I.H.56.Steve Jobs.Manufacturing
1、《1992 Steve Jobs.MIT Distinguished Speaker Series》
Let's talk about manufacturing. How many of you have a manufacturing background? Oh, that's great. I love manufacturing. And what kinds of things? What kinds of companies? You have—
让我们谈谈制造业。你们中有多少人有制造背景？哦，那太好了。我喜欢制造业。你们做什么样的事情？什么样的公司？你们有——
Pharmaceuticals. 药品。
Pharmaceuticals? Any auto people here?
制药行业？这里有汽车行业的人吗？
Yeah. 是的。
Him. 他。
Auto? Electronics? Which 汽车？电子产品？哪个
TI.
TI, uh-huh. TI，嗯哼。
Motorola. 摩托罗拉。
Motorola? 摩托罗拉？
Is it true you're sending your manufacturing overseas, or just— I heard—
你们真的要把制造业转移到海外吗，还是只是——我听说——
Yeah, I heard that rumor, too. No, it couldn't be further from the truth. We love manufacturing at NeXT. And when I was at Apple, I had the good fortune to lead the effort to build a Mac factory. And we designed, and built, and operated that factory. And it was a real breakthrough. It was the best factory in the industry until we built the at NeXT. And we made a lot of—
是的，我也听到了那个传闻。不，这与事实相去甚远。我们在 NeXT 热爱制造。当我在苹果时，我有幸领导建立 Mac 工厂的工作。我们设计、建造并运营了那座工厂。这是一次真正的突破。那是行业中最好的工厂，直到我们在 NeXT 建造了新的工厂。我们做了很多——
We made a lot of mistakes, though. As an example, I remember walking through it. You know, one of the things you learn when you start building factories is that warehouses are really bad, right?
我们犯了很多错误。例如，我记得走过这个地方。你知道，当你开始建造工厂时，你会学到的一件事是仓库真的很糟糕，对吧？
Warehouses are bad, because you tend to put things in them. And inventory is really bad. Inventory is really bad, because if it's defective, you don't find out about it for a while. And you don't close the quality feedback loop with the vendor, and correct the problem, until they've made a zillion of them. What you want to do is find the problem the first one that comes in the door, and stop them from making more until you fix the problem.
仓库不好，因为你倾向于把东西放进去。而库存真的很糟糕。库存真的很糟糕，因为如果它有缺陷，你不会立刻发现。而且在供应商那里你无法关闭质量反馈循环，直到他们生产了无数个。你想要做的是在第一个问题出现时就找到它，并阻止他们继续生产，直到你解决了问题。
So warehouses also cost money, because you put all this stuff in them. And the stuff— you have to go borrow money from the bank, or use money that could be used in a more productive purpose, so warehouses are bad.
所以仓库也需要花钱，因为你把所有这些东西放在里面。而这些东西——你必须去向银行借钱，或者使用本可以用于更有生产力的目的的钱，所以仓库是坏的。
And you want to go to JIT. I'm sure you've studied this all, and studied examples. I was walking through the Mac factory one day, and the two biggest pieces of automation we put in were a giant small-part storage and retrieval system. It was the totes that ran around.
你想去 JIT。我相信你已经研究过这一切，并研究了例子。一天我在 Mac 工厂走动时，我们投入的两个最大的自动化设备是一个巨大的小件存储和检索系统。就是那些四处移动的托盘。
And the second one was this giant burn in system at the end. And a few tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment. And I realized, unfortunately too late, that both of them are warehouses. They're just high-tech warehouses.
第二个是最后的这个巨型烧录系统，还有几千万美元的设备。我意识到，遗憾的是为时已晚，它们都是仓库。它们只是高科技仓库。
And so when we looked at NeXT, we said no warehouses of any kind. We have a true JIT factory. Stuff comes in, and is delivered right to the point of use on the factory floor. There is no warehouse. Deliveries are made daily, sometimes more frequently than that. There is no outgoing warehouse. Everything is visible.
因此，当我们查看 NeXT 时，我们说不需要任何类型的仓库。我们有一个真正的即时生产工厂。物品进来后，直接送到工厂车间的使用点。没有仓库。交付是每日进行的，有时更频繁。没有出货仓库。一切都是可见的。
And the reason that we were able to do a lot of what we've done = because we looked at— well, I'll give you an example. When we were learning about manufacturing at Mac, we hired a Stanford Business School Professor at the time named Steven Wheelwright, who Harvard has since stolen away, I think.
我们能够做到很多事情的原因是因为我们考虑了——好吧，我给你举个例子。当我们在 Mac 学习制造时，我们聘请了一位当时的斯坦福商学院教授，名叫史蒂文·惠尔赖特，我想哈佛后来把他挖走了。
And he did a neat thing. He drew on the board a little chart, first time I met him. He said, you can view all companies from a manufacturing perspective this way. You can say there's five stages— one, two, three, four, five. They all have these things.
他做了一件很棒的事。第一次见到他时，他在黑板上画了一个小图表。他说，你可以从制造的角度来看待所有公司。你可以说有五个阶段——一、二、三、四、五。它们都有这些东西。
And stage one is companies that view manufacturing as a necessary evil. They wish they didn't have to do it, but damn it, they do. And all the way up through stage five, which is companies that view manufacturing as a competitive opportunity for competitive advantage, right? We can get better time to market, and get new products out faster. We get lower costs. We get higher quality.
第一阶段是那些将制造视为必要之恶的公司。他们希望自己不必这样做，但可恶的是，他们必须这样做。一直到第五阶段，那些将制造视为竞争优势机会的公司，对吧？我们可以更快地进入市场，更快地推出新产品。我们降低成本，提高质量。
And in general, you know, you can, sort of, put the American flag here, and put the Japanese flag here.
一般来说，你可以把美国国旗放在这里，把日本国旗放在这里。
And that's changing, however. That's changing. And it's changing, because people like you are going into manufacturing. Companies are starting to realize that we were great at this one time. And then we took it for granted. And people are starting to pay good salaries now, and get good people.
然而，这种情况正在改变。人们像你一样进入制造业。公司开始意识到我们曾经在这一领域表现出色。然后我们对此视而不见。现在，人们开始支付高薪，吸引优秀人才。
And so we want to be one of these. And we try very hard. By the way, just going back to software for a minute, I often apply this scale to computer companies, and how they look at software. See, I think most computer companies are stage one. They wish software had never been invented.
因此，我们希望成为其中之一。我们非常努力。顺便说一下，回到软件上，我经常将这个标准应用于计算机公司，以及他们如何看待软件。你看，我认为大多数计算机公司处于第一阶段。他们希望软件从未被发明。
I put Compaq in that category. And IBM is maybe stage two, and things like that. And I think there's only— you know, Suns maybe, sort of, in the middle, maybe here. I think there's only three companies here, and that's us, Apple, and Microsoft, in stage five. We start everything with the software and work back.
我把康柏放在那个类别里。IBM 可能是第二阶段，还有其他类似的公司。我认为这里只有三家公司，那就是我们、苹果和微软，处于第五阶段。我们从软件开始，然后向后发展。
But anyway going back to manufacturing, we started looking at the factory as a software problem. And the first people we hired in the factory were some software engineers. We convinced them to move from R&D into software, which was not easy.
但无论如何，回到制造业，我们开始将工厂视为一个软件问题。我们在工厂招聘的第一批人是一些软件工程师。我们说服他们从研发转到软件，这并不容易。
We had to give them bonuses. We had to cajole them. We had to promise them they could come back if they hated it. And they went over there. And we said, this is really just a software problem with interesting I/O devices called robots. That's all it is. And so we started building the software first.
我们不得不给他们奖金。我们不得不劝说他们。我们不得不承诺他们如果讨厌这里可以回来。他们就去了那里。我们说，这实际上只是一个软件问题，涉及一些有趣的输入输出设备，叫做机器人。就这样。于是我们开始先构建软件。
And our first robots that we got, we specced them out. And we bought them completely turnkey, with the robot arms on them, and all the electronics, and the software to control them. And we specced it out, but we didn't write it.
我们买的第一台机器人，是我们自己设计的。我们买的是全套设备，包括机械臂、所有电子设备和控制软件。我们制定了规格，但没有编写软件。
And they didn't— they worked OK. Some of them are still in use, but they weren't great. And being software folks, we weren't real happy. They weren't elegant. We couldn't do what we wanted with the robots. We couldn't tie-in a quality information system to them, and all this other stuff we wanted.
他们没有——它们工作得还可以。其中一些仍在使用，但并不出色。作为软件人员，我们并不太满意。它们不够优雅。我们无法用机器人实现我们想要的功能。我们无法将一个质量信息系统与它们连接起来，以及我们想要的其他所有东西。
So the second generation, we specced out the hardware, and had somebody build the hardware for us, but we wrote all the software on our own computers. We're object-oriented, so we started writing robot objects, quality objects, you know, all sorts of objects to control this factory.
所以第二代，我们指定了硬件，并让人给我们制造硬件，但我们在自己的电脑上编写了所有软件。我们是面向对象的，所以我们开始编写机器人对象、质量对象，你知道的，各种对象来控制这个工厂。
And we found in our computer was great for it. And so our whole factory now runs on this object-oriented factory and quality system. The last generation of— our latest generation of robots, which we've deployed this year, we actually built the hardware.
我们发现我们的计算机非常适合这个。因此，我们整个工厂现在都在这个面向对象的工厂和质量系统上运行。我们今年部署的最新一代机器人，实际上是我们自己制造的硬件。
I've been to Japan maybe— oh, a lot of times— maybe 30, 40 times. And I love to have factories over there. They always amaze me, because they built everything themselves. They weren't afraid of anything. They needed a robot. They tried to buy one. But if they couldn't, they'd actually engineer it and build it.
我去过日本很多次——哦，大约 30、40 次。我喜欢在那里有工厂。它们总是让我惊叹，因为他们自己建造了一切。他们不怕任何事情。他们需要一个机器人。他们试图购买一个。但如果买不到，他们实际上会设计并制造一个。
And you'd think this was really expensive, but we found out it's pretty cheap. It's actually cheaper than buying them. And so we've actually now designed our— and specced out our own robots. We don't mill the metal or anything. We get that all made. We put them all together. And we do the software top-to-bottom.
你可能会认为这真的很贵，但我们发现其实很便宜。实际上，它比购买它们还便宜。因此，我们现在已经设计并规范了我们自己的机器人。我们不铣削金属或其他任何东西。我们把所有的部件都制作好，然后组装在一起。我们从头到尾做软件。
And we have now some extraordinarily advanced robots in the factory. And our computers are built, start to finish, on the key components, completely untouched by human hands. So we're pretty convinced we're the low-cost producer. We do it in Fremont, California, right under our nose. And we export them to Japan, and all sorts of other places.
我们现在在工厂里有一些极其先进的机器人。我们的电脑从头到尾都是基于关键组件制造的，完全没有人手接触。因此，我们非常确信我们是低成本生产者。我们在加利福尼亚州的弗里蒙特进行生产，就在我们眼皮底下。我们将它们出口到日本以及其他各种地方。
And Canon is our partner in Japan. And they do very, very thorough quality audits. And we're now at the point where we're directly shipped to stock with them. And they say we're a very high-quality supplier.
佳能是我们在日本的合作伙伴。他们进行非常彻底的质量审计。我们现在已经能够直接向他们发货并入库。他们说我们是一个非常高质量的供应商。
How do your lines tie in with your research— your development team? Because I had heard that they could actually change the line from their own computers [INAUDIBLE]
您的产品线如何与您的研究（您的开发团队）结合起来？因为我听说他们实际上可以从自己的计算机上更改线路[听不清]
Yeah, they can. Well, we don't give everybody permission to do that, but
是的，他们可以。好吧，我们并不是给每个人都允许这样做，但
—yes, they can. Here's how it works. One of the things we do is we actually— when we want to build an engineering prototype— see what happens in most— one of the key things that manufacturing can contribute to competitive advantage is time to market. Why is that?
-是的，他们可以。事情是这样的。我们要做的一件事就是，当我们想制造一个工程原型时，看看在大多数情况下会发生什么，制造业能够为竞争优势做出贡献的关键因素之一就是上市时间。为什么这么说呢？
Because the way most things work is you design your product here. And after you're done, you throw it over the wall. And you design your manufacturing process here, sorting out a bunch of things that maybe weren't done right here, fixing them, changing them, and then completing the process design.
因为大多数事物的运作方式是你在这里设计你的产品。完成后，你把它扔到墙那边。然后你在这里设计你的制造过程，解决一些可能在这里没有做好、修复它们、改变它们，然后完成过程设计。
What you want to do is do this, and ship it right here while your competitors are still here. And that's what we've been able to do in many cases. What we do is, we suck data out of our CAD systems in engineering. We zing them around over the local networks over a T1 to [INAUDIBLE] factory is about 15 minutes away.
你想要做的是这样做，并在你的竞争对手仍在这里的时候将其发货。这就是我们在许多情况下能够做到的。我们所做的是，从我们的工程 CAD 系统中提取数据。我们通过本地网络以 T1 的速度将它们传送到距离约 15 分钟的[INAUDIBLE]工厂。
And in our own computers, we compute all of the robot placement programs' fully-optimized path. We compute all the vision system programs. We check it against the bill of materials in the IS system. And we download it to the robots. And we're ready to build a board, lot size of one, in-between two production CPU boards on the line, full surface mount with all of our automation technology.
在我们的计算机中，我们将所有机器人放置程序的完全优化路径计算出来。我们计算所有视觉系统程序。我们会根据 IS 系统中的物料清单进行核对。然后我们将它下载到机器人。然后就可以在生产线上的两块生产 CPU 板之间构建一个单批次、全表面贴装的电路板，并使用我们所有的自动化技术。
Now, the key is that manufacturing did that so well for engineering, that we haven't built a prototype in engineering for two years. We haven't built a wire wrap, or any other kind of prototype in engineering for two years. Everything has been built in the factory.
现在，关键是制造业在工程方面做得如此出色，以至于我们在工程领域已经两年没有建造原型了。我们已经两年没有在工程中建造过线缆包封装或任何其他类型的原型。所有的东西都是在工厂里建造的。
Now, what does that mean? What that means is, manufacturing gets involved from day one. Because the— the engineering guys call up manufacturing go, hey, we want to build a prototype. We're going to need these special parts in that thing. Take a look at this. Tell us what you think. We'd like to do it tomorrow. Let us know if that's OK, blah, blah, blah. They get involved from day one.
现在，这是什么意思呢？这意味着，从第一天起，制造就参与进来了。因为工程师们打电话给制造部门，说，嘿，我们想要制造一个原型。我们需要这些特殊的零件。看看这个。告诉我们你的想法。我们希望明天就能做到。让我们知道这是否可以，等等。他们从第一天起就参与其中。
And what it also means is— so we get this parallelism. Secondly, a lot of times, when you build prototypes, it's not quite the same technology as you're going to use in production. And so all the accumulated knowledge you get from building your prototypes, you throw away when you change technology to go into production. And you start over in that accumulation process.
这也意味着——我们得到了这种平行性。其次，很多时候，当你构建原型时，所使用的技术与最终生产中将使用的技术并不完全相同。因此，从构建原型中获得的所有积累知识，在你更换技术以进入生产时都会被抛弃。你需要在这个积累过程中重新开始。
Because we don't change technology, we don't throw anything away. We don't waste time. And it's led to one of the healthiest relationships between an engineering and manufacturing group I've ever seen in my life.
因为我们不改变技术，所以我们不扔掉任何东西。我们不浪费时间。这导致了我一生中见过的工程和制造团队之间最健康的关系之一。
They're all working off the same databases. They're all working on the same processes. They're all working in a very disciplined process environment, to where, when any processes are change, they all get together and review the proposals, and all buy into it.
他们都在使用相同的数据库。他们都在进行相同的流程。他们都在一个非常有纪律的流程环境中工作，因此，当任何流程发生变化时，他们都会聚在一起审查提案，并达成共识。
And it's not that hard. The key to it all, though, was we didn't go out and hire a bunch manufacturing people. We went out and hired engineers. And we convinced them that we were going to be different. We were going to pay them exactly the same as— as a matter of fact, we paid them a little more at the beginning.
这并不难。关键在于，我们并没有出去雇佣一大堆制造人员。我们出去雇佣了工程师。我们说服他们，我们会有所不同。我们会支付给他们与——实际上，起初我们支付给他们的还多一点。
But we pay him exactly the same as R&D, no different. There's migration, both directions, not just from manufacturing into R&D, but both directions. And they're not second-class citizens. They have the same offices. They have the same test equipment. They have the same computers on their desks.
但我们支付给他的薪水与研发部门完全相同，没有区别。人员流动是双向的，不仅仅是从制造转向研发，而是双向的。他们不是二等公民。他们有相同的办公室。他们有相同的测试设备。他们的桌子上有相同的电脑。
And it took us a while to convince them that we were really serious. For about the first few years, we had more PhDs in manufacturing than we did design engineering, until design engineering stole a few of them away.
而我们花了一段时间才说服他们我们真的很认真。在最初的几年里，我们在制造方面的博士人数比设计工程还要多，直到设计工程挖走了他们中的一些。
So it's really paid off for us, and I think it's one of our real opportunities for competitive advantage. Yeah, I think one or two more, and we've got to run. And probably, you do too. Yes, up there, [INAUDIBLE]?
所以这对我们真的很有帮助，我认为这是我们获得竞争优势的真正机会之一。是的，我认为再来一两个，我们就能成功。而且你们可能也是。是的，上面， [听不清]？
So you have no warehouses, is that true? You are doing true JIT? [INAUDIBLE]
所以你没有仓库，这是真的吗？你是在做真正的准时生产吗？[听不清]
Yeah. 是的。
How are you getting your products or your raw materials?
你是如何获取你的产品或原材料的？
How are we getting our raw materials?
我们如何获取原材料？
Yeah. 是的。
You mean, like, what truck line brings them in? Or what do you mean?
你是说，哪个卡车公司把它们送来？还是你是什么意思？
Is it air? Is it truck? I mean, how are you getting everything in that quickly?
是空运吗？是卡车吗？我的意思是，你怎么能这么快把所有东西都弄到位？
See the key thing is, that's not our problem. That's our suppliers' problem. So we agree with our supplier when the stuff is going to arrive on our factory floor. And if they can— if they're together enough to ship it by truck, that's fine. If they have to ship it by air, that's too bad. If they want to have a warehouse next to ours, because they're not good enough, well, then they have to do that.
关键是，这不是我们的问题。这是我们供应商的问题。因此，我们与供应商达成一致，确定货物何时会到达我们的工厂。如果他们能够——如果他们足够协调以通过卡车运输，那很好。如果他们必须通过空运，那就太糟糕了。如果他们想在我们旁边有一个仓库，因为他们不够好，那他们就得这样做。
Now, we're not giant, so we can't go command people to do things. But what's happened is, is we have a fairly narrow supply base. We don't have three billion suppliers. And they see tremendous advantages in working with us.
现在，我们不是巨头，所以我们不能命令人们做事情。但发生的情况是，我们的供应基础相对较窄。我们没有三十亿个供应商。他们在与我们合作中看到了巨大的优势。
We're pushing our quality information systems back to them. As an example, Motorola is one of our key suppliers. Almost every key supplier has NeXT computers. And we send them statistical quality information, sometimes daily— daily— off our automated quality information systems on their parts.
我们将我们的质量信息系统推回给他们。举个例子，摩托罗拉是我们的一家关键供应商。几乎每个关键供应商都有 NeXT 计算机。我们每天——每天——通过我们的自动化质量信息系统向他们发送关于他们零件的统计质量信息。
And those kinds of things are extremely valuable to them. So while we're not Goliath, we're a very valuable David to work with. And so they really bend over backwards to work with us.
这些事情对他们来说非常重要。因此，虽然我们不是巨人，但我们是一个非常有价值的大卫可以合作。因此，他们真的非常努力地与我们合作。
And we try to push the problems where they belong. If it's our problems, we take full responsibility for them. We own our process. But they— it's their job to get us a zero defect material on-time, per agreements. And our philosophy is, our money doesn't break after we give it to them, so their parts shouldn't break after they give them to us.
我们试图把问题推到属于它们的地方。如果是我们自己的问题，我们就要承担全部责任。我们拥有自己的流程。但他们的工作是按时、按协议为我们提供零缺陷的材料。我们的理念是，我们的钱给他们后不会坏，所以他们的零件给我们后也不应该坏。
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1977 Steve Jobs.Interview with The New Yorker
“It’s a domesticated computer.” "这是一台驯化的电脑" Steve’s first appearance in a national publication came in a 1977 issue of The New Yorker. The magazine sent a reporter to the First Annual Personal Computing Expo, held in the New York Coliseum. Most ...2012-04 Walter Isaacson.The Real Leadership Lessons of Steve Jobs
Six months after Jobs’s death, the author of his best-selling biography identifies the practices that every CEO can try to emulate. by Walter Isaacson. 沃尔特·艾萨克森（Walter Isaacson）在乔布斯去世六个月后，作为他畅销传记的作者，确定了每位CEO都可以尝试效仿的做法。 Summary. The author, whose ...1985-09 Steve Jobs.Interview with Newsweek
Steve left Apple in September 1985, after losing a power struggle with CEO John Sculley. The departure was officially a resignation, but Steve considered it a betrayal. A few weeks later, he spoke to Newsweek. 史蒂夫在 1985 年 9 ...1984-05 Steve Jobs.Interview with Michael Moritz
Steve and Michael Moritz, a reporter who would soon switch careers and become a venture capitalist, spoke at Steve’s office at Apple in May 1984. They covered a wide range of topics, including Steve’s thoughts on product design. 史蒂夫和迈克尔·莫里茨（Michael ...1995-04-20 Steve Jobs.Interview with Daniel Morrow
Excerpts from an Oral History Interview with Steve Jobs?Founder, NeXT Computer. 与 NeXT Computer 创始人史蒂夫-乔布斯的口述历史访谈摘录。 Interviewer: Daniel Morrow, Executive Director, The Computerworld Smithsonian Awards Program 采访者丹尼尔-莫罗（Daniel ...