2009-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our decrease in net worth during 2008 was $11.5 billion, which reduced the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 9.6%. Over the last 44 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,530, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*
我们在 2008 年的净资产减少了 115 亿美元，这使得我们的 Class A 与 Class B 股票的每股账面价值均下降了 9.6%。在过去 44 年（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 70,530 美元，复合年增长率为 20.3%。*
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for A.
本报告中所有“每股”数据均以 Berkshire 的 A 股为基准。B 股数据为 A 股的 1/30。
The table on the preceding page, recording both the 44-year performance of Berkshire’s book value and the S&P 500 index, shows that 2008 was the worst year for each. The period was devastating as well for corporate and municipal bonds, real estate and commodities. By yearend, investors of all stripes were bloodied and confused, much as if they were small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.
前一页的表格记录了 Berkshire 账面价值与 S&P 500 指数在这 44 年间的表现，显示 2008 年对两者而言都是最糟糕的一年。同样遭受重创的还有公司债与市政债、房地产以及大宗商品。到年底，各路投资者都被打得遍体鳞伤、茫然失措，就像一群误闯进羽毛球比赛场地的小鸟一样。
As the year progressed, a series of life-threatening problems within many of the world’s great financial institutions was unveiled. This led to a dysfunctional credit market that in important respects soon turned non-functional. The watchword throughout the country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was young: “In God we trust; all others pay cash.”
随着这一年推进，全球许多顶级金融机构内部一连串“致命”的问题被揭开，信用市场随之失灵，并在若干关键层面迅速从“功能紊乱”走向“几乎停摆”。全国上下的口头禅变成了我年轻时在餐馆墙上常见的那句信条：“In God we trust; all others pay cash.”
By the fourth quarter, the credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices, had produced a paralyzing fear that engulfed the country. A freefall in business activity ensued, accelerating at a pace that I have never before witnessed. The U.S. — and much of the world — became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback cycle. Fear led to business contraction, and that in turn led to even greater fear.
到了第四季度，信贷危机叠加房价与股价暴跌，引发了一种席卷全国的瘫痪式恐惧。商业活动随即自由落体式下滑，其加速之快，是我从未见过的。美国——以及世界上很大一部分地区——被困在一个恶性“负反馈”循环里：恐惧导致企业收缩，而企业收缩又反过来加深恐惧。
This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone “all in.” Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won’t leave willingly.
这一令人窒息的螺旋式下行，促使政府采取了大规模行动。用扑克牌术语说，Treasury 和 Fed 已经“all in”。过去按“杯”计量的经济药方，最近改成了按“桶”倾倒。这种过去难以想象的剂量，几乎必然会带来令人不快的后遗症。具体会是什么，谁也说不准；但一个可能的后果，是通胀的猛攻。此外，主要行业已经开始依赖联邦援助，接下来还会轮到提出“令人瞠目”的请求的城市与州。要让这些实体断奶、离开公共财政的奶嘴，将是一项政治挑战；他们不会心甘情愿地离开。
Whatever the downsides may be, strong and immediate action by government was essential last year if the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown. Had one occurred, the consequences for every area of our economy would have been cataclysmic. Like it or not, the inhabitants of Wall Street, Main Street and the various Side Streets of America were all in the same boat.
不管这些副作用如何，政府在去年迅速而强力地出手都是必要的，否则金融体系就可能发生全面崩溃。一旦崩溃，其对我们经济各个领域造成的后果将是灾难性的。不管你愿不愿意，Wall Street、Main Street，以及美国各种 Side Streets 的居民，当时都在同一条船上。
Amid this bad news, however, never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past. In the 20th Century alone, we dealt with two great wars (one of which we initially appeared to be losing); a dozen or so panics and recessions; virulent inflation that led to a 21½% prime rate in 1980; and the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment ranged between 15% and 25% for many years. America has had no shortage of challenges.
尽管坏消息不断，但千万别忘了：我们的国家过去经历过更糟糕的磨难。仅在 20 世纪，我们就打过两场大战（其中一场在最初阶段我们看起来像是要输）；经历了十来次金融恐慌与衰退；还遭遇过恶性通胀——1980 年的最优惠贷款利率（prime rate）高达 21½%；以及 1930 年代的大萧条，当时失业率多年徘徊在 15% 到 25% 之间。美国从来不缺挑战。
Without fail, however, we’ve overcome them. In the face of those obstacles — and many others — the real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven-fold during the 1900s, while the Dow Jones Industrials rose from 66 to 11,497. Compare the record of this period with the dozens of centuries during which humans secured only tiny gains, if any, in how they lived. Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has worked extraordinarily well over time. It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it will continue to do so. America’s best days lie ahead.
但我们从未例外地战胜了它们。面对这些障碍——以及更多其他困难——在整个 1900 年代，美国人的实际生活水平提升了将近 7 倍，而 Dow Jones Industrials 则从 66 点涨到 11,497 点。把这段记录与此前人类经历的数十个世纪相比：在那漫长时期里，人类生活水平若有提升，也只是微乎其微，甚至没有。道路并不平坦，但从长期看，我们的经济制度运行得异常出色。它释放了人类潜能，其程度是任何其他制度都做不到的，而且未来也将继续如此。美国最好的日子仍在前方。
Take a look again at the 44-year table on page 2. In 75% of those years, the S&P stocks recorded a gain. I would guess that a roughly similar percentage of years will be positive in the next 44. But neither Charlie Munger, my partner in running Berkshire, nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance. (In our usual opinionated view, we don’t think anyone else can either.) We’re certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 — and, for that matter, probably well beyond — but that conclusion does not tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall.
再看一眼第 2 页那张 44 年的表格。在其中 75% 的年份里，S&P 股票都是上涨的。我猜在未来 44 年里，上涨年份的比例也会大致相当。但无论是 Charlie Munger（我在 Berkshire 的合伙人）还是我，都无法提前预测哪一年会赢、哪一年会输。（以我们一贯“有主见”的看法，我们认为别人也同样做不到。）例如，我们确信 2009 年经济将一团糟——而且很可能糟得不止一年——但这个判断并不能告诉我们股市会涨还是会跌。
In good years and bad, Charlie and I simply focus on four goals:
无论好年景还是坏年景，Charlie 和我都只专注于四个目标：
1.maintaining Berkshire’s Gibraltar-like financial position, which features huge amounts of excess liquidity, near-term obligations that are modest, and dozens of sources of earnings and cash;
保持 Berkshire “像直布罗陀一样坚固”的财务状况：拥有巨额的超额流动性、短期义务很轻，以及数十个来源的盈利与现金流；
新的提法。
2.widening the “moats” around our operating businesses that give them durable competitive advantages;
拓宽我们旗下经营性业务的“护城河”，让它们拥有持久的竞争优势；
3.acquiring and developing new and varied streams of earnings;
收购并培育新的、更加多元的盈利来源；
4.expanding and nurturing the cadre of outstanding operating managers who, over the years, have delivered Berkshire exceptional results.
扩充并培育一支卓越的经营管理者队伍——多年来，正是他们为 Berkshire 交出了非凡的成果。
Berkshire in 2008
Berkshire 在 2008 年
Most of the Berkshire businesses whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned below their potential last year, and that will be true in 2009 as well. Our retailers were hit particularly hard, as were our operations tied to residential construction. In aggregate, however, our manufacturing, service and retail businesses earned substantial sums and most of them — particularly the larger ones — continue to strengthen their competitive positions. Moreover, we are fortunate that Berkshire’s two most important businesses — our insurance and utility groups — produce earnings that are not correlated to those of the general economy. Both businesses delivered outstanding results in 2008 and have excellent prospects.
2008 年，Berkshire 里那些业绩会被宏观经济显著影响的业务，大多都没有发挥出应有的潜力；2009 年也会如此。我们的零售业务受到的冲击尤其严重，与住宅建设相关的业务也同样受挫。但总体而言，我们的制造、服务与零售业务仍然赚到了可观的利润，而且其中大多数——尤其是规模更大的那些——继续在强化自身的竞争地位。此外，我们很幸运：Berkshire 最重要的两大业务——保险与公用事业（utility）集团——其盈利并不与整体经济同向波动。两项业务在 2008 年都交出了杰出的成绩单，前景也非常好。
As predicted in last year’s report, the exceptional underwriting profits that our insurance businesses realized in 2007 were not repeated in 2008. Nevertheless, the insurance group delivered an underwriting gain for the sixth consecutive year. This means that our $58.5 billion of insurance “float” — money that doesn’t belong to us but that we hold and invest for our own benefit — cost us less than zero. In fact, we were paid $2.8 billion to hold our float during 2008. Charlie and I find this enjoyable.
正如我在去年的报告中所预言，2007 年保险业务实现的“异常出色”的承保利润，在 2008 年没有再现。尽管如此，保险集团仍连续第六年实现了承保盈利（underwriting gain）。这意味着：我们 585 亿美元的保险“float”（这些钱不属于我们，但我们代为持有并投资，从而为自己创造收益）对我们的成本低于零。事实上，2008 年我们拿着这些 float，还被“倒贴”了 28 亿美元。Charlie 和我觉得这事儿挺快乐。
Over time, most insurers experience a substantial underwriting loss, which makes their economics far different from ours. Of course, we too will experience underwriting losses in some years. But we have the best group of managers in the insurance business, and in most cases they oversee entrenched and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths, I believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing. Our insurance operation, the core business of Berkshire, is an economic powerhouse.
长期来看，大多数保险公司都会出现显著的承保亏损，这使得它们的经济模型与我们截然不同。当然，我们某些年份也会出现承保亏损。但我们拥有保险行业里最优秀的一组管理者，而且在多数情况下，他们管理的是根基深厚、价值极高的特许经营（franchises）。考虑到这些优势，我相信我们在多年维度上会实现承保盈利，因此我们的 float 也就等于不花成本。Berkshire 的保险业务——公司的核心业务——是一台强大的“经济发动机”。
Charlie and I are equally enthusiastic about our utility business, which had record earnings last year and is poised for future gains. Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the managers of this operation, have achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility industry. I love it when they come up with new projects because in this capital-intensive business these ventures are often large. Such projects offer Berkshire the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent returns.
Charlie 和我对我们的公用事业业务同样充满热情：这项业务去年创下了历史纪录的盈利，并且已经为未来增长做好了姿态。Dave Sokol 与 Greg Abel（这项业务的管理者）取得的成绩，在公用事业行业里罕有匹敌。我喜欢他们提出新项目——因为在这种资本密集型行业里，这些项目往往规模巨大。它们给 Berkshire 提供了一个机会：以不错的回报率投出大笔资金。
Things also went well on the capital-allocation front last year. Berkshire is always a buyer of both businesses and securities, and the disarray in markets gave us a tailwind in our purchases. When investing, pessimism is your friend, euphoria the enemy.
去年在资本配置（capital allocation）方面，我们的表现也不错。Berkshire 一向既买企业也买证券，而市场的混乱反而给我们的买入带来了顺风。投资时，悲观是你的朋友，亢奋是你的敌人。
In our insurance portfolios, we made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable in normal markets. These should add about $1½ billion pre-tax to Berkshire’s annual earnings and offer possibilities for capital gains as well. We also closed on our Marmon acquisition (we own 64% of the company now and will purchase its remaining stock over the next six years). Additionally, certain of our subsidiaries made “tuck-in” acquisitions that will strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.
在保险投资组合里，我们以在正常市场环境下根本拿不到的条款，做了三笔大额投资。它们预计将为 Berkshire 每年贡献大约 15 亿美元的税前利润，同时也提供了资本利得的可能性。我们还完成了对 Marmon 的收购（目前我们持有该公司 64%，并将在未来六年内买下剩余股份）。另外，我们的一些子公司还做了“tuck-in”式收购（把小型收购“塞进”现有业务体系的补强型并购），这将强化它们的竞争地位与盈利能力。
That’s the good news. But there’s another less pleasant reality: During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt. I will tell you more about these later. Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in that should have caused me to re-examine my thinking and promptly take action.
这是好消息。但还有一个不那么愉快的现实：2008 年我在投资上干了些蠢事。我至少犯了一个重大的“该做不该做”的错误（mistake of commission），以及几次较小但同样造成伤害的错误。我稍后会把细节告诉你们。此外，我也犯了一些“该做却没做”的错误（errors of omission）：当新的事实出现、理应促使我重新审视判断并迅速行动时，我却在那儿“吮拇指”（sucking my thumb），等于什么也没干。
Additionally, the market value of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a significant decline along with the general market. This does not bother Charlie and me. Indeed, we enjoy such price declines if we have funds available to increase our positions. Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.
另外，我们仍然持有的债券与股票，其市场价值也随着大盘一起大幅下跌。这并不会让 Charlie 和我困扰。实际上，如果我们手头有资金可以加仓，我们反而享受这种价格下跌。很久以前，Ben Graham 教会我一句话：“Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” 不管我们谈的是袜子还是股票，我都喜欢在优质商品打折时买入。
Yardsticks
衡量标尺
Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend those totaled $122 billion (not counting the investments held by our finance and utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value). About $58.5 billion of that total is funded by our insurance float.
Berkshire 的价值主要来自两个大块。第一块是我们的投资：股票、债券以及现金等价物。到年末，这些合计 1,220 亿美元（不包括我们的金融与公用事业业务所持有的投资，我们把那部分归入第二个价值“桶”里）。在这 1,220 亿美元中，大约 585 亿美元来自保险 float 的资金支持。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 67 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 96. We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation because the value of our insurance operation comes from the investable funds it generates, and we have already included this factor in our first bucket.
Berkshire 的第二块价值来自“投资与保险以外”的盈利来源。这部分盈利由我们 67 家非保险公司贡献，名单在第 96 页逐一列出。我们在这项计算中把保险盈利排除在外，因为保险业务的价值来自它所产生的、可供投资的资金，而这个因素我们已经在第一块价值里体现过了。
In 2008, our investments fell from $90,343 per share of Berkshire (after minority interest) to $77,793, a decrease that was caused by a decline in market prices, not by net sales of stocks or bonds. Our second segment of value fell from pre-tax earnings of $4,093 per Berkshire share to $3,921 (again after minority interest).
2008 年，我们的投资（按 Berkshire 每股口径，扣除少数股东权益后）从每股 90,343 美元降至 77,793 美元。这个下降是由市场价格下跌造成的，而不是因为我们净卖出了股票或债券。第二块价值（同样按扣除少数股东权益后的口径）也从每股税前盈利 4,093 美元降到 3,921 美元。
Both of these performances are unsatisfactory. Over time, we need to make decent gains in each area if we are to increase Berkshire’s intrinsic value at an acceptable rate. Going forward, however, our focus will be on the earnings segment, just as it has been for several decades. We like buying underpriced securities, but we like buying fairly-priced operating businesses even more.
这两项表现都不令人满意。从长期看，如果我们要以一个可接受的速度提升 Berkshire 的内在价值，那么这两个领域都必须取得像样的增长。不过展望未来，我们的重点会放在“经营性盈利”这块，就像过去几十年一直做的那样。我们喜欢买被低估的证券，但我们更喜欢买价格公允的经营性企业。
Now, let’s take a look at the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is done in standard financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在，让我们来看看 Berkshire 的四个主要经营部门。它们在资产负债表结构与损益表特征上差异极大。因此，像标准财务报表那样把它们混在一起，会妨碍分析。于是我们会把它们当作四家独立的企业来呈现——这也是 Charlie 和我看待它们的方式。
Regulated Utility Business
受监管的公用事业业务
Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 723,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 9% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
Berkshire 持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 87.4%（稀释后）的权益；该公司拥有多种多样的公用事业业务。其中规模最大的是：(1) Yorkshire Electricity 与 Northern Electric，它们拥有 380 万终端用户，使其成为英国第三大配电公司；(2) MidAmerican Energy，主要在 Iowa 为 723,000 名电力客户提供服务；(3) Pacific Power 与 Rocky Mountain Power，在美国西部六个州为约 170 万电力客户提供服务；(4) Kern River 与 Northern Natural 两条管道，它们输送的天然气约占美国消费量的 9%。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, and my long-time friend, Walter Scott. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Nine years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
与我们共同持有 MidAmerican 的合伙人包括两位杰出的管理者 Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel，以及我相识多年的朋友 Walter Scott。各方分别有多少表决权并不重要；我们只有在一致认为“这件事明智”时，才会做出重大动作。与 Dave、Greg 和 Walter 共事的九年，进一步强化了我最初的判断：Berkshire 不可能找到更好的合伙人。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Last year was a terrible year for home sales, and 2009 looks no better. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
有点“不太搭”的是，MidAmerican 还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司 HomeServices of America。该公司通过 21 家本地品牌公司运营，旗下有 16,000 名经纪人。去年房屋销售极其惨淡，而 2009 年看起来也好不到哪去。不过，只要能以合理价格买到优质的经纪业务，我们仍会继续收购。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
以下是 MidAmerican 运营情况的一些关键数据：
MidAmerican’s record in operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas pipelines is truly outstanding. Here’s some backup for that claim.
MidAmerican 在运营其受监管的电力公用事业与天然气管道方面，纪录确实出色。下面给出一些证据来支撑这一说法。
Our two pipelines, Kern River and Northern Natural, were both acquired in 2002. A firm called Mastio regularly ranks pipelines for customer satisfaction. Among the 44 rated, Kern River came in 9th when we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked 39th. There was work to do.
我们旗下两条管道 Kern River 与 Northern Natural 都是在 2002 年收购的。有一家叫 Mastio 的公司会定期根据客户满意度给管道公司排名。在被评级的 44 家里，我们买下 Kern River 时它排第 9；Northern Natural 排第 39。提升空间很大。
In Mastio’s 2009 report, Kern River ranked 1st and Northern Natural 3rd. Charlie and I couldn’t be more proud of this performance. It came about because hundreds of people at each operation committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on their commitment.
在 Mastio 的 2009 年报告中，Kern River 排第 1，Northern Natural 排第 3。Charlie 和我对这份成绩再骄傲不过了。之所以能做到，是因为每个业务里有数以百计的人投入到一种新的文化之中，并且用行动兑现了自己的承诺。
Achievements at our electric utilities have been equally impressive. In 1995, MidAmerican became the major provider of electricity in Iowa. By judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency, the company has kept electric prices unchanged since our purchase and has promised to hold them steady through 2013.
我们的电力公用事业业务，同样令人印象深刻。1995 年，MidAmerican 成为 Iowa 的主要电力供应商。通过审慎规划与对效率的执着，公司在我们收购之后一直把电价保持不变，并承诺电价将稳定到 2013 年。
MidAmerican has maintained this extraordinary price stability while making Iowa number one among all states in the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind. Since our purchase, MidAmerican’s wind-based facilities have grown from zero to almost 20% of total capacity.
MidAmerican 在保持这种非凡价格稳定的同时，还让 Iowa 在“风电占发电装机容量比例”这一指标上位居全美第一。自我们收购以来，MidAmerican 的风电设施从零增长到接近总装机的 20%。
Similarly, when we purchased PacifiCorp in 2006, we moved aggressively to expand wind generation. Wind capacity was then 33 megawatts. It’s now 794, with more coming. (Arriving at PacifiCorp, we found “wind” of a different sort: The company had 98 committees that met frequently. Now there are 28. Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more electricity, doing so with 2% fewer employees.)
同样地，当我们在 2006 年收购 PacifiCorp 时，我们迅速推进风电扩张。当时风电装机只有 33 兆瓦；现在已达到 794 兆瓦，而且还会继续增加。（我们接手 PacifiCorp 时，发现另一种“风”：公司有 98 个经常开会的委员会。现在只剩 28 个。与此同时，我们发电与供电量显著增加，而员工人数却减少了 2%。）
In 2008 alone, MidAmerican spent $1.8 billion on wind generation at our two operations, and today the company is number one in the nation among regulated utilities in ownership of wind capacity. By the way, compare that $1.8 billion to the $1.1 billion of pre-tax earnings of PacifiCorp (shown in the table as “Western”) and Iowa. In our utility business, we spend all we earn, and then some, in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas. Indeed, MidAmerican has not paid a dividend since Berkshire bought into the company in early 2000. Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the utility systems our customers require and deserve. In exchange, we have been allowed to earn a fair return on the huge sums we have invested. It’s a great partnership for all concerned.
仅在 2008 年一年，MidAmerican 就在两处业务的风电建设上投入了 18 亿美元；如今公司在受监管公用事业中拥有的风电装机容量位列全美第一。顺便一提，把这 18 亿美元与 PacifiCorp（表格里以 “Western” 列示）以及 Iowa 两地合计 11 亿美元的税前利润对照一下。在我们的公用事业业务里，我们把赚到的全部利润都花出去，甚至花得更多，以满足服务区域的需求。事实上，自 Berkshire 在 2000 年初入股以来，MidAmerican 从未派发过股息。它的盈利被再投资，用于建设客户“需要且理应得到”的公用事业系统。作为交换，监管允许我们在投入的巨额资本上获得合理回报。这对所有相关方来说，都是一种很棒的合作关系。
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Our long-avowed goal is to be the “buyer of choice” for businesses — particularly those built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it. That means we must keep our promises; avoid leveraging up acquired businesses; grant unusual autonomy to our managers; and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin (though we prefer thick and thicker).
我们长期公开宣示的目标，是成为企业——尤其是由家族建立并持有的企业——的“首选买家”（buyer of choice）。实现这一目标的办法，是配得上这个称号。这意味着：我们必须信守承诺；不把收购来的企业加杠杆；给予管理者不同寻常的自主权；并在顺境逆境中都长期持有被收购的公司（当然，我们更喜欢“顺”而且“更顺”）。
长期专注于某个业务能在大脑里跑出稳定的轨道。
Our record matches our rhetoric. Most buyers competing against us, however, follow a different path. For them, acquisitions are “merchandise.” Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts, these operators are contemplating “exit strategies.” We have a decided advantage, therefore, when we encounter sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.
我们的行动与言辞一致。不过，大多数与我们竞争的买家走的是另一条路。对他们而言，收购是“商品”（merchandise）。在收购合同的墨迹还没干之前，这些操盘者就已经在琢磨“退出策略”（exit strategies）了。因此，当我们遇到那些真正关心企业未来的卖家时，我们就占了明确优势。
Some years back our competitors were known as “leveraged-buyout operators.” But LBO became a bad name. So in Orwellian fashion, the buyout firms decided to change their moniker. What they did not change, though, were the essential ingredients of their previous operations, including their cherished fee structures and love of leverage.
若干年前，我们的竞争者被称为“leveraged-buyout operators”（杠杆收购操盘者）。但 LBO 成了坏名声。于是，这些收购公司以一种“奥威尔式”的方式，决定给自己换个称呼。可他们没变的，是旧模式的核心配方：他们珍爱的收费结构，以及对杠杆的痴迷。
Their new label became “private equity,” a name that turns the facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing. A number of these acquirees, purchased only two to three years ago, are now in mortal danger because of the debt piled on them by their private-equity buyers. Much of the bank debt is selling below 70¢ on the dollar, and the public debt has taken a far greater beating. The private-equity firms, it should be noted, are not rushing in to inject the equity their wards now desperately need. Instead, they’re keeping their remaining funds very private.
他们的新标签叫 “private equity”（私募股权），这个名字把事实完全颠倒过来了：这些机构一旦收购企业，几乎总会让被收购企业资本结构中的“权益”占比相对原先大幅下降。许多仅在两三年前才被它们买下的企业，如今因为私募股权买家堆上去的债务而命悬一线。大量银行债务的交易价格已跌到面值的 70 美分以下，而公开市场债券遭到的打击更重。需要指出的是：这些私募股权公司并没有急着注入它们“被监护者”（wards）眼下急需的权益资本；相反，它们把剩余资金“更私密”地藏了起来。
In the regulated utility field there are no large family-owned businesses. Here, Berkshire hopes to be the “buyer of choice” of regulators. It is they, rather than selling shareholders, who judge the fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.
在受监管的公用事业领域，没有大型的家族控股企业。在这里，Berkshire 希望成为监管者的“首选买家”。因为在交易被提出时，评判买家是否合格的是监管者，而不是卖出股票的股东。
There is no hiding your history when you stand before these regulators. They can — and do — call their counterparts in other states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect to all aspects of the business, including a willingness to commit adequate equity capital.
当你站到这些监管者面前，你的历史无处可藏。他们可以——而且确实会——打电话给你在其他州的监管同行，询问你在业务各方面的行为记录，包括你是否愿意投入充足的权益资本。
When MidAmerican proposed its purchase of PacifiCorp in 2005, regulators in the six new states we would be serving immediately checked our record in Iowa. They also carefully evaluated our financing plans and capabilities. We passed this examination, just as we expect to pass future ones.
当 MidAmerican 在 2005 年提出收购 PacifiCorp 时，我们即将进入的六个新州的监管者立刻核查了我们在 Iowa 的记录。他们也仔细评估了我们的融资计划与能力。我们通过了这次审查——正如我们也期待未来能通过更多审查一样。
There are two reasons for our confidence. First, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel are going to run any businesses with which they are associated in a first-class manner. They don’t know of any other way to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future — and we know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new jurisdictions tomorrow.
我们之所以有信心，有两个原因。第一，Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel 会以一流方式经营任何与他们相关的业务；他们不知道还有别的经营方式。更深一层的原因是：我们希望未来还能收购更多受监管的公用事业公司——而我们今天在现有辖区里的经营行为，将决定我们明天在新辖区会受到怎样的欢迎。
Insurance
保险
Our insurance group has propelled Berkshire’s growth since we first entered the business in 1967. This happy result has not been due to general prosperity in the industry. During the 25 years ending in 2007, return on net worth for insurers averaged 8.5% versus 14.0% for the Fortune 500. Clearly our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back. Yet these managers have excelled to a degree Charlie and I never dreamed possible in the early days. Why do I love them? Let me count the ways.
自 1967 年我们第一次进入保险业以来，Berkshire 的保险集团一直在推动公司的成长。这个令人愉快的结果，并非来自行业整体的繁荣。以截至 2007 年的 25 年为期，保险公司的净资产收益率（return on net worth）平均只有 8.5%，而 Fortune 500 的平均值是 14.0%。显然，我们的保险业务 CEO 并没有“顺风”可借。然而，这些管理者的表现之出色，远远超出了 Charlie 和我在早期所能想象的程度。我为什么喜欢他们？让我细数其中缘由。
At GEICO, Tony Nicely — now in his 48th year at the company after joining it when he was 18 — continues to gobble up market share while maintaining disciplined underwriting. When Tony became CEO in 1993, GEICO had 2.0% of the auto insurance market, a level at which the company had long been stuck. Now we have a 7.7% share, up from 7.2% in 2007.
在 GEICO，Tony Nicely——他 18 岁加入公司，如今已在公司第 48 个年头——在保持严谨承保纪律的同时，持续“吞食”市场份额。Tony 1993 年成为 CEO 时，GEICO 在汽车保险市场的份额是 2.0%，这个水平公司长期卡在那里。现在我们的份额达到 7.7%，高于 2007 年的 7.2%。
The combination of new business gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing business has moved GEICO into the number three position among auto insurers. In 1995, when Berkshire purchased control, GEICO was number seven. Now we trail only State Farm and Allstate.
新业务增长与老业务续保率提升两者叠加，使 GEICO 跃升为全美第三大汽车保险公司。1995 年 Berkshire 买入控制权时，GEICO 排名第七。现在我们只落后于 State Farm 和 Allstate。
GEICO grows because it saves money for motorists. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But virtually everyone likes to drive. So, sensibly, drivers look for the lowest-cost insurance consistent with first-class service. Efficiency is the key to low cost, and efficiency is Tony’s specialty. Five years ago the number of policies per employee was 299. In 2008, the number was 439, a huge increase in productivity.
GEICO 的增长来自它为车主省钱。没人喜欢买车险，但几乎人人都喜欢开车。所以，驾驶者很理性：他们会寻找“在一流服务前提下成本最低”的保险。低成本的关键是效率，而效率正是 Tony 的强项。五年前，每名员工对应的保单数是 299；到 2008 年，这个数字变成了 439，生产率大幅提升。
As we view GEICO’s current opportunities, Tony and I feel like two hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp. Juicy targets are everywhere. First, and most important, our new business in auto insurance is now exploding. Americans are focused on saving money as never before, and they are flocking to GEICO. In January 2009, we set a monthly record — by a wide margin — for growth in policyholders. That record will last exactly 28 days: As we go to press, it’s clear February’s gain will be even better.
当我们审视 GEICO 当前的机会时，Tony 和我感觉自己就像“裸体营地里的两只饥饿蚊子”：到处都是肥美目标。首先、也是最重要的，我们的车险新业务正在爆发式增长。美国人正以前所未有的程度专注于省钱，因此纷纷涌向 GEICO。2009 年 1 月，我们创下月度保单持有人增长纪录——而且是大幅刷新。这个纪录将只维持 28 天：在我们付印之际，已经很明显 2 月的增幅会更好。
Beyond this, we are gaining ground in allied lines. Last year, our motorcycle policies increased by 23.4%, which raised our market share from about 6% to more than 7%. Our RV and ATV businesses are also growing rapidly, albeit from a small base. And, finally, we recently began insuring commercial autos, a big market that offers real promise.
除此之外，我们在相关险种上也在扩大领先优势。去年，我们的摩托车保单增长了 23.4%，使市场份额从约 6% 提升到超过 7%。我们的房车（RV）与全地形车（ATV）业务也在快速增长，尽管基数还小。最后，我们最近开始承保商业车险，这是一个规模巨大的市场，前景很有希望。
GEICO is now saving money for millions of Americans. Go to GEICO.com or call 1-800-847-7536 and see if we can save you money as well.
GEICO 现在正在为数以百万计的美国人省钱。去 GEICO.com 或拨打 1-800-847-7536，看看我们是否也能帮你省钱。
General Re, our large international reinsurer, also had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had serious problems (which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late 1998). By 2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO, assisted by his partner, Tad Montross, General Re’s culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting, reserving and expenses. After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively and successfully addressed. Today General Re has regained its luster. Last spring Joe stepped down, and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that, with Tad, General Re’s future is in the best of hands.
我们大型的国际再保险公司 General Re，在 2008 年也交出了极其出色的成绩。早些时候，这家公司曾有严重问题（而我在 1998 年底收购它时，完全没能察觉）。到 2001 年 Joe Brandon 出任 CEO、在合伙人 Tad Montross 协助下接手时，General Re 的文化进一步恶化：承保纪律、准备金（reserving）以及费用控制都出现了松动。Joe 和 Tad 掌舵之后，这些问题被果断而成功地解决。如今 General Re 重拾光彩。去年春天 Joe 退任，Tad 成为 CEO。Charlie 和我很感激 Joe 把船扶正，我们也确信在 Tad 的带领下，General Re 的未来交到了最可靠的手里。
Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises, sometimes extending for fifty years or more. This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle: A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That’s where General Re excels: It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation. Ben Franklin once said, “It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.” That’s no worry for General Re clients.
再保险是一门“长期承诺”的生意，有时期限长达 50 年甚至更久。过去这一年再次教会客户一个关键原则：承诺的价值，不会超过做出承诺的个人或机构的可靠程度。General Re 的强项正是在这里：它是唯一一家背靠 AAA 评级企业的再保险公司。Ben Franklin 曾说：“空袋子很难站直。”General Re 的客户不用担心这个问题。
Our third major insurance operation is Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division, headquartered in Stamford and staffed by only 31 employees. This may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the world, hard to characterize but easy to admire.
我们第三个主要的保险业务，是 Ajit Jain 的再保险部门，总部在 Stamford，员工只有 31 人。这可能是世界上最令人惊叹的生意之一：很难用几句话准确描述，但很容易让人由衷敬佩。
From year to year, Ajit’s business is never the same. It features very large transactions, incredible speed of execution and a willingness to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads. When there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured, Ajit is almost certain to be called.
Ajit 的业务每年都不一样。它的特点是：交易规模极大、执行速度惊人，并且愿意为那些让同行挠头的保单报价。当出现巨额且非常规的风险需要承保时，Ajit 几乎必定会被召唤。
Ajit came to Berkshire in 1986. Very quickly, I realized that we had acquired an extraordinary talent. So I did the logical thing: I wrote his parents in New Delhi and asked if they had another one like him at home. Of course, I knew the answer before writing. There *isn’*t anyone like Ajit.
Ajit 于 1986 年加入 Berkshire。很快我就意识到，我们得到了一位非凡的人才。于是我做了一件“合乎逻辑”的事：我写信给他在新德里的父母，问他们家里是不是还有一个像他这样的。当然，写之前我就知道答案——世界上没有第二个 Ajit。
Our smaller insurers are just as outstanding in their own way as the “big three,” regularly delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost. We aggregate their results below under “Other Primary.” For space reasons, we don’t discuss these insurers individually. But be assured that Charlie and I appreciate the contribution of each.
我们的其他小型保险公司，在各自领域里也同样出色，持续为我们提供“负成本”的宝贵 float。我们在下表中把它们的结果汇总在 “Other Primary” 项下。出于篇幅原因，我们不逐一讨论这些公司。但请相信，Charlie 和我都很珍视每一家所做出的贡献。
Here is the record for the four legs to our insurance stool. The underwriting profits signify that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without cost, just as they did in 2007. And in both years our underwriting profitability was considerably better than that achieved by the industry. Of course, we ourselves will periodically have a terrible year in insurance. But, overall, I expect us to average an underwriting profit. If so, we will be using free funds of large size for the indefinite future.
下面是我们保险“凳子”四条腿的成绩记录。承保利润意味着：去年这四个板块都像 2007 年一样，为 Berkshire 提供了“无成本”的资金来源。而在这两年里，我们的承保盈利能力都显著优于行业整体。当然，我们自己也会周期性地遇到某一年保险业务极其糟糕。但总体而言，我预计我们能在长期平均上实现承保盈利。若真如此，我们将在很长、很长的未来里持续使用规模巨大的“免费资金”。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Berkshire 在这一板块的业务几乎无所不包、覆盖面极广。不过，我们先来看一下整个集团的汇总资产负债表与损益表。
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned an impressive 17.9% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s also noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on our balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 8.1%.
这个“杂牌军”卖的东西从棒棒糖到房车应有尽有。去年，它们在平均有形净资产（tangible net worth）上的回报率高达 17.9%，相当亮眼。更值得注意的是：这些业务在取得该回报时，只使用了很少的财务杠杆。显然，我们拥有一些非常棒的企业。不过，我们收购其中许多企业时，支付的价格相对于净资产有很高溢价——这在资产负债表中的商誉（goodwill）项目里有所体现——而这一事实会把“按平均账面投资额（carrying value）计算的收益率”拉低到 8.1%。
Though the full-year result was satisfactory, earnings of many of the businesses in this group hit the skids in last year’s fourth quarter. Prospects for 2009 look worse. Nevertheless, the group retains strong earning power even under today’s conditions and will continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company. Overall, these companies improved their competitive positions last year, partly because our financial strength let us make advantageous tuck-in acquisitions. In contrast, many competitors were treading water (or sinking).
尽管全年结果还算令人满意，但这个板块里许多企业在去年第四季度出现了明显下滑。2009 年的前景看起来更糟。即便如此，在当前环境下，这个集团依然保有很强的盈利能力，并将继续向母公司输送可观现金。总体来说，这些公司去年还提升了各自的竞争地位，其中一个原因是：我们的财务实力让我们得以做出有利的“tuck-in”补强型收购。反观不少竞争对手，只能原地踩水（甚至下沉）。
The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was Iscar’s late-November purchase of Tungaloy, a leading Japanese producer of small tools. Charlie and I continue to look with astonishment — and appreciation! — at the accomplishments of Iscar’s management. To secure one manager like Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing. Getting three is like winning the Triple Crown. Iscar’s growth since our purchase has exceeded our expectations — which were high — and the addition of Tungaloy will move performance to the next level.
这些收购中最值得一提的，是 Iscar 在 11 月下旬收购了日本领先的小型工具生产商 Tungaloy。Charlie 和我依旧带着惊讶——也带着感激！——看 Iscar 管理层取得的成就。我们每收购一家企业，能得到像 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 或 Danny Goldman 这样的经理人之一，就已经是福气；一下子得到三个，简直像赢下“三冠王”（Triple Crown）。Iscar 自我们收购以来的增长，超过了我们原本就很高的预期；而 Tungaloy 的加入，将把业绩推进到下一个层级。
MiTek, Benjamin Moore, Acme Brick, Forest River, Marmon and CTB also made one or more acquisitions during the year. CTB, which operates worldwide in the agriculture equipment field, has now picked up six small firms since we purchased it in 2002. At that time, we paid $140 million for the company. Last year its pre-tax earnings were $89 million. Vic Mancinelli, its CEO, followed Berkshire-like operating principles long before our arrival. He focuses on blocking and tackling, day by day doing the little things right and never getting off course. Ten years from now, Vic will be running a much larger operation and, more important, will be earning excellent returns on invested capital.
MiTek、Benjamin Moore、Acme Brick、Forest River、Marmon 与 CTB 在这一年里也各自完成了一项或多项收购。CTB 在农业设备领域全球运营；自我们 2002 年买下它以来，已经收购了六家小公司。当时我们为 CTB 支付了 1.4 亿美元，而去年它的税前利润是 8,900 万美元。其 CEO Vic Mancinelli 早在我们到来之前，就一直遵循类似 Berkshire 的经营原则：他专注于“基本功”和“硬仗”（blocking and tackling），日复一日把小事做对，从不偏离航道。十年之后，Vic 将经营一家规模大得多的企业——更重要的是，他将获得出色的投入资本回报率。
子公司层面和集团都是相同的原则：不进入自己没有优势的领域。
Finance and Financial Products
金融与金融产品
I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the end of this section. I do this because Clayton’s recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages. But first a little background.
我将在这里用较长篇幅谈 Clayton Homes 的按揭业务，而跳过对整体金融业务的评论（相关内容已在本节末尾的表格中做了汇总）。我这样做，是因为 Clayton 最近的经历，可能对关于住房与按揭的公共政策讨论有所帮助。不过先交代一点背景。
Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry, delivering 27,499 units last year. This came to about 34% of the industry’s 81,889 total. Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress. Industrywide, units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of 372,843 in 1998.
Clayton 是预制房（manufactured home）行业里最大的公司，去年交付了 27,499 套，占全行业 81,889 套总量的约 34%。我们的份额在 2009 年很可能还会提高，部分原因是行业里其他很多公司正陷入严重困境。整个行业的销量自 1998 年见顶（372,843 套）以来，一直在持续下滑。
At that time, much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious. Writing about the period somewhat later, I described it as involving “borrowers who shouldn’t have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent.”
在当时，行业里相当一部分公司采用的销售做法极其恶劣。后来我回顾那段时期时，把它形容为：“不该借的人在借钱，而不该放贷的人在放贷。”
To begin with, the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored. Sometimes fakery was involved. (“That certainly looks like a $2,000 cat to me” says the salesman who will receive a $3,000 commission if the loan goes through.) Moreover, impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose. The resulting mortgages were usually packaged (“securitized”) and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors. This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.
首先，对“必须有实质性首付”这一要求常常被忽视。有时甚至存在造假。（“在我看来这只猫肯定值 2,000 美元，”销售员这么说；只要贷款批下来，他就能拿到 3,000 美元佣金。）此外，一些借款人同意了根本不可能承担的月供，因为他们签字时觉得自己“反正也没什么可失去的”。这些按揭贷款随后通常会被打包（“证券化” securitized），由华尔街机构卖给毫不知情的投资者。这条愚蠢链条注定要以坏结局收场——事实也确实如此。
Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest. But Clayton was the exception; industry losses were staggering. And the hangover continues to this day.
需要强调的是：在那段时期，Clayton 在自身放贷业务上采取的做法要理性得多。实际上，任何购买了 Clayton 发起、并随后被证券化出售的按揭资产的人，从未在本金或利息上亏过一分钱。但 Clayton 是例外；行业整体的损失触目惊心。而这场“宿醉”直到今天仍未散去。
This 1997-2000 fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market. But investors, government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle. Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004-07 period: Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn’t repay out of their incomes, and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments. Both parties counted on “house-price appreciation” to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work. It was Scarlett O’Hara all over again: “I’ll think about it tomorrow.” The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.
这场 1997-2000 年的惨剧，本该像“煤矿里的金丝雀”一样，向规模远大得多的传统住房市场发出预警。但投资者、政府和评级机构从这场预制房灾难中什么也没学到。相反，在一次令人不寒而栗的“灾难重演”中，同样的错误在 2004-07 年的传统住房市场被重复了一遍：放贷人兴高采烈地把贷款发给那些根本无法用收入偿还的人，借款人也同样兴高采烈地签字承诺支付这些月供。双方都指望“房价上涨”（house-price appreciation）让这套本来不可能成立的安排变得可行。这又回到了 Scarlett O’Hara 那一套：“我明天再想。”而这种行为的后果，如今正在我们经济的每个角落回响。
Clayton’s 198,888 borrowers, however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses. This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy, a point proved by FICO scores (a standard measure of credit risk). Their median FICO score is 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below 620, the segment usually designated “sub-prime.” Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit, as measured by FICO scores.
然而，Clayton 的 198,888 名借款人，在房市崩盘期间仍持续按正常节奏还款，没有给我们带来任何意料之外的损失。这并不是因为这些借款人的信用格外好——FICO 分数（衡量信用风险的标准指标）足以证明这一点。他们的 FICO 分数中位数是 644，而全美中位数是 723；并且约有 35% 低于 620，这一段通常被划为“次级”（sub-prime）。许多传统住房按揭的灾难性资产池里，借款人的 FICO 分数反而要高得多。
Yet at yearend, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004. (In addition to our originated loans, we’ve also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.) Clayton’s foreclosures during 2008 were 3.0% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and 5.3% in 2004.
但截至年末，我们自发起贷款的逾期率是 3.6%，仅较 2006 年的 2.9% 与 2004 年的 2.9% 略有上升。（除了自发起贷款外，我们还从其他金融机构批量买入过不同类型的贷款组合。）2008 年 Clayton 的止赎率（foreclosures）为自发起贷款的 3.0%，相比之下 2006 年为 3.8%，2004 年为 5.3%。
Why are our borrowers — characteristically people with modest incomes and far-from-great credit scores — performing so well? The answer is elementary, going right back to Lending 101. Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage payments would compare with their actual — not hoped-for — income and then decided whether they could live with that commitment. Simply put, they took out a mortgage with the intention of paying it off, whatever the course of home prices.
为什么我们的借款人——典型是收入不高、信用分也谈不上优秀的人——反而表现得这么好？答案非常简单，回到“放贷 101”的常识即可：我们的借款人只是把“全额月供”与他们真实的——不是寄希望于未来的——收入做了比较，然后决定自己是否承受得起这项承诺。说白了，他们借按揭时就打算把它还清，而不管房价怎么走。
Just as important is what our borrowers did not do. They did not count on making their loan payments by means of refinancing. They did not sign up for “teaser” rates that upon reset were outsized relative to their income. And they did not assume that they could always sell their home at a profit if their mortgage payments became onerous. Jimmy Stewart would have loved these folks.
同样重要的是，我们的借款人没有做什么。他们没有指望通过再融资（refinancing）来支付月供；没有选择那种“诱饵利率”（teaser rates）——利率重设（reset）后会高到与其收入不匹配；也没有假设一旦月供变得沉重，就总能把房子卖出盈利来脱身。Jimmy Stewart 一定会喜欢这些人。
Of course, a number of our borrowers will run into trouble. They generally have no more than minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits. The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a job, but death, divorce and medical expenses all cause problems. If unemployment rates rise — as they surely will in 2009 — more of Clayton’s borrowers will have troubles, and we will have larger, though still manageable, losses. But our problems will not be driven to any extent by the trend of home prices.
当然，我们的一部分借款人终究会遇到麻烦。他们通常只有很少的储蓄，难以在逆境来临时撑过一段时间。逾期或止赎最主要的原因是失业，但死亡、离婚和医疗费用也都会带来问题。如果失业率上升——2009 年几乎肯定会如此——更多 Clayton 的借款人会陷入困难，我们的损失也会扩大，不过仍在可控范围内。但我们的问题几乎不会由房价走势所驱动。
Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than its mortgage (so-called “upside-down” loans). Rather, foreclosures take place because borrowers can’t pay the monthly payment that they agreed to pay. Homeowners who have made a meaningful down-payment — derived from savings and not from other borrowing — seldom walk away from a primary residence simply because its value today is less than the mortgage. Instead, they walk when they can’t make the monthly payments.
关于当前住房危机的评论，常常忽视一个关键事实：大多数止赎并不是因为房子价值低于按揭余额（所谓“倒挂”/“upside-down” 贷款）。相反，止赎发生是因为借款人付不起他们承诺要付的月供。对于那些付了“实打实的首付”的房主——首付来自储蓄，而不是来自其他借款——他们很少会仅仅因为房子今天的价值低于按揭余额，就放弃自己的自住房。真正让他们走人的，是他们付不起月供。
Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser.
拥有住房是一件美好的事。我和家人在现在这套房子里已经住了 50 年，而且还会继续住下去。但买房的首要动机应当是居住的享受与使用价值，而不是利润或再融资的可能性。而且，所买的房子应当与购买者的收入相匹配。
The present housing debacle should teach home buyers, lenders, brokers and government some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future. Home purchases should involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least 10% and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by the borrower’s income. That income should be carefully verified.
眼下这场住房乱局，应该给购房者、放贷人、经纪人以及政府上一些简单的课，以确保未来的稳定。买房必须包含一笔“货真价实”的首付，至少 10%；月供必须是借款人凭其收入可以轻松承担的；并且，这份收入应当被认真核实。
Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.
把人送进房子里住——固然是个值得追求的目标——但不该成为我们国家的首要目标。让他们留在自己的房子里，才应当是我们的雄心。
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Clayton’s lending operation, though not damaged by the performance of its borrowers, is nevertheless threatened by an element of the credit crisis. Funders that have access to any sort of government guarantee — banks with FDIC-insured deposits, large entities with commercial paper now backed by the Federal Reserve, and others who are using imaginative methods (or lobbying skills) to come under the government’s umbrella — have money costs that are minimal. Conversely, highly-rated companies, such as Berkshire, are experiencing borrowing costs that, in relation to Treasury rates, are at record levels. Moreover, funds are abundant for the government-guaranteed borrower but often scarce for others, no matter how creditworthy they may be.
Clayton 的放贷业务虽然没有被借款人还款表现所伤，但仍然受到信贷危机中某个因素的威胁。那些能获得某种政府担保的资金提供者——比如拥有 FDIC 存款保险的银行、如今其商业票据得到 Federal Reserve 背书的大型机构，以及其他通过“富有想象力的方法”（或高超的游说技巧）把自己纳入政府保护伞之下的机构——其资金成本极低。相反，像 Berkshire 这样评级极高的公司，如今的借款成本相对于 Treasury 利率而言，处在历史最高水平之一。此外，对于享受政府担保的借款人来说，资金供应充裕；但对其他人而言，资金常常稀缺——无论他们的信用有多好。
This unprecedented “spread” in the cost of money makes it unprofitable for any lender who doesn’t enjoy government-guaranteed funds to go up against those with a favored status. Government is determining the “haves” and “have-nots.” That is why companies are rushing to convert to bank holding companies, not a course feasible for Berkshire.
这种前所未有的资金成本“利差”（spread），使得任何一个不享受政府担保资金的放贷人，都无法在利润上与那些拥有“特权地位”的放贷人竞争。政府正在决定谁是“有”的、谁是“无”的。也正因如此，许多公司急着改造成银行控股公司（bank holding companies）——但这条路对 Berkshire 并不可行。
Though Berkshire’s credit is pristine — we are one of only seven AAA corporations in the country — our cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with shaky balance sheets but government backing. At the moment, it is much better to be a financial cripple with a government guarantee than a Gibraltar without one.
尽管 Berkshire 的信用无可挑剔——我们是全国仅有的 7 家 AAA 评级企业之一——我们的借款成本如今却远高于那些资产负债表摇摇欲坠但享受政府背书的竞争对手。眼下，做一个有政府担保的“金融残疾人”，反而比做一个没有担保的“直布罗陀”更有优势。
Today’s extreme conditions may soon end. At worst, we believe we will find at least a partial solution that will allow us to continue much of Clayton’s lending. Clayton’s earnings, however, will surely suffer if we are forced to compete for long against government-favored lenders.
今天这种极端状况或许很快会结束。即便最糟糕的情况，我们也相信至少能找到一个“部分解决方案”，使我们能够继续开展 Clayton 放贷业务中的相当一部分。但如果我们被迫长期与政府偏袒的放贷人竞争，Clayton 的盈利无疑会受到冲击。
Tax-Exempt Bond Insurance
免税债券保险
Early in 2008, we activated Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company (“BHAC”) as an insurer of the tax-exempt bonds issued by states, cities and other local entities. BHAC insures these securities for issuers both at the time their bonds are sold to the public (primary transactions) and later, when the bonds are already owned by investors (secondary transactions).
2008 年初，我们启用了 Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company（“BHAC”），作为各州、市以及其他地方实体发行的免税债券（tax-exempt bonds）的保险人。BHAC 既在债券首次向公众出售时（一级市场交易，primary transactions）为发行人提供保险，也在债券已被投资者持有之后（二级市场交易，secondary transactions）提供保险。
By yearend 2007, the half dozen or so companies that had been the major players in this business had all fallen into big trouble. The cause of their problems was captured long ago by Mae West: “I was Snow White, but I drifted.”
截至 2007 年底，原本在这一业务中占据主导地位的大约六家主要公司，全都陷入了严重麻烦。它们的问题原因，早就被 Mae West 一句话说透了：“I was Snow White, but I drifted.”（我原本是白雪公主，但我慢慢走偏了。）
The monolines (as the bond insurers are called) initially insured only tax-exempt bonds that were low-risk. But over the years competition for this business intensified, and rates fell. Faced with the prospect of stagnating or declining earnings, the monoline managers turned to ever-riskier propositions. Some of these involved the insuring of residential mortgage obligations. When housing prices plummeted, the monoline industry quickly became a basket case.
这些“单一险种保险公司”（monolines，指专门做债券保险的公司）起初只承保低风险的免税债券。但多年下来，竞争加剧、费率下滑。面对利润停滞甚至下滑的前景，monoline 的管理层转向越来越高风险的业务。其中一些业务涉及为住宅按揭相关的债务提供保险。当房价暴跌时，monoline 行业很快就变成了一团糟。
因压力缓慢转移的注意力。
Early in the year, Berkshire offered to assume all of the insurance issued on tax-exempts that was on the books of the three largest monolines. These companies were all in life-threatening trouble (though they said otherwise.) We would have charged a 1½% rate to take over the guarantees on about $822 billion of bonds. If our offer had been accepted, we would have been required to pay any losses suffered by investors who owned these bonds — a guarantee stretching for 40 years in some cases. Ours was not a frivolous proposal: For reasons we will come to later, it involved substantial risk for Berkshire.
年初，Berkshire 提议接手三家最大的 monoline 账上所有免税债券保险业务。这三家公司都处在“性命攸关”的困境里（尽管它们自己不承认）。我们愿意以 1½% 的费率，接管大约 8,220 亿美元债券的担保。如果我们的提议被接受，我们就必须赔付持有这些债券的投资者可能遭遇的任何损失——在某些情况下，这种担保期限长达 40 年。我们的提议绝非儿戏：由于一些原因（稍后会谈到），这对 Berkshire 来说包含了实质性的风险。
The monolines summarily rejected our offer, in some cases appending an insult or two. In the end, though, the turndowns proved to be very good news for us, because it became apparent that I had severely underpriced our offer.
这些 monoline 立刻拒绝了我们的报价，有些甚至顺便加了几句讥讽。但最终，这些拒绝对我们反而成了好消息，因为后来很明显：我当时给出的报价被我自己严重低估了。
Thereafter, we wrote about $15.6 billion of insurance in the secondary market. And here’s the punch line: About 77% of this business was on bonds that were already insured, largely by the three aforementioned monolines. In these agreements, we have to pay for defaults only if the original insurer is financially unable to do so.
此后，我们在二级市场承保了约 156 亿美元的保险。而“包袱”在这里：这笔业务中大约 77% 对应的债券本来就已经有保险了，主要由前面提到的那三家 monoline 承保。在这些协议里，只有当原始保险公司在财务上无力赔付时，我们才需要为违约买单。
We wrote this “second-to-pay” insurance for rates averaging 3.3%. That’s right; we have been paid far more for becoming the second to pay than the 1.5% we would have earlier charged to be the first to pay. In one extreme case, we actually agreed to be fourth to pay, nonetheless receiving about three times the 1% premium charged by the monoline that remains first to pay. In other words, three other monolines have to first go broke before we need to write a check.
我们承做这种“第二顺位赔付”（second-to-pay）的保险，平均费率是 3.3%。没错：我们做“第二个付款的人”，拿到的保费反而远高于我们此前愿意做“第一个付款的人”时所报的 1.5%。在一个极端案例中，我们甚至同意做“第四顺位赔付”，但仍拿到了大约是那家仍处于“第一顺位赔付”的 monoline 所收 1% 保费的三倍。换句话说：得先有三家 monoline 先破产，我们才需要掏支票。
Two of the three monolines to which we made our initial bulk offer later raised substantial capital. This, of course, directly helps us, since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay, at least in the near term, any claims on our second-to-pay insurance because these two monolines fail. In addition to our book of secondary business, we have also written $3.7 billion of primary business for a premium of $96 million. In primary business, of course, we are first to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.
我们最初打包报价的三家 monoline 中，有两家后来募集了相当可观的资本。这当然直接对我们有利，因为这降低了它们（至少在短期内）出现赔付能力不足、从而触发我们“第二顺位”保险赔付的概率。除了这本二级市场业务外，我们还承做了 37 亿美元的一手（primary）业务，收取保费 9,600 万美元。在一手业务里，如果发行人出问题，当然是我们“第一顺位”赔付。
We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the insurance we write than does any other monoline. Consequently, our guarantee is far more valuable than theirs. This explains why many sophisticated investors have bought second-to-pay insurance from us even though they were already insured by another monoline. BHAC has become not only the insurer of preference, but in many cases the sole insurer acceptable to bondholders.
相较任何其他 monoline，我们在所承保的保险背后有更多倍数的资本支撑。因此，我们的担保价值远高于他们。这也解释了：为何许多成熟的机构投资者，尽管已经有其他 monoline 的保险，仍然会再向我们购买“第二顺位”保险。BHAC 不仅成了投资者的首选保险人，而且在许多情况下，甚至是债券持有人唯一能接受的保险人。
Nevertheless, we remain very cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from a sure thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable for us. The reason is simple, though I have never seen even a passing reference to it by any financial analyst, rating agency or monoline CEO.
尽管如此，我们对承保业务仍保持非常谨慎，并不把“最终能盈利”视为板上钉钉的事。原因很简单，但我从未见过任何金融分析师、评级机构或 monoline CEO 甚至顺带提到过这一点。
The rationale behind very low premium rates for insuring tax-exempts has been that defaults have historically been few. But that record largely reflects the experience of entities that issued uninsured bonds. Insurance of tax-exempt bonds didn’t exist before 1971, and even after that most bonds remained uninsured.
免税债券保险之所以长期能收取很低的保费，理由在于：历史上违约确实很少。但这种记录在很大程度上反映的是发行了未投保债券的主体的经验。免税债券保险在 1971 年之前并不存在，即便之后，多数债券也仍是未投保状态。
A universe of tax-exempts fully covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat different loss experience from a group of uninsured, but otherwise similar bonds, the only question being how different. To understand why, let’s go back to 1975 when New York City was on the edge of bankruptcy. At the time its bonds — virtually all uninsured — were heavily held by the city’s wealthier residents as well as by New York banks and other institutions. These local bondholders deeply desired to solve the city’s fiscal problems. So before long, concessions and cooperation from a host of involved constituencies produced a solution. Without one, it was apparent to all that New York’s citizens and businesses would have experienced widespread and severe financial losses from their bond holdings.
如果一个免税债券“宇宙”里的债券都被保险覆盖，那么它的损失经验必然会与一组同样条件但未投保的债券有所不同；唯一的问题只是“差多少”。要理解原因，让我们回到 1975 年——当时 New York City 已经濒临破产。那时它的债券几乎都没有保险，而且主要由本市更富裕的居民，以及纽约的银行和其他机构大量持有。这些本地债权人迫切希望解决城市的财政问题。因此不久之后，来自多方利益相关者的让步与合作促成了解决方案。没有方案的话，人人都看得很清楚：纽约的市民与企业将因其债券持有而遭受广泛而严重的财务损失。
Now, imagine that all of the city’s bonds had instead been insured by Berkshire. Would similar belt-tightening, tax increases, labor concessions, etc. have been forthcoming? Of course not. At a minimum, Berkshire would have been asked to “share” in the required sacrifices. And, considering our deep pockets, the required contribution would most certainly have been substantial.
现在想象一下：如果城市的所有债券当时都由 Berkshire 承保。还会出现类似的勒紧裤腰带、加税、劳方让步等等吗？当然不会。至少，Berkshire 会被要求在“必要的牺牲”中分担一部分。而考虑到我们“口袋很深”，需要我们承担的贡献几乎肯定会相当可观。
Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems in the future than they have to date. The pension liabilities I talked about in last year’s report will be a huge contributor to these woes. Many cities and states were surely horrified when they inspected the status of their funding at yearend 2008. The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of present liabilities is simply staggering.
未来地方政府将面临比以往严峻得多的财政问题。我在去年报告里提到的养老金负债，将是这些困境的巨大推手。许多城市与州在审视 2008 年年末的资金状况时，想必被吓了一跳。资产与“按现实精算口径评估的现有负债”之间的缺口，简直惊人。
When faced with large revenue shortfalls, communities that have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop “solutions” less favorable to bondholders than those communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and residents. Losses in the tax-exempt arena, when they come, are also likely to be highly correlated among issuers. If a few communities stiff their creditors and get away with it, the chance that others will follow in their footsteps will grow. What mayor or city council is going to choose pain to local citizens in the form of major tax increases over pain to a far-away bond insurer?
当面对巨额财政缺口时，那些债券全部投保的社区，更容易形成对债券持有人不利的“解决方案”，相较之下，那些有未投保债券、且债券由本地银行与居民持有的社区，就没那么容易这么做。免税债券领域的损失一旦发生，也很可能在不同发行主体之间高度相关：如果少数社区赖掉债务还能全身而退，其他社区跟着效仿的概率就会上升。哪位市长或市议会，会愿意选择让本地市民承受加税之痛，而不是把痛苦转移给远方的债券保险公司呢？
Insuring tax-exempts, therefore, has the look today of a dangerous business — one with similarities, in fact, to the insuring of natural catastrophes. In both cases, a string of loss-free years can be followed by a devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier profits. We will try, therefore, to proceed carefully in this business, eschewing many classes of bonds that other monolines regularly embrace.
因此，如今承保免税债券看起来像是一门危险的生意——事实上，它与承保自然灾害有相似之处：在这两种业务里，一连串“零损失”的年份之后，可能紧跟着一场毁灭性的损失事件，其规模足以把此前所有利润连本带利全部抹去。因此，我们会努力在这项业务中谨慎前行，刻意避开许多其他 monoline 常常承保的债券类别。
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The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from a universe of non-insured bonds onto a deceptively-similar universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas of finance. “Back-tested” models of many kinds are susceptible to this sort of error. Nevertheless, they are frequently touted in financial markets as guides to future action. (If merely looking up past financial data would tell you what the future holds, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
把“未投保债券宇宙”的损失经验，投射到一个看似相似、但其实很多债券已投保的“新宇宙”上——这种推断谬误，在金融的其他领域也经常出现。各种“回测”（back-tested）模型都容易犯这类错误。尽管如此，它们却常被金融市场吹捧为指导未来行动的工具。（如果只要查一查过去的金融数据就能知道未来会发生什么，那 Forbes 400 应该全是图书管理员了。）
Indeed, the stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models used by salesmen, rating agencies and investors. These parties looked at loss experience over periods when home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was negligible. They then made this experience a yardstick for evaluating future losses. They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently skyrocketed, loan practices had deteriorated and many buyers had opted for houses they couldn’t afford. In short, universe “past” and universe “current” had very different characteristics. But lenders, government and media largely failed to recognize this all-important fact.
事实上，与按揭相关证券的那些令人瞠目结舌的损失，很大程度上就来自销售人员、评级机构和投资者使用的、基于历史的错误模型。这些人观察的是一个时期的损失经验：当时房价只是温和上涨，炒房投机几乎可以忽略不计。随后，他们把这段经验当成衡量未来损失的标尺。他们心安理得地忽视了一个事实：房价最近已经暴涨，放贷实践在恶化，许多买家选择了自己负担不起的房子。简而言之，“过去的宇宙”和“当前的宇宙”具有截然不同的特征。但放贷人、政府与媒体在很大程度上都没能意识到这一至关重要的事实。
Investors should be skeptical of history-based models. Constructed by a nerdy-sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta, gamma, sigma and the like, these models tend to look impressive. Too often, though, investors forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols. Our advice: Beware of geeks bearing formulas.
投资者应该对基于历史的模型保持怀疑。这些模型往往由一个听起来很“书呆子”的神职阶层构建，使用诸如 beta、gamma、sigma 等玄奥术语，因此看起来很有说服力。但投资者太常忘记去检查符号背后的假设。我们的建议是：小心那些手捧公式的极客。
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A final post-script on BHAC: Who, you may wonder, runs this operation? While I help set policy, all of the heavy lifting is done by Ajit and his crew. Sure, they were already generating $24 billion of float along with hundreds of millions of underwriting profit annually. But how busy can that keep a 31-person group? Charlie and I decided it was high time for them to start doing a full day’s work.
关于 BHAC 最后补充一句：你们可能会好奇，谁在负责这项业务？我负责制定政策方向，但真正干“重活”的，是 Ajit 和他的团队。没错，他们原本就已经每年为我们带来 240 亿美元的浮存金，以及数亿美元的承保利润。但一个 31 人的小团队，干这些能有多忙？Charlie 和我觉得，是时候让他们开始“做满一整天的工作”了。
Investments
投资
Because of accounting rules, we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories. The table below, presenting the first category, itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500 million.
由于会计规则的原因，我们今年把所持有的大额普通股分成两类。下表展示第一类：这些投资在资产负债表上按市价（market value）计量，并且年末市值超过 5 亿美元。
In addition, we have holdings in Moody’s and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at “equity value” — our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase, minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends. This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.
此外，我们还持有 Moody’s 与 Burlington Northern Santa Fe 的股份；这些股份现在按“权益法价值”（equity value）入账——也就是我们的成本，加上自我们买入以来对应的留存收益，减去如果这些收益以股息形式分配给我们本应缴纳的税。通常当我们对被投资公司持股达到 20% 时，就需要采用这种会计处理。
We purchased 15% of Moody’s some years ago and have not since bought a share. Moody’s, though, has repurchased its own shares and, by late 2008, those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%. Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.
我们多年前买入了 Moody’s 的 15%，之后就没有再增持过一股。不过，Moody’s 持续回购自身股票，到 2008 年末，回购把其流通股数减少到一个程度，使我们的持股比例被动升至 20% 以上。Burlington Northern 也回购过股份，但我们持股升至 20% 的主要原因，是我们持续买入这只股票。
Unless facts or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at “equity accounting” values, whatever their market prices. You will also see our share of their earnings (less applicable taxes) regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.
除非事实或规则发生变化，你们将看到这些持股无论市场价格如何波动，都以“权益法核算”的数值反映在我们的资产负债表中。你们也会看到我们按持股比例确认的它们的利润（扣除相关税费），会被定期计入我们季度与年度的盈利中。
I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current $40-$50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise, moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.
我在本报告前面部分告诉过你们：去年我犯了一个重大的“该做不该做”的错误（mistake of commission）（也许不止一个；但这个最扎眼）。在没有 Charlie 或任何人怂恿的情况下，我在油气价格接近峰值时买入了大量 ConocoPhillips 的股票。我完全没有预料到下半年能源价格会出现如此剧烈的下跌。我仍然认为，从概率上看，未来油价很可能会远高于当前 40-50 美元的水平。但截至目前，我彻彻底底错了。更何况，即便价格将来上涨，我买入时点之糟糕，也已经让 Berkshire 付出了数十亿美元的代价。
I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244 million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me. At yearend we wrote these holdings down to market: $27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”
我还犯了一些其他“现在就已经一眼可见”的错误。它们规模更小，但遗憾的是，也没小到可以忽略。2008 年，我花了 2.44 亿美元买了两家爱尔兰银行的股票，当时在我看来很便宜。到年末，我们按市价把这两笔持仓写到了 2,700 万美元，亏损 89%。此后，这两只股票又进一步下跌。网球圈会把我的错误称为“非受迫性失误”（unforced errors）。
On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged — to you, the rating agencies and myself — to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.
去年也有好的一面：我们合计买入了 145 亿美元的固定收益证券，发行人包括 Wrigley、Goldman Sachs 与 General Electric。我们非常喜欢这些投资承诺：它们的当期收益率很高，单就这一点就已经足够让投资“令人满意”。但在这三笔投资中，我们还额外获得了相当可观的股权参与，算是“赠品”。为了筹措资金来完成这些大额买入，我不得不卖出一些我本来更愿意持有的仓位的一部分（主要是 Johnson & Johnson、Procter & Gamble 和 ConocoPhillips）。但我已经向你们、评级机构以及我自己承诺：Berkshire 永远要在现金上保持“绰绰有余”。我们从不希望为了满足明天的义务而去指望陌生人的善意。被迫做选择时，我不会为了多赚点利润，拿哪怕一晚上的睡眠去交换。
The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.
投资世界已经从“低估风险”走到了“高估风险”。这不是小幅摆动；钟摆划过的弧度极其惊人。几年前，人们几乎无法想象：在“无风险”的政府短债给出接近零的回报、长期债也不过是微薄收益的同时，优质的市政债或公司债竟能提供像今天这样高的收益率。当这十年的金融史被书写时，人们必然会提到 1990 年代末的互联网泡沫，以及 2000 年代初的住房泡沫。但 2008 年末的美国 Treasury bond 泡沫，或许也会被认为几乎同样离奇。
17年的熊市周期中灾害连连。
Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable — in fact, almost smug — in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim “cash is king,” even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.
在当前的收益率水平下，长期抱着现金等价物或长期政府债不放，几乎肯定是个糟糕透顶的政策——如果你打算长期这么干的话。随着金融动荡加剧，这些工具的持有人当然会越来越觉得安心——甚至有点自鸣得意——仿佛事实在不断验证他们的选择。当他们听到评论员高喊“cash is king”时，更会觉得自己判断正确；可别忘了，那些“尊贵的现金”几乎赚不到任何利息，而且它的购买力必然会在时间中被侵蚀。
Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
但投资的目标不是赢得掌声。事实上，掌声往往适得其反：它会让大脑进入“被麻醉”的状态，使你对新事实不够敏感，也更不愿重新审视先前形成的结论。要警惕那些能带来喝彩的投资动作；真正伟大的举动，往往只会换来打哈欠。
Derivatives
衍生品
Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally missed their cooking of the books.
衍生品是危险的。它们极大地增加了我们金融体系中的杠杆与风险；使投资者几乎不可能理解并分析最大的商业银行与投行；让 Fannie Mae 和 Freddie Mac 多年来能够大规模虚报盈利。Freddie 和 Fannie 的结构复杂到什么程度？就连它们的联邦监管机构 OFHEO 都看不懂——OFHEO 有 100 多名员工，唯一的工作就是监管这两家机构，却完全错过了它们做账造假的事实。
Indeed, recent events demonstrate that certain big-name CEOs (or former CEOs) at major financial institutions were simply incapable of managing a business with a huge, complex book of derivatives. Include Charlie and me in this hapless group: When Berkshire purchased General Re in 1998, we knew we could not get our minds around its book of 23,218 derivatives contracts, made with 884 counterparties (many of which we had never heard of). So we decided to close up shop. Though we were under no pressure and were operating in benign markets as we exited, it took us five years and more than $400 million in losses to largely complete the task. Upon leaving, our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song: “I liked you better before I got to know you so well.”
事实上，近期事件表明：一些在大型金融机构里名声显赫的 CEO（或前 CEO），根本无力管理一家拥有庞大、复杂衍生品账簿的公司。Charlie 和我也属于这类“倒霉蛋”：1998 年 Berkshire 收购 General Re 时，我们就知道自己不可能把它那本包含 23,218 份衍生品合约、涉及 884 个交易对手（其中很多我们听都没听过）的账簿弄明白。于是我们决定把这门生意关掉。即便我们并没有受到任何压力，而且退出时的市场环境也算温和，这个收尾过程仍然花了我们五年时间，并且造成了超过 4 亿美元的损失，才基本把事情了结。离开时，我们对这门生意的感受，正如一首乡村歌曲里唱的那句：“在我把你了解得这么透彻之前，我其实更喜欢你。”
Improved “transparency” — a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks — won’t cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can’t audit these contracts, and regulators can’t regulate them. When I read the pages of “disclosure” in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I *don’*t know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).
所谓“提高透明度”——这是政客、评论员和金融监管者最爱开的药方，用来避免未来再次发生列车脱轨式灾难——并不能解决衍生品带来的问题。我想不出任何披露机制，能够接近于描述并衡量一个巨大且复杂的衍生品组合中蕴含的风险。审计师审不了这些合约，监管者也管不了它们。当我去读那些被这些工具缠住的公司在 10-K 里写的“披露”页面时，我最终唯一确定的是：我并不知道它们的组合里到底发生了什么（然后我就得去找点阿司匹林）。
For a case study on regulatory effectiveness, let’s look harder at the Freddie and Fannie example. These giant institutions were created by Congress, which retained control over them, dictating what they could and could not do. To aid its oversight, Congress created OFHEO in 1992, admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving themselves. With that move, Fannie and Freddie became the most intensely-regulated companies of which I am aware, as measured by manpower assigned to the task.
要看监管到底有多“有效”，我们不妨更仔细地看看 Freddie 与 Fannie 这个例子。这两家巨无霸机构由 Congress 设立，而 Congress 一直保留对它们的控制权，规定它们能做什么、不能做什么。为了帮助监督，Congress 在 1992 年设立了 OFHEO，并告诫它必须确保这两头巨兽守规矩。就我所知，从投入的人力规模来看，Fannie 与 Freddie 由此成为“监管最密集”的公司。
On June 15, 2003, OFHEO (whose annual reports are available on the Internet) sent its 2002 report to Congress — specifically to its four bosses in the Senate and House, among them none other than Messrs. Sarbanes and Oxley. The report’s 127 pages included a self-congratulatory cover-line: “Celebrating 10 Years of Excellence.” The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days after the CEO and CFO of Freddie had resigned in disgrace and the COO had been fired. No mention of their departures was made in the letter, even while the report concluded, as it always did, that “Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed.”
2003 年 6 月 15 日，OFHEO（其年度报告可在互联网上获取）把它的 2002 年报告提交给 Congress——具体是提交给参众两院的四位“上司”，其中就包括 Sarbanes 和 Oxley 两位先生。报告共 127 页，封面上还有一句自我陶醉的标语：“Celebrating 10 Years of Excellence.” 这封转呈信和报告送达的时间，是 Freddie 的 CEO 与 CFO 因丑闻辞职、COO 被解雇后的第九天。可在信中对这些离职只字未提；与此同时，报告却一如既往地下结论说：“Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed.”
In truth, both enterprises had engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time. Finally, in 2006, OFHEO issued a 340-page scathing chronicle of the sins of Fannie that, more or less, blamed the fiasco on every party but — you guessed it — Congress and OFHEO.
事实上，这两家机构早已进行过一段时间的大规模会计把戏。终于到了 2006 年，OFHEO 发布了一份 340 页的严厉报告，详细记录了 Fannie 的种种“罪行”。而这份报告的归因方式，基本上把责任怪到所有人头上——除了你猜对了——Congress 和 OFHEO 自己。
The Bear Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in derivatives transactions, a time bomb I first discussed in Berkshire’s 2002 report. On April 3, 2008, Tim Geithner, then the able president of the New York Fed, explained the need for a rescue: “The sudden discovery by Bear’s derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear’s counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets.” This is Fedspeak for “We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude.” In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.
Bear Stearns 的崩溃，凸显了衍生品交易中内嵌的交易对手（counterparty）问题——这颗定时炸弹，我在 Berkshire 2002 年的报告里就谈过。2008 年 4 月 3 日，当时担任 New York Fed 行长的 Tim Geithner（能力出众）解释了为何需要救助：“Bear 的衍生品交易对手突然发现：他们为了对冲金融风险而建立的一些关键金融头寸已不再有效，这将触发市场进一步的大规模错位。这会导致 Bear 的交易对手争相处置他们为这些头寸所持有的抵押品，并试图在本已极其脆弱的市场中复制这些头寸。” 这段“Fed 式英语”的意思是：“我们介入，是为了避免一场规模不可预知的金融链式反应。” 依我看，Fed 这么做是对的。
A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash, the other its securities. Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means credit problems can’t accumulate. This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from five days to three days in 1995.
一笔普通的股票或债券交易，几天内就会完成：一方拿到现金，另一方拿到证券。交易对手风险因此很快消失，也就意味着信用问题难以累积。正是这种快速结算过程，维持了市场的完整性。实际上，这也是 NYSE 和 NASDAQ 在 1995 年把结算周期从 5 天缩短到 3 天的原因之一。
Derivatives contracts, in contrast, often go unsettled for years, or even decades, with counterparties building up huge claims against each other. “Paper” assets and liabilities — often hard to quantify — become important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well. Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It’s not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with.
相比之下，衍生品合约往往多年甚至几十年都不结清，交易对手之间的巨额债权债务不断累积。“纸面”资产与负债——常常难以量化——会成为财务报表的重要组成部分，但这些项目要很多年后才会被验证。此外，巨型金融机构之间还会形成一张令人不寒而栗的相互依赖之网。数十亿规模的应收应付，集中在少数大型做市商/交易商手里，而这些机构往往在其他方面也高度加杠杆。试图躲避麻烦的参与者，会遇到和躲避性病一样的问题：关键不仅在于你跟谁睡，还在于他们又在跟谁睡。
Sleeping around, to continue our metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers because it assures them government aid if trouble hits. In other words, only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood — I won’t mention names — are certain to become a concern of the state (an outcome, I’m sad to say, that is proper). From this irritating reality comes The First Law of Corporate Survival for ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books: Modest incompetence simply won’t do; it’s mindboggling screw-ups that are required.
继续沿用这个隐喻：“到处睡”对大型衍生品交易商反而可能有用，因为这能确保一旦出事，他们就会得到政府援助。换句话说，只有那些麻烦足以“传染整个街区”的公司——我就不点名了——才必然会成为国家关注的对象（遗憾的是，我得承认，这种结果在现实里是合理的）。从这个令人恼火的现实里，就诞生了那条“企业生存第一定律”，专门送给那些堆高杠杆、经营庞大且难以理解衍生品账簿的野心 CEO：小打小闹的无能是不够的；必须是惊世骇俗的巨大失误，才行。
Considering the ruin I’ve pictured, you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re). The answer is simple: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well. If we lose money on our derivatives, it will be my fault.
鉴于我刚刚描绘的那幅“毁灭图景”，你们可能会问：为什么 Berkshire 还会参与 251 份衍生品合约（不包括 MidAmerican 为经营目的使用的那些，以及 Gen Re 仍残留的少量合约）？答案很简单：我相信我们持有的每一份合约，在签订之初都存在错误定价——有些甚至错得非常离谱。这些头寸由我亲自发起、并由我持续监控。这与我一贯的观点一致：任何大型金融机构的 CEO，都必须同时担任首席风险官（Chief Risk Officer）。如果我们在衍生品上亏了钱，那就是我的错。
Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated. Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid — our derivatives “float,” so to speak — totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.
我们的衍生品交易安排，要求交易对手在合约成立时向我们付款。因此，钱始终在 Berkshire 手里，这使得我们几乎不承担有意义的交易对手风险。截至年末，对手方支付给我们的款项减去我们已支付的损失——可以把它称作我们的衍生品“float”——合计为 81 亿美元。这个 float 与保险 float 很像：如果底层交易我们最终打平，那么我们就等于长期无成本使用了一大笔资金。我们的预期是（虽然绝非板上钉钉）我们会好于打平，而我们对这笔资金赚到的可观投资收益，则是锦上添花。
也曾经考虑过高盛作为交易对手的风险。
Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year’s fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our securities portfolio. (When we post collateral, we deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.) In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create, real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions (and, for that matter, at Constellation Energy, which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue).
我们合约里只有很小一部分，在市场朝不利方向波动时需要我们追加抵押品（posting of collateral）。即便在去年第四季度那样混乱的市场环境下，我们需要追加的抵押品也不到我们证券投资组合的 1%。（当我们追加抵押品时，会把证券存放在第三方处，但我们仍保留这些证券所产生的投资收益。）在 2002 年年报中，我们就警告过：追加抵押品要求可能带来致命威胁。去年我们在多家金融机构身上看到了真实案例（甚至 Constellation Energy 也是——MidAmerican 赶去救援时，它距离破产只剩几个小时）。
Our contracts fall into four major categories. With apologies to those who are not fascinated by financial instruments, I will explain them in excruciating detail.
我们的合约大致分为四大类。先向那些对金融工具并不着迷的读者道歉：我接下来会把它们解释得“极其细致”。
We have added modestly to the “equity put” portfolio I described in last year’s report. Some of our contracts come due in 15 years, others in 20. We must make a payment to our counterparty at maturity if the reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it was at the inception of the contract. Neither party can elect to settle early; it’s only the price on the final day that counts.
我们对去年报告里提到的“股票指数看跌期权（equity put）”组合做了小幅增持。有些合约 15 年到期，有些 20 年到期。如果到期时，这些看跌期权所挂钩的参考指数低于合约签订时的水平，我们就必须向交易对手支付一笔款项。双方都不能选择提前结算；唯一算数的是到期最后一天的价格。
To illustrate, we might sell a $1 billion 15-year put contract on the S&P 500 when that index is at, say, 1300. If the index is at 1170 — down 10% — on the day of maturity, we would pay $100 million. If it is above 1300, we owe nothing. For us to lose $1 billion, the index would have to go to zero. In the meantime, the sale of the put would have delivered us a premium — perhaps $100 million to $150 million — that we would be free to invest as we wish.
举个例子：当 S&P 500 指数处在比如 1300 点时，我们可能会卖出一份 15 年期、名义本金 10 亿美元的看跌期权（put）。如果到期那天指数在 1170 点——下跌 10%——我们就要支付 1 亿美元。如果指数高于 1300 点，我们一分钱都不用付。要让我们亏掉 10 亿美元，指数必须跌到零。与此同时，卖出这份 put 会让我们收到一笔权利金——可能是 1 亿到 1.5 亿美元——这笔钱我们可以按自己的意愿自由投资。
作为普通的投资者，可以用T-bill质押了做Sell PUT的交易，相比于BRK要差一些。
Our put contracts total $37.1 billion (at current exchange rates) and are spread among four major indices: the S&P 500 in the U.S., the FTSE 100 in the U.K., the Euro Stoxx 50 in Europe, and the Nikkei 225 in Japan. Our first contract comes due on September 9, 2019 and our last on January 24, 2028. We have received premiums of $4.9 billion, money we have invested. We, meanwhile, have paid nothing, since all expiration dates are far in the future. Nonetheless, we have used Black-Scholes valuation methods to record a yearend liability of $10 billion, an amount that will change on every reporting date. The two financial items — this estimated loss of $10 billion minus the $4.9 billion in premiums we have received — means that we have so far reported a mark-to-market loss of $5.1 billion from these contracts.
我们的 put 合约总名义金额为 371 亿美元（按当前汇率），分散在四个主要指数上：美国的 S&P 500、英国的 FTSE 100、欧洲的 Euro Stoxx 50，以及日本的 Nikkei 225。第一份合约到期日是 2019 年 9 月 9 日，最后一份到期日是 2028 年 1 月 24 日。我们已收到 49 亿美元的权利金，并已将其投入投资。与此同时，因为所有到期日都还很遥远，我们至今没有支付任何赔付。尽管如此，我们仍使用 Black-Scholes 估值方法，在年末记录了 100 亿美元的负债，这个数额会在每个报告日随着市场变化而变化。两项财务数字——我们估计的 100 亿美元损失减去已收到的 49 亿美元权利金——意味着截至目前，我们在这些合约上报告了 51 亿美元的按市价计量（mark-to-market）损失。
We endorse mark-to-market accounting. I will explain later, however, why I believe the Black-Scholes formula, even though it is the standard for establishing the dollar liability for options, produces strange results when the long-term variety are being valued.
我们支持按市价计量（mark-to-market）会计。不过我稍后会解释：为什么我认为 Black-Scholes 公式虽然是期权负债定价的行业标准，但在给长期期权估值时会产生一些“怪异”的结果。
One point about our contracts that is sometimes not understood: For us to lose the full $37.1 billion we have at risk, all stocks in all four indices would have to go to zero on their various termination dates. If, however — as an example — all indices fell 25% from their value at the inception of each contract, and foreign-exchange rates remained as they are today, we would owe about $9 billion, payable between 2019 and 2028. Between the inception of the contract and those dates, we would have held the $4.9 billion premium and earned investment income on it.
关于我们的合约，有一点常被误解：要让我们把所承担的全部 371 亿美元风险都亏光，四个指数中的所有成分股必须在各自的终止日全部归零。但如果——举例说——所有指数相对各自合约签订时的水平下跌 25%，并且外汇汇率保持今天的水平，我们大约需要支付 90 亿美元，支付时间分布在 2019 至 2028 年之间。而从合约签订到这些支付日期之间，我们一直持有那 49 亿美元权利金，并在其上赚取投资收益。
The second category we described in last year’s report concerns derivatives requiring us to pay when credit losses occur at companies that are included in various high-yield indices. Our standard contract covers a five-year period and involves 100 companies. We modestly expanded our position last year in this category. But, of course, the contracts on the books at the end of 2007 moved one year closer to their maturity. Overall, our contracts now have an average life of 21⁄3 years, with the first expiration due to occur on September 20, 2009 and the last on December 20, 2013.
我们在去年报告中描述的第二类合约，是那些在若干高收益指数（high-yield indices）所包含的公司发生信用损失时，需要我们赔付的衍生品。我们的标准合约覆盖 5 年期限，涉及 100 家公司。我们在去年对这一类头寸做了小幅扩张。当然，截至 2007 年末账上的合约也都向到期日又近了一年。总体而言，这些合约目前的平均剩余期限为 2 又 1/3 年，最早一批到期在 2009 年 9 月 20 日，最晚一批到期在 2013 年 12 月 20 日。
By yearend we had received premiums of $3.4 billion on these contracts and paid losses of $542 million. Using mark-to-market principles, we also set up a liability for future losses that at yearend totaled $3.0 billion. Thus we had to that point recorded a loss of about $100 million, derived from our $3.5 billion total in paid and estimated future losses minus the $3.4 billion of premiums we received. In our quarterly reports, however, the amount of gain or loss has swung wildly from a profit of $327 million in the second quarter of 2008 to a loss of $693 million in the fourth quarter of 2008.
截至年末，我们在这些合约上累计收到权利金 34 亿美元，已支付损失 5.42 亿美元。按按市价计量原则，我们还为未来损失计提了负债，年末合计 30 亿美元。因此，到那时我们在这一类合约上累计确认的亏损约为 1 亿美元——这是我们已支付与预计未来损失合计 35 亿美元，减去我们收到的 34 亿美元权利金得出的结果。不过在我们的季度报告中，盈亏幅度曾剧烈摆动：2008 年第二季度还是 3.27 亿美元利润，到了 2008 年第四季度却变成了 6.93 亿美元亏损。
Surprisingly, we made payments on these contracts of only $97 million last year, far below the estimate I used when I decided to enter into them. This year, however, losses have accelerated sharply with the mushrooming of large bankruptcies. In last year’s letter, I told you I expected these contracts to show a profit at expiration. Now, with the recession deepening at a rapid rate, the possibility of an eventual loss has increased. Whatever the result, I will keep you posted.
令人意外的是，去年我们在这些合约上的实际赔付只有 9,700 万美元，远低于我当初决定做这类交易时所估计的数额。但今年，随着大型破产案件“蘑菇般涌现”，损失已经明显加速。在去年的信中，我告诉过你们，我预计这些合约到期时会有盈利。现在，随着经济衰退以很快的速度加深，最终出现亏损的可能性上升了。不管结果如何，我都会持续向你们汇报。
In 2008 we began to write “credit default swaps” on individual companies. This is simply credit insurance, similar to what we write in BHAC, except that here we bear the credit risk of corporations rather than of tax-exempt issuers.
2008 年，我们开始对单一公司承做“credit default swaps”（信用违约掉期，CDS）。这本质上就是信用保险，和我们在 BHAC 承做的保险类似，只不过在这里我们承担的是公司债的信用风险，而不是免税发行人的信用风险。
If, say, the XYZ company goes bankrupt, and we have written a $100 million contract, we are obligated to pay an amount that reflects the shrinkage in value of a comparable amount of XYZ’s debt. (If, for example, the company’s bonds are selling for 30 after default, we would owe $70 million.) For the typical contract, we receive quarterly payments for five years, after which our insurance expires.
比如说 XYZ 公司破产了，而我们写了一份名义金额 1 亿美元的合约，我们就有义务支付一笔金额，反映出相当额度的 XYZ 债务在破产后的价值缩水。（例如，若公司债在违约后以 30 的价格交易，我们就需要支付 7,000 万美元。）典型合约中，我们会按季度收取保费，持续五年，五年后保险到期终止。
At yearend we had written $4 billion of contracts covering 42 corporations, for which we receive annual premiums of $93 million. This is the only derivatives business we write that has any counterparty risk; the party that buys the contract from us must be good for the quarterly premiums it will owe us over the five years. We are unlikely to expand this business to any extent because most buyers of this protection now insist that the seller post collateral, and we will not enter into such an arrangement.
截至年末，我们承做了总计 40 亿美元的合约，覆盖 42 家公司，我们每年收取的保费合计 9,300 万美元。这是我们唯一一类存在交易对手风险的衍生品业务：从我们这里买保护的一方，必须在未来五年里按时支付每季度应付的保费。我们不太可能在这一业务上做任何程度的扩张，因为如今大多数买方都要求卖方追加抵押品，而我们不会接受这种安排。
At the request of our customers, we write a few tax-exempt bond insurance contracts that are similar to those written at BHAC, but that are structured as derivatives. The only meaningful difference between the two contracts is that mark-to-market accounting is required for derivatives whereas standard accrual accounting is required at BHAC.
应客户要求，我们还承做少量“免税债券保险”合约，它们与 BHAC 的业务类似，但结构上被设计成衍生品。这两类合约之间唯一实质性的差别在于：衍生品需要按市价计量（mark-to-market）会计，而 BHAC 的保险业务必须使用标准的权责发生制（accrual）会计。
But this difference can produce some strange results. The bonds covered — in effect, insured — by these derivatives are largely general obligations of states, and we feel good about them. At yearend, however, mark-to-market accounting required us to record a loss of $631 million on these derivatives contracts. Had we instead insured the same bonds at the same price in BHAC, and used the accrual accounting required at insurance companies, we would have recorded a small profit for the year. The two methods by which we insure the bonds will eventually produce the same accounting result. In the short term, however, the variance in reported profits can be substantial.
但这种差别会造成一些看起来很“怪”的结果。这些衍生品所覆盖（实质上被保险）的债券，多数是各州的一般责任债（general obligations），我们对其信用质量感觉很好。然而在年末，按市价计量会计要求我们在这些衍生品合约上确认 6.31 亿美元的亏损。假如我们用 BHAC 以同样的价格承保同样的债券，并采用保险公司要求的权责发生制会计，我们反而会在当年确认一笔小额盈利。用这两种方式去承保这些债券，最终都会产生相同的会计结果；但在短期内，报告利润的差异可能非常大。
We have told you before that our derivative contracts, subject as they are to mark-to-market accounting, will produce wild swings in the earnings we report. The ups and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. Indeed, the “downs” can be helpful in that they give us an opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms. I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think similarly.
我们之前就告诉过你们：由于衍生品合约需要按市价计量，我们报告的盈利会出现剧烈波动。这样的起伏既不会让 Charlie 和我兴奋，也不会让我们烦恼。事实上，“下跌”有时还会有帮助——它给了我们一个机会，以更有利的条款扩大头寸。我希望这番解释能让你们也用类似的心态看待我们的操作。
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The Black-Scholes formula has approached the status of holy writ in finance, and we use it when valuing our equity put options for financial statement purposes. Key inputs to the calculation include a contract’s maturity and strike price, as well as the analyst’s expectations for volatility, interest rates and dividends.
Black-Scholes 公式在金融领域几乎被奉为“圣典”，而我们在财务报表中给股票指数看跌期权估值时也使用它。该计算的关键输入包括：合约到期时间与行权价，以及分析师对波动率、利率与股息的预期。
If the formula is applied to extended time periods, however, it can produce absurd results. In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this point well. But their devoted followers may be ignoring whatever caveats the two men attached when they first unveiled the formula.
但如果把这个公式应用到极长的时间跨度上，它可能会给出荒谬的结果。公平地说，Black 和 Scholes 很可能对此心知肚明；但他们那些虔诚的追随者，也许忽略了两人在首次提出公式时附带的各种限制条件。
大部分投资者没有机会接触10年以上的期权交易。
It’s often useful in testing a theory to push it to extremes. So let’s postulate that we sell a 100-year $1 billion put option on the S&P 500 at a strike price of 903 (the index’s level on 12/31/08). Using the implied volatility assumption for long-dated contracts that we do, and combining that with appropriate interest and dividend assumptions, we would find the “proper” Black-Scholes premium for this contract to be $2.5 million.
检验一个理论时，把它“推到极端”往往很有用。那我们假设：我们以 903 的行权价（S&P 在 2008 年 12 月 31 日的点位），卖出一份 100 年期、名义金额 10 亿美元的 S&P 500 看跌期权。使用我们对超长期合约所采用的隐含波动率假设，并结合适当的利率与股息假设，我们会算出这个合约“正确的” Black-Scholes 权利金是 250 万美元。
To judge the rationality of that premium, we need to assess whether the S&P will be valued a century from now at less than today. Certainly the dollar will then be worth a small fraction of its present value (at only 2% inflation it will be worth roughly 14¢). So that will be a factor pushing the stated value of the index higher. Far more important, however, is that one hundred years of retained earnings will hugely increase the value of most of the companies in the index. In the 20th Century, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average increased by about 175-fold, mainly because of this retained-earnings factor.
要判断这份权利金是否合理，我们得评估：一百年后 S&P 的价值是否可能低于今天。当然，到那时美元的购买力必然只剩现在的一小部分（即便通胀只有 2%，美元的购买力也会下降到大约 14 美分）。这一点会推动指数的名义数值更高。但更重要的是：一百年的留存收益会极大提升指数中大多数公司的价值。20 世纪中，道琼斯工业指数大约上涨了 175 倍，主要就是这股“留存收益”因素驱动的。
Considering everything, I believe the probability of a decline in the index over a one-hundred-year period to be far less than 1%. But let’s use that figure and also assume that the most likely decline — should one occur — is 50%. Under these assumptions, the mathematical expectation of loss on our contract would be $5 million ($1 billion X 1% X 50%).
综合来看，我认为在一百年跨度里指数出现下跌的概率远低于 1%。但我们就用 1% 这个数字，并假设：一旦真的下跌，最可能的跌幅是 50%。在这些假设下，我们这份合约的数学期望损失将是 500 万美元（10 亿美元 × 1% × 50%）。
But if we had received our theoretical premium of $2.5 million up front, we would have only had to invest it at 0.7% compounded annually to cover this loss expectancy. Everything earned above that would have been profit. Would you like to borrow money for 100 years at a 0.7% rate?
但如果我们一开始按理论值收到了 250 万美元的权利金，只需要把它以年化 0.7% 的复利去投资，就足以覆盖这 500 万美元的损失期望；超出 0.7% 的部分就全是利润。你愿意用 0.7% 的利率借钱借 100 年吗？
Let’s look at my example from a worst-case standpoint. Remember that 99% of the time we would pay nothing if my assumptions are correct. But even in the worst case among the remaining 1% of possibilities — that is, one assuming a total loss of $1 billion — our borrowing cost would come to only 6.2%. Clearly, either my assumptions are crazy or the formula is inappropriate.
我们从最坏情形来审视我刚才的例子。记住：如果我的假设成立，那么有 99% 的概率我们一分钱都不用付。但即便是在剩下那 1% 的可能性里最糟糕的情况——也就是假设我们会全损 10 亿美元——我们的“借款成本”也只有 6.2%。很显然：要么我的假设荒唐，要么这个公式不适用。
The ridiculous premium that Black-Scholes dictates in my extreme example is caused by the inclusion of volatility in the formula and by the fact that volatility is determined by how much stocks have moved around in some past period of days, months or years. This metric is simply irrelevant in estimating the probability-weighted range of values of American business 100 years from now. (Imagine, if you will, getting a quote every day on a farm from a manic-depressive neighbor and then using the volatility calculated from these changing quotes as an important ingredient in an equation that predicts a probability-weighted range of values for the farm a century from now.)
在我这个极端例子中，Black-Scholes 给出的荒谬权利金，源于公式里引入了“波动率”，而波动率又取决于股票在过去若干天、若干月或若干年里价格如何上下波动。对于估计“一百年后美国企业价值的概率加权区间”来说，这个指标完全不相干。（你可以想象一下：你每天都从一个躁郁症邻居那里给你的农场报一个价，然后用这些日复一日变化的报价算出来的波动率，作为一个公式里的重要输入，去预测一百年后这座农场的概率加权价值区间。）
Though historical volatility is a useful — but far from foolproof — concept in valuing short-term options, its utility diminishes rapidly as the duration of the option lengthens. In my opinion, the valuations that the Black-Scholes formula now place on our long-term put options overstate our liability, though the overstatement will diminish as the contracts approach maturity.
尽管历史波动率在给短期期权估值时是一个有用——但远非万无一失——的概念，但随着期权期限拉长，它的用处会迅速下降。在我看来，Black-Scholes 目前对我们长期 put 期权给出的估值夸大了我们的负债，尽管这种夸大会随着合约接近到期而逐步减弱。
Even so, we will continue to use Black-Scholes when we are estimating our financial-statement liability for long-term equity puts. The formula represents conventional wisdom and any substitute that I might offer would engender extreme skepticism. That would be perfectly understandable: CEOs who have concocted their own valuations for esoteric financial instruments have seldom erred on the side of conservatism. That club of optimists is one that Charlie and I have no desire to join.
即便如此，当我们估计长期股票指数 put 在财务报表中的负债时，仍会继续使用 Black-Scholes。这个公式代表了“传统共识”，而任何我自己提出的替代方法，都会引发极大的怀疑——这完全可以理解：那些为晦涩金融工具自创估值方法的 CEO，几乎从来都不是“偏保守”地犯错。那个乐观主义者俱乐部，Charlie 和我一点也不想加入。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 2nd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
我们今年的会议将于 5 月 2 日（周六）举行。和往常一样，Qwest Center 的大门将在早上 7 点开放，8:30 将放映一部新的 Berkshire 电影。9:30 我们会直接进入问答环节（中午在 Qwest 的餐饮摊位休息用餐），问答将持续到下午 3:00。随后短暂休会，Charlie 和我会在 3:15 正式召开股东年会。如果你决定在当天的问答期间提前离场，请务必在 Charlie 发言时离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 31,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I lock the exits.)
当然，离场最好的理由是去购物。我们会通过“帮你购物”来协助你：把与会议区域相连的 194,300 平方英尺大厅，塞满 Berkshire 子公司的各类产品。去年，来参会的 31,000 人做得不错，几乎每个摊位都创下销售纪录。但你们还能做得更好。（友情提醒：如果我发现销售乏力，我会把出口锁上。）
This year Clayton will showcase its new i-hous**e that includes Shaw flooring, Johns Manville insulation and MiTek fasteners. This innovative “green” home, featuring solar panels and numerous other energy-saving products, is truly a home of the future. Estimated costs for electricity and heating total only about $1 per day when the home is sited in an area like Omaha. After purchasing the i-house, you should next consider the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby. Make your neighbors jealous.
今年，Clayton 将展示它的新款 i-house，其中包括 Shaw 的地板、Johns Manville 的保温材料以及 MiTek 的连接件。这是一套创新的“绿色”住宅，配备太阳能板以及其他多种节能产品，确实称得上“未来之家”。如果把房子放在像 Omaha 这样的地区，预计电费与供暖费用合计每天只要约 1 美元。买完 i-house 之后，你接下来应该考虑旁边展出的 Forest River 房车和浮筒船（pontoon boat）。让你的邻居眼红去吧。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 也会设摊位，由来自全国各地的一批顶尖顾问驻场，随时为你提供车险报价。在多数情况下，GEICO 还能给股东提供折扣（通常是 8%）。我们运营所在的 50 个辖区里，有 44 个允许这项特殊优惠。（补充一点：如果你还符合其他折扣条件，比如某些团体折扣，这个股东折扣不能叠加。）请带上你现有保险的详细信息，来看看我们能不能帮你省钱。我相信至少有 50% 的人能省到。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of NetJets aircraft available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take along — with no fear of a strip search — the Ginsu knives that you’ve purchased at the exhibit of our Quikut subsidiary.
周六当天，在 Omaha 机场，我们照例会安排一系列 NetJets 飞机供你参观。到 Qwest 的 NetJets 摊位了解如何去看这些飞机。坐大巴来 Omaha；开着你的新飞机回去。顺便带上——完全不用担心被“脱衣搜身”——你在我们 Quikut 子公司展位买的 Ginsu 刀具。
Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books and DVDs. A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity.
接着，如果你还有剩余资金，就去逛 Bookworm，它会出售大约 30 本书和 DVD。对于那些“求知欲超过携带能力”的人，我们还提供邮寄服务。
Finally, we will have three fascinating cars on the exhibition floor, including one from the past and one of the future. Paul Andrews, CEO of our subsidiary, TTI, will bring his 1935 Duesenberg, a car that once belonged to Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr., parent and grandparent of our new partners in the Wrigley purchase. The future will be represented by a new plug-in electric car developed by BYD, an amazing Chinese company in which we have a 10% interest.
最后，我们会在展厅里展示三辆极具看点的汽车——其中一辆来自过去，一辆来自未来。我们子公司 TTI 的 CEO Paul Andrews 会把他的 1935 年 Duesenberg 开来；这辆车曾属于 Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr.，她既是我们在 Wrigley 收购案中新伙伴的母亲，也是祖母。“未来”则由一辆新的插电式电动车代表，它由 BYD 开发——这是一家了不起的中国公司，我们持有其 10% 的权益。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
本报告随附的委托书材料（proxy material）里有一份附件，说明你如何获得进入大会及其他活动所需的入场凭证（credential）。至于飞机、酒店与租车预订，我们再次请 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。负责这些事项的 Carol Pedersen 每年都为我们做得非常出色，我在此向她致谢。酒店房间可能不好订，但只要和 Carol 一起努力，你就能订到。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM twelve years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to a record $33.3 million in 2008. On Saturday of that weekend, we also set a single day record of $7.2 million. Ask any retailer what he thinks of such volume.
在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（地址在 72nd Street，介于 Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地 77 英亩），我们今年仍将举办 “Berkshire Weekend” 折扣活动。我们在 12 年前在 NFM 启动了这个特别活动，“周末”期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2008 年创纪录的 3,330 万美元。而在那个周末的周六，我们还创下了单日 720 万美元的纪录。你去问任何一个零售商，他都会告诉你这样的销量意味着什么。
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 30th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a western cookout to which you are all invited.
要获得 Berkshire 折扣，你必须在 4 月 30 日（周四）到 5 月 4 日（周一）期间（含首尾两天）完成购买，并出示你的参会凭证。这个时段的特价甚至适用于一些知名制造商的产品——这些厂商平时有“铁一般”的规定，严格禁止打折；但出于我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例了。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM 的营业时间为：周一至周六 10:00-21:00；周日 10:00-18:00。今年周六 17:30-20:00，NFM 还将举办一场西部风格的露天烧烤，你们全都受邀参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在 Borsheims，我们今年仍会举办两场“仅限股东”的活动。第一场是鸡尾酒招待会，时间为 5 月 1 日（周五）18:00-22:00。第二场也是主要的庆典活动，将于 5 月 3 日（周日）9:00-16:00 举行。周六当天，我们将营业到 18:00。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整个周末 Borsheims 都会人潮汹涌。为方便大家，股东价将从 4 月 27 日（周一）一直提供到 5 月 9 日（周六）。在这段期间，请出示参会凭证，或能证明你持有 Berkshire 股票的券商对账单，以表明你的股东身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
周日，在 Borsheims 外的商场区域，一位蒙着眼的 Patrick Wolff（两届美国国际象棋冠军）将以六人一组的方式迎战所有挑战者——挑战者则可以睁大眼睛正常下棋。附近，来自达拉斯、技艺非凡的魔术师 Norman Beck 会让围观者目瞪口呆。此外，周日下午，我们还会安排两位世界顶级桥牌专家 Bob Hamman 与 Sharon Osberg，与股东们一起打桥牌。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 975 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,448 including 702 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please don’t embarrass me by ordering foie gras. Remember: To come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).
Gorat’s 餐厅将再次在 5 月 3 日（周日）专门对 Berkshire 股东开放，营业时间从下午 1 点到晚上 10 点。去年，Gorat’s 只有 240 个座位，但在“股东周日”当天却供应了 975 份晚餐；三天合计供应 2,448 份，其中包括 702 份 T-bone 牛排——行家们最爱的主菜。拜托别通过点 foie gras 来让我难堪。记住：那天要去 Gorat’s，必须提前预订。想订位的话，请在 4 月 1 日拨打 402-551-3733（但不要提前打）。
We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 700 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from outside the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
我们还会在周六下午 4 点，为来自北美以外地区的股东再举办一场招待会。每年我们的大会都会吸引全球各地的人前来，Charlie 和我希望能亲自向那些远道而来的朋友问好。去年，我们很高兴见到了来自数十个国家的 700 多位股东。凡是来自美国或加拿大以外地区的股东，都会获得一张特别凭证，以及参加这项活动的说明。
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This year we will be making important changes in how we handle the meeting’s question periods. In recent years, we have received only a handful of questions directly related to Berkshire and its operations. Last year there were practically none. So we need to steer the discussion back to Berkshire’s businesses.
今年，我们将对大会问答环节的安排做出重要调整。近几年里，我们收到的、与 Berkshire 及其业务直接相关的问题只有寥寥几个。去年几乎一个都没有。所以我们需要把讨论重新引导回 Berkshire 的业务上来。
In a related problem, there has been a mad rush when the doors open at 7 a.m., led by people who wish to be first in line at the 12 microphones available for questioners. This is not desirable from a safety standpoint, nor do we believe that sprinting ability should be the determinant of who gets to pose questions. (At age 78, I’ve concluded that speed afoot is a ridiculously overrated talent.) Again, a new procedure is desirable.
另一个相关问题是：早上 7 点开门时总会出现一阵“疯狂冲刺”，由那些想在 12 个提问麦克风前抢到第一排的人带头。从安全角度看这不理想；我们也不认为“跑得快”应该决定谁有资格提问。（78 岁的我已经得出结论：两条腿跑得快，真是一种被严重高估的才能。）因此，我们同样需要一个新的流程。
In our first change, several financial journalists from organizations representing newspapers, magazines and television will participate in the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
第一项改变是：我们会邀请几位来自报纸、杂志和电视机构的财经记者参与问答环节，由他们代表股东来提问——问题来自股东通过电子邮件提交。记者及其邮箱如下：Fortune 的 Carol Loomis，邮箱 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的 Becky Quick，邮箱 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及 The New York Times 的 Andrew Ross Sorkin，邮箱 arsorkin@nytimes.com。每位记者会从收到的问题中，挑选大约十二个他或她认为最有趣、最重要的问题。（在邮件里请告诉记者：如果你的问题被选中，你是否希望提及你的名字。）
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.
无论 Charlie 还是我，都不会提前得到任何关于这些问题的“提示”。我们知道记者会挑一些尖锐的问题——我们就喜欢这样。
In our second change, we will have a drawing at 8:15 at each microphone for those shareholders hoping to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. At least half the questions — those selected by the panel from your submissions — are therefore certain to be Berkshire-related. We will meanwhile continue to get some good — and perhaps entertaining — questions from the audience as well.
第二项改变是：在每个提问麦克风处，我们会在 8:15 进行抽签，决定哪些股东能亲自提问。在大会上，我会把“记者提问”和“抽签中选的股东提问”交替进行。这样一来，至少一半的问题——即由记者从你们提交的问题中选出的那些——必然与 Berkshire 相关。同时，我们也仍会从现场观众那里听到一些不错的——或许也很有趣的——问题。
So join us at our Woodstock for Capitalists and let us know how you like the new format. Charlie and I look forward to seeing you.
所以，欢迎来到我们这场“资本家的伍德斯托克”（Woodstock for Capitalists），也请告诉我们你对新形式的感受。Charlie 和我期待与你们见面。
February 27, 2009
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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