2015-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2015-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2014 was $18.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 8.3%. Over the last 50 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded annually.*

Berkshire在2014年的净资产增长为183亿美元，使我们A类股和B类股的每股账面价值提高了8.3%。在过去50年（也就是自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到146,186美元，年复合增长率为19.4%*。

During our tenure, we have consistently compared the yearly performance of the S&P 500 to the change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. We’ve done that because book value has been a crude, but useful, tracking device for the number that really counts: intrinsic business value.

在我们的任期内，我们一直将S&P 500的年度表现与Berkshire每股账面价值的变动进行比较。我们之所以这样做，是因为账面价值虽然粗糙，但却是一个有用的追踪指标，用来衡量真正重要的数字：企业的内在价值。

In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire’s assets were then largely securities whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of the assets involved in the calculation of book value were “marked to market.”

在早期的几十年里，账面价值与内在价值之间的关系比现在紧密得多。这是因为当时Berkshire的资产主要是证券，其价值会持续重估以反映当前的市场价格。用华尔街的话说，计入账面价值计算的大多数资产都是“marked to market”。

Today, our emphasis has shifted in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened.

如今，我们的重点已大幅转向拥有并运营大型企业。其中许多企业的价值远高于其以成本计量的账面价值。但无论这些公司的价值增长了多少，这一金额都不会被向上重估。因此，Berkshire的内在价值与其账面价值之间的差距显著扩大。

With that in mind, we have added a new set of data – the historical record of Berkshire’s stock price – to the performance table on the facing page. Market prices, let me stress, have their limitations in the short term. Monthly or yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and not indicative of changes in intrinsic value. Over time, however, stock prices and intrinsic value almost invariably converge. Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I believe that has been true at Berkshire: In our view, the increase in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value over the past 50 years is roughly equal to the 1,826,163% gain in market price of the company’s shares.

基于这一点，我们在对页的业绩表中新增了一组数据——Berkshire股价的历史记录。我要强调，市场价格在短期内是有局限的。股票在月度或年度层面的波动往往飘忽不定，并不代表内在价值的变化。然而，随着时间推移，股价与内在价值几乎总会趋同。Berkshire副董事长、我的合伙人Charlie Munger和我认为，这一点在Berkshire身上也成立：在我们看来，过去50年中Berkshire每股内在价值的增长，大体等于公司股票市场价格1,826,163%的涨幅。

*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

*本报告中使用的所有每股数据均适用于Berkshire的A类股。B类股的数据为A类股所示数值的1/1500。

The Year at Berkshire

Berkshire这一年

It was a good year for Berkshire on all major fronts, except one. Here are the important developments:

对Berkshire而言，这一年在几乎所有主要方面都表现良好，只有一处例外。以下是重要进展：

‹ Our “Powerhouse Five” – a collection of Berkshire’s largest non-insurance businesses – had a record $12.4 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2014, up $1.6 billion from 2013.* The companies in this sainted group are Berkshire Hathaway Energy (formerly MidAmerican Energy), BNSF, IMC (I’ve called it Iscar in the past), Lubrizol and Marmon.

‹ 我们的“Powerhouse Five”（Berkshire规模最大的非保险业务集合）在2014年实现创纪录的124亿美元税前利润，较2013年增加16亿美元*。该组公司包括Berkshire Hathaway Energy（原MidAmerican Energy）、BNSF、IMC（我过去称其为Iscar）、Lubrizol和Marmon。

Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us a decade ago. Subsequently we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the ten-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.

在这五家公司中，只有Berkshire Hathaway Energy在十年前就由我们持有，当时其盈利为3.93亿美元。随后我们以全现金方式又收购了其中三家。在收购第五家BNSF时，我们约70%的对价以现金支付，剩余部分发行Berkshire股票，使流通股数增加了6.1%。换言之，这五家公司在十年间为Berkshire带来的每年约120亿美元的盈利增量，仅伴随了轻微的摊薄。这符合我们的目标：不仅要提高盈利，更要确保每股结果同步提升。

If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2015, we expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve as well. The gain could reach $1 billion, in part because of bolt-on acquisitions by the group that have already closed or are under contract.

如果美国经济在2015年继续改善，我们预计Powerhouse Five的盈利也将随之提升。增幅可能达到10亿美元，部分原因是该集团已经完成或签约中的bolt-on并购将贡献增长。

‹ Our bad news from 2014 comes from our group of five as well and is unrelated to earnings. During the year, BNSF disappointed many of its customers. These shippers depend on us, and service failures can badly hurt their businesses.

‹ 2014年的坏消息同样来自这组五家公司，但与盈利无关。BNSF在这一年令不少客户失望。这些托运人依赖我们，而服务失误会严重损害他们的业务。

BNSF is, by far, Berkshire’s most important non-insurance subsidiary and, to improve its performance, we will spend $6 billion on plant and equipment in 2015. That sum is nearly 50% more than any other railroad has spent in a single year and is a truly extraordinary amount, whether compared to revenues, earnings or depreciation charges.

BNSF无疑是Berkshire最重要的非保险子公司。为改善其表现，我们将在2015年投入60亿美元用于厂房与设备。无论与收入、盈利还是折旧费用相比，这都是一个极为惊人的数额，且比其他任何一家铁路公司在单一年份的投入都高出近50%。

Though weather, which was particularly severe last year, will always cause railroads a variety of operating problems, our responsibility is to do whatever it takes to restore our service to industry-leading levels. That can’t be done overnight: The extensive work required to increase system capacity sometimes disrupts operations while it is underway. Recently, however, our outsized expenditures are beginning to show results. During the last three months, BNSF’s performance metrics have materially improved from last year’s figures.

尽管天气（去年尤其严峻）总会给铁路带来各种运营问题，我们的责任是不惜一切手段把服务恢复到行业领先水平。这不可能一蹴而就：为提升系统运能所需的大量工程在实施期间有时会扰动运营。然而，最近我们的超大规模投入开始显现成效。过去三个月，BNSF的运营指标较去年的数据已有显著改善。

‹ Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.1 billion last year, up from $4.7 billion in 2013. Here, as with our Powerhouse Five, we expect further gains in 2015. Within this group, we have two companies that last year earned between $400 million and $600 million, six that earned between $250 million and $400 million, and seven that earned between $100 million and $250 million. This collection of businesses will increase in both number and earnings. Our ambitions have no finish line.

‹ 我们数十家较小的非保险业务在去年实现了51亿美元盈利，高于2013年的47亿美元。与Powerhouse Five相同，我们预计2015年还会进一步增长。在这一组中，去年盈利介于4亿至6亿美元的公司有两家，介于2.5亿至4亿美元的有六家，介于1亿至2.5亿美元的有七家。这个业务组合的数量和盈利都将继续增加。我们的抱负没有终点线。

‹ Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2014 – that makes 12 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 12-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $84 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.

‹ Berkshire庞大且不断扩张的保险业务在2014年再次实现了承保盈利——这已是连续第12年——同时扩大了浮存金。在这12年间，我们的浮存金（不属于我们的资金，但我们可以为Berkshire的利益进行投资）从410亿美元增长到840亿美元。尽管这项增长及浮存金的规模并未体现在Berkshire的会计利润中，但浮存金使我们得以持有相应资产，从而产生可观的投资收益。

*Throughout this letter, as well as in the “Golden Anniversary” letters included later in this report, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.

*除非另有说明，本信函及本报告随后收录的“Golden Anniversary”信件中的所有盈利数据均为税前口径。

Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $24 billion during the twelve-year period, including $2.7 billion earned in 2014. And all of this began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.

同时，在这十二年期间，我们的承保利润累计达到240亿美元，其中2014年为27亿美元。而这一切都始于我们在1967年以860万美元收购National Indemnity。

‹ While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year was particularly fruitful: We contracted for 31 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $7.8 billion in aggregate. The size of these transactions ranged from $400,000 to $2.9 billion. However, the largest acquisition, Duracell, will not close until the second half of this year. It will then be placed under Marmon’s jurisdiction.

‹ 在Charlie和我寻找可收购的新业务的同时，我们的众多子公司也在常态化地进行bolt-on并购。去年尤其硕果累累：我们签约了31笔bolt-on交易，计划合计耗资78亿美元。交易规模从40万美元到29亿美元不等。不过，规模最大的一笔收购Duracell要到今年下半年才能完成。届时它将归入Marmon的管理。

Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us aren’t.) They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. This means no more work for us, yet more earnings, a combination we find particularly appealing. We will make many more of these bolt-on deals in future years.

只要定价合理，Charlie和我都鼓励bolt-on交易。（多数抛给我们的交易并非如此。）这类交易将资本投向与我们现有业务契合的活动，由我们经验丰富的经理团队来管理。对我们而言，这意味着不需要增加工作量，却能带来更多收益——这种组合对我们格外有吸引力。未来几年我们还会做更多这类bolt-on交易。

‹ Two years ago my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann, asked Berkshire to join his 3G Capital group in the acquisition of Heinz. My affirmative response was a no-brainer: I knew immediately that this partnership would work well from both a personal and financial standpoint. And it most definitely has.

‹ 两年前，我的朋友Jorge Paulo Lemann邀请Berkshire与他的3G Capital团队一道收购Heinz。我的答应几乎不必思量：我立刻确信这段合作在个人层面和财务层面都会运转良好。事实确是如此。

I’m not embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better under Alex Behring, Chairman, and Bernardo Hees, CEO, than would be the case if I were in charge. They hold themselves to extraordinarily high performance standards and are never satisfied, even when their results far exceed those of competitors.

我并不觉得难为情去承认：在董事长Alex Behring和CEO Bernardo Hees的领导下，Heinz的运营远胜于由我亲自掌舵的情形。他们对自身设定了异常严苛的业绩标准，即便结果远超竞争对手也从不自满。

We expect to partner with 3G in more activities. Sometimes our participation will only involve a financing role, as was the case in the recent acquisition of Tim Hortons by Burger King. Our favored arrangement, however, will usually be to link up as a permanent equity partner (who, in some cases, contributes to the financing of the deal as well). Whatever the structure, we feel good when working with Jorge Paulo.

我们预计会与3G在更多事务上合作。有时我们的参与仅限于提供融资，如最近Burger King收购Tim Hortons时的安排。不过，我们更偏好的方式通常是作为长期的股权合作伙伴（在某些情况下也会提供部分融资）。无论结构如何，与Jorge Paulo合作我们都感觉很好。

Berkshire also has fine partnerships with Mars and Leucadia, and we may form new ones with them or with other partners. Our participation in any joint activities, whether as a financing or equity partner, will be limited to friendly transactions.

Berkshire与Mars和Leucadia同样保持着良好的合作关系，我们可能与他们或其他伙伴建立新的合作。不论我们以融资方还是股权伙伴的身份参与，所有联合交易都将限定在友好性质。

‹ In October, we contracted to buy Van Tuyl Automotive, a group of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well-run. Larry Van Tuyl, the company’s owner, and I met some years ago. He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, its home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently completed, and we are now “car guys.”

‹ 10月，我们签约收购Van Tuyl Automotive——一个由78家汽车经销店组成、运营极其出色的集团。几年前我与公司所有者Larry Van Tuyl见过面。他当时就决定，如果有一天出售公司，它的归宿应当是Berkshire。我们的收购近日已完成，如今我们也成了“car guys”。

Larry and his dad, Cecil, spent 62 years building the group, following a strategy that made owner-partners of all local managers. Creating this mutuality of interests proved over and over to be a winner. Van Tuyl is now the fifth-largest automotive group in the country, with per-dealership sales figures that are outstanding.

Larry和他的父亲Cecil用了62年打造了这个集团，采取的策略是让所有地方经理都成为所有者—合伙人。事实一再证明，打造这种利益共同体是赢家之道。Van Tuyl如今是全美第五大汽车经销集团，单店销售额指标相当出色。

In recent years, Jeff Rachor has worked alongside Larry, a successful arrangement that will continue. There are about 17,000 dealerships in the country, and ownership transfers always require approval by the relevant auto manufacturer. Berkshire’s job is to perform in a manner that will cause manufacturers to welcome further purchases by us. If we do this – and if we can buy dealerships at sensible prices – we will build a business that before long will be multiples the size of Van Tuyl’s $9 billion of sales.

近些年，Jeff Rachor与Larry并肩工作，这一成功的安排将会延续。全美约有17,000家经销店，而所有权转移总需相关汽车制造商批准。Berkshire的任务，是以令制造商乐于我们继续收购的方式去运营。如果我们做到这一点——并且能够以合理的价格收购经销店——我们将把这项业务在不久的将来做成Van Tuyl 90亿美元销售规模的数倍。

With the acquisition of Van Tuyl, Berkshire now owns 91⁄2 companies that would be listed on the Fortune 500 were they independent (Heinz is the 1⁄2). That leaves 4901⁄2 fish in the sea. Our lines are out.

随着收购Van Tuyl，若按独立公司计算，Berkshire现在拥有9又1⁄2家本可跻身Fortune 500的企业（Heinz算1⁄2）。海里还剩下490又1⁄2条鱼。我们的钓线已经抛出。

‹ Our subsidiaries spent a record $15 billion on plant and equipment during 2014, well over twice their depreciation charges. About 90% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we will always invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunities runs through America. The treasures that have been uncovered up to now are dwarfed by those still untapped. Through dumb luck, Charlie and I were born in the United States, and we are forever grateful for the staggering advantages this accident of birth has given us.

‹ 我们的各子公司在2014年用于厂房与设备的支出创下纪录，达150亿美元，远超当年折旧费用的两倍。其中约90%花在美国。虽然我们也会始终在海外投资，但机会的主矿脉在美国。迄今挖掘出的宝藏，与尚未开采的相比不过小巫见大巫。纯属运气，Charlie和我出生在美国，我们将永远感激这一出生偶然带给我们的巨大利益。

‹ Berkshire’s yearend employees – including those at Heinz – totaled a record 340,499, up 9,754 from last year. The increase, I am proud to say, included no gain at headquarters (where 25 people work). No sense going crazy.

‹ Berkshire年末员工总数——包括Heinz——达到创纪录的340,499人，较上年增加9,754人。我自豪地说，这一增长并不包括总部（那儿有25人）的人数增加。没必要疯狂。

‹ Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 7.8% versus 6.3% at yearend 2013). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola, American Express and Wells Fargo raised our percentage ownership of each. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.1% to 9.2%, our interest in American Express increased from 14.2% to 14.8% and our ownership of Wells Fargo grew from 9.2% to 9.4%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by $50 million.

‹ Berkshire在去年提高了其“Big Four”投资——American Express、Coca-Cola、IBM和Wells Fargo——中每一家公司的持股比例。我们增持了IBM（持股从2013年年末的6.3%提升至7.8%）。与此同时，Coca-Cola、American Express和Wells Fargo的回购也提高了我们在各自公司的持股比例。我们在Coca-Cola的权益从9.1%增至9.2%，在American Express的权益从14.2%增至14.8%，在Wells Fargo的持股从9.2%增至9.4%。如果你觉得百分点的十分之一无足轻重，不妨算笔账：这四家公司合计中，我们持股每增加0.1个百分点，Berkshire分得的其年度收益就增加5,000万美元。

2008-2009像是僵住了，2015年以后才会一些大的动作，相当于一场严重的车祸，死伤惨重，有些也不知道伤的怎么样，等上几年看一看，确认有活力的再下手。

These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

这四家被投公司拥有出色的业务，并由既有能力又以股东为导向的经理人经营。在Berkshire，我们远比起拥有一家平庸企业的100%股权，更偏好在一家卓越公司中持有一笔不控股但可观的份额。拥有Hope Diamond的一部分，胜过拥有整块水钻。

If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2014 earnings before discontinued operations amounted to $4.7 billion (compared to $3.3 billion only three years ago). In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.6 billion last year. (Again, three years ago the dividends were $862 million.) But make no mistake: The $3.1 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

以Berkshire年末持仓为基准，我们在“Big Four”2014年终止经营前收益中所对应的份额为47亿美元（而在三年前仅为33亿美元）。然而，在我们向你们报告的利润中，只计入了我们收到的股息——去年约为16亿美元。（同样，三年前的股息为8.62亿美元。）但请别搞错：我们未计入报表的这几家公司另外31亿美元利润，对我们而言与Berkshire入账的部分一样宝贵。

The earnings these investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that enhances Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. Their retained earnings also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time (though 2015 will be a tough year for the group, in part because of the strong dollar). If the expected gains materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains. (For the package of four, our unrealized gains already totaled $42 billion at yearend.)

这些被投公司留存的利润常被用于回购自家股票——这无需我们花一分钱，却能提升Berkshire未来应占利润份额。它们的留存利润也用于资助往往颇为有利的业务机会。所有这些使我们预期，这四家公司的合计每股收益将随着时间显著增长（尽管2015年对该组合而言将是艰难的一年，部分原因是美元走强）。如果预期的增长兑现，Berkshire收到的股息将增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本利得也会增加。（就这四家公司组合而言，我们的未实现收益在年末已达420亿美元。）

Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash.

我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意在非控股的业务中被动投入巨额资金——让我们相较那些只限于收购可自营业务的公司拥有显著优势。无论是经营性业务还是被动投资，我们的胃口都在，因而为Berkshire源源不断的现金寻找合理用途的机会也翻了一番。

‹ I’ve mentioned in the past that my experience in business helps me as an investor and that my investment experience has made me a better businessman. Each pursuit teaches lessons that are applicable to the other. And some truths can only be fully learned through experience. (In Fred Schwed’s wonderful book, Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?, a Peter Arno cartoon depicts a puzzled Adam looking at an eager Eve, while a caption says, “There are certain things that cannot be adequately explained to a virgin either by words or pictures.” If you haven’t read Schwed’s book, buy a copy at our annual meeting. Its wisdom and humor are truly priceless.)

‹ 我过去提到过，我的商业经历帮助了我的投资，而我的投资经历也让我成为更出色的商人。每一种追求都会传授可用于另一种追求的经验。而有些真理只能通过亲身体验才能真正掌握。（在Fred Schwed那本精彩的书Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?中，Peter Arno的一幅漫画画的是困惑的Adam看着热切的Eve，配文写道：“有些事无论用文字还是图片，都无法向处子恰当地解释。”如果你还没读过Schwed的书，去我们的年会上买一本。它的智慧与幽默确实无价。）

知识是一种体验，是神经层面系统性运作的结果，就像骑自行车，不可能通过说明书学会骑自行车。

Among Arno’s “certain things,” I would include two separate skills, the evaluation of investments and the management of businesses. I therefore think it’s worthwhile for Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our two investment managers, to each have oversight of at least one of our businesses. A sensible opportunity for them to do so opened up a few months ago when we agreed to purchase two companies that, though smaller than we would normally acquire, have excellent economic characteristics. Combined, the two earn $100 million annually on about $125 million of net tangible assets.

在Arno所说的“有些事”之中，我会把两项独立的技能也算进去：投资评估与企业管理。因此，我认为让我们的两位投资经理Todd Combs和Ted Weschler各自监督至少一家我们的业务是值得的。几个月前出现了一个合适的机会：我们同意收购两家公司，尽管规模小于我们通常会收购的对象，但它们具备出色的经济特征。两家公司合计以约1.25亿美元的净有形资产，每年赚取1亿美元。

I’ve asked Todd and Ted to each take on one as Chairman, in which role they will function in the very limited way that I do with our larger subsidiaries. This arrangement will save me a minor amount of work and, more important, make the two of them even better investors than they already are (which is to say among the best).

我已请Todd和Ted分别担任其中一家的董事长，在这一角色上，他们将以与我对我们更大子公司相同的高度克制方式履职。此安排会替我省下一点点工作，更重要的是，会让他们两位在原本已很优秀的基础上成为更出色的投资者（也就是说，跻身最佳之列）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”

2009年末，在“大衰退”的阴霾之中，我们同意收购BNSF，这是Berkshire历史上最大的一笔收购。当时，我称这笔交易是对美国经济未来的一次“孤注一掷的押注”。

That kind of commitment was nothing new for us. We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too: Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.

这种承诺对我们而言并不新鲜。自1965年Buffett Partnership Ltd.取得Berkshire控制权以来，我们一直在进行类似的押注。理由也很充分：Charlie和我始终认为，押注美国繁荣持续上升，几乎等同于押注一个十拿九稳的结果。

Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 238 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. In my lifetime alone, real per-capita U.S. output has sextupled. My parents could not have dreamed in 1930 of the world their son would see. Though the preachers of pessimism prattle endlessly about America’s problems, I’ve never seen one who wishes to emigrate (though I can think of a few for whom I would happily buy a one-way ticket).

事实上，过去238年里，有谁靠做空美国而获益？如果你把我们国家当前的状况与1776年的状况相比，你会不禁揉眼惊叹。仅在我有生之年，美国人均实际产出就增长到原来的六倍。我的父母在1930年根本无法想象他们的儿子将看到怎样的世界。尽管那些悲观鼓吹者没完没了地喋喋不休，谈论美国的问题，但我从未见过一个真的想要移民的人（不过我倒能想到少数几个，我很乐意为他们买一张单程票）。

The dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. Gains won’t come in a smooth or uninterrupted manner; they never have. And we will regularly grumble about our government. But, most assuredly, America’s best days lie ahead.

我们市场经济中蕴含的活力将继续发挥魔力。收获不会以平滑、不中断的方式到来——从来也不是。我们也会时不时抱怨政府。但可以肯定的是，美国最好的日子仍在前方。

With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

在这股顺风的助力下，Charlie和我希望通过以下方式提升Berkshire的每股内在价值：（1）不断提升我们众多子公司的基础盈利能力；（2）通过bolt-on并购进一步提高其盈利；（3）受益于被投企业的增长；（4）当Berkshire股价相对内在价值存在显著折价时回购股份；以及（5）偶尔进行一笔大型收购。我们也会尽量通过极少、甚至尽可能不发行Berkshire股票来为你们最大化成果。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.

这些构件建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一个世纪之后，BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy仍将在人类经济中发挥关键作用。住宅和汽车仍将是大多数家庭生活的核心。保险对企业和个人依然不可或缺。展望未来，Charlie和我看到一个为Berkshire量身定制的世界。我们很幸运被托付去管理它。

非常简单的判断。

Intrinsic Business Value

企业内在价值

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 123-124.

尽管Charlie和我经常谈论企业内在价值，但我们无法精确告诉你Berkshire股票的这一数值（事实上，对任何其他股票也是如此）。不过，在我们的2010年年度报告中，我们列出了我们认为是合理估算Berkshire内在价值所必需的三项要素——其中一项是定性因素。该讨论已在第123-124页全文重印。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2014 our per-share investments increased 8.4% to $140,123, and our earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 19% to $10,847 per share.

以下是两项定量因素的最新进展：2014年，我们的每股投资资产增长8.4%，达到$140,123；来自非保险与非投资业务的每股盈利增长19%，至$10,847。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 44 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main focus is to build operating earnings. That’s why we were pleased to exchange our Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings stock for operating businesses last year and to contract with Procter and Gamble to acquire Duracell by means of a similar exchange set to close in 2015.

自1970年以来，我们的每股投资资产以19%的复合年增长率提升，而我们的盈利指标则以20.6%的速度增长。Berkshire股票在随后44年里的涨幅与这两项价值衡量指标非常接近，这绝非巧合。Charlie和我乐见这两部分都取得进展，但我们的主要关注点是打造经营性盈利。这也是为什么我们很高兴在去年用持有的Phillips 66与Graham Holdings的股票交换经营性业务，并与Procter and Gamble签约，通过类似的交换在2015年完成对Duracell的收购。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)

现在，让我们来审视我们业务运营的四个主要板块。每个板块在资产负债表和损益特征上都与其他板块大不相同。因此，我们会把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现——这也是Charlie和我看待它们的方式（尽管把它们都置于同一屋檐下确有重要且持久的优势）。我们的目标是向你提供这样一些信息：如果角色互换——由你担任报告经理，而我们是缺席股东——我们会希望掌握的信息。（但可别因此打什么主意！）

Insurance

保险

Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation. That industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.

先看保险，这是Berkshire的核心业务。自1967年我们以860万美元收购National Indemnity及其姊妹公司National Fire & Marine以来，这一行业一直是推动我们扩张的引擎。尽管这笔收购对Berkshire影响深远，但执行起来却极其简单。

Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a public accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.

Jack Ringwalt，我的一位朋友、这两家公司的控股股东，来到我的办公室说他想出售。十五分钟后，我们就达成了交易。Jack的两家公司从未接受过公共会计师事务所的审计，而我也没有要求进行审计。我的理由是：（1）Jack为人诚实；（2）他也有点古怪，一旦交易变得哪怕稍微复杂，他很可能就会转身走人。

On pages 128-129, we reproduce the 11⁄2-page purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berkshire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.

在第128-129页，我们重印了当时用于完成该交易的1又1⁄2页购买协议。那份合同是“自制品”：双方都没有请律师。就“每页价值”而论，这该是Berkshire最好的交易：National Indemnity如今的GAAP（generally accepted accounting principles）净资产为1,110亿美元，超过了世界上任何其他保险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the property-casualty business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

我们之所以被property-casualty业务吸引，原因之一在于其财务特征：P/C保险公司先收保费、后付赔款。在某些极端情形下，比如源自特定工伤事故的赔付，付款期可以延续数十年。这种“先收后付”的模式使P/C公司手中持有大量资金——我们称之为“float（浮存金）”——最终这些钱会支付给他人。与此同时，保险公司可以为自身利益投资这笔浮存金。尽管单个保单与赔案此起彼伏，但保险公司所持有的浮存金金额通常与保费规模相对稳定。因此，随着我们的业务增长，浮存金也随之增长。至于我们增长到了什么程度，下面的表格会给出说明：

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and our new commercial insurance operation are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. This strength is a key pillar in Berkshire’s economic fortress.

浮存金的进一步增长将难以实现。从积极的一面看，GEICO和我们新的商业保险业务几乎可以肯定会以良好的速度增长。然而，National Indemnity的再保险部门参与了若干run-off合约，其浮存金正缓慢下行。即便我们终会经历浮存金的下降，过程也会非常渐进——在最极端的情况下，任何一年降幅也不超过3%。由于我们保险合同的性质，我们绝不会面临相对于我们现金资源而言巨额资金被立即要求支付的情况。这项强项是Berkshire经济堡垒的关键支柱。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费超过费用与最终赔付的总和，我们就会取得承保利润，它会叠加在浮存金所带来的投资收益之上。当获得这样的利润时，我们相当于在使用“免费的资金”——更妙的是，还因为持有它而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it frequently causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates our country is now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望达成这种理想结果，这种愿望导致竞争异常激烈，以至于经常使整个P/C行业出现显著的承保亏损。从效果上讲，这一亏损就是行业为持有其浮存金所支付的代价。竞争态势几乎可以保证，尽管行业内所有公司都享有浮存金带来的收益，保险业相较其他美国企业，仍将延续其在有形净资产回报方面低于正常水平的糟糕记录。我们国家当前所面对的长期低利率时期，使浮存金的收益下降，从而加剧了行业的盈利困境。

Progressive采取单点突破的策略不是最佳也至少是次优的办法。

As noted in the first section of this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for twelve consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $24 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. That message is given at least lip service by all insurers; at Berkshire it is a religion.

正如本报告第一部分所述，Berkshire至今已连续十二年实现了承保盈利，该期间税前累积收益达240亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们在大多数年份仍将实现盈利承保。做到这一点是我们所有保险管理者的日常重点，他们明白虽然浮存金很有价值，但其收益可能会被糟糕的承保结果所淹没。所有保险公司至少在口头上都会这么说；而在Berkshire，这是一条宗教般的信条。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $22.7 billion to more than six million claimants in 2014 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float.

那么，我们的浮存金如何影响内在价值？在计算Berkshire的账面价值时，我们会将全部浮存金作为负债予以扣减，就好像我们必须在明天就把它付出去而且无法补充一样。但把浮存金仅仅视作负债是不正确的；它更应被看作一笔循环资金。我们每天支付旧的赔案及相关费用——仅在2014年就向六百多万名索赔人支付了高达227亿美元——这会减少浮存金。同样确定的是，我们每天也在承接新的业务，从而产生新的赔案并增加浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities are treated as equals, however, under GAAP.

如果我们的这笔循环浮存金既无成本又能长期维持——我相信会如此——那么这种负债的真实价值将远低于会计上的负债。名义上欠着1美元、但实质上这笔钱几乎永远不会离开公司——因为新业务几乎必然会带来替代的资金——这与欠着1美元、明天就会流出且无法补充，二者截然不同。然而，在GAAP下，这两类负债被一视同仁。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这一被高估负债的部分对冲，是一项155亿美元的“商誉”资产——这是我们在收购保险公司时形成并增加账面价值的。在很大程度上，这项商誉代表了我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值并无必然关系。举例来说，如果一家保险公司长期发生巨额承保亏损，那么无论其最初成本是多少，账面上的任何商誉资产都应被视为一文不值。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Under present accounting rules (with which we agree) this excess value will never be entered on our books. But I can assure you that it’s real. That’s one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，这并不符合Berkshire的情况。Charlie和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——也即如果我们去收购一家拥有同等质量浮存金能力的保险业务，我们乐于为之支付的价格——远远高于其历史账面价值。按照现行会计规则（对此我们表示认同），这部分超额价值永远不会记录在我们的账上。但我可以向你保证，它确实存在。这也是我们相信Berkshire的企业内在价值显著高于其账面价值的原因之一——而且是一个重要的原因。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

Berkshire之所以拥有颇具吸引力的保险经济属性，完全在于我们有一批出色的管理者在以高度自律的方式运营那些难以复制的商业模式。下面我来介绍几大主要单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

按浮存金规模计，排在第一位的是由Ajit Jain管理的Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group。Ajit承保的是其他人既无意愿也无足够资本去承担的风险。他的运营以独特方式兼具承保能力、速度、决断力，且最重要的是智慧；但同时他从不让Berkshire暴露在与我们资源不相称的风险之下。

Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities in a market that might well have gone into shock. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，在规避风险方面，我们比多数大型保险公司要保守得多。举例来说，如果保险业遭遇某次特大灾害造成2500亿美元的损失——约为以往任何一次损失的三倍——凭借多元的收益来源，Berkshire整体上这一年大概率仍将录得可观利润。我们也将继续现金充裕，并在可能陷入震荡的市场中寻找大型机会。与此同时，其他主要的保险与再保险公司将深陷亏损，甚至面临资不抵债的风险。

Ajit’s underwriting skills are unmatched. His mind, moreover, is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment. Last year I told you about his formation of Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly welcomed by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. Previously, we had written only a few specialized lines of commercial insurance.

Ajit的承保能力无人可比。此外，他的大脑就像一家创意工厂，不断寻找可以纳入当前组合的更多业务线。去年我曾提到他创立了Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance（“BHSI”）。这一举措使我们进入商业保险领域，并立即受到全美主要保险经纪人与企业风险管理者的欢迎。此前，我们仅承保过少数几条商业保险的专门业务线。

BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. During 2014, Peter expanded his talented group, moving into both international business and new lines of insurance. We repeat last year’s prediction that BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years.

BHSI由Peter Eastwood领导，他是一位经验老到、在保险业内备受尊敬的承保人。2014年间，Peter扩充了他的优秀团队，同时拓展了国际业务与新的保险产品线。我们重申去年的预测：BHSI将成为Berkshire的一项重要资产，并将在数年内带来以数十亿美元计的业务规模。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们在General Re拥有另一支再保险劲旅，由Tad Montross负责管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

归根结底，稳健的保险经营必须遵循四项纪律：(1) 理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险暴露；(2) 保守评估各项风险暴露实际引发损失的可能性及一旦发生时的可能成本；(3) 设定这样的保费水平：在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用之后，平均能够实现盈利；以及(4) 如果无法获得相称的保费，就要愿意果断放弃业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司能够通过前三项测试，却在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法对竞争对手争相承保的业务转身说不。那句老话——“别人在做，所以我们也必须做”——在任何行业都预示麻烦，而在保险业尤甚。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

Tad遵循了这四条保险“戒律”，这一点从他的业绩中可见一斑。在他的领导下，General Re庞大的浮存金在成本上远好于“零成本”，我们预计这种平均表现将会延续。我们对General Re的国际寿险再保险业务尤为看好；自1998年我们收购该公司以来，这项业务一直保持持续且盈利的增长。

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

值得回忆的是，我们收购General Re不久便遭遇一连串问题，令评论人士——以及我本人也曾短暂地——认为我犯下了一个大错。那样的日子早已一去不复返。General Re如今是一颗瑰宝。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 64 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 53 years of service in 2014. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony.

最后，还有GEICO，这是我64年前磨炼本领的那家保险公司。GEICO由Tony Nicely管理，他18岁加入公司，并在2014年达到了53年的服务年限。Tony于1993年出任CEO，自那以后公司一路腾飞。没有比Tony更好的管理者。

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.

1951年1月我第一次接触GEICO时，公司相较行业巨头所拥有的巨大成本优势令我震撼。我清楚地知道GEICO会成功，因为它理应成功。没人喜欢买汽车保险，但几乎人人都喜欢开车。因此所需的保险对大多数家庭而言是一项重要支出。节省对他们很重要——而只有低成本的运营才能做到这一点。事实上，至少40%的正在阅读这封信的人通过在GEICO投保可以省钱。所以别再读了，去 geico.com，或拨打 800-368-2734。

GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2014 at 10.8% compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. The gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality – he works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he never gets a swelled head from his fame nor does he have an agent to constantly remind us how valuable he is. I love the little guy.

GEICO的成本优势使其得以年复一年地吞下市场份额。（到2014年我们达到了10.8%，而在1995年Berkshire取得GEICO控制权时仅为2.5%。）公司的低成本构筑了护城河——而且是持久的那种——竞争对手无法跨越。我们的gecko从不厌倦地告诉美国人，GEICO如何能为他们省下一笔可观的费用。补充一句，这只gecko有一个特别讨人喜欢的优点——他无偿工作。不像人类代言人，他不会因名气而自满，也没有经纪人不断提醒我们他有多么“物有所值”。我喜欢这个小家伙。

明星代言是比较扯的模式。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Indeed, over the past decade, they have earned $2.95 billion from underwriting while growing their float from $1.7 billion to $8.6 billion. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了我们的三大保险业务之外，我们还拥有一组规模较小的公司，其中大多数在保险业较为冷门的细分领域开展业务。总体而言，这些公司构成了一项不断成长、且持续实现承保盈利的业务。事实上，在过去十年间，它们通过承保获得了29.5亿美元的利润，同时将其浮存金从17亿美元增长到86亿美元。Charlie和我十分珍视这些公司及其管理者。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future should certain unwanted events occur.

简单来说，保险就是出售承诺。“客户”现在付钱；而当某些不受欢迎的事件发生时，保险人承诺在未来支付赔款。

Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by people in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay, even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives, is all-important.

有时，这份承诺要几十年后才会接受检验。（想想二十多岁的人购买的人寿保险。）因此，保险人即便在付款时点经济动荡时仍具备支付的能力与意愿，这两点至关重要。

Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by certain of the world’s largest and most sophisticated P/C insurers, who wished to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” these liabilities – most of them potential losses from asbestos claims – to a reinsurer. They needed the right one, though: If a reinsurer fails to pay a loss, the original insurer is still on the hook for it. Choosing a reinsurer, therefore, that down the road proves to be financially strapped or a bad actor threatens the original insurer with getting huge liabilities right back in its lap.

Berkshire的承诺无出其右。近年来，这一点已被世界上一些规模最大、最成熟的P/C保险公司所印证：它们希望摆脱规模巨大且存续期极长的负债。也就是说，这些保险公司希望将这些负债——其中大多是源自石棉索赔的潜在损失——“cede”（分出）给再保险人。但它们必须找到合适的对象：如果再保险人不赔，原保险公司仍需承担责任。因此，倘若所选择的再保险人日后陷入财务困境或行为不端，原保险公司就有可能被迫重新背上这笔巨额负债。

Last year, our premier position in reinsurance was reaffirmed by our writing a policy carrying a $3 billion single premium. I believe that the policy’s size has only been exceeded by our 2007 transaction with Lloyd’s, in which the premium was $7.1 billion.

去年，我们签发了一份一次性保费为30亿美元的保单，再次确认了我们在再保险领域的领先地位。我认为这一保单的规模只被我们在2007年与Lloyd’s达成的那笔交易所超过，当时的保费为71亿美元。

In fact, I know of only eight P/C policies in history that had a single premium exceeding $1 billion. And, yes, all eight were written by Berkshire. Certain of these contracts will require us to make substantial payments 50 years or more from now. When major insurers have needed an unquestionable promise that payments of this type will be made, Berkshire has been the party – the only party – to call.

事实上，我所知的历史上只有八份P/C保单的一次性保费超过10亿美元。没错，这八份全都由Berkshire承保。其中某些合同将要求我们在50年甚至更久以后支付大额款项。每当大型保险公司需要对于此类支付作出毋庸置疑的承诺时，Berkshire一直都是——并且是唯一——会被他们联系的一方。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.

Berkshire拥有卓越的管理者、一流的财务实力，以及多种受宽广护城河保护的商业模式，这在保险业中极为独特。上述优势的组合对Berkshire股东而言是一项巨大资产，并且会随着时间推移而愈发珍贵。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管、资本密集型业务

We have two major operations, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们拥有两项主要业务，BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”），它们具有一些与我们其他业务明显不同的重要特征。因此，在本信中我们为它们单列章节，并在我们的GAAP资产负债表和损益表中单独披露这两项业务的合并财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

两家公司共同的关键特征在于：它们在使用寿命极长、受监管的资产上进行了巨额投资，其中部分由大量长期债务融资，而这些债务并未由Berkshire担保。实际上并不需要我们的信用背书，因为每家公司即便在极端恶劣的经济环境下，其盈利能力也远超利息支出。举例来说，去年BNSF的利息保障倍数超过8:1。（我们对coverage的定义是pre-tax earnings/interest，而不是广泛使用但我们认为严重有缺陷的EBITDA/interest。）

At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Recently, we have further broadened that base through our $3 billion (Canadian) acquisition of AltaLink, an electric transmission system serving 85% of Alberta’s population. This multitude of profit streams, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, has enabled BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.

与此同时，BHE在任何情形下都能履行债务义务的能力来自两个因素。其一，是所有公用事业的共性：抗衰退的盈利能力，源于这些公司以独家形式提供不可或缺的服务。其二，是少数公用事业才具备的：高度多元的收益来源，使我们不至于因任何单一监管机构的决定而受到严重伤害。最近，我们以30亿加元收购AltaLink，这是一套服务阿尔伯塔省85%人口的电力输电系统，从而进一步拓宽了这一基础。多元的利润来源，加上强大母公司所有权带来的内在优势，使BHE及其公用事业子公司得以显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实同时惠及我们和我们的客户。

美国政治比较搞的地方。

Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:

每天，我们的两家子公司都以重要方式为美国经济“输送动能”：

• BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.

• BNSF承运全国城际货运总量中约15%（以吨英里计），无论货物由公路、铁路、水运、航空还是管道运输。事实上，我们完成的货运吨英里数超过任何其他主体，这一事实使BNSF成为我国经济“循环系统”中最重要的动脉。

BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.

与所有铁路一样，BNSF以极高的燃油效率和对环境友好的方式运送货物：每加仑柴油可将一吨货物运送约500英里。执行同样任务的卡车则要消耗大约四倍的燃料。

• BHE’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are a leader in renewables: From a standing start ten years ago, BHE now accounts for 6% of the country’s wind generation capacity and 7% of its solar generation capacity. Beyond these businesses, BHE owns two large pipelines that deliver 8% of our country’s natural gas consumption; the recentlypurchased electric transmission operation in Canada; and major electric businesses in the U.K. and Philippines. And the beat goes on: We will continue to buy and build utility operations throughout the world for decades to come.

• BHE的公用事业业务向11个州的受监管零售用户提供服务。没有任何一家公用事业公司的触角伸得更远。除此之外，我们在可再生能源领域处于领先地位：从十年前白手起家发展至今，BHE现已占全国风电装机容量的6%、光伏装机容量的7%。在这些业务之外，BHE还拥有两条大型管道，输送全国8%的天然气消费；在加拿大拥有recentlypurchased的电力输电业务；并在英国和菲律宾拥有重要的电力业务。并且还将继续：未来数十年，我们将在全球范围内持续收购与建设公用事业资产。

BHE can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. In fact, last year the company retained more dollars of earnings – by far – than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this 100% retention policy as an important advantage – one almost certain to distinguish BHE from other utilities for many years to come.

BHE之所以能够进行这些投资，是因为它将自身的全部利润予以留存。事实上，去年该公司留存的利润（远远）超过任何其他美国电力公用事业。我们与监管者都认为这项100%留存政策是一项重要优势——几乎可以肯定，它将在未来多年让BHE区别于其他公用事业公司。

When BHE completes certain renewables projects that are underway, the company’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. In addition, we have conventional projects in the works that will also cost many billions. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

当BHE完成目前在建的部分可再生能源项目时，公司可再生能源资产组合的累计投入将达到150亿美元。除此之外，我们在建的常规项目也将投入数十亿美元。只要这些承诺能够带来合理回报，我们就乐于投入——在这方面，我们对未来的监管安排抱有充分信任。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们之所以有信心，一是基于过往经验，二是因为我们明白社会对交通与能源的巨额投资需求将永续存在。政府以能确保资金持续流向关键项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同样地，我们以获得监管者及其所代表公众的认可的方式开展经营，也符合我们的自身利益。

Last year we fully met this objective at BHE, just as we have in every year of our ownership. Our rates remain low, our customer satisfaction is high and our record for employee safety is among the best in the industry.

去年，我们在BHE完全实现了这一目标——与我们持有以来的每一年一样。我们的费率保持低位，客户满意度高，员工安全记录位居行业前列。

The story at BNSF, however – as I noted earlier – was not good in 2014, a year in which the railroad disappointed many of its customers. This problem occurred despite the record capital expenditures that BNSF has made in recent years, with those having far exceeded the outlays made by Union Pacific, our principal competitor.

然而，正如我先前所述，BNSF在2014年的表现并不理想，这一年铁路业务让不少客户失望。尽管BNSF近年来的资本开支创下纪录，且远超我们的主要竞争对手Union Pacific的投入，这一问题仍然出现了。

The two railroads are of roughly equal size measured by revenues, though we carry considerably more freight (measured either by carloads or ton-miles). But our service problems exceeded Union Pacific’s last year, and we lost market share as a result. Moreover, U.P.’s earnings beat ours by a record amount. Clearly, we have a lot of work to do.

以收入计，这两家铁路公司的规模大致相当，尽管我们承运的货量（无论以车数还是吨英里计）明显更多。但去年我们的服务问题多于Union Pacific，结果丢失了市场份额。此外，U.P.的利润以创纪录的幅度超过我们。显然，我们还有很多工作要做。

We are wasting no time: As I also mentioned earlier, we will spend $6 billion in 2015 on improving our railroad’s operation. That will amount to about 26% of estimated revenues (a calculation that serves as the industry’s yardstick). Outlays of this magnitude are largely unheard of among railroads. For us, this percentage compares to our average of 18% in 2009-2013 and to U.P.’s projection for the near future of 16-17%. Our huge investments will soon lead to a system with greater capacity and much better service. Improved profits should follow.

我们分秒必争：正如我先前提到的，我们将在2015年投入60亿美元以改进铁路运营。这相当于预计收入的约26%（这一口径是行业的共同标尺）。如此规模的支出在铁路业中几乎前所未闻。对我们而言，这一比例高于2009—2013年的平均18%，也高于U.P.在可预见未来预计的16—17%。我们的大额投资很快会带来更大运能和更优服务，利润改善应会随之而来。

Here are the key figures for Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF:

以下是Berkshire Hathaway Energy与BNSF的关键数据：

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造业、服务业与零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

在Berkshire的这一板块中，我们的业务范围几乎包罗万象。不过，我们先来看一下整个集团的资产负债表与损益表概要。

*Earnings for 2012 and 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in the Finance and Financial Products section.

*2012年与2013年的收益已重述以剔除Marmon’s的租赁业务，该部分现计入Finance and Financial Products板块。

Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 49. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.

符合GAAP的收入与费用数据在第49页。相较之下，上文的经营费用数据为non-GAAP，并不包含部分购并会计项目（主要为某些无形资产的摊销）。我们以这种方式呈现数据，是因为Charlie和我认为，与GAAP口径相比，经过调整的数字更能准确反映表中汇总业务的真实经济性费用与利润。

I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. The concept of making charges against other intangibles, such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arises through purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.

我不会解释所有调整项——有些很小且晦涩——但严肃的投资者应当理解无形资产性质的巨大差异。有些确实会随时间消耗，另一些则根本不会贬值。以软件为显著例子，其摊销费用是非常真实的成本。然而，对其他无形资产（如客户关系）计提摊销这一概念源自购并会计规则，显然并不反映现实。GAAP并不区分这两类费用；也就是说，在计算利润时二者都被记作费用——尽管从投资者的视角看，它们截然不同。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 49, amortization charges of $1.15 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once nonexistent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.

在第49页我们披露的符合GAAP的数据中，已有11.5亿美元的摊销被作为费用扣除。我们认为其中约20%是“真实”的，其余并非如此。这些“非真实”的费用在Berkshire曾经并不存在，但由于我们进行了大量并购，它们已变得显著。随着我们再收购更多公司，“非真实”的摊销几乎可以肯定还会进一步上升。

The GAAP-compliant table on page 67 gives you the current status of our intangible assets. We now have $7.4 billion left to amortize, of which $4.1 billion will be charged over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of non-real costs becomes entirely charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat.

第67页符合GAAP的表格展示了我们无形资产的最新状况。我们目前尚待摊销的余额为74亿美元，其中41亿美元将在未来五年内计提。最终，当然，每一美元“非真实”成本都会被完全摊销；届时，即便真实盈利持平，报表利润也会增加。

Depreciation charges, we want to emphasize, are different: Every dime of depreciation expense we report is a real cost. That’s true, moreover, at most other companies. When CEOs tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, wire them up for a polygraph test.

我们要强调，折旧则不同：我们报告的每一分钱折旧费用都是实际成本。对大多数其他公司亦然。当CEO把EBITDA当作估值指南来鼓吹时，给他们连上测谎仪吧。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.

当然，我们公开披露的利润将继续遵循GAAP。不过，若要贴近现实，你应记得把我们报告的多数摊销费用加回去。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

To get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, they sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, the result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates.

回到我们众多的制造、服务与零售业务，它们销售的产品从棒棒糖一直到喷气式飞机不等。以未加杠杆的净有形资产回报来衡量，这一板块中的部分业务拥有极佳的经济属性，税后回报从25%一直到远超100%。另一些业务取得了12%至20%区间的良好回报。然而也有少数业务回报很差，原因在于我在资本配置工作中犯下了一些严重错误。我并非被误导；只是我对公司或其所处行业的经济机理判断失误。

Fortunately, my blunders normally involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, nonetheless, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.

幸运的是，我的失误通常涉及相对较小的收购。我们的多数大额收购总体表现良好，少数几笔甚至表现出众。尽管如此，在购买企业或股票方面，我犯错的次数还不会画上句号。并非所有事情都能如计划般顺利。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2014 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using little leverage, earned 18.7% after-tax on that capital.

作为一个整体来看，这一组公司是一项出色的业务。2014年期间，它们平均动用了240亿美元的净有形资产；尽管持有大量超额现金且几乎不使用杠杆，却在这笔资本上实现了18.7%的税后回报。

NTA（净有形资产） =（总资产 − 无形资产）− 总负债=（71,088-28,107）-（10,699 + 3,801 + 4,269）=$24.2B。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought for too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin, and that premium is likely to widen. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in both the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.

当然，即便一家企业的经济属性极佳，如果买价太高，也可能成为一次糟糕的投资。我们对多数业务相对于净有形资产支付了可观的溢价，这一成本体现在我们披露的庞大商誉数字上。总体而言，我们在这一板块投入的资本获得了不错的回报。进一步说，这些业务的合计内在价值显著高于其账面价值，而且这一溢价很可能继续扩大。即便如此，保险与受监管行业板块中内在价值与账面价值之间的差距要大得多。真正的大赢家就在那些板块之中。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 97-100.

我们在这一组里拥有的公司多到无法逐一评论。此外，它们的现有和潜在竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们的少数业务中，若他人知晓我们的数据，可能使我们处于不利地位。因此，对于一些对评估Berkshire不具实质规模的业务，我们仅披露必要信息。不过，你仍可在第97–100页找到关于我们诸多业务的相当多细节。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This year we include in this section Marmon’s very sizable leasing operations, whose wares are railcars, containers and cranes. We have also restated the previous two years to reflect that change. Why have we made it? At one time there was a large minority ownership at Marmon, and I felt it was more understandable to include all of the company’s operations in one place. Today we own virtually 100% of Marmon, which makes me think you will gain more insight into our various businesses if we include Marmon’s leasing operations under this heading. (The figures for the many dozens of Marmon’s other businesses remain in the previous section.)

今年，我们在本节中纳入了Marmon规模颇大的租赁业务，其产品包括铁路货车、集装箱与起重机。我们也相应重述了前两年的数据以反映这一变动。为何如此处理？曾经Marmon有较大的少数股东持股，我认为把该公司的全部业务放在同一处披露更便于理解。如今我们几乎持有Marmon 100%的股权，这让我认为把Marmon的租赁业务纳入本节，有助于你更好地洞察我们的各项业务。（Marmon旗下数十项其他业务的数据仍列示在上一节中。）

Our other leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture) and XTRA (semi-trailers). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. Both companies have invested more money in new equipment than have many of their competitors, and that’s paying off.

我们的其他租赁与出租业务由CORT（家具）与XTRA（半挂车）经营。这些公司是各自领域的行业领先者，随着美国经济走强，它们的盈利显著提升。两家公司在新设备上的投入都超过许多竞争对手，而这笔投入正在产生回报。

Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the largest home builder in America. Last year, Clayton sold 30,871 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. When we purchased Clayton in 2003 for $1.7 billion, its share was 14%.

在美国最大的房屋建造商Clayton Homes，Kevin Clayton再次交出了行业领先的成绩。去年，Clayton售出30,871套住房，占美国人购买的工厂化住宅约45%。2003年我们以17亿美元收购Clayton时，其市场份额为14%。

Key to Clayton’s earnings is the company’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. During the financial panic of 2008 and 2009, when funding for the industry dried up, Clayton was able to keep lending because of Berkshire’s backing. In fact, we continued during that period to finance our competitors’ retail sales as well as our own.

支撑Clayton盈利的关键在于公司规模达130亿美元的抵押贷款组合。于2008与2009年的金融恐慌期间，当行业资金枯竭时，得益于Berkshire的支持，Clayton仍能持续放贷。事实上，那段时期我们不仅为自家零售销售提供融资，也继续为竞争对手的零售销售提供融资。

Many of Clayton’s borrowers have low incomes and mediocre FICO scores. But thanks to the company’s sensible lending practices, its portfolio performed well during the recession, meaning a very high percentage of our borrowers kept their homes. Our blue-collar borrowers, in many cases, proved much better credit risks than their higher-income brethren.

Clayton的许多借款人收入较低、FICO评分一般。但由于公司审慎的放贷做法，其贷款组合在衰退期间表现良好，这意味着我们有很高比例的借款人保住了住房。在许多情况下，我们的蓝领借款人所呈现的信用风险状况远优于高收入群体。

At Marmon’s railroad-car operation, lease rates have improved substantially over the past few years. The nature of this business, however, is that only 20% or so of our leases expire annually. Consequently, improved pricing only gradually works its way into our revenue stream. The trend, though, is strong. Our 105,000-car fleet consists largely of tank cars, but only 8% of those transport crude oil.

在Marmon的铁路货车业务中，过去几年租赁费率大幅改善。然而，这类业务的特性是每年只有约20%的租约到期。因此，提价对我们收入流的影响只能逐步体现。尽管如此，趋势强劲。我们拥有105,000辆车的车队，其中大多为罐车，但仅有8%用于运输原油。

One further fact about our rail operation is important for you to know: Unlike many other lessors, we manufacture our own tank cars, about 6,000 of them in a good year. We do not book any profit when we transfer cars from our manufacturing division to our leasing division. Our fleet is consequently placed on our books at a “bargain” price. The difference between that figure and a “retail” price is only slowly reflected in our earnings through smaller annual depreciation charges that we enjoy over the 30-year life of the car. Because of that fact as well as others, Marmon’s rail fleet is worth considerably more than the $5 billion figure at which it is carried on our books.

关于我们的铁路业务，还有一项重要事实：不同于许多其他出租方，我们自制罐车，在景气年份约6,000辆。当我们将车辆从制造部门转至租赁部门时，并不确认任何利润。由此，我们的车队以一个“低价”入账。该数字与“零售价”之间的差额，只会在车辆30年寿命期内，通过较低的年度折旧费用，缓慢地体现在我们的利润中。基于这一点及其他原因，Marmon的铁路车队的实际价值远高于我们账面上按50亿美元计量的数额。

Here’s the earnings recap for this sector:

以下是本板块的盈利概览：

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.

下面列出我们在年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资。

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.

*这是我们的实际买入价，也是我们的税务计税基础；在少数情况下，根据GAAP规则要求进行的增值（write-ups）或减值（write-downs）调整，会使GAAP口径下的“成本”有所不同。

**Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.

**不包括Berkshire子公司养老基金持有的股份。

***Held under contract of sale for this amount.

***按该金额签署的出售合同项下持有。

Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $12.5 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly.

Berkshire有一项未列入表格的重大股票头寸：在2021年9月之前的任何时间，我们都可以以50亿美元购买Bank of America的7亿股。年末这些股份的市值为125亿美元。我们很可能在期权到期前购入这些股份。与此同时，你需要认识到：Bank of America事实上是我们的第四大股票投资——而且我们对此高度重视。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Attentive readers will notice that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our largest common stock investments, is now absent. An attentive investor, I’m embarrassed to report, would have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this investment by dawdling.

细心的读者会注意到，去年还在我们最大普通股投资名单上的Tesco，如今已不在列。让我感到惭愧的是，一位细心的投资者本应更早卖出Tesco的股票。我在这笔投资上因拖延而犯下了一个大错。

At the end of 2012 we owned 415 million shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food retailer in the U.K. and an important grocer in other countries as well. Our cost for this investment was $2.3 billion, and the market value was a similar amount.

到2012年末，我们持有Tesco的4.15亿股股票；该公司当时并至今仍是英国领先的食品零售商，同时在其他国家也是重要的杂货零售商。这笔投资的成本为23亿美元，市值当时也相近。

In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company’s then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior “thumb-sucking.” (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)

2013年，我对公司当时的管理层有些失望，遂卖出了1.14亿股，获得4,300万美元的利润。而我从容缓慢的出售节奏事实证明代价不菲。Charlie把这种行为称为“thumb-sucking。”（考虑到我的拖延让我们付出的代价，他算是客气了。）

During 2014, Tesco’s problems worsened by the month. The company’s market share fell, its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced. In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.

到了2014年，Tesco的问题月复一月地恶化。公司的市场份额下滑，利润率收缩，且曝出会计问题。在商业世界里，坏消息往往是成串出现的：你在厨房看到一只蟑螂；过些天你会遇到它的亲戚。

We sold Tesco shares throughout the year and are now out of the position. (The company, we should mention, has hired new management, and we wish them well.) Our after-tax loss from this investment was $444 million, about 1/5 of 1% of Berkshire’s net worth. In the past 50 years, we have only once realized an investment loss that at the time of sale cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice, we experienced 1% losses. All three of these losses occurred in the 1974-1975 period, when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy others we believed to be even cheaper.

我们在全年陆续卖出了Tesco的股票，如今已不再持有该头寸。（需要说明的是，公司已聘请了新的管理层，我们祝他们顺利。）这笔投资我们税后亏损4.44亿美元，约为Berkshire净资产的0.2%。在过去50年里，我们仅有一次在出售时产生的投资亏损达到了净资产的2%；另有两次亏损为1%。这三次亏损都发生在1974—1975年，当时我们卖出了非常便宜的股票，以便去购买我们认为更便宜的其他股票。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our investment results have been helped by a terrific tailwind. During the 1964-2014 period, the S&P 500 rose from 84 to 2,059, which, with reinvested dividends, generated the overall return of 11,196% shown on page 2. Concurrently, the purchasing power of the dollar declined a staggering 87%. That decrease means that it now takes $1 to buy what could be bought for 13¢ in 1965 (as measured by the Consumer Price Index).

我们的投资结果受益于强劲的顺风。在1964—2014年间，S&P 500从84点上涨到2,059点，若将股息再投资，其总体回报达到第2页所示的11,196%。与此同时，美元的购买力惊人地下降了87%。这一下降意味着，如今需要1美元才能买到1965年只需13美分即可购买的同样商品（以Consumer Price Index衡量）。

There is an important message for investors in that disparate performance between stocks and dollars. Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined investing as “the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future.”

股票与美元截然不同的表现，向投资者传达了一个重要信息。回想我们的2011年年度报告，我们将投资定义为：“在现在将购买力转移给他人，同时基于理性预期，在未来在对名义收益缴纳税款之后，获得更多的购买力。”

The unconventional, but inescapable, conclusion to be drawn from the past fifty years is that it has been far safer to invest in a diversified collection of American businesses than to invest in securities – Treasuries, for example – whose values have been tied to American currency. That was also true in the preceding half-century, a period including the Great Depression and two world wars. Investors should heed this history. To one degree or another it is almost certain to be repeated during the next century.

过去五十年的非常规但不可回避的结论是：投资于多元分散的美国企业，远比投资于与美元价值绑定的证券（例如Treasuries）要安全得多。在之前的半个世纪——包括大萧条和两次世界大战的时期——这一点同样成立。投资者应当重视这段历史。在不同程度上，这一历史几乎可以肯定会在下一个世纪重演。

Stock prices will always be far more volatile than cash-equivalent holdings. Over the long term, however, currency-denominated instruments are riskier investments – far riskier investments – than widely-diversified stock portfolios that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions. That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools, where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for risk. Though this pedagogic assumption makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong: Volatility is far from synonymous with risk. Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students, investors and CEOs astray.

股票价格的波动性永远会远高于现金等价物。但从长期来看，以货币计价的工具比起广泛分散、分期买入、并以极低费用与佣金持有的股票组合更具风险——风险大得多。商学院通常并不这样教，他们几乎普遍用波动性作为风险的替代指标。尽管这种教学假设便于授课，但它完全错误：波动性绝非风险的同义词。将二者等同的流行公式，会误导学生、投资者和CEO。

It is true, of course, that owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier (in both nominal and purchasing-power terms) than leaving funds in cash-equivalents. That is relevant to certain investors – say, investment banks – whose viability can be threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced to sell securities during depressed markets. Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near-term needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries or insured bank deposits.

当然，持有股票一天、一周或一年，确实要比把资金放在现金等价物中风险更大（无论以名义还是购买力计）。这与某些投资者有关——比如投资银行——它们的生存能力可能会因资产价格下跌而受到威胁，并可能在低迷市场被迫抛售证券。此外，任何在短期内可能有大量资金需求的主体，都应当将适当数额配置在Treasuries或受保险保障的银行存款中。

For the great majority of investors, however, who can – and should – invest with a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant. Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains in purchasing power over their investing lifetime. For them, a diversified equity portfolio, bought over time, will prove far less risky than dollar-based securities.

然而，对绝大多数能够——并且应当——以数十年为投资视角的投资者而言，报价上的下跌并不重要。他们的重心应该始终放在整个投资生涯中实现购买力的大幅提升。对他们来说，分散的股票组合、以时间分散买入，事实证明远比以美元计价的证券风险要小得多。

If the investor, instead, fears price volatility, erroneously viewing it as a measure of risk, he may, ironically, end up doing some very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised investing in “safe” Treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit. People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on sums they had previously expected would finance a pleasant retirement. (The S&P 500 was then below 700; now it is about 2,100.) If not for their fear of meaningless price volatility, these investors could have assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying a very low-cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward over the years and whose principal would grow as well (with many ups and downs, to be sure).

如果投资者反而惧怕价格波动，并错误地将其视为风险的度量，他很可能讽刺地最终做出一些非常冒险的事情。请回想，六年前那些专家痛惜股价下跌，建议把资金投向“安全”的短期国库券或银行存单。听从这种布道的人，如今只能在那些原本期待能支撑舒适退休生活的资金上获得微薄收益。（当时S&P 500低于700点；而现在约为2,100点。）若非对毫无意义的价格波动心生恐惧，这些投资者只需买入一只成本极低的指数基金，就可以为自己锁定一生不错的收入：其股息会随岁月上升，本金也会随之增长（当然期间会经历许多起伏）。

Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior, make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to “time” market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor’s tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator – and definitely not Charlie nor I – can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet.

当然，投资者完全可能通过自己的行为，让持有股票变得极其危险——而且许多人确实如此。频繁交易、试图“择时”、分散不足、向经理人与顾问支付高昂且不必要的费用，以及使用借入资金，都会摧毁本可由长期股票持有者享有的可观回报。事实上，借钱不该出现在投资者的工具箱里：市场中任何事情都可能在任何时刻发生。没有任何顾问、经济学家或电视评论员——当然也不包括Charlie和我——能够告诉你混乱何时到来。市场预测者可以灌满你的耳朵，却永远装不满你的钱包。

The commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited to “the little guy.” Huge institutional investors, viewed as a group, have long underperformed the unsophisticated index-fund investor who simply sits tight for decades. A major reason has been fees: Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants who, in turn, recommend high-fee managers. And that is a fool’s game.

上述“投资之罪”的犯规者并不局限于“the little guy”。作为一个整体，庞大的机构投资者长期跑输那些几十年按兵不动的朴素指数基金投资者。主要原因之一在于费用：许多机构向顾问支付巨额报酬，而顾问又会转而推荐高收费的管理人。这是一场fool’s game。

There are a few investment managers, of course, who are very good – though in the short run, it’s difficult to determine whether a great record is due to luck or talent. Most advisors, however, are far better at generating high fees than they are at generating high returns. In truth, their core competence is salesmanship. Rather than listen to their siren songs, investors – large and small – should instead read Jack Bogle’s The Little Book of Common Sense Investing.

当然，也有少数投资经理确实很出色——尽管在短期内，很难判断优异战绩究竟源于运气还是才能。然而，大多数顾问更擅长的是创造高额费用，而非创造高额回报。坦白说，他们的核心能力是“销售术”。与其倾听他们的“海妖之歌”，大小投资者都不如去读一读Jack Bogle的《The Little Book of Common Sense Investing》。

Decades ago, Ben Graham pinpointed the blame for investment failure, using a quote from Shakespeare: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”

数十年前，Ben Graham用Shakespeare的一句名言精确指出了投资失败的根源：“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 2nd at the CenturyLink Center. Last year’s attendance of 39,000 set a record, and we expect a further increase this year as we celebrate our Golden Anniversary. Be there when the doors open at 7 a.m.

年度股东大会将于5月2日（周六）在CenturyLink Center举行。去年的到场人数为39,000人，创下纪录；今年我们庆祝Golden Anniversary，预计出席人数将进一步上升。请在上午7点开门时到场。

Berkshire’s talented Carrie Sova will again be in charge. Carrie joined us six years ago at the age of 24 as a secretary. Then, four years ago, I asked her to take charge of the meeting – a huge undertaking, requiring a multitude of skills – and she jumped at the chance. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in the hundreds who work with her. She is aided by our entire home office crew who enjoy pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.

Berkshire才华横溢的Carrie Sova将再次负责大会。Carrie六年前以24岁的秘书身份加入我们。四年前，我请她负责大会——这是一项庞大的工程，需要多种技能——她立刻欣然承担。Carrie沉着冷静、机智巧妙，善于激发与她合作的数百名同事的最佳表现。我们的总部全体同事也会协助她，让这个周末对我们的股东既有趣又有收获。

And, yes, we also try to sell our visiting shareholders our products while they’re here. In fact, this year we will substantially increase the hours available for purchases, opening for business at the CenturyLink on Friday, May 1st, from noon to 5 p.m. as well as the usual 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on meeting day. So bring a smile to Charlie’s face and do some serious shopping.

当然，我们也会趁股东来访时努力推销我们的产品。事实上，今年我们将大幅延长可购物的时间：5月1日（周五）中午12点至下午5点在CenturyLink开放营业；大会当天仍为早上7点至下午4点。请让Charlie露出笑容，认真血拼一把。

Get up early on Saturday morning. At 6:20 a.m., Norman and Jake, two Texas longhorns each weighing about a ton, will proceed down 10th Street to the CenturyLink. Aboard them will be a couple of our Justin Boot executives, who do double duty as cowboys. Following the steers will be four horses pulling a Wells Fargo stagecoach. Berkshire already markets planes, trains and automobiles. Adding steers and stagecoaches to our portfolio should seal our reputation as America’s all-purpose transportation company.

周六早起。上午6:20，两头名叫Norman和Jake、各重约一吨的Texas longhorns会沿第10街走向CenturyLink。它们将驮着我们几位Justin Boot高管，这几位还兼任牛仔。随后还有四匹马拉着Wells Fargo的驿站马车。Berkshire已经销售飞机、火车和汽车，如今再把公牛和驿站马车加入“组合”，应该足以巩固我们“美国全能交通公司”的名声。

At about 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, we will have our fourth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target again will be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I tossed about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). I’ll present a special prize to the 12-or-under contestant who makes the best toss. Deb Bosanek will be the judge.

周六上午约7:30，我们将举行第四届International Newspaper Tossing Challenge。目标仍是一个Clayton Home的门廊，距离投掷线恰好35英尺。我青少年时代——在我短暂实践“诚实劳动”的时期——大约投递过500,000份报纸。所以我自认还不错。来挑战我吧！让我出丑！把我拉下神坛！谁投得比我更接近门口，我就请他/她吃一支Dilly Bar。报纸页数为36至42页，必须自己折叠（不允许用橡皮筋）。我会给12岁及以下、投掷最佳的参赛者颁发特别奖。评委为Deb Bosanek。

At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so.

上午8:30，将播放一部新的Berkshire影片。一小时后开始问答环节（中间在CenturyLink的摊位用午餐休息），持续到下午3:30。短暂休息后，Charlie和我将在3:45召开年会业务会议。该环节通常只持续约半小时。

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. If you don’t get your shopping done on Friday, slip out while Charlie’s talking on Saturday and binge on our bargains. Check the terrific BNSF railroad layout also. Even though I’m 84, it still excites me.

购物场地是与会场相连、面积为194,300平方英尺的大厅，届时将出售Berkshire数十家子公司的产品。若你周五没买够，周六趁Charlie发言时溜出去，尽情扫货。别忘了看看精彩的BNSF铁路模型布局。即使我已84岁，它仍让我热血沸腾。

Last year you did your part as a shopper, and most of our businesses racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period on Saturday, we sold 1,385 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 23 seconds), 13,440 pounds of See’s candy, 7,276 pairs of Wells Lamont work gloves and 10,000 bottles of Heinz ketchup. Heinz has a new mustard product, so both mustard and ketchup will be available this year. (Buy both!) Now that we are open for business on Friday as well, we expect new records in every precinct.

去年你们的“剁手”很给力，我们的大多数业务创下了销售纪录。周六短短九小时里，我们卖出1,385双Justin boots（平均每23秒一双）、13,440磅See’s糖果、7,276双Wells Lamont劳保手套以及10,000瓶Heinz番茄酱。Heinz新出了mustard产品，今年mustard和ketchup都会有。（两样都买！）既然周五也开卖，我们预计各摊位都会刷新纪录。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our third annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your credentials for the meeting. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in.)

我们的跑鞋公司Brooks将再次在大会上推出特别纪念款。买上一双，第二天穿去参加我们第三届“Berkshire 5K”——上午8点从CenturyLink起跑。参赛详情见与你的会议证件一同寄送的Visitor’s Guide。参赛者会发现自己与许多Berkshire的经理、董事和同事并肩奔跑。（不过Charlie和我会睡个懒觉。）

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money.

购物区的GEICO展台将由来自全美的顶级顾问值守。欢迎过来获取报价。在多数情况下，GEICO能给你股东折扣（通常为8%）。这一特别优惠在我们经营的51个司法辖区中，有44个允许。（补充一点：若你还符合其他折扣条件——例如特定群体可享的折扣——该折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息来对比一下，我们能为许多人实实在在省钱。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Last year, many shareholders purchased Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965, and he has produced an updated edition for the meeting. We also expect to be selling an inexpensive book commemorating our fifty years. It’s currently a work in process, but I expect it to contain a wide variety of historical material, including documents from the 19th Century.

务必光顾Bookworm。那里将有约35种书籍和DVD，其中包含几本新书。去年，许多股东购买了Max Olson汇编的自1965年以来的Berkshire信件，他已为本次大会出了更新版。我们也预计销售一本价格亲民的五十周年纪念书。目前仍在制作中，但我预计其将包含丰富的历史材料，包括19世纪的文献。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

随本报告附上的proxy材料中有一份附件，说明了如何获取参加大会与其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在Berkshire周末抬价。若你从远方而来，请比较飞往Kansas City与Omaha的费用。这两城之间自驾约2又1/2小时；Kansas City可能为你节省不少钱，尤其当你原本计划在Omaha租车时。两人同行可省下$1,000或更多。把这笔钱留给我们消费吧。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did a record $40,481,817 of business. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store is about $9 million.)

在Nebraska Furniture Mart（位于72nd Street上Dodge与Pacific之间、占地77英亩），我们将再次提供“Berkshire Weekend”折扣价。去年在大会前后一周，该店创造了$40,481,817的销售纪录。（NFM奥马哈店的平均周销售约为$9百万。）

To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 28th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

要在NFM享受Berkshire折扣，你必须在4月28日（周二）至5月4日（周一）期间购物，并出示你的会议证件。期间的特价甚至适用于几家通常“铁律禁折”的知名厂商之产品，他们为股东周末的精神破例一次。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM营业时间：周一至周五10 a.m.–9 p.m.，周六10 a.m.–9:30 p.m.，周日10 a.m.–8 p.m.。周六5:30 p.m.–8 p.m.，NFM将举行野餐活动，欢迎各位参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded our sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.

在Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅面向股东的活动。第一场是5月1日（周五）6 p.m.–9 p.m.的鸡尾酒会。第二场主活动将于5月3日（周日）9 a.m.–4 p.m.举行。周六我们营业至6 p.m.。近年来，我们三天的销售额远超整个12月（珠宝商通常最好的月份）。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末Borsheims将人潮涌动。为方便起见，股东价将自4月27日（周一）起持续至5月9日（周六）。期间请出示你的会议证件或能证明你持有Berkshire的券商对账单以表明股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.

周日，在Borsheims外侧的商场里，来自Dallas的杰出魔术师Norman Beck将让观众目不暇接。此外，我们还邀请到了全球顶尖桥牌高手Bob Hamman与Sharon Osberg，于周日下午与股东切磋桥牌。别跟他们打钱局。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a sophomore at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.

我的朋友Ariel Hsing也将在周日来到商场，接受乒乓球挑战。我在她9岁时就认识她，那时我连一分都拿不到。如今她是Princeton的大二学生，早已在2012年代表美国出战奥运会。如果你不介意“自取其辱”，从下午1点开始可以上前试试身手。Bill Gates和我将率先上阵，尝试“软化”她。

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before); for Piccolo’s, call 402-346-2865. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.

5月3日（周日），Gorat’s与Piccolo’s将再次只对Berkshire股东开放。两家均营业至10 p.m.，其中Gorat’s于1 p.m.开门，Piccolo’s于4 p.m.开门。这两家餐馆是我的最爱，周日晚我会两家都去。请记住：预订Gorat’s请在4月1日（提前不受理）拨打402-551-3733；预订Piccolo’s请拨打402-346-2865。在Piccolo’s请点一份巨大的root beer float作甜点。点小份的只有“胆小鬼”。

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, who retired last year after sixty years at Fortune, but remains the expert on business and financial matters, and who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

今年的问答环节仍由同三位财经记者主持，他们将就股东通过电子邮件提交的问题向Charlie和我提问。三位记者及其邮箱分别是：Carol Loomis，她在Fortune服务六十年后于去年退休，但仍是商业与金融领域的权威，邮箱为 loomisbrk@gmail.com；来自CNBC的Becky Quick，邮箱为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及The New York Times的Andrew Ross Sorkin，邮箱为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

在提交的问题中，每位记者将各自选出六个他们认为最有趣且最重要的问题。记者们告诉我：如果你保持问题简明、避免在最后一刻才发送、确保与Berkshire相关，并且每封邮件不超过两个问题，你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在邮件中，如你希望在提问被采用时提及你的名字，请告知记者。）

We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.

我们还将邀请三位长期关注Berkshire的分析师组成小组。今年的保险领域专家是Dowling & Partners的Gary Ransom；有关我们非保险业务的问题将由Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb的Jonathan Brandt和Morningstar的Gregg Warren提出。我们希望分析师与记者们提出的问题，能帮助股东加深对其投资的理解与认识。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 62 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

Charlie和我不会提前得到任何与问题相关的线索。可以肯定，其中一些会很尖锐——而我们正喜欢这种方式。总体而言，我们预计至少有54个问题：每位分析师和记者各六个，另有18个来自现场观众。（去年总计为62个。）来自观众的提问者将通过11次抽签产生，抽签将在年会当天早上8:15进行。设在主会场与主溢出会场的11个话筒，各自将主持一次“抽签”。

While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders.

既然谈到股东获取信息这件事，我想提醒你：Charlie和我认为，所有股东都应当同时获得Berkshire发布的新信息，并且应当有充足时间进行分析。这就是我们尽量在周五晚或周六一早发布财务数据、以及把年度股东大会安排在周六的原因。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一交流，而是把他们与所有其他股东一视同仁。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We get terrific help at meeting time from literally thousands of Omaha residents and businesses who want you to enjoy yourselves. This year, because we expect record attendance, we have worried about a shortage of hotel rooms. To deal with that possible problem, Airbnb is making a special effort to obtain listings for the period around meeting time and is likely to have a wide array of accommodations to offer. Airbnb’s services may be especially helpful to shareholders who expect to spend only a single night in Omaha and are aware that last year a few hotels required guests to pay for a minimum of three nights. That gets expensive. Those people on a tight budget should check the Airbnb website.

在大会期间，我们得到来自Omaha成千上万居民和企业的极大帮助，他们希望你们玩得尽兴。由于我们预计今年出席人数将创纪录，我们担心酒店房间会短缺。为应对这一潜在问题，Airbnb正特别努力在大会前后期间增加房源，届时很可能会提供种类丰富的住宿选择。Airbnb的服务对那些只计划在Omaha停留一晚、并且知道去年有少数酒店要求至少连住三晚的股东尤其有用。那样会很贵。预算紧张的朋友应当去Airbnb网站看看。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers also to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

基于充分理由，我经常赞扬我们业务经理们的成就。他们真的是AllStars，经营业务就像那是他们家族唯一的资产一样。我相信，我们经理人的心态在大型上市公司中也是最以股东为导向的那一类。我们的大多数经理人并非出于经济需要而工作。把业务打出“全垒打”的喜悦对他们而言与薪水同样重要。

Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 24,100-page Federal income tax return and oversees the filing of 3,400 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.

同样重要的还有与我在公司总部一起工作的24位同事（男女都有）。这个团队高效处理大量SEC及其他监管要求，申报一份长达24,100页的Federal所得税申报，并监督提交3,400份州税申报，回应无数股东与媒体的询问，完成年度报告，筹备全国规模最大的年度股东大会，协调Board的各项活动——等等等等。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.

他们愉快而高效地处理所有这些事务，让我的生活轻松而惬意。他们的工作还超出与Berkshire严格相关的活动：去年，他们对接了40所大学（从200个申请者中遴选），这些学校派学生到Omaha与我进行一天的Q&A。他们还处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的行程，甚至为我的午餐准备汉堡和薯条（当然要浇满Heinz ketchup）。没有哪位CEO比我更幸福；我每天真的都有种“踢踏着舞步去上班”的感觉。

Last year, for the annual report, we dropped our 48-year-old “no pictures” policy – who says I’m not flexible? – and ran a photo of our remarkable home-office crew that was taken at our Christmas lunch. I didn’t warn the gang of the public exposure they were to receive, so they didn’t have on their Sunday best. This year was a different story: On the facing page you will see what our group looks like when they think someone will be noticing. However they dress, their performance is mind-boggling.

去年，为了年度报告，我们打破了延续48年的“no pictures”政策——谁说我不灵活？——刊登了一张我们出色总部团队在Christmas午餐时拍的照片。我事先没有提醒大家他们会“公开亮相”，所以他们并未盛装出席。今年则不同：翻到对页，你会看到当他们自知有人会关注时，我们团队的样子。无论如何着装，他们的表现都令人惊叹。

Come meet them on May 2nd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.

5月2日来见见他们，享受我们的“Woodstock for Capitalists”。

February 27, 2015

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2015-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2015-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

The Year at Berkshire

Intrinsic Business Value

Insurance

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

Finance and Financial Products

Investments

The Annual Meeting

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