2020-02-22 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2020-02-22 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire earned $81.4 billion in 2019 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24 billion of operating earnings, $3.7 billion of realized capital gains and a $53.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold. Each of those components of earnings is stated on an after-tax basis.  
伯克希尔在 2019 年按普遍公认会计准则（通常称为 GAAP）计算的利润为 814 亿美元。其中包括 240 亿美元的营业利润、37 亿美元的已实现资本利得，以及 537 亿美元源于所持股票未实现净资本利得增加的收益。上述各项收益均以税后口径列示。  

That $53.7 billion gain requires comment. It resulted from a new GAAP rule, imposed in 2018, that requires a company holding equity securities to include in earnings the net change in the unrealized gains and losses of those securities. As we stated in last year’s letter, neither Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, nor I agree with that rule.  
对于 537 亿美元的收益，需要进一步说明。这一数字源自 2018 年实施的一项新的 GAAP 规定：凡持有股票类资产的公司，必须将该等资产未实现盈亏的净变动计入当期损益。正如我们在去年的致股东信中所言，负责管理伯克希尔的合伙人查理·芒格和我本人都不同意这一规定。  

The adoption of the rule by the accounting profession, in fact, was a monumental shift in its own thinking. Before 2018, GAAP insisted – with an exception for companies whose business was to trade securities – that unrealized gains within a portfolio of stocks were never to be included in earnings and unrealized losses were to be included only if they were deemed “other than temporary.” Now, Berkshire must enshrine in each quarter’s bottom line – a key item of news for many investors, analysts and commentators – every up and down movement of the stocks it owns, however capricious those fluctuations may be.  
事实上，会计界采纳这一规定标志着其思维方式的巨大转变。2018 年之前，GAAP 一直坚持（对以交易证券为主营业务的公司除外）股票组合中的未实现收益不得计入利润，而未实现损失仅在被认定为“并非暂时性”时才计入。如今，伯克希尔必须在每个季度的净利润中——这是众多投资者、分析师和评论员关注的核心指标——如实呈现所持股票的每一次涨跌，无论这些波动多么随意。  

Berkshire’s 2018 and 2019 years glaringly illustrate the argument we have with the new rule. In 2018, a down year for the stock market, our net unrealized gains decreased by $20.6 billion, and we therefore reported GAAP earnings of only $4 billion. In 2019, rising stock prices increased net unrealized gains by the aforementioned $53.7 billion, pushing GAAP earnings to the $81.4 billion reported at the beginning of this letter. Those market gyrations led to a crazy 1,900% increase in GAAP earnings!  
伯克希尔 2018 年和 2019 年的表现充分说明了我们对这一新规的质疑。2018 年股市下跌，我们的未实现净收益减少 206 亿美元，因而只报告了 40 亿美元的 GAAP 利润。2019 年股价上升，未实现净收益增加前述的 537 亿美元，将 GAAP 利润推高到本信开头提到的 814 亿美元。市场的这种剧烈波动导致 GAAP 利润竟然暴涨了 1,900%！  

Meanwhile, in what we might call the real world, as opposed to accounting-land, Berkshire’s equity holdings averaged about $200 billion during the two years, and the intrinsic value of the stocks we own grew steadily and substantially throughout the period.  
与此同时，在所谓“现实世界”——而非“会计世界”——中，伯克希尔两年间所持股票市值平均约为 2,000 亿美元，我们所拥有股票的内在价值在此期间持续且显著地增长。  

Charlie and I urge you to focus on operating earnings – which were little changed in 2019 – and to ignore both quarterly and annual gains or losses from investments, whether these are realized or unrealized.  
查理和我敦促各位关注营业利润——2019 年几乎未发生变化——并忽略投资带来的季度和年度盈亏，无论其已实现还是未实现。  

Our advising that in no way diminishes the importance of these investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect our equity holdings – as a group – to deliver major gains, albeit in an unpredictable and highly irregular manner. To see why we are optimistic, move on to the next discussion.  
我们的建议绝不意味着这些投资对伯克希尔不重要。从长期看，查理和我预期我们的股票投资组合将带来可观收益，尽管实现路径不可预测且极不规律。如欲了解我们为何保持乐观，请继续阅读下一部分讨论。

The Power of Retained Earnings  

留存收益的力量  

In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith, an obscure economist and financial advisor, wrote Common Stocks as Long Term Investments, a slim book that changed the investment world. Indeed, writing the book changed Smith himself, forcing him to reassess his own investment beliefs.  
1924 年，籍籍无名的经济学家兼财务顾问埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯出版了《普通股长期投资》一书——这本薄薄的小册子改变了投资世界。事实上，撰写此书也改变了史密斯本人，迫使他重新审视自己的投资理念。  

Going in, he planned to argue that stocks would perform better than bonds during inflationary periods and that bonds would deliver superior returns during deflationary times. That seemed sensible enough. But Smith was in for a shock.  
在动笔之前，他原本打算论证：通胀时期股票优于债券，而通缩时期债券回报更佳。这一观点看似合乎情理，但史密斯最终却大为震惊。  

His book began, therefore, with a confession: “These studies are the record of a failure – the failure of facts to sustain a preconceived theory.” Luckily for investors, that failure led Smith to think more deeply about how stocks should be evaluated.  
因此，他在书中一开篇便坦白道：“这些研究记录了一次失败——事实无法支撑先入为主的理论。”幸运的是，这次失败促使史密斯更深入地思考应如何评估股票。  

For the crux of Smith’s insight, I will quote an early reviewer of his book, none other than John Maynard Keynes: “I have kept until last what is perhaps Mr. Smith’s most important, and is certainly his most novel, point. Well-managed industrial companies do not, as a rule, distribute to the shareholders the whole of their earned profits. In good years, if not in all years, they retain a part of their profits and put them back into the business. Thus there is an element of compound interest (Keynes’ italics) operating in favour of a sound industrial investment. Over a period of years, the real value of the property of a sound industrial is increasing at compound interest, quite apart from the dividends paid out to the shareholders.”  
为了阐明史密斯洞见的核心，我引用其早期书评人——正是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯——的话：“我把也许是史密斯先生最重要、肯定也是最新颖的观点留到最后。管理良好的工业企业通常不会把全部利润分配给股东。在好的年份——如果不是所有年份——它们会留存部分利润并再投入业务。于是复利因素（凯恩斯加粗）便开始在优质工业投资中发挥作用。多年以后，优质工业企业的真实价值会以复利方式增长，这与分派给股东的股息无关。”  

And with that sprinkling of holy water, Smith was no longer obscure.  
在这番“点石成金”的评价加持下，史密斯不再默默无闻。  

It’s difficult to understand why retained earnings were unappreciated by investors before Smith’s book was published. After all, it was no secret that mind-boggling wealth had earlier been amassed by such titans as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, all of whom had retained a huge portion of their business earnings to fund growth and produce ever-greater profits. Throughout America, also, there had long been small-time capitalists who became rich following the same playbook.  
让人难以理解的是，在史密斯的书问世之前，投资者为何并未重视留存收益。毕竟，安德鲁·卡内基、约翰·洛克菲勒和亨利·福特等商业巨擘通过保留大量企业收益来资助扩张、实现更高利润而积累的惊人财富早已是公开事实。在整个美国，也长期存在着依循同一路径而致富的小资本家。  

Nevertheless, when business ownership was sliced into small pieces – “stocks” – buyers in the pre-Smith years usually thought of their shares as a short-term gamble on market movements. Even at their best, stocks were considered speculations. Gentlemen preferred bonds.  
然而，在股票这一所有权“切片”出现并流通的史密斯前时代，买家往往把持股视为对市场波动的短期赌注。即便表现良好，股票也仅被看作投机工具；绅士们偏爱债券。  

Though investors were slow to wise up, the math of retaining and reinvesting earnings is now well understood. Today, school children learn what Keynes termed “novel”: combining savings with compound interest works wonders.  
尽管投资者觉悟缓慢，如今人们已深谙留存并再投资收益的数学原理。今天，连小学生都明白凯恩斯所称的“新颖”之处：把储蓄与复利结合，能产生奇迹般的力量。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy – at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and evergrowing sums of money.
在伯克希尔，查理和我长期以来都专注于善用留存收益。有时候这项工作很轻松——但有时候则异常艰难，尤其是当我们开始处理庞大且不断增长的资金时。

In our deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshire’s depreciation charges have aggregated \$65 billion whereas the company’s internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled \$121 billion. Reinvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority.
在运用我们留存的资金时，我们首先会寻求投资于我们已拥有的各类多元化业务。在过去十年里，伯克希尔的折旧费用总计为650亿美元，而公司在物业、厂房和设备上的内部投资累计达1210亿美元。对生产性运营资产的再投资将永远是我们的首要任务。

In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.
此外，我们持续寻找符合三个标准的新企业。第一，它们必须能在其运营所需的有形净资本上获得良好回报；第二，它们必须由有能力且诚实的管理者经营；第三，它们必须以合理的价格可供收购。

When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards.
当我们发现这样的企业时，我们更倾向于全资收购。但符合我们要求的大型收购机会十分罕见。更多时候，是多变的股市为我们提供了机会，让我们能在符合标准的上市公司中买入大量但非控股的股份。

Whichever way we go – controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market – Berkshire’s financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand.
无论我们选择哪条路径——收购控股公司，还是通过股市取得重大持股——伯克希尔从这项投资中获得的财务成果将在很大程度上取决于我们所购企业的未来盈利能力。然而，这两种投资方式之间存在一个极其重要的会计差异，这是你必须了解的。

In our controlled companies, (defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares), the earnings of each business flow directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get.
在我们控股的公司中（定义为伯克希尔持股超过50%的企业），每家公司的利润会直接计入我们向你报告的营业利润中。你看到的，就是你实际得到的。

In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? They’re working hard and creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshire’s reported earnings.
而在非控股公司中，我们所持的是可交易股票，只有伯克希尔收到的股息才会计入我们报告的营业利润中。至于留存收益？它们确实在积极运作并创造大量附加价值，但这些收益并不会直接体现在伯克希尔的报告利润中。

At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what we’ll call this “nonrecognition of earnings” important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of a magnitude that we lay out for you below.
在除伯克希尔之外的几乎所有大型公司中，投资者通常不会认为这种“未确认收益”很重要。但对我们而言，它却是一个显著的遗漏，其影响程度之大，我们将在下文向你详细说明。

Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting – these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees – and our share, so to speak, of the earnings the investees retain and put to work. Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshire’s share of the company’s future earnings.
在这里，我们列出了我们十大市值最高的股票投资持仓。这个清单区分了根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP）向你报告的收益——即伯克希尔从这十家公司获得的股息——以及我们“应享份额”的那部分被被投资企业留存并继续运用的利润。通常，这些公司会利用留存收益来扩展业务并提升效率。有时，它们还会用这些资金大规模回购自家股票，从而提高伯克希尔在其未来收益中的占比。


(1) Based on current annual rate.
基于当前年度利率。

(2) Based on 2019 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.
基于2019年收益扣除已支付的普通和优先股股息后的数据。

Obviously, the realized gains we will eventually record from partially owning each of these companies will not neatly correspond to “our” share of their retained earnings. Sometimes, alas, retentions produce nothing. But both logic and our past experience indicate that from the group we will realize capital gains at least equal to – and probably better than – the earnings of ours that they retained. (When we sell shares and realize gains, we will pay income tax on the gain at whatever rate then prevails. Currently, the federal rate is 21%.)
显然，我们最终因部分持有这些公司而实现的收益，并不会严格对应于“我们”应享的那部分留存收益。有时候，遗憾的是，留存收益可能一无所成。但从逻辑上讲，以及从我们以往的经验来看，我们相信，从这些公司中实现的资本收益至少会等于——甚至很可能超过——他们为我们“留存”的那部分利润。（当我们出售股份并实现收益时，我们将按当时适用的税率缴纳所得税。目前的联邦税率为21%。）

It is certain that Berkshire’s rewards from these 10 companies, as well as those from our many other equity holdings, will manifest themselves in a highly irregular manner. Periodically, there will be losses, sometimes company-specific, sometimes linked to stock-market swoons. At other times – last year was one of those – our gain will be outsized. Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshire’s value.
可以肯定的是，伯克希尔从这十家公司以及其他众多股票持仓中获得的回报，将以极不规律的方式显现。有时候会出现亏损，可能是某家公司自身的问题，也可能是市场整体低迷所致。另一些时候——比如去年——我们的收益则会格外丰厚。总体而言，我们被投资公司的留存收益无疑将在伯克希尔价值增长过程中发挥重大作用。

Mr. Smith got it right.
史密斯先生说得对。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险业务

Tom Murphy, a valued director of Berkshire and an all-time great among business managers, long ago gave me some important advice about acquisitions: “To achieve a reputation as a good manager, just be sure you buy good businesses.”
汤姆·墨菲是伯克希尔备受尊敬的董事，也是史上最出色的企业管理者之一。早年他曾给我一条关于收购的重要建议：“若想获得优秀经理人的声誉，只需确保你所收购的是好企业。”

Over the years Berkshire has acquired many dozens of companies, all of which I initially regarded as “good businesses.” Some, however, proved disappointing; more than a few were outright disasters. A reasonable number, on the other hand, have exceeded my hopes.
多年来，伯克希尔收购了几十家公司，在最初看来它们都是“好企业”。然而，部分结果令人失望；不止几家最终成了彻头彻尾的灾难。另一方面，也有不少公司超出了我的期望。

In reviewing my uneven record, I’ve concluded that acquisitions are similar to marriage: They start, of course, with a joyful wedding – but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either party’s hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift. Applying those images to corporate acquisitions, I’d have to say it is usually the buyer who encounters unpleasant surprises. It’s easy to get dreamy-eyed during corporate courtships.
回顾自己参差不齐的收购记录，我得出的结论是：收购就像婚姻。当然，它们都始于喜庆的“婚礼”——但现实往往会与婚前的预期背道而驰。有时，令人惊喜的是，这段新联姻带来的幸福超出双方的想象；但在另一些情况下，幻灭来得非常迅速。若将这些类比应用于企业收购，那我必须说，通常是买方遭遇了令人不快的意外。在企业“求爱期”，人们很容易迷失自我。

Pursuing that analogy, I would say that our marital record remains largely acceptable, with all parties happy with the decisions they made long ago. Some of our tie-ups have been positively idyllic. A meaningful number, however, have caused me all too quickly to wonder what I was thinking when I proposed.
延续这个类比，我会说我们的“婚姻记录”总体上仍属可接受，所有相关方对当初的决定大多感到满意。有些结合简直称得上是“田园诗般的幸福”。但也有相当数量的合作让我很快就开始怀疑，当初求“婚”时我到底在想什么。

Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint: As the years pass, the “poor” business tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshire’s capital. Meanwhile, our “good” businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. Because of these contrasting trajectories, the assets employed at Berkshire’s winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital.
幸运的是，许多错误所造成的影响因一个共同特征而被减弱：大多数令人失望的企业，随着时间推移，往往会陷入停滞状态，其运营所需的伯克希尔资本占比也越来越小。与此同时，我们的“好”企业往往会持续成长，并找到以有吸引力的回报率投资新增资本的机会。由于这两类企业发展轨迹的反差，伯克希尔优质业务所使用的资本占比逐步扩大，形成了良性结构。

As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshire’s original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required nearly all of Berkshire’s capital. For some time, therefore, Berkshire’s non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually, though, we acquired a spread of “good” businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion of our capital.
一个极端的例子就是伯克希尔最初的纺织业务。当我们在1965年初取得该公司的控制权时，这家困难重重的企业几乎耗尽了伯克希尔的全部资本。因此，在相当一段时间里，纺织业务这一无盈利资产严重拖累了我们的整体回报。但最终，我们陆续收购了一系列“好企业”，随着业务重心的转变，到1980年代初，逐渐萎缩的纺织业务只占用了我们极小一部分的资本。
不产生资本收益就让其自然萎缩。
Today, we have most of your money deployed in controlled businesses that achieve good-to-excellent returns on the net tangible assets each requires for its operations. Our insurance business has been the superstar. That operation has special characteristics that give it a unique metric for calibrating success, one unfamiliar to many investors. We will save that discussion for the next section.
目前，我们将你们的大部分资金投放在控股业务上，这些业务在其运营所需的有形净资产上实现了良好至极佳的回报。我们的保险业务堪称明星业务。这一业务具备一些特殊属性，使其拥有一套独特的衡量成功的指标，这套标准对许多投资者而言并不熟悉。我们将在下一部分中专门讨论这个话题。

In the paragraphs that follow, we group our wide array of non-insurance businesses by size of earnings, after interest, depreciation, taxes, non-cash compensation, restructuring charges – all of those pesky, but very real, costs that CEOs and Wall Street sometimes urge investors to ignore. Additional information about these operations can be found on pages K-6 – K-21 and pages K-40 – K-52.
接下来的段落中，我们将根据盈利规模对旗下众多非保险业务进行分类。这些盈利数据是在扣除利息、折旧、税项、非现金薪酬、重组费用等各类恼人但真实存在的成本之后得出的——这些成本经常被CEO们和华尔街建议投资者忽略。有关这些业务的更多信息详见K-6至K-21页及K-40至K-52页。

Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) – the two lead dogs of Berkshire’s noninsurance group – earned a combined \$8.3 billion in 2019 (including only our 91% share of BHE), an increase of 6% from 2018.
我们的BNSF铁路公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（“BHE”）是伯克希尔非保险业务集团的两大“主力军”，2019年它们合计贡献了83亿美元的利润（其中BHE只计入我们持有的91%份额），较2018年增长6%。

Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate earnings in 2019 of \$4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018.
接下来五家按盈利排名（此处按字母顺序列出）的非保险子公司——Clayton Homes、International Metalworking、Lubrizol、Marmon和Precision Castparts——在2019年共实现盈利48亿美元，与2018年基本持平。

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned \$1.9 billion last year, up from the \$1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2018.
下一个梯队的五家公司，也按盈利排名（此处同样按字母顺序列出）：Berkshire Hathaway Automotive、Johns Manville、NetJets、Shaw和TTI，去年共实现盈利19亿美元，高于2018年这一组的17亿美元。

The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had aggregate earnings of \$2.7 billion in 2019, down from \$2.8 billion in 2018.
伯克希尔所持有的其余众多非保险业务在2019年合计盈利27亿美元，低于2018年的28亿美元。

Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to \$17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the \$17.2 billion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results.
我们在2019年从控股的非保险业务中获得的净利润总计为177亿美元，较2018年这些业务群体的172亿美元增长了3%。期间的收购和剥离交易对这些业绩几乎没有净影响。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire’s operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.
我必须补充最后一件事，以凸显伯克希尔业务范围之广。自2011年起，我们拥有了一家总部位于俄亥俄州的公司——Lubrizol，该公司在全球范围内生产和销售润滑油添加剂。2019年9月26日，一场起火于邻近小型设施的火灾蔓延至Lubrizol在法国的一家大型工厂。

The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.
这场事故造成了严重的财产损失，并对Lubrizol的业务运营造成重大中断。尽管如此，公司因财产损毁和业务中断所蒙受的损失将通过可观的保险理赔得到部分弥补。

But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by . . . uh, Berkshire.
但正如已故保罗·哈维在他著名的广播节目中常说的：“故事的下半段来了。”Lubrizol的主要保险公司之一竟然是……呃，伯克希尔旗下的一家公司。

In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to “Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth.” Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.
《马太福音》第6章第3节教导我们：“不要让左手知道右手所做的事。”你们的董事长显然是严格照做了。

Property/Casualty Insurance

财产与意外伤害保险业务

Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest P/C company in the world as measured by net worth. Insurance is a business of promises, and Berkshire’s ability to honor its commitments is unmatched.
我们的财产与意外伤害（“P/C”）保险业务自1967年以来一直是推动伯克希尔成长的核心引擎。那一年，我们以860万美元收购了National Indemnity及其姊妹公司National Fire & Marine。如今，以净资产计算，National Indemnity已成为全球最大的财产险公司。保险是一个建立在承诺之上的行业，而伯克希尔履行承诺的能力无人能及。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
我们被P/C保险业务吸引的原因之一在于它的商业模式：P/C保险公司先收取保费，后支付赔款。在一些极端情况下，比如石棉暴露引起的索赔或严重的工作场所事故，赔付时间可能会延续数十年。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
这种“先收后付”的模式使得P/C公司能够持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”（float）——这些钱最终将支付给他人。而在此期间，保险公司可以将浮存金用于自身投资。尽管个别保单和赔案不断更替，但保险公司所持有的浮存金总额通常与保费规模保持相对稳定。因此，随着我们的业务扩展，浮存金也随之增长。下表展示了我们浮存金的增长历程：

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or nearterm demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.
未来我们可能会经历浮存金的减少。如果发生，这种减少也将非常缓慢——每年最多不超过3%。我们保险合同的结构决定了我们永远不会面临对现金资源构成重大威胁的即期或短期资金需求。这种安排是我们有意设计的，也是我们保险公司无与伦比的财务实力的关键组成部分。这种实力绝不会被削弱。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过了总支出和最终赔付，我们的保险业务就会产生承保利润，而这笔利润会叠加在浮存金所带来的投资收益之上。当我们实现这类利润时，我们不仅能使用“免费资金”，更妙的是，还能因持有它而获得报酬。

For the P/C industry as a whole, the financial value of float is now far less than it was for many years. That’s because the standard investment strategy for almost all P/C companies is heavily – and properly – skewed toward high-grade bonds. Changes in interest rates therefore matter enormously to these companies, and during the last decade the bond market has offered pathetically low rates.
对整个财产险行业而言，浮存金的财务价值如今远不如多年来的水平。这是因为几乎所有财产险公司标准的投资策略都高度（也是合理地）倾向于投资高评级债券。因此，利率的变化对这些公司影响极大，而在过去十年里，债券市场提供的收益率低得可怜。

Consequently, insurers suffered, as year by year they were forced – by maturities or issuer-call provisions – to recycle their “old” investment portfolios into new holdings providing much lower yields. Where once these insurers could safely earn 5 cents or 6 cents on each dollar of float, they now take in only 2 cents or 3 cents (or even less if their operations are concentrated in countries mired in the never-never land of negative rates).
因此，保险公司遭受损失，因为它们年复一年被迫因债券到期或发行人赎回条款而将“旧”投资组合重新配置到收益率更低的“新”资产中。曾几何时，这些保险公司可在每一美元浮存金上安全地赚取5至6美分，如今却只能赚取2至3美分（如果其业务集中在深陷负利率“永无之地”的国家，收益甚至更少）。

Some insurers may try to mitigate their loss of revenue by buying lower-quality bonds or non-liquid “alternative” investments promising higher yields. But those are dangerous games and activities that most institutions are ill-equipped to play.
一些保险公司可能试图通过购买低质量债券或非流动性“另类”投资来弥补收入损失，这些投资承诺更高收益。但这种做法非常危险，大多数机构根本没有能力玩转这类游戏。

Berkshire’s situation is more favorable than that of insurers in general. Most important, our unrivaled mountain of capital, abundance of cash and a huge and diverse stream of non-insurance earnings allow us far more investment flexibility than is generally available to other companies in the industry. The many choices open to us are always advantageous – and sometimes have presented us with major opportunities.
伯克希尔的情况比大多数保险公司要好得多。最重要的是，我们拥有无与伦比的资本规模、充沛的现金流，以及庞大而多元的非保险业务收益来源，使我们在投资上拥有远超业内其他公司的灵活性。我们可选择的路径不仅始终具备优势，有时还为我们带来了重大机遇。

Our P/C companies have meanwhile had an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 16 of the last 17 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was a whopping $3.2 billion. For the entire 17-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27.5 billion, of which $400 million was recorded in 2019.
与此同时，我们的财产险公司在承保方面也取得了优异的业绩。在过去17年中，伯克希尔有16年实现了承保利润，唯一的例外是2017年，当年的税前亏损高达32亿美元。在这17年间，我们累计税前盈利达275亿美元，其中4亿美元来自2019年。

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the rewards of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
这样的成绩绝非偶然：严格的风险评估是我们保险经理人每天的工作重心。他们深知，浮存金带来的好处完全可能被糟糕的承保结果所吞噬。所有保险公司嘴上都承认这一点，而在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰——带有旧约圣经风格的虔诚信仰。

As I have repeatedly done in the past, I will emphasize now that happy outcomes in insurance are far from a sure thing: We will most certainly not have an underwriting profit in 16 of the next 17 years. Danger always lurks.
正如我过去多次强调的那样，现在我再次重申：保险业务的良好结果绝非理所当然。我们在未来17年中肯定不会再有16年获得承保利润。风险始终潜伏其间。

Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years – even decades – to surface and ripen. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as wind or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, Berkshire will get its share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, handling the loss will not come close to straining our resources, and we will be eager to add to our business the next day.
对保险风险的评估失误可能巨大，而且往往需要多年甚至数十年才能浮现和发酵（比如石棉事件）。一场远超卡特里娜飓风和迈克尔飓风的重大灾难迟早会发生——也许是明天，也许是几十年之后。“大事件”可能来自传统灾因，比如风灾或地震；也可能是全然意料之外的事件，比如一场网络攻击，其灾难性后果远超当今保险公司所能预料。当这种超大型灾难来临时，伯克希尔将承担它应有的一份损失，而且数额将非常巨大。但不同于许多其他保险公司，处理这种损失对我们的资源几乎不会构成压力，我们甚至会在次日积极扩展业务。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Close your eyes for a moment and try to envision a locale that might spawn a dynamic P/C insurer. New York? London? Silicon Valley?
闭上眼睛，试着想象一个可能孕育出一家充满活力的财产险公司（P/C）的地方。纽约？伦敦？硅谷？

How about Wilkes-Barre?
那威尔克斯-巴里呢？

Late in 2012, Ajit Jain, the invaluable manager of our insurance operations, called to tell me that he was buying a tiny company – GUARD Insurance Group – in that small Pennsylvania city for $221 million (roughly its net worth at the time). He added that Sy Foguel, GUARD’s CEO, was going to be a star at Berkshire. Both GUARD and Sy were new names to me.
2012年底，我们宝贵的保险业务负责人阿吉特·贾恩打电话告诉我，他正在以2.21亿美元的价格收购一家位于宾夕法尼亚州小城的微型公司——GUARD保险集团（当时大致相当于其净资产）。他还补充说，GUARD的首席执行官赛·福戈尔将会成为伯克希尔的一颗新星。GUARD和赛对我而言都是第一次听说的名字。

Bingo and bingo: In 2019, GUARD had premium volume of $1.9 billion, up 379% since 2012, and also delivered a satisfactory underwriting profit. Since joining Berkshire, Sy has led the company into both new products and new regions of the country and has increased GUARD’s float by 265%.
结果完美命中：到了2019年，GUARD的保费收入已达19亿美元，较2012年增长379%，并实现了令人满意的承保利润。自加入伯克希尔以来，赛带领公司拓展了新产品线和新的地区市场，同时将GUARD的浮存金规模提升了265%。

In 1967, Omaha seemed an unlikely launching pad for a P/C giant. Wilkes-Barre may well deliver a similar surprise.
1967年，奥马哈似乎并不是孕育财产险巨头的理想之地。而如今，威尔克斯-巴里或许也将带来类似的惊喜。

Berkshire Hathaway Energy

伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司

Berkshire Hathaway Energy is now celebrating its 20th year under our ownership. That anniversary suggests that we should be catching up with the company’s accomplishments.
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）如今迎来了我们持有它的第20个年头。这一周年正是我们回顾其成就的良机。

We’ll start with the topic of electricity rates. When Berkshire entered the utility business in 2000, purchasing 76% of BHE, the company’s residential customers in Iowa paid an average of 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Prices for residential customers have since risen less than 1% a year, and we have promised that there will be no base rate price increases through 2028. In contrast, here’s what is happening at the other large investor-owned Iowa utility: Last year, the rates it charged its residential customers were 61% higher than BHE’s. Recently, that utility received a rate increase that will widen the gap to 70%.
我们从电价谈起。伯克希尔于2000年进入公用事业行业，收购了BHE 76%的股份。当时，BHE在爱荷华州的居民客户支付的平均电价为每千瓦时8.8美分。从那以后，居民电价每年上涨幅度不到1%，而我们承诺，到2028年前都不会上调基础电价。对比来看，另一家大型的投资者所有的爱荷华州公用事业公司在去年向其居民客户收取的电价比BHE高出61%；而最近他们又获得了一次涨价批准，将这一差距进一步拉大到70%。

The extraordinary differential between our rates and theirs is largely the result of our huge accomplishments in converting wind into electricity. In 2021, we expect BHE’s operation to generate about 25.2 million megawatt-hours of electricity (MWh) in Iowa from wind turbines that it both owns and operates. That output will totally cover the annual needs of its Iowa customers, which run to about 24.6 million MWh. In other words, our utility will have attained wind self-sufficiency in the state of Iowa.
我们与对手之间这一巨大电价差异，主要得益于我们在风能发电方面取得的巨大成就。预计在2021年，BHE在爱荷华州自有并自营的风电机组将发电约2520万兆瓦时（MWh），完全足以满足我们当地客户每年约2460万兆瓦时的用电需求。换句话说，我们的公用事业公司将在爱荷华州实现风能自给。

In still another contrast, that other Iowa utility generates less than 10% of its power from wind. Furthermore, we know of no other investor-owned utility, wherever located, that by 2021 will have achieved a position of wind self-sufficiency. In 2000, BHE was serving an agricultural-based economy; today, three of its five largest customers are high-tech giants. I believe their decisions to site plants in Iowa were in part based upon BHE’s ability to deliver renewable, low-cost energy.
再看另一个对比，那家爱荷华州的竞争对手，其风力发电所占比例不到10%。此外，据我们所知，在2021年前，还没有任何一家投资者所有的公用事业公司——无论身处何地——能实现风能自给。2000年，BHE所服务的是一个以农业为主的经济体；而如今，其五大客户中已有三家是高科技巨头。我相信，他们选择在爱荷华州建厂，部分原因正是因为BHE能够提供可再生、低成本的能源。

Of course, wind is intermittent, and our blades in Iowa turn only part of the time. In certain periods, when the air is still, we look to our non-wind generating capacity to secure the electricity we need. At opposite times, we sell the excess power that wind provides us to other utilities, serving them through what’s called “the grid.” The power we sell them supplants their need for a carbon resource – coal, say, or natural gas.
当然，风力具有间歇性，我们在爱荷华州的风机并不是一直在转动。在风平气静的时段，我们会依靠非风力发电能力来确保电力供应。而在风力充足的时期，我们会将多余的风能电力销售给其他公用事业公司，通过所谓的“电网”向其输送。这些售出的电力取代了对方对碳资源——比如煤炭或天然气——的需求。

Berkshire Hathaway now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel. BHE has never paid Berkshire Hathaway a dividend since our purchase and has, as the years have passed, retained $28 billion of earnings. That pattern is an outlier in the world of utilities, whose companies customarily pay big dividends – sometimes reaching, or even exceeding, 80% of earnings. Our view: The more we can invest, the more we like it.
伯克希尔哈撒韦目前持有BHE 91%的股份，合作伙伴包括沃尔特·斯科特二世和格雷格·阿贝尔。自我们收购以来，BHE从未向伯克希尔支付过股息，而是累计保留了280亿美元的利润。这种做法在公用事业行业中非常罕见，该行业公司通常支付高额股息——有时甚至高达或超过利润的80%。我们的看法是：我们越能再投资，我们就越喜欢。

Today, BHE has the operating talent and experience to manage truly huge utility projects – requiring investments of $100 billion or more – that could support infrastructure benefitting our country, our communities and our shareholders. We stand ready, willing and able to take on such opportunities.
如今，BHE具备了运营能力和经验，能够管理真正庞大的公用事业项目——投资规模可能达1000亿美元甚至更高——这些项目能够支持对我们国家、社区以及股东都有益的基础设施建设。我们已准备就绪，愿意承担，并具备能力去抓住这样的机遇。
Investments
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz at December 31, 2019. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only $10.5 billion.

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
*** Includes $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum Corporation consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock.
Charlie and I do not view the $248 billion detailed above as a collection of stock market wagers – dalliances to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” an earnings “miss,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.
What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.
Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared to the returns that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 21⁄2% or even less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.
Forecasting interest rates has never been our game, and Charlie and I have no idea what rates will average over the next year, or ten or thirty years. Our perhaps jaundiced view is that the pundits who opine on these subjects reveal, by that very behavior, far more about themselves than they reveal about the future.
What we can say is that if something close to current rates should prevail over the coming decades and if corporate tax rates also remain near the low level businesses now enjoy, it is almost certain that equities will over time perform far better than long-term, fixed-rate debt instruments.
That rosy prediction comes with a warning: Anything can happen to stock prices tomorrow. Occasionally, there will be major drops in the market, perhaps of 50% magnitude or even greater. But the combination of The American Tailwind, about which I wrote last year, and the compounding wonders described by Mr. Smith, will make equities the much better long-term choice for the individual who does not use borrowed money and who can control his or her emotions. Others? Beware!
The Road Ahead
Three decades ago, my Midwestern friend, Joe Rosenfield, then in his 80s, received an irritating letter from his local newspaper. In blunt words, the paper asked for biographical data it planned to use in Joe’s obituary. Joe didn’t respond. So? A month later, he got a second letter from the paper, this one labeled “URGENT.”
Charlie and I long ago entered the urgent zone. That’s not exactly great news for us. But Berkshire shareholders need not worry: Your company is 100% prepared for our departure.
The two of us base our optimism upon five factors. First, Berkshire’s assets are deployed in an extraordinary variety of wholly or partly-owned businesses that, averaged out, earn attractive returns on the capital they use. Second, Berkshire’s positioning of its “controlled” businesses within a single entity endows it with some important and enduring economic advantages. Third, Berkshire’s financial affairs will unfailingly be managed in a manner allowing the company to withstand external shocks of an extreme nature. Fourth, we possess skilled and devoted top managers for whom running Berkshire is far more than simply having a high-paying and/or prestigious job. Finally, Berkshire’s directors – your guardians – are constantly focused on both the welfare of owners and the nurturing of a culture that is rare among giant corporations. (The value of this culture is explored in Margin of Trust, a new book by Larry Cunningham and Stephanie Cuba that will be available at our annual meeting.)
Charlie and I have very pragmatic reasons for wanting to assure Berkshire’s prosperity in the years following our exit: The Mungers have Berkshire holdings that dwarf any of the family’s other investments, and I have a full 99% of my net worth lodged in Berkshire stock. I have never sold any shares and have no plans to do so. My only disposal of Berkshire shares, aside from charitable donations and minor personal gifts, took place in 1980, when I, along with other Berkshire stockholders who elected to participate, exchanged some of our Berkshire shares for the shares of an Illinois bank that Berkshire had purchased in 1969 and that, in 1980, needed to be offloaded because of changes in the bank holding company law.
Today, my will specifically directs its executors – as well as the trustees who will succeed them in administering my estate after the will is closed – not to sell any Berkshire shares. My will also absolves both the executors and the trustees from liability for maintaining what obviously will be an extreme concentration of assets.
The will goes on to instruct the executors – and, in time, the trustees – to each year convert a portion of my A shares into B shares and then distribute the Bs to various foundations. Those foundations will be required to deploy their grants promptly. In all, I estimate that it will take 12 to 15 years for the entirety of the Berkshire shares I hold at my death to move into the market.
Absent my will’s directive that all my Berkshire shares should be held until their scheduled distribution dates, the “safe” course for both my executors and trustees would be to sell the Berkshire shares under their temporary control and reinvest the proceeds in U.S. Treasury bonds with maturities matching the scheduled dates for distributions. That strategy would leave the fiduciaries immune from both public criticism and the possibility of personal liability for failure to act in accordance with the “prudent man” standard.
I myself feel comfortable that Berkshire shares will provide a safe and rewarding investment during the disposal period. There is always a chance – unlikely, but not negligible – that events will prove me wrong. I believe, however, that there is a high probability that my directive will deliver substantially greater resources to society than would result from a conventional course of action.
Key to my “Berkshire-only” instructions is my faith in the future judgment and fidelity of Berkshire directors. They will regularly be tested by Wall Streeters bearing fees. At many companies, these super-salesmen might win. I do not, however, expect that to happen at Berkshire.
Boards of Directors
In recent years, both the composition of corporate boards and their purpose have become hot topics. Once, debate about the responsibilities of boards was largely limited to lawyers; today, institutional investors and politicians have weighed in as well.
My credentials for discussing corporate governance include the fact that, over the last 62 years, I have served as a director of 21 publicly-owned companies (listed below). In all but two of them, I have represented a substantial holding of stock. In a few cases, I have tried to implement important change.
During the first 30 or so years of my services, it was rare to find a woman in the room unless she represented a family controlling the enterprise. This year, it should be noted, marks the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which guaranteed American women the right to have their voices heard in a voting booth. Their attaining similar status in a board room remains a work in progress.
Over the years, many new rules and guidelines pertaining to board composition and duties have come into being. The bedrock challenge for directors, nevertheless, remains constant: Find and retain a talented CEO – possessing integrity, for sure – who will be devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime. Often, that task is hard. When directors get it right, though, they need to do little else. But when they mess it up, . . . . . .
Audit committees now work much harder than they once did and almost always view the job with appropriate seriousness. Nevertheless, these committees remain no match for managers who wish to game numbers, an offense that has been encouraged by the scourge of earnings “guidance” and the desire of CEOs to “hit the number.” My direct experience (limited, thankfully) with CEOs who have played with a company’s numbers indicates that they were more often prompted by ego than by a desire for financial gain.
Compensation committees now rely much more heavily on consultants than they used to. Consequently, compensation arrangements have become more complicated – what committee member wants to explain paying large fees year after year for a simple plan? – and the reading of proxy material has become a mind-numbing experience.
One very important improvement in corporate governance has been mandated: a regularly-scheduled “executive session” of directors at which the CEO is barred. Prior to that change, truly frank discussions of a CEO’s skills, acquisition decisions and compensation were rare.
Acquisition proposals remain a particularly vexing problem for board members. The legal orchestration for making deals has been refined and expanded (a word aptly describing attendant costs as well). But I have yet to see a CEO who craves an acquisition bring in an informed and articulate critic to argue against it. And yes, include me among the guilty.
 
Berkshire, Blue Chip Stamps, Cap Cities-ABC, Coca-Cola, Data Documents, Dempster, General Growth, Gillette, Kraft Heinz, Maracaibo Oil, Munsingwear, Omaha National Bank, Pinkerton’s, Portland Gas Light, Salomon,
Sanborn Map, Tribune Oil, U.S. Air, Vornado, Washington Post, Wesco Financial
Overall, the deck is stacked in favor of the deal that’s coveted by the CEO and his/her obliging staff. It would be an interesting exercise for a company to hire two “expert” acquisition advisors, one pro and one con, to deliver his or her views on a proposed deal to the board – with the winning advisor to receive, say, ten times a token sum paid to the loser. Don’t hold your breath awaiting this reform: The current system, whatever its shortcomings for shareholders, works magnificently for CEOs and the many advisors and other professionals who feast on deals. A venerable caution will forever be true when advice from Wall Street is contemplated: Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.
Over the years, board “independence” has become a new area of emphasis. One key point relating to this topic, though, is almost invariably overlooked: Director compensation has now soared to a level that inevitably makes pay a subconscious factor affecting the behavior of many non-wealthy members. Think, for a moment, of the director earning $250,000-300,000 for board meetings consuming a pleasant couple of days six or so times a year. Frequently, the possession of one such directorship bestows on its holder three to four times the annual median income of U.S. households. (I missed much of this gravy train: As a director of Portland Gas Light in the early 1960s, I received $100 annually for my service. To earn this princely sum, I commuted to Maine four times a year.)
And job security now? It’s fabulous. Board members may get politely ignored, but they seldom get fired. Instead, generous age limits – usually 70 or higher – act as the standard method for the genteel ejection of directors.
Is it any wonder that a non-wealthy director (“NWD”) now hopes – or even yearns – to be asked to join a second board, thereby vaulting into the $500,000-600,000 class? To achieve this goal, the NWD will need help. The CEO of a company searching for board members will almost certainly check with the NWD’s current CEO as to whether NWD is a “good” director. “Good,” of course, is a code word. If the NWD has seriously challenged his/her present CEO’s compensation or acquisition dreams, his or her candidacy will silently die. When seeking directors, CEOs don’t look for pit bulls. It’s the cocker spaniel that gets taken home.
Despite the illogic of it all, the director for whom fees are important – indeed, craved – is almost universally classified as “independent” while many directors possessing fortunes very substantially linked to the welfare of the corporation are deemed lacking in independence. Not long ago, I looked at the proxy material of a large American company and found that eight directors had never purchased a share of the company’s stock using their own money. (They, of course, had received grants of stock as a supplement to their generous cash compensation.) This particular company had long been a laggard, but the directors were doing wonderfully.
Paid-with-my-own-money ownership, of course, does not create wisdom or ensure business smarts. Nevertheless, I feel better when directors of our portfolio companies have had the experience of purchasing shares with their savings, rather than simply having been the recipients of grants.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Here, a pause is due: I’d like you to know that almost all of the directors I have met over the years have been decent, likable and intelligent. They dressed well, made good neighbors and were fine citizens. I’ve enjoyed their company. Among the group are some men and women that I would not have met except for our mutual board service and who have become close friends.
Nevertheless, many of these good souls are people whom I would never have chosen to handle money or business matters. It simply was not their game.
They, in turn, would never have asked me for help in removing a tooth, decorating their home or improving their golf swing. Moreover, if I were ever scheduled to appear on Dancing With the Stars, I would immediately seek refuge in the Witness Protection Program. We are all duds at one thing or another. For most of us, the list is long. The important point to recognize is that if you are Bobby Fischer, you must play only chess for money.
At Berkshire, we will continue to look for business-savvy directors who are owner-oriented and arrive with a strong specific interest in our company. Thought and principles, not robot-like “process,” will guide their actions. In representing your interests, they will, of course, seek managers whose goals include delighting their customers, cherishing their associates and acting as good citizens of both their communities and our country.
Those objectives are not new. They were the goals of able CEOs sixty years ago and remain so. Who would have it otherwise? Short Subjects
In past reports, we’ve discussed both the sense and nonsense of stock repurchases. Our thinking, boiled down: Berkshire will buy back its stock only if a) Charlie and I believe that it is selling for less than it is worth and b) the company, upon completing the repurchase, is left with ample cash.
Calculations of intrinsic value are far from precise. Consequently, neither of us feels any urgency to buy an estimated $1 of value for a very real 95 cents. In 2019, the Berkshire price/value equation was modestly favorable at times, and we spent $5 billion in repurchasing about 1% of the company.
Over time, we want Berkshire’s share count to go down. If the price-to-value discount (as we estimate it) widens, we will likely become more aggressive in purchasing shares. We will not, however, prop the stock at any level.
Shareholders having at least $20 million in value of A or B shares and an inclination to sell shares to Berkshire may wish to have their broker contact Berkshire’s Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. We request that you phone Mark between 8:00-8:30 a.m. or 3:00-3:30 p.m. Central Time, calling only if you are ready to sell.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In 2019, Berkshire sent $3.6 billion to the U.S. Treasury to pay its current income tax. The U.S. government collected $243 billion from corporate income tax payments during the same period. From these statistics, you can take pride that your company delivered 11⁄2% of the federal income taxes paid by all of corporate America.
Fifty-five years ago, when Berkshire entered its current incarnation, the company paid nothing in federal income tax. (For good reason, too: Over the previous decade, the struggling business had recorded a net loss.) Since then, as Berkshire retained nearly all of its earnings, the beneficiaries of that policy became not only the company’s shareholders but also the federal government. In most future years, we both hope and expect to send far larger sums to the Treasury.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
On pages A-2 – A-3, you will find details about our annual meeting, which will be held on May 2, 2020. Yahoo, as usual, will be streaming the event worldwide. There will be one important change, however, in our format: I’ve had suggestions from shareholders, media and board members that Ajit Jain and Greg Abel – our two key operating managers – be given more exposure at the meeting. That change makes great sense. They are outstanding individuals, both as managers and as human beings, and you should hear more from them.
Shareholders who this year send a question to be asked by our three long-serving journalists may specify that it be posed to Ajit or Greg. They, like Charlie and me, will not have even a hint of what the questions will be.
The journalists will alternate questions with those from the audience, who also can direct questions to any of the four of us. So polish up your zingers.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
On May 2nd, come to Omaha. Meet your fellow capitalists. Buy some Berkshire products. Have fun. Charlie and I – along with the entire Berkshire gang – are looking forward to seeing you.
February 22, 2020 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board

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