I.H.129.Right Business.Warren Buffett.Retailing is a tough business
卖的都是别人的东西，缺少自我的零售业需要一直保持“聪明”以吸引用户，以下是巴菲特的评价。
零售业者必须时时保持聪明警惕，因为你的竞争对手随时准备复制你的做法，然后超越你，同时消费者总是被各种可能的方式吸引去尝试新的商家，在零售业一旦业绩滑坡，注定就会失败。
1、《1996-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
It was Nebraska Furniture Mart's Irv Blumkin who did the walking around in the case of R.C. Willey, long the leading home furnishings business in Utah. Over the years, Irv had told me about the strengths of that company. And he had also told Bill Child, CEO of R.C. Willey, how pleased the Blumkin family had been with its Berkshire relationship. So in early 1995, Bill mentioned to Irv that for estate tax and diversification reasons, he and the other owners of R.C. Willey might be interested in selling.
收购犹他州最大家具店R.C.Willey，这次换做是内布拉斯加家具店的艾文·布鲁姆金(Irv Blumkin)做走动式并购，多年以来，Irv一直向我提及这家公司所拥有的竞争力，而他也不断地告诉R.C.Willey的CEO比尔·蔡德(Bill Child)，Blumkin家族与伯克希尔的合作关系是多么地令人愉快，终于到了1995年，Bill向Irv提及基于资产税负与分散风险考量，他自己本身与R.C.Willey其它股东有意出售该公司股份。
From that point forward, things could not have been simpler. Bill sent me some figures, and I wrote him a letter indicating my idea of value. We quickly agreed on a number, and found our personal chemistry to be perfect. By mid-year, the merger was completed.
从那一刻开始，事情就变得再简单也不过了，Bill给了我一些报表，而我则回信表达我对价值的看法，5月我们双方很快地就价格达成协议(约1.5亿美元BRK股票，其销售规模约是NFM的两倍)，而我们私下的相处可说是再完美不过了，一直到年中，整个合并案大功告成。
R.C. Willey is an amazing story. Bill took over the business from his father-in-law in 1954 when sales were about $250,000. From this tiny base, Bill employed Mae West's philosophy: "It's not what you've got - it's what you do with what you've got." Aided by his brother, Sheldon, Bill has built the company to its 1995 sales volume of $257 million, and it now accounts for over 50% of the furniture business in Utah. Like Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey sells appliances, electronics, computers and carpets in addition to furniture. Both companies have about the same sales volume, but NFM gets all of its business from one complex in Omaha, whereas R.C. Willey will open its sixth major store in the next few months.
R.C.Willey有一段相当精彩的故事，1954年当Bill从其岳父手中接下这项事业时，该公司的年营业额只有25万美元，从那个基础开始，Bill运用Mae West的哲学：重点不在于你拥有什么，而在于你如何运用。在其兄弟Sheldon的协助之下，Bill将公司的营业额一举提升到1995年的2.57亿美元，目前拥有犹他州超过50%以上的家具市场份额。跟内布拉斯加家具店一样，除了卖家具以外，R.C.Willey也卖电器、电子产品与地毯等商品。两家公司的营业额相当，只是内布拉斯加家具店的营收全部来自在奥马哈惟一的一家店，而R.C.Willey却即将在几个月后成立第6家分店。
Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.
零售业的经营相当不易，在我个人的投资生涯中，我看过许多零售业曾经拥有极高的成长率与股本回报率，然后突然间表现急速下滑，很多甚至被迫以倒闭关门收场，比起一般制造业或服务业，这种流星般的现象在零售业履见不鲜，部分的原因是，这些零售业者必须时时保持聪明警惕，因为你的竞争对手随时准备复制你的做法，然后超越你，同时消费者总是被各种可能的方式吸引去尝试新的商家，在零售业一旦业绩滑坡，注定就会失败。
零售业是个缺少本质的业务（卖的都是别人的产品），巴菲特的观察很仔细，他说：“因为你的竞争对手随时准备复制你的做法。。。”，因为产品都是别人的，自己所能提供的服务是有限的，困境是制造骗子的地方，《Supplying Saks Was a Soapmaker’s Dream Until He Got a $74 Check》这个例子比较典型，最终极的原因都是因为不够“本分”，这是一个不“本分”的商业模式。
In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy.
与这种必须时时保持聪明的业务相反，有一种我称之为只要聪明一次的业务。举个例子来说，如果你足够聪明，在很早以前就买下一家地方电视台，你甚至可以把它交给懒惰又差劲的亲人来经营，而这项事业却仍然可以好好地经营个几十年，当然若是你懂得将汤姆·墨菲摆在正确的位置上，你会做得更惊人，但没有他你也可以舒服的赚钱。但是对零售业来说，用人不当将是快速破产的入场券。
The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the alumnus whose message to the football coach is "I'm 100% with you - win or tie." Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our managers as we like our owners to behave with us.
不过今年我们买下的这两家零售业，却很幸运的拥有喜欢面对竞争挑战的经理人，同时过去几十年来也表现的相当优异，就像是我们旗下其它事业的经理人，他们将独立自主地经营，我们希望他们觉得就好象是在经营自己的事业一样，这意味着查理和我不会在旁边指手画脚。我们尽量避免像校友会常常对足球校队教练所说的那样：不论赢或是打平，我们都站在你这边。身为所有权人，我们的基本原则是，我们期望怎么对待自己，就怎么对待我们的经理人。
巴菲特一边说零售业不行一边又买入相应的资产，在我看来他遵循了另一个更重要的哲学：活在当下，r=c/DCF+g，c/DCF（即市盈率）代表当下，g代表未来的增长，巴菲特在对企业估值时当下的权重很高，未来的权重很低，未来都是不确定的，最能影响未来的是做好当下，买的便宜是做好当下的表现。
As we add more operations, I'm sometimes asked how many people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon, that's one too many, and if I have managers like those we now have, the number can be almost unlimited. We are lucky to have Bill and Sheldon associated with us, and we hope that we can acquire other businesses that bring with them managers of similar caliber.
随着我们旗下事业越来越多，有时我被问及，我到底可以应付多少个经理人同时向我报告，我的回答相当简单，要是我只管一个经理人，而他是一个讨厌鬼，那么管一个人都太多了。相反的，要是我所面对的是像我们现在所拥有的经理人的话，那么这个数目将没有上限，我们很幸运能与Bill跟Sheldon共事，我们也很希望在不久的未来，还能有更多相同水准的经理人加入我们公司。
Not much has gone right for Walgreens Boots Alliance WBA -1.40%decrease; red down pointing triangle in the past decade.
过去十年里，沃尔格林联合博姿公司（Walgreens Boots Alliance）几乎没有什么顺利的事情。
Customers bought more and more household items online at sites such as Amazon.com, instead of Walgreens’s more than 8,000 stores across the U.S. The pharmacy chain inked deals with other drug suppliers and doctors offices, but stood pat while rivals, including CVS and Express Scripts, merged with big health insurers, gaining control of the medical-reimbursement purse strings that were squeezing pharmacies.
顾客越来越多地在亚马逊等网站上在线购买家庭用品，而不是去沃尔格林在美国各地超过 8000 家的门店。这家连锁药店虽然与其他药品供应商和医生诊所签订了协议，但在竞争对手（包括 CVS 和 Express Scripts）纷纷与大型健康保险公司合并、掌控医疗报销资金并挤压药店利润空间时，却按兵不动。
Walgreens cash flow sagged, its debt piled up and shares sank. And on Thursday, Walgreens was sold to private-equity firm Sycamore for $10 billion, down a staggering 91% from its $106 billion peak in 2015.
沃尔格林的现金流下滑，债务累积，股价暴跌。周四，沃尔格林以 100 亿美元的价格被私募股权公司 Sycamore 收购，较 2015 年 1060 亿美元的峰值暴跌了惊人的 91%。
The storied pharmacy chain—which became a ubiquitous seller of everything from diabetes injections to nail files as retailers consolidated across the U.S.—fell after it neglected to keep up with customer preference to buy online and failed to navigate the fierce competition and intense cost pressures of healthcare.
这家历史悠久的连锁药店曾随着美国零售商的整合而遍布各地，销售从糖尿病注射剂到指甲锉等各种商品，但由于未能跟上顾客转向线上购物的趋势，也未能应对医疗保健领域的激烈竞争和巨大成本压力，最终走向衰落。
It could shrink more after its sale. Sycamore, a New York-based firm that specializes in retail and consumer investments and, more recently, is better known for smaller deals, is expected to sell off pieces of the business or work with partners to turn it around, The Wall Street Journal reported.
出售后其规模可能进一步缩减。据《华尔街日报》报道，总部位于纽约、专注于零售和消费领域投资的 Sycamore 公司近年来以规模较小的交易而闻名，预计将出售该业务的部分资产，或与合作伙伴共同推动业务转型。
Globally, the transaction ranks as one of the largest leveraged buyouts in the past decade.
在全球范围内，这笔交易是过去十年中规模最大的杠杆收购之一。
Walgreens was founded in 1905, when Chicago druggist Charles R. Walgreen Sr. purchased the store where he worked. By 1929, the company was publicly traded and operated some 525 stores, including locations in New York City and Florida.
沃尔格林成立于1905年，当时芝加哥药剂师Charles R. Walgreen Sr.买下了他工作的商店。 到1929年，该公司上市并经营了约525家商店，包括在纽约市和佛罗里达州的分店。
Even during the Great Depression, the chain grew thanks in part to innovations such as the malted milk shake, a sweeter version of the original.
即使在大萧条时期，这家连锁企业仍在增长，部分原因是推出了麦芽奶昔等创新产品，这种奶昔比原版口味更甜。
Charles “Cork” R. Walgreen III, the founder’s grandson who took the helm in the 1970s, helped pioneer the drive-through pharmacy and made placing stores conveniently a corporate priority, clustering retail outlets closely together in dense urban areas to make it as easy as possible to shop at Walgreens.
创始人的孙子查尔斯·“科克”·R·沃尔格林三世在 20 世纪 70 年代掌舵公司，推动了汽车穿梭式药房的兴起，并将门店选址便利性作为企业优先事项，在人口密集的城市地区密集布局零售店，使顾客在沃尔格林购物尽可能方便。
By last year, 78% of the U.S. population lived within 5 miles of a Walgreens-owned pharmacy.
截至去年，美国 78%的人口居住在距离沃尔格林旗下药店 5 英里范围内。
The chain was a retail juggernaut, its red cursive logo a common sight on city street corners and in suburban shopping centers. Walgreens’s power started to diminish in the 21st century.
这家连锁店曾是零售业巨头，其红色草书标志在城市街角和郊区购物中心随处可见。Walgreens 的影响力在 21 世纪开始减弱。
Walgreens didn’t recognize it at first. For years, the company had dangled its thousands of retail locations and loyal customer base to win favorable terms from the powerful firms that pay for patients’ prescriptions—called pharmacy-benefit managers.
沃尔格林最初并未意识到这一点。多年来，该公司一直利用其数千家零售门店和忠实的客户群，向那些为患者处方买单的强大企业（即药品福利管理公司）争取优惠条款。
In 2011, Express Scripts, one of the biggest PBMs, called its bluff, leading to a nasty public dispute and Walgreens’s losing access to millions of customers.
2011 年，最大的药品福利管理公司之一 Express Scripts 戳穿了其虚张声势的做法，引发了一场激烈的公开争端，导致 Walgreens 失去了数百万客户。
It was a misstep that made investors antsy about Walgreens executive leadership, and created an opening for an Italian billionaire named Stefano Pessina to step into the picture.
这一失误令投资者对沃尔格林的高管领导层感到不安，也为一位名叫斯特凡诺·佩西纳的意大利亿万富翁提供了介入的机会。
Via dealmaking, Pessina, a trained nuclear engineer, had transformed his family’s wholesaling business into global healthcare giant Alliance Boots. It operated nearly 2,000 pharmacy stores across the U.K., with an emphasis on personal beauty products.
通过交易运作，受过核工程师训练的佩西纳将家族批发业务转型为全球医疗保健巨头联合博姿（Alliance Boots）。该公司在英国经营着近 2000 家药店，重点销售个人美容产品。
In 2012, he orchestrated a two-step, multiyear deal to have Walgreens acquire Alliance Boots for more than $10 billion in cash and stock. The combination formed one of the world’s largest pharmacy chains. When the merger was completed in late 2014, he became CEO.
2012 年，他策划了一项分两步、历时数年的交易，使沃尔格林以超过 100 亿美元的现金和股票收购了联合博姿。这次合并形成了全球最大的连锁药店之一。2014 年底合并完成后，他成为了首席执行官。
Pessina also became the company’s largest shareholder, with holdings worth $12 billion.
佩西纳也成为该公司最大股东，持股价值达 120 亿美元。
“It’s an American dream come true,” Pessina told The Wall Street Journal in 2013. He installed his partner—now spouse—Ornella Barra, as Walgreens chief executive of global wholesaling and international retail operations. And he forecast a long, bright future for the historic retailer.
“这是一个实现了的美国梦，”佩西纳在 2013 年对《华尔街日报》表示。他任命了自己的伴侣——现为配偶的奥内拉·巴拉担任沃尔格林全球批发和国际零售业务的首席执行官。他还预测这家历史悠久的零售商将拥有一个长期而光明的未来。
Behind Pessina’s confidence was his diagnosis of a bloated and inefficient U.S. health system compared with the government-run systems in Europe. He prescribed combining American and European companies as the antidote, betting he could wring out savings from the consolidation that would drive years of growth.
佩西纳的信心背后，是他对美国医疗体系的诊断：与欧洲政府运营的体系相比，美国的医疗体系臃肿且低效。他开出的药方是将美国和欧洲的公司合并，押注于通过整合实现节约，从而推动多年的增长。
Even after uniting Walgreens and Boots, the company sought to further expand its pharmacy footprint.
即使在合并了 Walgreens 和 Boots 之后，公司仍寻求进一步扩大其药房版图。
In addition, Walgreens Boots sought to leverage its heft at filling prescriptions through partnerships with the firms that distributed medicines to pharmacies. Under Pessina, Walgreens joined with one of the largest U.S. drug wholesalers, AmerisourceBergen, now known as Cencora. The deal connected the drug supply chains of Europe and the U.S. for the first time.
此外，沃尔格林博姿试图通过与向药房分销药品的公司合作，利用其在处方药领域的规模优势。在佩西纳的领导下，沃尔格林与美国最大的药品批发商之一 AmerisourceBergen（现名为 Cencora）合作。这笔交易首次连接了欧洲和美国的药品供应链。
“So how do [I] see the future of this company?” Pessina told the Journal in a 2019 interview. “I see a future that will extend into the next couple of centuries.”
“那么，[我]如何看待这家公司的未来呢？”佩西纳在 2019 年接受《华尔街日报》采访时表示，“我看到的是一个将延续到未来几个世纪的前景。”
But health insurers and pharmacy-benefit managers, who were responsible for paying for much of Americans’ healthcare, were facing pressure to keep a lid on soaring costs. Companies began linking up vertically to make sure they weren’t squeezed by the cost-control push.
但负责支付大部分美国人医疗费用的健康保险公司和药品福利管理公司正面临着控制不断飙升成本的压力。各公司开始进行垂直整合，以确保自己不会因成本控制措施而受到挤压。
In the winter of 2018, insurer Cigna bought Express Scripts for $67 billion, and CVS acquired insurer Aetna for $70 billion.
2018 年冬季，保险公司信诺以 670 亿美元收购了 Express Scripts，CVS 以 700 亿美元收购了保险公司安泰。
The deals helped protect pharmacies from lower reimbursement rates that health insurers and pharmacy-benefit managers were seeking during contract negotiations.
这些交易帮助药店在合同谈判中抵御了健康保险公司和药品福利管理公司寻求降低报销费率的影响。
Walgreens Boots missed out. Pessina pulled off the acquisition of thousands of additional Rite Aid stores, but didn’t achieve a purchase of AmerisourceBergen or a tie-up with insurer Humana. The failure to find an insurer parent was, analysts said, a mistake.
沃尔格林博姿错失了机会。佩西纳成功收购了数千家额外的来德爱门店，但未能完成对 AmerisourceBergen 的收购，也未能与保险公司 Humana 达成合作。分析人士表示，未能找到一家保险公司作为母公司是一个错误。
“The single biggest issue for Walgreens is pharmacy reimbursement, which in simple terms is they’re getting paid less by PBMs and payers every year to dispense the same prescription,” said Michael Cherny, a Leerink Partners analyst.
Leerink Partners 分析师 Michael Cherny 表示：“沃尔格林面临的最大问题是药房报销，简单来说，就是药房福利管理公司（PBMs）和付款方每年支付给他们的相同处方药配药费用越来越低。”
Pessina sought to compensate for Walgreens stores’ declining prescription margins by beefing up the “front of the store,” where consumers could buy cosmetics and other home goods. More and more customers, however, were buying goods online.
佩西纳试图通过加强沃尔格林门店的“店面前端”业务（消费者可在此购买化妆品和其他家居用品），来弥补处方药利润率的下降。然而，越来越多的顾客开始在网上购物。
At the back of the stores, meanwhile, Walgreens sought to create the pharmacy of the future, joining with various healthcare providers to offer services that could attract new customers.
与此同时，在门店后方，沃尔格林试图打造未来药房，与多家医疗服务提供商合作，提供能够吸引新顾客的服务。
There was an ill-fated deal in 2013 to create dozens of Theranos blood-testing clinics in its pharmacies. In 2020, Walgreens made a $1 billion investment in VillageMD, a network of clinics offering primary medical care.
2013 年曾有一项不幸的交易，计划在其药店内建立数十家 Theranos 血液检测诊所。2020 年，沃尔格林向提供初级医疗服务的诊所网络 VillageMD 投资了 10 亿美元。
The moves didn’t pay off, at least not enough to offset the struggles in its core pharmacy business. In 2021, Pessina stepped down as CEO and was succeeded by Rosalind Brewer, the chief operating officer at Starbucks and a healthcare outsider.
这些举措并未奏效，至少不足以抵消其核心药房业务的困境。2021 年，佩西纳辞去首席执行官职务，由星巴克首席运营官、医疗保健领域的外行罗莎琳德·布鲁尔接任。
Brewer saw a U.S. pharmacy industry stuck in perpetual low-growth mode, and rivals such as CVS betting big on providing healthcare directly to patients. Walgreens should chase a similar formula, she said, capitalizing on the government’s push to pay for how well doctors improve patients’ health, not just each X-ray and procedure they perform.
布鲁尔认为，美国药房行业陷入了长期低增长模式，而 CVS 等竞争对手则大举押注于直接向患者提供医疗服务。她表示，Walgreens 应效仿类似模式，利用政府推动的按医生改善患者健康状况的效果付费的政策，而不仅仅是为每次 X 光检查和医疗程序付费。
The company would attach more Walgreens stores to its doctors offices, in hopes that patients would fill their prescriptions at the pharmacy after their doctor visits.
该公司计划将更多沃尔格林门店与其诊所相结合，希望患者在看完医生后能在药房配药。
Under Brewer, Walgreens paid $5.2 billion to buy a controlling stake in VillageMD. In 2022, she struck a deal to buy a group of urgent-care centers, including CityMD, for $9 billion.
在布鲁尔的领导下，沃尔格林以 52 亿美元收购了 VillageMD 的控股权。2022 年，她又达成了一项以 90 亿美元收购包括 CityMD 在内的一批紧急护理中心的交易。
But the deals added more debt, while failing to stop the damage to Walgreens’s pharmacy margins and stock price. She also clashed with Pessina. Making matters worse, the pandemic hit, accelerating patients’ shift from bricks-and-mortar retailers to e-commerce websites.
但这些交易增加了更多债务，却未能阻止沃尔格林药房利润率和股价的下滑。她还与佩西纳发生了冲突。更糟糕的是，疫情爆发，加速了患者从实体零售商向电商网站的转移。
By 2023, Brewer was out, abruptly succeeded by healthcare veteran Tim Wentworth. An enthusiastic leader proud of community-college roots in Rochester, N.Y., Wentworth had worked at the highest levels of the PBM industry for decades, most recently as chief executive of Express Scripts, where he oversaw the company’s sale to Cigna.
到 2023 年，布鲁尔已离职，由医疗行业资深人士蒂姆·温特沃斯突然接任。温特沃斯是一位充满热情的领导者，以自己在纽约州罗切斯特社区学院的背景为荣。他在药品福利管理（PBM）行业的最高层工作了数十年，最近担任 Express Scripts 的首席执行官，期间负责了该公司向信诺（Cigna）的出售事宜。
Wentworth set out to cut costs and return Walgreens back to its roots with a focus on its pharmacy customer experience. He announced plans to close 1,200 stores over three years and to roll back the company’s expansion into medical care, by looking to sell its share in VillageMD and explore its options for the rest.
温特沃斯着手削减成本，并让沃尔格林回归本源，专注于药房客户体验。他宣布计划在三年内关闭 1200 家门店，并撤回公司在医疗服务领域的扩张，寻求出售其在 VillageMD 的股份，并为其余业务探索其他选择。
He also sought to renegotiate better contracts with his old insurer colleagues.
他还试图与他以前的保险公司同事重新协商更好的合同。
A year into Wentworth’s stewardship of Walgreens, however, investors didn’t give the company credit for its turnaround efforts.
然而，在温特沃斯接管沃尔格林一年后，投资者并未认可该公司的扭亏努力。
In January, the company said it would suspend its quarterly dividend—paid for 91 straight years—because it needs the cash to refinance debt and deal with litigation, including a recent Justice Department lawsuit over the pharmacy’s distribution of opioids.
今年 1 月，该公司表示将暂停已连续支付 91 年的季度股息，因为公司需要现金来为债务再融资并应对诉讼，包括司法部最近就该药房分销阿片类药物提起的诉讼。
A private-equity deal, in which parts of the company—including its Boots pharmacies in the U.K.—would likely be sold off might make it easier to revive the core U.S. retail pharmacy business outside the spotlight.
一项私募股权交易可能会出售公司部分业务（包括其在英国的 Boots 药房），这或许更容易在聚光灯之外重振美国核心零售药房业务。
Pessina’s vision for a cross-continental pharmacy colossus had collapsed. His stake in the company lost $10 billion in value. Now 83 years old, he resides in the tax haven of Monaco.
佩西纳打造跨洲药房巨头的愿景已经破灭。他在公司的股份价值损失了 100 亿美元。现年 83 岁的他居住在避税天堂摩纳哥。
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