1850-03-26 American Express.The Treaty Of Buffalo

1850-03-26 American Express.The Treaty Of Buffalo


When the American Express Company was founded in 1850, it did exactly what its name said.The express business itself had existed for less than fifteen years, but already it was a vital component of the American transportation and communication system. As the population of the U.S. grew and dispersed into the nation’s interior in the middle of the nineteenth entury,business followed,and with it the need to move goods quickly over vast distances. The railroads became the primary transportation-communications link in American commerce, and the express rode literally and figuratively on the backs of railroads, offering a new service that combined the high-speed transport of the rails with a delivery system of a post ofice. Railroads handled bulk freight; the U.S. Post Office carried the mails; the express transported everything else. Actually, the lines between freight,post, and express materials often blurred, and the three systems at times fought over the same business. But the express was specifically designed to carry items that required both rapid transport and safe delivery; the express promised speed and took responsibility for damage and loss.
当美国运通公司于1850年成立时，它确实像其名称所示那样从事快运业务。快运业本身出现还不到十五年，但已成为美国交通与通信系统的重要组成部分。19世纪中叶，随着美国人口增长并向内陆扩散，商业随之而来，对在广阔距离内快速运输货物的需求亦随之增加。铁路成为美国商业的主要交通通信纽带，而快运则在铁路的“背上”——无论字面还是比喻意义上——行进，提供一种将铁路高速运输与邮局投递系统结合的新服务。铁路负责大宗货运，美国邮政负责邮件，而快运运输其余所有物品。实际上，货运、邮政与快运之间的界限常常模糊，这三种系统有时会争夺同一笔业务。但快运专门用于运送既需快速运输又需安全递送的物品；快运承诺速度，并对损坏与丢失承担责任。

A limited and informal version of the express business existed before the organization of express companies. Stagecoach drivers used to carry letters and packages from town to town, secreting valuables.in their large bell-crowned hats. But stage drivers could not maintain a communications network over such vast and expanding territory. Individually they traveled short routes over a limited range,and carying packages was never more than a sideline to their driving jobs. Only a formal service based primarily on rail transportation could meet the growing needs of the country. The U.S. Post Office failed to provide it. In the early years of the country, its service proved too expensive and notoriously unreliable.
在快运公司成立之前，快运业务曾以有限且非正式的形式存在。驿车车夫过去常在城镇之间携带信件和包裹，将贵重物品藏在他们高高的钟形帽里。但驿车车夫无法在如此广阔且不断扩张的领土上维系通信网络；他们个人行驶的路线短、范围有限，而携带包裹始终只是驾车工作的副业。唯有建立一种主要依赖铁路运输的正式服务才能满足国家日益增长的需求。美国邮政未能提供这种服务。在建国初期，其服务既昂贵又出了名的不可靠。

For a time, merchants preferred to transport packages and money through friends who happened to be traveling in the right direction. And if a businessman could not find a friend,he would hand over the packet to a friend of a friend, or even toa perfect stranger. Throughout the first third of the nineteenth century, on any business day,merchants scoured the wharves of ports such as New York, Boston, and Providence, pouncing on virtually any traveler and stuffing some merchandise into his or her hands. Miraculously, most of the goods ended up in the right place.
曾有一段时间，商人们更倾向于通过恰好要往正确方向出行的朋友来运送包裹和资金。如果找不到朋友，商人就把包裹交给朋友的朋友，甚至于一个完全陌生的人。在19世纪前1/3的任何工作日里，商人们都会在纽约、波士顿和普罗维登斯等港口的码头徘徊，几乎逮住任何旅行者并把一些货物塞到他或她手中。不可思议的是，大多数货物最终都送到了正确的目的地。

But bankers did most to spur a formal express service. In l836, the federal government dissolved the second Bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve of the day. But when the U.S. bank closed, the only national, interbank,messenger service ended with it. Banks had to handle such transactions themselves,which they did at high cost.A bank hired a special courier to deliver a draft. To cover the cost of transportation and insurance, the bank had to deduct a part of every draft, discounting it by as much as lO percent. The banks, above all, needed a more permanent system that could reduce their costs.
然而，正是银行家们最推动了正式快运服务的发展。1836年，联邦政府解散了当时相当于今日联邦储备的第二合众国银行；随着该行关闭，唯一的全国性银行间信使服务也随之终结。各银行不得不自行处理此类交易，而成本高昂。银行会雇用专差递送汇票；为支付运输与保险费用，银行不得不从每张汇票中扣除一部分，贴现率高达10%。银行最需要的是一种更持久的系统以降低其成本。

The express filled that need. It offered to carry for all the banks every kind of financial instrument-cash, securities, and gold-with the same speed and attention as a special courier. Messengers accompanied express shipments every step of the way. But the express proposed to combine valuables with other material needing fast transportpackages (no parcel post existed in the U.S. until the l900s), fragile items,and perishables.Through economies of scale, the express could lower the cost for banks enormously. In fact, the advent of the express business dropped the discount rate from l0 percent to around 1 percent. Banks welcomed the express, and bank contracts became an important part of an express company’s business.
快运满足了这一需求。它向所有银行承诺，以与专差相同的速度和谨慎运送各种金融票据——现金、证券和黄金。快运信使全程伴随货物运送。但快运还提议将贵重物品与其他需快速运输的材料——包裹（当时美国直到20世纪初才有包裹邮递）、易碎品和易腐品——混合运输。借助规模经济，快运能极大地降低银行成本。事实上，快运业的出现把贴现率从10%降至约1%。银行欣然接受快运业务，银行合同也成为快运公司业务的重要组成部分。

Bank business also had special attractions for express companies. Transportation of money and securities produced the largest return for the expresses because, while they charged for carrying packages by the weight, they charged for shipment of financial instruments by the value. A single messenger could carry a good day’s profit in his pocket, or certainly in one bag. It made the express business a natural for ambitious men without any capital. They only needed a bag and a rail ticket to set up shop.
银行业务对快运公司也具有独特吸引力。运送货币和证券能为快运公司带来最高回报，因为它们对包裹按重量收费，而对金融票据按价值收费。一名信使口袋里，或者至少一只袋子里，就能装上一天的可观利润。快运业因此成为无本雄心之士的天然选择——他们只需一个包和一张火车票就能开业。

Two bank couriers formed what was arguably the first express operation. In 1834, B. D. and L. B. Earle created a company to carry packages and money on the new rail link between Boston and Providence. But the Earle brothers did not provide a service that covered a sufficiently broad territory to meet the needs of the banking and business communities. A company that had greater geographical scope held an advantage over all others. One organization serving Boston, Albany, New York, Providence, and Philadelphia could handle all at a net lower cost.
两名银行信使创办了可以说是最早的快运业务。1834 年，B·D· Earle与 L·B· Earle兄弟成立公司，在波士顿至普罗维登斯的新铁路上运送包裹和资金。但Earle兄弟的服务范围不足以满足银行和商界的需求。地理覆盖更广的公司会对所有同行形成优势。一家能同时服务波士顿、奥尔巴尼、纽约、普罗维登斯与费城的机构，就能以更低的净成本处理全部业务。

The first to appreciate the advantage of a widespread express system was a delicately built, sanguine-looking Bostonian named William Harnden. In 1839, Harnden recognized the potential and hit on the name “express.” Then he bought a carpetbag to carry valuables, a ticket for the steamship from New York to Providence and one for the train from Providence to Boston, and launched “Harnden’s Package Express,” headquartered at 20 Wall Street in New York’s financial center. He lost money until he made a deal with steamship operator Daniel Drew. Drew competed with Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt for East-Coast shipping business, and so he offered Harnden a free pass on his boats in exchange for free publicity; Harnden let it be known that he traveled on Drew’s line, not Vanderbilt’s. Soon, Harnden had sufficient business to run his express every evening, and he usually carried enough to fill whole freight cars.
最先意识到广域快运系统优势的是来自波士顿、体格纤细且神色乐观的威廉·哈恩登。1839 年，哈恩登看准潜力，提出“express（快运）”一词。随后他买了一只地毯包来携带贵重物品，买了一张从纽约到普罗维登斯的轮船票及一张从普罗维登斯到波士顿的火车票，创立了“哈恩登包裹快运”，总部位于纽约金融中心华尔街 20 号。起初他亏损，直至与轮船经营者丹尼尔·德鲁达成协议。德鲁与康沃利斯·范德比尔特争夺东海岸航运业务，便向哈恩登提供免费乘船权以换取免费宣传；哈恩登公开宣称自己乘坐德鲁的船，而非范德比尔特的。很快，哈恩登的业务量足以每晚运营快运，且装载常常多到能填满整节货车厢。

With his needs for space so great, Harnden negotiated contracts with carriers; the terms would comprise contracts between expresses and carriers—particularly railroads—thereafter. In exchange for a fat monthly fee and/or a percentage of the gross receipts of the express business, the railroads provided cars, transportation (of personnel and goods), and depot facilities. Railroads and expresses leaned toward the gross-receipts formula since it encouraged friendly relations between the two parties: the more business the express carried, the more money the railroads made. At the same time, the contracts usually contained protections for both parties. The expresses promised to keep their rates above bulk-freight rates so that they would not compete with the railroads. For their part, the express companies asked for, and usually were granted, exclusivity—a monopoly right of express privilege over a given rail or steamer line. This was, indeed, the most important clause as far as the expresses were concerned, since monopoly guaranteed high profits.*
由于对车厢空间需求巨大，哈恩登开始与承运人谈判合同；其条款后来成为快运与承运人——尤其是铁路公司——之间合同的范本。铁路公司提供车厢、人员与货物运输及车站设施，作为交换，收取高额月费和/或快运总收入的一定比例。双方倾向于采用总收入分成模式，因为它鼓励合作：快运承运量越大，铁路收入越多。同时，合同通常包含保护双方的条款。快运公司承诺其费率高于大宗货运价，以避免与铁路直接竞争；作为交换，快运公司要求并通常获得排他权——即在特定铁路或轮船线上拥有快运垄断权。对快运公司而言，这是最重要的条款，因为垄断保证了高额利润。*

As business grew, Harnden expanded his operations along the East Coast and up the Hudson River from New York City to Albany. Initially, he failed to gain a contract for express privileges on Drew’s Hudson River fleet; Drew held a monopoly on Hudson River traffic and saw no benefit to himself in awarding a second contract to Harnden. But the Bostonian persisted and finally won it with the help of an acquaintance of Drew’s, Henry Wells. After Harnden signed the contract in 1840, he made Wells his first agent in Albany. Wells’s entry in the express business began a chain of events that would lead to the creation of the American Express Company.
随着业务增长，哈恩登将业务扩展至东海岸，并沿哈德逊河从纽约市北上至奥尔巴尼。起初，他未能获得德鲁控制的哈德逊河船队的快运特许；德鲁垄断了河上交通，自认为授予第二份合同无利可图。但这位波士顿人锲而不舍，在德鲁的一位熟人亨利·威尔斯的帮助下最终拿下合同。1840 年哈恩登签约后，任命威尔斯为奥尔巴尼的首位代理。威尔斯的加入引发了一连串事件，最终催生了美国运通公司。

Henry “Stuttering” Wells was a flamboyant character who dressed in ruffled shirts and in winter always wore a velvet Basque cap with gold tassel. A broad-shouldered six-footer, he was also the physical opposite of the frail Harnden. But like him, Wells was ambitious, and he had tried and failed to make a mark on the world since his preteens. One of his many jobs included schoolmastering at an institution for the “cure of speech defects” (though he failed to cure his own). At the time Harnden found him, the self-educated Wells was thirty-five years old and working as a freight forwarder and ticket agent for traffic between Albany and Buffalo on the 365-mile navigable waterway through the center of New York State known as the Erie Canal.
亨利“口吃”威尔斯是个张扬的人物，常穿带荷叶边的衬衫，冬天总戴着缀金流苏的天鹅绒巴斯克帽。他肩宽体壮、身高六英尺，与体弱的哈恩登形成鲜明对比。但与哈恩登一样，威尔斯雄心勃勃，自少年起便屡次尝试闯出名堂而屡败。其中一份工作是在一家“矫正语言缺陷”机构当教师（却未能治好自己的口吃）。哈恩登找到他时，这位自学成才的威尔斯 35 岁，正担任货运代理和售票员，负责奥尔巴尼至布法罗间、贯穿纽约州中部 365 英里可航行水道——伊利运河——的交通业务。

As it turned out Wells did not succeed in the job Harnden gave him either; he stayed on only a year. What led to the break was a conflict of business vision between the two men. Soon after he began working for Harnden, Wells urged that his boss put in an express line from Albany to Buffalo. But Harnden refused. “Put people there,” the Bostonian said, “and my express will soon follow.”
事实证明，威尔斯在哈恩登安排的岗位上也没能成功；他只干了一年。双方分道扬镳的原因在于商业愿景冲突。威尔斯入职后不久便敦促老板开通奥尔巴尼至布法罗的快运线路，但哈恩登拒绝了。“先把人派到那儿，”这位波士顿人说，“我的快运很快会跟上。”

Wells, however, had a better sense of New York State than his employer. Not only had he worked canal traffic, but he also had spent most of his life in upstate New York and had witnessed its transformation after the opening of the canal in 1825. Over the next fifteen years, it had evolved from an area of isolated frontier towns to a prosperous mercantile and industrial region. By 1840, significant population centers had sprung up along the length of the canal: thousands of people now lived in the cities of Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Utica. Wells saw Buffalo as most important. It contained 18,041 people, a “literary and scientific academy,” three banks, and seven newspapers. It also possessed significant port facilities which served traffic on the canal, the Great Lakes, and the St. Lawrence River. Wells recognized that if Buffalo’s population was growing, its business would grow, and the city would need better links with the mercantile centers on the Atlantic seaboard.
然而，威尔斯比雇主更了解纽约州。他不仅从事过运河运输，还在州北部度过大半生，见证了运河于 1825 年开通后该地区的变迁。在随后十五年里，这里从孤立的边境小镇群发展成繁荣的商业与工业区。到 1840 年，沿运河已出现多个重要人口中心：布法罗、罗切斯特、锡拉丘兹、尤蒂卡等城市居住着成千上万的人。威尔斯认为布法罗最为关键。该市人口 18,041 人，拥有“一所文理科学院”、三家银行和七家报纸，并设有服务运河、五大湖和圣劳伦斯河航运的重大港口设施。威尔斯认识到，若布法罗人口持续增长，其商业亦将增长，城市便需要与大西洋沿岸商贸中心建立更好的联系。

Already, he had witnessed improvement and development in tanportation. The canal had proved an inefficient commercial highway. In winter it froze, and even in summer traffic only crept along. Sys tems of locks held ships immobile for days. But beginning in 1831, short-line railroads began carrying people around the slowest sections of the canal, reducing the travel time from Albany to Bufalo,and by 1840,railroad companies were joining their track. Once that process was completed, Wells foresaw the promise of year-round,high-speed transport across the center of New York State, and the integration of the region into the mainstream of American commerce. But to participate fully in that commerce, Wells believed Buffalo and the other cities of New York also needed an express service.
他已经亲眼见证了交通的改进与发展。事实证明，运河是一条效率低下的商业通道；冬季封冻，夏季船行也只能缓慢挪动，闸锁系统常使船只停滞数日。但自1831年起，短程铁路开始绕过运河最慢的河段载客，将奥尔巴尼至布法罗的旅程时间缩短；到1840年，各铁路公司开始接轨。一旦这一过程完成，威尔斯便预见到纽约州中部全年高速运输的前景，以及该地区融入美国主流商业体系的可能性。但要充分参与此商业网络，威尔斯认为布法罗和纽约州其他城市同样需要快运服务。

When Wells realized he could not convince Harnden of the need, he spoke to a friend, George Pomeroy,and convinced him to startan Albany-Buffalo express line. Pomeroy organized a company in 1841 and began operations,but with the rail line still incomplete,he found the journey from Albany to Buffalo too arduous. He quit after three trips.But Wells still believed strongly in the idea,and he finally came to the conclusion that for an Albany-Buffalo express to succeed, he would have to run it himself. In partnership with investor Crawford Livingston,Wells took over Pomeroy & Co. and began making the run across New York State as the company’s messenger. For the next eighteen months, he traveled continuously.
当威尔斯意识到无法说服哈恩登时，他找来朋友乔治·波默罗，说服他开通奥尔巴尼—布法罗快运线路。波默罗于1841年组建公司并开始运营，但铁路尚未完工，他发现从奥尔巴尼到布法罗的旅程过于艰辛，跑了三趟就放弃了。然而威尔斯依旧坚信此设想，并最终得出结论：若要让奥尔巴尼—布法罗快运成功，他必须亲自经营。威尔斯与投资人克劳福德·利文斯顿合伙接手了波默罗公司，并作为公司的信使开始穿越纽约州运营。此后十八个月里，他一直在路上奔波。

As Pomeroy had discovered, the trip was grueling. Wells traveled only by rail and stage; one way between Buffalo and Albany took him four nights and three days.As he explained in later years to the Buffalo Historical Society, the trains were both slow and dangerous. The cars rode on strap rails,essentially iron bars spiked down to the beds. These rails tended to loosen, causing frequent “run offs” (derailments), or worse, the rails bowed upward in what were called “snake heads,” which had the unfortunate effect of ripping through cars and the people inside them. Also, for a good part of the trip, Wells rode in stagecoaches over roads so poorly maintained that the horses could seldom even trot.
正如波默罗所发现的，那趟旅程极其艰苦。威尔斯只能乘火车和驿车；布法罗到奥尔巴尼单程需四夜三天。他后来向布法罗历史学会回忆说，列车既慢又危险。车厢行驶在带状铁轨上，本质上是钉在枕木上的铁条，这些铁条容易松动，常引起“跑轨”（脱轨）；更糟的是，铁条会上翘形成“蛇头”，可怕到会撕裂车厢及乘客。此外，旅程相当一段路程中，威尔斯乘坐驿车行驶在维护极差的道路上，马匹几乎无法小跑。

As if the journey were not disheartening enough, Wells discovered he had mistimed his venture. Within six months of his first trip,a business depression hit Buffalo and left every bank in the city insolvent. But Wells also proved very lucky. The business community of Buffalo,even more than Wells had anticipated, wanted to maintain this transportation-communications link to other financial and business centers, and consequently, business people nurtured Wells’s oeration. Wells found they were always “anxious to see whether our list of friends had increased,and whether our trunks seemed well fed by packages.”
旅途艰辛已足够令人沮丧，而威尔斯又发现自己选错了时机。首次出行六个月内，一场商业萧条席卷布法罗，城中所有银行破产。但威尔斯也非常走运。布法罗商界比他预想的更渴望维系这条通往其他金融与商业中心的交通通信纽带，因此商人们悉心扶植威尔斯的业务。威尔斯发现他们总是“急切地想看看我们的‘朋友名单’是否增加，箱子是否被包裹‘喂得饱饱的’”。

In time,Wells was making money and he gave up his duties as messenger to concentrate on proprietorship. By l842, the rail link between Albany and Buffalo was completed, which enormously speeded and simplified the trip. It also led to further growth of the Buffalo region; between 1840 and l845, the population of the city nearly doubled.
随着时间推移，威尔斯开始盈利，遂放下信使工作，专心经营。到1842年，奥尔巴尼与布法罗间的铁路全线贯通，旅程大幅提速并更为便捷，也进一步推动了布法罗地区的发展；1840年至1845年，该市人口几乎翻番。

In l842, Wels hired a freight agent away from the Auburn & Syracuse Railroad and made him a messenger. The man,William George Frgoheninhis idtwenties,as cyicalmitioud physically courageous.Like Wells,he had struck out on his own at age thirteen with a strong back and almost no formal education. Also a native of upstate New York, Fargo had already failed as a grocer and appeared to have been just marking time in the freight agent’s job. Within a year after he met Wells,however,he proved his value as an expressman,and Wells appointed him the company’s agent in Bufalo. By this time, Wells’s line, renamed Livingston,Wells & Co., served all of the major cities of central New York, and Wells looked to expand it further.
1842年，威尔斯从奥本—锡拉丘兹铁路挖来一名货运代理并聘为信使。此人名叫威廉·乔治·法戈，二十多岁，性格多疑、老练且勇敢。和威尔斯一样，他十三岁就离家闯荡，体力强健而几乎没受过正规教育。同样出生在纽约州北部的法戈，曾当杂货商失败，在货运代理岗位上似乎也只是混日子。然而与威尔斯结识不到一年，他便证明了自己在快运行业的价值，威尔斯任命他为布法罗业务代理。此时，威尔斯的线路已更名为“利文斯顿、威尔斯公司”，服务纽约中部所有主要城市，且威尔斯计划进一步扩张。

Wells looked west and formed an express line under Fargo’s management that offered service from Buffalo to Chicago via Ohio, Michigan,and Indiana. In creating this line, Wells was gambling on the future of the country.In effect, he bet that the settlers and homesteaders he had seen embarking for the midwest from the Lake Erie port at Buffalo represented growth and development in a new region of the country. Almost no formal transportation system existed through this territory where Wells put his express line. Railroads did not run past Buffalo. Wells recalled that the trip from Buffalo just as far as Detroit could take as long as eight days, and the expense was so high that for the first couple of years he could not make a profit.
威尔斯把目光投向西部，在法戈的管理下开设了一条从布法罗经俄亥俄、密歇根、印第安纳到芝加哥的快运线路。创建此线时，威尔斯在赌国家的未来——他押注自己在布法罗伊利湖港口看到的那些前往中西部的定居者与开拓者，将推动该国新地区的增长与发展。在威尔斯铺设快运线的这片疆域几乎没有正式交通系统；铁路并未延伸至布法罗之外。威尔斯回忆说，从布法罗到底特律仅这一段路就可能耗时八天，而且成本高昂，以至于最初几年他无法盈利。

But the New York express more than made up the difference, and Wells expanded it continuously. In 1845, after Harnden died (he had worked himself to death at age thirty-two), Wells added the express route from New York to Albany to his line and moved his headquarters to New York City. A year later, he sold all, or most, of his share of the western express to Fargo and William Livingston, Crawford’s brother. When Crawford died in 1848, Wells renamed his own company Wells & Co., though he sold a share of it to Johnston Livingston.\* The business grew enormously. Express traffic in New York State increased a hundredfold from 1841 to 1849, and Wells, Fargo, and the Livingstons controlled all of it.
然而，纽约州境内的快运业务足以弥补亏空，并且威尔斯持续扩张该线路。1845 年，哈恩登去世（年仅三十二岁，因过度劳累猝逝）后，威尔斯将纽约至奥尔巴尼的快运线路纳入旗下，并把总部迁至纽约市。一年后，他将自己在西部快运中的全部或大部分股份出售给法戈与克劳福德之弟威廉·利文斯顿。1848 年克劳福德去世后，威尔斯将公司更名为 “Wells & Co.”，但同时又将部分股权转让给约翰斯顿·利文斯顿 *。业务规模随之迅猛扩张：1841 至 1849 年间，纽约州的快运流量增长了一百倍，而威尔斯、法戈与利文斯顿家族对此实现了完全控制。

Their success, however, captured the attention of John Butterfield, a onetime stagecoach driver from Utica. Butterfield was a few years older than Wells, and like Wells and Fargo, self-educated and self-made, but by the mid-1840s, probably a good deal richer than both. Butterfield controlled virtually all the stagecoach lines in western New York (which still carried all of the freight and passengers to settlements not on a rail line). He also built the telegraph from Albany to Buffalo (Wells had invested in that venture), and had started a steamship operation on Lake Ontario that dominated traffic along the lake and the St. Lawrence River. Butterfield had powerful friends, too. They included future U.S. President James Buchanan and Erastus Corning, New York’s leading railroad man.
然而，他们的成功吸引了约翰·巴特菲尔德的注意。这位来自尤蒂卡、曾经的驿车车夫比威尔斯年长几岁，与威尔斯和法戈一样都是白手起家的自学成才之人，但到 1840 年代中期，他或许已远比两人更为富有。巴特菲尔德几乎垄断了纽约州西部所有驿车线路（这些线路仍承担着未通铁路地区的全部货运与客运）。他还修建了奥尔巴尼至布法罗的电报线路（威尔斯曾投资此项目），并在安大略湖创办了汽船业务，主宰了该湖及圣劳伦斯河的航运。此外，巴特菲尔德还结交了强大的政商盟友，其中包括未来的美国总统詹姆斯·布坎南以及纽约铁路巨头伊拉斯图斯·科宁。

The growth of the express business proved a tempting target for Butterfield, and in 1849, he, along with James Wasson of Albany, formed a rival express, Butterfield, Wasson & Company,\* to compete with Wells & Company throughout New York State. Wells had a contract with Corning’s railroads; the contract gave Wells the right to carry express matter on those lines for a flat fee of \$100 a day. Butterfield told his friend Corning that he would pay the same amount for the same privileges, and Corning agreed. What’s more, Butterfield cut the cost to customers, making it cheaper for shippers to send express material through Butterfield, Wasson than through Wells & Co.
快运业的迅猛增长对巴特菲尔德来说极具诱惑。1849 年，他与奥尔巴尼的詹姆斯·沃森合作成立了竞争性公司 “Butterfield, Wasson & Company”*，试图在纽约州全境与 Wells & Company 一决高下。威尔斯与科宁旗下铁路公司签有合同，按日支付 100 美元的固定费用以获得线路快运权。巴特菲尔德告诉好友科宁，他愿意支付同样的费用换取同等特权，科宁欣然同意。更甚者，巴特菲尔德还降低了客户费用，使得托运人通过 Butterfield, Wasson 运送快件的成本低于 Wells & Co.

Competition, any competition, caused extreme alarm among expressmen. They saw competition in social Darwinian terms as a battle for the survival of the fittest or the richest. Of course, this view was not uncommon among businessmen of that era, but expressmen felt particularly vulnerable to competitors. While an individual needed large resources to start a new railroad or an iron mill, he could start an express with virtually no capital and offer the same services as an established company. The expressmen believed then that if they allowed any competition, it would open the way for more and eventually lead to their own destruction.
在快运经营者眼中，任何竞争都会引发极度恐慌。他们将竞争视作社会达尔文式的“优胜—or—富者生存”之战。当然，这种观点在当时商界并不罕见，但快运业者格外感到脆弱：创办铁路或钢铁厂需巨额资本，而开办一家快运几乎不需要资金，却能提供与成熟公司同等的服务。于是，他们坚信一旦放任竞争，就会吸引更多对手，最终导致自身毁灭。

As a result, the expressmen believed that competition required elimination, and they used two strategies to accomplish it. First, they tried to destroy competitors; Wells had crushed a few upstarts over the years. If that failed, the other alternative was merger. But companies merged only when they agreed that warfare would be too costly and that even the winner would pay too high a price for victory.
因此，快运业者认定必须消除竞争，并采用两种策略实现此目标。其一是摧毁对手——多年来威尔斯已击溃过若干新晋公司。若此计失灵，则诉诸并购。但只有在双方一致认为价格战代价过高、即便胜者也难以承受时，公司才会合并。

Wells set out to crush Butterfield by dropping his own rates below those Butterfield offered. Soon both companies were losing money, but Butterfield’s pockets were at least as deep as Wells’s. After a few months of losses, and when Butterfield showed no inclination to give up, Wells knew he couldn’t win. It was time for alternative two. Sources differ on who called for the merger. Some say it was Wells; others insist Butterfield took the lead. It might even have been Corning who decided to bring the two men together. In any case, by early 1850 negotiations began, and they concluded in Buffalo at the end of March with an agreement that might have been called the Treaty of Buffalo but was known instead as the Articles of Association of the American Express Company.
威尔斯企图通过将运价压得低于巴特菲尔德来击垮后者。很快，两家公司都在亏损，但巴特菲尔德的资本实力与威尔斯旗鼓相当。几个月的亏损后，眼见巴特菲尔德丝毫无意认输，威尔斯意识到此战难以取胜，只得启用第二方案。关于谁首先提出合并，史料说法不一：有人称出自威尔斯，有人说是巴特菲尔德主导，甚至可能是科宁撮合二人。无论如何，1850 年初谈判启动，并于 3 月底在布法罗达成协议——本可称作《布法罗条约》，最终却以《美国运通公司章程》之名载入史册。

The battle between Wells and Butterfield ended with the creation of American Express, but its birth was not simple, nor did the company seem likely to survive. Like many treaties, the one that created Amexco\* tried to strike a compromise and balance of interests. But so far from settling conflicts, the agreement created an organization that was divided, contentious, and in some ways virtually paralyzed.
威尔斯与巴特菲尔德的对决以美国运通的诞生告终，但其诞生并不简单，公司前景亦并不光明。与许多条约一样，缔造 Amexco* 的协议力图在各方利益之间求得妥协和平衡。然而，该协议非但未能化解矛盾，反而孕育出一个内部分裂、争执不断、在某些方面几近瘫痪的组织。

The termination of war did not result in an even balance of power between the two men. Rather the merger marked the surrender of Henry Wells to Butterfield, who emerged as the most powerful figure in the new company. Wells retained some influence and power, but Butterfield wound up with the stronger hand in the business that Wells himself had built.
停战并未让两位对手获得均衡的权力格局；这次合并更像是亨利·威尔斯向巴特菲尔德的投降，后者成为新公司中最具实力的人物。威尔斯保留了部分影响力与权力，但巴特菲尔德最终在这家由威尔斯亲手缔造的企业中取得了主导地位。

But American Express was not only the combination of Wells & Co. with Buterfield,Wsonut witha irdomny well.ito Fargo & Co.also joined the new organization, but its presence greatly complicated the power relationships. Why Livingston and Fargo offered Butterfield a stake in their western express remains conjecture. The likeliest reason was that Butterfield threatened to create a rival western express. With his money and connections, Butterfield could have built a company that would have swamped Livingston, Fargo & Co.But Butterfield had not put that to the test and so had little leverage over Fargo and Livingston. As a result, Fargo came to the negotiating table but would sign an agreement only if it gave him significant power. He and Butterfield together as equals hammered out the form and system of American Express. Henry Wells bowed out of the process. In March l850, as the talks neared their conclusion,he left for a vacation in Europe. He did not see the final agreement until months afterward.
然而，美国运通并非只是 Wells & Co. 与 Butterfield, Wasson 的合并，第三家公司 Fargo & Co. 也加入了这一新组织，但它的出现极大地复杂化了权力关系。为何 Livingston 和 Fargo 会让 Butterfield 入股他们的西部快运，仍是猜测。最可能的原因是 Butterfield 威胁要创办一家竞争性的西部快运。凭借资金与人脉，Butterfield 本可以建立一家足以吞噬 Livingston, Fargo & Co. 的公司。但他并未真正付诸行动，因此对 Fargo 和 Livingston 的筹码有限。结果，Fargo 走上谈判桌，但仅在协议赋予他重大权力时才愿意签字。他与 Butterfield 以平等身份共同敲定了美国运通的结构与制度。亨利·威尔斯则退出了谈判。1850 年 3 月，当谈判接近尾声时，他前往欧洲度假，数月后才看到最终协议。

The reality of the two forces was clearly evident in the agreement that emerged. While the three companies merged into one named American Express, they remained two operating units\:Livingston, Fargo & Co.retained its identity， while in New York State, Wells & Co.and Butterfield,Wassonbecame Wells,Butterfield & Co.(he order of the names did not indicate the relative power, however. Butterfeld was named the line superintendent, which made him the operating head of the company. Wells gained no status within Wells, Butterfield.)
最终协议清晰地反映了两股力量的现实。三家公司虽然合并成名为“美国运通”的实体，但仍保留了两个运营单元：Livingston, Fargo & Co. 保持原名；而在纽约州，Wells & Co. 与 Butterfield, Wasson 合并为 Wells, Butterfield & Co.（名称顺序并不代表权力高低）。Butterfield 被任命为线路监督，成为公司运营负责人；Wells 在 Wells, Butterfield 内部并未获得任何头衔。

These two operating units did not promote a real merger of interests, but rather accommodated and balanced the power of the two strongest members and their respective supporters. As a result, both operating units remained autonomous, and so separate that they did not even report the basic business details of profit and loss to each other, or to the American Express board asa whole. This was not just decentralization, but factionalism, and it guaranteed an adversary relationship among leaders of the company. In other companies directors feuded, but American Express was unusual in that it was created around op position and conflict.
这两个运营单元并未实现真正的利益融合，而是为了容纳并平衡最强两派及其支持者的权力。因此，它们各自独立，甚至互不向对方或美国运通董事会整体报告利润亏损等基本经营数据。这不仅是分权，更是派系化，注定了公司高层的对立关系。其他公司也有董事争斗，但美国运通的特殊之处在于，它自诞生之初就建立在对立与冲突之上。

Six men met at Mansion House, the main financial building of Buffalo, on March 18, l850, to work out the final agreement. Butterfield, William and Johnston Livingston, Butterfield’s partner Wasson,FargondufalolawerJmesMcKaycompletedtheety of Buffalo over eight days. The agreement they signed gave the new American Express Company a lifetime of ten years. That was it. It could be dissolved sooner only by a vote of the shareholders,butafter a decade, the company would be forced to disband. Though this clause refected the mistrust between the parties at Mansion House,it also made business sense. The ten-year limit presented an obstacle against a move to take over the company by one faction or another. Any shareholder would need the cooperation of the others to reconstitute the company at that day in the future when it would be dissolved.
1850 年 3 月 18 日，六位缔约者在布法罗金融中心大楼 Mansion House 会面，敲定最终协议。参会者有 Butterfield、William 与 Johnston Livingston、Butterfield 的合伙人 Wasson、Fargo，以及布法罗律师 James McKay。历时八天，他们完成了这份可称作“布法罗条约”的文件。协议规定新成立的美国运通公司存续期为十年，仅可由股东投票提前解散；十年期满，公司必须自动解散。此条款反映了 Mansion House 会谈各方的互不信任，但亦合乎商业逻辑：十年期限为任何派系意图单独接管公司设置了障碍。届时若欲续存，任何股东都需得到其他人的合作。

The new company was capitalized at \$150,000 (1,500 shares, \$100 per share), with each of the three original companies “contributing” \$50,000 .Most likely, they actually paid in nothing at all.\* The men sitting at the table at Mansion House merely decided to value the assets of each of the three original companies at \$50,000 and then they created stock for that amount. That number did not reflect real capital assets. (It was questionable whether the tangible assets of the three combined-a few wagons and horses mostly-equaled \$50,000. ） Rather the “capital” represented an amount for figuring dividends; company officials estimated they could maintain a good return on \$150,000 ，and so they created a mythical capital of that amount. Actually， Butterfield may have paid in some cash, since he was the newcomer to the business and had not built as much “capital.” In any event,he wound up the largest shareholder with 225 shares,15 percent of the company. (Wells and Fargo had about lOo each.)
新公司名义资本为 15 万美元（1,500 股，每股 100 美元），三家原公司各“认缴”5 万美元。但极可能并未实际出资 \*。座谈的各位仅是将三家公司资产估作 5 万美元，然后按此金额发行股票。该数字与真实资产不符（合并后的有形资产——几辆马车和马匹——能否值 5 万美元都成问题）。所谓“资本”只是用于计算分红的基数；公司高层估计以 15 万美元为本可获得良好回报，于是凭空设定了这一资本额。事实上，作为行业新人且缺乏“资本”的 Butterfield 可能确实投入了一些现金。不管怎样，他最终持有 225 股，占公司 15%，成为最大股东（Wells 与 Fargo 各约 100 股）。

Because he had the largest number of shares, Butterfield gained more power than anyone else, but also more risk. The American Express Company was not a corporation but an “unincorporated jointstock association.” Stockholders could sell and trade their shares like shares of a corporation, but they had responsibilities of unlimited partners. That meant that shareholders were personally liable for the company’s debts, even beyond’the extent of its capital. If the company lost more money than it had in the till, shareholders could be assessed for what the company still owed, proportionally based on number of shares. So while Butterfield had the most to gain from the success of the new company, he also had the most to lose from its failure.
由于持股最多，Butterfield 获得的权力最大，但承担的风险也最大。美国运通并非公司而是“无限责任股份联合体”。股东可像交易公司股票那样买卖股份，但负有无限合伙人的责任——即对公司债务负连带责任，超出公司资本亦然。若公司亏损超过账面资金，股东需按持股比例补缴差额。因此，新公司若成功，Butterfield 收益最多；若失败，他损失也最大。

However, the joint-stock concept possessed advantages that must have appealed to the founders of the company. Unlike corporations, stock associations had few legal obligations toward shareholders. If a stockholder wanted a meeting, he had to request it and put the matter toa shareholder vote.Inthe normal course of events,stockholdersalso never received statements of income or assets.\* Nor did they vote on directors; the board of Amexco became self-perpetuating. In other words, because Amexco wasa joint-stock association,its leaders could do what they wanted in total secrecy. This would have appealed to the two dominant figures of the company, Fargo and Butterfield. In contrast to Wells,who loved to talk and tell stories, they were extremely secretive, private men-Butterfield, for example, kept his few records in his hat and left almost no records after his death-and the company took on their secretive nature. They made secrecy a matter of personal privilege as well as company policy. Even after they had left the scene, the company maintained the policy that the best publicity was no publicity. The less anyone knew about American Express, the better.
然而，股份联合会这一概念本身具有吸引公司创始人的优势。与公司制不同，股份联合会对股东几乎没有法律义务。如果股东想召开会议，必须提出请求并付诸全体股东表决。在正常情况下，股东也从未收到过任何收入或资产报表\*，他们也不对董事进行投票；Amexco 的董事会自我延续。换句话说，正因为 Amexco 是股份联合会，其领导层可以在完全保密的情况下为所欲为。这一点正合公司两位核心人物法戈和巴特菲尔德的心意。与喜欢交谈、讲故事的威尔斯不同，他们极其保守且注重隐私——巴特菲尔德甚至将少数记录藏在帽子里，死后几乎未留下任何档案——公司也因此染上了他们的隐秘性格。他们把保密视为个人特权，也视为公司政策。即便在他们退出舞台之后，公司仍坚持“最好的宣传就是不宣传”，让外界对美国运通知之越少越好。

Although Butterfield had the most stock,for the American x agreement to work, control of the company had to reside with the board of directors as a whole. Neither Butterfield nor Fargo could be allowed to dominate. The seven-member board represented three distinct interests: Butterfield and Wasson comprised one faction; Fargo and William Livingston, a second; and Johnston Livingston, James McKay, and usually Henry Wells, the third-what might be called the swing faction. These men had greater loyalty to American Express than to either Butterfield or Fargo and so would thwart any attempt by one faction or the other to gain absolute power. The board, seat of true executive power in the company, operated on an ad hoc committee system that must have been an unwritten part of the agreement in Buffalo in March l850. The board referred important questions to committees,consisting of a member of each of the factions, before the board as a whole made a decision.
尽管巴特菲尔德持股最多，但为了使美国运通协议得以运作，公司控制权必须归整个董事会所有，既不能让巴特菲尔德，也不能让法戈一方独大。七人董事会代表三种明确利益：巴特菲尔德与沃森为一派；法戈与威廉·利文斯顿为第二派；约翰斯顿·利文斯顿、詹姆斯·麦凯以及通常的亨利·威尔斯构成第三派——可以称为摇摆派。这些人对美国运通的忠诚高于对巴特菲尔德或法戈，因此能阻止任何一派获得绝对权力。董事会作为公司真正的执行权中心，采用特设委员会制度——这应是 1850 年 3 月布法罗协议中未明文写出的部分。董事会在作出整体决定前，会将重大问题提交由各派代表组成的委员会审议。

Four officers were elected on the same day the board approved the Articles of Association, March 26, l850. Fargo became secretary; Butterfield,vice president; John Day (who was soon fred), trerer; and the absent Henry Wells, president. It would be weeks before he would even hear about his election, and four months before he would attend a board of directors meeting.
1850 年 3 月 26 日，董事会批准公司章程的同一天选举了四名高管。法戈任秘书；巴特菲尔德任副总裁；约翰·戴（不久后被解雇）任司库；而缺席的亨利·威尔斯被选为总裁。他要过几周才听说自己当选，又过四个月才参加第一次董事会会议。

Like other aspects of the creation of American Express, Wells’s election to the presidency owed a great deal to his surrender to John Butterfield. His withdrawal from the field made his election not just understandable, but probably inevitable. Neither Butterfield nor Fargo could hold the offce. Since they retained operating control of the halves of the company, the presidency would make either of them the dominant figure. Wells, on the other hand, represented comromise figure. Over the years, he had been a respected colleague of Fargo and William Livingston, so they accepted him. By capitulating, Wells became acceptable to Butterfield as well. As a result, he could mediate disputes that arose internally. (At times,Butterfield would suspect that Wells was not a neutral party,but Wells generally fulfilled the role assigned him.) Wells did not become chief executive, however, and the board pegged his annual salary at only \$1,250 .That was not a mean paycheck in an age when \$40 per month represented a decent wage,but Fargo earned more for running what, at the time, was the less profitable half of the American Express Company.
与美国运通成立过程中的其他方面一样，威尔斯当选总裁在很大程度上源于他向约翰·巴特菲尔德的让步。他退出竞争不仅情有可原，甚至可以说是不可避免。巴特菲尔德和法戈都不能出任此职，因为他们各自掌控公司一半业务，一旦任总裁便会成为主宰。威尔斯则是折中人选。多年来，他一直是法戈和威廉·利文斯顿尊敬的同事，因此他们接受他；而威尔斯的妥协也让巴特菲尔德乐于接受。于是，他能在内部纠纷中充当调解者。（偶尔巴特菲尔德怀疑威尔斯并非中立，但威尔斯大体履行了自己的角色。）然而，威尔斯并未成为首席执行官，董事会仅为其定下年薪 1,250 美元。在当时每月 40 美元即属体面工资的年代，这并不算少，但法戈因负责当时利润较低的公司另一半业务，收入仍高于他。

Upon his return from Europe that summer, Wells attended his first board meeting at Astor House, New York City’s leading hotel. He thanked the board officially for his new job, worked at it for a month, and then announced, without resigning, that he was moving to the upstate New York village of Aurora on Lake Cayuga. This decision removed Wells from the day-to-day affairs of the company. No telegraph reached Aurora; the nearest railroad lay a forty-mile stagecoach ride away (or sleigh ride in winter)-hours of travel time. Wells had moved into the middle of a beautiful, serene nowhere. In Aurora,he built for himself a Tuscan-style villa of blue limestone, and he seemed, at age forty-five, to welcome the semiretirement forced on him by John Butterfield. He decided to devote much of the rest of his life to travel and philanthropy, particularly his pet project, a women’s college in Aurora,in the hills above the lake.
当年夏天自欧洲归来后，威尔斯在纽约市著名的阿斯特楼参加了首次董事会会议。他正式感谢董事会授予新职务，工作一个月后，未辞职便宣布迁居纽约州上州卡尤加湖畔的奥罗拉小村。此举使威尔斯脱离了公司的日常事务。奥罗拉既无电报，也离最近的铁路有四十英里驿车（冬季雪橇）路程——需数小时方可抵达。威尔斯搬到了一个美丽宁静的偏僻之地。在奥罗拉，他用蓝色石灰岩为自己建造了一座托斯卡纳式别墅，似乎在四十五岁时欣然接受了约翰·巴特菲尔德强加给他的半退休生活。他决定把余生的大部分时间投入旅行和慈善，尤其是他钟爱的项目——在湖畔山上创办一所女子学院。

He had less of a retirement than he wanted. Company affairs summoned him often. As president for the next eighteen years, he fre quently found he had to mediate crises from within and without. On several important occasions,he demonstrated thathis loyalty to Amexco transcended factionalism，and he helped keep both Butterfield and Fargo from gaining control of the company.
他的退休生活远没有他期望的那般悠闲。公司事务频频召唤他。作为接下来十八年的公司总裁，他经常发现自己必须调停来自内外部的危机。在若干关键时刻，他证明了自己对 Amexco 的忠诚超越了派系之争，并帮助阻止巴特菲尔德和法戈掌控公司。

But he did not make company policy or control operations. Indeed, no individual did. Operational details remained the responsibility of each separate operating unit. Except for an occasional homily against drinking on the job or a threat to go after employees who stole from the cash drawer,\* the members of the board and the officers of the company paid no attention to employment practice or policy, nor did they worry about customer relations. The key to profits was not a happy work force or even happy customers, but exclusive contracts and mo nopoly control over routes. The board constantly fretted about contracts. If they obtained control over routes,they knew they could make all the money commerce could give the express, which was consider able and growing all the time. Any other operating details appeared trivial by comparison.
但他并不制定公司政策或主导运营。事实上，没有任何个人这样做。运营细节仍由各独立运营单元负责。除了偶尔训诫禁止上班饮酒或威胁追究偷取现金抽屉款项的员工\*外，董事会成员及公司高管几乎不关注用工实践或政策，也不担心客户关系。利润的关键不是快乐的员工，甚至不是快乐的客户，而是独家合约和对线路的垄断控制。董事会始终为合约忧心忡忡；只要掌握线路控制权，他们就知道能够赚取商业赋予快运的一切财富，而这些财富相当可观且持续增长。相比之下，其他运营细节显得微不足道。

Executive power resided in the board. The board negotiated contracts with the railroads and the banks, counted the profits and distrib uted them, mainly to one another. The most difficult problem for management was to keep the power with the whole board, to balance and account for the factions without giving up too much to one or another. Consequently， meetings often proved intense, acrimonious affairs, which produced few results even after hours of exhausting debate. Although these men had agreed to be partners, they still saw themselves as rivals, too, who did not much like or trust each other. Finally they had to submerge their feelings in order to protect the company from splintering apart. But often they submerged their feelings only aftera struggle. Indeed, decision making frequently took on the character of a test of power and will.
公司的执行权掌握在董事会手中。董事会与铁路和银行谈判合同，计算利润并将其分配出去，主要分配给彼此。管理层最棘手的问题是让权力留在整个董事会，平衡并核算各派系，而不让任何一派得到过多好处。因此，会议常常激烈而充满敌意，即便经过数小时的激辩也少有结果。虽然这些人同意成为合伙人，他们仍把彼此视为不甚喜欢或信任的竞争对手。最终他们必须压抑情绪，以防公司四分五裂，但往往只有经过一番斗争才能做到。事实上，决策过程常常演变成一场权力与意志的较量。

The nature of this organization in effect set limits on how much could be accomplished. The company could and did make money through expansion of its express business within its original territorial range. But for Amexco to stay intact, the board needed to satisfy all sides, and that guaranteed paralysis in undertaking new ventures or even significantly extending the limits of Amexco’s express activities. Any move could be viewed as a threat by one faction to expand its power. Any new activity offered an opportunity for one side to gain greater authority and leverage. As a result, new ideas had to be opposed.
这种组织形式实际上限定了公司的成就上限。公司可以并且确实通过在原有辖区内扩展快运业务获利。但为了保持 Amexco 的完整，董事会必须让各方满意，这就导致公司在开展新业务或显著扩展快运范围方面陷入瘫痪。任何行动都可能被一派视为扩张其权力的威胁，任何新活动都给另一派提供了获得更大权威和筹码的机会。结果，新点子必须被反对。

Satisfying each side-maintaining a balance-remained the preoccupation for the board for eighteen years,because individuals and their supporters did seek to gain control of the board and its executive power. Until 1868, the question of who, if anyone, would dominate the company influenced every decision and the character of decision making itself at American Express.
让各方满意——维持平衡——在十八年里一直是董事会的首要任务，因为个人及其支持者确实试图掌控董事会及其执行权。直到 1868 年，谁将主宰公司——如果有的话——这一问题影响了美国运通的每一项决策及决策本身的性质。

The system embodied in the Treaty of Buffalo worked well as long as board members accepted its premises. That lasted less than two years.Early on, Butterfield indicated that he disliked the way American Express was constituted. He soured on the prospect of sharing the leading role with Fargo, especially after he found that he could not get basic business information about Fargo’s operating unit. In l85l, he forced through a board resolution requiring Fargo to make a statement of losses. It seemed like a small thing to ask since he,Butterfield, was liable for Fargo’s losses. But by the next year, Butterfield still had not gained a full picture of the state of the western express. That was not a situation he was willing to endure quietly.
《布法罗条约》确立的体系在董事会成员接受其前提时运转良好，但这一局面不足两年便终结。早期，巴特菲尔德就表示，他不满意美国运通的组织架构。与法戈共享领导角色的前景令他反感，尤其是在发现自己无法获得法戈运营单元的基本业务信息之后。1851 年，他强行通过董事会决议，要求法戈申报亏损情况。这似乎是小要求，因为巴特菲尔德要对法戈的亏损承担责任。但到第二年，巴特菲尔德依旧未能全面了解西部快运的状况，这种局面他不愿默默忍受。

In 1852,Butterfield began playing his hand more forcefully and made clear his dissatisfaction. Ultimately， he got most or all of what he wanted, but to achieve it, he spent more than a year maneuvering, taking advantage finally of a disaster and an internal crisis to advance his cause. The extent and complexity of his efforts demonstrated just how difficult it was to get anything done at American Express.
1852年，巴特菲尔德开始更强势地出招，明确表达了他的不满。最终，他几乎得到了自己想要的一切，但为此他运作了一年多，最终利用一场灾难和一次内部危机来推进自己的目标。他所付出的努力之广泛与复杂，充分显示出在美国运通要成就任何事情是多么困难。

Butterfield made his first challenge at a board session in Albany. (Meetings were held in different places all along the route of the company—New York City, Albany, Utica, Buffalo, and in summer, Saratoga Springs.) This session produced four days of continuous conflict. Butterfield’s first maneuver concerned the matter of who would fill a vacancy on the board—an issue that came up the first day of meetings, February 10. William Livingston, Fargo’s partner, had sold his shares and resigned. Butterfield nominated T. S. Faxton, a Utica railroad man and crony who had been a partner in the Albany-Buffalo telegraph venture.\* With a hundred shares of Amexco stock (5 percent of the company due to a recent addition of capital),† Faxton held one of the largest blocks. Yet the board rejected his nomination. Livingston had been Fargo’s man; Faxton’s election would give Butterfield three board seats to Fargo’s one, a major shift in the balance of power. The guardians of the Amexco charter, McKay, J. Livingston, and Wells, tabled the nomination, effectively defeating it.
巴特菲尔德的首次挑战发生在奥尔巴尼的一次董事会议上。（公司的会议在其运营路线上的不同地点举行——纽约市、奥尔巴尼、尤蒂卡、布法罗，夏季则在萨拉托加温泉。）这次会议持续了四天的持续冲突。巴特菲尔德的第一项动作涉及由谁填补董事会空缺的问题——该议题在2月10日会议首日被提出。法戈的合伙人威廉·利文斯顿已出售股份并辞职。巴特菲尔德提名尤蒂卡铁路人兼老友T.S.福克斯顿，他曾是奥尔巴尼—布法罗电报项目的合伙人*，持有100股美国运通股票（由于最近增资，占公司5%），是最大股东之一。然而董事会否决了他的提名。利文斯顿曾是法戈的人；福克斯顿的当选将使巴特菲尔德在董事会拥有三席而法戈仅一席，权力平衡将发生重大变化。作为美国运通章程的守护者，麦凯、J.利文斯顿和威尔斯搁置了该提名，实际上将其否决。

The next day, Butterfield forced a long argument about the dividend by demanding the highest possible payout. As the largest shareholder, Butterfield received the most from any dividend, yet he often felt he was being short-changed by the others, and he frequently dragged out dividend debates for hours and hours. The debate went to the heart of the conflict. From Butterfield’s perspective, power on the board meant money. Butterfield wanted to take as much as he could out of the company, wanted an ally like Faxton on the board to see that he got his money, and wanted to see Fargo’s books to know how much he could take. But Butterfield could not get information about the western express, faced a battle every time he tried to get money out of it, and so determined to change the company.
第二天，巴特菲尔德通过要求支付最高额分红，迫使董事会就分红问题展开旷日持久的争论。作为最大股东，巴特菲尔德从任何分红中获得最多收益，但他常觉得自己被其他人克扣，并经常将分红辩论拖延数小时。争论直指冲突核心：在巴特菲尔德看来，董事会的权力就意味着金钱。巴特菲尔德想从公司拿走尽可能多的钱，希望像福克斯顿这样的盟友进入董事会以确保他得到回报，并想查看法戈的账簿以了解自己能拿多少。然而巴特菲尔德无法获得西部快运的信息，每次试图分红都要面临一场战斗，于是他决心改变公司。

But in the midst of Butterfield’s effort, Fargo offered a resolution on February 13 to “extend this line to California.” The resolution threw Butterfield suddenly from offense to defense, and he set off a furious debate that lasted a month.
但正在巴特菲尔德努力之际，2月13日法戈提出一项决议，要求“将该线路延伸至加利福尼亚”。此举立刻让巴特菲尔德从进攻转入防守，引发了持续一个月的激烈辩论。

Butterfield did not object to a California express because he feared it would lose money. Butterfield, in fact, probably expected it would make money. In 1849, just after the Gold Rush began, he invested in a company that transported freight and people to and from California across the isthmus of Panama. Consequently, he knew better than Wells and Fargo the profit potential of a move further west. The motive behind Butterfield’s opposition was the preservation of his own power. Any new venture could enhance one member’s power at the expense of another; in this case the western character of the venture would certainly put it in Fargo’s domain. Butterfield did not need it spelled out who would win and who would lose. Indeed, he may well have spelled it out himself, probably in obscene terms; he was known to scrape the “sinks of iniquity” in his language on such occasions. And coming on the heels of his defeat over Faxton, he probably felt in no mood to accommodate W. G. Fargo.
巴特菲尔德反对开通加州快运并非因为担心亏损。事实上，他很可能预期此举会赚钱。1849年，加州淘金热刚开始时，他投资了一家通过巴拿马地峡往返运输货物和人员的公司，因此他比威尔斯和法戈更了解进一步西进的盈利潜力。巴特菲尔德反对的真正动机是维护自身权力。任何新业务都会让某一方权力增长而另一方受损；在此情形下，该业务的西部特性必然落入法戈势力范围。胜负无需多言，巴特菲尔德自己可能就用粗俗语言阐明了——众所周知，他在这种场合会口不择言——加之在福克斯顿事件中的受挫，他大概没有心情去迁就W\.G.法戈。

The debate over the American Express California operation remained heated at subsequent board meetings. Butterfield opposed everything—in one instance even the minutes of previous meeting. The debate over the minutes consumed an entire board session. When the members finally voted on the California proposal, they defeated it, four to two. Butterfield, McKay, Livingston and Wasson voted against it; only Wells and Fargo voted yes. But in reality, only Butterfield and Wasson were opposed. Livingston and McKay performed their duty as swing votes. They must have agreed with Butterfield that this move could affect the balance of power, and to keep the peace in the company, they actually voted contrary to their inclinations. They took the unprecedented step of reading into the record the reasons for their votes. Said Livingston, “The opposition of Mr. Butterfield carries with it a sizable portion of stock, and in justice to those he represents, I am unwilling to engage in a California Express.” McKay voiced an identical rationale, although he also noted the opposition of Butterfield’s friend T. S. Faxton. Their votes ended discussion of the California express at Amexco, but Wells and Fargo decided to go ahead with a California express on their own. Ten days after the vote, they met with a group of investors at Astor House and formed Wells, Fargo & Company, which became a major express company in its own right.\*
随后几次董事会上，关于美国运通是否进入加州的争论依旧激烈。巴特菲尔德对一切议题都表示反对——有一次甚至反对通过上次会议记录，仅讨论会议记录就耗尽了一整次董事会。最终，当成员们就加州提案进行表决时，结果以四票对二被否决。巴特菲尔德、麦凯、利文斯顿和沃森投了反对票；只有威尔斯和法戈赞成。但实际上，只有巴特菲尔德和沃森真正持反对立场。利文斯顿和麦凯履行了摇摆票职责，他们必定同意巴特菲尔德的观点，即此举可能破坏权力平衡，为了维持公司和平，他们投票违背了自己的倾向。他们采取前所未有的做法，将投反对票的理由记录在案。利文斯顿说：“巴特菲尔德先生的反对带来了相当数量的股份，出于对他所代表股东的公正考虑，我不愿涉足加州快运。”麦凯表达了同样的理由，并提到巴特菲尔德的朋友T.S.福克斯顿的反对。他们的投票终结了美国运通对加州快运的讨论，但威尔斯和法戈决定自行推进加州快运。投票十天后，他们在阿斯特楼与一群投资者会面，成立了Wells, Fargo & Company，该公司最终成为一家独立的大型快运企业。
Idea
富国银行的前身。
The board of Amexco meanwhile continued to be true to the principle of balance.In May， it sided with Fargo in filling the vacancy on the board. On a resolution from Wells, the board nominated and electedE.P.Williams,Fargo’s brother-in-law,to fill the slot.Wasson voted against it; Butterfield did not attend the meeting, nor would he attend another for several months. Butwhile he may have taken the Williams electionasa majordefeat,it was really the modus vivendi for the whole company.
与此同时，Amexco 董事会继续坚持平衡原则。五月份，它在填补董事会空缺时站在法戈一边。根据威尔斯的提议，董事会提名并选举了 E.P. 威廉姆斯——法戈的妹夫——来填补该席位。沃森投了反对票；巴特菲尔德没有出席会议，之后几个月也未再参加任何会议。虽然他可能把威廉姆斯的当选视为一次重大失败，但事实上这只是整个公司的权宜之计。

Butterfield had won one and lost one, but on the whole,he remained unhappy and looked for another chance to dominate American Express. He bided his time and got an opportunity quite unexpectedly, an incident that from his own standpoint was both frightening and fortuitous.
巴特菲尔德赢了一局也输了一局，但总体而言，他依然不满，仍在寻找再次主导美国运通的机会。他耐心等待，却意外获得了机会——从他自身角度看，那既令人恐惧又幸运。

On August 20, 1852, the S.S. Atlantic,a Lake Erie steamer, sank after it collided with the schooner Ogdensberg off Point Albino,New York. On board the Atlantic was John Murphy, an American Express messenger. Murphy got himself to safety before the ship went down, but his little safe containing an estimated \$50,000 in valuables went to the bottom of the lake. In those days, the loss represented a substantial amount of money-a loss for which the stockholders of the company had ultimate liability. Large shareholders like Butterfield and Faxton were liable for proportionately more of the loss. A month later, Faxton precipitated a crisis more than likely on behalf of John Butterfield.
1852 年 8 月 20 日，伊利湖汽船 S.S. Atlantic 在纽约州阿尔比诺角附近与双桅船 Ogdensberg 相撞后沉没。船上有美国运通的信使约翰·墨菲。墨菲在船沉前逃生，但装有约 50,000 美元贵重物品的小保险箱沉入湖底。在当时，这是一笔巨额损失——公司股东最终需对此承担责任。像巴特菲尔德和法克斯顿这样的持股大户要按比例承担更多损失。一个月后，法克斯顿很可能代表约翰·巴特菲尔德引发了一场危机。

Faxton distributed to shareholders an ornately printed letter that combined hysteria with fact. After explaining who he was, Faxton got to the point, “After what has occurred on Lake Erie, and what we are Liable to Daily, I feel my position to be rather an unpleasant one;and unless something different takes place in the management of our business,I feel I shall be called upon in self-defence, to do something to meet the case!”
法克斯顿向股东散发了一封装饰华丽、夹杂着惊恐与事实的信件。介绍完自己后，法克斯顿切入正题：“在伊利湖发生的事情以及我们每日面临的风险之后，我觉得自己的处境相当不妙；除非公司管理出现重大变化，否则为了自保，我恐怕不得不采取一些措施来应对！”

He then railed about how there was “not a company in the State of New York … that is so badly managed,” where directors voted “themselves large salaries \[and] heavy traveling expenses, \[and who werel receiving pay from other companies to the prejudice of this.” Most of his charges were quite true. Board members had just voted themselves a salary increase-Fargo’s salary was the highest at \$3,400 1 a fact that Faxton could not have known unless Butterfield or Wasson had told him. Proceedings of board sessions and the details of resolutionswere notopen to shareholder inspection.
随后他痛斥道，纽约州“没有任何一家公司管理得如此糟糕”，董事们给自己投票发放“高额薪酬和巨额差旅费，并从其他公司领取报酬，损害本公司利益”。他的大部分指控都属实。董事们刚刚给自己加薪——法戈的薪水最高，为 3,400 美元——若非巴特菲尔德或沃森透露，法克斯顿不可能知道这一点。董事会会议的过程和决议细节并不向股东公开。

Faxton went on to decry “daily losses”and assets so small that, in the event of a big loss, they would “do little towards paying it.” In answer to these charges,Faxton claimed,the company would only say,“we get greater Dividends than many other companies, and therefore have no right to complain.”
法克斯顿接着抨击公司“每天都有损失”，资产规模之小，以至于一旦出现重大损失，将“几乎无法偿付”。针对这些指控，法克斯顿称，公司只会说：“我们的分红比许多其他公司都高，因此无权抱怨。”

Faxton offered his own remedy for these problems\:a shareholders meeting to “require the present trustees to give an Exposé of their business.” Faxton certainly had a valid point when he noted that shareholders did not even know the asset base of the company,a situation, as he said, quite unlike most other companies. He could have added that even Butterfield was not certain of the size of the company’s assets,a situation even less like other companies.
为解决这些问题，法克斯顿提出自己的办法：召开股东大会，“要求现任受托人公开业务情况”。他指出，股东甚至不知道公司的资产规模，这一点确实不同于大多数公司，他的观点显然有理。他还可以补充说，连巴特菲尔德也不确定公司资产的规模，这种情况就更不像其他公司了。

Faxton criticized the entire board, but he singled out “one or two of them \[whol have more to say about its management than all the others.” That he meant Fargo, and maybe Wells, but not Butterfield seems very likely. Wells’s friend, E. B. Morgan, believed he saw Butterfield’s hand in this. In a letter to another shareholder, Daniel Lothrop, he wrote that “this is a Utica movement \[Butterfield was from Utica and was its leading business figurel to get control of the company and not designed for your interest or mine.” And he defended his friends on the board, “I would rather have Wells, Fargo, Livingston and their associates’ knowledge of Expressing-as capital than Faxton with \$300,000 of capital.”
法克斯顿批评了整个董事会，但特别点名“有一两个人在管理上比其他人更有发言权”。显然，他指的是法戈，或许还有威尔斯，但并非巴特菲尔德。威尔斯的朋友 E.B. 摩根认为这里面有巴特菲尔德的影子。他在写给另一位股东丹尼尔·洛思洛普的信中说：“这是一次由尤蒂卡人（巴特菲尔德来自尤蒂卡，是当地首屈一指的商业人物）发起的行动，目的是控制公司，并不符合你或我的利益。”他还为自己在董事会的朋友辩护说：“我宁愿要威尔斯、法戈、利文斯顿以及他们同事在快递业务方面的知识充当资本，也不愿要法克斯顿那 30 万美元的资本。”

Healso offered a curious rationale for opposing a shareholders meeting.”If the shareholders assemble together and have a full exposé of all matters and ask explanations for this and that and the other-get into a warm discussiona broil and blowup-that the whole thing \[Amexco] will go to Davie Jones-that others will be induced to engage in the business-and that your stock and mine will hereafter offer short dividends.” In other words, if stockholders actually find out about the company, they will either get angry and destroy it, or go off and form a company to take its business away.
他还提出了反对召开股东大会的奇怪理由：“如果股东们聚在一起，对所有事务进行全面披露，要求对这事那事进行解释——争论激烈、吵闹不休、最终闹翻——那整个（美国运通）就会沉到海底，其他人会被吸引进入这一行业，你我的股票以后就只能得到微薄的分红。”换句话说，如果股东们真的了解公司的情况，他们要么愤怒地搞垮公司，要么自立门户夺走公司的业务。

Yet Faxton won the round. With the help of John Butterfield, Faxton forced a shareholders meeting. The prospect worried other board members, because the exposé Faxton demanded was sure to come to pass, and no one, not even Fargo,knew for sure how much money the western express had. If an audit showed that the company could not cover the Atlantic losses, because of deficiencies on Fargo’s side of the ledgerFargoWilliams,and probably Wells,tooce ouster. The company would surely pass entirely into Butterfield’s control.
然而，法克斯顿赢得了这一局。在约翰·巴特菲尔德的帮助下，法克斯顿迫使召开了一次股东大会。这一前景让其他董事忧心忡忡，因为法克斯顿要求的披露势在必行，而没有人——就连法戈也不例外——确切知道西部快递到底有多少钱。如果审计显示公司因账目中属于法戈一方的缺口而无法弥补 Atlantic 的损失，法戈、威廉姆斯，甚至可能还有威尔斯，都将面临被罢免的风险。公司肯定会完全落入巴特菲尔德的控制之中。

The directors had no choice but to go ahead with the meeting. On October l9, shareholders gathered at Astor House. They appointed a committee to go over the books of the two operating companies, in effect permitting Butterfield to get an independent appraisal of Fargo’s books. At the same time, the meeting did not result in the ouster of any officials.deed,argoWellsnd he rest wona qualifed ment of their handling of the Atlantic affair, leaving Faxton’s group dissatisfied with the outcome. Fargo’s brother-in-law, E. P. Williams, wrote, “Our . . . meeting went off to the satisfaction of a majority, leaving a small minority of sore heads to find fault.”
董事们别无选择，只能按计划召开会议。10 月 19 日，股东们在阿斯特楼聚集。他们任命了一个委员会，审查两家运营公司的账册，实际上让巴特菲尔德得以对法戈账簿进行独立评估。与此同时，会议并未导致任何高管被罢免；事实上，法戈、威尔斯等人就他们处理 Atlantic 事故获得了一份“有保留的认可”，令法克斯顿一派对结果十分不满。法戈的妹夫 E.P. 威廉姆斯写道：“我们的……会议让大多数人满意，只留下少数心怀怨气的人挑刺。”

While the Uticans won at least a partial victory Faxton did not wait for the committee report but, rather, planned a new battle. He and several associates began the ultimate attack on American Express: they prepared to launch a new, competitive express company.
虽然尤蒂卡人至少取得了部分胜利，但法克斯顿并未等待委员会的报告，而是筹划新的战斗。他与几位同伴开始对美国运通发起最后的攻击：他们准备创办一家新的竞争性快递公司。

Did Butterfield encourage this? Either as a real threat or as a ploy to maneuver himself into a commanding position at Amexco? Butterfield covered his tracks well; his colleagues on the Amexco board thought they discerned his hand but could find no trace of it. But if he did encourage Faxton just as a gambit, he used an extremely clever one. No prospect upset expressmen more than competition,and merely the threat of competition would force the board of Amexco to act. Of course, the directors could have taken various actions, not all of them favorable to Butterfield. But as events unfolded, Butterfield adroitly pushed Amexco along the path he wanted.
巴特菲尔德是否在暗中鼓励这一行动？是出于真正的威胁，还是为了把自己运作到 Amexco 的主导地位？巴特菲尔德掩饰得很好；Amexco 董事会的同僚认为看出了他的影子，却找不到任何确凿痕迹。但如果他确实把法克斯顿当作棋子，那便是一着极其高明的棋。没有什么比竞争更能令快递业者恐慌，单是竞争的威胁就足以迫使 Amexco 董事会采取行动。当然，董事们本可以采取各种措施，其中并非都对巴特菲尔德有利。然而随着事态发展，巴特菲尔德巧妙地把 Amexco 推向了他想要的道路。

Even as a ploy, the competition had to appear serious, and Faxton made it seem very real. The new company,Livingston said,would be capitalized at \$500,000 -two and half times the capitalization of Amexco-and would start business on March l, l853, with lines running all the way to St. Louis, according to Johnston Livingston, “a grand scheme.” It seemed real enough to the board of American Express, so they readied the usual tactics. They started with war.“I have written to Fargo and Williams . . . telling them to put up all the bans and lay anchors to the windward,” McKay wrote Wells on November l8. “I propose we set to work right earnestly and give these fellows what they deserve.”
即便只是策略，竞争也必须看起来来势汹汹，而法克斯顿确实让它显得十分真实。据利文斯顿说，新公司将以 50 万美元资本成立——是 Amexco 资本额的两倍半——并计划于 1853 年 3 月 1 日开业，线路一路延伸至圣路易斯；约翰斯顿·利文斯顿称之为“一项宏伟计划”。这在美国运通董事会看来已经足够真实，于是他们准备采取惯常手段，首先就是开战。11 月 18 日，麦凯致信威尔斯：“我已写信给法戈和威廉姆斯……让他们布下所有禁令，把锚抛向上风口。我建议我们立刻全力开干，给这些家伙应得的教训。”

But Faxton’s group was fighting too. Amexco officials soon realized the upstarts had the money and were trying very hard to establish the necessary connections as well. Faxton’s cronies began lobbying businessmen and bankers for express contracts,and they went after investors to subscribe to the stock offering of a company they called the United States Express Company.
但法克斯顿一派也在奋力出击。Amexco 的高管很快意识到，这些新秀不仅有资金，而且正在竭力建立所需的业务联系。法克斯顿的亲信开始游说商人和银行家签订快递合同，同时向投资者兜售他们称之为“United States Express Company”的股票认购。

More ominously for American Express, in January l853, Faxton went to Albany to try to get the state legislature to pass a bill permitting him to create a state-franchised, incorporated express company. This prospect made Amexco offcials particularly nervous; they feared that the bill would create a company with such powerful political support that it would be impossible to compete against.\* Johnston Livingston wrote, “The passage of an act of incorporation of this kind, if the capital be large enough, must in time become \[al monopoly.”
对美国运通而言，更为不祥的是，1853 年 1 月，法克斯顿前往奥尔巴尼，试图促使州议会通过一项法案，允许他创建一家拥有州特许权并取得法人资格的快递公司。此举令 Amexco 高管格外紧张；他们担心该法案会催生一家拥有强大政治支持的企业，以致无法与之竞争。\* 约翰斯顿·利文斯顿写道：“如果通过此类公司法，而其资本又足够雄厚，终有一日必将成为\[一]家垄断企业。”

But Amexco prepared to battle the bill through the legislature. Board members asked E.B. Morgan,a U.S.congressman aswell asa shareholder in Amexco, to use his influence. Fargo reported that“one or two friends have promised to keep us advised of \[Faxton’s] movements.” He particularly wanted to engage the services of William Bogart,a Cayuga assemblyman in the pay of Corning’s Utica & Schenectady Railroad “to keep an eye to this matter for us.”
然而 Amexco 准备在立法程序中抗击该法案。董事会成员请求 E.B. 摩根——他既是美国国会议员，也是 Amexco 股东——运用其影响力。法戈报告说，“一两位朋友已答应向我们通报\[法克斯顿]的动向。” 他尤其想聘请卡尤加县众议员威廉·博加特（受雇于康宁的尤蒂卡—斯克内克塔迪铁路公司）“为我们盯紧此事”。

Meanwhile Butterfield worked on a different plan,what he called a tactic to help defeat “our opponents.” But it seemed less that than a tactic to help himself, very likely what he envisioned all along. He offered a “recapitalization plan” that would raise Amexco’s own capital to \$500,000 . Ostensibly, this would allow the company to compete with U.S. Express. But as a plan for express war, it had value only in that it might increase available cash through the sale of new stock. At the same time, the threat of an express war cast doubt on whether the company could even sell the new issue. Who would buy with a money-losing battle looming? The real heart of Butterfield’s plan, however, was not a new stock issue, but a stock dividend and a generous payout of profits
与此同时，巴特菲尔德着手另一套方案，他称之为帮助击败“我们的对手”的策略。但这更像是助己之计，很可能正是他早已设想的。他提出一项“资本重组计划”，要将 Amexco 资本提高至 50 万美元。表面看，这能使公司与 U.S. Express 竞争；然而作为快递战方案，其唯一价值不过是借发行新股增加现金。同时，快递大战的威胁也让人怀疑公司能否卖出新股。如今战云密布，谁会买？实际上，巴特菲尔德计划的核心并非发行新股，而是派发股票股息并慷慨分红。

Before the board could act on the plan, Butterfield and his colleagues received another bit of good news: the shareholder committee had examined the books of Amexco and found cash and rising profits in both operating companies. The company had \$40,000 in cash on hand, almost enough to pay the Atlantic liabilities; and since, as the committee reported, profits were rising steadily, the rest could come out of a few months’ income. Butterfield had satisfied one of his objectives and learned the financial condition of the western express. The report reduced and perhaps ended the threat of an express war. Now,Butterfield and Faxton had no incentive for war and only wanted to see that they and their friends captured the profits.
在董事会来得及表决前，巴特菲尔德及同僚又收到捷报：股东委员会查阅 Amexco 账簿，发现两家运营公司均现金充裕且利润增长。公司手握 40,000 美元现金，几乎足以支付 Atlantic 事故赔偿；且正如委员会所述，利润稳步上升，其余损失可在数月收入中弥补。巴特菲尔德达成了了解西部快递财务状况的目标。此报告削弱甚至终结了快递大战威胁。如今，巴特菲尔德与法克斯顿已无战意，只盼与友人瓜分利润。

Faxton kept up the pressure. Though he had trouble getting his bill through the legislature, he and his men continued to push contracts and sell stock throughout the East and Midwest. But the urge for battle had waned on both sides, and soon Faxton and Amexco were talking merger, based largely’on Butterfield’s recapitalization plan. The Amexco board endorsed the basic plan in February but, on Butterfield’s motion, tabled’it so that it could be used ina deal with Faxton’s group. By this time, however, the Amexco board no longer thought of war. Instead of preserving resources needed fora fight, the board voted a generous 15 percent cash dividend before settling with Faxton. John Butterfield appeared very much in command.
法克斯顿仍在施压。其法案虽在议会受阻，他和部下却继续在东部及中西部推进合同、兜售股票。但双方战意渐消，不久便围绕巴特菲尔德的资本重组方案开始商谈合并。 Amexco 董事会于 2 月批准该基本方案，却在巴特菲尔德提议下暂缓执行，以便作为与法克斯顿团队交易的筹码。此时，董事会已不再考虑战争，而是在与法克斯顿和解前，慷慨批准 15 % 现金股息。约翰·巴特菲尔德显然主导全局。

And what of Henry Wells in all this? In December,when the U.S. Express fight reached its peak,he again demonstrated his habit of vanishing at just the wrong time: he took a three-month leave of absence to go to California and look after the affairs of Wells, Fargo & Co.While his decision on the surface seemed a masterpiece of improper timing, the board,and particularly Butterfield,may have encouraged him to go. His departure could have been a discreet, temporary exit to allow Butterfield short-term control. With Wells gone，Butterfield not only orchestrated events, but he also ran the meetings,and at least temporarily,the board made every effort to accommodate his settlement strategy.
那么亨利·威尔斯在其中扮演何角？12 月，U.S. Express 之争正酣，他再次于关键时刻消失——请假三月赴加州处理 Wells, Fargo & Co. 事务。表面看此举时机蹩脚，然董事会，尤其巴特菲尔德，或许怂恿其离去；他此行或为低调暂退，以便巴特菲尔德短期掌控。威尔斯走后，巴特菲尔德不仅导演局势，还主持会议，且至少在暂时期间，董事会全力配合其和解策略。

Official negotiations did not begin until March 2, the day after U.S. Express began operations. The new company produced a big, public spectacle, parading red wagons through the streets of New York City. But the company lasted only another week. Just as the talks were ending, Fargo wrote, “I am half sick and worn out with these difficult negociations \[sic] and I ashure \[sic] you very much confused.” Fargo,
直至 3 月 2 日——U.S. Express 开业次日——官方谈判方始。新公司高调亮相，红色马车游行纽约街头；却仅再存续一周。谈判将毕之际，法戈写道：“这些艰难的谈判令我半病半残，我向你保证我极度困惑。” 法戈，

Butterfield,and Johnston Livingston negotiated for Amexco,and the deal they struck helped existing shareholders of Amexco most of all. U.S.Express investors agreed to buy the new subscription of 2,000 Amexco shares for \$200,000 . Half of thatmoney became a dividend for original shareholders; the other half went into the Amexco treasury. Current shareholders also divided the entire remaining profits of the company (from both Wells,Butterfield andLivingston,Fargo) through May 1，1853，by that time over \$70,000 . Then to top it off, the company declared a 25 percent stock dividend,giving every shareholder even more shares. The Faxton group also won three new seats on the board.*ButButterfield did bestofall.He cleared over \$22,000 in cash in four months-in an age when a company president could make as little as \$1,250 a year. So in the end,a movement that started with the claim that all American Express could do was pay high dividends was bought off with even higher dividends. Butterfield may have had that in mind all along.
巴特菲尔德与约翰斯顿·利文斯顿代表 Amexco 谈判，他们达成的协议最惠现有股东。U.S. Express 投资者同意以 20 万美元认购 2,000 股 Amexco 新股，其中一半直接作为分红发放予原股东，另一半入 Amexco 金库。现有股东还瓜分公司截至 1853 年 5 月 1 日的全部剩余利润（来自 Wells、Butterfield 和 Livingston、Fargo 两家运营公司），已逾 70,000 美元。更甚者，公司再宣派 25 % 股票股息，令每位股东获得更多股份。法克斯顿集团亦获三席董事。* 然而巴特菲尔德获益最大：短短四月套现逾 22,000 美元——当时公司总裁年薪或仅 1,250 美元。于是，一场声称美国运通只会发高额股息的运动，最终竟被更高的股息收买平息；这或许正是巴特菲尔德早已筹划的。

After this affair, Butterfield appeared to spend less energy on Amexco and more on other ventures. Though he remained vice president and a board member of American Express, in 1856 he became mayor of Utica,and in 1857, with the help of his friend President James Buchanan, he won for his company, the Butterfield Overland Mail Co., the guaranteed \$650,000 per year government contract to carry the mail to California. He still made his presence felt at American Express board meetings,and he successfully led fights for high dividends. Including a 50 percent stock dividend in 1854, original share holders received about 36 percent annually through 1859,on shares which probably cost them nothing to buy.t
在这场风波之后，巴特菲尔德似乎将精力从 Amexco 转向其他事业。虽然他仍是美国运通的副总裁和董事会成员，但 1856 年他当选尤蒂卡市长；1857 年在好友总统詹姆斯·布坎南的帮助下，他为自己的巴特菲尔德大陆邮运公司赢得了每年 65 万美元、负责运送加州邮件的政府合同。他在美国运通董事会上依旧活跃，并成功掀起高额分红的争取战。加上 1854 年 50% 的股票股息，最初股东在 1859 年前每年约获 36% 的回报，而这些股票或许是他们当初零成本取得。

The U.S. Express episode represented the last internal crisis for several years, but the threat of crisis persisted.Board members continued to be wary and distrustful of one another. In terms of feeling, nothing much had changed. Fargo and Wells still disliked Butterfield and referred to him as chief “Ossawatomie.” Butterfield felt as hostile toward them.
美国快递（U.S. Express）事件是随后数年公司面对的最后一次内部危机，但危机阴影依旧存在。董事们仍彼此猜忌、不信任。感情层面几乎没有变化：法戈和威尔斯依旧讨厌巴特菲尔德，称他为“奥萨瓦托米”头目；巴特菲尔德对他们也同样敌视。

Balance of power questions still influenced most decisions,and new ideas typically produced long, inconclusive wrangling. The board did agree to one new idea: the company took a large share in the Merchants Despatch,a fast-freight line, somethingbetween ordinary freight and express. But this step was safe since it benefited both operating units,Wells, Butterfield and Livingston, Fargo. New ideas came and either went nowhere or died.A steamship ticket agency, for example, though profitable, lasted only a couple months before John Butterfield killed it.
权力平衡问题仍主导大多数决策，新点子往往引发漫长而无果的争执。董事会确实采纳了一个新思路：公司大举入股商贸快运（Merchants Despatch），一种介于普通货运和快递之间的快速货运线路。此举之所以安全，是因为它同样惠及两家运营实体——“威尔斯、巴特菲尔德与利文斯顿”一方和“法戈”一方。其他新点子要么不了了之，要么胎死腹中。例如，一家虽盈利的蒸汽船票务代理仅运营数月，就被约翰·巴特菲尔德叫停。

Although th’e internal company structure could not accommodate new business ventures, the company kept growing. The express had become a vital business in what was a rapidly growing country and rapidly growing economy. As long as Amexco had monopoly control of express traffic over its lines-now extended from New York through out the Midwest and into Canada-profits rolled in. Within its territory in the East and Middle West, American Express expanded continuously. As new rail lines connected more towns and cities to the transportation system, American Express followed. Its service ran on 6,000 miles of railroad track by the end of the l85Os,and it had become a money machine immune to the squabbles of the directorate that ran it.
尽管公司内部架构难以容纳新业务，企业本身仍持续壮大。在这个快速发展的国家和经济中，快递业已成为至关重要的业务。只要 Amexco 对其线路（如今从纽约延伸至中西部并进入加拿大）的快递运输保持垄断，利润便源源不断。在其东部和中西部辖区，美国运通不断扩张。随着新铁路线把更多城镇接入交通体系，美国运通紧随其后。到 1850 年代末，其服务已覆盖 6,000 英里铁路，俨然成为一台不受董事会争斗影响的“印钞机”。

The U.S. Express settlement also ended for more than a decade the threat of a serious competitor to Amexco. During that time, only one otherlarge independent express company, the Adams Express Company,operated in the eastern U.S.\* But Adams agreed as early as 1851 on a territorial division with Amexco. The agreement gave Adams free rein along the eastern seaboard and throughout the South while American Express operated unopposed in other parts of the Northeast and in the Midwest.\*
与 U.S. Express 的和解也让 Amexco 十余年内免受强劲竞争者威胁。其间，仅有另一家大型独立快递企业——亚当斯快递公司（Adams Express）——在美国东部运营。* 但亚当斯早在 1851 年就与 Amexco 达成分区协议，协议允许亚当斯在东海岸及整个南部自由运营，而美国运通则在东北其他地区及中西部无对手竞争。*

For the most part, the express companies cooperated. They not only fixed territory,they also fixed express rates, and Amexco and Adams even formed a jointly owned Union Express Company to handle business in cities where their territories met. To the extent that such collusion was known to the public, the companies faced criticism,but monopoly practices of this type were perfectly legal. Although the two companies experienced periods of tension and even outright conflict, they mostly worked in harmony, and together they would dominate the express business for over sixty years.t
总体而言，各快递公司相互合作。他们不仅划分地盘，还协定运费；Amexco 与亚当斯甚至共同组建联合快递公司（Union Express Company），处理两家领地交界城市的业务。此类合谋一旦为公众所知，公司会遭到指责，但这种垄断行为在当时完全合法。尽管两家公司偶有紧张甚至公开冲突，它们大多和谐共处，并将在快递行业共治六十余年。

While no competitors disrupted the smooth flow of profits in the 1850s,one other group could and did pose problems for the expresses the railroads. When railroad men finally realized just how much money the express business produced, they began to regret that they had not absorbed the express for themselves. Because the expresses depended so much on rail transportation, they could not afford a great deal of conflict with the railroads. Yet the rails could not simply have taken over the express business unless all the railroad companies collaborated.If only one railroad decided to absorb the express service on its line,then the big express companies held an advantage: they covered a larger territory than any spanned by an individual railroad. They used several rail lines as well as steamships, and even stagecoaches when necessary.As a result, if a railroad tried to seize local express traffic,the express companies could usually either divert traffic away from that rail line or play the railroad off against its competitors.
在 1850 年代，没有竞争者扰乱利润的顺畅流入，但还有一股力量确实给快递业带来麻烦——铁路。当铁路人最终意识到快递业务利润丰厚时，他们开始懊悔未将其吞并。由于快递高度依赖铁路运输，它们经不起与铁路的大规模冲突。然而，除非所有铁路公司联手，否则铁路也无法轻易接管快递业务。若仅一家铁路欲吞并线路上的快递服务，大型快递公司反而占优：它们的网络覆盖区域远大于任何单一路线，并可同时利用多条铁路、轮船，甚至驿马车。因此，若某条铁路试图抢占本地快递业务，快递公司通常能将货流转移或借竞争铁路制衡该路。

Because of the nature of express contracts, railroads benefited more by cooperating with express companies than with fellow railroaders. An express paid a railroad on the basis of gross receipts on whatever it shipped over the line, both materials destined for a customer on the line or for through shipments. Given the network of rails, ships,and roads by the 185Os, an express could usually divert all nonlocal traffic off of a hostile rail line. In other words, a package going from Chicago to Boston could go by way of New York or Albany or Philadelphia or even Montreal. Railroads in fact welcomed the chance to make money at the expense of competitors and so would encourage the diversion of express traffic. The railroads could have overcome the advantage of the expresses only by banding together. According to Charles Francis Adams, Jr.,\* several railroad people once approached Commodore Vanderbilt, who by the 1850s had become one of the most powerful figures in the railroad business, to lead a revolt against the express companies, but he declined, saying he was too old. Adams felt that other rail men would have followed the commodore’s lead. But no one else possessed the prestige and power to have kept the railroads together in such a venture,and the idea died.
由于快递合同的性质，铁路公司与快递公司合作比与同行铁路合作获益更大。快递公司按在铁路线上运输货物的总收入向铁路支付费用，包括寄往沿线客户的货物和过境货物。鉴于 1850 年代已形成的铁路、航运和公路网络，快递公司通常能把所有非本地货物从敌对铁路线上转移出去。换言之，一件从芝加哥寄往波士顿的包裹可以经纽约、奥尔巴尼、费城，甚至蒙特利尔中转。铁路公司实际上欢迎这种以竞争对手为代价赚钱的机会，因此会鼓励快递业务改道。铁路若想消除快递公司的优势，只有联合起来。查尔斯·弗朗西斯·亚当斯 (Charles Francis Adams, Jr.) 记载，* 有几位铁路人士曾请 1850 年代已成为铁路业巨擘的范德比尔特 (Commodore Vanderbilt) 领导一次反快递公司的起义，但他以年事已高为由婉拒。亚当斯认为，其他铁路人本会追随范德比尔特的步伐，但再无人拥有足以让铁路业联合起来的威望与实力，于是此事作罢。

For the most part, though, the express companies and the railroads collaborated,and they developed more than cursory interconnections. The express companies bribed top railroad officials with stock to assure cooperation and favorable contracts. American Express, for example, in the early 186Os passed out hundred-share blocks-very large amounts in those days-to officials of the New York Central, the railroad that had been created by Erastus Corning in 1853, uniting all of the short lines between Albany and Buffalo.
不过，大体而言，快递公司与铁路公司之间还是合作为主，而且关系远不止表面那么简单。为了确保合作与优惠合同，快递公司以股票行贿铁路高层。例如，美国运通在 1860 年代初向纽约中央铁路（由埃拉斯图斯·科宁于 1853 年整合奥尔巴尼至布法罗所有短线铁路而成）的高管赠送了每人百股的大额股票——在当时这是极可观的数目。

The railroads also went into debt to the express companies. American Express, especially, began using surplus funds to buy railroad stock and bonds. In fact, when a railroad-a capital-intensive business—needed money, it often went to an express company, which provided capital in exchange for interest-paying bonds and favorable, long-term, exclusive express contracts. Before long, expressmen had joined directorates of key railroads;both Butterfield and Fargo, for instance, sat on the board of the New York Central for a time. By 1870,Charles Adams believed that the management of the rails was in danger of falling into the hands of the express fraternity. Actually,as he put it the charge was untrue, but express companies had acquired undeniable infuence and leverage over America’s railroads.
铁路公司也欠下快递公司的债务。美国运通尤其如此，它开始用盈余资金购买铁路股票和债券。事实上，当资本密集型的铁路业需要资金时，往往会向快递公司求助，快递公司则以有息债券和长期、独家、优惠的快递合同作为交换提供资本。不久，快递业人士进入了关键铁路的董事会；例如，巴特菲尔德和法戈都曾在纽约中央铁路董事会任职一段时间。到 1870 年，查尔斯·亚当斯认为铁路管理层有落入快递业同盟之手的危险；实际上，正如他所说，这种指控并不属实，但快递公司已在美国铁路业中获得了不容否认的影响力和杠杆。

Inevitably, the railroads and the express companies sometimes feuded.In l854,for example, the New York & Erie-the line from New York to Buffalo through southern New York-summarily kicked Amexco off its line. This presented the fragile Amexco board with a potentially difficult decision: should it try to fight a war against that railroad? But before board members had to answer that question,circumstances dictated an easy solution and indeed a policy: the company inventeda”competitor.”
铁路与快递公司之间偶尔也会爆发冲突。1854 年，纽约—伊利铁路（自纽约经纽约州南部至布法罗）便突然将 Amexco 逐出其线路。这给本已脆弱的 Amexco 董事会带来一个棘手抉择：是否要与这家铁路公司开战？然而在董事们尚未作答前，形势已给出一个简单且实用的对策：公司“制造”了一个“竞争者”。

The Erie ousted American Express after the railroad was taken over by steamship man Daniel Drew. Drew wanted to keep the express business under his control if not actually in his hands. As a result, the Erie’s operating head,Homer Ramsdale,informed Henry Wells that the Erie had no intention of renewing its contract with American Express, that in fact it had already agreed to give the express business to someone else. The news not only rankled Wells, it also perplexed him.Who had the contract? Ramsdale did not say. Was it Adams? It would have been a clear violation of their territorial agreement,a declaration of express war. American Express officials immediately dispatched spies to find out who had the contract, but soon the culprit came to them.He wasa riend,anforth N. Barney,a New York banker who had sat briefly,in 1853,on Amexco’s board.Wells felt better,especially when he heard what Barney had to say. The banker explained that the Erie had asked him to apply for express privileges.He did,and now he had the contract,but he added he “did not wish to engage in opposition with the American Express and would like to talk it over with the Board of Directors.”
在蒸汽船商丹尼尔·德鲁接管铁路后，伊利铁路将美国运通赶下线路。德鲁希望把快递业务置于自己控制之下，甚至亲手掌握。因此，伊利铁路运营负责人霍默·拉姆斯戴尔告知亨利·威尔斯，伊利无意续签与美国运通的合同，事实上已同意将快递业务交给他人。此消息既激怒又困惑了威尔斯——合同花落谁家？拉姆斯戴尔并未说明。难道是亚当斯？那将明显违反双方的地盘协议，相当于向美国运通宣战。美国运通高层立即派出探子追查合同得主，但不久对方主动找上门来。原来他是朋友——安福思·N·巴尼 (Anforth N. Barney)，一位纽约银行家，1853 年曾短暂担任 Amexco 董事。得知此人来意，威尔斯稍感安心，尤其在听完巴尼的话后：巴尼解释说，伊利铁路请他申请快递特许，他照办后拿到合同，但他补充道自己“并不想与美国运通为敌，愿与董事会商议此事”。

In March 1854, Barney and his friends at American Express negotiated a secret agreement. Barney created a new express company which they decided to name after the company Amexco had recently managed to erase-the United States Express Company (the “States” for short),\* probably because in the public mind there had briefly been a real competitor of that name. The new company was “capitalizedat \$300,000 ,but the only capital came from American Express. Amexco not only “conceded” the Erie contract, it sold Barney several lines in the Midwest for \$150,000 ,but the sales were as artificial as the concession. They fixed rates, but more significantly， the two companies agreed to pool all express earnings on a 60-40 basis, Amexco obtaining the larger share. Ostensibly this created competition, and railroaders like Drew, if they became disgruntled with one company could turn to the other. But W. G. Fargo explained how Amexco really saw it. “All things considered,” he wrote to E.B. Morgan, “I regard it as a favor able agreement for both parties. It will satisfy the Rail Road Co.,and place the Express business out west out of reach of further competition for some time to come. We shall be able to make better contracts with the Roads, get a good price for doing the business, and the public will be satisfied because there is opposition.” As if to show just how diffhcult this competition was going to be, the board of American Express raised its capitalization to \$750,000 with a 50 percent stock dividend.
1854 年 3 月，巴尼与美国运通的朋友们达成了一项秘密协议。巴尼创建了一家新的快递公司，他们决定沿用 Amexco 最近设法抹去的名称——合众国快递公司（简称“States”）\*，很可能因为公众曾短暂认为确有同名竞争者。新公司“资本额为 30 万美元”，但唯一资金来源正是美国运通。Amexco 不仅“让出”伊利铁路合同，还以 15 万美元的价格向巴尼出售了几条中西部线路，但这些出售与让步一样虚假。他们限定费率，更重要的是，两家公司同意按 60∶40 合并所有快递收益，Amexco 获得更大份额。表面看似制造竞争，像德鲁这样的铁路经营者若对一家公司不满，便可投向另一家。但 W\.G. 法戈揭示了 Amexco 的真正盘算。他致信 E.B. 摩根写道：“综上所述，我认为这是双方都受益的协议。它能让铁路公司满意，并使西部快递业务在相当长时间内无惧进一步竞争。我们可与铁路签订更优合同，收取更高运费，而公众也会因‘存在竞争’而心满意足。”为了显示这种竞争究竟多“激烈”，美国运通董事会将资本额提高到 75 万美元，并派发 50% 的股票股息。

The idea of the straw competitor had a definite appeal. The next year the company decided to do it again, creating the National Express for business running north of Albany into Canada. Although companies often create subsidiaries, the National Express was unusual. For the next forty years, only a handful of people knew that it actually was and always had been controlled by Amexco.
“空壳竞争者”的点子显然颇具吸引力。翌年，公司决定故技重施，成立 National Express，经营自奥尔巴尼向北至加拿大的业务。尽管企业创建子公司并不稀奇，但 National Express 颇为特殊：在随后的四十年里，仅有少数人士知晓它一直由 Amexco 掌控。

Amexco’s business continued to generate huge amounts of cash. The company had enough extra money to begin buying real estate. In New York, it built a new, redbrick headquarters on the corner of Jay and Hudson streets in New York, celebrating the completion in 1857 with a parade of American Express wagons through the city’s streets.
Amexco 的业务持续带来巨额现金，公司盈余充足，开始购置房产。在纽约，它在杰伊街与哈德逊街拐角处建起一座红砖新总部，并于 1857 年竣工时组织美国运通马车在全城游行庆祝。

But for all this good fortune,because of this good fortune, Amexco officials had a new concern. A problem loomed, and no one quite knew what to do about it. Amexco was coming up to its tenth birthday, and according to the terms of its original agreement, it had to dissolve-the last thing anyone wanted. The company could reconstitute itself in some form or other,but the danger lay in the loss of the name, American Express, which had gained widespread recognition as the entity connected with Wells,utterfield & Co.and ivingstonago \&Co.
然而，正因这番好运，Amexco 高层又生新忧。一桩难题迫在眉睫，却无人知晓解决之道。Amexco 即将迎来十周年，而按最初协议条款，它必须解散——这是众所皆不欲的。公司固可另行重组，但危险在于失去“American Express”这一已广为人知、与 Wells、utterfield & Co. 及 ivingstonago & Co. 紧密相连的名称。

Lawyer McKay studied this issue carefully in early l859 and determined that if Amexco sold everything else, it could keep the name. The board was delighted. The assets had little value without the name. So at the end of 1859, Amexco announced an “auction” of its assets. A friend of one of the directors came down from Schenectady, New York, “bought’ the company for \$600,000 ，handed it back to the directors, and then everyone went to lunch. The directors met again and recapitalized American Express at \$1 million, consisting of 2,000 shares of stock at \$500 per share, distributed to the original shareholders of the company. This time, while they retained the form of an unlimited-liability joint-stock association, they gave it a time limit of thirty years, and made the association easily renewable by a unanimous vote of the directors.
律师麦凯于 1859 年初仔细研究此事，认定只要 Amexco 变卖其余一切资产，便可保住名称。董事会闻讯大喜：若无名称，这些资产价值寥寥。于是 1859 年底，Amexco 宣布“拍卖”资产。一位董事的朋友从纽约斯克内克塔迪赶来，以 60 万美元“买下”公司，又将其交回董事会，随后众人去吃午餐。董事会再度开会，将美国运通资本额增至 100 万美元，计 2,000 股，每股 500 美元，分配给原始股东。本次虽仍沿用无限责任合股公司形式，却设定 30 年期限，并规定经全体董事一致同意即可轻松续存。

The same officers and board remained, and the power relationships stayed the same at the new American Express. Wells had not wanted to continue as president. He had been thrown from a carriage in 1859 and could barely walk a year later. But he still represented a compromise between the factions,and influential board members felt he had to stay in office to keep the peace. Johnston Livingston and Butterfield’s son-in-lawerld’s Wells and finally convinced him that Amexco needed him to mediate between the factions.
新美国运通继续沿用原班高管与董事会，权力格局依旧。威尔斯本不欲再任总裁——1859 年他自马车摔下，一年后几乎无法行走。但他仍是各派妥协的象征，且有影响力的董事认为为维系和平，他必须留任。约翰斯顿·利文斯顿与巴特菲尔德的女婿 erld’s Wells 终于说服他：Amexco 需要他在各派间调和。

They were correct; Wells played a key role in blocking power moves by both Butterfield and Fargo.\* Over the previous ten years, Fargo had grown rich and successful; now in his early forties, he suddenly became very ambitious and contentious. He wanted to go to war with Commodore Vanderbilt’s Hudson River Railroad over a contract, but his fellow board members said no. He wanted to go to war with Adams Express over territory, but Wells opposed and defeated the move at “the Expence \[sic] of being thought a Coward’ by his onetime employee. Then Fargo attempted to take control not just of American Express, but in one audacious play,control of Wells,Fargo and U.. Express as well. Henry Wells thwarted him. As Wells later explained, he decided to “put a stopper to it.”t
事实证明此举正确；威尔斯在阻挡巴特菲尔德与法戈的权力扩张上发挥了关键作用。\* 过去十年间，法戈已腰缠万贯、事业有成；如今年逾四十，忽然雄心勃勃、好斗非常。他欲就合同问题与范德比尔特的哈德逊河铁路开战，却被董事会否决；他欲因领地问题与亚当斯快递开战，但威尔斯反对并挫败此举，代价是被昔日雇员斥为“懦夫”\[原文 Expence sic]。随后，法戈试图一举掌控的不仅是美国运通，更包括 Wells, Fargo 及 U.. Express；亨利·威尔斯挫败了他。正如威尔斯后来所言，他决定“终结此事”。

Though W. G. Fargo lost three times, his ambition had not diminished. Later that year he won something of a consolation prize — the mayoralty of Buffalo. He said he did not want the job, though he appeared to take it up with enthusiasm. At the same time, his main interest remained business. “The mayor-elect \[himself] receives the congratulations of his friends … with great pleasure,” he wrote to his fellow expressmen. “He begs to refer them to the enclosed time table for the purpose of showing how fast the express can run; as for the plunder, that comes hereafter, and is, of course, to be divided as heretofore.”
尽管 W. G. 法戈三战皆败，但他的雄心并未减弱。那年晚些时候，他获得了一种“安慰奖”——布法罗市长职位。他声称自己并不想要这份工作，然而看上去却颇为投入。同时，他最大的兴趣仍是经商。“当选市长的本人欣然接受朋友们的祝贺……倍感荣幸。”他给同业快递人写道，“附上的时刻表足以说明快递能跑多快；至于‘战利品’，那是后话，当然还是照旧分账。”

Whether his reference to plunder was serious can only be guessed. But the Civil War had begun, and even he could not have imagined how much plunder there would be. In 1875, Harper’s explained how the express companies had profited from the Civil War:
他所说的“战利品”究竟是否当真，只能猜测。但南北战争已经打响，连他也想不到这场战争居然会带来如此丰厚的“战利品”。1875 年，《哈珀斯月刊》解释了快递公司如何从内战中获利：
Quote
The source of the express business’s present vast wealth was the immense business during the war of the rebellion. It has been truthfully said that no person unconnected with the company could imagine the magnitude of its transactions while the States were in conflict. On the nearest and most remote fields the agents of the express were always found, venturing often where a picket-guard would hardly venture, collecting money, letters, and trophies for the soldiers for transmission to “the loved ones at home.” Many a thrilling episode might be related of the vicissitudes and perils endured by the expressmen in conveying these articles from the southern frontier to their destination in the North. Where the armies went they followed with the zeal and pertinacity of newspaper correspondents. … Around bivouac fires in the stillness of Southern forests they were found waiting for the homeward-bound messages that were hastily scribbled on the torn fly-leaves of prayer-books, or even on scraps of newspapers. Many a time in the thick of a battle a faint voice called them to the side of a fallen soldier, with blood oozing from a death-wound in his breast, and entreated them to remain a moment while he transferred to their care a letter or a locket addressed to a girl in the North. Many a time, too, they saw a noble fellow fall into an eternal sleep before he could finish his message. A romanticist might gather suggestions of countless pathetic incidents from the experience of expressmen who followed the armies during the rebellion. One of the most melancholy duties these brave fellows had to execute was the transmission of the bodies of the slaughtered to their relatives and friends. The delivery at the home office often occasioned heart-breaking scenes, as “somebody’s darling, dead in a horse-foul, was sent” to the woman who had kissed his handsome face good-bye scarcely six months before.
快递业如今巨额财富的源头，正是内战时期的庞大业务。曾有人真实地说，没有外人能想象各州交战时快递业务交易规模之巨大。无论是前线还是偏远战场，总能见到快递代理人的身影，他们常常冒险去连哨兵都不愿涉足的地方，为士兵收取金钱、书信和战利品，寄回“家中的亲人”。在将这些物品从南方前线运往北方途中，快递员经历的波折与危险可讲述出无数惊心动魄的故事。军队走到哪里，他们就像新闻记者般热忱执着地跟随到哪里……在寂静的南方森林里，他们围着营火等待匆匆写在祈祷书撕页或报纸碎片上的家书。激战正酣时，常有微弱的声音呼唤他们来到一名倒地士兵身旁，那士兵胸口血流不止，恳请他们稍停片刻，将写给北方姑娘的信或小挂坠托付给他们。也常有勇士尚未写完留言便永眠沙场。一位浪漫主义者或可从这些追随大军的快递员经历中汲取无数悲怆素材。这些勇敢的人承担的最凄惨任务之一，是把战死者遗体送回亲友身边。遗体抵达家乡办事处时，常常上演令人心碎的场景——“某人的爱子，死于马槽”，被送到六个月前才吻别他俊朗面庞的女人手中。
The board of American Express rewarded mainly itself for the “vicissitudes and perils” of the men in the field. The record of dividends paid from 1863 to 1866 vividly illustrated the value of this sometimes ghoulish commerce. During that period American Express never paid less than \$115 per share per year (over 20 percent). The board also handed out to each of its members bonuses of \$5,000, and upped all executive salaries; Fargo earned \$7,500 per year from Amexco while still the mayor of Buffalo. And in 1866, the generous heads of the company handed out an 80 percent stock dividend plus \$170 per share in cash, a total cash payment of nearly \$3 million. Previous stock dividends had made each of these cash payouts especially generous to those who had owned stock before the war. For every share an individual held in 1860, he now had nine. (Capital had grown to \$9 million.) Of course, the largest shareholders were the board members themselves. Admittedly, the war produced relatively high inflation, but the directors of American Express more than kept up.
美国运通董事会对前线人员的“颠沛与危险”主要以肥己方式作出“回报”。1863 至 1866 年的分红记录，生动展现了这门有时颇显阴森的生意的价值。在此期间，美国运通每股年分红从未低于 115 美元（逾 20%）。董事会还给每位成员发放 5,000 美元奖金，并调高全部高管薪酬；法戈在兼任布法罗市长期间，每年从 Amexco 领薪 7,500 美元。1866 年，公司高层更慷慨派发 80% 股票股息，并每股额外付现 170 美元，现金总额近 300 万美元。此前的股票股息使得这些现金分红对战前股东尤为丰厚：1860 年持有的一股，如今已变成九股（资本增至 900 万美元）。当然，最大股东正是董事们自己。诚然，战争导致了较高通胀，但美国运通董事的收入增长远超通胀速度。

The gentlemen of the express fraternity actually made far more than even the spectacular returns of American Express indicate. They also owned shares of U.S. Express and Wells, Fargo and in some cases Adams Express, and all of these companies paid huge returns. Not surprising, too, the old hostilities among the board members of American Express faded to the background after 1862. Butterfield, Fargo and Wells still did not like each other, but they were too busy counting money to show it.
快递同业诸君事实上赚得远比美国运通的亮眼回报更为可观。他们还持有U.S. Express、Wells, Fargo的股份，在某些情况下甚至持有亚当斯快递股份，而这些公司也都大额分红。也难怪，自 1862 年后，美国运通董事会成员间的宿怨逐渐淡出视野。巴特菲尔德、法戈与威尔斯仍彼此厌恶，却忙于点钞，无暇显露。

Company coffers bulged even after the rich payouts. Amexco had enough cash left over to increase its portfolio of rail stocks and bonds. During the war, Amexco also provided most of the funds for the building of the short-line Oil Creek Railroad, and by 1866, the company had accumulated several thousand shares of its principal carrier, the New York Central.
即便慷慨派息后，公司金库仍然鼓胀。Amexco 仍有充裕现金增持铁路股票与债券。战争期间，Amexco 亦为短线油溪铁路的建设提供了大部分资金；至 1866 年，公司已持有其主要承运商——纽约中央铁路——数千股股票。

This incredible record had, regrettably from the expressmen’s point of view, received attention. If express business made that much money and people knew about it, they would inevitably want some of it, and soon after Lee and Grant met at Appomattox, others were plotting ways to get in on the express bonanza. The result of this would change the management structure of American Express, and finally end the rule by a contentious board of directors.
这种惊人的业绩不幸（对快递业者而言）引起了外界关注。既然快递业务如此赚钱，而世人皆知，人们势必想分一杯羹。李将军与格兰特在阿波马托克斯会面之后不久，便有人密谋分享这场快递盛宴。这最终将改变美国运通的管理结构，并终结那个争斗不休的董事会的统治。

The first attack came from a company called the National Bankers Express. Formed by another group of upstate New Yorkers with good connections and some capital, National Bankers made a public announcement of a new express in mid-1865. But it appeared that this group hoped primarily to be bought out by American Express, and it accepted an Amexco offer without much fuss early in l866 without ever carrying a package. About the only change that came from this was the addition of banker E. B. Judson to the American Express board.
第一轮攻击来自一家名为 National Bankers Express 的公司。这支由另一批纽约州北部人士组成的团队人脉广、资本也颇丰，于 1865 年年中公开宣布将创办一家新快递公司。然而看上去，他们的主要目的不过是在被美国运通收购；1866 年初，他们在未曾运送过任何包裹的情况下，轻而易举地接受了 Amexco 的报价。此事带来的唯一变化，是银行家 E.B. 贾德森加入了美国运通董事会。

No sooner had American Express disposed of that problem when another group of upstate New Yorkers got together to form the Merchants Union Express (MUE). This time serious warfare broke out. The Merchants Union began with capital of \$20 million, much of it real cash,and it launched an attack on two fronts-both business and public relations. The Merchants Union did not use a delicate approach. Through setup newspaper attacks and posted broadsides, the MUE attacked the old express companies (particularly American Express) for pursuing a policy that “the people are legitimate plunder,” and at the same time, the MUE slashed rates, forcing Amexco to do the same. W. G. Fargo’s brother, J.C., directed Amexco’s side of the warfrom headquarters in New York. He fired off directives to employees and hortatory letters to colleagues and friends calling on the company “to retain the business of the American Express Company at whatever reduction in price may be necessary, on all routes where the ‘Merchants Union’ comes in competition with this Company.”
美国运通刚解决完那桩麻烦，另一群纽约州北部人士又聚在一起，组建了 Merchants Union Express（MUE）。这一次爆发了真刀真枪的大战。商人联合公司以 2000 万美元资本起家，其中大部分是真金白银，并在商业与公关两条战线上同时进攻。商人联合并未采取温和策略——通过操控报纸攻击和张贴布告，MUE 指责老牌快递公司（尤其是美国运通）实行“人民是合法掠夺对象”的政策；与此同时，MUE 大幅削减运费，迫使 Amexco 跟进。W\.G. 法戈的弟弟 J.C. 在纽约总部指挥美国运通作战，向员工下达命令，又给同事和朋友发激励信，号召公司“在所有与‘商人联合’竞争的线路上，不惜任何必要降价幅度，保住美国运通的业务”。

The MUE and Amexco continued to fight each other for months, both in the marketplace and in the press. The MUE pressed the publicity war, and it was an extremely effective tactic for the newcomer.Amexco officials detested publicity even when it was good; bad press hurt all the more. The old express companies tried to fight back, forming a committee to “controll \[sic] the public press upon Express matters.”\* But at best they achieved a standoff, which left them in control of some news organs and the MUE, others. The New York Daily Tribune,for one,refused to fallin line with the old comnies. It wrote: “The best informed and most comprehensive minds saw that unless \[the old express companies] were checked they would absorb to themselves much of the wealth of the country. A full account of the magnitude of their operations, of the extent of their power and the oppressions they afflicted, would astonish.”
MUE 与美国运通在市场和媒体上鏖战数月。MUE 倾力发动舆论战，对新来者而言，这一策略极为有效。美国运通高管即使面对正面报道也厌恶曝光，更遑论负面新闻。老牌快递公司试图反击，成立委员会“控制快递事务的公共舆论”\*，但充其量只形成僵持：他们掌握部分新闻机构，MUE 掌握另外一些。《纽约每日论坛报》就拒绝与老公司同调。该报写道：“最具见识、最周全的人士认为，如果不遏制这些老牌快递公司，它们将吸走国家的大量财富。若完整披露其业务规模、权力范围及其施加的压迫，定会令人震惊。”

The Tribune made many charges and claims,at least one of which was definitely false. The paper claimed the MUE remained profitable despite a 25-40 percent reduction in rates. In fact, losses mounted on both sides. American Express lost hundreds of thousands of dollars a month; the MUE’s losses reached the millions. Yet neither side showed any willingness to compromise; MUE officials actually made a public declaration that they would never merge with Amexco. J. C. Fargo and Henry Wells sent a letter to shareholders saying that American Express intended to reduce the surplus of the company to zero and assess shareholders for more cash if necessary to keep fighting. Neither side considered merger from late l866 through the first half of 1867.
《论坛报》提出了很多指控和论断，其中至少有一项绝对错误：该报声称，尽管运费降低 25–40%，MUE 依旧盈利。事实上，双方亏损都在扩大。美国运通每月亏损数十万美元；MUE 的亏损高达数百万美元。然而双方都无意妥协；MUE 官员甚至公开宣称永不与 Amexco 合并。J.C. 法戈和亨利·威尔斯向股东致信称，美国运通准备将公司盈余降至零，如有必要还将向股东再度征资以继续作战。自 1866 年末至 1867 年上半年，双方都未考虑合并。

But by June the losses became intolerable. The American Express board appointed Butterfield, Fargo, and Livingston to negotiate a “consolidation,” not with MUE, but rather with Adams and the U.S. Express Co. Amexco officials had apparently decided to pursue a consolidation of the older companies to create an entity with unassailable resources capable of defeating the MUE. But consolidation talks foundered because of reluctance on the part of Amexco’s ungrateful step child, the States, which opposed the grand merger scheme.
然而到了六月，亏损已无法忍受。美国运通董事会任命巴特菲尔德、法戈和利文斯顿，与亚当斯快递及合众国快递谈判“整合”——并非与 MUE 合并。美国运通高层显然打算整合老牌公司，组建一家资源雄厚、能击败 MUE 的实体。但由于 Amexco 那个“不知感恩的养子”States 公司反对这一宏大合并计划，谈判最终搁浅。

In August, the siuation,from American Exress’s standpoint,r ened.A shareholder of both Amexco and the MUE filed suit against the American Express board, declaring it guilty of mismanagement of the assets of the company,and demanding that the company be placed in receivership and then liquidated. It was not hard to discern the hand of the Merchants Union in this; the shareholder who filed the suit owned five Amexco shares and 900 MUE shares.
八月，形势对美国运通而言愈发严峻。一名同时持有美国运通和 MUE 股票的股东起诉美国运通董事会，指控其资产管理不善，并要求将公司置于破产接管后清算。这背后不难看出商人联合的身影——提起诉讼的股东持有美国运通股票 5 股，却拥有 MUE 股票 900 股。

American Express blocked the lawsuit but could not stop the losses or the attacks in the press, and some officials finally accepted the fact that they had failed to bring down the MUE. But if confrontation had failed.thatleftonlyonealternative-combination.Reportedly,Wells called for pursuing the battle by raising more money through an assessment of shareholders. W\.G.Fargo counseled settlement, and the board agreed with him.
美国运通挡下了这场诉讼，却无法阻止亏损或媒体的抨击，一些高管终于承认未能击垮 MUE。既然对抗失败，就只剩下一个选择——合并。据说威尔斯主张通过向股东征资筹款继续战斗；W.G. 法戈则建议和解，董事会最终采纳了他的意见。

What came out of Fargo’s initiative was more sweeping than anyone had expected. A Board of Control-a kind of industry-created regulatory body-was established,consisting of representatives from all four major eastern and midwestern express companies\:Adams, American, U.S.,and Merchants Union expresses. (Amexco’s representative was J.C.Fargo.) The control boardpickeda fifth memberto actashead， and the companies surrendered to the board the right to divide and regulate all express business east of the Rockies. “The child is born,” reported one expressman.”He has four legs,four arms,and one head.”
法戈的倡议带来的结果比任何人预料的都要深远。一个控制委员会——业界自创的监管机构——成立，由东部和中西部四家主要快递公司：亚当斯快递、美国运通、合众国快递以及商人联合快递的代表组成（Amexco 的代表是 J.C. 法戈）。控制委员会再选出第五名成员担任主席，各公司向委员会让渡了划分并监管落基山以东所有快递业务的权力。一位快递业者报道说：“孩子出生了——他有四条腿、四条胳膊和一个脑袋。”

He was also not to live very long, but he served his purpose. Rates went back up, and everyone went back to making money. But American Express had lost a good deal of its territory to the MUE in the treaty drawn up by the Board of Control, and by the end of the following year, itoffereda merger to the upstart. The MUE,despite its promise never to merge, quickly agreed. Together, they formed a company called the American Merchants Union Express Company， capitalized at \$18 million,with a charter (still a joint-stock company) to last for thirty-five years. After the creation of the new company, the express Board of Control lost its reason for being and faded out of existence. Despite the merger, some hard feelings remained.“I almost regret the fusing of the Am. and the M.U.,” said A. H. Barney， Danforth’s brother and now the head of the States.“My feeling is to crush them out, my judgement, not so decided.”
然而这个“孩子”寿命并不长，但它完成了使命。运价恢复上涨，大家又开始赚钱。不过在控制委员会拟定的条约中，美国运通将不少辖区割让给 MUE，至次年底，它便向这家新秀提出合并。尽管曾宣称绝不合并，MUE 还是迅速同意。双方共同组建了“美国商人联合快递公司”，资本 1,800 万美元，章程（仍为合股公司）有效期三十五年。新公司成立后，快递控制委员会失去存在意义而淡出历史舞台。即便合并了，仍有人心怀不满。“我几乎后悔把 Am. 和 M.U. 融合在一起，”States 的负责人、丹福斯的兄弟 A.H. 巴尼说，“感情上我想把他们碾碎，但理智上没那么坚决。”

The resolution of the fight resembled the one that had led to the creation of Amexco in 1850, but internally it had a very different outcome. Unlike the earlier merger, this one did not lead to a weak executive; one voice had emerged as dominant.
这场争斗的解决方式类似于 1850 年促成 Amexco 诞生的那一次，但内部结果截然不同。这一次的合并并未造成软弱的领导层；有一个声音脱颖而出并占据主导。

That voice belonged to W. G. Fargo. Each of the merger partners American Express and the MUE-won six seats on the new board of directors. The company remained a joint-stock association, and W\.G. Fargo became president. Somewhere along the line, Henry Wells resigned or was forced out.\* Company sources have said he left because of ill health and advancing years; he was sixty-three and had often stated that he wanted to leave office. But at the time he finally departed, he made no request, nor did the board issue a statement reluctantly accepting a resignation and thanking him for a job well done.Given that such letters and statements were almost inevitable, the more plausible explanation was offered by a banker from the Aurora area who knew Wells. The banker claimed that Wells was forced out because he had tried to assess the shareholders for more money to fight rather than pursue peace. Fargo, on the other hand, had taken the lead in settling the feud, and so would have been most acceptable to the old MUE people, as well as to Amexco’s shareholders. He was elected as the candidate of compromise, as Wells himself once had been.
这一声音属于 W\.G. 法戈。合并双方——美国运通与 MUE——各在新董事会中占据六个席位。公司仍为无限责任合股协会，W\.G. 法戈出任总裁。某个阶段，亨利·威尔斯辞职或被迫离职\*。公司消息称他因健康不佳和年事已高离开；他当时 63 岁，并曾多次表示想退位。但在最终离任时，他既未提出要求，董事会也未发布勉强接受辞呈并致谢的声明——此类函件几乎必不可少。更可信的解释来自奥罗拉地区一位熟识威尔斯的银行家：威尔斯因主张向股东再度征资打持久战而被迫出局；而主导和解的法戈更能让 MUE 旧部及 Amexco 股东接受。他像当年的威尔斯一样，以折中人选身份当选。
Idea
市场竞争的机制最终都让做出妥协的人胜出。
But unlike Wells, Fargo took decisive control and put an end to the domination of Amexco by a contentious board. W\.G.’s competition had left the company. He had outlasted and outlived the other powers in American Express. Not only did Wells resign the presidency, but Butterfeld,after sufferinga stroke, first retired and then died in 1869, a year after the Amexco-MUE merger. W. G. Fargo moved quickly to solidify his grasp on power. He appointed his brother J.C. not only a director and assistant treasurer of the company， but also to the key position of general superintendent of all express operations, east and west.Another brother, Charles, became the head of what had been Livingston, Fargo,now simply the Western Department of Amrican Merchants Union Express. (That was changed back to American Express a few years later.) In l875, brother Charles also joined the board of directors of the company. In fact, W\.G. raised nepotism to executive policy, filling the ranks from top to bottom with his relatives. The family’s domination of American Express would last almost half a century.
但与威尔斯不同，法戈果断掌权，终结了争吵不休的董事会对 Amexco 的统治。W\.G. 的竞争对手均已离场；在美国运通内部，他熬过并超越了其他权势人物。威尔斯辞去总裁职务；巴特菲尔德中风后先退而后于 1869 年（Amexco-MUE 合并一年后）逝世。W\.G. 法戈迅速巩固权力：他任命弟弟 J.C. 不仅为董事及助理司库，还担任东西部全部快递业务的总督导；另一位弟弟查尔斯成为原“利文斯顿—法戈”，现改称美国商人联合快递西部分部的负责人（数年后又改回美国运通）。1875 年，查尔斯也加入公司董事会。事实上，W\.G. 将裙带关系提升为公司政策，自上而下安插亲属。该家族对美国运通的统治将延续近半个世纪。

W\.G. also made a key organizational change. He created an executive committee which became the true policy making body of the company. It consisted at first of W\.G. and J. C. Fargo, Alexander Holland, Fargo crony Benjamin Cheney, and from the Merchants Union, the Civil War political figure Theodore M. Pomeroy. Only three members of the executive committee were needed for a quorum, and those three were usually Alex Holland, J.C. and W. G. Fargo, giving the brothers control of the company. So totally did the executive committee dominate that it soon decided everything from major policy issues to the salaries of employees in Dubuque. J.C. would eventually institute a policy that the executive committee would have to approve all expenditures of over \$50 .Records of the EC show it deciding on such trivial expenditures as pencils and wrapping paper for many decades thereafter.
W\.G. 还进行了一项关键组织改造：他设立了执行委员会，成为公司真正的决策机构。首任成员包括 W\.G. 与 J.C. 法戈、亚历山大·霍兰德、法戈密友本杰明·切尼，以及来自商人联合、南北战争时期政界人士西奥多·M·波默罗伊。执行委员会仅需三人即具法定人数，而通常到场三人正是霍兰德、J.C. 与 W\.G. 法戈，这让兄弟二人掌控公司。执行委员会权力之大，以致很快从重大政策到迪比克员工的薪资都由其决定。J.C. 最终制定政策，规定凡超过 50 美元的支出须经执行委员会批准。委员会记录显示，此后数十年，它甚至决定铅笔和包装纸等小额开支。

The board of directors, formerly the seat of real executive power, became little more than a rubber stamp, which met at congenial gatherings to vote another dividend. Probably around l868, the company began the practice of recording the minutes of board of directors meetings in advance, a practice continued well into the twentieth century. Since W\.G. and J.C. orchestrated those meetings, they did not need to wait for the actual event to record the results W\.G. had achieved one dream-domination of American Express, and at the time, it was probably a positive step for the company. For once it had stable management. Instead of decision making by squabbling buccaneers， the company now was managed by people who could focus on running it. The old system had been inherently unstable, and either had to destroy the company or solidify it around one figure or one faction. That had occurred,and now American Exs had a management that could make decisions and implement them. The price was one-family rule.
董事会曾经是公司真正执行权力的核心，如今却几乎沦为橡皮图章，只在友好聚会上开会投票发放新股息。大约在 1868 年前后，公司开始提前撰写董事会会议记录，这一做法一直持续到 20 世纪。由于 W\.G. 和 J.C. 安排了这些会议，他们无需等到会议正式召开就能记录结果。W\.G. 实现了他的一个梦想——掌控美国运通，而在当时，这对公司或许是一件好事。公司终于拥有了稳定的管理层。不再由争吵不休的冒险家做决定，而是由能专注经营的人来管理。旧制度本质上不稳定，要么毁掉公司，要么围绕某个个人或派系将其凝固。现在，这种情况已经发生，美国运通拥有了能够决策并执行的管理层，代价则是家族独裁。

Actually, W\.G. himself did not devote the bulk of his time to running the company. His success in taking over American Express had not blunted his ambitions, and he sought to become a great railroader. He succeeded for a time: he and a partner gained control of the New York Central,and he later joined financier Jay Cooke in developing the Northern Pacific Railroad. But he finally lost both companies, and after the collapse of the Northern Pacific project in 1872,\* W\.G. seemed to content himself with diversions: building a great mansion in Buffalo where he continued to live, despite the fact that Amexco kept its headquarters in New York City; throwing memorable parties; and dabbling in companies around Buffalo. But his life was not very happy. Six of his children died in childhood or soon after; only two survived him. In 1880, he took sick, dying in his great mansion in the spring of 1881.
事实上，W\.G. 本人并未将大部分时间投入到公司的日常运营中。他成功掌控美国运通并未削弱其雄心，他寻求成为一位伟大的铁路经营者。他一度成功：与合伙人夺得纽约中央铁路的控制权，后来又与金融家杰伊·库克联合开发北太平洋铁路。但最终他失去了这两家公司，在 1872 年北太平洋项目崩溃后 \*，W\.G. 似乎满足于一些消遣：在布法罗修建豪宅并继续居住于此（尽管美国运通仍将总部设在纽约市）；举办令人难忘的聚会；并涉足布法罗周边的公司。然而他的生活并不幸福，八个孩子中有六个在幼年或不久后夭折，仅有两个活过他本人。1880 年他患病，于 1881 年春在那座豪宅中去世。

Meanwhile W\.G.’s younger brother J.C. ran American Express and did so very successfully. Although the company faced some lean years during a depression in the mid-187Os, it always paid a dividend-no less than 3 percent, usually 6 percent-and by the end of the decade, profits became extremely robust. While the records are incomplete (even in the minute books of the board and EC, statements are left blank), by 1879 profits regularly topped \$100,000 per month, and a large surplus remained for the company to continue playing its role as major lender to the rails. Yet it earned its vast sums quietly,without challenge, out of the limelight. The railroad barons,more flamboyant, more visible,more directly threatening to the land,became the targets of nineteenth century populists and reformers, and J.C. and most other expressmen were content to let the rail men hold center stage. The express companies even kept their dividends artificially low so that they would not attract too much attention. Amexco once again slipped from the public eye. The press hardly ever ran stories about Amexco (and most of the other express companies) for the rest of the century.
与此同时，W\.G. 的弟弟 J.C. 运营美国运通，并且非常成功。虽然公司在 1870 年代中期经济萧条期间度过了一些艰难岁月，但始终发放股息——不少于 3%，通常为 6%——到十年末利润极为丰厚。尽管记录并不完整（即便在董事会和执行委员会的会议记录中，报表也常留空白），到 1879 年公司月利润经常超过 10 万美元，且仍保持大量盈余，继续担任铁路主要贷款人的角色。然而它悄然赚取巨额财富，既无挑战，也少曝光。那些张扬、显眼且更直接威胁土地的铁路大亨成为 19 世纪民粹主义者和改革者的目标，而 J.C. 和大多数其他快递人都乐意让铁路公司处于聚光灯下。快递公司甚至人为压低股息，以免过度引人注目。美国运通再次淡出公众视线。本世纪余下时间，媒体几乎不再报道美国运通（以及大多数其他快递公司）。
Idea
铁路不赚钱，建立在铁路之上的快递成为最赚钱的生意。
Actually, it was remarkable that the companies achieved freedom from scrutiny. For in the last half of the century, the express became almost as much a part of people’s lives as the railroads, the post office, and the telegraph. It was an essential service, and that fact made the secretive American Express Company an increasingly wealthy organization.
事实上，公司能够逃脱审查本身就非同寻常。因为在 19 世纪下半叶，快递几乎与铁路、邮局和电报一样成为人们生活中不可或缺的一部分。这是一项基本服务，而这一事实使得行事低调的美国运通公司变得日益富有。

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