2004-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 21%. Over the last 39 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $50,498, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.*
我们在 2003 年的净资产增加了 136 亿美元，使得 A 类与 B 类股票的每股账面价值都增长了 21%。在过去 39 年里（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 50,498 美元，年复合增长率为 22.2% 。*
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
本报告中使用的所有数据均针对伯克希尔的 A 类股票，该股票是 1996 年之前公司唯一已发行股票的继任者。B 类股票的经济权益相当于 A 类的 1/30。
It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2003, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a widely diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 39-year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 22.2% gain in book. (For a better understanding of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vice-chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 69.)
但真正重要的是每股内在价值，而不是账面价值。好消息是：在 1964 年到 2003 年间，伯克希尔从一家举步维艰、内在价值低于账面价值的北方纺织企业，蜕变为一家高度多元化、内在价值远高于账面价值的企业。因此，我们 39 年的内在价值增幅在某种程度上超过了账面价值 22.2% 的增幅。（若想更好理解“内在价值”以及我、合伙人兼伯克希尔副董事长 Charlie Munger 在经营伯克希尔时所遵循的经济原则，请阅读我们的《Owner’s Manual》，从第 69 页开始。）
Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once was in rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings, including convertible preferreds, have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an average of 50% in 2000-03. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case.
尽管账面价值计算有其不足，但在伯克希尔，它仍然有用——可以作为衡量我们内在价值长期增速的一把“略偏保守”的尺子。不过，与过去相比，用它来评估某一年度相对于 S&P 500 指数的表现（我们在对页展示了该对比）如今相关性更弱。我们的权益类持仓（包括可转换优先股）在净资产中的占比已经显著下降：例如在 1980 年代平均约为净资产的 114%，而在 2000—2003 年间平均约为 50%。因此，如今股市的年度波动对我们净资产的影响，比过去小得多。
Nonetheless, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P’s performance, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.
尽管如此，伯克希尔与标普 500 的长期相对表现仍然至关重要。我们的股东可以用极低成本通过指数基金买入标普 500。除非未来我们在每股内在价值上的增幅能跑赢标普的表现，否则 Charlie 和我并没有为你们创造任何你们自己做不到的东西。
If we fail, we will have no excuses. Charlie and I operate in an ideal environment. To begin with, we are supported by an incredible group of men and women who run our operating units. If there were a Corporate Cooperstown, its roster would surely include many of our CEOs. Any shortfall in Berkshire’s results will not be caused by our managers.
如果我们失败，我们没有任何借口。Charlie 和我处在一个近乎理想的环境里。首先，我们背后有一群令人惊叹的男女同事在经营各个运营单位。若真有“企业界的名人堂（Corporate Cooperstown）”，它的名单里一定会有我们许多 CEO。伯克希尔若有业绩短板，原因不会在我们的经理人身上。
Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom. Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints. A company’s history, for example, may commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street’s tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and capital-allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left to themselves.
此外，我们享有一种罕见的管理自由。大多数公司都背负制度性的束缚。比如，公司历史可能把它锁在一个如今机会有限的行业里。更常见的问题是：股东结构会逼迫管理层跟着华尔街的节奏起舞。有些 CEO 抵抗，但也有人屈服，转而采用与他们若能按自己意愿行事时完全不同的经营与资本配置政策。
局部泛化+外部环境的压力。
At Berkshire, neither history nor the demands of owners impede intelligent decision-making. When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are — in tennis parlance — unforced errors.
在伯克希尔，无论历史包袱还是所有者的要求，都不会妨碍理性的决策。Charlie 和我如果犯错——用网球的说法——那都是“非受迫性失误”。
Operating Earnings
经营性收益
When valuations are similar, we strongly prefer owning businesses to owning stocks. During most of our years of operation, however, stocks were much the cheaper choice. We therefore sharply tilted our asset allocation in those years toward equities, as illustrated by the percentages cited earlier.
当估值水平相近时，我们强烈倾向于直接拥有企业，而不是拥有股票。但在我们经营的大多数年份里，股票通常是更便宜的选择。因此，在那些年份里，我们大幅把资产配置倾向于股票，正如前文提到的比例所示。
In recent years, however, we’ve found it hard to find significantly undervalued stocks, a difficulty greatly accentuated by the mushrooming of the funds we must deploy. Today, the number of stocks that can be purchased in large enough quantities to move the performance needle at Berkshire is a small fraction of the number that existed a decade ago. (Investment managers often profit far more from piling up assets than from handling those assets well. So when one tells you that increased funds won’t hurt his investment performance, step back: His nose is about to grow.)
但近些年，我们发现很难再找到明显被低估的股票；而且由于我们必须投入的资金规模像蘑菇一样膨胀，这一困难被大大放大。今天，能够让伯克希尔“买得足够多、从而对业绩产生实质影响”的股票数量，只剩下十年前的一小部分。（投资经理往往从“堆积资产”中赚到的远多于把这些资产管好。所以当有人告诉你资金规模增加不会伤害他的投资表现时，退一步：他的鼻子马上要变长了。）
The shortage of attractively-priced stocks in which we can put large sums doesn’t bother us, providing we can find companies to purchase that (1) have favorable and enduring economic characteristics; (2) are run by talented and honest managers and (3) are available at a sensible price. We have purchased a number of such businesses in recent years, though not enough to fully employ the gusher of cash that has come our way. In buying businesses, I’ve made some terrible mistakes, both of commission and omission. Overall, however, our acquisitions have led to decent gains in per-share earnings.
我们并不为“能以诱人价格、且可投入大额资金的股票”变少而烦恼，前提是我们能买到这样的公司：（1）具有良好且持久的经济特征；（2）由有才干且诚实的管理层经营；（3）价格合理。近些年我们确实买了不少这样的企业——但仍不足以完全消化涌向我们的那股“现金喷泉”。在收购企业这件事上，我犯过一些糟糕的错误：既有“做了不该做的”（commission），也有“该做没做的”（omission）。不过总体而言，我们的收购仍带来了不错的每股收益增长。
Below is a table that quantifies that point. But first we need to warn you that growth-rate presentations can be significantly distorted by a calculated selection of either initial or terminal dates. For example, if earnings are tiny in a beginning year, a long-term performance that was only mediocre can be made to appear sensational. That kind of distortion can come about because the company at issue was minuscule in the base year — which means that only a handful of insiders actually benefited from the touted performance — or because a larger company was then operating at just above breakeven. Picking a terminal year that is particularly buoyant will also favorably bias a calculation of growth.
下面有一张表可以量化这一点。但在此之前，我们需要提醒你：用“增长率”的方式呈现业绩，很容易因为刻意选择起始或结束年份而被严重扭曲。比如，如果起始年份的盈利很小，那么即便长期表现只是平平，也能被包装成惊艳。这种扭曲可能来自两种情况：要么公司在基期极其微小——也就意味着真正受益的只是少数内部人；要么一家更大的公司在基期只是勉强盈亏平衡。反过来，若把终点选在一个特别景气的年份，也会让增长计算看起来更好。
The Berkshire Hathaway that present management assumed control of in 1965 had long been sizable. But in 1964, it earned only $175,586 or 15 cents per share, so close to breakeven that any calculation of earnings growth from that base would be meaningless. At the time, however, even those meager earnings looked good: Over the decade following the 1955 merger of Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing, the combined operation had lost $10.1 million and many thousands of employees had been let go. It was not a marriage made in heaven.
现任管理层在 1965 年接手的伯克希尔，规模早已不小。但在 1964 年，公司只赚了 175,586 美元，折合每股 15 美分，几乎就在盈亏平衡线上——以那一年为起点去计算“盈利增长”，基本没有意义。不过在当时，即便这点微薄利润看上去也算不错：在 1955 年 Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates 与 Hathaway Manufacturing 合并后的十年里，合并后的业务累计亏损 1,010 万美元，成千上万名员工被裁撤。这不是一桩“天作之合”的婚姻。
Against this background, we give you a picture of Berkshire’s earnings growth that begins in 1968, but also includes subsequent base years spaced five years apart. A series of calculations is presented so that you can decide for yourself which period is most meaningful. I’ve started with 1968 because it was the first full year we operated National Indemnity, the initial acquisition we made as we began to expand Berkshire’s business.
在这样的背景下，我们给你展示一幅伯克希尔盈利增长的图景：从 1968 年开始，同时也列出此后每隔五年设置一个基期年份。我们给出一系列计算，让你自己判断哪一段期间最有意义。我选择从 1968 年起算，是因为那是我们完整运营 National Indemnity 的第一年——这是我们在开始扩展伯克希尔业务时做出的第一笔收购。
I don’t believe that using 2003 as the terminal year distorts our calculations. It was a terrific year for our insurance business, but the big boost that gave to earnings was largely offset by the pathetically low interest rates we earned on our large holdings of cash equivalents (a condition that will not last). All figures shown below, it should be noted, exclude capital gains.
我不认为把 2003 年作为终点会扭曲我们的计算。那一年我们的保险业务非常出色，确实大幅推高了盈利；但这种提升在很大程度上被我们持有的大量现金等价物所获得的可怜低利率所抵消（这种情况不会持续太久）。还要注意：下面展示的所有数字都不包含资本利得。
We will continue the capital allocation practices we have used in the past. If stocks become significantly cheaper than entire businesses, we will buy them aggressively. If selected bonds become attractive, as they did in 2002, we will again load up on these securities. Under any market or economic conditions, we will be happy to buy businesses that meet our standards. And, for those that do, the bigger the better. Our capital is underutilized now, but that will happen periodically. It’s a painful condition to be in — but not as painful as doing something stupid. (I speak from experience.)
我们会继续沿用过去的资本配置做法：如果股票相对于整家公司变得明显更便宜，我们会积极买入股票；如果某些债券变得有吸引力——就像 2002 年那样——我们也会再次大量买入这些证券。无论市场或经济环境如何，只要有符合我们标准的企业，我们都会乐于收购；而且，对符合标准的企业来说，规模越大越好。我们目前的资本利用率偏低，但这种情况会周期性出现。这是一种痛苦的状态——但还不如做蠢事那么痛苦。（我有亲身经验。）
Overall, we are certain Berkshire’s performance in the future will fall far short of what it has been in the past. Nonetheless, Charlie and I remain hopeful that we can deliver results that are modestly above average. That’s what we’re being paid for.
总体而言，我们确信伯克希尔未来的表现会远远低于过去。但尽管如此，Charlie 和我仍希望能交出“略高于平均水平”的结果——这正是我们拿薪酬的原因。
Acquisitions
收购
As regular readers know, our acquisitions have often come about in strange ways. None, however, had a more unusual genesis than our purchase last year of Clayton Homes.
老读者都知道，我们的收购往往是以一些“奇怪”的方式发生的。不过，没有哪一笔收购的来龙去脉比我们去年买下 Clayton Homes 更离奇。
The unlikely source was a group of finance students from the University of Tennessee, and their teacher, Dr. Al Auxier. For the past five years, Al has brought his class to Omaha, where the group tours Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s, eats at Gorat’s and then comes to Kiewit Plaza for a session with me. Usually about 40 students participate.
这件事的起点，居然是一群来自田纳西大学（University of Tennessee）的金融专业学生，以及他们的老师 Dr. Al Auxier。过去五年里，Al 每年都会带着他的班级来奥马哈：参观 Nebraska Furniture Mart 和 Borsheim’s，在 Gorat’s 吃饭，然后到 Kiewit Plaza 跟我交流一场。通常大约有 40 名学生参加。
After two hours of give-and-take, the group traditionally presents me with a thank-you gift. (The doors stay locked until they do.) In past years it’s been items such as a football signed by Phil Fulmer and a basketball from Tennessee’s famous women’s team.
在两个小时的一问一答之后，这个团队按惯例会送我一份“感谢礼物”。（在他们送出礼物之前，门会一直锁着。）往年送过的东西包括：Phil Fulmer 签名的橄榄球、以及田纳西著名女子篮球队的篮球等。
This past February, the group opted for a book — which, luckily for me, was the recently-published autobiography of Jim Clayton, founder of Clayton Homes. I already knew the company to be the class act of the manufactured housing industry, knowledge I acquired after earlier making the mistake of buying some distressed junk debt of Oakwood Homes, one of the industry’s largest companies. At the time of that purchase, I did not understand how atrocious consumer-financing practices had become throughout most of the manufactured housing industry. But I learned: Oakwood rather promptly went bankrupt.
而今年二月，这个团队选了一本书作为礼物——对我而言幸运的是，那本书恰好是 Jim Clayton（Clayton Homes 创始人）新近出版的自传。我之前就知道这家公司是预制房（manufactured housing）行业里的“标杆选手”，这种认识来自我更早以前犯过的一个错误：我曾买入 Oakwood Homes（行业最大公司之一）的困境垃圾债。当时我并不了解，在大多数预制房行业里，面向消费者的融资做法已经糟糕到何等程度。但我很快就学到了：Oakwood 迅速破产。
Manufactured housing, it should be emphasized, can deliver very good value to home purchasers. Indeed, for decades, the industry has accounted for more than 15% of the homes built in the U.S. During those years, moreover, both the quality and variety of manufactured houses consistently improved.
必须强调的是，预制房对购房者而言可以提供非常高的性价比。事实上，几十年来，这个行业在美国新建住房中占比一直超过 15%。在那些年里，预制房的质量与品类也持续改进。
Progress in design and construction was not matched, however, by progress in distribution and financing. Instead, as the years went by, the industry’s business model increasingly centered on the ability of both the retailer and manufacturer to unload terrible loans on naive lenders. When “securitization” then became popular in the 1990s, further distancing the supplier of funds from the lending transaction, the industry’s conduct went from bad to worse. Much of its volume a few years back came from buyers who shouldn’t have bought, financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent. The consequence has been huge numbers of repossessions and pitifully low recoveries on the units repossessed.
然而，设计与建造方面的进步，并没有在分销与融资方面得到对应的提升。相反，随着时间推移，这个行业的商业模式越来越围绕着一件事：零售商与制造商能否把糟糕的贷款“甩给”天真的资金方。到了 1990 年代，“securitization（证券化）”开始流行，使资金供给方与具体放贷交易进一步脱钩，行业行为便从糟糕滑向更糟。几年前，这个行业的很大一部分销量来自两类人凑在一起：本不该买的人买了房，本不该贷的人放了款。结果就是大量回收（repossession）发生，而被回收的房屋单位回收率低得可怜。
Oakwood participated fully in the insanity. But Clayton, though it could not isolate itself from industry practices, behaved considerably better than its major competitors.
Oakwood 在这场疯狂中参与得彻彻底底。但 Clayton 虽然无法完全与行业惯例隔绝，却比主要竞争对手做得要好得多。
Upon receiving Jim Clayton’s book, I told the students how much I admired his record and they took that message back to Knoxville, home of both the University of Tennessee and Clayton Homes. Al then suggested that I call Kevin Clayton, Jim’s son and the CEO, to express my views directly. As I talked with Kevin, it became clear that he was both able and a straight-shooter.
收到 Jim Clayton 的书后，我告诉学生们我多么钦佩他的业绩记录；他们把这句话带回了 Knoxville——那里既是 University of Tennessee 的所在地，也是 Clayton Homes 的总部。随后 Al 建议我打电话给 Kevin Clayton（Jim 的儿子、现任 CEO），把我的看法直接告诉他。和 Kevin 交谈后，我很快发现：他既能干，又说话直来直去、实事求是。
Soon thereafter, I made an offer for the business based solely on Jim’s book, my evaluation of Kevin, the public financials of Clayton and what I had learned from the Oakwood experience. Clayton’s board was receptive, since it understood that the large-scale financing Clayton would need in the future might be hard to get. Lenders had fled the industry and securitizations, when possible at all, carried far more expensive and restrictive terms than was previously the case. This tightening was particularly serious for Clayton, whose earnings significantly depended on securitizations.
不久之后，我仅根据 Jim 的账本、我对 Kevin 的评估、Clayton 的公开财务数据以及我从 Oakwood 经验中学到的东西提出了收购要约。Clayton 的董事会对此持开放态度，因为他们明白 Clayton 将来所需的大规模融资可能很难获得。放贷方已经撤离该行业，而且即便能做证券化，其条款也比以前更加昂贵且限制更多。对于严重依赖证券化以获取收益的 Clayton 来说，这种收紧尤为严重。
Today, the manufactured housing industry remains awash in problems. Delinquencies continue high, repossessed units still abound and the number of retailers has been halved. A different business model is required, one that eliminates the ability of the retailer and salesman to pocket substantial money up front by making sales financed by loans that are destined to default. Such transactions cause hardship to both buyer and lender and lead to a flood of repossessions that then undercut the sale of new units. Under a proper model — one requiring significant down payments and shorter-term loans — the industry will likely remain much smaller than it was in the 90s. But it will deliver to home buyers an asset in which they will have equity, rather than disappointment, upon resale.
如今，预制房屋行业仍然问题重重。违约率持续偏高，收回的房屋仍然大量存在，零售商数量也减半了。需要一种不同的商业模式，消除零售商和销售员通过促成注定会违约的贷款而在交易初期捞取大量利润的可能性。这类交易既给买方也给贷款方带来困境，并导致大量回收房屋，进而压低新房的销售。在一个合适的模式下——要求较高的首付和更短期限的贷款——该行业很可能会比 90 年代小得多。但它将为购房者提供一种在转售时拥有资产净值而非失望的房屋。
In the “full circle” department, Clayton has agreed to buy the assets of Oakwood. When the transaction closes, Clayton’s manufacturing capacity, geographical reach and sales outlets will be substantially increased. As a byproduct, the debt of Oakwood that we own, which we bought at a deep discount, will probably return a small profit to us.
“兜了一圈又回到起点”这部分：Clayton 已同意收购 Oakwood 的资产。交易完成后，Clayton 的制造产能、地域覆盖以及销售网点都会显著扩大。顺带一提，我们持有的 Oakwood 债务——当初是以大幅折价买入的——很可能会给我们带来一小笔利润。
And the students? In October, we had a surprise “graduation” ceremony in Knoxville for the 40 who sparked my interest in Clayton. I donned a mortarboard and presented each student with both a PhD (for phenomenal, hard-working dealmaker) from Berkshire and a B share. Al got an A share. If you meet some of the new Tennessee shareholders at our annual meeting, give them your thanks. And ask them if they’ve read any good books lately.
那群学生呢？十月，我们在 Knoxville 为那 40 位点燃我对 Clayton 兴趣的学生，搞了一场惊喜“毕业典礼”。我戴上了学位帽（mortarboard），给每位学生颁发了两样东西：一张来自伯克希尔的 “PhD”（phenomenal, hard-working dealmaker——“非凡且勤奋的交易撮合者”）证书，以及一股 B 类股。Al 则得到了一股 A 类股。若你在我们的年会遇到这些来自田纳西的新股东，请向他们道声谢。顺便问问他们：最近读到什么好书没有。
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In early spring, Byron Trott, a Managing Director of Goldman Sachs, told me that Wal-Mart wished to sell its McLane subsidiary. McLane distributes groceries and nonfood items to convenience stores, drug stores, wholesale clubs, mass merchandisers, quick service restaurants, theaters and others. It’s a good business, but one not in the mainstream of Wal-Mart’s future. It’s made to order, however, for us.
初春时节，Goldman Sachs 的董事总经理 Byron Trott 告诉我，Wal-Mart 想出售其 McLane 子公司。McLane 向便利店、药店、批发俱乐部（wholesale clubs）、大型综合零售商（mass merchandisers）、快餐连锁（quick service restaurants）、影院等客户分销食品杂货与非食品商品。这是一门好生意，但并不属于 Wal-Mart 未来战略的主航道；不过对我们而言，却是量身定做。
McLane has sales of about $23 billion, but operates on paper-thin margins — about 1% pre-tax — and will swell Berkshire’s sales figures far more than our income. In the past, some retailers had shunned McLane because it was owned by their major competitor. Grady Rosier, McLane’s superb CEO, has already landed some of these accounts — he was in full stride the day the deal closed — and more will come.
McLane 年销售额约 230 亿美元，但利润率薄得像纸——税前大约只有 1%——它会把伯克希尔的“营收数字”推高很多，却不会同等幅度地增加我们的“利润数字”。过去，一些零售商曾刻意回避 McLane，因为它归他们的主要竞争对手所有。McLane 出色的 CEO Grady Rosier 已经把其中一些客户争取了回来——交易完成当天他就已经火力全开——未来还会有更多客户加入。
For several years, I have given my vote to Wal-Mart in the balloting for Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired” list. Our McLane transaction reinforced my opinion. To make the McLane deal, I had a single meeting of about two hours with Tom Schoewe, Wal-Mart’s CFO, and we then shook hands. (He did, however, first call Bentonville). Twenty-nine days later Wal-Mart had its money. We did no “due diligence.” We knew everything would be exactly as Wal-Mart said it would be — and it was.
多年来，在 Fortune Magazine 的“Most Admired（最受赞赏）”评选投票中，我一直把票投给 Wal-Mart。这笔 McLane 交易，让我的看法更坚定。为了促成交易，我只与 Wal-Mart 的 CFO Tom Schoewe 见了一次面，约两个小时，然后我们就握手成交。（当然，他事先还是给 Bentonville 打了电话。）29 天后，Wal-Mart 就拿到了钱。我们没有做任何“尽职调查（due diligence）”。我们知道 Wal-Mart 说的一切都会分毫不差——事实也确实如此。
I should add that Byron has now been instrumental in three Berkshire acquisitions. He understands Berkshire far better than any investment banker with whom we have talked and — it hurts me to say this — earns his fee. I’m looking forward to deal number four (as, I am sure, is he).
我还要补充一点：Byron 现在已经在伯克希尔三笔收购中发挥了关键作用。他对伯克希尔的理解，超过我们交谈过的任何一位投行人士——而且（这话说出来让我难受）他确实配得上那笔费用。我期待着第四笔交易（我相信他也同样期待）。
Taxes
税收
On May 20, 2003, The Washington Post ran an op-ed piece by me that was critical of the Bush tax proposals. Thirteen days later, Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury, delivered a speech about the new tax legislation saying, “That means a certain midwestern oracle, who, it must be noted, has played the tax code like a fiddle, is still safe retaining all his earnings.” I think she was talking about me.
2003 年 5 月 20 日，《The Washington Post》刊登了我写的一篇评论文章，批评 Bush 的税收提案。13 天后，美国财政部负责税收政策的助理部长 Pamela Olson 在谈到新税法的一次演讲中说：“这意味着某位中西部的‘预言家’——值得一提的是，他把税法像小提琴一样玩得溜——仍然可以安然保留自己的全部收益。”我想她说的就是我。
Alas, my “fiddle playing” will not get me to Carnegie Hall — or even to a high school recital. Berkshire, on your behalf and mine, will send the Treasury $3.3 billion for tax on its 2003 income, a sum equaling 2½% of the total income tax paid by all U.S. corporations in fiscal 2003. (In contrast, Berkshire’s market valuation is about 1% of the value of all American corporations.) Our payment will almost certainly place us among our country’s top ten taxpayers. Indeed, if only 540 taxpayers paid the amount Berkshire will pay, no other individual or corporation would have to pay anything to Uncle Sam. That’s right: 290 million Americans and all other businesses would not have to pay a dime in income, social security, excise or estate taxes to the federal government. (Here’s the math: Federal tax receipts, including social security receipts, in fiscal 2003 totaled $1.782 trillion and 540 “Berkshires,” each paying $3.3 billion, would deliver the same $1.782 trillion.)
唉，我这点“拉小提琴”的本事，别说去 Carnegie Hall 演出了，连高中音乐会的节目单都上不了。就你我共同的利益而言，伯克希尔将为 2003 年的收入向财政部缴纳 33 亿美元的税款——这相当于美国所有公司在 2003 财年缴纳的公司所得税总额的 2.5%。（相比之下，伯克希尔的市值大约只占全美公司总市值的 1%。）这笔缴税几乎肯定会让我们跻身美国纳税额前十名。事实上，如果只有 540 个纳税人都缴纳与伯克希尔相同的税额，那么其他任何个人或企业都不必再向 Uncle Sam 缴一分钱。没错：2.9 亿美国人以及所有其他企业，都无需向联邦政府缴纳任何所得税、社会保障税、消费税或遗产税。（算术在这里：2003 财年联邦税收收入——包括社会保障缴款——合计 1.782 万亿美元；若有 540 个“伯克希尔”，每个缴 33 亿美元，合计就同样是 1.782 万亿美元。）
Our federal tax return for 2002 (2003 is not finalized), when we paid $1.75 billion, covered a mere 8,905 pages. As is required, we dutifully filed two copies of this return, creating a pile of paper seven feet tall. At World Headquarters, our small band of 15.8, though exhausted, momentarily flushed with pride: Berkshire, we felt, was surely pulling its share of our country’s fiscal load.
我们 2002 年的联邦税表（2003 年的还未最终定稿）显示当年缴税 17.5 亿美元，而这份申报材料总共只有——注意，是“只有”——8,905 页。按规定，我们老老实实递交了两份副本，于是堆出了一摞高达七英尺的纸。公司总部里，我们那支规模仅 15.8 人的小队虽然累到虚脱，却一度涌起一种短暂的自豪：我们觉得，伯克希尔肯定是在为国家财政负担尽自己那份力。
But Ms. Olson sees things otherwise. And if that means Charlie and I need to try harder, we are ready to do so.
但 Ms. Olson 显然不这么看。倘若这意味着 Charlie 和我得更努力地“拉小提琴”，我们也准备好了。
I do wish, however, that Ms. Olson would give me some credit for the progress I’ve already made. In 1944, I filed my first 1040, reporting my income as a thirteen-year-old newspaper carrier. The return covered three pages. After I claimed the appropriate business deductions, such as $35 for a bicycle, my tax bill was $7. I sent my check to the Treasury and it — without comment — promptly cashed it. We lived in peace.
不过我真希望 Ms. Olson 能对我已经取得的“进步”给予一点肯定。1944 年，我第一次填报 1040 表——当时我是个 13 岁送报童。那份申报表只有三页。扣除我应得的经营性抵扣（比如买自行车的 35 美元）后，我的税单是 7 美元。我把支票寄给财政部，他们——一句话也没说——很快就把钱兑现了。我们相安无事。
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I can understand why the Treasury is now frustrated with Corporate America and prone to outbursts. But it should look to Congress and the Administration for redress, not to Berkshire.
我理解财政部如今为什么会对 Corporate America 感到沮丧、动不动就“情绪爆发”。但如果要寻求纠正之道，它应该去找 Congress 和 Administration，而不是来找伯克希尔。
Corporate income taxes in fiscal 2003 accounted for 7.4% of all federal tax receipts, down from a post-war peak of 32% in 1952. With one exception (1983), last year’s percentage is the lowest recorded since data was first published in 1934.
在 2003 财年，公司所得税只占联邦全部税收收入的 7.4%，而二战后峰值曾在 1952 年达到 32%。除了一次例外（1983 年），去年的占比是自 1934 年首次公布这项数据以来的最低纪录。
Even so, tax breaks for corporations (and their investors, particularly large ones) were a major part of the Administration’s 2002 and 2003 initiatives. If class warfare is being waged in America, my class is clearly winning. Today, many large corporations — run by CEOs whose fiddle-playing talents make your Chairman look like he is all thumbs — pay nothing close to the stated federal tax rate of 35%.
即便如此，给企业（以及它们的投资者，尤其是大投资者）减税，仍是 Administration 在 2002 与 2003 年政策倡议的重要组成部分。如果美国正在进行所谓“阶级战争”，那显然是我所属的阶级在赢。如今，许多大型公司——它们的 CEO “拉小提琴”的功夫，比你们这位董事长高到让他显得笨手笨脚——实际缴税离 35% 的联邦法定税率差得很远，甚至几乎不缴。
In 1985, Berkshire paid $132 million in federal income taxes, and all corporations paid $61 billion. The comparable amounts in 1995 were $286 million and $157 billion respectively. And, as mentioned, we will pay about $3.3 billion for 2003, a year when all corporations paid $132 billion. We hope our taxes continue to rise in the future — it will mean we are prospering — but we also hope that the rest of Corporate America antes up along with us. This might be a project for Ms. Olson to work on.
1985 年，伯克希尔缴纳的联邦所得税是 1.32 亿美元，而全美所有公司合计缴了 610 亿美元。1995 年的对应数字分别是 2.86 亿美元与 1,570 亿美元。而正如前面提到的，我们在 2003 年将缴纳大约 33 亿美元；而当年全美所有公司合计缴纳 1,320 亿美元。我们希望未来我们的税继续增长——这意味着我们更繁荣——但我们也希望美国其他公司能和我们一起“把该掏的掏出来”。这或许可以作为 Ms. Olson 该去推动的一个项目。
Corporate Governance
公司治理
In judging whether Corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the results aren’t encouraging. A few CEOs, such as Jeff Immelt of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs that are fair to managers and shareholders alike. Generally, however, his example has been more admired than followed.
在判断 Corporate America 是否真心要自我改革时，CEO 薪酬仍是最关键的“试金石”。迄今为止，结果并不令人鼓舞。少数 CEO——例如 General Electric 的 Jeff Immelt——率先推动了一些对管理层与股东都公平的方案。但总体而言，他更多是被赞赏，而不是被效仿。
It’s understandable how pay got out of hand. When management hires employees, or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of interest is equal on both sides of the table. One party’s gain is the other party’s loss, and the money involved has real meaning to both. The result is an honest-to-God negotiation.
薪酬失控是可以理解的：当管理层雇佣员工，或公司与供应商谈判时，桌子两边的关注强度是对等的。一方多拿一分，另一方就少拿一分；而且涉及的钱对双方都有“真实意义”。因此，谈判往往是真刀真枪的。
But when CEOs (or their representatives) have met with compensation committees, too often one side — the CEO’s — has cared far more than the other about what bargain is struck. A CEO, for example, will always regard the difference between receiving options for 100,000 shares or for 500,000 as monumental. To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem unimportant — particularly if, as has been the case at most companies, neither grant will have any effect on reported earnings. Under these conditions, the negotiation often has a “play-money” quality.
但当 CEO（或其代表）与薪酬委员会坐下来时，往往出现一种情况：一边——CEO 那边——在意得多得多；而另一边却没那么在意。比如，CEO 一定会认为：拿到 10 万股期权与 50 万股期权之间的差别是天壤之别。但对薪酬委员会来说，这种差别可能显得无关紧要——尤其在大多数公司里，这两种授予在会计上都不会影响已披露的利润。在这种条件下，所谓“谈判”就很容易带上“玩具钞票（play-money）”的味道。
Overreaching by CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation packages gained by the most avaricious— a title for which there was vigorous competition — were promptly replicated elsewhere. The couriers for this epidemic of greed were usually consultants and human relations departments, which had no trouble perceiving who buttered their bread. As one compensation consultant commented: “There are two classes of clients you don’t want to offend — actual and potential.”
CEO 的过度攫取在 1990 年代大大加速：最贪婪的人拿到的薪酬方案（这个头衔竞争相当激烈）很快就被别处照搬复制。把这种贪婪“疫情”传播开来的快递员，通常是咨询顾问和人力资源部门——他们很清楚谁在给他们涂黄油、谁在养他们。一位薪酬顾问曾评论道：“有两类客户你最好别得罪——现有的，和潜在的。”
In proposals for reforming this malfunctioning system, the cry has been for “independent” directors. But the question of what truly motivates independence has largely been neglected.
在修补这个失灵系统的改革建议里，人们反复呼吁要有“independent（独立）”董事。但一个更根本的问题却在很大程度上被忽视了：究竟是什么在真正驱动“独立”？
In last year’s report, I took a look at how “independent” directors — as defined by statute — had performed in the mutual fund field. The Investment Company Act of 1940 mandated such directors, and that means we’ve had an extended test of what statutory standards produce. In our examination last year, we looked at the record of fund directors in respect to the two key tasks board members should perform — whether at a mutual fund business or any other. These two all-important functions are, first, to obtain (or retain) an able and honest manager and then to compensate that manager fairly.
在去年的报告里，我考察了共同基金（mutual fund）领域中，那些按法律定义为“独立董事”的表现。《Investment Company Act of 1940》强制要求配置这类董事，这意味着我们拥有一段很长的“法定标准”压力测试，可以观察它到底产出什么效果。去年我们的检视聚焦于基金董事在两项关键职责上的记录——这两项职责，不仅适用于共同基金，也适用于任何董事会。它们至关重要：第一，找到（或留住）一位能干且诚实的经理人；第二，公平地补偿这位经理人。
Our survey was not encouraging. Year after year, at literally thousands of funds, directors had routinely rehired the incumbent management company, however pathetic its performance had been. Just as routinely, the directors had mindlessly approved fees that in many cases far exceeded those that could have been negotiated. Then, when a management company was sold — invariably at a huge price relative to tangible assets — the directors experienced a “counter-revelation” and immediately signed on with the new manager and accepted its fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided that whoever would pay the most for the old management company was the party that should manage the shareholders’ money in the future.
我们的调查看起来并不令人鼓舞。年复一年，在成千上万只基金里，董事们几乎例行公事地重新聘用原来的管理公司——不管它的业绩有多么可怜。同样例行公事地，董事们又机械地批准了管理费：而在许多情况下，这些费用远高于本可以通过谈判压下来的水平。然后，当某家管理公司被出售——而且总是以相对于其有形资产“极其高昂”的价格成交——这些董事却会经历一次“反向顿悟（counter-revelation）”：他们立刻与新管理人签约，并接受对方的收费表。实际上，董事们等于是认定：谁愿意为旧管理公司支付最高价，谁就最适合在未来替股东管理资金。
Despite the lapdog behavior of independent fund directors, we did not conclude that they are bad people. They’re not. But sadly, “boardroom atmosphere” almost invariably sedates their fiduciary genes.
尽管这些所谓独立基金董事表现得像看门狗中的“哈巴狗”，我们并没有因此断定他们是坏人。他们并不是。但遗憾的是，“董事会会议室的氛围”几乎总能把他们的受托责任基因镇静掉。
On May 22, 2003, not long after Berkshire’s report appeared, the Chairman of the Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about “The State of our Industry.” Responding to those who have “weighed in about our perceived failings,” he mused, “It makes me wonder what life would be like if we’d actually done something wrong.”
2003 年 5 月 22 日，在伯克希尔的报告发布不久后，Investment Company Institute 的主席对其会员发表了题为“我们的行业现状（The State of our Industry）”的讲话。回应那些“就我们被认为的缺陷发表评论的人”时，他沉吟道：“这让我不禁想，如果我们真的做错了什么，生活会是什么样子。”
Be careful what you wish for.
小心你许的愿。
Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund-management companies had followed policies that hurt the owners of the funds they managed, while simultaneously boosting the fees of the managers. Prior to their transgressions, it should be noted, these management companies were earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that were the envy of Corporate America. Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.
几个月之内，全世界开始了解到：许多基金管理公司一直在执行一些伤害基金持有人利益、却同时抬高管理人收费的政策。还要指出的是，在这些越轨行为发生之前，这些管理公司的利润率、以及对有形股本的回报率，都高到足以让 Corporate America 羡慕。但为了把利润再往上拱，它们以一种令人发指的方式践踏了基金股东的利益。
So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management company (though naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees). Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a boys-will-be-boys attitude?
那么，这些被掠夺的基金的董事们在做什么？就我写这段话时所见，没有一个董事会解除了那家违规管理公司的合同（当然，那家机构往往会“自然地”开除一些员工）。你能想象吗：如果被欺诈的是董事们自己，他们还会用这种“男孩子嘛，总会犯点错（boys-will-be-boys）”的态度来对待？
To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has put itself up for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a huge sum for “delivering” the mutual funds it has managed to the highest bidder among other managers. This is a travesty. Why in the world don’t the directors of those funds simply select whomever they think is best among the bidding organizations and sign up with that party directly? The winner would consequently be spared a huge “payoff” to the former manager who, having flouted the principles of stewardship, deserves not a dime. Not having to bear that acquisition cost, the winner could surely manage the funds in question for a far lower ongoing fee than would otherwise have been the case. Any truly independent director should insist on this approach to obtaining a new manager.
更离谱的是，至少有一家作恶的管理公司已经挂牌准备出售——毫无疑问，是希望以高价把自己管理的共同基金“打包交付”给其他管理人中出价最高的那个。这简直荒唐。那些基金的董事为什么不干脆在参与竞标的机构里，选出他们认为最好的那一家，然后直接与其签约？这样一来，中标者就不必向前任管理人支付一大笔“买路钱”；而那位前任管理人既然公然背弃受托责任原则，根本不配拿到一分钱。少了这笔收购成本，中标者当然就可以用更低的持续管理费来经营这些基金——要比在支付了那笔买断费用之后的费率低得多。任何真正独立的董事，都应该坚持用这种方式来引入新的管理人。
The reality is that neither the decades-old rules regulating investment company directors nor the new rules bearing down on Corporate America foster the election of truly independent directors. In both instances, an individual who is receiving 100% of his income from director fees — and who may wish to enhance his income through election to other boards — is deemed independent. That is nonsense. The same rules say that Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson, who receives from us perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire pays his firm rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire director. Rest assured, 3% from any source would not torpedo Ron’s independence. But getting 20%, 30% or 50% of their income from director fees might well temper the independence of many individuals, particularly if their overall income is not large. Indeed, I think it’s clear that at mutual funds, it has.
现实是：无论是几十年来监管投资公司董事的旧规则，还是如今压向 Corporate America 的新规则，都没有促进“真正独立”董事的产生。在这两套规则下，一个把 100% 收入都来自董事费的人——而且可能还希望通过进入更多董事会来进一步增加收入——居然被认定为独立。这太荒谬了。同样的规则却说：伯克希尔的董事兼律师 Ron Olson，从我们这里获得的收入大概只占他很高总收入的 3%，却不算独立；原因是这 3% 来自伯克希尔支付给他律师事务所的法律服务费，而不是他作为伯克希尔董事拿到的董事费。你尽管放心：3% 无论来自哪一种来源，都不可能摧毁 Ron 的独立性。但如果一个人的收入中有 20%、30% 甚至 50% 来自董事费——尤其当他的总收入并不高时——这种比例很可能会削弱许多人的独立性。事实上，我认为在共同基金领域，这一点已经表现得很清楚了。
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Let me make a small suggestion to “independent” mutual fund directors. Why not simply affirm in each annual report that “(1) We have looked at other management companies and believe the one we have retained for the upcoming year is among the better operations in the field; and (2) we have negotiated a fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with equivalent funds would negotiate.”
让我给这些“独立”的共同基金董事提个小建议：为什么不在每年的年报里直接做出如下确认——“(1) 我们已经考察过其他管理公司，并相信我们为下一年度留用的这家管理人，是业内较优秀的运营机构之一；(2) 我们已经与管理人谈判并达成的费率，与其他拥有同等规模基金的客户所能谈到的费率相当。”
It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund directors — who are often receiving fees that exceed $100,000 annually — to declare themselves on these points. Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money to the manager. If directors are unwilling to make these two declarations, shareholders should heed the maxim “If you don’t know whose side someone is on, he’s probably not on yours.”
股东有理由期待基金董事——而这些董事往往每年拿到的报酬超过 10 万美元——就这两点明确表态，这并不过分。倘若董事们要把自己一大笔钱交给管理人打理，他们当然会把这两件事搞清楚。若董事不愿意做出这两项声明，股东应当记住一句格言：“如果你搞不清一个人站在哪一边，那他多半不是站在你这边。”
Finally, a disclaimer. A great many funds have been run well and conscientiously despite the opportunities for malfeasance that exist. The shareholders of these funds have benefited, and their managers have earned their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of certain funds, including some that charge above-average fees, I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I have suggested. Additionally, those index funds that are very low-cost (such as Vanguard’s) are investor-friendly by definition and are the best selection for most of those who wish to own equities.
最后，再补充一段免责声明：尽管存在作恶空间，仍有大量基金一直经营得很好、也很尽责。这些基金的股东因此受益，而管理人也配得上他们的报酬。事实上，如果我担任某些基金的董事——其中甚至包括一些收费高于平均水平的基金——我会很乐意、也会很坚定地做出我上面建议的两项声明。此外，那些费用极低的指数基金（例如 Vanguard 的）从定义上就更偏向投资者；对大多数想持有股票的人而言，它们是最佳选择。
I am on my soapbox now only because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred has betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders. Hundreds of industry insiders had to know what was going on, yet none publicly said a word. It took Eliot Spitzer, and the whistleblowers who aided him, to initiate a housecleaning. We urge fund directors to continue the job. Like directors throughout Corporate America, these fiduciaries must now decide whether their job is to work for owners or for managers.
我之所以现在站在“肥皂箱”（soapbox）上慷慨陈词，只因为这些赤裸裸的违法行为背叛了数以百万计股东的信任。行业里成百上千的内部人士一定知道发生了什么，但没有一个人公开说过一句话。最终，是 Eliot Spitzer 以及协助他的举报者（whistleblowers），才启动了这场“大扫除”。我们敦促基金董事把清理工作继续做下去。就像 Corporate America 其他地方的董事一样，这些受托人现在必须决定：他们的工作到底是为所有者服务，还是为经理人服务。
Berkshire Governance
伯克希尔的公司治理
True independence — meaning the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish — is an enormously valuable trait in a director. It is also rare. The place to look for it is among high-grade people whose interests are in line with those of rank-and-file shareholders — and are in line in a very big way.
真正的独立——指的是当某位强势 CEO 做了错误或愚蠢的事时，董事愿意站出来挑战——是一种极其宝贵的董事特质。但它也非常稀缺。要找到它，你得去那些一流的人里找：他们的利益必须与普通股东的利益一致——而且要在“很大程度上”一致。
We’ve made that search at Berkshire. We now have eleven directors and each of them, combined with members of their families, owns more than $4 million of Berkshire stock. Moreover, all have held major stakes in Berkshire for many years. In the case of six of the eleven, family ownership amounts to at least hundreds of millions and dates back at least three decades. All eleven directors purchased their holdings in the market just as you did; we’ve never passed out options or restricted shares. Charlie and I love such honest-to-God ownership. After all, who ever washes a rental car?
我们在伯克希尔就是这样找的。我们现在有 11 位董事，每一位董事连同其家庭成员，持有的伯克希尔股票都超过 400 万美元。此外，他们都已经持有伯克希尔的大额股份很多年了。在这 11 人中，有 6 人的家庭持股至少达到数亿美元，而且持有历史至少可追溯到 30 年前。11 位董事的持股都是像你一样在市场上买来的；我们从不发放期权或限制性股票。Charlie 和我就喜欢这种“货真价实的所有权”。毕竟，谁会去认真洗一辆租来的车呢？
In addition, director fees at Berkshire are nominal (as my son, Howard, periodically reminds me). Thus, the upside from Berkshire for all eleven is proportionately the same as the upside for any Berkshire shareholder. And it always will be.
另外，伯克希尔的董事费很象征性（我儿子 Howard 会隔三差五提醒我）。因此，对这 11 位董事而言，来自伯克希尔的“上行收益”与任何一位普通股东在比例上完全相同——而且永远如此。
The downside for Berkshire directors is actually worse than yours because we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. Therefore, if something really catastrophic happens on our directors’ watch, they are exposed to losses that will far exceed yours.
而对伯克希尔董事而言，“下行风险”其实比你还更糟，因为我们不购买董事及高管责任保险（directors and officers liability insurance）。因此，如果在他们任期内真的发生灾难性事件，董事们面临的潜在损失将远远超过你所承受的。
The bottom line for our directors: You win, they win big; you lose, they lose big. Our approach might be called owner-capitalism. We know of no better way to engender true independence. (This structure does not guarantee perfect behavior, however: I’ve sat on boards of companies in which Berkshire had huge stakes and remained silent as questionable proposals were rubber-stamped.)
所以对我们的董事来说，结论很简单：你赢，他们也大赢；你输，他们也大输。我们的做法可以称为“owner-capitalism（所有者资本主义）”。我们不知道还有什么更好的方式能孕育真正的独立性。（当然，这种结构也不能保证完美行为：我也曾在某些公司担任董事，那些公司里伯克希尔持有巨大股份，而我却在一些可疑提案被橡皮图章通过时保持沉默。）
In addition to being independent, directors should have business savvy, a shareholder orientation and a genuine interest in the company. The rarest of these qualities is business savvy — and if it is lacking, the other two are of little help. Many people who are smart, articulate and admired have no real understanding of business. That’s no sin; they may shine elsewhere. But they don’t belong on corporate boards. Similarly, I would be useless on a medical or scientific board (though I would likely be welcomed by a chairman who wanted to run things his way). My name would dress up the list of directors, but I wouldn’t know enough to critically evaluate proposals. Moreover, to cloak my ignorance, I would keep my mouth shut (if you can imagine that). In effect, I could be replaced, without loss, by a potted plant.
除了独立之外，董事还应当具备商业头脑、股东导向，以及对公司真实的兴趣。在这三项品质里，最稀缺的是商业头脑——而如果缺了它，另外两项也帮不上什么忙。很多聪明、善于表达、也备受敬重的人，其实并不真正懂商业。这不是罪过；他们可能在别处大放异彩。但他们不适合坐在公司董事会里。类似地，如果让我去一个医学或科学领域的董事会，我也会毫无用处（不过如果某位主席想按自己的方式把事情办成，我大概率会很受欢迎）。我的名字能把董事名单“装点”得更好看，但我并没有足够的知识去批判性地评估提案。而且，为了掩盖自己的无知，我会选择闭嘴不说（如果你能想象的话）。实际上，我完全可以在不造成任何损失的情况下，被一盆盆栽替换掉。
Last year, as we moved to change our board, I asked for self-nominations from shareholders who believed they had the requisite qualities to be a Berkshire director. Despite the lack of either liability insurance or meaningful compensation, we received more than twenty applications. Most were good, coming from owner-oriented individuals having family holdings of Berkshire worth well over $1 million. After considering them, Charlie and I — with the concurrence of our incumbent directors — asked four shareholders who did not nominate themselves to join the board: David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough and Tom Murphy. These four people are all friends of mine, and I know their strengths well. They bring an extraordinary amount of business talent to Berkshire’s board.
去年，当我们着手调整董事会时，我邀请认为自己具备伯克希尔董事所需素质的股东进行自荐。尽管我们既没有董事及高管责任保险，也没有有意义的薪酬，我们仍收到了二十多份申请。大多数申请都不错，来自一些以“所有者”视角行事的人，他们家庭持有的伯克希尔股票价值都远远超过 100 万美元。综合考虑后，Charlie 和我——并得到现任董事的一致认可——邀请了四位并未自荐的股东加入董事会：David Gottesman、Charlotte Guyman、Don Keough 和 Tom Murphy。这四位都是我的朋友，我非常了解他们的长处。他们为伯克希尔董事会带来了极其出色的商业才干。
The primary job of our directors is to select my successor, either upon my death or disability, or when I begin to lose my marbles. (David Ogilvy had it right when he said: “Develop your eccentricities when young. That way, when you get older, people won’t think you are going gaga.” Charlie’s family and mine feel that we overreacted to David’s advice.)
我们董事最重要的工作，是在我去世或失能时，或者当我开始“脑子不灵光”时，为我挑选继任者。（David Ogilvy 说得很对：“年轻时就培养自己的古怪癖好。这样等你老了，人们就不会以为你开始发疯。” Charlie 的家人和我的家人觉得，我们对 David 的建议反应过度了。）
At our directors’ meetings we cover the usual run of housekeeping matters. But the real discussion — both with me in the room and absent — centers on the strengths and weaknesses of the four internal candidates to replace me.
在董事会上，我们会处理常规的各类事务性议题。但真正的讨论——无论我在场还是不在场——都集中在四位内部候选人身上：他们各自的优点与弱点，以及谁来接替我。
Our board knows that the ultimate scorecard on its performance will be determined by the record of my successor. He or she will need to maintain Berkshire’s culture, allocate capital and keep a group of America’s best managers happy in their jobs. This isn’t the toughest task in the world — the train is already moving at a good clip down the track — and I’m totally comfortable about it being done well by any of the four candidates we have identified. I have more than 99% of my net worth in Berkshire and will be happy to have my wife or foundation (depending on the order in which she and I die) continue this concentration.
董事会清楚：他们最终的“成绩单”，将由我继任者的表现来决定。继任者必须维持伯克希尔的文化、做好资本配置，并让一群美国最优秀的经理人乐于继续把工作干下去。这不是世界上最难的任务——列车已经以不错的速度在轨道上前行——而且我完全放心：我们识别出的这四位候选人中的任何一位，都能把事情做好。我超过 99% 的净资产都在伯克希尔里；我也愿意让我的妻子或基金会（取决于我们两人谁先离世）继续保持这种高度集中持有。
Sector Results
分部业绩
As managers, Charlie and I want to give our owners the financial information and commentary we would wish to receive if our roles were reversed. To do this with both clarity and reasonable brevity becomes more difficult as Berkshire’s scope widens. Some of our businesses have vastly different economic characteristics from others, which means that our consolidated statements, with their jumble of figures, make useful analysis almost impossible.
作为管理者，Charlie 和我希望向所有者提供我们在角色互换时自己也想得到的财务信息与评论。但随着伯克希尔的业务版图不断扩大，要在保持清晰的同时又做到合理简洁，就越来越难。我们的一些业务在经济特性上与其他业务差异巨大，这意味着合并报表里那一堆杂乱数字，会让有用的分析几乎不可能进行。
On the following pages, therefore, we will present some balance sheet and earnings figures from our four major categories of businesses along with commentary about each. We particularly want you to understand the limited circumstances under which we will use debt, since typically we shun it. We will not, however, inundate you with data that has no real value in calculating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Doing so would likely obfuscate the most important facts. One warning: When analyzing Berkshire, be sure to remember that the company should be viewed as an unfolding movie, not as a still photograph. Those who focused in the past on only the snapshot of the day sometimes reached erroneous conclusions.
因此，在接下来的页面里，我们将按四大业务类别，分别提供一些资产负债表与盈利数据，并配上对每一类的评论。我们尤其希望你理解：在什么有限的情况下我们才会使用负债——因为通常我们是回避负债的。不过，我们也不会用对计算伯克希尔内在价值毫无意义的数据把你淹没。那样做只会把最重要的事实搅浑。提醒一句：分析伯克希尔时，务必记住这家公司应当被当作一部不断展开的电影来看，而不是一张静态照片。过去那些只盯着某一天“快照”的人，有时会得出错误结论。
Insurance
保险
Let’s start with insurance — since that’s where the money is.
先从保险讲起——因为钱就在这里。
The fountain of funds we enjoy in our insurance operations comes from “float,” which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide — insurance protection — is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, since it sometimes takes years for losses to be reported (think asbestos), negotiated and settled.
我们在保险业务里享有的资金“泉眼”，来自所谓的 “float（浮存金）”——这是一笔不属于我们、但我们暂时持有的资金。我们的浮存金主要来自两点：(1) 保费是预先收取的，但我们提供的服务——保险保障——是在一段时间内逐步兑现的，通常覆盖一年；(2) 今天发生的损失事件，并不一定会让我们立刻支付理赔，因为损失有时需要多年才会被报案（想想石棉案）、谈判并最终结案。
第2点也非常好。
Float is wonderful — if it doesn’t come at a high price. The cost of float is determined by underwriting results, meaning how losses and expenses paid compare with premiums received. The property-casualty industry as a whole regularly operates at a substantial underwriting loss, and therefore often has a cost of float that is unattractive.
浮存金很美妙——前提是它的价格不高。浮存金的成本由承保结果决定，也就是我们支付的损失与费用，相对于收到的保费到底如何。整个财产险与意外险（property-casualty）行业经常在承保端出现显著亏损，因此它的浮存金成本往往并不划算。
Overall, our results have been good. True, we’ve had five terrible years in which float cost us more than 10%. But in 18 of the 37 years Berkshire has been in the insurance business, we have operated at an underwriting profit, meaning we were actually paid for holding money. And the quantity of this cheap money has grown far beyond what I dreamed it could when we entered the business in 1967.
总体来看，我们的结果不错。确实，我们曾有五个糟糕年份，浮存金的成本超过 10%。但在伯克希尔经营保险业务的 37 年里，有 18 年我们实现了承保盈利——也就是说，我们实际上是在“拿着别人的钱，同时还拿到了报酬”。而这笔廉价资金的规模增长之大，远远超出我 1967 年进入这一行业时所能梦想的程度。
Last year was a standout. Float reached record levels and it came without cost as all major segments contributed to Berkshire’s $1.7 billion pre-tax underwriting profit.
去年是一个亮眼的年份。浮存金创下纪录新高，而且几乎零成本：所有主要业务板块共同促成了伯克希尔 17 亿美元的税前承保利润。
Our results have been exceptional for one reason: We have truly exceptional managers. Insurers sell a non-proprietary piece of paper containing a non-proprietary promise. Anyone can copy anyone else’s product. No installed base, key patents, critical real estate or natural resource position protects an insurer’s competitive position. Typically, brands do not mean much either.
我们之所以能取得如此出色的成绩，原因只有一个：我们拥有真正卓越的管理者。保险公司卖的，是一张没有专利的纸，上面写着一项没有专利的承诺。任何人都可以复制别人的产品。保险公司的竞争地位没有“装机量”、关键专利、稀缺地段或自然资源来保护。通常，品牌的意义也不大。
The critical variables, therefore, are managerial brains, discipline and integrity. Our managers have all of these attributes — in spades. Let’s take a look at these all-stars and their operations.
因此，真正关键的变量是：管理层的脑子、纪律与诚信。我们的经理人这三样都具备——而且是“超量配置”。下面我们就看看这些全明星，以及他们的业务。
• General Re had been Berkshire’s problem child in the years following our acquisition of it in 1998. Unfortunately, it was a 400-pound child, and its negative impact on our overall performance was large.
General Re 在我们 1998 年收购它之后的几年里，一直是伯克希尔的“问题孩子”。不幸的是，这是个 400 磅的孩子，它对我们整体业绩的负面影响非常大。
That’s behind us: Gen Re is fixed. Thank Joe Brandon, its CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, for that. When I wrote you last year, I thought that discipline had been restored to both underwriting and reserving, and events during 2003 solidified my view.
但这已经过去了：Gen Re 修好了。要感谢它的 CEO Joe Brandon，以及他的搭档 Tad Montross。我去年写信时就认为，承保与准备金计提方面的纪律已经恢复；2003 年发生的事情进一步巩固了我的判断。
That does not mean we will never have setbacks. Reinsurance is a business that is certain to deliver blows from time to time. But, under Joe and Tad, this operation will be a powerful engine driving Berkshire’s future profitability.
这并不意味着我们永远不会遇到挫折。再保险（reinsurance）是一门注定会不时挨打的生意。但在 Joe 和 Tad 的带领下，这项业务将成为推动伯克希尔未来盈利能力的一台强劲发动机。
Gen Re’s financial strength, unmatched among reinsurers even as we started 2003, further improved during the year. Many of the company’s competitors suffered credit downgrades last year, leaving Gen Re, and its sister operation at National Indemnity, as the only AAA-rated companies among the world’s major reinsurers.
Gen Re 的财务实力在 2003 年初就已经是再保险行业无出其右，而在这一年里还进一步增强。公司许多竞争对手在去年遭遇信用评级下调，使得 Gen Re 以及 National Indemnity 的姊妹业务，成为全球主要再保险公司中仅有的两家 AAA 评级公司。
When insurers purchase reinsurance, they buy only a promise — one whose validity may not be tested for decades — and there are no promises in the reinsurance world equaling those offered by Gen Re and National Indemnity. Furthermore, unlike most reinsurers, we retain virtually all of the risks we assume. Therefore, our ability to pay is not dependent on the ability or willingness of others to reimburse us. This independent financial strength could be enormously important when the industry experiences the mega-catastrophe it surely will.
当保险公司购买再保险时，它们买的只有一个承诺——而且这个承诺的有效性可能几十年都不会被真正检验。在再保险世界里，没有任何承诺能与 Gen Re 和 National Indemnity 所提供的承诺相媲美。并且，与大多数再保险公司不同，我们几乎保留了我们所承担的全部风险。因此，我们的偿付能力不依赖于他人是否有能力或是否愿意向我们赔付。这种独立的财务实力，在行业遭遇其必然会发生的“超级灾难（mega-catastrophe）”时，可能会变得极其重要。
差异化的竞争优势。
• Regular readers of our annual reports know of Ajit Jain’s incredible contributions to Berkshire’s prosperity over the past 18 years. He continued to pour it on in 2003. With a staff of only 23, Ajit runs one of the world’s largest reinsurance operations, specializing in mammoth and unusual risks.
我们年报的老读者都知道：在过去 18 年里，Ajit Jain 对伯克希尔的繁荣作出了难以置信的贡献。2003 年他依旧火力全开。Ajit 只带着 23 人的团队，却运营着全球最大的再保险业务之一，专门承保那些规模巨大、形态罕见的风险。
Often, these involve assuming catastrophe risks — say, the threat of a large California earthquake — of a size far greater than any other reinsurer will accept. This means Ajit’s results (and Berkshire’s) will be lumpy. You should, therefore, expect his operation to have an occasional horrible year. Over time, however, you can be confident of a terrific result from this one-of-a-kind manager.
这类业务经常涉及承接灾难风险——比如加州可能发生的大地震——其承保规模远大于任何其他再保险公司愿意接受的程度。这意味着 Ajit 的业绩（以及伯克希尔的业绩）会呈现“忽高忽低”的波动。因此，你应当预期他的业务偶尔会出现极其糟糕的一年。但从长期看，你可以对这位独一无二的经理人交出极佳结果充满信心。
Ajit writes some very unusual policies. Last year, for example, PepsiCo promoted a drawing that offered participants a chance to win a $1 billion prize. Understandably, Pepsi wished to lay off this risk, and we were the logical party to assume it. So we wrote a $1 billion policy, retaining the risk entirely for our own account. Because the prize, if won, was payable over time, our exposure in present-value terms was $250 million. (I helpfully suggested that any winner be paid $1 a year for a billion years, but that proposal didn’t fly.) The drawing was held on September 14. Ajit and I held our breath, as did the finalist in the contest, and we left happier than he. PepsiCo has renewed for a repeat contest in 2004.
Ajit 承保的保单有些非常“非典型”。举个例子：去年 PepsiCo 推出了一场抽奖活动，参与者有机会赢得 10 亿美元的大奖。可以理解，Pepsi 希望把这项风险转移出去，而我们正是最合逻辑的承接方。于是我们出了一张 10 亿美元的保单，并把风险完全留在自己的账上。因为大奖若被抽中，是分期支付的，所以按现值计算，我们的实际敞口是 2.5 亿美元。（我“贴心地”建议：如果有人中奖，就每年支付 1 美元，连续付 10 亿年——但这个提议没被采纳。）抽奖在 9 月 14 日进行。Ajit 和我都屏住呼吸，比赛的决赛入围者也一样；而最后，我们走出来时比他还开心。PepsiCo 已经续签，准备在 2004 年再办一次同样的活动。
资本主义生活的多样性。
• GEICO was a fine insurance company when Tony Nicely took over as CEO in 1992. Now it is a great one. During his tenure, premium volume has increased from $2.2 billion to $8.1 billion, and our share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.1% to 5.0%. More important, GEICO has paired these gains with outstanding underwriting performance.
1992 年 Tony Nicely 接任 CEO 时，GEICO 已经是一家很不错的保险公司。如今，它是一家伟大的公司。在他任期内，保费规模从 22 亿美元增长到 81 亿美元；我们在个人汽车保险市场的份额也从 2.1% 提升到 5.0%。更重要的是，GEICO 在实现这些增长的同时，还保持了出色的承保表现。
(We now pause for a commercial)
（下面插播一段广告）
It’s been 67 years since Leo Goodwin created a great business idea at GEICO, one designed to save policyholders significant money. Go to Geico.com or call 1-800-847-7536 to see what we can do for you.
距离 Leo Goodwin 在 GEICO 创造出一个伟大商业点子——一个能为投保人省下不少钱的点子——已经 67 年了。你可以访问 Geico.com，或拨打 1-800-847-7536，看看我们能为你做些什么。
(End of commercial)
（广告结束）
In 2003, both the number of inquiries coming into GEICO and its closure rate on these increased significantly. As a result our preferred policyholder count grew 8.2%, and our standard and non-standard policies grew 21.4%.
2003 年，流入 GEICO 的咨询数量与咨询转化率（closure rate）都显著提高。结果，我们的优选保单持有人数量增长了 8.2%，标准与非标准保单增长了 21.4%。
GEICO’s business growth creates a never-ending need for more employees and facilities. Our most recent expansion, announced in December, is a customer service center in — I’m delighted to say — Buffalo. Stan Lipsey, the publisher of our Buffalo News, was instrumental in bringing the city and GEICO together.
GEICO 的增长带来了对员工与办公设施“永无止境”的需求。我们最近一次扩张是在 12 月宣布的：在——我很高兴地说——Buffalo 建立一个客户服务中心。我们旗下《Buffalo News》的出版人 Stan Lipsey 在促成 Buffalo 与 GEICO 牵手方面起到了关键作用。
The key figure in this matter, however, was Governor George Pataki. His leadership and tenacity are why Buffalo will have 2,500 new jobs when our expansion is fully rolled out. Stan, Tony, and I — along with Buffalo — thank him for his help.
但在这件事上，最关键的人物其实是 Governor George Pataki。正是他的领导力与韧性，才让 Buffalo 在我们的扩张全面落地后新增 2,500 个工作岗位。Stan、Tony 和我——以及 Buffalo 这座城市——都感谢他所提供的帮助。
• Berkshire’s smaller insurers had another terrific year. This group, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster, increased its float by 41%, while delivering an excellent underwriting profit. These men, though operating in unexciting ways, produce truly exciting results.
伯克希尔旗下较小的保险公司群组也迎来了又一个极其出色的年份。这个团队由 Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Don Towle 和 Don Wurster 负责运营：在实现优秀承保利润的同时，浮存金增长了 41%。这些人虽然做事方式并不“刺激”，但他们创造出来的结果却真正令人兴奋。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We should point out again that in any given year a company writing long-tail insurance (coverages giving rise to claims that are often settled many years after the loss-causing event takes place) can report almost any earnings that the CEO desires. Too often the industry has reported wildly inaccurate figures by misstating liabilities. Most of the mistakes have been innocent. Sometimes, however, they have been intentional, their object being to fool investors and regulators. Auditors and actuaries have usually failed to prevent both varieties of misstatement.
我们还要再次指出：在任何一个年份里，一家承保“长尾险种”（long-tail insurance：指那些索赔往往在损失事件发生多年之后才结案的保险）的公司，几乎可以报出 CEO 想要的任何利润数字。行业里太常见的一种情况是：通过错误陈述负债来报出离谱不准的数据。多数错误是无心之失；但有时也会是故意为之，其目的就是欺骗投资者与监管机构。审计师和精算师通常都没能阻止这两类错报。
I have failed on occasion too, particularly in not spotting Gen Re’s unwitting underreserving a few years back. Not only did that mean we reported inaccurate figures to you, but the error also resulted in our paying very substantial taxes earlier than was necessary. Aaarrrggghh. I told you last year, however, that I thought our current reserving was at appropriate levels. So far, that judgment is holding up.
我自己也有失手的时候，尤其是几年前没能及时发现 Gen Re 在无意中计提准备金不足。不仅这意味着我们向你报告了不准确的数据，这个错误还导致我们比必要时间更早地缴了相当可观的税。啊啊啊。尽管如此，我在去年已告诉你：我认为我们目前的准备金计提水平是恰当的。到目前为止，这一判断仍然站得住。
Here are Berkshire’s pre-tax underwriting results by segment:
下面是伯克希尔按业务板块划分的税前承保结果：
* These contracts were explained on page 10 of the 2002 annual report, available on the Internet at www.berkshirehathaway.com. In brief, this segment consists of a few jumbo policies that are likely to produce underwriting losses (which are capped) but also provide unusually large amounts of float.
这些合约已在 2002 年年报第 10 页解释过，该年报可在互联网上 www.berkshirehathaway.com查阅。简而言之，这个板块由少数几张“超大额”保单构成：它们很可能带来承保亏损（但亏损有上限），同时却能提供异常庞大的浮存金。
Regulated Utility Businesses
受监管的公用事业业务
Through MidAmerican Energy Holdings, we own an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in a wide variety of utility operations. The largest are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 689,000 electric customers in Iowa and; (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas transported in the United States.
通过 MidAmerican Energy Holdings，我们以完全稀释口径持有其 80.5% 的权益，覆盖多种公用事业运营。其中规模最大的是：(1) Yorkshire Electricity 和 Northern Electric——其 370 万电力用户使其成为英国第三大配电公司；(2) MidAmerican Energy——为爱荷华州 689,000 名电力用户提供服务；(3) Kern River 与 Northern Natural 两条管道——承运了美国天然气运输量的 7.8%。
Berkshire has three partners, who own the remaining 19.5%: Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the brilliant managers of the business, and Walter Scott, a long-time friend of mine who introduced me to the company. Because MidAmerican is subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”), Berkshire’s voting interest is limited to 9.9%. Walter has the controlling vote.
伯克希尔还有三位合伙人持有剩余的 19.5%：该业务的杰出管理者 Dave Sokol 与 Greg Abel，以及我多年的朋友 Walter Scott——正是他把我介绍给这家公司。由于 MidAmerican 受《Public Utility Holding Company Act（“PUHCA”）》约束，伯克希尔的表决权权益被限制在 9.9%。Walter 拥有控制性表决权。
Our limited voting interest forces us to account for MidAmerican in our financial statements in an abbreviated manner. Instead of our fully including its assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses in our statements, we record only a one-line entry in both our balance sheet and income account. It’s likely that some day, perhaps soon, either PUHCA will be repealed or accounting rules will change. Berkshire’s consolidated figures would then take in all of MidAmerican, including the substantial debt it utilizes.
我们有限的表决权，使得我们在财务报表中只能以一种简化方式核算 MidAmerican。我们并不会把它的资产、负债、收入与费用完整并入报表，而是在资产负债表与利润表中各用一行来反映。未来某一天——也许不久——PUHCA 可能被废除，或者会计规则可能改变。届时，伯克希尔的合并报表将把 MidAmerican 全部并入，其中也包括它使用的大量负债。
The size of this debt (which is not now, nor will it be, an obligation of Berkshire) is entirely appropriate. MidAmerican’s diverse and stable utility operations assure that, even under harsh economic conditions, aggregate earnings will be ample to very comfortably service all debt.
这笔负债的规模（现在不是、未来也不会成为伯克希尔的义务）是完全恰当的。MidAmerican 多元且稳定的公用事业运营保证：即便在严峻的经济环境下，其整体盈利也足以非常从容地覆盖全部债务的利息与本金偿付。
At yearend, $1.578 billion of MidAmerican’s most junior debt was payable to Berkshire. This debt has allowed acquisitions to be financed without our three partners needing to increase their already substantial investments in MidAmerican. By charging 11% interest, Berkshire is compensated fairly for putting up the funds needed for purchases, while our partners are spared dilution of their equity interests.
在年末，MidAmerican 最次级的 15.78 亿美元债务应付给伯克希尔。这笔债务使得收购得以融资，而无需我们的三位合伙人进一步增加他们在 MidAmerican 中已经相当可观的投资。通过收取 11% 的利息，伯克希尔因提供收购所需资金而得到公平补偿，同时我们的合伙人也避免了股权被稀释。
MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business, Home Services of America, the second largest real estate broker in the country. Unlike our utility operations, this business is highly cyclical, but nevertheless one we view enthusiastically. We have an exceptional manager, Ron Peltier, who, through both his acquisition and operational skills, is building a brokerage powerhouse.
MidAmerican 还拥有一项重要的非公用事业业务 Home Services of America——它是全美第二大房地产经纪公司。与我们的公用事业运营不同，这项业务具有很强的周期性，但我们仍对它充满热情。我们拥有一位出色的管理者 Ron Peltier，他凭借并购能力与运营能力，正在打造一个经纪业务的“强力平台”。
Last year, Home Services participated in $48.6 billion of transactions, a gain of $11.7 billion from 2002. About 23% of the increase came from four acquisitions made during the year. Through our 16 brokerage firms — all of which retain their local identities — we employ 16,343 brokers in 16 states. Home Services is almost certain to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to acquire leading localized operations.
去年，Home Services 参与完成了 486 亿美元的交易额，比 2002 年增加 117 亿美元。其中约 23% 的增长来自当年完成的四笔收购。通过我们旗下 16 家经纪公司——它们都保留各自的本地品牌——我们在 16 个州雇用了 16,343 名经纪人。随着我们持续收购各地领先的本土机构，Home Services 在未来十年几乎肯定会显著增长。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Here’s a tidbit for fans of free enterprise. On March 31, 1990, the day electric utilities in the U.K. were denationalized, Northern and Yorkshire had 6,800 employees in functions these companies continue today to perform. Now they employ 2,539. Yet the companies are serving about the same number of customers as when they were government owned and are distributing more electricity.
给“自由企业”的拥趸们一个小花絮：1990 年 3 月 31 日——英国电力公用事业私有化（denationalized）的那一天——Northern 和 Yorkshire 在它们至今仍在执行的那些职能岗位上，一共有 6,800 名员工。现在它们只有 2,539 名员工。但公司服务的客户数量与国有时期大致相同，而且分配的电量还更多。
This is not, it should be noted, a triumph of deregulation. Prices and earnings continue to be regulated in a fair manner by the government, just as they should be. It is a victory, however, for those who believe that profit-motivated managers, even though they recognize that the benefits will largely flow to customers, will find efficiencies that government never will.
需要说明的是，这并不是“放松监管（deregulation）”的胜利。价格与利润仍然由政府以公平的方式监管——也本该如此。但这确实是那些相信市场化管理的人一次胜利：以利润为动机的管理者，即便清楚效率改进带来的好处主要会流向客户，也仍会去发现政府永远发现不了的效率。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
下面是 MidAmerican 运营的一些关键数据：
Finance and Financial Products
金融与金融产品
This sector includes a wide-ranging group of activities. Here’s some commentary on the most important.
这个板块涵盖了一组范围很广的业务。下面我对其中最重要的部分做一些说明。
• I manage a few opportunistic strategies in AAA fixed-income securities that have been quite profitable in the last few years. These opportunities come and go — and at present, they are going. We sped their departure somewhat last year, thereby realizing 24% of the capital gains we show in the table that follows.
我管理着几项在 AAA 级固定收益证券中进行的机会型策略，过去几年收益相当可观。这类机会会来、也会走——而眼下，它们正在“走人”。去年我们还稍微加速了它们的离场，因此实现了下表所示资本利得的 24%。
Though far from foolproof, these transactions involve no credit risk and are conducted in exceptionally liquid securities. We therefore finance the positions almost entirely with borrowed money. As the assets are reduced, so also are the borrowings. The smaller portfolio we now have means that in the near future our earnings in this category will decline significantly. It was fun while it lasted, and at some point we’ll get another turn at bat.
这些交易当然远非万无一失，但它们不涉及信用风险，并且操作对象是流动性极佳的证券。因此，我们几乎完全用借入资金来持有这些头寸。随着资产规模下降，借款规模也同步下降。眼下较小的投资组合意味着：在不远的将来，这一类别的收益会显著下滑。趁它还在时确实挺有意思；等到某个时候，我们还会再轮到一次上场击球的机会。
• A far less pleasant unwinding operation is taking place at Gen Re Securities, the trading and derivatives operation we inherited when we purchased General Reinsurance.
另一个“平仓收尾”的过程就没那么愉快了：这发生在 Gen Re Securities——我们在收购 General Reinsurance 时一并接手的交易与衍生品部门。
When we began to liquidate Gen Re Securities in early 2002, it had 23,218 outstanding tickets with 884 counterparties (some having names I couldn’t pronounce, much less creditworthiness I could evaluate). Since then, the unit’s managers have been skillful and diligent in unwinding positions. Yet, at yearend — nearly two years later — we still had 7,580 tickets outstanding with 453 counterparties. (As the country song laments, “How can I miss you if you won’t go away?”)
2002 年初我们开始清算 Gen Re Securities 时，它有 23,218 张未结“票据/合约”（tickets），对应 884 个交易对手方（其中一些名字我连读都读不出来，更别提评估其信用状况了）。此后，这个部门的管理团队一直以相当高的技巧与勤勉在逐步解除头寸。然而到了年末——差不多两年之后——我们仍然有 7,580 张未结票据、453 个对手方。（借用乡村歌曲里那句抱怨：“你要是不走开，我怎么会想你呢？”）
The shrinking of this business has been costly. We’ve had pre-tax losses of $173 million in 2002 and $99 million in 2003. These losses, it should be noted, came from a portfolio of contracts that — in full compliance with GAAP — had been regularly marked-to-market with standard allowances for future credit-loss and administrative costs. Moreover, our liquidation has taken place both in a benign market — we’ve had no credit losses of significance — and in an orderly manner. This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a financial crisis forced a number of derivatives dealers to cease operations simultaneously.
这项业务的收缩代价不小：我们在 2002 年录得税前亏损 1.73 亿美元，2003 年税前亏损 9,900 万美元。需要说明的是，这些亏损来自一组合约组合——它们一直在完全符合 GAAP 的前提下按市价计量（mark-to-market），并采用了标准的、用于未来信用损失与管理成本的准备/折扣。更进一步，我们的清算是在市场相当温和的环境中进行的——并未发生任何显著的信用损失——而且过程有序。这与一种可能出现的情形恰恰相反：如果金融危机迫使多家衍生品交易商同时停止经营，局面会完全不同。
If our derivatives experience — and the Freddie Mac shenanigans of mind-blowing size and audacity that were revealed last year — makes you suspicious of accounting in this arena, consider yourself wised up. No matter how financially sophisticated you are, you can’t possibly learn from reading the disclosure documents of a derivatives-intensive company what risks lurk in its positions. Indeed, the more you know about derivatives, the less you will feel you can learn from the disclosures normally proffered you. In Darwin’s words, “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.”
如果我们的衍生品经历——以及去年曝光的 Freddie Mac 那些规模惊人、胆大包天的把戏——让你开始怀疑这一领域的会计处理，那么你算是“开窍”了。无论你在金融上有多精通，你都不可能仅靠阅读一家重度使用衍生品公司的披露文件，就真正弄清楚其头寸里潜伏着哪些风险。事实上，你越了解衍生品，越会觉得：从那些通常提供给你的披露中，你能学到的越少。用 Darwin 的话说：“比起知识，无知更常孕育自信。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge advantage. (A historical note: We had just such an experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major insurance fraud. We could not determine for some time how much the fraud would ultimately cost us and therefore kept more funds in cash-equivalents than we normally would have.
现在到了“忏悔时间”：如果我当初更果断、更迅速地关停 Gen Re Securities，我确信可以为你们节省大约 1 亿美元的税前损失。General Reinsurance 并购时，Charlie 和我就知道它的衍生品业务并不讨喜。那些被报告出来的利润在我们看来像是海市蜃楼，我们也认为这门生意携带着规模不小、却无法被有效衡量或限制的风险。此外，我们还知道：一旦这项业务遇到重大麻烦，它很可能会与金融或保险体系的整体困境同向发生——而那种困境也会在伯克希尔的其他地方同时显现。换句话说，如果衍生品业务某天需要“救火”或“补资本”，它会在我们本可以把资本与信用用到极大利益之处的关键时刻，反过来征用伯克希尔的资本与信用。（一个历史注脚：1974 年我们就经历过类似情况——当时我们成为一场重大保险欺诈的受害者。我们一度无法判断这起欺诈最终会让我们付出多少代价，因此我们把比平时更多的资金留在现金等价物里。
相互关联的灾难性事件。
Absent this precaution, we would have made larger purchases of stocks that were then extraordinarily cheap.)
如果没有这种谨慎，我们本可以在当时股票极其便宜时买入更多。）
Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities — no question about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.
Charlie 当时肯定会雷厉风行地关掉 Gen Re Securities——这点毫无疑问。而我却犹豫拖延了。结果，我们股东为退出这项业务付出的代价，比本来必须付出的高得多。
• Though we include Gen Re’s sizable life and health reinsurance business in the “insurance” sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain’s life and annuity business in this section. That’s because this business, in large part, involves arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured in accidents.
尽管我们在“保险”板块里纳入了 Gen Re 规模可观的人寿与健康再保险业务，但在这一板块里我们展示的是 Ajit Jain 的寿险与年金业务表现。原因在于：这项业务在很大程度上是在做资金的套利（arbitraging money）。我们的年金产品从直接在互联网上销售的零售产品，到结构性和解（structured settlements）——这类和解要求我们向严重事故伤者支付长达 70 年甚至更久的款项。
We’ve realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated principal payments we received from certain fixed-income securities we had purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years.
在这项业务里，我们还因为某些折价买入的固定收益证券发生了提前偿还本金，从而确认了一些额外收益。这种现象已经结束，因此在未来几年里，这个细分板块的盈利很可能会更低。
• We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management of, Mark’s enterprise, which specializes in highly-hedged fixed-income opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a significant investment in Value.
我们在 Value Capital 投入了 6.04 亿美元——这是一家合伙企业，由 Mark Byrne 负责管理。Mark 所属的家族多年来以多种方式帮助过伯克希尔。伯克希尔在 Mark 的企业中是有限合伙人，对其管理没有任何发言权；该企业专注于高度对冲（highly-hedged）的固定收益机会。Mark 聪明且诚实，并且他与家族也在 Value 中投入了相当可观的资金。
Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be instituted that are likely to require that Value’s assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire’s balance sheet. We regard this requirement as inappropriate, given that Value’s liabilities — which usually are above $20 billion — are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us as partners in Value. When enough do, the need for us to consolidate Value will disappear.
由于 Enron 以及其他事件中的会计滥用，新的规则很快将出台，很可能要求把 Value 的资产与负债并入伯克希尔的资产负债表。我们认为这一要求并不恰当，因为 Value 的负债——通常超过 200 亿美元——无论如何都不是我们的负债。随着时间推移，其他投资者也会加入我们，成为 Value 的合伙人。等到参与者足够多时，我们就不再需要合并 Value 的报表。
• We have told you in the past about Berkadia, the partnership we formed three years ago with Leucadia to finance and manage the wind-down of Finova, a bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would supply most of the capital and Leucadia would supply most of the brains. And that’s the way it has worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, who together run Leucadia, have done such a fine job in liquidating Finova’s portfolio that the $5.6 billion guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction has been extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of this fast payoff is that our future income will be much reduced. Overall, Berkadia has made excellent money for us, and Joe and Ian have been terrific partners.
我们过去曾向你介绍过 Berkadia——这是我们三年前与 Leucadia 共同成立的合伙企业，用于为 Finova（一个已破产的放贷业务）提供资金，并管理其“收缩清算（wind-down）”。当初的计划是：我们提供大部分资本，Leucadia 提供大部分脑力。事实也确实如此。实际上，负责运营 Leucadia 的 Joe Steinberg 与 Ian Cumming 在清理 Finova 资产组合方面做得非常出色，以至于我们在该交易中承担的 56 亿美元担保已经被解除。这个快速回收的“副作用”是：我们未来的收入会显著下降。但总体而言，Berkadia 为我们赚了很不错的钱，而 Joe 与 Ian 也是极好的合作伙伴。
• Our leasing businesses are XTRA (transportation equipment) and CORT (office furniture). Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two years as the recession caused demand to drop considerably more than was anticipated. They remain leaders in their fields, and I expect at least a modest improvement in their earnings this year.
我们的租赁业务包括 XTRA（运输设备）和 CORT（办公家具）。由于衰退导致需求下滑幅度远超预期，这两项业务在过去两年里盈利都很差。它们仍是各自领域的领先者，我预计今年它们的盈利至少会有小幅改善。
• Through our Clayton purchase, we acquired a significant manufactured-housing finance operation. Clayton, like others in this business, had traditionally securitized the loans it originated. The practice relieved stress on Clayton’s balance sheet, but a by-product was the “front-ending” of income (a result dictated by GAAP).
通过收购 Clayton，我们也获得了一项规模可观的预制房（manufactured-housing）消费金融业务。Clayton 和业内其他公司一样，过去传统做法是将其发放的贷款进行证券化（securitized）。这种做法可以缓解 Clayton 资产负债表的压力，但副作用是：会把收入“前置确认（front-ending）”（这是 GAAP 会计处理所决定的）。
We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance-sheet strength, and believe that over the long-term the economics of holding our consumer paper are superior to what we can now realize through securitization. So Clayton has begun to retain its loans.
我们并不急着把收入记到报表上；我们的资产负债表实力极其雄厚；并且我们认为，从长期来看，把消费者贷款（consumer paper）留在自己手里所获得的经济利益，要优于我们现在通过证券化能实现的利益。因此，Clayton 已开始把贷款留存，而不是卖出去证券化。
We believe it’s appropriate to finance a soundly-selected book of interest-bearing receivables almost entirely with debt (just as a bank would). Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money to finance Clayton’s portfolio and re-lend these funds to Clayton at our cost plus one percentage point. This markup fairly compensates Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an attractive price.
我们认为：对一组合乎审慎标准、能产生利息收入的应收账款（interest-bearing receivables），几乎完全用负债来融资是合理的（就像银行一样）。因此，伯克希尔将借入资金来为 Clayton 的贷款组合融资，并以“我们的融资成本 + 1 个百分点”的利率把这些资金再贷给 Clayton。这一加点既能公平补偿伯克希尔把其卓越的信用资质拿出来使用，同时也仍能让 Clayton 以一个有吸引力的价格获得资金。
In 2003, Berkshire did $2 billion of such borrowing and re-lending, with Clayton using much of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios from lenders exiting the business. A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided “catch-up” funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year from its own operation and had found difficult to securitize.
2003 年，伯克希尔进行了 20 亿美元的此类“借入再贷出”，而 Clayton 把其中大部分资金用于从一些退出行业的放贷机构手中收购若干大型贷款组合。我们对 Clayton 的部分贷款还用于给它年内自身业务所产生、却难以证券化的贷款提供“追补式（catch-up）”资金支持。
You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a mountain of cash. It’s because of our “every tub on its own bottom” philosophy. We believe that any subsidiary lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds needed to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by its parent. Otherwise, having a rich daddy can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business acquisitions or for the purchase of securities that offer opportunities for significant profit. Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.
你可能会纳闷：我们明明坐拥一座现金大山，为什么还要去借钱？原因在于我们奉行“every tub on its own bottom（各洗各的澡盆，各自站稳自己的底）”的理念。我们认为，任何一个发放贷款的子公司，都应该为支撑其应收账款所需的资金支付恰当的价格，而不应当由母公司补贴。否则，“家里有个有钱的爹”很容易导致决策松懈。与此同时，伯克希尔本部积累的现金，是为收购企业或购买能带来显著盈利机会的证券而准备的。Clayton 的贷款组合在不太多的年份里很可能增长到至少 50 亿美元；只要我们保持审慎的信贷标准，它就应当能贡献可观的盈利。
For simplicity’s sake, we include all of Clayton’s earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.
为求简化，我们把 Clayton 的全部盈利都归入本板块，尽管其中相当一部分来自消费金融以外的业务。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. But let’s look at a simplified balance sheet and earnings statement consolidating the entire group.
我们在这一类别里的业务可谓“包罗万象”。不过先来看一张简化的资产负债表与利润表，把整个板块合并起来看。
This eclectic group, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to B-737s, earned a hefty 20.7% on average tangible net worth last year. However, we purchased these businesses at substantial premiums to net worth — that fact is reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet — and that reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.2%.
这组“杂烩式”的企业——卖的东西从 Dilly Bars 到 B-737（波音 737）——去年在平均有形净资产（tangible net worth）上赚到了相当可观的 20.7%。但我们买入这些企业时，支付了显著高于其净资产的溢价——这一点体现在资产负债表中的商誉（goodwill）项目上——而这会把我们按平均账面载入价值（carrying value）计算的收益率拉低到 9.2%。
Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units.
下面是较大类别或业务单元的税前利润数据。
• Three of our building-materials businesses — Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore and MiTek — had record operating earnings last year. And earnings at Johns Manville, the fourth, were trending upward at yearend. Collectively, these companies earned 21.0% on tangible net worth.
我们三家建材业务——Acme Brick、Benjamin Moore 和 MiTek——去年都创下了经营利润新高。第四家 Johns Manville 的盈利在年末也呈上升趋势。合计来看，这些公司在有形净资产上的收益率为 21.0%。
• Shaw Industries, the world’s largest manufacturer of broadloom carpet, also had a record year. Led by Bob Shaw, who built this huge enterprise from a standing start, the company will likely set another earnings record in 2004. In November, Shaw acquired various carpet operations from Dixie Group, which should add about $240 million to sales this year, boosting Shaw’s volume to nearly $5 billion.
全球最大的簇绒地毯（broadloom carpet）制造商 Shaw Industries 也创下了纪录。公司由 Bob Shaw 领衔——他从零起步打造了这个庞大的企业——Shaw 很可能在 2004 年再创盈利新高。11 月，Shaw 从 Dixie Group 收购了若干地毯业务，今年预计将增加约 2.4 亿美元销售额，把 Shaw 的规模推升到接近 50 亿美元。
• Within the apparel group, Fruit of the Loom is our largest operation. Fruit has three major assets: a 148-year-old universally-recognized brand, a low-cost manufacturing operation, and John Holland, its CEO. In 2003, Fruit accounted for 42.3% of the men’s and boys’ underwear that was sold by mass marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, K-Mart, etc.) and increased its share of the women’s and girls’ business in that channel to 13.9%, up from 11.3% in 2002.
在服装板块中，Fruit of the Loom 是我们最大的业务。Fruit 有三项核心资产：一个拥有 148 年历史、普遍为人所知的品牌；一套低成本制造体系；以及它的 CEO John Holland。2003 年，Fruit 在大众零售渠道（Wal-Mart、Target、K-Mart 等）中销售的男士与男童内衣占比达到 42.3%；同时，它在该渠道的女士与女童业务份额提升到 13.9%，高于 2002 年的 11.3%。
• In retailing, our furniture group earned $106 million pre-tax, our jewelers $59 million and See’s, which is both a manufacturer and retailer, $59 million.
在零售方面，我们的家具业务税前盈利 1.06 亿美元，珠宝商税前盈利 5,900 万美元；See’s 既是制造商也是零售商，税前盈利同为 5,900 万美元。
Both R.C. Willey and Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”) opened hugely successful stores last year, Willey in Las Vegas and NFM in Kansas City, Kansas. Indeed, we believe the Kansas City store is the country’s largest-volume home-furnishings store. (Our Omaha operation, while located on a single plot of land, consists of three units.)
R.C. Willey 和 Nebraska Furniture Mart（“NFM”）去年都开出了极其成功的新店：Willey 在 Las Vegas，NFM 在堪萨斯州堪萨斯城（Kansas City, Kansas）。事实上，我们认为堪萨斯城这家店是全美销售额最大的家居卖场。（我们的奥马哈业务虽然在同一块地上，但实际上由三个单元构成。）
NFM was founded by Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”) in 1937 with $500. She worked until she was 103 (hmmm . . . not a bad idea). One piece of wisdom she imparted to the generations following her was, “If you have the lowest price, customers will find you at the bottom of a river.” Our store serving greater Kansas City, which is located in one of the area’s more sparsely populated parts, has proved Mrs. B’s point. Though we have more than 25 acres of parking, the lot has at times overflowed.
NFM 由 Rose Blumkin（“Mrs. B”）于 1937 年用 500 美元创立。她一直工作到 103 岁（嗯……这主意似乎不坏）。她留给后辈的一条智慧是：“只要你价格最低，顾客就算在河底也会找到你。”我们那家服务大堪萨斯城地区的门店，选址在该区域人口相对稀疏的一处地方，却恰恰验证了 Mrs. B 的说法。尽管我们有超过 25 英亩的停车场，停车位有时仍会溢出爆满。
必需品+结构化的成本优势。
“Victory,” President Kennedy told us after the Bay of Pigs disaster, “has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” At NFM, we knew we had a winner a month after the boffo opening in Kansas City, when our new store attracted an unexpected paternity claim. A speaker there, referring to the Blumkin family, asserted, “They had enough confidence and the policies of the Administration were working such that they were able to provide work for 1,000 of our fellow citizens.” The proud papa at the podium? President George W. Bush.
“胜利有一千个父亲，失败却是孤儿。”肯尼迪总统在猪湾事件之后这样说。在 NFM，我们在堪萨斯城新店开业大卖一个月后就知道自己赢了——因为我们的新店引来了一位“意想不到的父亲”来认亲。当地一位演讲者谈到 Blumkin 家族时宣称：“他们有足够的信心，而且政府的政策正在发挥作用，所以他们才能为我们的一千名同胞提供工作。”站在讲台上、神情自豪的那位“爸爸”是谁？President George W. Bush。
• In flight services, FlightSafety, our training operation, experienced a drop in “normal” operating earnings from $183 million to $150 million. (The abnormals: In 2002 we had a $60 million pre-tax gain from the sale of a partnership interest to Boeing, and in 2003 we recognized a $37 million loss stemming from the premature obsolescence of simulators.) The corporate aviation business has slowed significantly in the past few years, and this fact has hurt FlightSafety’s results. The company continues, however, to be far and away the leader in its field. Its simulators have an original cost of $1.2 billion, which is more than triple the cost of those operated by our closest competitor.
在飞行服务方面，我们的培训业务 FlightSafety 的“正常”经营利润从 1.83 亿美元下降到 1.50 亿美元。（“非正常项”方面：2002 年我们因将一项合伙企业权益出售给 Boeing 而获得 6,000 万美元税前收益；2003 年我们因模拟机提前报废确认了 3,700 万美元损失。）过去几年企业航空业务明显放缓，这一事实拖累了 FlightSafety 的业绩。不过，公司依然是该领域遥遥领先的霸主。其模拟机的原始成本达到 12 亿美元，超过我们最接近竞争对手运营设备成本的三倍以上。
NetJets, our fractional-ownership operation lost $41 million pre-tax in 2003. The company had a modest operating profit in the U.S., but this was more than offset by a $32 million loss on aircraft inventory and by continued losses in Europe.
NetJets——我们的公务机分时所有权（fractional-ownership）业务——在 2003 年录得 4,100 万美元税前亏损。公司在美国本土实现了小幅经营利润，但这被 3,200 万美元的飞机库存损失以及欧洲业务持续亏损所抵消。
NetJets continues to dominate the fractional-ownership field, and its lead is increasing: Prospects overwhelmingly turn to us rather than to our three major competitors. Last year, among the four of us, we accounted for 70% of net sales (measured by value).
NetJets 仍然主导着分时所有权市场，而且领先优势还在扩大：潜在客户压倒性地选择我们，而不是我们的三家主要竞争对手。去年，在我们四家之中，我们拿下了 70% 的净销售额（以金额计）。
An example of what sets NetJets apart from competitors is our Mayo Clinic Executive Travel Response program, a free benefit enjoyed by all of our owners. On land or in the air, anywhere in the world and at any hour of any day, our owners and their families have an immediate link to Mayo. Should an emergency occur while they are traveling here or abroad, Mayo will instantly direct them to an appropriate doctor or hospital. Any baseline data about the patient that Mayo possesses is simultaneously made available to the treating physician. Many owners have already found this service invaluable, including one who needed emergency brain surgery in Eastern Europe.
一个体现 NetJets 区别于竞争对手的例子，是我们与 Mayo Clinic 合作的 Executive Travel Response 计划：这是一项所有机主都可免费享受的福利。无论在陆地还是空中、无论身处世界何地、无论一天中的任何时刻，我们的机主及其家人都能立刻与 Mayo 建立联系。若他们在国内或国外旅行时发生紧急情况，Mayo 会立即把他们引导至合适的医生或医院；Mayo 所掌握的关于病人的任何基础数据，也会同步提供给负责救治的医生。许多机主已经发现这项服务极其宝贵，其中就包括一位在东欧需要紧急脑部手术的机主。
The $32 million inventory write-down we took in 2003 occurred because of falling prices for used aircraft early in the year. Specifically, we bought back fractions from withdrawing owners at prevailing prices, and these fell in value before we were able to remarket them. Prices are now stable.
我们在 2003 年计提的 3,200 万美元库存减值，源于当年早些时候二手飞机价格下跌。具体来说：我们按当时的市场价格回购了退出机主手里的份额，但在我们重新销售这些份额之前，它们的价值就下跌了。现在价格已经稳定。
The European loss is painful. But any company that forsakes Europe, as all of our competitors have done, is destined for second-tier status. Many of our U.S. owners fly extensively in Europe and want the safety and security assured by a NetJets plane and pilots. Despite a slow start, furthermore, we are now adding European customers at a good pace. During the years 2001 through 2003, we had gains of 88%, 61% and 77% in European management-and-flying revenues. We have not, however, yet succeeded in stemming the flow of red ink.
欧洲业务的亏损令人痛苦。但任何一家放弃欧洲的公司——正如我们所有竞争对手都已放弃——都注定只能处于二流地位。我们的许多美国机主在欧洲飞行频繁，他们希望获得 NetJets 飞机与飞行员所保证的安全与保障。此外，尽管起步缓慢，我们现在正以不错的速度增加欧洲客户。2001 到 2003 年，我们的欧洲管理与飞行收入分别增长了 88%、61% 和 77%。不过，我们仍未能止住持续流出的“红墨水”（亏损）。
Rich Santulli, NetJets’ extraordinary CEO, and I expect our European loss to diminish in 2004 and also anticipate that it will be more than offset by U.S. profits. Overwhelmingly, our owners love the NetJets experience. Once a customer has tried us, going back to commercial aviation is like going back to holding hands. NetJets will become a very big business over time and will be one in which we are preeminent in both customer satisfaction and profits. Rich will see to that.
NetJets 非同寻常的 CEO Rich Santulli 和我预计：2004 年欧洲亏损会收窄，并且我们也预计它会被美国业务的利润所远远抵消。绝大多数机主都热爱 NetJets 的体验。一旦客户用过我们，再回到商业航班，就像从“坐飞机”退回到“牵手走路”。随着时间推移，NetJets 会成为一家非常大的企业，而且会在客户满意度与利润两方面都处于领先地位。Rich 会做到这一点。
Investments
投资
The table that follows shows our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2003 are itemized.
下表列示了我们的普通股投资组合。截至 2003 年末，市值超过 5 亿美元的持仓将被单独列示。
We bought some Wells Fargo shares last year. Otherwise, among our six largest holdings, we last changed our position in Coca-Cola in 1994, American Express in 1998, Gillette in 1989, Washington Post in 1973, and Moody’s in 2000. Brokers don’t love us.
去年我们买入了一些 Wells Fargo 的股票。除此之外，在我们最大的六项持仓中：我们上一次调整 Coca-Cola 的持仓是在 1994 年；American Express 在 1998 年；Gillette 在 1989 年；Washington Post 在 1973 年；Moody’s 在 2000 年。券商可不太喜欢我们。
We are neither enthusiastic nor negative about the portfolio we hold. We own pieces of excellent businesses — all of which had good gains in intrinsic value last year — but their current prices reflect their excellence. The unpleasant corollary to this conclusion is that I made a big mistake in not selling several of our larger holdings during The Great Bubble. If these stocks are fully priced now, you may wonder what I was thinking four years ago when their intrinsic value was lower and their prices far higher. So do I.
我们对当前持有的投资组合既谈不上兴奋，也谈不上悲观。我们持有的都是优秀企业的一部分——而且这些企业在去年内在价值都实现了不错的增长——但它们的当前价格也已经反映了这种优秀。这个结论带来的一个不太好听的推论是：在“伟大泡沫（The Great Bubble）”期间，我没有卖出我们几项较大持仓，这是一个重大错误。如果这些股票现在都已被充分定价，那么你可能会问：四年前它们的内在价值更低、价格却高得多时，我到底在想什么？我自己也这么问。
In 2002, junk bonds became very cheap, and we purchased about $8 billion of these. The pendulum swung quickly though, and this sector now looks decidedly unattractive to us. Yesterday’s weeds are today being priced as flowers.
2002 年，垃圾债（junk bonds）变得非常便宜，我们买入了大约 80 亿美元。但钟摆很快又摆了回来，现在这个板块在我们看来已经明显缺乏吸引力。昨天的杂草，今天却被当成花来定价。
We’ve repeatedly emphasized that realized gains at Berkshire are meaningless for analytical purposes. We have a huge amount of unrealized gains on our books, and our thinking about when, and if, to cash them depends not at all on a desire to report earnings at one specific time or another. Nevertheless, to see the diversity of our investment activities, you may be interested in the following table, categorizing the gains we reported during 2003:
我们一再强调：对伯克希尔而言，“已实现收益（realized gains）”在分析上没有意义。我们账面上有巨额未实现收益；而我们关于何时、以及是否兑现这些收益的思考，完全不取决于“想在某个特定时点报出利润”。不过，为了让你看到我们投资活动的多样性，你也许会对下表感兴趣：它把我们在 2003 年报告的收益按类别进行了划分。
The common stock profits occurred around the edges of our portfolio — not, as we already mentioned, from our selling down our major positions. The profits in governments arose from our liquidation of long-term strips (the most volatile of government securities) and from certain strategies I follow within our finance and financial products division. We retained most of our junk portfolio, selling only a few issues. Calls and maturing bonds accounted for the rest of the gains in the junk category.
普通股的利润来自我们投资组合的“边缘地带”——并非如前所述来自我们减持主要头寸。政府债券的利润来自我们清算长期 STRIPS（政府债中波动性最大的品种），以及我在“金融与金融产品”部门内实施的一些策略。我们保留了大部分垃圾债组合，只卖出少数券种；垃圾债类别里其余的收益来自被赎回（calls）以及到期债券。
During 2002 we entered the foreign currency market for the first time in my life, and in 2003 we enlarged our position, as I became increasingly bearish on the dollar. I should note that the cemetery for seers has a huge section set aside for macro forecasters. We have in fact made few macro forecasts at Berkshire, and we have seldom seen others make them with sustained success.
2002 年，我人生第一次进入外汇市场；而在 2003 年，随着我对美元越来越看空，我们扩大了头寸。我得说明：先知的墓地里，有一大片专门留给宏观预测者。伯克希尔事实上很少做宏观预测，而我们也很少见到别人能持续成功地做对这件事。
We have — and will continue to have — the bulk of Berkshire’s net worth in U.S. assets. But in recent years our country’s trade deficit has been force-feeding huge amounts of claims on, and ownership in, America to the rest of the world. For a time, foreign appetite for these assets readily absorbed the supply. Late in 2002, however, the world started choking on this diet, and the dollar’s value began to slide against major currencies. Even so, prevailing exchange rates will not lead to a material letup in our trade deficit. So whether foreign investors like it or not, they will continue to be flooded with dollars. The consequences of this are anybody’s guess. They could, however, be troublesome — and reach, in fact, well beyond currency markets.
我们现在——也会继续——把伯克希尔净资产的大部分放在美国资产上。但近些年来，我们国家的贸易赤字一直在“强行灌食”——把对美国的债权与所有权的大量份额喂给世界其他国家。曾经有一段时间，海外对这些资产的胃口足以轻松消化这份供给。但到了 2002 年末，世界开始被这顿“饮食”噎住了，美元相对于主要货币开始走弱。即便如此，当前的汇率水平仍不足以让我们的贸易赤字出现实质性缓解。因此，无论海外投资者愿不愿意，他们都会持续被美元“淹没”。这会带来什么后果，谁也说不准。但它们可能会很麻烦——而且影响范围实际上可能远远超出外汇市场。
As an American, I hope there is a benign ending to this problem. I myself suggested one possible solution — which, incidentally, leaves Charlie cold — in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune Magazine. Then again, perhaps the alarms I have raised will prove needless: Our country’s dynamism and resiliency have repeatedly made fools of naysayers. But Berkshire holds many billions of cash-equivalents denominated in dollars. So I feel more comfortable owning foreign-exchange contracts that are at least a partial offset to that position.
作为美国人，我希望这个问题能有一个温和的结局。我曾在 2003 年 11 月 10 日《Fortune Magazine》的一篇文章里提出过一种可能的解决方案——顺便说一句，这个方案让 Charlie “不买账”。当然，也许我拉响的警报最终证明是多余的：我们国家的活力与韧性已经无数次让唱衰者出丑。但伯克希尔持有数十亿美元以美元计价的现金等价物。因此，我更愿意持有一些外汇合约，至少能对冲这部分头寸的一部分风险。
These contracts are subject to accounting rules that require changes in their value to be contemporaneously included in capital gains or losses, even though the contracts have not been closed. We show these changes each quarter in the Finance and Financial Products segment of our earnings statement. At yearend, our open foreign exchange contracts totaled about $12 billion at market values and were spread among five currencies. Also, when we were purchasing junk bonds in 2002, we tried when possible to buy issues denominated in Euros. Today, we own about $1 billion of these.
这些合约受会计规则约束：其价值变化必须实时计入资本利得或损失，即便合约尚未平仓。我们每个季度都会在“金融与金融产品”板块的利润表中反映这些变化。到年末，我们未平仓的外汇合约按市值计约 120 亿美元，分布在五种货币之间。此外，2002 年我们买入垃圾债时，能买到的话就尽量买以欧元计价的券。如今我们持有这类债券约 10 亿美元。
When we can’t find anything exciting in which to invest, our “default” position is U.S. Treasuries, both bills and repos. No matter how low the yields on these instruments go, we never “reach” for a little more income by dropping our credit standards or by extending maturities. Charlie and I detest taking even small risks unless we feel we are being adequately compensated for doing so. About as far as we will go down that path is to occasionally eat cottage cheese a day after the expiration date on the carton.
当我们找不到任何令人兴奋的投资机会时，我们的“默认”持仓就是美国国债（Treasuries），包括短期国库券（bills）与回购（repos）。无论这些工具的收益率低到什么程度，我们都绝不会为了多一点点收益而“伸手够”（reach）——比如降低信用标准或拉长期限。Charlie 和我厌恶承担哪怕很小的风险，除非我们觉得自己得到了足够的补偿。我们在这条路上能走到的极限，大概就是：偶尔在盒装奶酪（cottage cheese）过期一天之后还把它吃掉。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A 2003 book that investors can learn much from is Bull! by Maggie Mahar. Two other books I’d recommend are The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, and In an Uncertain World by Bob Rubin. All three are well-reported and well-written. Additionally, Jason Zweig last year did a first-class job in revising The Intelligent Investor, my favorite book on investing.
一本 2003 年出版、投资者能从中学到很多的书是 Maggie Mahar 写的《Bull!》。另外两本我也推荐：Bethany McLean 与 Peter Elkind 合著的《The Smartest Guys in the Room》，以及 Bob Rubin 的《In an Uncertain World》。这三本书都采访扎实、写得也好。此外，Jason Zweig 去年对《The Intelligent Investor》做了头等水准的修订——那是我最喜欢的投资书。
Designated Gifts Program
指定捐赠计划
From 1981 through 2002, Berkshire administered a program whereby shareholders could direct Berkshire to make gifts to their favorite charitable organizations. Over the years we disbursed $197 million pursuant to this program. Churches were the most frequently named designees, and many thousands of other organizations benefited as well. We were the only major public company that offered such a program to shareholders, and Charlie and I were proud of it.
1981 年到 2002 年，伯克希尔运行过一个项目：股东可以指定由伯克希尔向他们喜爱的慈善机构捐款。多年下来，我们通过该项目累计拨付了 1.97 亿美元。教会是最常被指定的受赠方，此外还有成千上万家组织也因此受益。我们是唯一一家向股东提供这种项目的大型上市公司，Charlie 和我为此感到自豪。
We reluctantly terminated the program in 2003 because of controversy over the abortion issue. Over the years numerous organizations on both sides of this issue had been designated by our shareholders to receive contributions. As a result, we regularly received some objections to the gifts designated for pro-choice operations. A few of these came from people and organizations that proceeded to boycott products of our subsidiaries. That did not concern us. We refused all requests to limit the right of our owners to make whatever gifts they chose (as long as the recipients had 501(c)(3) status).
我们在 2003 年不得不（非常不情愿地）终止了这个项目，原因是围绕堕胎议题的争议。多年里，在这一议题两端的众多组织都曾被股东指定为受捐对象。因此，我们经常收到对捐赠“支持选择权（pro-choice）”机构的反对意见。其中有少数个人与组织甚至进一步发起抵制，抵制我们子公司的产品。但这并不困扰我们。我们拒绝了所有“限制股东指定捐赠对象”的要求——只要受赠方具有 501(c)(3) 资格，股东就有权把钱捐给他们想捐的对象。
In 2003, however, many independent associates of The Pampered Chef began to feel the boycotts. This development meant that people who trusted us — but who were neither employees of ours nor had a voice in Berkshire decision-making — suffered serious losses of income.
但在 2003 年，《The Pampered Chef》旗下许多独立业务伙伴开始切实感受到抵制带来的影响。这意味着：一些信任我们的人——他们既不是我们的雇员，也无法参与伯克希尔的决策——却遭受了严重的收入损失。
For our shareholders, there was some modest tax efficiency in Berkshire doing the giving rather than their making their gifts directly. Additionally, the program was consistent with our “partnership” approach, the first principle set forth in our Owner’s Manual. But these advantages paled when they were measured against damage done loyal associates who had with great personal effort built businesses of their own. Indeed, Charlie and I see nothing charitable in harming decent, hard-working people just so we and other shareholders can gain some minor tax efficiencies.
对股东而言，由伯克希尔代为捐赠相比股东自己直接捐赠，确实有一些适度的税务效率。另外，该项目也符合我们“合伙人（partnership）”的理念——这是《Owner’s Manual》里提出的第一条原则。但当把这些好处与对那些忠诚伙伴造成的伤害放在一起衡量时，这些好处就显得微不足道了：这些伙伴靠着巨大的个人努力，建立起属于他们自己的事业。事实上，Charlie 和我认为：为了让我们和其他股东获得一点点税务效率，却去伤害那些体面、勤劳的人，这里面没有任何“慈善”可言。
Berkshire now makes no contributions at the parent company level. Our various subsidiaries follow philanthropic policies consistent with their practices prior to their acquisition by Berkshire, except that any personal contributions that former owners had earlier made from their corporate pocketbook are now funded by them personally.
伯克希尔如今在母公司层面不再进行任何捐赠。我们的各子公司仍按它们在被伯克希尔收购之前的惯例执行慈善政策；唯一的变化是：过去由原所有者用公司资金进行的个人捐赠，现在改为由他们用个人资金承担。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Last year, I asked you to vote as to whether you wished our annual meeting to be held on Saturday or Monday. I was hoping for Monday. Saturday won by 2 to 1. It will be a while before shareholder democracy resurfaces at Berkshire.
去年，我请你们投票决定：年度股东大会是放在周六还是周一举行。我原本希望是周一。结果周六以 2 比 1 获胜。看来“股东民主”要在伯克希尔重新浮现，还得等一阵子。
But you have spoken, and we will hold this year’s annual meeting on Saturday, May 1 at the new Qwest Center in downtown Omaha. The Qwest offers us 194,000 square feet for exhibition by our subsidiaries (up from 65,000 square feet last year) and much more seating capacity as well. The Qwest’s doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches will be available at the Qwest’s concession stands.) That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. We will tell you everything we know . . . and, at least in my case, more.
但你们已经表态，因此今年的股东大会将于 5 月 1 日（周六） 在奥马哈市中心新建的 Qwest Center 举行。Qwest 为我们提供 194,000 平方英尺 的子公司展览空间（去年是 65,000 平方英尺），座位容量也大得多。Qwest 的大门将在 早上 7 点 开放，影片 8:30 开始播放，会议本身 9:30 正式开始。中午会有一个短暂休息用餐。（Qwest 的小吃摊会提供三明治。）除这段插曲外，Charlie 和我会一直回答问题到 3:30。我们会把我们知道的都告诉你……而且至少在我这里，还会多说一些。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.
随本报告附上的代理材料（proxy material）里有一份附件，说明你如何获取参加会议及其他活动所需的入场凭证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们仍然请 American Express（800-799-6634） 为你提供特别协助。他们每年都做得非常出色，我在此表示感谢。
In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the vans will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
按惯例，我们会安排面包车从较大的酒店往返会场。会后，面包车还会往返酒店、Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim’s 以及机场。即便如此，你大概率还是会觉得有辆车更方便。
Our exhibition of Berkshire goods and services will blow you away this year. On the floor, for example, will be a 1,600 square foot Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns-Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings, and outfitted with NFM furniture). You’ll find it a far cry from the mobile-home stereotype of a few decades ago.
今年我们伯克希尔各类商品与服务的展览会“震撼到你”。比如，展馆地面上将摆放一套 1,600 平方英尺 的 Clayton 住宅（使用 Acme 砖、Shaw 地毯、Johns-Manville 保温材料、MiTek 紧固件、Carefree 遮篷，并配上 NFM 家具）。你会发现它与几十年前人们对移动房屋的刻板印象已完全不是一回事。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.
GEICO 会设一个展位，由来自全国各地的一批顶级顾问驻场，随时为你提供车险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能给你一个股东特别折扣（通常为 8%）。我们经营的 49 个司法辖区中，有 41 个允许提供这项特别优惠。带上你现有保险的细节，看看我们能不能帮你省钱。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home.
周六在奥马哈机场，我们会像往常一样安排一批 NetJets® 飞机供你参观。到 Qwest 的 NetJets 展位了解如何去看这些飞机。如果你在周末买了我们认为“数量合适”的一堆东西，你很可能需要一架自己的飞机把它们运回家。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM seven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $17.3 million in 2003. Every year has set a new record.
在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）——位于 72nd Street、Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地 77 英亩——我们今年仍将提供“Berkshire Weekend”特价，也就是给股东提供通常只给员工的折扣。我们七年前在 NFM 开始了这项特别定价，“周末”期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2003 年的 1,730 万美元，而且每一年都刷新纪录。
To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29 and Monday, May 3 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque and drinking Coke.
要享受折扣，你必须在 4 月 29 日（周四）到 5 月 3 日（周一）（含首尾两天）期间完成购买，并出示你的参会凭证。活动期间的特价甚至也适用于一些知名厂商的产品——这些厂商通常有“铁一般”不许打折的规定，但出于我们股东周末的精神，特意为你破例。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM 营业时间为：周一至周六 上午 10 点到晚上 9 点，周日 上午 10 点到下午 6 点。今年周六 5:30 p.m. 到 8 p.m.，我们将为股东举办一场特别活动（仅限股东参加）。我会在那里，一边吃烧烤，一边喝可乐。
Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 2. Ask Charlie to autograph your sales ticket.
Borsheim’s——全美最大的珠宝店（除 Tiffany’s 曼哈顿店外）——将举办两场“股东专属”活动。第一场是 4 月 30 日（周五）晚 6 点到 10 点 的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场、也是主活动，是 5 月 2 日（周日）上午 9 点到下午 4 点 的盛会。让 Charlie 给你的购物小票签名吧。
Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save — at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me. (Both were impressed early in life by the story of the boy who, after missing a street car, walked home and proudly announced that he had saved 5¢ by doing so. His father was irate: “Why didn’t you miss a cab and save 85¢?”)
股东价格从周四持续到周一，所以如果你想避开周五晚与周日会出现的人潮，可以选其他时间到店，并表明自己是股东。周六我们营业到 下午 6 点。Borsheim’s 的毛利率比主要竞争对手足足低 20 个百分点，所以你买得越多，省得越多——至少我老婆和女儿是这么跟我说的。（她们小时候都被一个故事打动：一个男孩错过了电车，只好走回家，他得意地说自己因此省了 5 美分。他父亲却大怒：“那你怎么不干脆错过出租车，省 85 美分呢？”）
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Additionally, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! I’ve watched, and he doesn’t peek.
在 Borsheim’s 外面的商场里，周日下午我们会请来两位世界顶级桥牌高手 Bob Hamman 与 Sharon Osberg，随时与股东对局。另外，曾两度获得美国国际象棋冠军的 Patrick Wolff 也会在商场里，蒙眼同时对战所有挑战者！我看过，他不偷看。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Flaunt your mastery of fine dining by ordering, as I do, a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——今年也将于 5 月 2 日（周日） 专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间是 下午 4 点到晚上 10 点。请记住：想在周日去 Gorat’s，必须提前订位。订位电话是 402-551-3733，请在 4 月 1 日 打电话（但不要更早）。如果周日订满了，那就试试你在城里其他晚上的时间。想秀一下你的“高级餐饮修养”，可以像我一样点：一份三分熟的 T-bone，再加一份双倍薯饼（hash browns）。
We will have a special reception on Saturday afternoon from 4:00 to 5:00 for shareholders who come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally meet those who have come so far. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given special credentials and instructions for attending this function.
周六下午 4:00 到 5:00，我们还会为来自北美以外地区的股东举办一场特别招待会。每年都有许多来自世界各地的人来参加我们的年会，Charlie 和我希望能亲自见到那些远道而来的朋友。任何来自美国或加拿大以外地区的股东，都将获得参加这项活动的特别凭证与指引。
Charlie and I have a great time at the annual meeting. And you will, too. So join us at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.
Charlie 和我在年会上总是玩得很开心，你也一定会。来 Qwest 吧，加入我们一年一度的“资本家伍德斯托克（Woodstock for Capitalists）”。
February 27, 2004
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Wells Fargo
Refer To：《1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was ...1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Measuring Insurance Performance
Refer To：《1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 Measuring Insurance Performance 衡量保险业绩 In the previous section I mentioned “float,” the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. ...1936 Ben Graham.US Steel Announces Sweeping Modernization Scheme
An unpublished satire by Ben Graham, written in 1936 and given by the author to Warren Buffett in 1954. Myron C. Taylor, Chairman of U. S. Steel Corporation, today announced the long awaited plan for completely modernizing the world's largest ...2026-02-28 Greg Abel VS Warren Buffett
Greg Abel VS Warren Buffett 1、同一个主题的表述 有一段针对保险业务的评论可以测试两个人在思维方式上的差异。在Right People的评价中先理清一个概念：不是标上数字的才是量化。 （1）Greg Abel Refer To：《2026-02-28 Greg Abel's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 Reinsurance Group Our reinsurance operations face similar ...2026-02-28 Greg Abel's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2026-02-28 Greg Abel's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To My Fellow Berkshire Shareholders, Warren Buffett is arguably the greatest investor of all time, with generations benefiting from his investment acumen. He has also been a ...