者设立了一只信托基金，其最重要的资产是对 JM 的控股权。这个信托基金（非常理性地）希望分散资产，于是去年 6 月同意将该企业出售给一家 LBO（杠杆收购）买方。但最终，LBO 团队未能获得融资。
Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted tentatively to accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract.
因此，这笔交易在 12 月 8 日（星期五）被取消。紧接着的下周一，Charlie 和我给信托基金主席 Bob Felise 打电话，提出一份“全现金、无融资条件”的报价。第二天，受托人们初步投票同意接受我们的报价；一周后，我们签署了合同。
JM is the nation’s leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of engineered products. The company’s sales exceed $2 billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM’s CEO, had announced his retirement plans a year ago, but I’m happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around.
JM 是美国商业与工业保温材料的领先生产商，同时在屋顶系统以及多种工程化产品上也占据重要位置。公司销售额超过 20 亿美元，业务回报不错，尽管具有周期性。JM 的 CEO Jerry Henry 早在一年前就宣布了退休计划，但我很高兴地告诉你：Charlie 和我说服他继续留下来。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw near-term slowdowns in their businesses — and, in fact, we purchased several companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all of our businesses to now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don’t care about the bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us.
去年我们之所以出现一波收购活动高峰，背后可能有两个经济因素在起作用。第一，许多经理人和企业主预见到他们的业务在短期内会放缓——事实上，我们收购的几家公司，其盈利几乎肯定会在今年从 1999 或 2000 年的峰值回落。对我们而言，这种回落无关紧要，因为我们预期所有企业都会时不时经历起伏。（只有在投行的销售演示里，盈利才会永远向上。）我们不在乎这些颠簸；重要的是整体结果。但其他人的决策有时会受到短期前景影响：这既会刺激卖方更愿意出售，也会让原本可能与我们竞争的买方降低热情。
A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, “financial” buyers of businesses — those who wish to buy using only a sliver of equity — became unable to borrow all they thought they needed. What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price. Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their bidding when businesses came up for sale last year. Because we analyze purchases on an all-equity basis, our evaluations did not change, which means we became considerably more competitive.
第二个帮助我们在 2000 年成功出手的因素是：垃圾债市场在那一年逐渐枯竭。在此前两年里，垃圾债买家放松了标准，用不恰当的价格去买越来越弱的发行人债务。去年，这种松懈的后果体现为违约率的膨胀。在这样的环境中，那些“金融型”买家——也就是只想拿很少的自有资金、靠大量借债来买企业的人——发现自己借不到他们以为需要的那么多钱。即使还能借到，成本也非常高。因此，当企业在去年挂牌出售时，LBO 操作方在出价上变得不那么激进。我们则是用“全权益（all-equity）”视角来分析收购，因此估值没有变化——这意味着我们变得显著更具竞争力。
Aside from the economic factors that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn’t assure a deal — sellers have to like our price, and we have to like their business and management — but it does help.
除了这些对我们有利的经济因素之外，我们在收购方面现在还有一个重大且日益增强的优势：我们往往是卖方“首选的买家”。当然，这并不保证成交——卖方必须喜欢我们的价格，我们也必须喜欢他们的业务与管理层——但它确实有帮助。
We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale will bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities will likely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense of direction. The reverse is apt to be true, also. When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the seller is a “financial owner.” And if owners behave with little regard for their business and its people, their conduct will often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the company.
当企业主在意“把公司卖给谁”时，我们觉得这很有意义。我们喜欢和那种热爱自己公司的人做生意，而不是只爱出售能带来的钱的人（当然，我们也完全理解他为什么也喜欢钱）。当这种情感依附存在时，往往意味着企业内部也可能拥有重要品质：诚实的会计、对产品的自豪感、对客户的尊重，以及一群忠诚、方向感强的同事。反过来通常也成立：当企业主把公司拿去拍卖，对未来毫不在意时，你常会发现这家公司为了出售被“精心打扮”过，尤其当卖方是“金融所有者”时更是如此。而如果企业主对公司及其员工缺乏敬意，他们的行为往往会污染整家公司的态度与做法。
When a business masterpiece has been created by a lifetime — or several lifetimes — of unstinting care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history. Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home. We take our obligations to the people who created a business very seriously, and Berkshire’s ownership structure ensures that we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth, or assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises to the bank.
当一件商业杰作，是靠一生——甚至几代人——毫无保留的用心与卓越才华打造出来时，对企业主而言，把这段历史托付给哪家公司延续，理应是重要的。Charlie 和我相信，Berkshire 提供了一个几乎独一无二的归宿。我们非常认真地对待对企业创造者及其人群所负的责任，而 Berkshire 的所有权结构确保我们能够兑现承诺。当我们告诉 John Justin：公司总部将继续留在 Fort Worth；或向 Bridge 家族保证：其业务不会与另一家珠宝商合并时，这些卖方可以把我们的承诺当成银行存款一样可靠。
How much better it is for the “painter” of a business Rembrandt to personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their business creations. We’ll leave the auctions to others.
让一位“画出商业版 Rembrandt”的创作者亲自为其作品选择永久归宿，远比让信托官员或漠不关心的继承人把它拿去拍卖要好得多。多年来，我们与那些认识到这一点、并把这种认识落实到自己商业创造上的人合作，经历非常愉快。拍卖这种事，就留给别人去做吧。
The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance
财产/意外险（Property/Casualty）保险的经济学
Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
我们的主营业务——虽然我们还有其他同样重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解 Berkshire，你必须理解如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素是：(1) 业务产生的 float（浮存金）规模；(2) float 的成本；以及 (3) 最关键的：这两项因素的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先，float 是“我们持有但不属于我们”的钱。在保险经营中，float 的形成源于：保费先收进来，而赔付要在之后才发生，两者之间的时间差有时会延续多年。在这段时间里，保险公司可以把这笔钱拿去投资——这当然是一件令人愉快的事。但它通常伴随一个负面：保险公司收取的保费，往往不足以覆盖它最终必须支付的赔款与费用。于是公司就会出现“承保亏损（underwriting loss）”，而这正是 float 的成本。保险业务之所以有价值，是因为：长期来看，它的 float 成本低于公司如果通过其他方式筹资所需要付出的资金成本。反之，如果 float 成本高于市场资金利率，这门保险生意就是个“烂柠檬”。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.
这里需要一个重要提醒：由于损失成本必须靠估计，保险公司在计算承保结果时拥有巨大的自由裁量权，这使得投资者极难计算一家公司的真实 float 成本。估计错误通常是无心之失，但有时也并非如此；而且偏差可能非常巨大。这些错误会直接流入利润表，影响盈利。经验丰富的观察者通常能识别出大规模的准备金计提错误，但公众通常只能接受公司呈现的数字；有时我会对那些被知名审计机构“默许”的数字感到震惊。保险公司的利润表与资产负债表都可能是雷区。
At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always are unpleasant.
在 Berkshire，我们努力在准备金计提上做到一致且保守。但我们仍会犯错。并且我们提醒你：保险行业里的“意外”几乎从来不是对称的——它们几乎总是令人不快的。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 34 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Don’t panic, there won’t be a quiz.)
下表（按间隔年份）展示了我们自 34 年前通过收购 National Indemnity Company 进入保险业以来，Berkshire 各保险板块产生的 float 规模。（National 的传统业务线被归入 “Other Primary” 这一板块。）在表格中，我们按照如下方式计算 float——相对于保费规模，我们产生的 float 量非常大：把净赔付准备金（net loss reserves）、理赔费用准备金（loss adjustment reserves）、分入再保险项下持有资金（funds held under reinsurance assumed）以及未赚保费准备金（unearned premium reserves）加总，然后再减去与保险相关的应收款（insurance-related receivables）、预付取得成本（prepaid acquisition costs）、预付税款（prepaid taxes）以及适用于分入再保险的递延费用（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。（别紧张，不会考试。）
We’re pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not happy with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering 19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in 2001 — perhaps substantially — in large part because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may experience the same improving trend.
我们对 2000 年 float 的增长感到满意，但对其成本并不高兴。多年来，我们的 float 成本一直非常接近零：多数年份实现的承保利润，抵消了偶尔出现的糟糕年份——例如 1984 年，当时我们的成本高得惊人，达到 19%。但在 2000 年，我们出现了 16 亿美元的承保亏损，这使得 float 成本为 6%。如果不发生超级巨灾，我们预计 2001 年 float 成本会下降——也许会显著下降——主要原因是 General Re 的定价正在纠偏，这种影响会随着一年推进而越来越明显。在较小范围内，GEICO 也可能出现同样的改善趋势。
There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very rare at other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs attached to this business.
有两个影响我们 float 成本的因素，在其他保险公司那里非常罕见，但现在在 Berkshire 这里却变得很突出。第一，一些当前正遭遇巨大亏损的保险公司，以一种会“惩罚”我们当期盈利的方式，把其中相当一部分损失转移给了我们；但作为交换，我们获得了可供多年使用的 float。在我们承受了保单第一年的损失之后，这类业务就不再附带进一步成本。
When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the pain-today, gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you about them as they occur.
当这些保单定价合理时，我们欢迎它们所带来的“今日之痛、明日之利”效应。1999 年，我们 4 亿美元的承保亏损（约占总亏损的 27.8%）来自这类业务；2000 年该数字为 4.82 亿美元（占亏损的 34.4%）。我们无法预测未来会承保多少类似业务，但我们拿到的通常会是“大块头”。由于这类交易可能会显著扭曲我们的财务数据，我们会在它们发生时向你说明。
Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance. They simply can’t stomach what huge underwriting losses do to their reported results, even though these losses are produced by policies whose overall economics are certain to be favorable. You should be careful, therefore, in comparing our underwriting results with those of other insurers.
其他再保险公司对这种保险几乎没有兴趣。他们根本受不了巨额承保亏损对其报表结果造成的冲击——尽管这些亏损来自一些“总体经济性必然有利”的保单。因此，你在比较我们的承保结果与其他保险公司的结果时必须小心。
An even more significant item in our numbers — which, again, you won’t find much of elsewhere — arises from transactions in which we assume past losses of a company that wants to put its troubles behind it. To illustrate, the XYZ insurance company might have last year bought a policy obligating us to pay the first $1 billion of losses and loss adjustment expenses from events that happened in, say, 1995 and earlier years. These contracts can be very large, though we always require a cap on our exposure. We entered into a number of such transactions in 2000 and expect to close several more in 2001.
我们数据中还有一项更重要的因素——同样，你在别处很难看到这么多——来自这样的交易：我们接手一家企业过去发生的损失，使其能够把麻烦留在身后。举例说，XYZ 保险公司可能在去年买了一份保单，要求我们承担来自 1995 年及更早年份事件所产生的、前 10 亿美元的损失与理赔费用（loss adjustment expenses）。这类合同规模可能非常大，不过我们始终要求对我们的责任设定上限（cap）。我们在 2000 年进行了若干此类交易，并预计在 2001 年还会完成几笔。
Under GAAP accounting, this “retroactive” insurance neither benefits nor penalizes our current earnings. Instead, we set up an asset called “deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance,” in an amount reflecting the difference between the premium we receive and the (higher) losses we expect to pay (for which reserves are immediately established). We then amortize this asset by making annual charges to earnings that create equivalent underwriting losses. You will find the amount of the loss that we incur from these transactions in both our quarterly and annual management discussion. By their nature, these losses will continue for many years, often stretching into decades. As an offset, though, we have the use of float — lots of it.
在 GAAP 会计处理下，这类“追溯性（retroactive）”保险既不会改善也不会损害我们当期盈利。相反，我们会确认一项资产，称为“deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance（适用于分入再保险的递延费用）”，金额等于我们收到的保费与我们预计将支付（且立即计提准备金）的更高损失之间的差额。随后，我们通过每年摊销这项资产来冲减利润：每年计入一笔费用，使其形成等额的承保亏损。你可以在我们的季度与年度管理层讨论（MD&A）中看到，这些交易当期带来的亏损金额。按其性质，这些亏损会持续很多年，经常延续到几十年。作为对冲，我们获得了 float 的使用权——而且非常多。
Clearly, float carrying an annual cost of this kind is not as desirable as float we generate from policies that are expected to produce an underwriting profit (of which we have plenty). Nevertheless, this retroactive insurance should be decent business for us.
显然，带着这种年度成本的 float，并不如那些预计能带来承保利润的保单所产生的 float（我们也有很多这样的业务）来得理想。尽管如此，这类追溯性保险对我们而言仍应是一门不错的生意。
The net of all this is that a) I expect our cost of float to be very attractive in the future but b) rarely to return to a “no-cost” mode because of the annual charge that retroactive reinsurance will lay on us. Also — obviously — the ultimate benefits that we derive from float will depend not only on its cost but, fully as important, how effectively we deploy it.
综上所述：a) 我预计未来我们的 float 成本会非常有吸引力，但 b) 由于追溯性再保险每年都会给我们带来一笔年度费用，我们很少会再回到“零成本 float”的状态。另外——显而易见——我们从 float 中最终获得的好处，不仅取决于其成本，同样重要的是：我们把它用得有多有效。
Our retroactive business is almost single-handedly the work of Ajit Jain, whose praises I sing annually. It is impossible to overstate how valuable Ajit is to Berkshire. Don’t worry about my health; worry about his.
我们的追溯性业务几乎完全由 Ajit Jain 一手打造——我每年都会歌颂他。Ajit 对 Berkshire 的价值之大，怎么强调都不过分。别担心我的健康；担心他的。
Last year, Ajit brought home a $2.4 billion reinsurance premium, perhaps the largest in history, from a policy that retroactively covers a major U.K. company. Subsequently, he wrote a large policy protecting the Texas Rangers from the possibility that Alex Rodriguez will become permanently disabled. As sports fans know, “A-Rod” was signed for $252 million, a record, and we think that our policy probably also set a record for disability insurance. We cover many other sports figures as well.
去年，Ajit 从一份追溯性承保英国一家大型公司的保单中，为我们带回了 24 亿美元的再保险保费——这也许是史上最大的单笔再保险保费。随后，他又承保了一份大额保单，保护 Texas Rangers 免受 Alex Rodriguez 永久伤残的风险。体育迷都知道，“A-Rod”当时签下 2.52 亿美元的合同，创下纪录，而我们认为这份保单很可能也创下了伤残保险的纪录。我们还为许多其他体育人物提供保障。
In another example of his versatility, Ajit last fall negotiated a very interesting deal with Grab.com, an Internet company whose goal was to attract millions of people to its site and there to extract information from them that would be useful to marketers. To lure these people, Grab.com held out the possibility of a $1 billion prize (having a $170 million present value) and we insured its payment. A message on the site explained that the chance of anyone winning the prize was low, and indeed no one won. But the possibility of a win was far from nil.
再举一个体现他“多面手”本领的例子：去年秋天，Ajit 与 Grab.com 谈成了一笔非常有意思的交易。Grab.com 是一家互联网公司，目标是吸引数百万人访问其网站，并从他们那里提取对营销人员有用的信息。为了吸引这些人，Grab.com 抛出了一个“10 亿美元大奖”的可能性（其现值为 1.7 亿美元），而我们为该奖金的支付提供了保险。网站上的信息说明：任何人中奖的概率都很低；事实上也确实无人中奖。但中奖的可能性并非为零。
Writing such a policy, we receive a modest premium, face the possibility of a huge loss, and get good odds. Very few insurers like that equation. And they’re unable to cure their unhappiness by reinsurance. Because each policy has unusual — and sometimes unique — characteristics, insurers can’t lay off the occasional shock loss through their standard reinsurance arrangements. Therefore, any insurance CEO doing a piece of business like this must run the small, but real, risk of a horrible quarterly earnings number, one that he would not enjoy explaining to his board or shareholders. Charlie and I, however, like any proposition that makes compelling mathematical sense, regardless of its effect on reported earnings.
承保这种保单，我们收取一笔不大的保费，却要面对可能极其巨大的赔付损失，但赔率对我们有利。很少有保险公司喜欢这种“方程式”。而且他们也无法通过再保险来“治好”这种不喜欢。因为每张保单都具有不寻常——有时甚至独一无二——的特性，保险公司无法通过常规再保险安排把偶发的冲击性损失分出。因此，任何保险公司的 CEO 若做这种生意，都要承担一个小但真实的风险：某个季度可能出现惨不忍睹的盈利数字——而他可不想向董事会或股东解释这种结果。Charlie 和我则相反：只要一个提议在数学上极具吸引力，不管它对报表盈利有什么影响，我们都喜欢。
At General Re, the news has turned considerably better: Ron Ferguson, along with Joe Brandon, Tad Montross, and a talented supporting cast took many actions during 2000 to bring that company’s profitability back to past standards. Though our pricing is not fully corrected, we have significantly repriced business that was severely unprofitable or dropped it altogether. If there’s no mega-catastrophe in 2001, General Re’s float cost should fall materially.
General Re 的消息已经明显转好：Ron Ferguson 与 Joe Brandon、Tad Montross 以及一支很有才华的团队，在 2000 年采取了很多措施，把公司的盈利能力拉回到以往水准。虽然定价尚未完全纠正，但我们已大幅重定价那些严重亏损的业务，或干脆停止承保。如果 2001 年不发生超级巨灾，General Re 的 float 成本应会显著下降。
The last couple of years haven’t been any fun for Ron and his crew. But they have stepped up to tough decisions, and Charlie and I applaud them for these. General Re has several important and enduring business advantages. Better yet, it has managers who will make the most of them.
过去一两年对 Ron 和他的团队而言一点都不好过。但他们作出了艰难决策、并且顶了上去，Charlie 和我为他们鼓掌。General Re 拥有若干重要且持久的业务优势。更好的是，它有能把这些优势发挥到极致的管理层。
In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations produced an excellent underwriting profit in 2000 while generating significant float — just as they have done for more than a decade. If these companies were a single and separate operation, people would consider it an outstanding insurer. Because the companies instead reside in an enterprise as large as Berkshire, the world may not appreciate their accomplishments — but I sure do. Last year I thanked Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster, and I again do so. In addition, we now also owe thanks to Tom Nerney at U.S. Liability and Michael Stearns, the new head of Cypress.
总体而言，我们规模较小的保险业务在 2000 年实现了极佳的承保利润，同时也创造了可观的 float——而且十多年来一直如此。如果把这些公司视作一个单独的独立保险集团，人们会认为它是一家杰出的保险公司。可因为它们身处像 Berkshire 这样庞大的体系里，外界可能并不充分理解它们的成就——但我非常清楚。去年我感谢过 Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Don Towle 和 Don Wurster，现在我再次致谢。此外，我们也要感谢 U.S. Liability 的 Tom Nerney，以及 Cypress 新任负责人 Michael Stearns。
You may notice that Brad Kinstler, who was CEO of Cypress and whose praises I’ve sung in the past, is no longer in the list above. That’s because we needed a new manager at Fechheimer Bros., our Cincinnati-based uniform company, and called on Brad. We seldom move Berkshire managers from one enterprise to another, but maybe we should try it more often: Brad is hitting home runs in his new job, just as he always did at Cypress.
你可能注意到：过去我曾多次称赞的 Cypress CEO Brad Kinstler，这次不在上面名单里了。原因是：我们位于 Cincinnati 的制服公司 Fechheimer Bros. 需要一位新经理，我们就把 Brad 调了过去。我们很少把 Berkshire 的经理人从一个企业调到另一个企业，但也许我们应该更常尝试：Brad 在新岗位上依旧“全垒打连发”，就像他在 Cypress 时一样。
GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)
We show below the usual table detailing GEICO’s growth. Last year I enthusiastically told you that we would step up our expenditures on advertising in 2000 and that the added dollars were the best investment that GEICO could make. I was wrong: The extra money we spent did not produce a commensurate increase in inquiries. Additionally, the percentage of inquiries that we converted into sales fell for the first time in many years. These negative developments combined to produce a sharp increase in our per-policy acquisition cost.
下面我们照例给出一张表格，详细列示 GEICO 的增长情况。去年我还很兴奋地告诉你：我们会在 2000 年加大广告投入，而多花出去的每一美元，都是 GEICO 能做出的最佳投资。我错了：我们额外花的钱，并没有带来相称的咨询量增长。此外，咨询转化为成交的比例，也在很多年来第一次出现下降。这些负面变化叠加，导致我们每张保单的获客成本大幅上升。
Agonizing over errors is a mistake. But acknowledging and analyzing them can be useful, though that practice is rare in corporate boardrooms. There, Charlie and I have almost never witnessed a candid post-mortem of a failed decision, particularly one involving an acquisition. A notable exception to this never-look-back approach is that of The Washington Post Company, which unfailingly and objectively reviews its acquisitions three years after they are made. Elsewhere, triumphs are trumpeted, but dumb decisions either get no follow-up or are rationalized.
为错误而痛苦纠结是种错误。但承认并分析错误可能是有用的，尽管这种做法在公司董事会里极为罕见。在那里，Charlie 和我几乎从未见过对一次失败决策的坦诚复盘，尤其是涉及收购的失败。一个显著例外是 The Washington Post Company：它会在收购完成三年后，始终如一、客观地回顾这笔收购。除此之外，胜利会被大肆宣扬，但愚蠢的决策要么没人追问，要么被找理由圆过去。
The financial consequences of these boners are regularly dumped into massive restructuring charges or write-offs that are casually waved off as “nonrecurring.” Managements just love these. Indeed, in recent years it has seemed that no earnings statement is complete without them. The origins of these charges, though, are never explored. When it comes to corporate blunders, CEOs invoke the concept of the Virgin Birth.
这些蠢事造成的财务后果，通常会被塞进巨额“重组费用”或“减记（write-offs）”里，然后被轻描淡写地挥手说成是“非经常性（nonrecurring）”。管理层特别喜欢这么干。事实上，近些年似乎没有这些东西，一份利润表就不算完整。但这些费用从何而来，几乎从不被追究。谈到公司犯错时，CEO 们就搬出“童贞降生（Virgin Birth）”的概念。
To get back to our examination of GEICO: There are at least four factors that could account for the increased costs we experienced in obtaining new business last year, and all probably contributed in some manner.
回到 GEICO：关于我们去年获取新业务成本上升，至少有四个因素可以解释，而且它们很可能都在某种程度上起了作用。
First, in our advertising we have pushed “frequency” very hard, and we probably overstepped in certain media. We’ve always known that increasing the number of messages through any medium would eventually produce diminishing returns. The third ad in an hour on a given cable channel is simply not going to be as effective as the first.
第一，我们在广告投放上非常强调“频次（frequency）”，而且在某些媒体上可能用力过猛。我们一直知道：在任何媒介上不断增加投放次数，最终都会出现边际效应递减。同一个有线频道一小时里出现的第三条广告，效果显然不如第一条。
Second, we may have already picked much of the low-hanging fruit. Clearly, the willingness to do business with a direct marketer of insurance varies widely among individuals: Indeed, some percentage of Americans — particularly older ones — are reluctant to make direct purchases of any kind. Over the years, however, this reluctance will ebb. A new generation with new habits will find the savings from direct purchase of their auto insurance too compelling to ignore.
第二，我们可能已经摘掉了很多“低垂的果子”。很明显，人们对向保险直销商购买保险的意愿差异很大：确实有一部分美国人——尤其是年长者——不太愿意进行任何形式的直购。不过，随着时间推移，这种犹豫会减弱。新一代人的习惯不同，他们会发现通过直购汽车保险节省的金额大到无法忽视。
Another factor that surely decreased the conversion of inquiries into sales was stricter underwriting by GEICO. Both the frequency and severity of losses increased during the year, and rates in certain areas became inadequate, in some cases substantially so. In these instances, we necessarily tightened our underwriting standards. This tightening, as well as the many rate increases we put in during the year, made our offerings less attractive to some prospects.
另一个无疑降低“咨询转化为成交”比例的因素，是 GEICO 更严格的核保。年内赔付的频率和严重程度都在上升，某些地区的费率变得不够用——有些情况下差得相当多。在这些情形下，我们必须收紧核保标准。这样的收紧，加上我们在这一年里多次提价，使得我们的产品对一部分潜在客户而言吸引力下降。
A high percentage of callers, it should be emphasized, can still save money by insuring with us. Understandably, however, some prospects will switch to save $200 per year but will not switch to save $50. Therefore, rate increases that bring our prices closer to those of our competitors will hurt our acceptance rate, even when we continue to offer the best deal.
需要强调的是：相当高比例的来电者，投保我们仍然可以省钱。但很容易理解：有些人愿意为了每年省 200 美元而换保险，却不会为了省 50 美元而换。因此，当提价把我们的价格拉近竞争对手时，即使我们仍然是最划算的选择，也会伤害我们的接受率（成交率）。
Finally, the competitive picture changed in at least one important respect: State Farm — by far the largest personal auto insurer, with about 19% of the market — has been very slow to raise prices. Its costs, however, are clearly increasing right along with those of the rest of the industry. Consequently, State Farm had an underwriting loss last year from auto insurance (including rebates to policyholders) of 18% of premiums, compared to 4% at GEICO. Our loss produced a float cost for us of 6.1%, an unsatisfactory result. (Indeed, at GEICO we expect float, over time, to be free.) But we estimate that State Farm’s float cost in 2000 was about 23%. The willingness of the largest player in the industry to tolerate such a cost makes the economics difficult for other participants.
最后，竞争格局至少在一个重要方面发生了变化：State Farm——远远最大的个人车险公司，市场份额约 19%——一直非常缓慢地提价。但它的成本显然和行业其他公司一样在上升。因此，State Farm 去年车险业务出现了承保亏损（包含返利给保单持有人）——亏损额相当于保费的 18%；相比之下，GEICO 为 4%。我们的亏损使 float 成本为 6.1%，这是个令人不满意的结果。（确实，GEICO 的 float，我们长期目标是“免费”。）但我们估计：State Farm 在 2000 年的 float 成本约为 23%。行业最大玩家愿意容忍如此之高的成本，会让其他参与者的经济性变得更困难。
That does not take away from the fact that State Farm is one of America’s greatest business stories. I’ve urged that the company be studied at business schools because it has achieved fabulous success while following a path that in many ways defies the dogma of those institutions. Studying counter-evidence is a highly useful activity, though not one always greeted with enthusiasm at citadels of learning.
但这并不影响一个事实：State Farm 是美国最伟大的商业故事之一。我一直建议商学院研究这家公司，因为它在取得惊人成功的同时，走的是一条在很多方面都违背商学院教条的路。研究“反证”是一项非常有用的活动，只是学术殿堂里不一定总是热烈欢迎。
State Farm was launched in 1922, by a 45-year-old, semi-retired Illinois farmer, to compete with long-established insurers — haughty institutions in New York, Philadelphia and Hartford — that possessed overwhelming advantages in capital, reputation, and distribution. Because State Farm is a mutual company, its board members and managers could not be owners, and it had no access to capital markets during its years of fast growth. Similarly, the business never had the stock options or lavish salaries that many people think vital if an American enterprise is to attract able managers and thrive.
State Farm 创立于 1922 年，由一位 45 岁、半退休的 Illinois 农民发起，去与那些历史悠久的保险公司竞争——这些位于 New York、Philadelphia 和 Hartford 的“高傲机构”在资本、声誉与分销渠道上拥有压倒性优势。由于 State Farm 是 mutual company（互助制公司），董事与管理层不能成为所有者；在其高速增长的岁月里，它也无法进入资本市场融资。同样，这家公司从未拥有股票期权或高薪酬——而很多人认为，如果一家美国企业要吸引能干的经理人并繁荣发展，这两样几乎是“必需品”。
In the end, however, State Farm eclipsed all its competitors. In fact, by 1999 the company had amassed a tangible net worth exceeding that of all but four American businesses. If you want to read how this happened, get a copy of The Farmer from Merna.
但最终，State Farm 还是把所有竞争对手都甩在了身后。事实上，到 1999 年，这家公司累积的有形净资产（tangible net worth）已经超过除四家美国企业以外的所有公司。如果你想了解它是怎么做到的，去找一本《The Farmer from Merna》。
Despite State Farm’s strengths, however, GEICO has much the better business model, one that embodies significantly lower operating costs. And, when a company is selling a product with commodity-like economic characteristics, being the low-cost producer is all-important. This enduring competitive advantage of GEICO — one it possessed in 1951 when, as a 20-year-old student, I first became enamored with its stock — is the reason that over time it will inevitably increase its market share significantly while simultaneously achieving excellent profits. Our growth will be slow, however, if State Farm elects to continue bearing the underwriting losses that it is now suffering.
尽管 State Farm 很强，但 GEICO 的商业模式要好得多——它体现为显著更低的运营成本。而当一家企业销售的是一种在经济特征上近似“商品化（commodity-like）”的产品时，成为低成本生产者至关重要。GEICO 这种持久的竞争优势——1951 年我还是 20 岁学生、第一次迷上它的股票时它就已经拥有——正是它未来必然会显著提高市场份额、同时实现优异利润的原因。不过，如果 State Farm 选择继续承担它目前正在承受的承保亏损，我们的增长就会变慢。
Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, remains an owner’s dream. Everything he does makes sense. He never engages in wishful thinking or otherwise distorts reality, as so many managers do when the unexpected happens. As 2000 unfolded, Tony cut back on advertising that was not cost-effective, and he will continue to do that in 2001 if cutbacks are called for (though we will always maintain a massive media presence). Tony has also aggressively filed for price increases where we need them. He looks at the loss reports every day and is never behind the curve. To steal a line from a competitor, we are in good hands with Tony.
GEICO 的 CEO Tony Nicely 依然是“老板梦寐以求”的那种经理人。他做的每件事都讲得通。他从不进行一厢情愿的思考，也不会像许多管理者在意外发生时那样去扭曲现实。随着 2000 年形势展开，Tony 缩减了那些不具成本效益的广告投入；如果 2001 年需要继续缩减，他也会这么做（尽管我们始终会保持强大的媒体存在）。Tony 还在需要提价的地区积极申请涨价。他每天都会查看赔付报告，从不落后于形势。借用一句竞争对手的话：把钱交给 Tony，我们很放心。
I’ve told you about our profit-sharing arrangement at GEICO that targets only two variables — growth in policies and the underwriting results of seasoned business. Despite the headwinds of 2000, we still had a performance that produced an 8.8% profit-sharing payment, amounting to $40.7 million.
我曾向你介绍过 GEICO 的利润分享（profit-sharing）安排：它只盯住两个变量——保单增长，以及“成熟业务（seasoned business）”的承保结果。尽管 2000 年逆风很大，我们的表现仍然触发了 8.8% 的分成支付，总额为 4,070 万美元。
GEICO will be a huge part of Berkshire’s future. Because of its rock-bottom operating costs, it offers a great many Americans the cheapest way to purchase a high-ticket product that they must buy. The company then couples this bargain with service that consistently ranks high in independent surveys. That’s a combination inevitably producing growth and profitability.
GEICO 将是 Berkshire 未来极其重要的一部分。因为其极低的运营成本，它为许多美国人提供了购买一种“必须买且客单价很高”的产品（车险）的最低成本途径。随后，公司又把这种低价与在独立调查中持续排名靠前的服务结合起来。这种组合必然带来增长与盈利。
In just the last few years, far more drivers have learned to associate the GEICO brand with saving money on their insurance. We will pound that theme relentlessly until all Americans are aware of the value that we offer.
就在最近几年里，越来越多的司机已经学会把 GEICO 这个品牌与“省钱买保险”联系在一起。我们会持续不断地猛打这个主题，直到所有美国人都知道我们提供的价值。
Investments
投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $1 billion at the end of 2000 are itemized.
下面我们列示普通股投资组合。凡是在 2000 年末市值超过 10 亿美元的持仓，都会逐项列出。
In 2000, we sold nearly all of our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae shares, established 15% positions in several mid-sized companies, bought the high-yield bonds of a few issuers (very few — the category is not labeled junk without reason) and added to our holdings of high-grade, mortgage-backed securities. There are no “bargains” among our current holdings: We’re content with what we own but far from excited by it.
在 2000 年，我们卖出了几乎全部 Freddie Mac 与 Fannie Mae 的股票；在若干中等规模公司建立了 15% 的持股；买入了少数发行人的高收益债券（非常少——“high-yield”这个类别被称为 junk 并非没有原因）；并增加了我们对高评级抵押贷款支持证券（mortgage-backed securities）的持仓。我们当前持仓里没有任何“便宜货”：我们对所持有的东西感到满意，但并不兴奋。
Many people assume that marketable securities are Berkshire’s first choice when allocating capital, but that’s not true: Ever since we first published our economic principles in 1983, we have consistently stated that we would rather purchase businesses than stocks. (See number 4 on page 60.) One reason for that preference is personal, in that I love working with our managers. They are high-grade, talented and loyal. And, frankly, I find their business behavior to be more rational and owner-oriented than that prevailing at many public companies.
很多人以为：在资本配置时，可交易证券（marketable securities）是 Berkshire 的第一选择。但事实并非如此：自从我们在 1983 年首次公布经济原则以来，我们一直明确表示：相比买股票，我们更愿意买企业。（见第 60 页第 4 条。）这种偏好有一个个人层面的原因：我喜欢与我们的经理人一起工作。他们品质上乘、才华出众且忠诚。坦白讲，我觉得他们的商业行为比许多上市公司里常见的做法更理性、更以所有者为导向。
But there’s also a powerful financial reason behind the preference, and that has to do with taxes. The tax code makes Berkshire’s owning 80% or more of a business far more profitable for us, proportionately, than our owning a smaller share. When a company we own all of earns $1 million after tax, the entire amount inures to our benefit. If the $1 million is upstreamed to Berkshire, we owe no tax on the dividend. And, if the earnings are retained and we were to sell the subsidiary — not likely at Berkshire! — for $1million more than we paid for it, we would owe no capital gains tax. That’s because our “tax cost” upon sale would include both what we paid for the business and all earnings it subsequently retained.
但这个偏好背后还有一个强有力的财务原因：税收。税法使得 Berkshire 持有一家企业 80% 或以上的股权，从比例意义上说，比我们只持有较小股份要更有利可图。当我们全资拥有的公司税后赚 100 万美元时，全部收益都归我们。如果这 100 万美元以股息形式上划给 Berkshire，我们无需为该股息缴税。而且，如果收益被留存、并且我们将子公司出售——在 Berkshire 这不太可能！——售价比我们买入价高 100 万美元，我们也无需缴纳资本利得税。原因在于：出售时我们的“税务成本（tax cost）”不仅包括当初的收购价，还包括此后子公司留存的全部利润。
Contrast that situation to what happens when we own an investment in a marketable security. There, if we own a 10% stake in a business earning $10 million after tax, our $1 million share of the earnings is subject to additional state and federal taxes of (1) about $140,000 if it is distributed to us (our tax rate on most dividends is 14%); or (2) no less than $350,000 if the $1 million is retained and subsequently captured by us in the form of a capital gain (on which our tax rate is usually about 35%, though it sometimes approaches 40%). We may defer paying the $350,000 by not immediately realizing our gain, but eventually we must pay the tax. In effect, the government is our “partner” twice when we own part of a business through a stock investment, but only once when we own at least 80%.
把这种情况与我们持有可交易证券时的情形对比一下：假设我们持有一家企业 10% 的股份，而该企业税后赚 1,000 万美元，那么我们对应的 100 万美元利润份额，还要再缴州税与联邦税：(1) 如果这 100 万以股息分给我们，需要缴约 14 万美元（我们对大多数股息的税率是 14%）；或 (2) 如果这 100 万被公司留存、随后以股价上涨的资本利得形式被我们“拿到”，那么税负不少于 35 万美元（我们对资本利得的税率通常约为 35%，有时接近 40%）。我们可以通过不立即实现收益来推迟缴这 35 万美元，但最终还是得交。换句话说，当我们通过股票投资只拥有一家企业的一部分时，政府在税上相当于当了我们两次“合伙人”；而当我们持股至少 80% 时，它只当一次。
Leaving aside tax factors, the formula we use for evaluating stocks and businesses is identical. Indeed, the formula for valuing all assets that are purchased for financial gain has been unchanged since it was first laid out by a very smart man in about 600 B.C. (though he wasn’t smart enough to know it was 600 B.C.).
撇开税收因素不谈，我们用来评估股票与企业的公式完全一样。事实上，用于给所有“为获取财务回报而购买的资产”估值的公式，自大约公元前 600 年由一位非常聪明的人提出以来就从未改变过。（当然，他不够聪明，不知道那时叫公元前 600 年。）
The oracle was Aesop and his enduring, though somewhat incomplete, investment insight was “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three questions. How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush? When will they emerge and how many will there be? What is the risk-free interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S. bonds)? If you can answer these three questions, you will know the maximum value of the bush — and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don’t literally think birds. Think dollars.
这位“先知”是 Aesop，而他那条经久不衰、但多少有些不完整的投资洞见是：“手里的一只鸟，胜过灌木丛里的两只鸟。”要把这条原则讲完整，你只需要回答三个问题：你有多确定灌木丛里确实有鸟？它们什么时候会飞出来、会有多少？无风险利率是多少（我们认为是长期 U.S. 国债的收益率）？如果你能回答这三个问题，你就知道那片灌木丛的最高价值——也就知道你现在手里这只鸟，最多应该拿出几只去换它。当然，别真的去想鸟。想美元。
Aesop’s investment axiom, thus expanded and converted into dollars, is immutable. It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties, bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. And neither the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of electricity nor the creation of the automobile changed the formula one iota — nor will the Internet. Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.
Aesop 的投资格言，一旦扩展并换算成美元，就是不可更改的。它适用于农场、石油版税、债券、股票、彩票以及制造工厂的资本支出。蒸汽机的出现、电力的驯服或汽车的创造，都没能让这个公式改变一丝一毫——Internet 也不会。只要把正确的数字代入，你就可以给宇宙中所有可能的资本用途排出吸引力的先后顺序。
Common yardsticks such as dividend yield, the ratio of price to earnings or to book value, and even growth rates have nothing to do with valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount and timing of cash flows into and from the business. Indeed, growth can destroy value if it requires cash inputs in the early years of a project or enterprise that exceed the discounted value of the cash that those assets will generate in later years. Market commentators and investment managers who glibly refer to “growth” and “value” styles as contrasting approaches to investment are displaying their ignorance, not their sophistication. Growth is simply a component — usually a plus, sometimes a minus — in the value equation.
常见的尺子——比如股息率、市盈率或市净率，甚至增长率——与估值本身无关，除非它们能提供线索，让你推断企业现金流入与流出的金额与时间点。事实上，如果一个项目或企业在早期需要投入的现金，超过了这些资产在未来所能产生现金的折现价值，那么增长反而会毁掉价值。那些把“growth”和“value”风格当成相互对立的投资方法、并且还说得头头是道的市场评论员与投资经理，展示的是无知，而不是高明。增长只是价值方程里的一个组成部分——通常是加分项，有时却是减分项。
Alas, though Aesop’s proposition and the third variable — that is, interest rates — are simple, plugging in numbers for the other two variables is a difficult task. Using precise numbers is, in fact, foolish; working with a range of possibilities is the better approach.
可惜的是，虽然 Aesop 的命题以及第三个变量（也就是利率）很简单，但给另外两个变量填数字却非常困难。事实上，用“精确数字”反而是愚蠢的；更好的做法是使用一系列可能性的范围。
Usually, the range must be so wide that no useful conclusion can be reached. Occasionally, though, even very conservative estimates about the future emergence of birds reveal that the price quoted is startlingly low in relation to value. (Let’s call this phenomenon the IBT — Inefficient Bush Theory.) To be sure, an investor needs some general understanding of business economics as well as the ability to think independently to reach a well-founded positive conclusion. But the investor does not need brilliance nor blinding insights.
通常，这个范围会宽到让你得不出任何有用结论。但偶尔，即便用非常保守的估计去判断“鸟未来会飞出来多少”，也会发现报价相对于价值低得惊人。（我们把这种现象称为 IBT——Inefficient Bush Theory，低效灌木理论。）当然，要得出一个站得住脚的正面结论，投资者仍需要对商业经济学有一些总体理解，并具备独立思考的能力。但投资者并不需要天才，也不需要耀眼的洞察力。
At the other extreme, there are many times when the most brilliant of investors can’t muster a conviction about the birds to emerge, not even when a very broad range of estimates is employed. This kind of uncertainty frequently occurs when new businesses and rapidly changing industries are under examination. In cases of this sort, any capital commitment must be labeled speculative.
在另一个极端，也有很多时候，即便最聪明的投资者也无法对“灌木丛里将飞出的鸟”形成确信——哪怕他采用了非常宽的估计区间也不行。这类不确定性，常发生在研究新业务与快速变化行业时。在这种情况下，任何资本承诺都必须被标注为投机（speculative）。
Now, speculation — in which the focus is not on what an asset will produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it — is neither illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in which Charlie and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should we expect to take anything home?
投机——其关注点不是资产会产出什么，而是“下一个人会出多少钱买走它”——既不违法，也不不道德，更不是“不美国”。但这不是 Charlie 和我想玩的游戏。我们给这场派对带不来任何东西，那又凭什么指望能带走点什么呢？
The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities — that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future — will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.
投资与投机之间的界线从来就不明晰；当市场参与者最近刚刚享受过胜利时，这条界线会变得更模糊。没有什么比“轻松赚到的大钱”更能麻醉理性。经历过那种令人飘飘然的体验后，原本很理智的人也会慢慢滑向一种类似 Cinderella 在舞会上的行为。他们知道：如果在派对上逗留太久——也就是继续在那些估值相对于未来可能产生现金流而言“巨大得离谱”的公司里投机——最终一定会迎来南瓜和老鼠（美梦破灭）。但他们仍然痛恨错过这场“嗨到爆”的派对的任何一分钟。因此，这些兴高采烈的参与者都计划在午夜前几秒撤离。问题在于：他们跳舞的房间里，钟表没有指针。
Last year, we commented on the exuberance — and, yes, it was irrational — that prevailed, noting that investor expectations had grown to be several multiples of probable returns. One piece of evidence came from a Paine Webber-Gallup survey of investors conducted in December 1999, in which the participants were asked their opinion about the annual returns investors could expect to realize over the decade ahead. Their answers averaged 19%. That, for sure, was an irrational expectation: For American business as a whole, there couldn’t possibly be enough birds in the 2009 bush to deliver such a return.
去年我们评论过当时盛行的亢奋情绪——而且，是的，那是不理性的——我们指出：投资者的预期已经膨胀到“可能回报”的好几倍。一个证据来自 Paine Webber-Gallup 在 1999 年 12 月对投资者做的一项调查：参与者被问到，他们认为未来十年投资者每年可以期待实现多少回报。平均答案是 19%。这当然是不理性的预期：就整个 American business 而言，2009 年那片灌木丛里不可能有足够多的鸟，去交付这样的回报。
Far more irrational still were the huge valuations that market participants were then putting on businesses almost certain to end up being of modest or no value. Yet investors, mesmerized by soaring stock prices and ignoring all else, piled into these enterprises. It was as if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well as amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses that underlay them.
更不理性的，是当时市场参与者给一些几乎注定最终只会变得“价值不大甚至毫无价值”的企业所贴上的天价估值。然而，投资者被股价飙升迷住了眼、对其他一切视而不见，蜂拥而入这些企业。那感觉就像有一种病毒，在专业投资人和业余投资人之间疯狂传播，引发幻觉：某些板块股票的“价格”，与其背后企业的“价值”彻底脱钩。
This surreal scene was accompanied by much loose talk about “value creation.” We readily acknowledge that there has been a huge amount of true value created in the past decade by new or young businesses, and that there is much more to come. But value is destroyed, not created, by any business that loses money over its lifetime, no matter how high its interim valuation may get.
这出超现实的场景，还伴随着大量关于“价值创造（value creation）”的随口胡扯。我们当然承认：过去十年，新创或年轻企业确实创造了大量真实价值，未来还会有更多。但无论一家企业在过程中被估值到多高，只要它在“整个生命周期”里亏钱，它就在毁灭价值，而不是创造价值。
What actually occurs in these cases is wealth transfer, often on a massive scale. By shamelessly merchandising birdless bushes, promoters have in recent years moved billions of dollars from the pockets of the public to their own purses (and to those of their friends and associates). The fact is that a bubble market has allowed the creation of bubble companies, entities designed more with an eye to making money off investors rather than for them. Too often, an IPO, not profits, was the primary goal of a company’s promoters. At bottom, the “business model” for these companies has been the old-fashioned chain letter, for which many fee-hungry investment bankers acted as eager postmen.
在这些案例中真正发生的，其实是财富转移，而且往往规模巨大。推广者无耻地兜售“没有鸟的灌木丛”，近些年来把数十亿美元从公众口袋转进了自己的钱袋（以及其朋友与同伙的口袋）。事实是：泡沫市场允许泡沫公司被“创造”出来——这些实体的设计更多是为了从投资者身上赚钱，而不是为投资者赚钱。太多时候，公司的推动者追求的核心目标是 IPO，而不是利润。归根结底，这些公司的“商业模式”就是老式的连锁信（chain letter）；而许多嗜费如命的投行家则兴致勃勃地充当了邮差。
But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street — a community in which quality control is not prized — will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest.
但每个泡沫都注定会遇到一根针。两者终将相遇时，新一波投资者会学到一些古老的教训：第一，Wall Street 上有很多人——身处一个并不重视质量控制的群体——会把任何你愿意买的东西卖给你。第二，当投机看起来最轻松时，它往往最危险。
At Berkshire, we make no attempt to pick the few winners that will emerge from an ocean of unproven enterprises. We’re not smart enough to do that, and we know it. Instead, we try to apply Aesop’s 2,600-year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will emerge (a formulation that my grandsons would probably update to “A girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook.”). Obviously, we can never precisely predict the timing of cash flows in and out of a business or their exact amount. We try, therefore, to keep our estimates conservative and to focus on industries where business surprises are unlikely to wreak havoc on owners. Even so, we make many mistakes: I’m the fellow, remember, who thought he understood the future economics of trading stamps, textiles, shoes and second-tier department stores.
在 Berkshire，我们从不试图在一片未经验证的企业海洋里挑出少数赢家。我们没那么聪明，而且我们知道自己没那么聪明。相反，我们努力把 Aesop 这条 2,600 年前的公式，应用到那些我们有相当把握判断“灌木丛里有多少鸟、以及它们何时飞出来”的机会之上（按我孙子的说法，这公式大概得更新成：“一位坐在敞篷车里的女孩，胜过电话簿里五个。”）。显然，我们永远无法精确预测一家企业现金流进出发生的时间点与金额。于是我们尽量让估计保守，并聚焦在那些“意外”不太可能把所有者打得七荤八素的行业。即便如此，我们仍会犯很多错：别忘了，我就是那个曾经以为自己理解 trading stamps、纺织、鞋类、以及二线百货商店未来经济性的人。
Lately, the most promising “bushes” have been negotiated transactions for entire businesses, and that pleases us. You should clearly understand, however, that these acquisitions will at best provide us only reasonable returns. Really juicy results from negotiated deals can be anticipated only when capital markets are severely constrained and the whole business world is pessimistic. We are 180 degrees from that point.
最近，最有希望的“灌木丛”往往来自于对整家企业的谈判式交易，这让我们很开心。不过你必须清楚：这些收购在最好情况下也只能带来“合理回报”。真正“肥得流油”的谈判交易，只有在资本市场被严重约束、而整个商业世界一片悲观时才可能出现。我们现在离那个点差了 180 度。
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告利润的来源
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 65, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了 Berkshire 报告利润的主要来源。在这种呈现方式下，购并会计（purchase-accounting）的调整项不会被分摊到具体对应的业务板块，而是汇总后单独列示。这样做能让你看到：如果我们当初没有收购这些企业，它们的盈利会如何被报告出来。基于第 65 页讨论的原因，我们认为这种呈现方式，对投资者与管理者而言，比 GAAP 更有用——因为 GAAP 要求把收购溢价按业务逐一摊销/冲减。我们在表中展示的净利润总额，当然与审计财务报表中按 GAAP 口径披露的净利润总额完全一致。
Most of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses did at least reasonably well last year.
我们的大多数制造、零售与服务业务在去年至少表现得还算不错。
The exception was shoes, particularly at Dexter. In our shoe businesses generally, our attempt to keep the bulk of our production in domestic factories has cost us dearly. We face another very tough year in 2001 also, as we make significant changes in how we do business.
例外是鞋类业务，尤其是 Dexter。总体而言，在鞋业这块，我们试图把大部分生产留在美国本土工厂，这个尝试让我们付出了沉重代价。2001 年我们还将再经历一个非常艰难的年份，因为我们要对经营方式做出重大调整。
I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter in 1993. Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using Berkshire shares in payment. Last year, to recognize my error, we charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was attributable to the Dexter transaction. We may regain some economic goodwill at Dexter in the future, but we clearly have none at present.
我显然犯了一个错误：1993 年为收购 Dexter 付出的价格太高。更糟的是，我又在支付方式上犯了一个“巨大错误”——用 Berkshire 股票来支付。去年，为了承认这个错误，我们把 Dexter 交易相关的剩余会计商誉（accounting goodwill）全部冲销掉。未来我们也许还能在 Dexter 重新获得一些经济商誉（economic goodwill），但目前显然没有。
The managers of our shoe businesses are first-class from both a business and human perspective. They are working very hard at a tough — and often terribly painful — job, even though their personal financial circumstances don’t require them to do so. They have my admiration and thanks.
我们鞋业的管理层，无论从商业能力还是做人层面，都是一流的。他们在一份艰难——而且常常极其痛苦——的工作上拼命努力，尽管就他们个人的财务状况而言，并不需要这么做。他们值得我钦佩与感谢。
On a more pleasant note, we continue to be the undisputed leader in two branches of Aircraft Services — pilot training at FlightSafety (FSI) and fractional ownership of business jets at Executive Jet (EJA). Both companies are run by their remarkable founders.
换个更愉快的话题：我们在 Aircraft Services 的两个分支里仍然是无可争议的行业领袖——FlightSafety (FSI) 的飞行员培训，以及 Executive Jet (EJA) 的公务机分时持有（fractional ownership）。这两家公司都由其非凡的创始人掌舵。
Al Ueltschi at FSI is now 83 and continues to operate at full throttle. Though I am not a fan of stock splits, I am planning to split Al’s age 2-for-1 when he hits 100. (If it works, guess who’s next.)
FSI 的 Al Ueltschi 现在 83 岁，仍然全速运转。虽然我不是股票拆细的粉丝，但等 Al 到 100 岁时，我打算把他的年龄做一次 2 拆 1。（如果这招好用，你猜下一个是谁。）
We spent $272 million on flight simulators in 2000, and we’ll spend a similar amount this year. Anyone who thinks that the annual charges for depreciation don’t reflect a real cost — every bit as real as payroll or raw materials — should get an internship at a simulator company. Every year we spend amounts equal to our depreciation charge simply to stay in the same economic place — and then spend additional sums to grow. And growth is in prospect for FSI as far as the eye can see.
我们在 2000 年花了 2.72 亿美元购买飞行模拟器，今年也会花差不多同样的金额。任何认为“年度折旧费用并不代表真实成本——不像工资或原材料那样真实”的人，都应该去模拟器公司实习一下。我们每年花出去的金额，差不多就等于折旧费用，仅仅是为了让公司停留在同一个经济位置——然后我们还得再额外投入，才能实现增长。而 FSI 的增长前景，放眼望去几乎看不到尽头。
Even faster growth awaits EJA (whose fractional-ownership program is called NetJets—). Rich Santulli is the dynamo behind this business.
EJA 的增长会更快（它的分时持有项目叫 NetJets—）。推动这门生意的发动机，是 Rich Santulli。
Last year I told you that EJA’s recurring revenue from monthly management fees and hourly usage grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000 the growth was 49%. I also told you that this was a low-margin business, in which survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA last year, in part because of the major costs we are incurring in developing our business in Europe.
去年我告诉过你：EJA 来自每月管理费与按小时使用费的经常性收入，在 1999 年增长了 46%；而 2000 年增长了 49%。我也说过：这是一门低利润率的生意，最终活下来的不会多。去年 EJA 的利润率确实很薄，部分原因是我们为在 Europe 建立业务而承担了重大成本。
Regardless of the cost, you can be sure that EJA’s spending on safety will be whatever is needed. Obviously, we would follow this policy under any circumstances, but there’s some self-interest here as well: I, my wife, my children, my sisters, my 94-year-old aunt, all but one of our directors, and at least nine Berkshire managers regularly fly in the NetJets program. Given that cargo, I applaud Rich’s insistence on unusually high amounts of pilot training (an average of 23 days a year). In addition, our pilots cement their skills by flying 800 or so hours a year. Finally, each flies only one model of aircraft, which means our crews do no switching around among planes with different cockpit and flight characteristics.
不管成本如何，你都可以确信：EJA 在安全上的投入会“需要多少就花多少”。显然，在任何情况下我们都会如此，但这里也有一点“自利”：我、我妻子、我的孩子、我的姐妹、我 94 岁的姑妈、除一名之外的所有董事，以及至少九位 Berkshire 的经理人，都经常乘坐 NetJets。带着这样的“货物”，我非常赞同 Rich 坚持让飞行员接受异常高强度的培训（平均每年 23 天）。此外，我们的飞行员每年飞行大约 800 小时，以此巩固技能。最后，每位飞行员只飞一种机型，这意味着我们的机组不会在座舱与飞行特性不同的机型之间来回切换。
EJA’s business continues to be constrained by the availability of new aircraft. Still, our customers will take delivery of more than 50 new jets in 2001, 7% of world output. We are confident we will remain the world leader in fractional ownership, in respect to number of planes flying, quality of service, and standards of safety.
EJA 的业务仍然受到新飞机供应数量的限制。尽管如此，我们的客户在 2001 年将接收超过 50 架新公务机，约占全球产量的 7%。我们有信心：在分时持有领域，我们会继续保持全球领先——无论是飞机在飞数量、服务质量还是安全标准。
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Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 42-58, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 67-73, we have rearranged Berkshire’s financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.
关于我们各项业务的更多信息见第 42–58 页，你也会在那部分看到按 GAAP 口径披露的分部利润。此外，在第 67–73 页，我们又将 Berkshire 的财务数据按“非 GAAP”口径重排成四个板块——这更符合 Charlie 和我思考公司的方式。
Look-Through Earnings
穿透式收益
Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table on page 15 include only the dividends we receive from investees — though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "lookthrough" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported on page 15; plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
报告利润并不足以衡量 Berkshire 的经济进步，部分原因在于：第 15 页表格里列示的数字，只包含我们从被投资公司收到的股息——而这些股息通常只是“按我们持股比例应归属于我们的盈利”的一小部分。为了更接近 Berkshire 的经济现实、而不是停留在报告利润上，我们采用“look-through（穿透式）”收益的概念。按我们的计算方式，它由以下部分组成：(1) 第 15 页披露的经营利润（operating earnings）；加上；
(2) 我们在主要被投资公司“留存”的经营利润中按持股比例应享有的份额——在 GAAP 下，这部分并不会反映到我们的利润里；减去；(3) 假设这些被投资公司的留存利润改为以股息形式分配给我们，Berkshire 需要为此支付的税额的一个估算扣减。在这里统计“经营利润”时，我们会剔除购并会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments），以及资本利得和其他重大非经常性项目。
The following table sets forth our 2000 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 15, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表列示了我们 2000 年的穿透式收益。不过我得提醒你：这些数字只能是近似值，因为其中包含不少需要判断取舍的估计。（这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息，已经被计入第 15 页逐项列示的经营利润里，大多归在 “Insurance Group: Net Investment Income（保险集团：净投资收益）” 项下。）
Full and Fair Reporting
充分且公允的披露
At Berkshire, full reporting means giving you the information that we would wish you to give to us if our positions were reversed. What Charlie and I would want under that circumstance would be all the important facts about current operations as well as the CEO’s frank view of the long-term economic characteristics of the business. We would expect both a lot of financial details and a discussion of any significant data we would need to interpret what was presented.
在 Berkshire，“充分披露”意味着：如果我们的角色互换，我们希望你如何对我们披露信息，我们就如何对你披露。若处在那种情形下，Charlie 和我会希望看到：关于当前经营的所有重要事实，以及 CEO 对企业长期经济特征的坦率看法。我们会期待大量财务细节，同时也期待对任何关键数据进行讨论——这些数据是我们解读所呈现内容所必需的。
When Charlie and I read reports, we have no interest in pictures of personnel, plants or products. References to EBITDA make us shudder — does management think the tooth fairy pays for capital expenditures? We’re very suspicious of accounting methodology that is vague or unclear, since too often that means management wishes to hide something. And we don’t want to read messages that a public relations department or consultant has turned out. Instead, we expect a company’s CEO to explain in his or her own words what’s happening.
当 Charlie 和我读报告时，我们对员工、工厂或产品的照片毫无兴趣。提到 EBITDA 我们就发怵——管理层以为资本开支是牙仙子掏钱的吗？对于含糊不清、模棱两可的会计方法，我们非常怀疑，因为那往往意味着管理层想隐藏什么。我们也不想读公关部门或顾问炮制出来的“漂亮话”。相反，我们期望公司的 CEO 用自己的语言解释正在发生什么。
For us, fair reporting means getting information to our 300,000 “partners” simultaneously, or as close to that mark as possible. We therefore put our annual and quarterly financials on the Internet between the close of the market on a Friday and the following morning. By our doing that, shareholders and other interested investors have timely access to these important releases and also have a reasonable amount of time to digest the information they include before the markets open on Monday. This year our quarterly information will be available on the Saturdays of May 12, August 11, and November 10. The 2001 annual report will be posted on March 9.
对我们来说，“公允披露”意味着：把信息同时（或尽可能接近同时）送达我们 30 万名“合伙人”。因此，我们会在周五收盘后到下周一早盘前，把年度与季度财务信息发布到 Internet 上。这样一来，股东与其他关注我们的投资者就能及时获得这些重要披露，并且在周一市场开盘前，有一个合理的时间窗口去消化其中的信息。今年我们的季度信息将在 5 月 12 日、8 月 11 日与 11 月 10 日这几个星期六发布。2001 年年报将于 3 月 9 日博出。
We applaud the work that Arthur Levitt, Jr., until recently Chairman of the SEC, has done in cracking down on the corporate practice of “selective disclosure” that had spread like cancer in recent years. Indeed, it had become virtually standard practice for major corporations to “guide” analysts or large holders to earnings expectations that were intended either to be on the nose or a tiny bit below what the company truly expected to earn. Through the selectively dispersed hints, winks and nods that companies engaged in, speculatively-minded institutions and advisors were given an information edge over investment-oriented individuals. This was corrupt behavior, unfortunately embraced by both Wall Street and corporate America.
我们赞赏 Arthur Levitt, Jr.（不久前刚卸任的 SEC 主席）在打击“选择性披露（selective disclosure）”这一公司行为方面所做的工作——近年来这种做法像癌细胞一样扩散。事实上，大公司几乎已经把“引导（guide）”分析师或大持有人去形成某种盈利预期当作标准操作：这些预期要么被引导到“刚好命中”，要么被引导到比公司真正预期略低一点。通过这种选择性散布的暗示、眨眼与点头，公司让偏投机的机构与顾问，相比以投资为导向的个人，获得信息优势。不幸的是，这是一种腐败行为，却被 Wall Street 与 corporate America 双方共同接受。
Thanks to Chairman Levitt, whose general efforts on behalf of investors were both tireless and effective, corporations are now required to treat all of their owners equally. The fact that this reform came about because of coercion rather than conscience should be a matter of shame for CEOs and their investor relations departments.
多亏 Levitt 主席——他在维护投资者利益上的总体努力既不知疲倦也卓有成效——公司现在被要求平等对待所有所有者。这个改革竟然是靠强制而非良知才促成的，CEO 以及其投资者关系部门理应为此感到羞愧。
One further thought while I’m on my soapbox: Charlie and I think it is both deceptive and dangerous for CEOs to predict growth rates for their companies. They are, of course, frequently egged on to do so by both analysts and their own investor relations departments. They should resist, however, because too often these predictions lead to trouble.
我在“讲道台”上再补充一点想法：Charlie 和我认为，CEO 为自己公司预测增长率，既具有欺骗性，也很危险。当然，分析师和公司自己的投资者关系部门经常怂恿他们这么做。但他们应该抵制，因为这种预测太常会引发麻烦。
It’s fine for a CEO to have his own internal goals and, in our view, it’s even appropriate for the CEO to publicly express some hopes about the future, if these expectations are accompanied by sensible caveats. But for a major corporation to predict that its per-share earnings will grow over the long term at, say, 15% annually is to court trouble.
CEO 当然可以在内部设定自己的目标；在我们看来，如果这些期望伴随着合理的前提与警示条款（caveats），他在公开场合表达一些对未来的希望也是可以的。但一家大型公司若预测其每股盈利长期将以比如每年 15% 的速度增长，那就是在“自找麻烦”。
That’s true because a growth rate of that magnitude can only be maintained by a very small percentage of large businesses. Here’s a test: Examine the record of, say, the 200 highest earning companies from 1970 or 1980 and tabulate how many have increased per-share earnings by 15% annually since those dates. You will find that only a handful have. I would wager you a very significant sum that fewer than 10 of the 200 most profitable companies in 2000 will attain 15% annual growth in earnings-per-share over the next 20 years.
原因是：如此幅度的增长率，只有极少数大型企业才能长期维持。你可以做个检验：看看 1970 年或 1980 年当时盈利最高的 200 家公司，统计一下从那时起，有多少家公司实现了每股盈利年化 15% 的增长。你会发现只有寥寥几家。我愿意跟你赌一大笔钱：2000 年盈利最高的 200 家公司里，未来 20 年能做到每股盈利年化 15% 增长的，不会超过 10 家。
The problem arising from lofty predictions is not just that they spread unwarranted optimism. Even more troublesome is the fact that they corrode CEO behavior. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many instances in which CEOs engaged in uneconomic operating maneuvers so that they could meet earnings targets they had announced. Worse still, after exhausting all that operating acrobatics would do, they sometimes played a wide variety of accounting games to “make the numbers.” These accounting shenanigans have a way of snowballing: Once a company moves earnings from one period to another, operating shortfalls that occur thereafter require it to engage in further accounting maneuvers that must be even more “heroic.” These can turn fudging into fraud. (More money, it has been noted, has been stolen with the point of a pen than at the point of a gun.)
高调预测带来的问题，不只是传播了缺乏依据的乐观情绪。更麻烦的是：它会腐蚀 CEO 的行为。多年来，Charlie 和我见过太多案例：CEO 为了达成自己宣布的盈利目标，去做一些“经济上不划算”的经营动作。更糟的是，当这些经营杂技的空间被榨干后，他们有时会玩出五花八门的会计把戏来“凑数字”。这些会计小动作往往会滚雪球：一旦公司把某个期间的盈利挪到另一个期间，之后发生的经营缺口就会迫使它进一步进行更“英勇”的会计操作。这样一来，“做账”就可能滑向“造假”。（有人说得很妙：用笔尖偷走的钱，比用枪口偷走的钱还多。）
Charlie and I tend to be leery of companies run by CEOs who woo investors with fancy predictions. A few of these managers will prove prophetic — but others will turn out to be congenital optimists, or even charlatans. Unfortunately, it’s not easy for investors to know in advance which species they are dealing with.
Charlie 和我往往会对那些靠华丽预测去“勾引”投资者的 CEO 所经营的公司保持警惕。确实，其中少数会被证明是先知；但更多的，可能只是天生乐观主义者，甚至是江湖骗子。不幸的是，投资者很难在事前判断，自己面对的到底是哪一种“物种”。
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I’ve warned you in the past that you should not believe everything you read or hear about Berkshire — even when it is published or broadcast by a prestigious news organization. Indeed, erroneous reports are particularly dangerous when they are circulated by highly-respected members of the media, simply because most readers and listeners know these outlets to be generally credible and therefore believe what they say.
我过去就提醒过你：不要相信关于 Berkshire 你读到或听到的一切——即使这些内容出自一家声望很高的新闻机构。事实上，当错误报道由高度受尊敬的媒体传播时尤其危险，因为大多数读者和听众知道这些机构通常可信，于是就相信他们说的话。
An example is a glaring error about Berkshire’s activities that appeared in the December 29 issue of The Wall Street Journal, a generally excellent paper that I have for all of my life found useful. On the front page (and above the fold, as they say) The Journal published a news brief that said, in unequivocal terms, that we were buying bonds of Conseco and Finova. This item directed the reader to the lead story of the Money and Investing section. There, in the second paragraph of the story, The Journal reported, again without any qualification, that Berkshire was buying Conseco and Finova bonds, adding that Berkshire had invested “several hundred million dollars” in each. Only in the 18th paragraph of the story (which by that point had jumped to an inside page) did the paper hedge a bit, saying that our Conseco purchases had been disclosed by “people familiar with the matter.”
一个例子是：在 12 月 29 日那期《The Wall Street Journal》上出现了一条关于 Berkshire 活动的刺眼错误。这是一份总体上非常优秀的报纸，我一辈子都觉得它很有用。在头版（而且是“上半版”，他们这么说）上，《The Journal》刊登了一则新闻简讯，斩钉截铁地说我们正在买 Conseco 和 Finova 的债券。该简讯还引导读者去看“Money and Investing”版块的头条文章。在那篇文章的第二段，《The Journal》再次不加任何限定地报道：Berkshire 在买 Conseco 和 Finova 的债券，并补充说 Berkshire 在每一家上都投资了“数亿美元”。直到文章第 18 段（那时文章已经跳转到内页），报纸才稍微打了点补丁，说我们的 Conseco 买入是由“熟悉此事的人”披露的。
Well, not that familiar. True, we had purchased bonds and bank debt of Finova — though the report was wildly inaccurate as to the amount. But to this day neither Berkshire nor I have ever bought a share of stock or a bond of Conseco.
嗯，也没那么熟。确实，我们买过 Finova 的债券和银行债务——但报道在金额上错得离谱。至于 Conseco：直到今天，无论 Berkshire 还是我本人，都从未买过 Conseco 的一股股票或一张债券。
Berkshire is normally covered by a Journal reporter in Chicago who is both accurate and conscientious. In this case, however, the “scoop” was the product of a New York reporter for the paper. Indeed, the 29th was a busy day for him: By early afternoon, he had repeated the story on CNBC. Immediately, in lemming-like manner, other respected news organizations, relying solely on the Journal, began relating the same “facts.” The result: Conseco stock advanced sharply during the day on exceptional volume that placed it ninth on the NYSE most-active list.
《The Journal》通常由其 Chicago 的记者报道 Berkshire，那位记者既准确又认真。但这一次所谓的“独家”，却出自该报一位 New York 记者。事实上，29 日对他而言是个忙碌的日子：下午早些时候，他又在 CNBC 上重复了这个故事。紧接着，其他受尊敬的新闻机构以一种“旅鼠式”的方式，仅凭《The Journal》作为来源，就开始传播同样的“事实”。结果是：Conseco 的股价当天在异常巨大的成交量下大幅上涨，成交活跃度排名 NYSE 第九。
During all of the story’s iterations, I never heard or read the word “rumor.” Apparently reporters and editors, who generally pride themselves on their careful use of language, just can’t bring themselves to attach this word to their accounts. But what description would fit more precisely? Certainly not the usual “sources say” or “it has been reported.”
在这条新闻的各种版本传播过程中，我从未听到或读到“rumor（谣言）”这个词。显然，记者和编辑通常以自己谨慎用词为傲，却怎么也不愿把这个词贴到自己的报道上。但还有什么描述更贴切呢？当然不是常见的“sources say（消息人士称）”或“it has been reported（据报道）”。
A column entitled “Today’s Rumors,” however, would not equate with the self-image of the many news organizations that think themselves above such stuff. These members of the media would feel that publishing such acknowledged fluff would be akin to L’Osservatore Romano initiating a gossip column. But rumors are what these organizations often publish and broadcast, whatever euphemism they duck behind. At a minimum, readers deserve honest terminology — a warning label that will protect their financial health in the same way that smokers whose physical health is at risk are given a warning.
但如果开一个名为“Today’s Rumors（今日谣言）”的专栏，就会损害许多自认为“高于这种东西”的新闻机构的自我形象。他们会觉得：承认自己在发布这种“毛边料”，就像 L’Osservatore Romano（《罗马观察报》）开了一个八卦专栏一样荒唐。然而，这些机构经常印刷或播报的就是谣言——不管他们躲在什么委婉语背后。至少，读者应当得到诚实的术语——一个“警示标签”，像给吸烟者（其身体健康面临风险）标注警告那样，保护读者的财务健康。
The Constitution’s First Amendment allows the media to print or say almost anything. Journalism’s First Principle should require that the media be scrupulous in deciding what that will be.
宪法《First Amendment（第一修正案）》允许媒体几乎可以印刷或说任何东西。新闻业的“第一原则”则应当要求媒体在决定“要说什么”时保持极端审慎。
Miscellaneous
杂项
In last year’s report we examined the battle then raging over the use of “pooling” in accounting for mergers. It seemed to us that both sides were voicing arguments that were strong in certain respects and seriously flawed in others. We are pleased that the Financial Accounting Standards Board has since gone to an alternative approach that strikes us as very sound.
在去年的报告里，我们讨论了当时围绕并购会计中“pooling（权益结合法）”使用所展开的激烈争论。在我们看来，双方的论点在某些方面都很有力，但在其他方面也都存在严重缺陷。我们很高兴 Financial Accounting Standards Board（FASB）此后转向了一种替代方案，我们认为这一方案非常稳健。
If the proposed rule becomes final, we will no longer incur a large annual charge for amortization of intangibles. Consequently, our reported earnings will more closely reflect economic reality. (See page 65.) None of this will have an effect on Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Your Chairman, however, will personally benefit in that there will be one less item to explain in these letters.
如果拟议规则最终生效，我们将不再承担每年一大笔“无形资产摊销（amortization of intangibles）”费用。因此，我们的报告利润会更接近经济现实。（见第 65 页。）这些变化不会影响 Berkshire 的内在价值。不过，你们的董事长会在个人层面受益——因为这些信里又少了一项需要解释的东西。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I’m enclosing a report — generously supplied by Outstanding Investor Digest — of Charlie’s remarks at last May’s Wesco annual meeting. Charlie thinks about business economics and investment matters better than anyone I know, and I’ve learned a lot over the years by listening to him. Reading his comments will improve your understanding of Berkshire.
我随信附上一份报告——由 Outstanding Investor Digest 慷慨提供——内容是 Charlie 在去年 5 月 Wesco 年会上所做的发言摘录。Charlie 在商业经济学与投资问题上的思考能力，是我认识的人里最强的；这些年来，我通过听他讲话学到了很多。读完他的评论，你会更理解 Berkshire。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In 1985, we purchased Scott Fetzer, acquiring not only a fine business but the services of Ralph Schey, a truly outstanding CEO, as well. Ralph was then 61. Most companies, focused on the calendar rather than ability, would have benefited from Ralph’s talents for only a few years.
1985 年，我们收购了 Scott Fetzer，不仅买到了一门好生意，也把 Ralph Schey 的服务一并收入囊中——他是一位真正杰出的 CEO。当时 Ralph 61 岁。多数公司把注意力放在日历而非能力上，因此即便得到 Ralph 的才华，也只能受益几年。
At Berkshire, in contrast, Ralph ran Scott Fetzer for 15 years until his retirement at the end of 2000. Under his leadership, the company distributed $1.03 billion to Berkshire against our net purchase price of $230 million. We used these funds, in turn, to purchase other businesses. All told, Ralph’s contributions to Berkshire’s present value extend well into the billions of dollars.
但在 Berkshire，Ralph 一口气执掌 Scott Fetzer 15 年，直到 2000 年底退休。在他的领导下，公司向 Berkshire 分配了 10.3 亿美元，而我们的净收购成本只有 2.3 亿美元。我们又用这些资金去收购其他企业。总的来说，Ralph 对 Berkshire 现值的贡献，规模高达数十亿美元。
As a manager, Ralph belongs in Berkshire’s Hall of Fame, and Charlie and I welcome him to it.
作为经理人，Ralph 完全配得上进入 Berkshire 的“名人堂”。Charlie 和我欢迎他加入。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A bit of nostalgia: It was exactly 50 years ago that I entered Ben Graham’s class at Columbia. During the decade before, I had enjoyed — make that loved — analyzing, buying and selling stocks. But my results were no better than average.
一点怀旧：正好在 50 年前，我进入 Columbia 的 Ben Graham 课堂。在此前的十年里，我一直享受——不，是热爱——分析、买入和卖出股票。但我的成绩并不比平均水平更好。
Beginning in 1951 my performance improved. No, I hadn’t changed my diet or taken up exercise. The only new ingredient was Ben’s ideas. Quite simply, a few hours spent at the feet of the master proved far more valuable to me than had ten years of supposedly original thinking.
从 1951 年开始，我的业绩改善了。不是因为我改变了饮食或开始锻炼。唯一的新变量，是 Ben 的思想。说到底，在大师脚下坐上几个小时，对我的价值远远超过此前十年那些所谓“原创思考”。
In addition to being a great teacher, Ben was a wonderful friend. My debt to him is incalculable.
Ben 不仅是一位伟大的老师，也是一位很好的朋友。我欠他的情谊无法估量。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股东指定捐赠
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2000 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 74-75.
在 Berkshire 的 2000 年“股东指定捐赠”项目中，约 97% 的符合条件股份参与了该计划，合计捐赠 1,690 万美元。该项目的完整说明见第 74–75 页。
Cumulatively, over the 20 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $164 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $18.3 million in 2000, including in-kind donations of $3 million.
按累计口径来看，在该项目运行的 20 年里，Berkshire 已根据股东指示捐赠了 1.64 亿美元。Berkshire 其余的慈善捐赠由各子公司完成；它们沿用被收购前就已存在的慈善模式（唯一的变化是：原来的所有者本人会继续负责其个人慈善项目，而不再由企业承担）。合计而言，我们的子公司在 2000 年捐赠了 1,830 万美元，其中包括 300 万美元的实物捐赠。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2001 will be ineligible for the 2001 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.
要参与未来的项目，你必须持有登记在“实际所有人”名下的 A 类股票，而不是登记在经纪商、银行或托管机构的代持（nominee）名下。凡未在 2001 年 8 月 31 日前完成上述登记的股份，将无资格参加 2001 年项目。当你收到我们寄出的捐赠表格后，请尽快寄回，避免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定将不予受理。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Last year we moved the annual meeting to the Civic Auditorium, and it worked very well for us. We will meet there again on Saturday, April 28. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food, with sandwiches available at the Civic’s concession stands. Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30.
去年我们把年度股东大会搬到 Civic Auditorium，效果很好。今年我们仍将在那里召开，时间是 4 月 28 日（星期六）。大门 7:00 开放，电影 8:30 开始，会议 9:30 正式开始。中午会有一个短暂休息供大家用餐，Civic 的小卖部会提供三明治。除这段间歇之外，Charlie 和我会回答问题直到 15:30。
For the next couple of years, the Civic is our only choice. We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare that would occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will have a new Convention Center with ample parking. Assuming that the Center is then available to us, I will poll shareholders to see whether you wish to return to a Monday meeting. We will decide that vote based on the wishes of a majority of shareholders, not shares.
未来一两年里，Civic 是我们唯一的选择。因此我们必须把会议安排在周六或周日，以避免工作日可能出现的交通与停车噩梦。不过，用不了多久 Omaha 就会有一个新的 Convention Center，停车位也会很充足。假如到时该中心能供我们使用，我会征询股东意见：你们是否希望回到周一开会。我们将按“股东人数多数”而不是“股份数多数”的意愿来决定这一投票结果。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to this year’s meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
随本报告附上的代理材料（proxy material）里有一份附件，说明你如何获取今年参会及参加其他活动所需的入场证（credential）。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。按惯例，我们会安排大巴从主要酒店接送股东去会场。会议结束后，大巴会把大家送回酒店，并前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim’s 和机场。即便如此，你大概率还是会觉得有辆车更方便。
We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year that I’m not going to detail all of the products that we will be selling at the meeting. But come prepared to carry home everything from bricks to candy. One new product, however, deserves special note: Bob Shaw has designed a 3 x 5 rug featuring an excellent likeness of Charlie. Obviously, it would be embarrassing for Charlie — make that humiliating — if slow sales forced us to slash the rug’s price, so step up and do your part.
今年我们给 Berkshire 增加了太多新公司，我就不打算把年会上要卖的所有产品都一一列出来了。不过你最好做好准备：从砖头到糖果，什么都可能让你背回家。有一个新产品值得特别一提：Bob Shaw 设计了一张 3×5 英尺的小地毯，上面印着一幅非常像 Charlie 的肖像。很显然，如果销量太慢迫使我们不得不降价，那对 Charlie 来说会很尴尬——不，是很羞辱——所以请站出来尽你的一份力。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount (usually 8%). Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you some money.
GEICO 会设一个展位，由来自全国各地的多位顶尖顾问坐镇，随时给你提供车险报价。多数情况下，GEICO 能给你提供专属股东折扣（通常 8%）。带上你现有保险的细节，看看我们能不能帮你省点钱。
At the Omaha airport on Saturday, we will have the usual array of aircraft from Executive Jet available for your inspection. Just ask an EJA representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home.
周六在 Omaha 机场，我们会照例陈列 Executive Jet 的一系列飞机供你参观。你只要在 Civic 找 EJA 的代表，提出想看哪架飞机即可。如果你在周末买了我们认为“足够多”的东西，你很可能真的需要一架自己的飞机把它们运回家。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM four years ago and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $9.1 million in 2000.
在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM），它位于 72nd Street、Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地 75 英亩，我们会再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”价格——也就是给股东提供通常只给员工的折扣。我们四年前开始在 NFM 推出这一特别价格，“周末”期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2000 年的 910 万美元。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Wednesday, April 25 and Monday, April 30 and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestige manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.
要获得折扣，你必须在 4 月 25 日（周三）到 4 月 30 日（周一）期间完成购买，并出示你的参会入场证。该时段的特价甚至适用于若干“高端品牌”的产品——这些品牌平时对折扣有铁一般的禁令，但出于股东周末的精神，破例对你开放。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM 的营业时间为：工作日 10:00–21:00，周六与周日 10:00–18:00。
Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 27. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, April 29. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that’s what my family always tells me).
Borsheim’s——除 Tiffany’s Manhattan 门店外全美最大的珠宝店——将举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是鸡尾酒招待会：4 月 27 日（周五）18:00–22:00。第二场也是主活动：4 月 29 日（周日）9:00–17:00。股东价从周四到周一都有效，所以如果你想避开周五晚与周日的人潮，可以选其他时间来，并表明你是股东。周六我们营业到 18:00。Borsheim’s 的毛利率比主要竞争对手低足足 20 个百分点，所以你买得越多，省得越多（至少我家里人一直这么跟我说）。
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have local bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday. Bob Hamman, who normally is with us, will be in Africa this year. He has promised, however, to be on hand in 2002. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! Last year, Patrick played as many as six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and demolished his opponents.
在 Borsheim’s 外的商场里，我们周日会安排本地桥牌高手与股东对弈。通常会来参加的 Bob Hamman 今年在 Africa，但他承诺 2002 年会到场。两次获得全美国际象棋冠军的 Patrick Wolff 也会在商场里，迎战所有来者——而且是蒙眼对弈！去年 Patrick 戴着牢靠的眼罩同时下了多达六盘棋，并把对手打得落花流水。
As if all this isn’t enough to test your skills, our Borsheim’s Olympiad this year will also include Bill Robertie, one of only two players to twice win the backgammon world championship. Backgammon can be a big money game, so bring along your stock certificates.
如果这些还不足以考验你的本事，今年的 Borsheim’s Olympiad 还将请来 Bill Robertie——全世界只有两位曾两度夺得西洋双陆棋（backgammon）世界冠军的选手之一。Backgammon 可能是一项“豪赌”游戏，所以把你的股票凭证也带上。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 29, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that you can’t come to Gorat’s on Sunday without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 2 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. If you order a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns, you will establish your credentials as an epicure.
Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——也会再次在 4 月 29 日（周日）专门为 Berkshire 股东开放，营业时间 16:00–22:00。请记住：周日去 Gorat’s 必须有预约。要预约，请在 4 月 2 日拨打 402-551-3733（但别提前打）。如果周日订满了，你在城里其他晚上也可以去试试。若你点一份三分熟的 T-bone，再来一份双倍 hash browns，你就算是把“美食家资质”给立住了。
The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden Spikes will play the New Orleans Zephyrs. Ernie Banks is again going to be on hand to — bravely — face my fastball (once clocked at 95 mpm — miles per month).
照例的棒球赛将于周六晚 19:00 在 Rosenblatt Stadium 举行。今年 Omaha Golden Spikes 将对阵 New Orleans Zephyrs。Ernie Banks 也会再次到场——勇敢地——面对我的快速球（曾经被测到 95 mpm——miles per month，每月英里）。
My performance last year was not my best: It took me five pitches to throw anything resembling a strike. And, believe me, it gets lonely on the mound when you can’t find the plate. Finally, I got one over, and Ernie lashed a line drive to left field. After I was yanked from the game, the many sports writers present asked what I had served up to Ernie. I quoted what Warren Spahn said after Willie Mays hit one of his pitches for a home run (Willie’s first in the majors): “It was a helluva pitch for the first sixty feet.”
我去年投得并不算好：我用了五个球才投出一个勉强像样的好球。相信我，当你怎么也找不到好球区时，站在投手丘上会非常孤独。最后我总算投进了一个，Ernie 立刻把球抽成一记飞向左外野的平直强袭球。我被换下场后，在场的许多体育记者问我到底给 Ernie 喂了个什么球。我引用了 Warren Spahn 的话——那是他在 Willie Mays 把他某个球轰成全垒打（也是 Willie 在大联盟的第一支全垒打）后说的：“对前 60 英尺来说，那真他妈是个好球。”
It will be a different story this year. I don’t want to tip my hand, so let’s just say Ernie will have to deal with a pitch he has never seen before.
今年就不一样了。我不想泄露底牌，所以我只能说：Ernie 得面对一种他从没见过的球。
Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action in town. So come for Woodstock Weekend and join our Celebration of Capitalism at the Civic.
我们的代理声明（proxy statement）里包含了如何获取球赛门票的说明，以及大量其他能帮助你在 Omaha 玩得尽兴的信息。城里会有很多活动。所以，来参加 Woodstock Weekend，和我们一起在 Civic 庆祝资本主义吧。
February 28, 2001
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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Refer To：《1997-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or 36.1%. Per-share book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because the ...1999-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《1999-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2000-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2000-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2001-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2001-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2000 was $3.96 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2002-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2002-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Berkshire’s loss in net worth during 2001 was $3.77 billion, which decreased the per-share book value of both our Class A and ...