2015-02-27 Warren Buffett.Intrinsic Value

INTRINSIC VALUE

内在价值

Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.

现在让我们聚焦一个我此前提到、你在未来年度报告中也会遇到的术语。

Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.

内在价值是一个至关重要的概念，它提供了评估投资与企业相对吸引力的唯一合乎逻辑的方法。其简单的定义是：在企业剩余寿命期间可从企业中取出的现金的折现价值。

The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover – and this would apply even to Charlie and me – will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.

不过，内在价值的计算并不那么简单。正如定义所暗示，内在价值是一个估值，而非精确数字；并且当利率变化或未来现金流预测被修正时，这一估值也必须随之调整。即便两个人看到同一组事实——这点对Charlie和我也成立——几乎不可避免地会得出至少略有差异的内在价值数字。这也是我们从不向你给出内在价值估算的原因之一。而我们的年报所提供的，是我们自己用来计算这一价值的事实依据。

Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.

与此同时，我们会定期披露每股账面价值，这个数值容易计算，但用途有限。其局限并不在于我们持有的可交易证券——这些在账上按当前价格计量——而在于我们所控股的公司，它们在账上反映的价值可能与其内在价值大相径庭。

The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.

这种偏差可能向上也可能向下。举例而言，1964年我们可以肯定地说Berkshire的每股账面价值是19.46美元。然而该数字大大高估了公司的内在价值，因为公司全部资源都捆绑在一个盈利不足的纺织业务中。我们的纺织资产无论作为持续经营还是清算，其价值都达不到账面值。如今情况相反：我们的账面价值远低估了Berkshire的内在价值，因为我们控股的许多业务的实际价值远高于账面价值。

Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.

尽管账面价值难以完整讲清事实，我们仍向你提供Berkshire的账面价值数据，因为它如今可作为一个粗略但明显低估的跟踪指标，用以反映Berkshire的内在价值。换句话说，某一年账面价值的百分比变化，大概率会与该年内在价值的变化相当接近。

You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.

你可以借助一种投资形式——大学教育——来理解账面价值与内在价值的差别。把教育成本视为其“账面价值”。若要准确，这一成本应包含学生因选择上大学而非就业所放弃的收入。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.

在这个练习中，我们忽略教育的重要非经济收益，只关注其经济价值。首先，我们必须估计毕业生一生将获得的收入，并从中减去若其没有受过该教育本可获得的收入估计值，由此得到“超额收益”。随后按适当利率将其折现回毕业当日。所得的美元数值即为这份教育的内在经济价值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.

有些毕业生会发现其教育的账面价值高于内在价值，意味着为该教育买单的人并未物有所值。也有相反的情况：教育的内在价值远高于其账面价值，这表明资本部署明智。不论哪种情况，明确的一点是：把账面价值当作内在价值的指标没有意义。

THE MANAGING OF BERKSHIRE

伯克希尔的管理

I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first ownerrelated principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 340,000 employees, only 25 of these are at headquarters.

我认为以讨论Berkshire当下与未来的管理来收尾是恰当的。按照我们的第一条所有者相关原则，Charlie和我是Berkshire的管理合伙人。但我们把业务中所有“重体力活”都分包给各子公司的经理人。事实上，我们的授权几乎接近“让位”：Berkshire大约有340,000名员工，但总部只有25人。

Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.

Charlie和我主要专注于资本配置，以及对关键经理人的关照与激励。多数经理人在被放手经营时最快乐，我们也通常如此放手。这让他们负责所有经营决策，并把所产生的超额现金上缴总部。把现金交给我们，他们就不会被亲自配置现金时可能遇到的各种诱惑分心。此外，Charlie和我能接触到的资金投资机会面更广，远胜任何经理人在其自身行业中所能找到的机会。

Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.

我们的大多数经理人本就财务独立，因此我们需要营造一种氛围，让他们愿意选择与Berkshire一起工作，而不是去打高尔夫或垂钓。这要求我们公平对待他们，并以我们在角色互换时希望被对待的方式对待他们。

As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.

至于资本配置，这是Charlie和我都乐在其中且已积累颇多经验的活动。总体而言，在这个赛场上“白发无碍”：推动资金并不需要出色的手眼协调或强健的肌肉（谢天谢地）。只要我们的头脑仍然有效运转，Charlie和我就能像过去一样继续好好干下去。

On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years.

当我去世时，Berkshire的所有权结构会发生变化，但不会以破坏性的方式发生：为支付我设定的现金遗赠或税款，无需出售我的任何Berkshire股票。我的其他资产将满足这些需求。我所持全部Berkshire股票将留给各基金会，预计将在十多年内按大致相等的份额分期接收。

At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.

在我去世时，Buffett family不会参与公司经营，但作为重要股东，将协助挑选并监督负责经营的经理人。至于这些经理人究竟是谁，当然取决于我去世的时间。但我可以预见管理结构：本质上我的工作将被拆分为两部分。一位高管将出任CEO并负责运营；投资职责将交由一位或多位高管承担。如果出现收购新业务的机会，这些高管将协同作出必要决定，当然需经董事会批准。我们将继续拥有一个极度以股东为本的董事会，其利益与你的利益高度一致。

Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence. Our managerial roster has never been stronger.

如果我们需要立即启用我刚才描述的管理架构，我们的董事们已经知道我对两项职位的推荐。所有候选人目前都在Berkshire任职或可为Berkshire所用，且都是我完全信任的人。我们的管理阵容从未如此强大。

I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact. As an added assurance that this will be the case, I believe it would be wise when I am no longer CEO to have a member of the Buffett family serve as the non-paid, non-executive Chairman of the Board. That decision, however, will be the responsibility of the then Board of Directors.

我会继续就继任问题向董事们通报进展。由于Berkshire股票几乎构成我全部遗产，并且在我去世后的相当一段时期内也将占各基金会资产的类似比例，你可以放心，我们与董事们已认真深思继任安排并做好充分准备。你同样可以确信，迄今为止我们用于经营Berkshire的原则将继续指引继任的管理者，我们异常强大且边界清晰的文化将保持完整。作为额外的保障，我认为当我不再担任CEO时，由Buffett family的一名成员出任不领取报酬的非执行董事长是明智的。当然，该决定将由届时的董事会负责。

Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.

为免以病恹的笔调作结，我还想告诉你：我从未感觉如此良好。我热爱经营Berkshire；如果享受生活有助于长寿，那么Methuselah的纪录恐怕要不保了。

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman

STOCK PERFORMANCE GRAPH

股票表现图

The following chart compares the subsequent value of $100 invested in Berkshire common stock on December 31, 2009 with a similar investment in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Stock Index and in the Standard and Poor’s Property—Casualty Insurance Index.**

下图比较了在2009年12月31日将100美元投资于Berkshire普通股，与将同样金额分别投资于Standard and Poor’s 500 Stock Index和Standard and Poor’s Property—Casualty Insurance Index之后的价值变化。**

*Cumulative return for the Standard and Poor’s indices based on reinvestment of dividends.

*Standard and Poor’s各指数的累计回报基于股息再投资计算。

** It would be difficult to develop a peer group of companies similar to Berkshire. The Corporation owns subsidiaries engaged in a number of diverse business activities of which the most important is the property and casualty insurance business and, accordingly, management has used the Standard and Poor’s Property—Casualty Insurance Index for comparative purposes.

** 要建立与Berkshire相近的公司同业组是困难的。公司拥有从事多种不同业务活动的子公司，其中最重要的是财产与意外伤害保险业务；因此，管理层采用Standard and Poor’s Property—Casualty Insurance Index作为比较基准。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

INTRINSIC VALUE – TODAY AND TOMORROW *

内在价值——今天与明天*

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.

尽管Berkshire的内在价值无法精确计算，但其三大关键支柱中的两项是可量化的。Charlie和我在自行估算Berkshire价值时高度依赖这些量化指标。

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

第一项价值组成是我们的投资：股票、债券与现金等价物。年末按市值计合计为1,580亿美元。

Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金（在保险业务中我们暂时持有、但不属于我们的资金）为我们的投资提供了660亿美元的资金。只要保险承保能打平，这笔浮存金就是“免费”的，也就是我们收到的保费等于发生的赔付与费用。当然，承保结果具有波动性，时而盈利、时而亏损。然而，从我们的整体历史看，我们显著盈利；我也预计未来平均将达到打平或更好。若能做到这一点，我们的全部投资——无论由浮存金还是由留存收益所资助——都可以被视为Berkshire股东价值的组成部分。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

Berkshire第二项价值组成是来自投资与保险承保之外来源的盈利。这部分盈利由我们68家非保险公司贡献，详见第106页。Berkshire早年更侧重投资端；然而在过去二十年里，我们日益强调来自非保险业务的盈利增长，这一做法将会延续。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.

下列表格展示了这种转变。第一张表按十年区间列示了自1970年（我们进入保险业务后三年）起的每股投资数据。与少数股东权益相关的投资被予以剔除。

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

尽管在这40年期间，我们每股投资资产的复合年增长率达到可观的19.9%，但随着我们把资金用于收购经营性业务，增速已显著放缓。

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

这种转向带来的回报体现在下表中，该表再次以每股口径并在扣除适用的少数股东权益后，展示了我们非保险业务盈利的增长情况。

For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.

在这四十年中，我们每股税前非保险盈利的复合年增速为21.0%。同一时期，Berkshire的股价年均上涨22.1%。从长期看，你可以预期我们的股价大体会与Berkshire的投资与盈利同步前行。市场价格与内在价值常常走在截然不同的路径上——有时持续很久——但最终会相遇。

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

内在价值的计算还包含第三个更主观、可能正也可能负的要素：未来对留存收益的配置效率。我们与许多其他企业一样，未来十年可能留存的利润将与我们当前使用的资本相当，甚至超出。一些公司会把这些留存的美元“变成50美分”，另一些公司则能把它们“变成2美元”。

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

要对一家公司的内在价值做出合理估计，我们（或任何人）都必须将“他们会如何使用这笔钱”的因素，与“我们现在拥有什么”的计算一并评估。原因在于：当管理层再投资属于外部投资者那一份公司利润时，外部投资者只能袖手旁观。如果一位CEO有望把这件事做好，那么再投资前景会提升公司的当下价值；若CEO的能力或动机存疑，则今天的价值必须打折。结果的差异可能巨大：20世纪60年代末，将一美元交到 Sears Roebuck 或 Montgomery Ward 的CEO手中，与将一美元托付给 Sam Walton，命运迥异。

*Reproduced from Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2010 Annual Report.

*摘自 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2010 Annual Report。

2015-02-27 Warren Buffett.Intrinsic Value

2015-02-27 Warren Buffett.Intrinsic Value

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