2019-05-02 Warren Buffett.Influencers with Andy Serwer

Refer To：《2019-05-02 Warren Buffett.Influencers with Andy Serwer》。

ANDY SERWER: Warren Buffett needs little introduction. He's the godfather of modern-day investing. For nearly 50 years, Buffett has run Berkshire Hathaway, which owns over 60 companies, like Geico and Dairy Queen, plus minority stakes in Apple, Coca-Cola, and many others. His $82.5 billion fortune makes him the third richest person in the world. And he's vowed to give nearly all of it away. The Oracle of Omaha is here to talk about what shaped his investment strategy and how to master today's market.

ANDY SERWER：Warren Buffett 毫无疑问不需要太多介绍。他被称为当代投资的教父。近 50 年来，Buffett 一直管理着 Berkshire Hathaway，这家公司拥有包括 Geico 和 Dairy Queen 在内的 60 多家企业，同时还持有 Apple、Coca-Cola 等众多公司的少数股权。他拥有 825 亿美元的财富，位列全球第三富有的人。他也承诺将几乎全部财富捐出。“奥马哈先知”今天来到这里，谈谈塑造其投资策略的因素，以及如何驾驭当今市场。

I'm Andy Serwer. Welcome to a special edition of "Influencers" from Omaha, Nebraska. It's my pleasure to welcome Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett. Warren, welcome.

我是 Andy Serwer。欢迎收看来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈的特别节目《Influencers》。非常荣幸邀请到 Berkshire Hathaway 的 CEO Warren Buffett。Warren，欢迎你。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks for coming.

WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢邀请。

ANDY SERWER: So let's start off and talk about the economy a little bit. And obviously, we've been on a good long run here.

ANDY SERWER：我们先从经济聊起吧。很显然，最近这段时间我们经历了一段非常不错、也非常长的扩张周期。

WARREN BUFFETT: A very long run.

WARREN BUFFETT：确实很长。

ANDY SERWER: And does that surprise you? And what would be the signs that you would look for to see that things were winding down?

ANDY SERWER：这让你感到惊讶吗？哪些迹象会让你判断经济周期在走向尾声？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I look at a lot of figures just in connection with our businesses. I like to get numbers. So I'm getting reports in weekly in some businesses, but that doesn't tell me what the economy's going to six months from now or three months from now. It tells me what's going on now with our businesses. And it really doesn't make any difference in what I do today in terms of buying stocks or buying businesses what those numbers tell me. They're interesting, but they're not guides to me.

WARREN BUFFETT：我会看很多与我们业务相关的数字。我喜欢拿到数据，所以一些业务每周都会给我报告。但这些并不会告诉我三个月或六个月后的经济状况，它只是在告诉我我们公司当下的运营情况。而且就我今天是否买入股票或企业而言，这些数据并不会改变我的行动。它们有趣，但对我来说不是指导。

If we buy a business, we're going to hold it forever. So we're going to have good years, bad years, in between years, maybe a disastrous year some year. And we care a lot about the price. We do not care about the next 12 months.

如果我们收购一家公司，我们打算永久持有。所以会有好年景、坏年景、普通的年份，某些年份甚至可能很糟。我们非常在意买入价格，但并不在意接下来 12 个月会怎样。

ANDY SERWER: But are you surprised at how long this economy has been expanding?

ANDY SERWER：但你会不会对这轮经济扩张持续这么久感到惊讶？

WARREN BUFFETT: I've been surprised by all kinds of things in the last 10 years about the economy. I don't think there was any economist I've ever read that talked about negative interest rates for long periods of time. If you go back and read Keynes, or you read Samuelson, you read any of them, they do not get into a negative rate environment. I think now there's still $11 trillion that's-- of government debt around the world that's at a negative rate.

WARREN BUFFETT：过去 10 年里，经济方面让我惊讶的事情太多了。我读过的经济学家里，没有人曾预见到长期的负利率。如果你回去读 Keynes，或者读 Samuelson，或其他任何人，他们都没有讨论过负利率的环境。而我认为现在全球仍有大约 11 万亿美元的政府债务处于负利率状态。

So we've never seen it before. And we've never seen, at least the conventional wisdom on it, a sustained period of long and growing deficits while the economy's getting better, extremely low interest rates, and really very little inflation. So something different's happening, but something different happens all the time. And that's one reason economic predictions just don't enter into our decisions.

所以这是前所未见的。我们同样从未见过——至少从传统观念来看——当经济改善的同时，长期且不断扩大的赤字、极低的利率与非常低的通胀共同存在。因此，确实发生了一些不同以往的事情，但世事本就常变。这也是经济预测不会进入我们决策过程的原因之一。

什么样的怪事都有可能出现。

Charlie Munger, my partner, and I, in 54 years now, we've never made a decision based on an economic prediction. We make business predictions about what individual businesses will do over time, and we compare that to what we have to pay for them, but we have never said yes to something because we thought the economy was going to do well in the next year or two years. And we've never said no to anything, because we were right in the middle of a panic even, if the price was right.

Charlie Munger 和我在过去 54 年里，从未基于宏观经济预测做出决策。我们会对具体企业的长期表现作出“商业预测”，并将之与我们需要为其支付的价格进行比较。但我们从未因为认为未来一两年经济会向好而同意某项投资；同样，只要价格合适，即便处在恐慌之中，我们也不会因此而拒绝投资。

ANDY SERWER: All right, so you don't pay much attention to the dismal scientists then, I guess.

ANDY SERWER：好吧，所以我猜你对那些“忧郁的科学家”（经济学家）并不太在意。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I pay none in the sense of as a guideline to doing anything. It's entertainment. It's like going to a variety show or something like that. But I just don't know of any economist that actually has bought businesses successfully or done well in stocks. Paul Samuelson did. And as you may know, he was a big shareholder at Berkshire.

WARREN BUFFETT：确切地说，我不会把它们作为任何行动的指引。它们更像是一种娱乐，就像看一场综艺表演之类的。但我不认识哪位经济学家真正通过买企业或做股票而取得过长期成功。Paul Samuelson 是个例外。你可能知道，他曾是 Berkshire 的重要股东。

But it's-- they make guesses. And there's so many variables. In the hard sciences, you know that if an apple falls from a tree that it isn't going to change over the centuries because of anything or political developments or 400 other variables that go in. But when you get into economics, there's so many variables. And the truth is you've got to expect good times and bad times in business. And if you were to buy an auto dealership wherever you live locally or a McDonald's franchise or anything like that, you wouldn't try and time the purchase. You'd try and make the right purchase at the right price, and you'd want to be sure you got a good business, but you wouldn't say, I'm going to buy it because growth this year is going to be 3% instead of 2.8% or something of the sort.

但归根结底，很多只是猜测，而且变量太多。自然科学里，你知道苹果从树上落下的规律不会因几个世纪里出现的任何事情、政治变迁或上百个变量而改变。但到了经济学，变量无穷无尽。事实是，商业里总会有好时光和坏时光。假如你在本地买一家汽车经销店，或获得一家 McDonald's 的特许经营权，或类似生意，你不会去“择时”购买；你会在合适的价格买对的生意，并确保这是一家好企业，但你不会因为“今年增速可能是 3% 而不是 2.8%”这种理由去决定是否买入。

ANDY SERWER: Fair enough. You have over $100 billion of cash at Berkshire.

ANDY SERWER：说得通。Berkshire 账上有超过 1000 亿美元的现金。

WARREN BUFFETT: Berkshire does.

WARREN BUFFETT：是 Berkshire 有。

ANDY SERWER: Berkshire. Not you. Well, I'm gonna see how much you got.

ANDY SERWER：是 Berkshire，不是你本人。嗯，我也想看看你有多少。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah! [LAUGHS]

WARREN BUFFETT：哈哈！[LAUGHS]

ANDY SERWER: Maybe you do! Berkshire has over $100 billion in cash. And you say that you always want this company to be a fortress. So how much cash should an ordinary investor have on a percentage basis, do you think?

ANDY SERWER：也许你也有！Berkshire 拥有超过 1000 亿美元现金。你说过你希望公司始终像一座堡垒。那你认为普通投资者应该按比例持有多少现金？

WARREN BUFFETT: It depends on their personal situation. If you're working in something where you're living off your paycheck from week to week, you want to have a little cash around, and you certainly don't want have a credit card that's maxed out or anything like that. But if your house is paid off, if you don't have big living expenses, you got a portfolio of decent diversified businesses, you don't really need any cash.

WARREN BUFFETT：这取决于个人情况。如果你的工作让你需要靠每周的薪水维持生活，你就应该手头留一点现金，而且绝对不要把信用卡刷爆之类的。可如果你的房子已经还清、生活开支不大、持有一篮子不错且分散的企业，你其实并不需要现金。

ANDY SERWER: So you can be more cash-free than Berkshire is.

ANDY SERWER：所以你可以比 Berkshire 更“不持有现金”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, I've got responsibil-- we've got insurance claims. We could have hurricanes that would happen, all kinds of things, where you might have to pay out billions of dollars. And I've got over a million people that own shares that are counting on me to run the place, so we get through periods like that.

WARREN BUFFETT：对。对，我有责任——我们有保险赔付。可能会发生飓风之类的各种事情，我们需要赔付数十亿美元。我还有一百多万名股东指望我来经营这家公司，确保我们能熬过那样的时期。

But if I were retired, I had a-- say, a million dollar portfolio of stocks that was paying me $30,000 a year in dividends or something of the sort, and my children were grown, the house was paid off and everything, I wouldn't worry too much about having a lot of cash around.

可如果我退休了，手里有——比如——价值 100 万美元的股票组合，每年给我 3 万美元股息之类的，孩子都已长大、房子也还清了，那我就不会太担心要留很多现金在手。

ANDY SERWER: Let's talk a little bit about Apple. Everyone always wants to talk about Apple, right? It's kind of the it stock, it company. You have a $45 billion stake, more or less. How closely do you follow the company? People are concerned they haven't really introduced any new products.

ANDY SERWER：我们聊聊 Apple。大家总是想谈 Apple，对吧？它像是“那只”股票、“那家公司”。你大约持有 450 亿美元的股份。你对这家公司跟得有多紧？有人担心他们并没有真正推出新产品。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you have to closely follow a company, you shouldn't own it.

WARREN BUFFETT：如果一家公司需要你“紧盯”着，说明你不该持有它。

ANDY SERWER: Really?

ANDY SERWER：真的？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. If you buy a business-- if you buy a farm, do you go up and look every couple of weeks to see how far the corn is up? And do you worry too much about whether somebody says this is going to be a year of low prices because exports are being affected or anything like that? You buy a farm, and you hold it for-- I've got one farm that I bought in the 1980s. And my son runs it. But I've been there once. It doesn't grow faster if I go and stare at it. I can't cheer for it, more effort, more effort, or something like that. And I know there's going to be some years when prices are going to be good and some when the prices aren't going to be good. I know there's years when yields will be better than others. But I bought the farm.

WARREN BUFFETT：不。你买下一门生意——比如你买了一个农场，你会每隔几周就跑去看玉米长了多高吗？你会不会为某人说“因为出口受影响，今年价格会低”之类的话而过度担心？你买了农场，然后长期持有——我在 20 世纪 80 年代买过一个农场，我儿子在经营它，但我只去过一次。我盯着它看也不会让它长得更快。我也不能给它加油，“更努力、更努力”之类的。我知道有些年份价格会好，有些年份价格不会好；我也知道有些年份产量会更高。但我已经买下了那个农场。

And it just doesn't-- I don't care about economic predictions or anything of the sort. I do care that over the years it's well tended to in terms of rotating crops. And I hope yields get better, which they generally have. In fact, that farm 100 years ago would have probably produced 30 bushels, maybe 35 bushels of corn per acre. Now on a good year, it'd be 200. We've really made progress in this country. That's one reason commodity prices, go back a couple hundred years, they've moved so little is because we've just gotten better and better at whether it's cotton or whether it's corn or soybeans or all kinds of things. And you and I have benefited from that.

而且这与——我不在乎经济预测或类似的东西。我在乎的是，多年下来它是否被好好管理，比如轮作。我希望产量提升，而总体上确实如此。事实上，100 年前那个农场一英亩也许只能产 30 蒲式耳、或许 35 蒲式耳玉米，而现在遇到好年景可以达到 200。我们国家确实取得了进步。这也是为什么把时间拉回两三百年，大宗商品价格波动并不大的原因之一——因为无论是棉花、玉米还是大豆、以及各种作物，我们的生产效率越来越高。你我都从中受益。

ANDY SERWER: And so Apple's kind of like a farm.

ANDY SERWER：所以 Apple 有点像农场。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it's a long-term investment. If you owned the best auto dealership in town, the best brand, and had somebody good running it, you wouldn't drop by every day and say, you know, how many people have come in today? Or, I think, interest rates are going up a little. Maybe we ought to slow down our sales.

WARREN BUFFETT：更确切地说，它是一项长期投资。如果你在本地拥有最好的汽车经销店、最好的品牌，还有能干的人在经营，你不会每天都跑去问“今天来了多少人？”或者说“我觉得利率要涨一点了，我们也许应该放慢销售”。

No, you buy it knowing there's 365 days a year. You're going to own it for 20 years. So that's 7,300 days. Things are going to be different from day to day and year to year. You shouldn't buy it if the day-to-day stuff is important.

不，你买它的时候就该知道一年有 365 天，你会持有 20 年，那就是 7300 天。每天、每年情况都会不同。如果你在乎的是每天的波动，那你就不该买它。

ANDY SERWER: Let's switch over to talk about buybacks, which is another hot topic these days. And you did a fair amount. If you look in the annual report, you can see that between December 13 and 24, it looks like you guys bought back about $233 million worth of Berkshire, which was right near that particular stock market bottom. How did you know that? What was going through your mind?

ANDY SERWER：我们换个话题聊回购，这也是当下的热门话题。你们也做了不少。如果看年报，可以看到 12 月 13 日到 24 日之间，你们似乎回购了大约 2.33 亿美元的 Berkshire 股票，恰好接近那一波股市的底部。你是怎么判断的？当时你在想什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: If I knew, I'd had bought a lot more than 200. That's not a big purchase for us, actually. We will buy Berkshire when we have lots of excess cash, all the needs of the business are taken care of. We spent $14 billion on property, plant, and equipment last year, way more than depreciation.

WARREN BUFFETT：要是我真知道，我会买远不止 2 亿多。实际上，那对我们来说不算大的买入。我们会在有大量剩余现金、且所有业务需求都被满足之后回购 Berkshire。去年我们在固定资产上的投入是 140 亿美元，远高于折旧。

So we take care of the needs of the business, then we have excess cash. We'd love to do is find other businesses to buy, but if I think the stock and my partner, Charlie Munger, think the stock is selling below intrinsic business value, we will buy in stock.

所以我们先满足业务需要，然后才会有剩余现金。我们更愿意去收购其他企业，但如果我和我的合伙人 Charlie Munger 认为公司股价低于其内在商业价值，我们就会回购股票。

ANDY SEWER: So it obviously was at that point?

ANDY SEWER：所以当时显然就是那样的判断？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we thought so, yeah. But what's really intriguing is when it goes down a lot. I mean, when you're buying dollar bills for $0.60 or $0.70, which, periodically, you get a chance to do it in stocks, then yeah, assuming you've the cash, whenever it gets so that some surprise could really take you out in some way. But if we've got excess cash, we'll buy it as fast as we can.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们当时就是那么认为的。真正让人兴奋的是价格大幅下跌的时候。也就是说，当你能用 0.60 或 0.70 美元买到 1 美元的东西——而在股市里你会周期性地遇到这种机会——前提是你手上有现金，且这些意外不会把你击倒。但如果我们有多余的现金，我们会尽可能快地买入。

ANDY SEWER: At that point, it'll be more like a 2009 rather than just December of this pay season?

ANDY SEWER：在那种情况下，更像是 2009 年的情形，而不仅仅是这个发薪季的 12 月，对吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, exactly. If you and I own a McDonald's franchise together, and it's worth a million dollars, and you own 50% of it, and you come to me and you say, I'll sell out for $400,000, I'll buy you out.

WARREN BUFFETT：对，正是如此。就像你我共同拥有一家 McDonald's 的特许经营店，价值 100 万美元，而你持有 50%。如果你来对我说，40 万美元就把你那一半卖给我，我会把你那部分买下来。

ANDY SEWER: In my mind, I'd be wary of that for just that reason.

ANDY SEWER：从我的角度，我恰恰会因为这个原因而保持警惕。

WARREN BUFFETT: You should be, yeah. If you want $600,000, you'll say come back tomorrow.

WARREN BUFFETT：你应该警惕，没错。如果你想要 60 万美元，你会说“明天再来”。

ANDY SEWER: So just continuing about buybacks, Senator Schumers and Sanders want the government to weigh in to sort of legislate when companies can do buybacks. And then also, there was a report recently about executives doing insider trading, it appears, around the times of buyback. So are buybacks kind of a problem?

ANDY SEWER：继续聊回购。参议员 Schumers 和 Sanders 希望政府介入，通过立法来规定公司何时可以回购。另外，最近还有报告称，高管似乎会在公司回购前后进行内幕交易。那么，回购算不算一种问题？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you'll have some people that misbehave irrespective of any activity. That really wouldn't have much to do with buybacks. I think, buybacks, the degree to which they've been part of nefarious activity that I've observed and put a lot of years in are very close to zero. But that just may be that there aren't enough opportunities.

WARREN BUFFETT：其实无论进行什么活动，总会有人行为不端。这和回购本身关系不大。以我多年观察，回购涉及不法行为的程度几乎接近于零。当然，也可能是因为“机会”并不多。

But that article did not-- I didn't follow the conclusion on it. You're distributing money to shareholders, essentially. You can do it by dividends and presumably, American business should distribute money to its owners occasionally. We do it through buybacks. We've done some, and we don't do it through dividends.

但那篇文章——我并不认同它的结论。说到底，你是在向股东分配资金。你可以通过分红来做——按理说，美国企业应该不时向所有者分配资金。我们是通过回购来做的。我们做过一些回购，但不通过分红。

But most companies do it through having a dividend policy. And then if they have money beyond the needs of the business, then, I think, if their stock is underpriced, then it makes nothing but sense.

但大多数公司会采用分红政策。如果他们有超出业务需要的资金，那么在我看来，如果其股票被低估，进行回购完全说得通。

ANDY SEWER: Should the government tell companies when to do it or, at least, mandate conditions where they can?

ANDY SEWER：政府是否应该告诉公司何时可以回购，或者至少强制规定一些可以回购的条件？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they do restrict you a little in terms of some general rule of the SEC, if you're having some kind of-- this isn't quite the right word, but-- manipulative activity or anything like that in the stock. But no, I don't think the government should decide your dividend policy. I don't even think they should direct your capital investments.

WARREN BUFFETT：确实有一些 SEC 的一般性规则会对你做出一些限制，比如当你在股票上进行某种——这词未必准确——操纵性的活动时。但总体上，我并不认为政府应该决定你的分红政策。我甚至认为他们也不应该主导你的资本投资。

They can make it enticing to make certain kinds of capital investments, which they do with renewable energy, for example. I mean, the government has interest in fostering certain developments in this country over time. There used to be a special oil depletion allowance 50 years ago and so on.

他们可以通过激励来鼓励某些类型的资本投资，比如在可再生能源领域就是这么做的。换言之，政府确实有意推动本国某些长期发展。50 年前还有针对石油的特殊枯竭补贴等等。

That was more politics than it was governmental policy. But certainly, renewables are a prime example of that. But the idea of directing whether you are entitled to return cash to shareholders and the manner in which you do it, I don't think, really makes a lot of sense.

那种做法更多是政治而非纯粹的政府政策。当然，可再生能源就是一个典型例子。但至于要不要向股东返还现金、以及以何种方式返还由政府来指挥，我觉得并不太有道理。

ANDY SEWER: The 2020 election is going to be upon us before we know it. And I know that you had some nice things to say about Mike Bloomberg, but it appears he is not going to be running now.

ANDY SEWER：转眼 2020 年大选就要到来。我知道你对 Mike Bloomberg 有过不少正面评价，但看起来他现在并不会参选了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it's hard to win with just the billionaire vote.

WARREN BUFFETT：是啊，只靠亿万富翁的选票很难赢。

[LAUGHTER]

ANDY SEWER: He'll have your vote and a few others. That's funny.

ANDY SEWER：他会有你的选票，再加上少数几张。真有意思。

WARREN BUFFETT: But I admire him enormously. I wish he had run. I want to be very clear on that.

WARREN BUFFETT：但我非常钦佩他。我确实希望他参选——这一点我想表达得非常清楚。

ANDY SEWER: President Trump was a business executive. So two questions. Is a business executive the right kind of person to be president? And what characteristics do you look for for a president that you would support?

ANDY SEWER：President Trump 出身商业高管。我有两个问题：商业高管是否适合当总统？另外，你支持的总统应具备哪些特质？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think a business executive can be the right person. But I don't think that because they're a business executive that you give them extra points. Number one, I want a president that wakes up every morning and realizes that the greatest threat to a country which has got all kinds of things going for it are weapons of mass destruction, and that we live in a world where people, organizations, and, occasionally, countries could have people that would like to wipe out a large percentage of the American people or maybe other countries as well.

WARREN BUFFETT：我认为商业高管当然可以成为合适的人选。但不能因为他是商业高管就给他“加分”。首先，我希望总统每天醒来都能意识到：对于一个各方面优势显著的国家而言，最大的威胁是大规模杀伤性武器。我们生活在这样一个世界里：个人、组织，乃至偶尔一些国家，可能会有人想要消灭美国相当比例的人口，或其他国家的人口。

And that you now have capabilities, which I always thought, until recently, I'd classify as nuclear, chemical, and biological. But I think, you have to add cyber now. If you have some evil genius someplace that, for crazy reasons, just like what happened with anthrax back-- who knows what motivates somebody that starts sending anthrax in letters-- if you have somebody that thinks it'd be great to send a false alarm to the Russians and to the US that the other side was launching or something of the sort-- it's a very, very dangerous world.

而且当下存在的能力——我过去一直把它们归为核、化学和生物——现在我认为必须再加上“网络”。如果某个地方有个心怀恶念的天才，出于疯狂的理由，类似当年炭疽邮件事件——谁知道是什么动机让人往信件里投放炭疽——或者有人觉得给俄罗斯和美国同时发出“对方已发射”的假警报是件“了不起”的事——我们所处的世界就极其危险。

It's a wonderful world, but it has dangers now that started in August of 1945 when Einstein said, you know, this changes everything in the world, except how men think. So I want a president that has that same fella that all of these other things are important. But protecting the country and reducing the chance of successful use of weapons of mass destruction against us is the number one job. And I think most of the presidents-- I've talked to a couple of them about it over the years, and I really think that they do realize it. They may get lost in the events of every day as they go along.

这是一个美好的世界，但自 1945 年 8 月以来，它也潜藏着新的危险。Einstein 说过，那一刻改变了世界上的一切，除了人的思维方式。所以我希望总统具备同样的认识：其他事情都很重要，但保护国家、降低大规模杀伤性武器对我们成功使用的概率，是头号任务。我相信多数总统——这些年我和其中几位谈过此事——他们真的意识到了这一点。尽管在日常纷繁事务中，他们可能会时而迷失。

And then beyond that, I want a president that has two objectives with the economy. One is to make sure that this marvelous goose we have keeps laying more golden eggs. And then I want a president that also feels that if GDP is $60,000 per capita in the United States, that nobody should get left behind. We've got a market system that works marvelously in turning out more goods and services, better ones year after year, done it all through my life.

除此之外，在经济方面我希望总统有两个目标：第一，确保这只非凡的“鹅”能够持续下金蛋；第二，我希望总统也认为，在美国人均 GDP 达到 6 万美元的情况下，不应让任何人被落下。我们的市场体系在不断产出更多、更优质的商品与服务方面表现卓越，贯穿了我的一生。

ANDY SEWER: Would you ever talk to a candidate and say, hey, what do you think about these three things?

ANDY SEWER：你会不会跟某位候选人直接交流，比如说，“嗨，这三件事你怎么看？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they'll tell me what I want to hear in most cases. So I want to hear what they tell people who disagree with them on the subject. I always like to ask a candidate-- they usually finesse me somewhere-- but I say, what are you for that the majority of your followers are against? I know you really believe in that, and that's really the test. But I'm not sure that, except under some kind of sodium pentothal or something you're gonna get a great answer to that question.

WARREN BUFFETT：多数情况下，他们会说我想听的话。所以我更想听的是他们会如何对持不同意见的人表述。我总爱问候选人一个问题——他们通常会某种方式回避——我会说，“有哪些你支持、但你的大多数追随者反对的立场？”我知道你真的相信那个，这才是真正的考验。但我并不确定，除非打了类似硫喷妥钠之类的“吐真剂”，否则你能从这个问题里得到多好的答案。

真的相信。

ANDY SEWER: That's great that that's the question you ask the presidential candidates or presidents that you would speak to.

ANDY SEWER：太有意思了——这就是你会问总统候选人，甚至在任总统的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: If I really want to get-- and that's why Bernie Sanders was so successful. 90% of the people who voted for Bernie Sanders had probably not heard of him two years earlier. They felt they knew exactly what he would do. They felt he was authentic. And if you asked him what he was for that most people might be against, he would tell you.

WARREN BUFFETT：如果我真的想弄清——这也是为什么 Bernie Sanders 那么成功。投票给 Bernie Sanders 的人里，可能有 90% 在两年前还没听说过他。他们觉得自己完全知道他会做什么，认为他很真诚。如果你问他支持哪些大多数人可能反对的事情，他会直接告诉你。

ANDY SEWER: A few questions about Kraft Heinz. Was that a mistake?

ANDY SEWER：聊聊 Kraft Heinz。那是个错误吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: We'll find out over time. But we did pay too much, in my view, for Kraft. We didn't pay too much for Heinz.

WARREN BUFFETT：时间会给出答案。但在我看来，我们为 Kraft 付得太多了。至于 Heinz，我们并没有付多。

So when we started out, it was originally a non-public partnership between us. And we did pay too much, in my view, for Kraft. There's not much you can do about things if you pay too much.

一开始，这本来是我们之间的非公开合伙。在我看来，我们确实为 Kraft 付得太多了。一旦付多了，很多事就无能为力。

And secondly, there's always been a struggle between the retailer and brands. If I've got a terribly weak brand, and I want to get into Walmart, I'm not to be able to do it. I'd have to offer all kinds of crazy concessions, you know? And I want to be in Walmart if I have some sort of consumer-packaged goods.

其次，零售商与品牌之间一直在博弈。如果我有一个非常弱的品牌，却想打入 Walmart，我基本做不到。你懂的——我得提出各种离谱的让步。而如果我做的是消费品，我当然想进 Walmart。

The negotiation is way different if you have something essential versus nonessential. 10 years ago, Costco tried to get rid of Coca-Cola. Costco's got terrific loyalty among customers, and their own Kirkland brand is a $39 billion brand now. And it moves from category to category, and they only started in 1992.

当你卖的是必需品还是非必需品，谈判完全不同。10 年前，Costco 试着下架 Coca-Cola。Costco 在顾客中有极强的忠诚度，他们自有的 Kirkland 品牌如今已是 390 亿美元级别，并且能在不同品类间迁移，而他们也才从 1992 年开始做。

So they know brands. But in the end, they put Coca-Cola back in. If had been Royal Crown Cola, they wouldn't have had to put it back in. So there's always that struggle between the brands, and there always will be. But the retailers net has been moving in their direction, particularly, I think, because of the Amazon revolution.

所以他们懂品牌。但最终他们还是把 Coca-Cola 上架了。要是 Royal Crown Cola，就不必非得上回来了。品牌之间的这种拉锯一直存在，也会一直存在。但总体上，零售商的优势在增强，尤其在我看来，Amazon 的革命推动了这种趋势。

ANDY SEWER: First Walmart, and then--

ANDY SEWER：先是 Walmart，然后——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Walmart. But it's been accentuated, I think. We have a new retailing environment now. It isn't like it goes from night to day, but it moves somewhat. And brands that people spent billions of dollars developing and sponsoring TV shows or sponsoring radio shows in the old days-- Campbell's soup was always on there with Jack Benny or something when I was a kid, and it was big.

WARREN BUFFETT：对，Walmart。但我觉得这种趋势被进一步放大了。我们现在处在一个新的零售环境中。它不是一夜之间天翻地覆，但确实在变化。过去人们花数十亿美元打造品牌、赞助电视节目或广播节目——我小的时候，Campbell's soup 经常出现在 Jack Benny 的节目里之类，那影响可大了。

And adult brands, and people obviously like the product, too. But people are more willing to change, and it's a somewhat different world than what-- it is night and day. You're very unlikely to keep changing brands everyday. But it really surprised me that Gillette lost position. Men don't like to experiment much. Women are better at experimenting.

还有面向成年人的品牌，而且人们显然也喜欢这些产品。但如今大家更愿意改变偏好，世界与以往相比在某种程度上不同——并不是天翻地覆。你不太可能每天都换品牌。但让我吃惊的是 Gillette 的地位下滑。男性并不喜欢尝试，女性在尝试方面更积极。

When you were a kid, Gillette cavalcade of sports was your pal, and brought you the Rose Bowl and the World Series, and all that sort of thing. You just shaved with Gillette the rest of your life. And you still do to a great degree. But it's not exactly the same as it was, even five years ago or so, when we bought Kraft.

你小时候，Gillette 的体育转播就是你的伙伴——给你带来 Rose Bowl、World Series 之类。然后你这辈子就用 Gillette 刮胡子。到今天很大程度上依然如此。但情况已不完全相同了——甚至和大约五年前我们买 Kraft 时相比都不同。

ANDY SEWER: You mentioned Amazon as a game-changer. And I have to ask you, you haven't bought the stock. You're an admirer of Jeff Bezos. A listing of the richest people in America came out. He's number one. I think, your friend, Bill Gates, is number two. You're number three.

ANDY SEWER：你提到 Amazon 是规则改变者。我必须问一句：你并没有买它的股票。你很钦佩 Jeff Bezos。最新的美国富豪榜出来了，他是第一。我想你的朋友 Bill Gates 是第二，你是第三。

So you can see what he's done in myriad ways. And, of course, the question is, how come you haven't bought Amazon? Is there still time to buy? Would you still buy?

所以你能从无数方面看到他的成就。当然，问题是：为什么你没有买 Amazon？现在还来得及买吗？你会不会买？

WARREN BUFFETT: I always admired Jeff. I met him 20 years ago or so, and I thought he was something special. But I didn't realize you could go from books to what's happened there. He had a vision and executed it in an incredible way-- something that would not have--

WARREN BUFFETT：我一直很钦佩 Jeff。大约 20 年前我见过他，我觉得他很不一般。但我没有意识到你能从卖书走到今天这样的局面。他有远见，而且以令人难以置信的方式把愿景落实了——这是在当时难以——

But there's a lot of games I've missed. I would've missed Microsoft, even if I'd gotten to know Bill earlier or something. Those just aren't my games. I don't worry about the things that I miss that are outside my circle of competence of evaluating.

不过我错过的“赛局”很多。即便更早认识 Bill，我也会错过 Microsoft。那些本就不在我的赛道里。我不会为圈外的错过而烦恼——那些超出我评估能力圈的东西。

I have missed things that were within my circle, and that's a terrible mistake. Those are my biggest mistakes. You haven't seen them. It's not a mistake because I missed Netscape or something like that at all. I would say that maybe 5% of the companies or 10% of the companies, at most, are within an area of my circle of competence, there's something I should be able to understand.

我也错过过在我能力圈之内的东西，那才是严重的错误——那些才是我最大的错误。你们没看到而已。错过 Netscape 之类完全不算错。我会说，最多也就 5%—10% 的公司落在我的能力圈范围内，是我应该能看懂的东西。

ANDY SEWER: All right, well let me switch gears then and ask you about leverage a little bit. Corporate debt people are concerned about, people are concerned about federal debt at $22 trillion dollars. Should we reduce, let's just say, the federal debt and how would we do that?

ANDY SEWER：好，那我换个话题，谈一点关于杠杆的问题。大家担心公司债务，也担心联邦债务已经达到 22 万亿美元。我们是否应该减少——就说联邦债务吧——以及我们该如何做到？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you're running a deficit getting close to 5% when things are really good, that's a new world. Neither the Republicans or Democrats are particularly concerned about it, and we're not having a lot of inflation.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，如果在形势非常好的时候，财政赤字仍接近 5%，那就是一个全新的世界。共和党和民主党都不怎么在意，而且我们也没有出现高通胀。

That wasn't supposed to happen, but it's happening. That's why I say, you don't want to get hung up on trying to make economic analysis, because nobody is any good at-- you don't get rich doing that. If you look at-- you mentioned that Forbes list, if you get out the list, the number of people that have done that by economic analysis, I think, are just about zilch on there.

这本不该发生，但它确实在发生。这就是我说不要执着于宏观经济分析的原因，因为没人擅长——靠这个也发不了财。你看你提到的《Forbes》榜单，翻开看看，有多少人是靠宏观经济分析致富的？我认为几乎一个都没有。

ANDY SEWER: OK, fair enough. Income inequality, wealth inequality-- you've talked about the Earned Income Tax Credit. Is there more to it than that? Should we adjust tax policy? It seems to be going the other way right now.

ANDY SEWER：好，有道理。关于收入不平等、财富不平等——你谈过 Earned Income Tax Credit（劳动所得税收抵免）。除此之外还有别的手段吗？我们是否应该调整税制？现在看起来方向有点相反。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it was going the other way. But I think, the Earned Income Tax Credit is the best way to put money in the pockets of people that don't fit well into the market system, but that are perfectly decent citizens and that have made a good bit of the success, something like I've had with Berkshire or something possible. It wouldn't have happened without the America we have.

WARREN BUFFETT：确实，方向曾经是相反的。但我认为，Earned Income Tax Credit 是把钱放进那些不太适应市场体系、却完全正派、并为像我在 Berkshire 那样的成功作出贡献的公民口袋里的最佳方式。没有当下这个美国，这些成功也不会发生。

And if you go back 200 years, and 80% of us are working on farms, the person that's the best at that-- working on that farm, whoever it may be-- is worth maybe twice the ones that's the worst. I mean, that's the difference between super-talent and no talent in the farm economy-- picking cotton or whatever it may be.

如果把时间倒回 200 年前，80% 的人从事农耕，干得最好的人——不管是谁——也不过比最差的价值高出一倍左右。也就是说，在农业经济里（比如采棉花或其他活计），超级能手与不太能干的人之间的差距也就这么大。

Now, if you're the best middleweight fighter in the world, you may get $20 or $30 million. And if you are just a good citizen, raised nice kids, helping the neighborhood and everything else, but you don't have market-related skills, you'd be good on that farm still. And you would be earning something comparable to most of the people around you.

而现在，如果你是世界上最顶尖的中量级拳手，你可能拿到 2000 万或 3000 万美元。可如果你只是一个好公民，养育了优秀的孩子、帮助社区、做好各种事，但缺乏与市场直接相关的技能，你在当年的农场仍然会是个好手，你的收入也会与周围大多数人相差无几。

But you don't have something out as it gets more and more specialized. And it's going to continue to get more specialized. You want two things for that person. You want them to have a decent life. They live in a country with $60,000 of GDP per person. You want them to have a decent life, and they can.

但随着分工日益专业化，你就会缺失一些与市场对接的能力，而这种专业化还会继续加深。对于这样的人，我们需要做到两点：第一，让他们过上体面的生活。毕竟他们生活在一个人均 GDP 6 万美元的国家；我们希望他们过得体面，这是可以做到的。

I also think you want them to have a feeling of accomplishment. So you want them to have a job, assuming that they're not handicapped in some way. You want them to have a job. But the minimum wage would be one way to say, well, we'll make sure that they have enough in their pocket. But that's got a lot of effects in disturbing the market system.

我也认为应让他们拥有成就感。所以，假设他们并无残障，你希望他们有一份工作。最低工资是一种办法，意思是确保他们口袋里有足够的钱。但那会对市场体系造成不少扭曲。

They just need more cash. They don't need a higher wage. They need more cash in their pocket. And the government, at relatively low cost, can provide a decent living for any that's living, that's working 40 hours a week and has a couple of children.

他们需要的是更多现金，而不是更高的名义工资。他们需要口袋里有更多现金。政府可以以相对较低的成本，为那些每周工作 40 小时、养育两个孩子的家庭提供体面的生活。

And we've gone in that direction, and it's sort of bipartisan. And I find both Republicans and Democrats for it. I think it would be better not to have one annual payment, that they get it monthly.

我们已经在朝这个方向前进，这在某种程度上是两党共识。我发现共和党和民主党都支持。我认为与其一年发一次，不如按月发放更好。

I think there are various things you could do. But you want them to feel part of the system, and as more and more of these golden eggs are laid, you want them to get a little bit more of their share.

我认为还可以做许多配套的事。但核心是让他们觉得自己是体系的一部分；当“金蛋”越来越多时，他们也应多分得一份。

ANDY SEWER: I mean, if we don't do that, and the Democrats win, it's possible we get big taxes on wealthy people, free college for all. And those are bigger plans.

ANDY SEWER：我的意思是，如果我们不这么做，而民主党赢了，可能会对富人开征高额税负、为所有人提供免费大学教育。这些都是更“大”的方案。

WARREN BUFFETT: You want more money in the pockets of everybody that's willing to work or is unable to work. And we can do it. A rich family would do that. If I had six or seven kids, and I had some business I wanted to pass on, you'd pick the most able person to run it, because that's the market system to do that. But you'd make sure that all seven of the family participated.

WARREN BUFFETT：你要做的是让每个愿意工作或无法工作的人的口袋里都有更多钱，而这是可行的。一个富裕的家庭就会这么做。假如我有六七个孩子，还有一项业务要传承，你会选最有能力的那位来经营——这是市场体系的选择。但你也会确保家里七个孩子都能参与、都受益。

You might give more to the one that kept producing the golden egg. You would. But you wouldn't just say to the one at the lowest end, who might be the best kid of all in most respects-- he's the one that shares with everybody and does all kinds of that-- you wouldn't say to him or her, too bad. That's just the way the market system works. Have your spouse get a job and look for housing someplace.

你或许会把更多给那位持续下“金蛋”的孩子——那是应该的。但你不会对处在底端、却在很多方面也许是最好的那个孩子——乐于分享、乐于助人的那位——说“很遗憾，这就是市场体系的运作。让你的配偶去找份工作，自己去别处找住处吧。”

ANDY SEWER: Right. Why don't we do an update about the Health Care Initiative, which now, the company has a name-- Haven. Was that your idea?

ANDY SEWER：好的。我们来更新一下这项医疗保健计划的进展，现在这家公司已经有了名字——Haven。这个名字是你起的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I didn't worry about a name. We could've gone on as a no-name operation for 10 years, as far as I'm concerned. We've got a wonderful partnership in the sense that it's large and has reasonable market muscle, with more than a million employees among the three of us.

WARREN BUFFETT：不是。我并不在意名字。就我个人来说，即使没有名字，我们也可以运营 10 年。我们的合作非常棒——规模大，也有一定的市场影响力，我们三家合计有超过一百万名员工。

We've got three CEOs that can make things get done and organizations that so are so big that normally, they wouldn't get very bureaucratic. If you tried to do this with many big companies, you'd have legal weighing in and public relations weighing in. We don't have any of that stuff.

我们有三位能够把事情推进的 CEO，还有各自庞大的组织，但通常并不会变得过度官僚化。换成其他很多大公司来做，法务、公关都会层层介入。我们没有这些掣肘。

They may have them in certain areas, but Jamie hasn't got to worry about doing that sort of thing and neither does Jeff. So we've got a unity of commitment and an ability to execute on the commitment. The only problem is, you've got a $3.4 trillion dollar industry, which is as much as the federal government raises every year, that, basically, feels pretty good about the system.

在某些领域他们或许也有这些部门，但 Jamie 不必为这些操心，Jeff 也不必。所以我们在承诺上高度一致，并且有能力把承诺落地。唯一的问题是，这是一项 3.4 万亿美元的产业，规模与联邦政府每年的财政收入相当，而行业整体对现有体系基本上感觉良好。

As we went around talking to people to find a leader for the group, for example, everybody says, the system, it turns out very good medicine. But you can't go from 5% of GDP to 18% without really making you less competitive, among other things, in the world. So everybody thought the system needed some adjustment, just not their part of the system. And that's very human. I'd do the same thing, I'm sure, if I was in the same place.

举例说，当我们四处沟通、为该项目寻找领导者时，大家都会说，这个体系确实产出了很好的医疗服务。但医疗占 GDP 的比重从 5% 涨到 18%，怎么都会让美国在全球的竞争力下降等方面付出代价。所以人人都觉得体系需要调整，只是“别调整到他们负责的那一部分”。这很人性化。换了我处在相同位置，八成也会这么想。

So there's enormous resistance to change, while a similar acknowledgment the change will be needed. And, of course, if the private sector doesn't supply that over a period of time, people will say, then, we give up. We've got to turn this over to government, which will probably be even worse.

因此，一方面大家承认需要变革，另一方面又对变革有巨大的抵触。更何况，如果私营部门长期无法拿出方案，最终人们会说“那就交给政府吧”，而这很可能更糟。

ANDY SEWER: How often do you talk to Jamie and Jeff about it? I know Todd Combs, I think, is your point person.

ANDY SEWER：你多长时间会就此事和 Jamie、Jeff 沟通一次？我知道 Todd Combs 应该是你这边负责对接的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Todd really does all the work. If this works, give Todd 100% of the credit from the Berkshire standpoint.

WARREN BUFFETT：Todd 基本承担了全部工作。如果这件事成功了，从 Berkshire 的角度看，100% 的功劳该归于 Todd。

ANDY SEWER: Does Haven have to buy companies to gain expertise? What do you--

ANDY SEWER：Haven 是否需要通过收购公司来获取专业能力？你的意思是——

WARREN BUFFETT: No.

WARREN BUFFETT：不需要。

ANDY SEWER: What is the plan?

ANDY SEWER：那计划是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: The plan is to support a very, very, very good thinker on this subject, who is a practicing physician and who commands the respect of the medical community, to, in effect, figure out some way, so that we can deliver even better care and have people feel better about their care, too. They have to perceive that they're receiving better care over time and stop the march upward of costs relative to the country's output.

WARREN BUFFETT：计划是支持一位在这个领域“非常非常非常”出色的思想者——他是一线执业医师，并且在医学界备受尊重。核心目标是找到路径，让我们能够提供更优质的医疗服务，同时让患者真正感觉到自己得到的照护在持续改善，并且逐步遏制医疗成本相对于国家产出的持续攀升。

We've got this incredible economic machine, but we shouldn't be spending 18% when other countries are doing something pretty comparable in terms of doctors per capita, hospital beds per capita, and all that. The very top stuff in medicine, I think, is very much concentrated in this country, and that's great.

我们拥有极其强大的经济引擎，但当其他国家在人均医生数量、每千人病床数等指标上与我们相当时，我们不应还要花到 18%。顶尖的医学资源在我看来高度集中在美国，这非常了不起。

I want us to be the leader, but I think we're paying a price. If we're paying seven extra points of GDP, that's $1.4 trillion a year.

我希望美国继续引领世界，但我们为此付出了代价。如果我们多花了 7 个百分点的 GDP，那就是每年 1.4 万亿美元。

ANDY SEWER: Is the administration focusing-- by focusing on drug prices, is that sort of a rabbit hole? Is that missing the bigger picture?

ANDY SEWER：政府把焦点放在药价上，算不算“钻牛角尖”？是不是忽略了更大的图景？

WARREN BUFFETT: They're trying. And Congress, generally-- I mean, you talk to the average congressmen-- they regard it as a problem. And they see specific instances of drug prices or something like that.

WARREN BUFFETT：他们在努力。总体上——比如你和一般的国会议员谈——他们也把这看作是个问题。药价等具体案例确实触目可见。

It's a big problem to change. The problem is, it intersects in so many ways. And that's why we've got Gawande heading it, and We've got three bigger-sized organizations backing him. We're not trying to do it to make money. That is not a goal that we end up with some business that we make money off of.

这是一个极难改造的系统性问题，牵涉面太广。这也是我们让 Gawande 牵头，并由三家大型机构共同支持他的原因。我们不是为了赚钱而做这件事。最终把它变成一个能赚钱的生意并不是我们的目标。

ANDY SEWER: Will he be talking to health insurers, for instance?

ANDY SEWER：比如说，他会不会与健康保险公司沟通？

WARREN BUFFETT: He'll be talking to everybody. His game plan is not something we're going to try and lay out, because it's in his head, to some degree. I mean, obviously, we selected him by hearing, and reading, and so on what he's done.

WARREN BUFFETT：他会和所有相关方交流。至于他的行动方案，我们不会试图对外展开细节，因为在某种程度上这些都在他脑子里。很显然，我们之所以选择他，是基于我们听到、读到的他过往的工作与成果。

But he'll learn as we go. We will conduct certain experiments, or he will, and try out a community, where one of us has a lot of employees maybe. There are various ways to experiment.

不过他会在推进过程中不断学习。我们会进行一些试点——或者说他会主导试点——比如在我们之一员工很多的某个社区先行尝试。实验有多种路径。

ANDY SEWER: Shifting gears, where do you find things like that Abe Lincoln tail-and-leg quotes? Do you read Bartlett's book of quotations--

ANDY SEWER：换个话题，你像“Abraham Lincoln 关于尾巴和腿”的那类名言都是从哪儿找来的？你会读 Bartlett's 的名人名言集吗——

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I don't read, but probably 50 years ago, I looked at a few Bartlett's quotations. But I read a lot and--

WARREN BUFFETT：不，我并不专门读，但大概 50 年前我翻过几条 Bartlett's 的引语。不过我平时读书很多，而且——

ANDY SEWER: Do you just remember these things and apply them?

ANDY SEWER：你就是记住这些话，然后在合适时机引用吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you're 88 years old, I mean, you ought to remember something. You don't remember what happened yesterday, but you remember the old stuff. You've got a lot of interesting quotations in your head.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，到了 88 岁，总得记住点什么。昨天发生的事未必记得清，但旧东西会记得。脑子里自然会存着不少有趣的名言。

ANDY SEWER: Yeah, but not like you do, I think. That's great. OK, so one company you invested in was GE, and you did well with that investment.

ANDY SEWER：是，但大概没有你这么会引用。真棒。好，我们谈一家你投过的公司——GE，你在那笔投资上做得不错。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I was too early, actually. If you look back, I was very active in the last half of September and early October. And then I wrote that article in later October. And I knew it was going to get bad. I wrote in the article, it was going to get bad.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，但其实我入场太早了。回头看，9 月下半月到 10 月上旬我动作很频繁，随后 10 月下旬我写了那篇文章。我知道情况会变糟，我在文章里也写了“会变糟”。

But I didn't think the stock market would react as much as it did between then and March. So I had, more or less, used up our powder well before the bottom was hit.

但我没想到从那时到翌年 3 月，股市反应会那么剧烈。所以在市场真正见底之前，我或多或少已经把“火药”用得差不多了。

ANDY SEWER: That's interesting. How have you avoided not getting back into GE more recently? I mean, I'm sure that they've reached out to. Everyone says, why doesn't Warren Buffett invest in GE, and save it, and take it to the promised land? It's this great American company.

ANDY SEWER：有意思。那最近这些年你是如何克制、没有再买回 GE 的？我确信他们找过你。大家都在说，为什么 Warren Buffett 不投 GE、把它“拯救”到理想之地？它可是家伟大的美国公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually, I think Larry is actually doing a good job.

WARREN BUFFETT：实际上，我觉得 Larry 做得确实不错。

ANDY SEWER: Larry Culp?

ANDY SEWER：Larry Culp？

WARREN BUFFETT: The Danaher. Yeah, Larry Culp at the Danaher is a good sell, and, I think, his priorities are straight. And, I think, he's a very able guy, and he's on the right track. And I'm a I'm a fan of GE's in the sense that we're a big buyer from them. We're a big seller to them. I know them, the managers.

WARREN BUFFETT：Danaher。对，来自 Danaher 的 Larry Culp 很能干，我认为他的优先级设置得很正确。他非常有能力，走在正确的轨道上。从这个意义上说，我是 GE 的“粉丝”——我们从他们那儿大额采购，也向他们大额销售。我认识他们，认识他们的管理层。

Jack Welch is a very good friend of mine. We don't agree on politics 100%, but we have a lot of fun together, and I love the guy. So I've got a great desire for GE to do well. It just hasn't looked that attractive to me.

Jack Welch 是我的至交好友。我们在政治上不可能 100% 一致，但我们一起相处很愉快，我很喜欢他。所以我非常希望 GE 表现出色。只是，从投资角度看，它对我并没有那么有吸引力。

ANDY SEWER: You talked about the groves of trees in the letters shareholder. One was the third grove, which was sort of the in-between stakes.

ANDY SEWER：你在致股东信里谈过“树林”比喻。其中第三片“树林”是介于两类之间的持股。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the equity interests.

WARREN BUFFETT：对，就是权益性持股。

ANDY SEWER: Yeah. Is it is it the case that those are sort of not the healthiest grove of trees? And why would that be?

ANDY SEWER：对。那是不是说，这片“树林”并非最健康？为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, Pilot Flying J is very-- there are companies that, under GAAP accounting, we have the record under equity method. We own more than 20%, but we don't control them. So it's treated under GAAP accounting as a special category. It didn't fit well in the other grove, so I had to make it a separate grove by itself. It's not that significant a grove.

WARREN BUFFETT：不是。比如 Pilot Flying J 就很好——有些公司在 GAAP 下需要采用权益法核算：我们持股超过 20%，但并不控制它们。因此在 GAAP 下它被归在一个特殊类别。它与其他两片“树林”都不太契合，所以我把它单独列为一片“树林”。这片“树林”的重要性并不算很大。

ANDY SEWER: You say that the sum of Berkshire has a greater valuation than the parts.

ANDY SEWER：你说过 Berkshire 的整体价值高于其各部分价值之和。

WARREN BUFFETT: That is true.

WARREN BUFFETT：没错。

ANDY SEWER: Did you ever try to calculate that? How much is that?

ANDY SEWER：你有没有尝试量化这个“整体溢价”？大概有多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that depends on circumstances. There's some times when the float from insurers can be very valuable. There are some times when the ability to use production tax credits will stay in the utility business, but have been on as part of our consolidated return, helps. But that varies a lot. But it is a plus, and we can move capital.

WARREN BUFFETT：这取决于具体情境。有时候，保险业务的浮存金价值很高；有时候，公用事业里产生的生产型税收抵免，作为我们合并报税的一部分而得以利用，也很有帮助。但这些因素变化很大。不过整体而言，这是正向加分，而且我们可以在内部调配资本。

Take a business like See's Candy, which we bought 40-odd years ago. It's a wonderful little business. It's put us out of capital. We've tried 50 different ways to expand geographically, do all kinds of things. Doesn't work. And we'll try it again, and it won't work. But we can move that capital to help buy BNSF Railroad or do all kinds of other things.

拿 See's Candy 举例，我们在 40 多年前买下它。这是个很棒的小生意，它把资本“吐”了出来。我们尝试过 50 种不同方式去做地域扩张、做各种尝试——行不通。我们还会再试，但大概还是行不通。不过，我们可以把流出的资本拿去收购 BNSF Railroad，或用于其他各种项目。

So we've got a seamless and tax-efficient way of moving capital where it's needed. And we've got some companies that really chew up capital, and we've got others that kick it off. And we can move it from one spot-- If you try to do that with your investments, you'll incur some taxes as you go along doing it. It's less efficient than what we've gotten.

因此，我们拥有一种无缝且税务高效的资本调度机制，把资金输送到需要的地方。我们有些公司非常“吃资本”，也有些公司“吐资本”。我们能在这些板块之间调拨。若你用个人投资组合来做同样的事，途中会产生税负，效率就比不上我们这样的架构。

ANDY SEWER: You talked a lot about the tax cuts and the benefits to Berkshire. You didn't really get into the costs of the tax cut, which surprised me a little bit. Are there costs? I mean, is it just free money?

ANDY SEWER：你谈了很多减税以及它对 Berkshire 的好处。但你并没有真正讨论减税的成本，这让我有点意外。有没有成本？我的意思是，这难道就是“天上掉钱”吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it makes a difference. The tax cut we get, for example, our utilities, as I mentioned in the report, that goes to the customers. That's just the nature of utility regulation. But net, we were a significant beneficiary from the tax cut.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这是有区别的。我们享受到的减税中，比如公用事业部分——我在报告里提到过——这部分会让利给客户。这是公用事业监管的本质。但从净效果看，我们确实是减税的显著受益者。

Basically, let's just say we had one class of stock. We got two. You and I own a business together, and we think we own all the stock. But the truth is, before the tax cut, the government had a 35% share of the stock on income.

基本上，可以这么说：原本我们只有一类股，如今变成了两类。你我共同拥有一家公司，我们以为持有全部股份。但事实上，在减税之前，政府在公司“收益”上相当于持有 35% 的“股份”。

Now they didn't have a share of the assets, but they had a share of the income. And if it wanted to change it to 40, it could've changed it. But fortunately, it changed it to 21. And if we had a private business, if we had a McDonald's franchise together or an auto dealership together-- the third shareholder-- that invisible shareholder, the government-- just handed us back a bunch of the shares of stock. And our shareholders benefited, and a lot of other shareholder benefited.

当然，政府并不持有资产的股份，但它分享收益。如果它想把比例改到 40%，它也能改。幸运的是，这次改成了 21%。如果我们是一家私营企业，比如你我一起拥有一家 McDonald's 的特许经营店，或者一家汽车经销店——那么第三位股东——那个“隐形股东”政府——就等于把一大块“股份”还给了我们。我们的股东受益了，许多其他公司的股东也受益了。

ANDY SEWER: You talked about Ajit Jain and Greg Abel saying that Berkshire blood flows through their veins. Have they made a difference since they become vice chairs? And then are they like Warren and Charlie?

ANDY SEWER：你提到 Ajit Jain 和 Greg Abel，说他们“体内流着 Berkshire 的血”。自从他们成为副董事长以来有没有带来变化？他们像 Warren 和 Charlie 吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, they don't have the interaction. They each run a separate business. Ajit does not think about the other businesses. He thinks about the insurance business. And Greg does not think about the insurance business at all. And I think about the money and the capital and so on.

WARREN BUFFETT：不，他们之间并没有那种互动。他们各自经营各自的业务。Ajit 不考虑其他业务，他只专注于保险业务；而 Greg 完全不考虑保险业务。我则专注于资金、资本等整体问题。

They're running two very big businesses. I mean, Ajit's business has, all told, a couple of hundred billion of assets. And Greg's business has $150 billion of revenues. They both would fit up there toward the top 10 or so in the country in terms of value, maybe the top 15. But they're very big businesses.

他们各自经营着非常庞大的业务。比如，Ajit 的板块合计资产达数千亿美元；Greg 的板块年收入约 1500 亿美元。按价值在全美都能排进前十来名，或者前十五名。它们都是非常大的业务。

ANDY SEWER: But they're not exactly like you two guys?

ANDY SEWER：但他们并不完全像你和 Charlie 那样？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, Charlie and I have a partnership thinking about the whole place, and we've done it forever now, and we still do.

WARREN BUFFETT：不。Charlie 和我以合伙人的方式思考整个公司，我们一直这么做，现在仍然如此。

ANDY SEWER: And Todd and Ted? I didn't see them mentioned.

ANDY SEWER：那 Todd 和 Ted 呢？我没看到他们被提及。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they have $13 billion each, including pension funds, our pension funds, that they run. So the $173 billion we had at year end in equities-- well, we had 173, but we had another $8 billion in pension funds. So of the 180 or so, they had 26 between them that they're managing.

WARREN BUFFETT：他们每人管理约 130 亿美元，其中包括我们公司的养老金。年末我们持有的股票市值是 1730 亿美元——是的，1730 亿，但养老金里还有 80 亿左右。加起来大约 1800 多亿美元，其中约 260 亿由他们两人管理。

They got total discretion on that. They don't ask me. At the month end, I look and see what they did. They don't do much. They don't do a lot of trading or anything. But I look to see what changes they made.

对这部分资金他们拥有完全自主权，不需要征求我意见。到月末我会看一眼他们做了什么。他们动得不多，不会频繁交易。但我会看看他们做了哪些调整。

Todd, for example, he made a couple of small investments in private-placement-type operations. And I know what the businesses do, but I can't tell you their names.

比如 Todd，他做了几笔小额的“私募类”投资。我知道那些业务是干什么的，但不能告诉你名字。

ANDY SEWER: Was one of those-- you made this investment in Oracle, and you sold it. Was that something they did?

ANDY SEWER：其中之一——你买过 Oracle，又把它卖了。那是他们做的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that was not something they did. That was something I did.

WARREN BUFFETT：不，那不是他们做的，是我做的。

ANDY SEWER: Yeah, and you said, you didn't understand it. That's why you sold. But than why'd you get it in the first place?

ANDY SEWER：对，你说你没看懂，所以卖掉了。但一开始你为什么要买呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's a good question to which I do not have a good answer. I know enough about the cloud to know I don't know enough about the cloud.

WARREN BUFFETT：这是个好问题，而我并没有一个好答案。关于“云”，我了解得足够多，以至于我知道自己对“云”了解得还不够。

ANDY SEWER: Right. OK. So Barclays put out a note. They said they were lowering the estimates for Berkshire for EPS. Do you read that stuff?

ANDY SEWER：好的。Barclays 发布了一份报告，他们表示下调对 Berkshire 每股收益（EPS）的预期。你会看这类东西吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Well, I mean, I may read it accidentally, but I don't seek it out to read. I'll put it that way. It just doesn't make any difference. If I spent time reading that, I wouldn't have the time to read 10Ks. And we're not going to do anything different.

WARREN BUFFETT：不会。嗯，意思是我可能偶尔碰巧看到，但我不会主动去看。可以这么说：这毫无意义。如果我拿时间去读这些，我就没时间读 10-K 了。而且我们也不会因此做出任何不同的事情。

I don't know what we're going to earn. As I put in the annual report-- and I really think this is unique-- we do not prepare financial statements monthly for Berkshire. There's just no other company that would do it. But there's no sense doing it.

我也不知道我们会赚多少。正如我在年报里写的——我认为这挺独特——我们并不为 Berkshire 做月度财务报表。几乎没有别的公司会这么做。但我们觉得这么做没有意义。

I know where the money is. I know how the companies are doing, generally, but what difference does it make? Because I'm not going to try and hit any number for the quarter by having a sale on insurance or doing something even worse. And Charlie, he knows where we stand. And we know what businesses are doing well and which aren't. We certainly know where the money is.

我知道钱在什么地方。我大致也知道各家公司经营得怎样，但这有什么区别呢？因为我不会为了季度数据去打什么保险“折扣”或者做更糟的事来“拼指标”。Charlie 也清楚我们的状况。我们知道哪些业务表现良好、哪些不佳。我们当然知道钱在哪里。

ANDY SEWER: Another one-- UBS survey of Berkshire investors says, the five most important things to them are succession, investment performance, M&A opportunities, share repurchase, insurance margins. Do you read that? Does that surprise you?

ANDY SEWER：还有一件事——UBS 对 Berkshire 投资者的调查显示，对他们最重要的五件事是：接班、投资表现、并购机会、股票回购、保险承保利润率。你会看吗？这让你意外吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, but I don't disagree with that. Somebody understands this.

WARREN BUFFETT：不意外，而且我也不反对这个排序。说明有人看懂了。

ANDY SEWER: Your own investors.

ANDY SEWER：是你的投资者自己说的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that's important. To go back to when I started my partnership in 1956 that Berkshire came out of, there were seven people sitting there at a table having dinner, relatives primarily. And I said, here's the partnership agreement.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的。这很重要。回到 1956 年我创立合伙基金时——Berkshire 就是从那里发展出来的——当时有七个人围坐在餐桌旁吃饭，主要是亲戚。我说：这是合伙协议。

It's done under Nebraska law. It's four or five pages. You don't need to read it. But I said, here's a little half page, what I call the ground rules. And I want you to read these, and if you feel OK about that-- about the interaction, what the expectations are, and all of that sort of thing-- then we'll join forces.

它受 Nebraska 州法管辖，四五页长。你们不必去读它。但我说：这里有半页纸，是我称之为“基本规则”的东西。我希望你们读这个——如果你们认同这些规则，包括彼此互动、期待值等等——那我们就一起合作。

And if you don't, it's fine. We shouldn't be partners. If I'm going to have a partnership with somebody, I want to be compatible. And when you have a public company, you can't control who comes in. I can't control some guy comes in and thinks we were going to pay big dividends or split the stock or something like that.

如果不认同，也没关系。那我们就不该成为合伙人。我要与谁建立合伙关系，我希望彼此“契合”。可一旦是上市公司，你无法控制谁会成为股东。有人进来可能以为我们会大派股息、会拆股之类，这不是我能控制的。

So by my actions and my communications and everything, I want to attract the people from the public market that I want, and I want to keep the others away. Costco was built-- Sal Price, who started the Price Club, I think, he sat down and figured out the customer he didn't want. And he set up a system that would keep away the customer he didn't want.

所以通过我的行为与沟通方式等等，我要从公开市场吸引我想要的股东，同时把其他人挡在外面。Costco 的成长——Price Club 的创始人 Sal Price——我想他曾认真思考过“自己不想要的客户是谁”。然后他建立了一套机制，把那些“不想要的客户”隔离在外。

Who did he not want? He didn't want somebody buying a quart of milk with somebody behind him with a basket of $200 worth of goods waiting for that. So he put in a membership fee. And by putting in a membership fee, he killed all the drop-in business, the business that belonged to the 7-Eleven.

他不想要谁？他不想要那种只买一夸脱牛奶、却让后面装着 200 美元商品的顾客排队等他的人。所以他设置了会员费。通过会员费，他砍掉了所有“顺路进来”的零散生意——那些本该属于 7-Eleven 的生意。

We want Berkshire to keep out people who have expectations about us that are different than ours. Good for them, and I hope they find somebody they fit. But if you're going to run a church, you want your seats to be filled by people that generally want to listen to your form of religion.

我们希望把对 Berkshire 抱有“与我们不同预期”的人挡在外面。祝他们好运，也希望他们能找到更契合的投资对象。但如果你要经营一座教堂，你当然希望座位是由愿意听你这种“宗教讲道”的人来坐满。

And you don't want it to change every week and say, gee, I need a new group. And I'll go out and talk to a bunch of investors and get them to come to my church next Sunday. Because there's only so many seats in the church. There's a 1,645,000 or so A-equivalent shares. And those are the seats, and I want them occupied by people that are on the same page I am.

你也不会希望每周都去改变，“哦，我需要一批新听众”，然后跑去向一群投资者推销，让他们下周来我的教堂。因为教堂的座位是有限的。我们大约有 1,645,000 股 A 股等值股份。那些就是“座位”，我希望它们被与我“同频”的人占据。

ANDY SEWER: The Church of Berkshire. Seems like you've got a big weighting in financials. And of course, you finally invested in Jamie Dimon's company. Why banks right now?

ANDY SEWER：Berkshire 的“教堂”。看起来你在金融板块的权重很高。当然，你最终也投了 Jamie Dimon 的公司。为什么此时选择银行？

WARREN BUFFETT: They're businesses I understand, and I like the price at which they're selling relative to their future prospects. I think, 10 years from now, that they'll be worth more money. And I feel there's a very high probability I'm right. And I don't think they will turn out to be the best investments at all of the whole panoply of things you could do. But I'm pretty sure that they won't disappoint me.

WARREN BUFFETT：这些是我看得懂的生意，而且就其未来前景而言，我喜欢它们当前的价格。我认为 10 年后它们会更值钱。我觉得我判断正确的概率非常高。我并不认为在所有可选项中它们一定是最好的投资。但我很确定它们不会让我失望。

ANDY SEWER: Is climate change changing your insurance businesses?

ANDY SEWER：气候变化是否正在改变你的保险业务？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it doesn't change the insurance business.

WARREN BUFFETT：没有，它并没有改变保险业务。

ANDY SEWER: Does it change modeling or something in the business?

ANDY SEWER：那它是否会改变业务中的建模之类的东西？

WARREN BUFFETT: It would change our insurance business if we were writing 20-year policies. If there was something that changed life mortality adversely to the interests of a life insurance company, you're stuck with a policy for 20 years if you write the life insurance policy. You'll keep paying your premiums if it's adverse to me. That's what's happened in long-term care insurance, for example.

WARREN BUFFETT：如果我们销售的是 20 年期的保单，它会改变我们的保险业务。比如，如果某种因素让寿险公司的死亡率假设对公司不利，你一旦卖出 20 年期寿险，就会被这张保单绑住 20 年。即便这对我不利，你也会继续缴保费。这就像长期护理保险的情况。

But when you write a policy for one year at a time, see what the developments are. Cars, for example, are much safer to drive than they used to be. There used to be 15 deaths per 100 million miles driven. Now, there's a little over one. On the other hand, they've become much more expensive to fix. That little side view mirror, which used to cost 10 bucks, is now 1,000 bucks or something like that.

但如果你是一年期一年期地签保单，就可以随时观察事态发展。比如汽车，现在比过去安全得多。过去每行驶 1 亿英里大约有 15 人死亡，现在略高于 1 人。另一方面，维修成本却大幅上升。以前一个小小的侧视镜 10 美元，现在要 1000 美元之类。

So you have things that are changing in terms of, if you're writing collision insurance, you've got to allow for the fact that the windshield, the bumper, all kinds of things, the side view mirror and all that are way more expensive. But if you're writing liability, people aren't going to die as often.

因此，变化很多：如果你卖的是碰撞险，就必须考虑到挡风玻璃、保险杠、侧视镜等一切部件贵了许多。但如果是责任险，人们发生致死事故的频率会降低。

Climate has been changing. But the truth is that you now can buy really big catastrophe limits cheaper than you could buy them in 2005 or thereabouts, allowing for changes in the dollar and concentration of population. So far, rates have come down. That's the reason we've gotten out of the cab business to a great degree.

气候一直在变化。但事实是，考虑到美元变化和人口集中度等因素，现在你可以买到的巨灾再保险限额，比 2005 年左右更便宜。到目前为止，费率下降了。这也是我们在很大程度上退出“巨灾业务”（cat business）的原因。

We were a very big writer of cab business 10 or 12 years ago. We aren't out of the cab business because of climate change. We're because the prices aren't right. And the world will change, and that's got very serious consequences. But it won't change that much from year to year. We've done very well during a period of some climate change.

十来年前我们是巨灾业务的大承保人。我们不是因为气候变化而退出巨灾业务，而是因为价格不合适。世界会变化，带来很严肃的后果。但它不会年年都剧烈改变。在气候有所变化的这段时期里，我们的表现依然很好。

ANDY SEWER: You've talked about technology advancing faster than our ability to understand it. And I'm wondering if social media, and Facebook, and Google, and Russian trolls coming in, is that maybe an example of that? Are you still worried about that problem?

ANDY SEWER：你提到过技术发展的速度快于我们理解它的能力。我在想，社交媒体、Facebook、Google，以及俄罗斯水军的介入，是否就是一个例子？你现在仍然担心这个问题吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think cyber poses real risks to humanity. Forgetting about the problem even of misinformation. I'm just thinking of we have railroads running over 22,000 miles of track. And some of them are carrying ammonia. And some of them are carrying chlorine and things. We have to carry them. We have no choice about that. We're required by law to carry them.

WARREN BUFFETT：我认为网络空间对人类构成了真实的风险。先撇开虚假信息的问题不谈。单就我们运营着超过 22,000 英里的铁路而言，其中一些列车运载氨气，另一些运载氯气等物质。我们必须运送这些物资，这并非选择题，法律就要求我们运送它们。

I would rather do that in a non-cyber world than a cyber world. There are all kinds of things-- the problem by something like cyber is that it's moving, and it's just unpredictable whether you'll get some crazy guy, like stuck the anthrax in the-- you know, what they can do becomes magnified. You saw what 19 guys did on 9/11.

相比之下，我宁愿在一个“非网络化”的世界里做这件事，而不是在高度网络化的世界。问题在于网络风险是动态演化的，你无法预测会不会突然出现某个疯子，像当年把炭疽带进邮件那样——他们能做的坏事在网络世界被放大。你已经见识过 9/11 时 19 个人能造成什么后果。

Tools in the hands or potentially in the hands of either crazy individuals, crazy groups, or even a few crazy governments are really something. And we don't necessarily know what all the tools they have are, and that is moving all the time. Again, Einstein said, I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. It's a dangerous world.

当那些工具落到疯狂的个人、疯狂的团体，甚至少数疯狂政府的手里或可能落入他们手里时，后果不堪设想。我们也不一定知道他们具体掌握了哪些工具，而且这些工具还在不断变化。正如 Einstein 所说：“我不知道第三次世界大战将用什么武器进行，但第四次世界大战将用棍棒和石头进行。”这个世界充满危险。

ANDY SEWER: I don't know if you've following this, Warren, but what do you think of Elon Musk's behavior as a CEO?

ANDY SEWER：我不确定你是否在关注这件事，Warren，你如何看待 Elon Musk 作为 CEO 的行为举止？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it has room for improvement. [CHUCKLING] And he would say the same thing. It's just, some people have a talent for interesting quotes, and others have a little bit more of a blocker up there that says, this could get me in a problem. But he's a remarkable guy.

WARREN BUFFETT：我觉得还有改进空间（笑）。他自己大概也会这么说。有人天生擅长抛出“名言”，也有人脑子里会多一道“闸门”，提醒自己“这句话可能会给我惹麻烦”。不过他确实是个了不起的人。

I just don't see the necessity to communicate. I think I've got seven tweets, because a friend of mine signed me up for it. And she's called me about 100 times saying, can I tweet this or that? I said yes to her seven times, I guess, or something like that. I've never actually written one myself. I don't even know how to do it.

我只是看不出非得那样沟通的必要。我自己大概发过七条推文，那是因为一位朋友替我注册了。她大概给我打过一百次电话，问我“这条能不能发、那条能不能发？”我可能答应过她七次之类。我从来没亲自写过推文，甚至都不知道怎么操作。

ANDY SEWER: Have you talked to Elon ever?

ANDY SEWER：你和 Elon 有过交流吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: He joined the Giving Pledge, so once or twice, but that's a lot of years ago, seven or eight years ago. He hasn't come to our annual gathering, so I haven't seen him for seven or eight years.

WARREN BUFFETT：他加入了 Giving Pledge，所以我们一两次有过接触，但那是很多年前的事了，七八年前。他没来我们的年度聚会，所以我已经七八年没见到他。

ANDY SEWER: So let's talk about this trade war that's been going on a little bit with China. And, I guess, I'd like to ask you, do you think that Donald Trump was right in calling out the Chinese government and, basically, putting them on notice?

ANDY SEWER：我们来谈谈与 China 之间正在发生的贸易战。我想问你，你认为 Donald Trump 公开点名 Chinese government、基本上对其“下战书”，这样做是否正确？

WARREN BUFFETT: I won't have any comment on that. In terms of political activity, I don't put my citizenship in a blind trust. So when the election comes around, I'll do something.

WARREN BUFFETT：对此我不作评论。就政治活动而言，我不会把自己的公民身份“放入盲目信托”。等到选举到来时，我会做我该做的。

On the other hand, people will interpret things I say about any president as, to some extent, coming from Berkshire. And they and they don't come from Berkshire. I'm just an individual. I'd be glad to talk about China, but I can't talk to you about that part of it.

另一方面，人们会把我对任何总统的言论，在某种程度上解读为出自 Berkshire。但这些并不代表 Berkshire，我只是以个人身份发言。关于 China 我很愿意谈，但关于你刚才问的那部分，我不能谈。

ANDY SEWER: Fair enough. I mean, do you think there was room for improvement, then, in terms of the trade relationship between China and the United States?

ANDY SEWER：可以理解。那么，你是否认为 China 与 United States 的贸易关系有改进空间？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that China and the United States absolutely are destined to be the superpowers beyond my great-grandchildren lives and will always be competitors and will be competitors in business. We'll be competitors in ideas, all kinds of ways.

WARREN BUFFETT：我认为 China 和 United States 注定会成为在我曾孙辈之后仍然存在的超级大国，并且始终是竞争者——在商业上竞争，在思想上竞争，在各种方面竞争。

There's no other way it would be, and we just have to make sure that competition doesn't get us to a point where we don't realize that the best world is one in which both the United States and China prosper. We do not want to have an island of prosperity and the rest of the world envious of us in a nuclear age. And China doesn't. Russia doesn't.

事情不会有别的走向。我们必须确保，这种竞争不会让我们忘记：最好的世界是 United States 和 China 都能繁荣的世界。在核武时代，我们不希望出现“繁荣孤岛”，让世界其他地方对我们心生嫉妒。China 不希望那样，Russia 也不希望那样。

I mean, we all recognize the dangers of letting competition get out of control. You can be competitors without being enemies. And that's what all powerful nations have to realize over time. It's different than 200 years ago when you could have some dominant country, and then they may have done some things that you didn't like. But it didn't threaten the existence of the world.

我们都清楚任由竞争失控的危险。可以是竞争者，而不是敌人——所有强国都必须逐渐认识到这一点。这与 200 年前不同，那时某个国家也许会占据主导，并做一些你不喜欢的事，但那并不威胁世界的存在。

You really threatened the existence of the world as we know it if important countries do not constantly recognize that they can compete, they can fight over certain things, but they can't regard it as, essentially, the equivalent of war.

如果重要国家不能持续认识到：可以竞争、可以在某些问题上较量，但不能把这些当成“变相的战争”，那么我们所认知的这个世界的存在就会真正受到威胁。

ANDY SEWER: Here's a question from Kevin Chen, who is a Berkshire shareholder and an NYU professor. And he says-- and this is sort of along the lines of what you were just saying, Warren-- but do you think the US and China will be able to resolve their differences or are conflicts unavoidable?

ANDY SEWER：这里有一个来自 Kevin Chen 的问题，他是 Berkshire 的股东，也是 NYU 的教授。他问——这与您刚才的观点相吻合——你认为 US 和 China 能够解决分歧吗？还是冲突不可避免？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don't think conflicts are unavoidable. But I think it has to be active thinking on the part of every hugely-powerful country. Russia is hugely-powerful. I mean, 90% of the nuclear arms in the world are between US and Russia.

WARREN BUFFETT：我不认为冲突是不可避免的。但每一个极其强大的国家都必须主动思考。Russia 也是极其强大的。全球 90% 的核武器都掌握在 US 和 Russia 手中。

They have to recognize that the best world for them is one where they don't try and grab all the apples, basically, and we have to recognize that. And we can't-- the United States-- we can't think that either our ideas run the world, or we start getting aggressive about things. And China can't think that. Russia can't think that.

他们必须认识到，对他们而言最好的世界并不是试图把“所有苹果”都抓到手里；而我们也必须认识到这一点。United States 不能认为我们的理念就该主宰世界，或在各类事务上变得咄咄逼人。China 不能那样想，Russia 也不能那样想。

That's obvious. You've got to be sure things don't escalate. We had World War I with an Archduke. You can get chance incidents. I asked one of the presidents one time in terms of what he would do if awakened in the middle of the night with somebody coming to him and saying, absolutely somebody else has launched. Would you launch on that? And you've got 10 minutes to decide. I wouldn't want to have that responsibility. But you want to make sure you don't get to that point.

这一点很明显：必须确保事态不升级。第一次世界大战由一位大公遇刺引发——偶发事件也可能点燃战火。我曾问过一位总统：如果半夜被叫醒，有人对你说“对方已经确实发射了”，你会不会“基于此就发射”？你只有 10 分钟决定。我可不想承担这样的责任。我们必须确保事情不会发展到那一步。

ANDY SEWER: Right. Right. Would you ever make a big acquisition in China. And if not, aren't you missing a huge portion of--

ANDY SEWER：对。对。你会不会在 China 进行一笔大型收购？如果不会，这难道不是错过了很大一块——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the answer is, we would. We would.

WARREN BUFFETT：会的，答案是我们会。我们会这么做。

ANDY SEWER: Have you looked?

ANDY SEWER：你们看过标的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: We've been made aware of some things, yeah.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们已经被告知过一些机会。

ANDY SEWER: On the flip side of the coin, are you concerned that the rule of law is different, that the accounting might be opaque?

ANDY SEWER：另一方面，你会不会担心法治环境不同、会计可能不够透明？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I'd want to be sure I understood the accounting, obviously. In some businesses, that'd be easier to do than others. But I know the laws, the customs, the accounting, the people better in the United States than any place else. So there's some small hurdle in many countries to get over, which I can get over, but it's just not as easy as looking at something where I already know the answer from previous transactions or something of the sort.

WARREN BUFFETT：显然，我会先确保自己吃透会计处理。在某些行业里这会比其他行业更容易。但在 United States，我对法律、商业习俗、会计以及人更熟悉于任何其他地方。所以在很多国家都会有一些小门槛需要跨越，我可以跨过去，但不如在我已有既往交易经验、已经“知道答案”的地方来得容易。

So it it's easier to make a big acquisition in the United States. I'd have to do more work if I'm looking beyond the borders. But I love the idea of doing it. When we made the acquisition in Israel a dozen years ago, I didn't know what the tax rates were there. I didn't know what corporate law. I suspected that it would all be answered satisfactorily, which it was. But I didn't just automatically know it.

所以在 United States 做一笔大收购更容易。如果放眼海外，我就得做更多功课。但我喜欢这么做。十来年前我们在 Israel 做收购时，我并不知道当地的税率、也不了解公司法。我只是判断这些问题会有令人满意的答案，事实也确实如此。但这些并不是我“天然就知道”的。

ANDY SEWER: It seems like you're more open about doing a deal in China than in previous conversations.

ANDY SEWER：听起来你对在 China 做交易比之前的谈话里更开放了。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don't think so.

WARREN BUFFETT：我不这么认为。

ANDY SEWER: No?

ANDY SEWER：不是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No.

WARREN BUFFETT：不是。

ANDY SEWER: It's out there.

ANDY SEWER：外界有这种感觉。

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm open. Yeah. We made two decent-sized stock acquisitions there, and that worked out fine.

WARREN BUFFETT：我始终是开放的。是的。我们在那里做过两笔相当规模的股票投资，结果不错。

ANDY SEWER: Those are?

ANDY SEWER：是哪两笔？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, PetroChina and DYD.

WARREN BUFFETT：PetroChina 和 DYD。

ANDY SEWER: DYD, yeah.

ANDY SEWER：DYD，没错。

WARREN BUFFETT: DYD was Charlie's. But Charlie's very well-versed on China.

WARREN BUFFETT：DYD 是 Charlie 做的。Charlie 对 China 非常熟悉。

ANDY SEWER: Right. The US trade deficit has been widening and, of course, a lot of that has to do with our trade with China. Is that something that worries you?

ANDY SEWER：好的。US 的贸易逆差在扩大，当然这与我们和 China 的贸易有很大关系。这个问题让你担忧吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wrote an article about it for "Fortune" and the trade situation many years ago and when our deficit got to be large in relation to GDP. I don't think it's essential to have a trade balance. But I think that, if a trade deficit gets large, and it looks like you have no way out from it, that can be a real problem over time.

WARREN BUFFETT：很多年前当逆差相对 GDP 已经很大时，我给《Fortune》写过一篇文章谈这个贸易问题。我不认为贸易必须平衡。但如果贸易逆差变得很大，而且看上去没有出路、无法逆转，长期而言会成为一个真正的问题。

You're shipping little pieces of paper to the rest of the world, and they're shipping you goods. People are working making underwear or shoes someplace, and they get little pieces of paper from us. And it gets very tempting, if you've done that enough, to make sure that those little pieces of paper aren't worth very much over time when they want to cash them for something.

你把一张张小纸片寄到世界各地，而他们把商品寄给你。有人在某地辛苦做内衣或鞋子，他们拿到的是我们寄出的这些小纸片。如果这种状况持续很久，就会很有诱惑去确保当他们想把这些小纸片兑换成某种实物时，这些纸片“随着时间并不值什么钱”。

We don't have any problem running trade deficits. But if we ran really large ones, and we sort of worked ourselves into a box, where we didn't really have a solution to get those numbers down, it could be a problem. And I wrote about it one time. It's kind of a nice thing, actually. Wouldn't you like to have something where you just send out little pieces of paper, and somebody could supply you with their food?

适度的贸易逆差不是问题。但如果逆差非常大，而且我们把自己逼进一个“没有现实解法能把数字降下来”的箱子里，那就成问题了。我当时就是这么写的。从某种意义上说，这也挺“美”的——你难道不想过一种“只需要寄出几张小纸片，就有人把食物供给你”的生活吗？

ANDY SEWER: I'm living it.

ANDY SEWER：我现在就是这么过的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

WARREN BUFFETT：是啊。

ANDY SEWER: Exactly.

ANDY SEWER：没错。

WARREN BUFFETT: We call them credit cards.

WARREN BUFFETT：我们称之为 credit cards。

ANDY SEWER: Exactly. Yes. OK, and last question. China is facing its slowest growth in nearly three decades. The leadership there lowered the targets, I think, to around 6.5%, 6%. Are you concerned about this slowing growth and the impact on global markets?

ANDY SEWER：没错。好，最后一个问题。China 正面临近三十年来最慢的增长。我记得那里的领导层把目标下调到大约 6.5%、6%。你是否担心这种放缓及其对全球市场的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don't worry about it in terms of global markets. China is going to grow a lot over time. When you think of what's happened-- was it in 1949-- but there's been nothing really like it. You had 20% of the world's population at that time perhaps, and it really hadn't remotely achieved their potential.

WARREN BUFFETT：就全球市场而言，我不担心。China 长期看还会有很大的增长。回想自 1949 年以来发生的事情，世上几乎没有类似的例子。那时他们大概拥有全球 20% 的人口，却远未发挥其潜力。

They had intellectual capacity. They had decent soil, all kinds of things. And what's happened there is almost beyond belief. And that game's not over, but we've had incredible developments in the United States. Real GDP per capita is six times what it was the day I was born in the United States-- six times. And we thought we were a pretty evolved country then and everything.

他们有人才、也有不错的土地与诸多要素。后来发生的事情几乎令人难以置信。这场“比赛”并未结束。与此同时，United States 也取得了惊人的进步。以实际值计算的人均 GDP 是我在美国出生那天的 6 倍——足足 6 倍。当时我们已经自认为是相当发达的国家了。

My parents wouldn't have believe it. They would have thought, this kid has really got it made being born in the United States. And it was true. We had this tailwind, and China's had a hurricane behind it in recent decades.

我的父母不会相信。他们会觉得，这孩子生在 United States 真是“赢在起跑线”。这话没错。我们享受了顺风助推，而 China 在最近几十年则是“身后有飓风”。

ANDY SEWER: In a good way.

ANDY SEWER：是从正面的意义上说的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely.

WARREN BUFFETT：完全正确。

ANDY SEWER: Because you were comparing it to the tailwind of the hurricane at their back.

ANDY SEWER：你的意思是把他们身后的“飓风”比作顺风。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, at their back. And they have found a way of life that is dramatically different than existed for the billion. There was a billion then, maybe a billion, two, or three, whatever it is now. They have changed a country, really, of size that, I don't think, there's ever been anything like it.

WARREN BUFFETT：对，在他们背后。而且他们找到了与过去截然不同的发展之道。那时有十亿人，如今是一十亿、十二亿、还是十三亿，不管具体多少。他们以这种规模改变了一个国家，我认为世上从未有过类似先例。

We've done it, too, but it took somewhat longer. It was more stretched out. It was a remarkable period, but when you go to-- I first went there in 1995. And then, they regarded it as a miracle. Then I went back 10 years later, and it was a whole different country beyond that.

我们也做到了，但花的时间更长，进程更“拉长”。那也是非凡的时期。不过就 China 而言——我第一次去那里是 1995 年。那时他们已经把所发生的一切视为“奇迹”。十年后我再去，那又已经是一个完全不同的国家了。

ANDY SEWER: Warren Buffett, thanks so much for joining us. I'm Andy Serwer. You've been watching "Influencers." We'll see you next time.

ANDY SEWER：Warren Buffett，非常感谢你的到来。我是 Andy Serwer。您正在收看的是《Influencers》。我们下次再见。

2019-05-02 Warren Buffett.Influencers with Andy Serwer

2019-05-02 Warren Buffett.Influencers with Andy Serwer

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