WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, what you find, of course, is that the cost of capital is about a quarter percent below the return promised by any deal that the CEO wants to do. It’s — (laughter) — very simple.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，你会发现资本成本通常比 CEO 想要做的任何交易所承诺的回报低大约 0.25%。这——（笑声）——非常简单。
You know, we have three questions on capital — with capital, throughout — leaving aside whether we want to borrow money, which we generally don’t want to do.
关于资本，我们有三个问题——在讨论资本时——暂且不谈我们是否想要借钱，因为我们通常不想这么做。
And one is, does it make more sense to pay it out to the shareholders than to keep it within the company? A sub-question on that is if we pay it out, is it better off to do it via repurchases or via dividend?
第一个问题是，将资金分配给股东是否比留在公司更有意义？关于这个问题的一个子问题是，如果我们分配出去，是通过回购股票更好，还是通过派发股息更好？
The test for whether we pay it out in dividends is, can we create more than a dollar of value within the company with that dollar than paying it out? And you never know the answer to that. But so far, the answer as judged by results is yes, we can.
判断是否派发股息的标准是，我们能否用这一美元在公司内部创造超过一美元的价值，而不是将其支付出去？对此，你永远无法确切知道答案。但迄今为止，从结果来看，答案是肯定的，我们可以。
And we think that prospectively, we can. But, that’s a — you know, that’s a hope on our part. And it’s justified to some extent by past history, but it’s not a certainty.
而且我们认为从未来的角度来看，我们可以。但这——你知道，这只是我们的一个希望。在某种程度上，它可以通过过去的历史得到证明，但并不确定。
Once we’ve crossed that threshold, then do we repurchase stock? Well, obviously, if you can buy your stock at a significant discount from conservatively calculated intrinsic value, and you could buy it in reasonable quantity, that’s a use for capital.
一旦我们跨过了这个门槛，那么我们是否回购股票？显然，如果你能以远低于保守计算的内在价值的价格回购你的股票，并且可以合理地购买一定数量的股票，这就是一种资本的用途。
Beyond that, then the question becomes, if you have the capital, you think you can create more than a dollar, how do you create the most with the least risk? And that gets to business risk. It doesn’t get to any calculation of the volatility.
除此之外，问题就变成了，如果你有资本并认为你能创造超过一美元的价值，那么你如何以最小的风险创造最大的价值？这涉及到商业风险，而不是波动性的计算。
I don’t know the risk in See’s Candy as measured by its stock volatility because the stock hasn’t been outstanding since 1972. Does that mean I can’t determine how risky a business See’s is, because we don’t have a daily quote on it?
我不知道如何通过 See’s Candy 的股票波动性来衡量它的风险，因为自 1972 年以来它的股票就没有公开交易。这是否意味着我无法确定 See’s 这项业务有多大的风险，因为我们没有它的每日报价？
No. I can determine it by looking at the business, and the competitive environment in which it operates, and so on.
不。我可以通过研究业务本身以及其运营的竞争环境等来判断。
So once we cross the threshold of deciding that we can deploy capital so as to create more than a dollar of present value for every dollar retained, then it’s just a question of doing the most intelligent thing that you can find. And, you know, that is —
因此，一旦我们跨过了这个门槛，决定可以通过部署资本为每一美元创造超过一美元的现值，那么接下来就是寻找最明智的方式去做。这——你知道，就是这样。
The cost of every deal we do is measured by the second best deal that’s around at a given time, including more — doing more of some of the things we’re already in.
我们做的每笔交易的成本都是通过当时第二好的交易来衡量的，包括我们已经参与的一些事情是否可以投入更多资金。
And I have listened to cost of capital discussions at all kinds of corporate board meetings and everything else. And, you know, I’ve never found anything that made very much sense in it except for the fact that it’s what they learned in business school and that’s what the consultants talked about.
我听过各种企业董事会会议和其他场合关于资本成本的讨论。你知道，除了这是他们在商学院学到的内容以及咨询顾问谈论的东西之外，我从未发现其中有任何真正有意义的东西。
And most of the board members would nod their head without knowing what the hell was going on. And that’s been my history with the cost of capital.
大多数董事会成员都会点头表示同意，但实际上并不知道到底发生了什么。这就是我对资本成本的经历。
14. Everyone else is wrong on cost of capital
其他人对资本成本的看法都是错误的
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Gregg, welcome.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。晨星的格雷格·沃伦。格雷格，欢迎。
GREGG WARREN: Thank you. Warren and Charlie, on behalf of Morningstar, I want to thank you for having us on the panel this year.
格雷格·沃伦：谢谢你。沃伦和查理，代表晨星，我想感谢你们让我们今年参加小组讨论。
I may not be an accredited bear, but hopefully, I ask probing questions that add value for shareholders.
我可能不是一个认证的投资者，但我希望我提出的问题能够为股东带来价值。
My first question relates to the measurement of management performance.
我第一个问题与管理绩效的测量有关。
For Morningstar, the ultimate measure of success is not just whether or not a firm can earn more than its cost of capital, but whether or not it can do so for an extended period of time.
对于晨星来说，成功的最终衡量标准不仅仅是一个公司是否能够赚取超过其资本成本的收益，而是它是否能够在较长时间内做到这一点。
Berkshire has historically done a good job of generating outsized returns. But as you’ve noted in the past, the sheer size of the firm’s operations, which continue to grow, will ultimately limit the returns that Berkshire could generate.
伯克希尔历史上在创造超额回报方面表现良好。但正如你过去所提到的，公司的运营规模不断扩大，最终将限制伯克希尔能够产生的回报。
With that in mind, what do you believe Berkshire’s cost of capital is? How much do you think that this hurdle rate is increased as you’ve acquired more capital intensive, debt-heavy firms?
考虑到这一点，您认为伯克希尔的资本成本是多少？您认为随着您收购更多资本密集型、债务沉重的公司，这个障碍率增加了多少？
And how much confidence do you have that future capital allocators at Berkshire will be able to generate returns in excess of the firm’s cost of capital, acknowledging, of course, the fact that Berkshire’s days of outsized returns are most likely behind it?
你对未来在伯克希尔的资本配置者能够产生超过公司资本成本的回报有多大信心，当然要承认，伯克希尔的超额回报时代很可能已经过去？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there’s no question that size is an anchor to performance. And we intend to prove that up to the point where it starts really biting.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。毫无疑问，规模是业绩的一个桎梏。我们打算证明这一点，直到它开始真正产生影响。
But it — we cannot earn the returns on capital with well over 200 — well, with a market cap of 300-plus billion. It just isn’t doable.
但我们无法在市值超过 3000 亿美元的情况下赚取资本回报。这根本不可行。
Archimedes, he said he could move the world if he had a long enough lever, didn’t he, or something like that, Charlie?
阿基米德，他说如果有足够长的杠杆就能移动世界，不是吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, he did.
查理·芒格：是的，他确实做了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish I had his lever because we don’t have that lever at Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：我希望我有他的杠杆，因为我们在伯克希尔没有那个杠杆。
So we — well, we’ll answer two questions there.
所以我们——好吧，我们将在那里回答两个问题。
In terms of cost of capital, Charlie and I always figure that our cost of capital is the — is what could be produced by our second best idea. And then our best idea has to exceed that.
在资本成本方面，查理和我总是认为我们的资本成本是——是我们第二好的想法所能产生的收益。然后，我们最好的想法必须超过这个收益。
We think — I have listened to so many nonsensical cost of capital discussions, that —
我们认为——我听过太多无意义的资本成本讨论，以至于——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve never heard an intelligent one.
查理·芒格：我从未听过一个聪明的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。（笑声）
It’s really true. I mean, and there’s — that’s another thing. I’ve been on boards and the CFO comes in and explains why we’re doing this and it always gets down to, you know, it exceeds our cost of capital.
这是真的。我是说，还有另一件事。我曾在董事会中，首席财务官进来解释我们为什么要这样做，最终总是归结为，你知道，这超出了我们的资本成本。
And he doesn’t know what the hell his cost of capital is, and I don’t know. And — but I don’t embarrass him, you know?
他不知道他的资本成本到底是多少，我也不知道。不过，我不会让他感到尴尬，你知道吗？
So I just sit there and listen to this stuff and apply my own thing, and then still end up voting for it, probably, if I don’t like it, although there have been a few exceptions to that.
所以我就坐在那里听这些东西，应用我自己的想法，然后如果我不喜欢，可能还是会投票支持它，尽管有一些例外。
The real test, you know, over time, is whether the capital we retain produces more than a dollar of market value as we go along.
真正的考验，你知道，随着时间的推移，是我们保留的资本是否能产生超过一美元的市场价值。
And if we keep putting billions in and those billions, in effect, are worth, in terms of present value terms, in terms of what they add to the value of the business, more than what we’re putting in, you know, we’ll keep doing it.
如果我们继续投入数十亿，那些数十亿在现值方面，增加业务价值的程度超出我们投入的金额，你知道，我们会继续这样做。
We bought a company day before yesterday, I guess it was. And we are spending close to $3 billion U.S. It’s a Canadian company.
我们前天收购了一家公司，我想是这样。我们花费了近 30 亿美元。这是一家加拿大公司。
And we think we will be better off financially because we did that and we thought it was the best thing that we could do with the $3 billion on that day. And those are the yardsticks that we have.
我们认为这样做会让我们的财务状况更好，因为我们认为这是那天我们可以用 30 亿美元做的最好的事情。这些就是我们所依据的标准。
And what I do know is that I’ve never seen a CEO who wanted to do a deal where the CFO didn’t come in and say it exceeded the cost of capital.
我知道的是，我从未见过一个首席执行官想做一笔交易，而首席财务官却说这笔交易超过了资本成本。
It’s just — it’s a game, as far as we’re concerned.
这只是——对我们来说，这是一场游戏。
And we think we can evaluate businesses. And we know the capital we have available. And we have things that we can sell to buy. Not businesses, but marketable securities that we can sell to buy businesses if we like.
我们认为我们可以评估企业，我们了解我们可用的资金。我们有可以卖出的东西来买。不是企业，而是可出售的有价证券，如果我们愿意，可以用这些证券来买入企业。
And we are constantly measuring that opportunity cost that Charlie talked about in the movie. It’s an important subject. And one that I think has had more nonsense written about it than about anything.
我们不断在衡量查理在电影中提到的机会成本。这是一个重要的话题。我认为关于它的胡说八道比任何其他事情都要多。
But I’ll turn it over to Charlie to go over —
但我会把它交给查理来讲解——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a phrase like “cost of capital,” which means different things to different people, and often means silly things to people who teach in business schools, we just don’t use it.
查理·芒格：嗯，“资本成本”这样的短语对不同的人意味着不同的东西，通常对商学院的老师来说意味着愚蠢的东西，我们就是不使用它。
Warren’s definition of behaving in a corporation, so that every dollar retained tends to create more than a dollar of market value for the shareholders, is probably the best way of describing cost of capital. That is not what they mean in business schools.
沃伦对在公司中行为的定义是，每保留一美元就倾向于为股东创造超过一美元的市场价值，这可能是描述资本成本的最佳方式。这并不是商学院所指的。
The answer’s perfectly simple. We’re right and they’re wrong. (Laughter)
答案非常简单。我们是对的，他们是错的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I look good compared to him, don’t I? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我看起来比他好，对吧？（笑声）