2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire earned \$42.5 billion in 2020 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The four components of that figure are \$21.9 billion of operating earnings, \$4.9 billion of realized capital gains, a \$26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an \$11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.

根据通用会计准则（即 GAAP），伯克希尔 2020 年的净收益为 425 亿美元。该数字由四部分组成：营业收益 219 亿美元；已实现资本收益 49 亿美元；所持股票净未实现资本收益增加带来的 267 亿美元收益；以及部分子公司与联营企业价值减记导致的 110 亿美元亏损。以上各项均为税后口径。

Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses. Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.

即便在营业收益并非 GAAP 合并数据最大项的年份，它仍是最重要的指标。伯克希尔一直专注于提升这一收入来源并收购优质且规模可观的企业。然而去年我们两项目标均未实现：伯克希尔没有进行大额并购，且营业收益下降了 9%。不过，通过保留利润并回购约 5% 的股份，我们仍提高了伯克希尔的每股内在价值。

不能体现在报表上。

The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today’s figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire’s capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.

GAAP 中与资本收益或损失相关的两项（无论已实现还是未实现）每年波动巨大，折射出股市涨跌。无论当前数字如何，我的长期合作伙伴查理·芒格和我坚信，随着时间推移，伯克希尔的投资持仓将贡献可观的资本收益。

As I’ve emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire’s holdings of marketable stocks – at yearend worth \$281 billion – as a collection of businesses. We don’t control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity. From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire’s income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.

我曾多次强调，查理和我把伯克希尔所持的流通股票——年末市值 2,810 亿美元——视作一组企业组合。我们虽不掌控这些公司的运营，却按比例分享其长期繁荣。然而在会计层面，我们应占的收益并未计入伯克希尔利润，账面仅记录被投资公司向我们支付的股息。在 GAAP 下，投资对象代我们保留的大额盈利自此隐形。

What’s out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value – lots of value – for Berkshire. Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings). As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country’s history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.

然而，看不见不代表不存在：这些未入账的留存收益通常正在为伯克希尔创造价值——而且是巨大的价值。投资对象利用留存资金扩张业务、进行并购、偿还债务，并常常回购本公司股份（此举会提高我们分享其未来收益的持股比例）。正如我们去年所述，留存收益在美国商业史上一以贯之地驱动发展。从卡内基、洛克菲勒时代开始，它的魔力已惠及数以百万计的股东。

Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire’s non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains. Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.

当然，我们的一些被投公司可能表现欠佳，留存收益对其价值贡献甚微，甚至毫无贡献；但也有公司超额完成，部分更是异彩纷呈。总体而言，我们预计伯克希尔非控股企业（他人所谓的权益投资组合）留存的巨额收益份额，最终将带来相当甚至更高的资本利得。在过去 56 年的经营中，这一预期一直得以兑现。

The final component in our GAAP figure – that ugly \$11 billion write-down – is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts (“PCC”), and I paid too much for the company.

GAAP 结果中的最后一个组成部分——那笔令人难堪的 110 亿美元减值——几乎完全量化了我在 2016 年犯下的一项错误。那一年，伯克希尔收购了精密铸件公司（PCC），而我为这家公司支付的价格过高。

No one misled me in any way – I was simply too optimistic about PCC’s normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC’s most important source of customers.

没有人以任何方式误导我——只是我对 PCC 的正常盈利潜力过于乐观。去年，航空航天行业的整体不利发展（PCC 最重要的客户来源）让我的误判暴露无遗。

In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company – the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC’s CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things.

收购 PCC 时，伯克希尔买下了一家优秀的企业——其所在行业的佼佼者。PCC 首席执行官马克·多尼根是一位充满激情的管理者，在我们收购前后始终以同样的投入倾注于这家公司。能由他掌舵，我们深感幸运。

I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.

我认为自己得出 PCC 依靠其运营中的净有形资产、长期能够获得良好回报的结论是正确的。然而，我在评估未来平均盈利水平上犯了错误，因此对应支付的合理价格也算错了。

PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one.

PCC 并不是我在这方面犯下的第一个错误，但这是一次重大的失误。

Two Strings to Our Bow

我们的一箭双雕

Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire – but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let’s review a little history.

伯克希尔经常被贴上“企业集团”这一标签——这个词带有贬义，指持有一堆彼此毫无关联业务的控股公司。的确，这在某种程度上描述了伯克希尔，但仅是部分情况。要理解我们与典型企业集团的不同之处及原因，我们先回顾一下历史。

Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.

长期以来，企业集团通常只专注于整买整卖地收购公司。然而，这一策略面临两大问题。其一是无法解决的：大多数真正优秀的公司根本不愿被任何人收购。因此，渴望并购的集团运营者只能把目光投向缺乏持久竞争优势的平庸企业。这显然不是一片优质的“钓鱼池”。

Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. (“I’ll pay you \$10,000 for your dog by giving you two of my \$5,000 cats.”)

更糟糕的是，当集团运营者涉足这些平庸企业时，往往需要支付惊人的“控制权溢价”才能捕获目标。雄心勃勃的集团运营者深知解决“付得过高”问题的办法：只需把自己公司的股票炒到远超实际价值，用这种“高估货币”去收购高价标的即可。（“我用两只各值 5,000 美元的猫，买你那条 10,000 美元的狗。”）

Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.

为抬高集团股价，常用的手段包括夸张宣传以及“富有想象力”的会计操作，这些做法至多称得上是误导，有时甚至触及欺诈。当这种把戏“成功”时，集团会把自己股票炒到实际价值的 3 倍，然后用其去收购目标公司，支付相当于目标价值 2 倍的对价。

Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the “proof” that an illusion is reality.

投资幻象往往能持续出乎意料的长时间。华尔街喜爱并购带来的丰厚费用，而媒体则偏爱多彩的推销故事。随着被炒作股票价格飞涨，这种上涨本身还会被当作“幻象成真”的证据。

Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.

当然，盛宴终会散场，很多商界“皇帝”最终被发现原来赤裸。金融史上不乏此类著名集团运营者：他们最初被记者、分析师和投行家奉为商业天才，而其打造的帝国最终却沦为破败的商业废墟。

Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.

企业集团的恶名并非空穴来风。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us.

查理和我希望我们的企业集团能全资或部分持有一系列拥有良好经济特性并配备优秀管理层的多元化公司。然而，伯克希尔是否对这些公司拥有控制权，对我们来说并不重要。

It took me a while to wise up. But Charlie – and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire – finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.

我花了一段时间才想明白这一点。但查理——以及我在伯克希尔继承的纺织业务上长达二十年的挣扎——最终让我确信：持有一家优秀企业的非控股股份，比全权经营一家边际企业更有利可图、更令人愉快，而且麻烦要少得多。

For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company’s durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price.

基于这些原因，我们的集团将继续由控股和非控股企业共同组成。查理和我只会根据企业持久的竞争优势、管理层的能力与品格以及价格，把你们的资本投向我们认为最合理的地方。

If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”

如果这一策略几乎不需我们付出额外努力，那就再好不过了。与跳水比赛的评分体系不同，商业世界并不会因为“难度系数”而给你加分。此外，正如罗纳德·里根所警示的那样：“据说努力工作从未害死任何人，但我可不想冒这个险。”

The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems

家族瑰宝，以及我们如何提升你在这些宝石中的份额

On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at year-end. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.

在附录 A-1，我们罗列了伯克希尔的各家子公司——这些林林总总的业务在年末共雇用了 36 万名员工。关于这些受控经营实体的更多信息，可参阅本报告后部的大篇幅 10-K。我们在未控股但持有重要股份的公司中的主要持仓，列于本信第 7 页。那部分业务组合同样规模庞大、类型多元。

Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.

然而，伯克希尔的大部分价值集中在四项业务上：其中三家为我们控股，一家我们仅持有 5.4% 股权。这四家业务皆为瑰宝。

The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.

价值最高的是我们的财产/意外险业务，该业务 53 年来一直是伯克希尔的核心。我们的保险集团在业内独树一帜，其掌舵人阿吉特·贾恩同样非凡——他于 1986 年加入伯克希尔。

Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.

整体而言，我们的保险舰队运用的资本规模远超全球任何竞争对手。凭借这一财务实力，再加上伯克希尔每年从非保险业务源源不断获得的大量现金流，使得我们的保险公司能够安全地实施股权占比极高的投资策略——这一点绝大多数保险商因监管和评级原因只能专注债券，难以效仿。

没有第二家保险公司能做到的差异化。

And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at year-end – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.

而如今债券并非理想去处。你能相信 10 年期美国国债的收益率在年末仅为 0.93% 吗——比 1981 年 9 月那 15.8% 的收益率下滑了 94%。在德国、日本等一些重要大国，投资者在数万亿美元的主权债务上甚至获得负收益。全球固定收益投资者——无论是养老金、保险公司还是退休人群——都面临黯淡前景。

Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.

一些保险商和其他债券投资者，可能会把买盘转向资质堪忧的借款方所发行的债务，以图提升可怜的收益率。然而，风险贷款并非低利率困境的解药。三十年前，曾经强大的储贷协会业正是因为无视此箴言而自毁长城。

Berkshire now enjoys \$138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds.

伯克希尔目前拥有 1,380 亿美元的保险“浮存金”——这笔资金虽不属于我们，却可由我们自由调配，无论投资于债券、股票还是美国国库券等现金等价物。浮存金与银行存款有些相似：资金每天流入流出保险公司，但其总量变化甚微。伯克希尔手中的巨额浮存金很可能在多年内保持现有水平，并且累计来看对我们无成本。当然，这一利好结果或许会改变——但从长期来看，我看好我们的胜算。

I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.

我已在历年的致股东信中反复——有人可能会说是没完没了——阐述我们的保险业务。因此，今年我建议希望深入了解保险业务及“浮存金”的新股东翻阅 2019 年报告中相关章节（重印于附录 A-2）。了解我们保险业务中的风险与机遇同样重要。

Our second and third most valuable assets – it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point – are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from \$122 million to \$3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.

我们排在第二、第三的最有价值资产——目前几乎难分伯仲——是伯克希尔全资拥有的 BNSF（按货运量计为美国最大铁路公司），以及我们持有 5.4% 股权的苹果公司。排在第四位的是我们 91% 持股的伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）。这是一家非常独特的公用事业企业，在我们 21 年的持有期内，其年度收益已从 1.22 亿美元增长到 34 亿美元。

I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.

稍后在信中我还会谈到 BNSF 和 BHE。现在，我想重点说明一项伯克希尔将定期采用的做法，以提升你们在“超级四强”以及伯克希尔其他众多资产中的持股份额。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending \$24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.

去年，我们通过回购相当于 80,998 股“A”类股份、耗资 247 亿美元的行动，表达了对伯克希尔资产组合的热情。这一举措在不需要你额外投入一分钱的情况下，使你在伯克希尔全部业务中的持股比例提高了 5.2%。

Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.

按照查理和我长期坚持的标准，我们之所以进行这些回购，是因为我们相信它们既能提升留存股东的每股内在价值，又能确保伯克希尔在面对任何机遇或挑战时仍拥有充裕资金。

In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.

我们绝不认为伯克希尔股票应在任何价格下都进行回购。我强调这一点，是因为美国 CEO 们在回购方面有一项尴尬记录：股价上涨时投入更多资金，股价低迷时反而按兵不动。而我们的做法恰恰相反。

Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple.

伯克希尔对苹果的投资生动展现了回购的威力。我们在 2016 年底开始买入苹果股票，到 2018 年 7 月初（经拆股调整后）持股略超 10 亿股。这里指的是伯克希尔普通账户中的投资，不包括后来已出售的一小笔独立管理持仓。2018 年年中完成买入时，伯克希尔普通账户持有苹果 5.2% 的股份。

Our cost for that stake was \$36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about \$775 million annually, and have also – in 2020 – pocketed an additional \$11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.

这笔持股的成本为 360 亿美元。此后，我们既享受了平均每年约 7.75 亿美元的常规分红，还在 2020 年通过出售一小部分持仓额外回笼 110 亿美元。

Despite that sale – voila! – Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.

尽管进行了上述出售——瞧！——伯克希尔如今仍持有苹果 5.4% 的股份。该比例的提升对我们来说完全零成本，因为苹果持续回购自家股票，大幅减少了流通股数。

But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 21⁄2 years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.

而好消息远不止于此。在过去两年半里，我们还回购了伯克希尔的股票，因此你现在间接拥有的苹果资产及未来收益，比 2018 年 7 月时整整多出 10%。

This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.

这种令人欣喜的动态仍在继续。年终以来伯克希尔又回购了更多股票，未来很可能进一步减少流通股数。苹果也已公开表示将继续回购股份。随着这些回购推进，伯克希尔股东不仅将在我们的保险集团、BNSF 和 BHE 中拥有更大权益，其间接持有的苹果股份也将随之增加。

The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.

回购的数学效应虽然缓慢，却能在时间的磨砺下展现强大力量。该过程为投资者提供了一条简易路径，让他们在卓越企业中持有不断扩大的份额。

And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful.”

正如风情万种的梅·韦斯特所言：“好东西再多一些……妙不可言。”

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend were our largest in market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding — 325,442,152 shares — because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for that investment using the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of \$13.3 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz on December 31, 2020. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only \$11.3 billion.

下文列出了年末按市值计我们规模最大的十五项普通股投资。我们不包括卡夫亨氏持股——325,442,152 股——因为伯克希尔与其他股东组成控股集团，必须采用“权益法”核算该投资。在资产负债表中，伯克希尔按美国通用会计准则（GAAP）将卡夫亨氏持股计为 133 亿美元，该金额代表截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日伯克希尔所占卡夫亨氏经审计净资产的份额。但请注意，当日我们所持股份的市值仅为 113 亿美元。

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.

不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金计划持有的股份。

** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.

这是我们的实际购入成本，也是我们的税务成本基础。

*** Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $9 billion.

其中包括对西方石油价值 100 亿美元的投资，形式为优先股以及购买普通股的认股权证，当前合计估值约为 90 亿美元。

A Tale of Two Cities

双城记

Success stories abound throughout America. Since our country’s birth, individuals with an idea, ambition and often just a pittance of capital have succeeded beyond their dreams by creating something new or by improving the customer’s experience with something old.

在美国，大大小小的成功故事比比皆是。自建国以来，许多怀揣创意与雄心、甚至仅凭微薄资本的个人，通过创造新品或改良旧品的客户体验，成就了远超梦想的事业。

Charlie and I journeyed throughout the nation to join with many of these individuals or their families. On the West Coast, we began the routine in 1972 with our purchase of See’s Candy. A full century ago, Mary See set out to deliver an age-old product that she had reinvented with special recipes. Added to her business plan were quaint stores staffed by friendly salespeople. Her first small outlet in Los Angeles eventually led to several hundred shops, spread throughout the West.

查理和我走遍全国，与这些创业者或其家族结缘。在西海岸，我们的这段历程始于 1972 年收购的 See’s Candy。一百年前，Mary See凭借独家配方重新演绎传统糖果，并配以古朴店面与亲切店员。她在洛杉矶开设的第一间小店，最终发展成遍布美国西部的数百家门店。

Today, Mrs. See’s creations continue to delight customers while providing life-long employment for thousands of women and men. Berkshire’s job is simply not to meddle with the company’s success. When a business manufactures and distributes a non-essential consumer product, the customer is the boss. And, after 100 years, the customer’s message to Berkshire remains clear: “Don’t mess with my candy.” (The website is https://www.sees.com; try the peanut brittle.)

如今，Mrs. See的糖果依旧让顾客喜爱，同时为成千上万的员工提供终身就业。伯克希尔的任务就是别去干预这家公司的成功。对于提供非必需消费品的企业而言，顾客就是老板。历经百年，顾客对伯克希尔的诉求依旧明晰：“别动我的糖！”（官网：https://www.sees.com；推荐花生酥脆糖。）

Let’s move across the continent to Washington, D.C. In 1936, Leo Goodwin, along with his wife, Lillian, became convinced that auto insurance – a standardized product customarily purchased from agents – could be sold directly at a much lower price. Armed with \$100,000, the pair took on giant insurers possessing 1,000 times or more their capital. Government Employees Insurance Company (later shortened to GEICO) was on its way.

让我们跨越大陆来到华盛顿特区。1936 年，Leo Goodwin与妻子Lillian坚信：汽车保险这种标准化产品无需透过代理，也可用大幅低价直接售予客户。凭借 10 万美元资本，他们向资本规模高出千倍的保险巨头发起挑战。政府雇员保险公司（后简写为 GEICO）就此启程。

By luck, I was exposed to the company’s potential a full 70 years ago. It instantly became my first love (of an investment sort). You know the rest of the story: Berkshire eventually became the 100% owner of GEICO, which at 84 years of age is constantly fine-tuning – but not changing – the vision of Leo and Lillian.

幸运的是，70 年前我就看到了这家公司的潜力，它立刻成为我投资生涯的“初恋”。故事的后续大家已了然：伯克希尔最终全资控股了 GEICO。如今 84 岁的 GEICO 始终在微调，却从未偏离Leo和Lillian的最初愿景。

There has been, however, a change in the company’s size. In 1937, its first full year of operation, GEICO did \$238,288 of business. Last year the figure was \$35 billion.

不过，公司规模却发生了巨变。1937 年——GEICO 完成首个完整经营年度——其业务量仅为 238,288 美元；而去年，这一数字已达到 350 亿美元。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Today, with much of finance, media, government and tech located in coastal areas, it’s easy to overlook the many miracles occurring in middle America. Let’s focus on two communities that provide stunning illustrations of the talent and ambition existing throughout our country.

如今，随着金融、媒体、政府及科技业大多集中于沿海地区，人们容易忽视美国中部发生的诸多奇迹。让我们聚焦两个社区，它们生动诠释了全国各地的才智与抱负。

You will not be surprised that I begin with Omaha.

我先从奥马哈谈起，这一点并不令人意外。

In 1940, Jack Ringwalt, a graduate of Omaha’s Central High School (the alma mater as well of Charlie, my dad, my first wife, our three children and two grandchildren), decided to start a property/casualty insurance company funded by \$125,000 in capital.

1940 年，Jack Ringwalt——奥马哈中央高中毕业生（查理、我的父亲、我的第一任妻子、我们的三个孩子及两个孙辈亦毕业于此）——决定创办一家以 12.5 万美元资本起步的财产与意外险公司。

Jack’s dream was preposterous, requiring his pipsqueak operation – somewhat pompously christened as National Indemnity – to compete with giant insurers, all of which operated with abundant capital. Additionally, those competitors were solidly entrenched with nationwide networks of well-funded and long-established local agents. Under Jack’s plan, National Indemnity, unlike GEICO, would itself use whatever agencies deigned to accept it and consequently enjoy no cost advantage in its acquisition of business. To overcome those formidable handicaps, National Indemnity focused on “odd-ball” risks, which were deemed unimportant by the “big boys.” And, improbably, the strategy succeeded.

Jack的梦想可谓大胆——让自己这家取名颇显张扬的“小不点”公司“国家赔偿”去挑战资本雄厚的保险巨头。此外，这些竞争者还依托历史悠久、资金充裕的本地代理商网络遍布全国。而Jack的计划中，国家赔偿并不像 GEICO 那样自建直销模式，而是依赖愿意合作的代理商，因而并无成本优势。为克服这些劣势，国家赔偿专攻“大公司”视为无足轻重的“怪风险”，没想到这一策略竟然奏效。

差异化。

Jack was honest, shrewd, likeable and a bit quirky. In particular, he disliked regulators. When he periodically became annoyed with their supervision, he would feel an urge to sell his company.

Jack为人诚实、精明、讨喜且略显古怪，尤其不喜欢监管者。每当他被监管困扰得不耐烦时，就会冒出出售公司的念头。

Fortunately, I was nearby on one of those occasions. Jack liked the idea of joining Berkshire, and we made a deal in 1967, taking all of 15 minutes to reach a handshake. I never asked for an audit.

幸运的是，其中一次他动念出售时我恰在附近。Jack认同加入伯克希尔的想法，我们在 1967 年达成交易，仅用 15 分钟便握手成交。我甚至未要求审计。

Today National Indemnity is the only company in the world prepared to insure certain giant risks. And, yes, it remains based in Omaha, a few miles from Berkshire’s home office.

如今，国家赔偿已成为全球唯一愿意承保某些巨额风险的公司。没错，它仍坐落于奥马哈，距离伯克希尔总部仅数英里。

Over the years, we have purchased four additional businesses from Omaha families, the best known among them being Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”). The company’s founder, Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”), arrived in Seattle in 1915 as a Russian emigrant, unable to read or speak English. She settled in Omaha several years later and by 1936 had saved \$2,500 with which to start a furniture store.

这些年里，我们又从奥马哈本地家族购入四家企业，其中最著名的是“内布拉斯加家具城”（NFM）。其创始人Rose Blumkin（“B 夫人”）于 1915 年以俄国移民身份抵达西雅图，不会读写或说英语。数年后她定居奥马哈，并在 1936 年攒下 2,500 美元开设了一家家具店。

Competitors and suppliers ignored her, and for a time their judgment seemed correct: World War II stalled her business, and at yearend 1946, the company’s net worth had grown to only \$72,264. Cash, both in the till and on deposit, totaled \$50 (that’s not a typo).

起初，竞争者与供应商皆不把她放在眼里，这种判断一度看似正确：二战令其业务受挫，截至 1946 年底，公司净资产仅 72,264 美元，账上现金（含库存及银行存款）合计 50 美元（没错，非误值）。

One invaluable asset, however, went unrecorded in the 1946 figures: Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s only son, had rejoined the store after four years in the U.S. Army. Louie fought at Normandy’s Omaha Beach following the D-Day invasion, earned a Purple Heart for injuries sustained in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally sailed home in November 1945.

然而，1946 年报表中漏掉了一项宝贵资产：B 夫人唯一的儿子Louie Blumkin服役四年后重返店铺。诺曼底登陆后，他在Omaha海滩参战，又在突出部战役中负伤获颁紫心勋章，最终于 1945 年 11 月返乡。

Once Mrs. B and Louie were reunited, there was no stopping NFM. Driven by their dream, mother and son worked days, nights and weekends. The result was a retailing miracle.

母子聚首后，NFM 一路高歌猛进。怀揣梦想，他们日以继夜、周末无休地干劲十足，最终缔造了零售奇迹。

By 1983, the pair had created a business worth \$60 million. That year, on my birthday, Berkshire purchased 80% of NFM, again without an audit. I counted on Blumkin family members to run the business; the third and fourth generation do so today. Mrs. B, it should be noted, worked daily until she was 103 – a ridiculously premature retirement age as judged by Charlie and me.

至 1983 年，母子二人将公司价值做至 6,000 万美元。同年，我生日那天，伯克希尔收购 NFM 80% 股权，再次未做审计。我依旧把经营交给Blumkin家族，如今由第三、第四代掌舵。值得一提的是，B 夫人每日工作直至 103 岁——在查理和我看来，这样的“退休”可谓早得离谱。

NFM now owns the three largest home-furnishings stores in the U.S. Each set a sales record in 2020, a feat achieved despite the closing of NFM’s stores for more than six weeks because of COVID-19.

现今，NFM 拥有全美最大的三家家居卖场。即便因新冠疫情门店停业逾六周，它们仍在 2020 年均创下销售纪录。

A post-script to this story says it all: When Mrs. B’s large family gathered for holiday meals, she always asked that they sing a song before eating. Her selection never varied: Irving Berlin’s “God Bless America.”

故事的尾声最能说明一切：B 夫人家族聚餐时，她总要大家在开席前唱首歌，曲目永远不变——欧文·柏林的《天佑美利坚》。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Let’s move somewhat east to Knoxville, the third largest city in Tennessee. There, Berkshire has ownership in two remarkable companies – Clayton Homes (100% owned) and Pilot Travel Centers (38% owned now, but headed for 80% in 2023).

接下来让我们向东来到田纳西州第三大城市诺克斯维尔。伯克希尔在这里持有两家非凡公司的股份—— Clayton住宅（全资持有）和Pilot旅行中心（目前持股 38%，预计 2023 年增至 80%）。

Each company was started by a young man who had graduated from the University of Tennessee and stayed put in Knoxville. Neither had a meaningful amount of capital nor wealthy parents.

这两家公司都由毕业于田纳西大学、并选择留在诺克斯维尔的年轻人创立。他们既没有雄厚资金，也没有富裕的父母。

But, so what? Today, Clayton and Pilot each have annual pre-tax earnings of more than \$1 billion. Together they employ about 47,000 men and women.

但这又如何？如今，Clayton和Pilot各自的年税前利润均超过 10 亿美元，共计雇佣约 4.7 万名员工。

Jim Clayton, after several other business ventures, founded Clayton Homes on a shoestring in 1956, and “Big Jim” Haslam started what became Pilot Travel Centers in 1958 by purchasing a service station for \$6,000. Each of the men later brought into the business a son with the same passion, values and brains as his father. Sometimes there is a magic to genes.

Jim Clayton在尝试了数项创业后，于 1956 年以微薄资本创立Clayton住宅；而“老吉姆” Haslam则在 1958 年用 6,000 美元买下一个加油站，开启了Pilot旅行中心的前身。后来，两位创始人各自让与父辈同样充满激情、秉承相同价值观且头脑灵活的儿子加入业务。有时候基因确实充满魔力。

“Big Jim” Haslam, now 90, has recently authored an inspirational book in which he relates how Jim Clayton’s son, Kevin, encouraged the Haslams to sell a large portion of Pilot to Berkshire. Every retailer knows that satisfied customers are a store’s best salespeople. That’s true when businesses are changing hands as well.

现年 90 岁的“老吉姆” Haslam最近撰写了一本励志书，讲述了Jim Clayton之子Kevin如何鼓励Haslam家族将Pilot的大部分股权出售给伯克希尔。每位零售商都明白：满意的顾客才是最好的推销员。企业易主时，这一点同样适用。

Pilot的交易最终不算顺利。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

When you next fly over Knoxville or Omaha, tip your hat to the Claytons, Haslams and Blumkins as well as to the army of successful entrepreneurs who populate every part of our country. These builders needed America’s framework for prosperity – a unique experiment when it was crafted in 1789 – to achieve their potential. In turn, America needed citizens like Jim C., Jim H., Mrs. B and Louie to accomplish the miracles our founding fathers sought.

当你下次飞越诺克斯维尔或奥马哈时，不妨向Claytons家族、Haslams家族和Blumkins家族，以及遍布全国各地、那些成功创业者们致敬。这些建设者们要实现他们的潜能，就需要美国在1789年开辟的那套繁荣框架——当时它还是一个独特的实验。反过来，美国也需要像Jim C.、Jim H.、Mrs. B和Louie这样的公民，去完成我们的开国元勋所期望的“奇迹”。

Today, many people forge similar miracles throughout the world, creating a spread of prosperity that benefits all of humanity. In its brief 232 years of existence, however, there has been no incubator for unleashing human potential like America. Despite some severe interruptions, our country’s economic progress has been breathtaking.

如今，全球许多人正创造着同样的奇迹，播撒繁荣惠及全人类。然而在短短232年的历史中，还没有任何地方能像美国这样，成为释放人类潜能的摇篮。尽管经历了数次重大中断，我们国家的经济进步依然令人惊叹。

Beyond that, we retain our constitutional aspiration of becoming “a more perfect union.” Progress on that front has been slow, uneven and often discouraging. We have, however, moved forward and will continue to do so.

此外，我们依然怀揣着宪法所倡导的“更加完善的联盟”之愿景。虽然在这一领域的进展缓慢、曲折，并且时常令人沮丧，但我们已经取得了前进，并将继续前行。

Our unwavering conclusion: Never bet against America.

我们坚定的结论是：永远不要对美国下注。

The Berkshire Partnership

伯克希尔合伙人关系

Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.

伯克希尔是一家特拉华州注册公司，我们的董事必须遵守该州法律，其中一项规定要求董事会成员必须维护公司及其股东的最大利益。我们的董事们完全认同并践行这一原则。

In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.

当然，伯克希尔的董事们也希望公司能让客户满意，培养并奖励36万名员工的才干，对债权人坚守诚信，并在我们运营的众多城市和州中，赢得良好公民的美誉。我们重视这四大重要利益群体。

None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’s directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.

不过，上述四大群体均无权对诸如股息分配、战略方向、CEO人选或并购及资产剥离等事项进行表决。这些职责完全由伯克希尔的董事承担，他们必须忠实维护公司及其所有者的长期利益。

Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.

超越法律义务，查理和我对伯克希尔的众多散户股东怀有特殊的责任感。以下一段个人经历或许能帮助你理解我们的这份特殊情怀，以及它如何塑造我们的行为。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”).

在加入伯克希尔之前，我通过一系列合伙企业为多位个人管理资金，其中最早的三个合伙于1956年成立。随着时间推移，多家实体的运作变得难以为继，1962年我们将12家合伙企业合并为一家——伯克希尔合伙有限公司（Buffett Partnership Ltd.，简称“BPL”）。

By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”) As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.

到那一年，几乎我和我妻子的全部资金都与众多有限合伙人的资金一道投入其中。我既不领取薪酬也不收取管理费。作为普通合伙人，只有在合伙人获得超过6%年回报后，我才能分享超出部分的收益；若回报低于6%，差额则从我未来的利润份额中扣除。（幸运的是，这种情况从未发生：合伙回报始终超过6%的“基准”）。随着岁月流逝，我的父母、兄弟姐妹、叔伯姑舅、表亲以及姻亲家庭的大量资产也陆续投向该合伙企业。

Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did. Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals – either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.

查理于1962年成立了自己的合伙企业，运作方式与我大同小异。我们都没有机构投资者，合伙人也很少精通金融。选择与我们合作的投资者，仅仅是因为信任我们会像打理自有资金那样打理他们的资产。他们——或凭直觉、或听从朋友建议——判断正确：查理和我对永久性资本损失极度厌恶，绝不会在预期业绩平平的情况下接受他人资金。

I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.

1965年，BPL收购伯克希尔后，我意外进入了企业经营领域。再后来，1969年我们决定解散BPL。年终后，合伙企业按比例将所有现金和三只股票分配给合伙人，其中价值最大的是BPL持有的伯克希尔70.5%股权。

Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.

与此同时，查理于1977年结束了他的合伙企业。他分配给合伙人的资产中包括对蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）的一项重大股权——这家公司由他的合伙企业、伯克希尔和我共同控制。蓝筹邮票也在我解散BPL时分配的三只股票之列。

In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’s base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone – old, new and prospective shareholders – to be on the same page.

1983年，伯克希尔与蓝筹邮票合并，使伯克希尔的注册股东由1,900人增至2,900人。查理和我希望所有股东——无论新旧及潜在者——都能对公司有统一的认识。

Therefore, the 1983 annual report – up front – laid out Berkshire’s “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well – believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.

因此，1983年年报开篇就阐述了伯克希尔的“主要经营原则”。其中首条写道：“尽管我们以公司形式运作，但我们的心态是一家合伙企业。”这一定义了我们在1983年的关系，也定义了我们至今的态度。查理、我以及董事们都深信，这条箴言将在未来数十年中继续为伯克希尔保驾护航。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by me as a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies.

如今，伯克希尔的所有权分布在五个大型“股东群”中，其中一类是我作为某种意义上的“创始人”所持有的股份。这部分股份注定将逐步归零，因为我每年都会将持股捐赠给不同的慈善机构。

Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people’s money. That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.

其余四个股东群中的两个属于机构投资者，他们管理着他人的资金。然而，这两个群体的相似性仅限于此：他们的投资模式几乎截然不同。

In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S\&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.

第一个机构股东群是指数基金，这是投资界一个庞大且持续扩张的群体。这些基金只是简单复制它们所跟踪的指数。指数投资者的首选标的是标普500指数，而伯克希尔正是该指数的成分股之一。需要强调的是，指数基金持有伯克希尔股票，仅仅是因为必须如此做。它们处于自动驾驶状态，只为指数权重调整而买卖股票。

In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.

另一个机构股东群则由专业人士组成，他们受托管理客户的资金，这些客户可能是富裕人士、大学、养老金领取者或其他任何群体。这些专业管理人有责任根据对估值和前景的判断，将资金从一种投资调配到另一种投资。这是一份光荣但艰巨的工作。

We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.

我们乐意为这个“主动投资”群体工作，与此同时，他们也在寻找更好的机会来配置客户的资金。诚然，有些管理人注重长期投资，很少交易；另一些则使用计算机和算法，在纳秒之间进行股票买卖；还有一些专业投资者会根据宏观经济判断，随时调整持仓。

Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.

第四个股东群由个人投资者组成，他们的投资方式类似于前述的主动型机构投资经理。当这些投资者看到其他更具吸引力的投资机会时，自然会将持有的伯克希尔股票视作潜在的资金来源。我们对这种态度并无异议，因为我们在管理伯克希尔自身持有的部分股票时，也会采用相似的思路。

All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.

尽管如此，如果查理和我对第五个股东群——那百万余名个人投资者没有一种特别的亲切感，就未免太不近人情了。这些投资者无条件信任我们能维护他们的利益，不论未来如何变化。他们加入我们时，就没有离开的打算，持有的心态与我们最初合伙人时期的投资者相似。事实上，许多合伙人时代的投资者及其后代，至今仍是伯克希尔的重要股东。

A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.

Stan Truhlsen是这些资深投资者的典型代表。他是一位开朗大方的奥马哈眼科医生，也是我的挚友，2020年11月13日刚满100岁。1959年，Stan和其他10位年轻的奥马哈医生与我共同成立了一个合伙企业。这些医生别出心裁地将企业命名为“Emdee有限公司”。每年，他们都会与我和我的妻子在家中聚餐庆祝。

When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners.

1969年，当我们的合伙企业分发伯克希尔股票时，所有医生都保留了所分配的股份。他们也许并不熟悉投资或会计的细节，但他们清楚一点：在伯克希尔，他们会得到合伙人的待遇。

Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability – along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively – serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?

Stan在Emdee的两位伙伴如今都已年逾九旬，仍继续持有伯克希尔股票。这个群体惊人的长寿，再加上查理和我分别已达97岁和90岁，不禁引发一个有趣的问题：难道持有伯克希尔股票有助于长寿？

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’t think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.

伯克希尔拥有这样一个独特且珍贵的个人股东群体，这或许能帮助你理解我们为何不愿费力去取悦华尔街的分析师和机构投资者。我们已拥有了自己期望的投资者，而且总体来看，我们并不认为将他们替换掉能带来任何提升。

There are only so many seats – that is, shares outstanding – available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.

伯克希尔的席位——也就是已发行的股票数量——毕竟有限，而我们非常喜欢目前占据这些席位的人。

Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?

当然，“合伙人”的变动偶尔会发生。不过，查理和我希望这种变动越少越好。毕竟，有谁会希望朋友、邻居或者婚姻对象频繁更换呢？

In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find upon entering your premises.

1958年，菲利普·费雪（Phil Fisher）撰写了一本出色的投资经典。他在书中将经营一家上市公司比作管理一家餐厅。他表示，如果你想招揽顾客并获得成功，可以选择提供汉堡配可乐，也可以提供法式料理配名贵葡萄酒。但费雪同时也告诫：切不可随意在两种风格之间摇摆不定。你向潜在客户传递的信息，必须与他们走进你的餐厅后实际获得的体验保持一致。

At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.

在伯克希尔，我们已经提供了56年的汉堡配可乐。我们珍视这些菜品所吸引到的客户。

The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors. “Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.

在美国和全球范围内，数以千万计的其他投资者和投机者能找到各种适合自己口味的股票。他们总能找到拥有迷人想法的CEO和市场专家。如果他们喜欢价格目标、粉饰的利润数据或“动人故事”，追求者从来不缺。“技术派”则会自信地告诉他们股价图表上的某些波动预示着下一步股票会如何发展。这种不断鼓动行动的声音永远不会停歇。

Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S\&P 500, will – over time – enjoy dividends and capital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original “selections.”

需要补充的是，上述许多投资者会获得不错的回报。毕竟，持有股票总体而言是一种“正和博弈”。事实上，只要保持耐心和冷静，即便是一只猴子随意将50支飞镖扔向一张标有标普500指数成分股的标靶来构建投资组合，长期下来也能享受股息与资本收益——前提是它不会因诱惑而随意调整最初的“选择”。

Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth – lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.

像农场、地产以及企业股权这样的生产性资产能够创造财富——而且是大量财富。这些资产的大多数所有者都会获得丰厚的回报。他们所需要做的仅仅是等待时间推移，保持内心平静，适当分散投资，尽量减少交易和费用。然而，投资者绝不能忘记：你所支付的费用正是华尔街的收入来源。另外，与我前面提到的那只猴子不同，华尔街人士可不会为几颗花生米就替你工作。

When seats open up at Berkshire – and we hope they are few – we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.

当伯克希尔的席位出现空缺时——当然我们希望这种情况很少发生——我们希望补位者是那些真正了解并欣赏我们所提供价值的投资者。经过几十年的管理，查理和我仍然无法承诺具体的投资回报，但我们能也确实做出这样的承诺：我们将始终如一地把你们视作合伙人。

And so, too, will our successors.

我们的继任者也会继续如此。

A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You

伯克希尔一个或许令你意外的数字

Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected: Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment – the sort of assets that make up the “business infrastructure” of our country – with a GAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company. Berkshire’s depreciated cost of these domestic “fixed assets” is \$154 billion. Next in line on this list is AT\&T, with property, plant and equipment of \$127 billion.

最近，我了解到公司一个自己都没想到的事实：伯克希尔所拥有的位于美国境内的地产、厂房和设备，也就是构成我们国家“商业基础设施”的这些资产，按照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）的价值计算，居然超过了美国其他任何公司。这些国内“固定资产”的折旧后成本高达1540亿美元。紧随其后排在第二的是AT&T，其地产、厂房和设备的价值为1270亿美元。

Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not, in itself, signal an investment triumph. The best results occur at companies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses – and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume with only minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of these exceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, grow slowly.

我要补充说明的是，我们在固定资产拥有量上的领先地位，本身并不意味着投资的胜利。最佳的投资回报，往往来自那些仅需少量资产就能开展高利润率业务的公司——这些公司提供的商品或服务，能够在极少额外资本投入的情况下实现销量的增长。事实上，我们确实也拥有几家这样的杰出企业，但它们规模相对较小，而且最多也只能实现缓慢增长。

Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed, we are delighted with our two giants – BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire’s first full year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of \$4.2 billion. In 2020, a tough year for many businesses, the pair earned \$8.3 billion.

但重资产的公司也能成为很好的投资。事实上，我们对旗下两家重资产巨头——伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路公司（BNSF）和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）——的表现感到非常满意。2011年是伯克希尔完全拥有BNSF后的第一年，那一年这两家公司合计盈利42亿美元；而2020年对许多企业来说都是艰难的一年，这两家公司的盈利仍达到83亿美元。

BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades to come. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns on the incremental investment.

未来几十年内，BNSF和BHE仍将需要大量资本开支。但好消息是，两家公司都有望在这些新增投资上获得合适的回报。

Let’s look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of all non-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in the United States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft. By a significant margin, BNSF’s loads top those of any other carrier.

我们先来看一下BNSF。这家属于你的铁路公司承担了全美大约15%的非本地货运吨英里数（即一吨货物运输一英里），无论货物运输的方式是铁路、公路、管道、驳船还是航空，BNSF的货运量都遥遥领先于其他任何一家运输企业。

The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or so of frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies, reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a few decades ago as mature and rationalized.

美国铁路的发展史引人入胜。在经过大约150年的疯狂建设、阴谋诡计、过度铺设、破产重组以及兼并收购之后，铁路行业终于在几十年前逐步成熟并趋于理性。

BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeastern Illinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased or merged. The company’s extensive lineage is laid out at (http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf).

BNSF创立于1850年，当时只是一条位于伊利诺伊州东北部、长仅12英里的铁路线路。如今，它拥有390个前身公司，这些铁路公司均通过收购或合并纳入其旗下。该公司复杂的历史渊源详见(http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf。)

Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroad has invested \$41 billion in fixed assets, an outlay \$20 billion in excess of its depreciation charges. Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they all the while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system.

伯克希尔于2010年初完成了对BNSF的收购。自收购以来，这家铁路公司已投资410亿美元用于固定资产，这一支出比同期的折旧费用高出了200亿美元。经营铁路可谓一项户外运动——一列列绵延数英里的火车需要在极寒和酷暑中保持可靠运行，同时还要穿越从沙漠到山区等各种不同的地形。此外，还要定期面对严重的洪灾。BNSF在全美28个州拥有长达2.3万英里的铁路线，它必须花费足够的资金，确保这一庞大系统的安全性和服务质量始终处于最佳水平。

Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire – \$41.8 billion in total. The railroad pays us, however, only what remains after it both fulfills the needs of its business and maintains a cash balance of about \$2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates, independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.

尽管如此，BNSF已向伯克希尔支付了大量股息，累计达418亿美元。不过，这家铁路公司支付给我们的股息，仅限于满足自身业务需求并维持约20亿美元现金余额后的剩余部分。这种保守的策略使BNSF可以以较低利率独立借款，无需伯克希尔提供债务担保。

One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and his number two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenses while navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline in the volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF’s profit margin by 2.9 percentage points. Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie took over as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.

再多说一句关于BNSF的话：去年，其首席执行官卡尔·艾斯（Carl Ice）和公司第二把手凯蒂·法默（Katie Farmer）在业务大幅下滑的情况下，出色地控制了成本。尽管货运量减少了7%，他们却成功地将BNSF的利润率提高了2.9个百分点。卡尔按照长期计划于年底退休，凯蒂接任CEO一职。你们的铁路公司处于非常可靠的管理之下。

BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.

与BNSF不同，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）对普通股不支付任何股息，这在电力公用事业领域极为罕见。这一近乎苦行僧式的政策，贯穿了我们拥有该公司21年来的始终。与铁路不同，美国的电力行业需要进行大规模的现代化改造，最终所需成本将极为巨大。这项任务将在未来数十年内消耗BHE的全部利润。我们欢迎这一挑战，并相信额外的投资终将获得合理的回报。

Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its \$18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.

让我向你们介绍一下BHE正在开展的一个项目——该公司计划投入180亿美元，对美国西部地区现有电力传输网络的大部分老旧线路进行升级改造和扩展。BHE于2006年启动该项目，预计将在2030年完成——是的，你没看错，就是2030年。

The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost.

可再生能源的兴起，让我们的项目成为社会必需品。从历史上看，长期占主导地位的煤电厂通常靠近人口密集的大城市。但在新能源时代，风能和太阳能发电的最佳地点却往往位于偏远地区。2006年，当BHE对形势进行评估时，很明显，美国西部地区输电线路需要大规模投资改造。然而，当各方算清楚项目成本后，很少有公司或政府机构能有底气站出来承担这个任务。

BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.

值得一提的是，BHE决定推进该项目，基于其对美国政治、经济和司法体系的充分信任。数十亿美元的资金投入后，才能看到实质的收入回报。这些输电线路需要跨越多个州和不同司法辖区，而每个辖区都有自己的规则和利益群体。此外，BHE还需与数百名土地所有者沟通协调，并与可再生能源发电供应商以及远距离输送电力的公用事业公司签订复杂的合同。利益冲突方、旧秩序的捍卫者，以及渴望一夜之间改变世界的空想家，都必须逐步赢得认同。

Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.

在这一过程中，遭遇各种意外和拖延几乎是必然的。但同样确定的是，BHE拥有实现承诺所需的管理人才、机构承诺以及财务能力。尽管我们的西部输电项目距离最终竣工尚需多年，但如今我们已经开始寻找其他规模相似的项目以继续推进。

Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.

无论前方还有多少障碍，BHE都将成为提供更清洁能源的领先者。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annual meeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.

去年2月22日，我给各位写信，提到我们计划举办一场盛大的年度大会。然而，不到一个月，这个计划就被迫放弃了。

Our home office group, led by Melissa Shapiro and Marc Hamburg, Berkshire’s CFO, quickly regrouped. Miraculously, their improvisations worked. Greg Abel, one of Berkshire’s Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a dark arena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before “showtime.”

在Melissa Shapiro与伯克希尔的首席财务官Marc Hamburg带领下，我们总部的团队迅速进行了重新安排。令人惊讶的是，他们的临时调整居然奏效了。伯克希尔的副董事长之一Greg Abel与我共同登台，面对漆黑的会场，1.8万个空座位和摄像机。我们没有进行彩排：Greg和我在“开场”前约45分钟才到达现场。

Debbie Bosanek, my incredible assistant who joined Berkshire 47 years ago at age 17, had put together about 25 slides displaying various facts and figures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team of computer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in proper order.

我了不起的助手Debbie Bosanek，她在17岁时加入伯克希尔，至今已47年了。她将我在家里准备的大约25张幻灯片整理好，这些幻灯片展示了各种数据和事实。一支不知名但非常专业的电脑和摄像团队，将这些幻灯片依次准确地投射到屏幕上。

Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience. Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questions from thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers had emailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage. See’s peanut brittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.

雅虎直播了整个过程，吸引了规模空前的全球观众。CNBC的Becky Quick则在新泽西州的家中工作，她从股东们之前提交的数千个问题及观众在Greg和我登台的4小时内通过电子邮件发送给她的问题中，进行了筛选。会议期间，喜诗的花生糖、软糖以及可口可乐为我们提供了补充能量的食物。

This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely on Yahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (“EDT”). Simply navigate to [https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream](https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream).

今年，我们计划在5月1日进一步提升水准。我们仍将依靠雅虎和CNBC完美地完成这次任务。雅虎将在美国东部夏令时间（EDT）下午1点开始直播。观看直播，请直接访问：[https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。](https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。)

Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by 5:30 p.m. Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayed by Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will be asked. Send your zingers to [BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com](mailto:BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com). Yahoo will wrap things up after 5:30.

我们的正式会议将于EDT下午5点开始，预计5点30分结束。而在此之前，从下午1点30分至5点，我们将回答Becky转述给我们的问题。和以往一样，我们事先不会知道哪些问题将被问到。请将你的尖锐问题发送至[BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com](mailto:BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com)。雅虎将在5点30分后结束当天的直播。

And now – drum roll, please – a surprise. This year our meeting will be held in Los Angeles . . . and Charlie will be on stage with me offering answers and observations throughout the 3½-hour question period. I missed him last year and, more important, you clearly missed him. Our other invaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answer questions relating to their domains.

现在，请敲起鼓点，我要宣布一个惊喜。今年我们的会议将在洛杉矶举行……Charlie将和我一同登台，在3个半小时的问答环节中提供解答和点评。去年我非常想念他，更重要的是，显然你们也都想念他。我们另外两位同样宝贵的副董事长Ajit Jain和Greg Abel也将与我们一道，回答各自领域的问题。

Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! We will have fun, and we hope you will as well.

欢迎通过雅虎加入我们，并将你真正棘手的问题抛给Charlie！我们会玩得很开心，也希望你们同样乐在其中。

Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. I hope and expect that will be in 2022. The citizens of Omaha, our exhibiting subsidiaries and all of us at the home office can’t wait to get you back for an honest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.

当然，更美好的日子将是我们再次面对面相见。我希望并预计这一天将在2022年到来。奥马哈市民、参展的子公司以及总部的所有人，都迫不及待地盼望着你们回归，共同参加一场名副其实的伯克希尔风格的年度盛会。

February 27, 2021

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

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Investments

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The Berkshire Partnership

A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You

The Annual Meeting

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