2006-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.*
我们在 2005 年的净资产增加了 56 亿美元，使我们的 Class A 和 Class B 股票每股账面价值都提高了 6.4%。过去 41 年（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值从 19 美元增长到 59,377 美元，年复合增长率为 21.5%。*
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
本报告中的所有数据均以 Berkshire 的 A 类股为准；A 类股是 1996 年之前公司唯一在外流通股票的继承者。B 类股的经济权益相当于 A 类股的 1/30。
Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion — and her ugly sisters, Rita and Wilma, cost us an additional $.9 billion.
Berkshire 在 2005 年表现不错。我们启动了五项收购（其中两项尚未完成交割），大多数运营子公司都取得了良好业绩。即使是整个保险业务也表现不差，尽管 Hurricane Katrina 给 Berkshire 和整个行业都带来了创纪录的损失。我们估计 Katrina 给我们造成的损失为 25 亿美元——而她的“丑陋姐妹” Rita 和 Wilma 又让我们额外损失了 9 亿美元。
Credit GEICO — and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely — for our stellar insurance results in a disaster-ridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% — and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.
要把我们在这个灾难频发的年份里取得的卓越保险业绩归功于 GEICO——以及它才华横溢的 CEO，Tony Nicely。一个数据格外醒目：仅仅两年时间，GEICO 的生产率提高了 32%。令人惊讶的是，在员工人数下降 4% 的同时，保单数量却增长了 26%——而且还会继续提升。当我们以如此显著的方式降低单位成本时，就能为客户提供越来越大的价值。回报是：去年，GEICO 提升了市场份额，赚取了可观利润，并强化了品牌。如果你在 2006 年迎来一个新儿子或孙子，就给他取名 Tony。
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My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an explanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77 — 78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of most companies.
我写这份报告的目的，是向你提供你需要的信息，以便你估算 Berkshire 的内在价值。我之所以说“估算”，是因为内在价值的计算虽然至关重要，却必然不精确，而且常常会严重出错。企业未来越不确定，计算结果就越可能偏离得离谱。（关于内在价值的解释，见第 77—78 页。）在这方面，Berkshire 具有一些优势：相对稳定的收益来源非常多样，同时具备极强的流动性并且负债极少。这些因素意味着，Berkshire 的内在价值可以比大多数公司更精确地计算出来。
Yet if precision is aided by Berkshire’s financial characteristics, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.
然而，即便 Berkshire 的财务特征有助于提高“精确度”，由于收益来源太多，计算内在价值这件事反而在复杂性上被推高了。回到 1965 年，当我们只拥有一家小型纺织业务时，计算内在价值简直轻而易举。如今我们拥有 68 家彼此独立的企业，它们的经营与财务特征差异巨大。这样一组互不相关的实体，再加上我们规模庞大的投资持仓，使得你不可能只看合并财务报表，就得出一个有见地的内在价值估算。
We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.
为减轻这一困难，我们尝试把业务归类为四个逻辑分组，并将在本报告后面逐一讨论。在这些讨论中，我们会提供该组整体及其重要组成部分的关键数据。当然，Berkshire 的价值可能高于、也可能低于这四部分价值之和。结果取决于：我们众多单位作为一个更大企业的一部分时，运行得更好还是更差；以及资本配置在控股公司统一指挥之下，是改善还是恶化。换句话说，Berkshire 的所有权到底“带来了什么”，还是说我们的股东如果直接分别持有这 68 家公司的股份，反而会更好？这些都是重要的问题，但你必须自己作出判断。
Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let’s review two sets of figures that show where we’ve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:
不过，在我们逐一审视各项业务之前，先看两组数字，它们能说明我们从哪里走来、现在处于何处。第一组数字是：我们按每股口径拥有的投资金额（包括现金及现金等价物）。在计算这一数字时，我们剔除金融业务中持有的投资，因为这些投资在很大程度上被借款所抵消：
In addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:
除了这些可交易证券（除少数例外，基本都持有在我们的保险公司里）之外，我们还拥有各种各样的非保险业务。下面我们按每股口径列示这些业务的税前收益（不含商誉摊销）：
When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.
当你讨论增长率时，最好先对“为什么选择这个起点年和终点年”保持怀疑。如果任一年份属于异常值，任何增长计算都会被扭曲。尤其是，当基准年利润很差时，得出的增长率可能“惊人”，但毫无意义。不过在上表中，1965 年这个基准年反而是异常地好；Berkshire 在那一年赚的钱，比之前十年里除了一年之外的任何一年都多。
As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope — metaphorically — to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife — stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight — felt a long-absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”
从这两张表你可以看出，过去十年里，Berkshire 两个价值构成要素的相对增长率发生了变化，这反映了我们越来越强调通过收购来扩张业务。尽管如此，我和我的合伙人——Berkshire 副董事长 Charlie Munger——都希望把两张表里的数字继续做大。为了实现这个雄心，我们希望——打个比方——别落到那对老夫妇的下场：他们浪漫生活已经冷淡了很久。可在结婚 50 周年的晚餐后，妻子在轻音乐、红酒和烛光的刺激下，忽然又找回了久违的悸动，含蓄地建议丈夫上楼去做爱。丈夫痛苦地想了一会儿，然后回答：“我可以做其中一件，但不能两件都做。”
Acquisitions
收购
Over the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.
这些年来，我们现有业务的整体合计，应该能带来“温和”的经营利润增长。但它们本身不足以带来真正令人满意的增长。要把这件事做成，我们需要进行大型收购。
In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were completed last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself — and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.
在这条路上，2005 年令人振奋。我们同意了五笔收购：其中两笔在去年完成，一笔在年末之后完成交割，另外两笔我们预计很快就会完成。所有交易都不涉及发行 Berkshire 股票。这一点至关重要，却常常被忽视：当管理层自豪地宣布用股票去收购另一家公司时，收购方的股东其实同时在出售自己对“所拥有的一切资产”的一部分权益。我自己也做过几次这种交易——总体而言，我的这些行动让你们亏了钱。
Here are last year’s purchases:
以下是去年的收购：
• On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality assuring doctors that long-to-settle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.
6 月 30 日，我们收购了 Medical Protective Company（“MedPro”），这是一家总部位于 Fort Wayne、已有 106 年历史的医疗事故责任险公司。医疗事故险承保难度极高，事实证明它是许多保险公司的“坟场”。但 MedPro 仍然应该能做得很好。它将拥有所有 Berkshire 旗下保险公司共同具备的“态度优势”：承保纪律高于一切目标。此外，作为 Berkshire 的一部分，MedPro 的财务实力远超其竞争对手——这一点能让医生相信，那些需要很长时间才能结案的理赔，不会因为保险公司倒闭而又“回到自己门口”。最后，这家公司还有一位聪明且精力充沛的 CEO——Tim Kenesey——他天生就像一个 Berkshire 式的管理者那样思考。
• Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21, I received a two-page fax telling me — point by point — why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal.
我们的第二笔收购 Forest River 于 8 月 31 日完成交割。几个月前的 6 月 21 日，我收到一份两页的传真，逐条说明 Forest River 为什么符合我们在本报告第 25 页列出的收购标准。此前我从未听说过这家公司——一家销售额 16 亿美元的房车（recreational vehicle）制造商——也没听说过它的所有者兼管理者 Pete Liegl。但这份传真说得通，我立刻要求提供更多数据。第二天早上数据就送到了，当天下午我就向 Pete 报了价。6 月 28 日，我们握手成交。
Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long, Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.
Pete 是一位非凡的企业家。几年前，他把自己的公司（那时规模远小于今天）卖给了一家 LBO（杠杆收购）操盘手，对方立刻开始教他“该怎么经营”。不久 Pete 就离开了，公司很快破产。随后 Pete 又把公司买了回来。你可以确信：我不会去告诉 Pete 该如何管理他的生意。
Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 — and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.
Forest River 拥有 60 家工厂、5,400 名员工，在房车业务中持续提升市场份额，同时也扩展到船只等其他领域。Pete 今年 61 岁——而且绝对处在“加速模式”。读一读随本报告附上的《RV Business》文章，你就会明白为什么 Pete 和 Berkshire 是天作之合。
• On November 12, 2005, an article ran in The Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire’s unusual acquisition and managerial practices. In it Pete declared, “It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license.”
2005 年 11 月 12 日，《The Wall Street Journal》刊登了一篇文章，讨论 Berkshire 非同寻常的收购与管理方式。文中 Pete 说：“卖掉我的公司，比续办我的驾照还容易。”
In New York, Cathy Baron Tamraz read the article, and it struck a chord. On November 21, she sent me a letter that began, “As president of Business Wire, I’d like to introduce you to my company, as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary companies as detailed in a recent Wall Street Journal article.”
在纽约，Cathy Baron Tamraz 读到了这篇文章，深受触动。11 月 21 日，她给我写了一封信，开头是：“作为 Business Wire 的总裁，我想向您介绍我们的公司，因为我相信它符合《The Wall Street Journal》近期文章中所描述的 Berkshire Hathaway 子公司画像。”
By the time I finished Cathy’s two-page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit. I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph: “We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under wraps. No secretaries or management layers here. Yet we’ll invest big dollars to gain a technological advantage and move the business forward.”
读完 Cathy 两页的来信时，我就觉得 Business Wire 和 Berkshire 非常契合。我尤其喜欢她倒数第二段：“我们把船开得很紧，能省则省，不必要的开支一律压住。这里没有秘书，也没有管理层层加码。但为了取得技术优势、推动业务前进，我们愿意投入大钱。”
I promptly gave Cathy a call, and before long Berkshire had reached agreement with Business Wire’s controlling shareholder, Lorry Lokey, who founded the company in 1961 (and who had just made Cathy CEO). I love success stories like Lorry’s. Today 78, he has built a company that disseminates information in 150 countries for 25,000 clients. His story, like those of many entrepreneurs who have selected Berkshire as a home for their life’s work, is an example of what can happen when a good idea, a talented individual and hard work converge.
我立刻给 Cathy 打了电话。不久之后，Berkshire 就与 Business Wire 的控股股东 Lorry Lokey 达成了协议。Lorry 于 1961 年创办了这家公司（而且他刚刚任命 Cathy 为 CEO）。我很喜欢 Lorry 这样的成功故事。如今他 78 岁，建立了一家为 25,000 个客户、在 150 个国家传播信息的公司。他的故事——就像许多把毕生事业托付给 Berkshire 的企业家一样——说明了当一个好点子、一个有才能的人以及艰苦努力汇合时，会发生什么。
• In December we agreed to buy 81% of Applied Underwriters, a company that offers a combination of payroll services and workers’ compensation insurance to small businesses. A majority of Applied’s customers are located in California.
12 月，我们同意收购 Applied Underwriters 81% 的股权。这家公司向小企业提供“薪资服务 + 工伤赔偿保险”的组合方案。Applied 的客户多数位于加州。
In 1998, though, when the company had 12 employees, it acquired an Omaha-based operation with 24 employees that offered a somewhat-similar service. Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies, who have built Applied’s remarkable business, concluded that Omaha had many advantages as an operational base — a brilliant insight, I might add — and today 400 of the company’s 479 employees are located here.
不过在 1998 年，当公司只有 12 名员工时，它收购了一家总部在 Omaha、拥有 24 名员工、提供某种相似服务的业务。Sid Ferenc 和 Steve Menzies（他们打造了 Applied 这门非凡生意）认为 Omaha 作为运营基地具备许多优势——我得说，这是个极其高明的洞见——而今天公司 479 名员工中，有 400 人就位于这里。
Less than a year ago, Applied entered into a large reinsurance contract with Ajit Jain, the extraordinary manager of National Indemnity’s reinsurance division. Ajit was impressed by Sid and Steve, and they liked Berkshire’s method of operation. So we decided to join forces. We are pleased that Sid and Steve retain 19% of Applied. They started on a shoestring only 12 years ago, and it will be fun to see what they can accomplish with Berkshire’s backing.
不到一年前，Applied 与 Ajit Jain（National Indemnity 再保险部门的杰出管理者）签订了一份大型再保险合同。Ajit 对 Sid 和 Steve 印象深刻，而他们也喜欢 Berkshire 的运作方式。所以我们决定携手合作。我们很高兴 Sid 和 Steve 仍保留 Applied 的 19% 股权。他们 12 年前几乎是白手起家，如今有 Berkshire 的支持，看看他们还能做出什么，会是一件很有意思的事。
• Last spring, MidAmerican Energy, our 80.5% owned subsidiary, agreed to buy PacifiCorp, a major electric utility serving six Western states. An acquisition of this sort requires many regulatory approvals, but we’ve now obtained these and expect to close this transaction soon. Berkshire will then buy $3.4 billion of MidAmerican’s common stock, which MidAmerican will supplement with $1.7 billion of borrowing to complete the purchase. You can’t expect to earn outsized profits in regulated utilities, but the industry offers owners the opportunity to deploy large sums at fair returns — and therefore, it makes good sense for Berkshire. A few years back, I said that we hoped to make some very large purchases in the utility field. Note the plural — we’ll be looking for more.
去年春天，我们持股 80.5% 的子公司 MidAmerican Energy 同意收购 PacifiCorp——一家为美国西部六个州提供服务的大型电力公用事业公司。这类收购需要通过许多监管审批，但我们现在已经拿到了这些批准，并预计很快完成交易。届时，Berkshire 将购买 34 亿美元的 MidAmerican 普通股，MidAmerican 还将再借入 17 亿美元来完成这笔收购。你不能指望在受监管的公用事业里赚到超额利润，但这个行业能让所有者以“合理回报”部署巨额资金——因此对 Berkshire 非常合适。几年前我说过，我们希望在公用事业领域做一些非常大的收购。注意我用的是复数——我们还会继续寻找更多机会。
In addition to buying these new operations, we continue to make “bolt-on” acquisitions. Some aren’t so small: Shaw, our carpet operation, spent about $550 million last year on two purchases that furthered its vertical integration and should improve its profit margin in the future. XTRA and Clayton Homes also made value-enhancing acquisitions.
除了买下这些新业务，我们也持续进行“bolt-on（加挂式）”收购。有些并不算小：我们的地毯业务 Shaw 去年在两笔收购上花了大约 5.5 亿美元，进一步推进了垂直整合，并应当能在未来改善利润率。XTRA 和 Clayton Homes 也做了提升价值的收购。
Unlike many business buyers, Berkshire has no “exit strategy.” We buy to keep. We do, though, have an entrance strategy, looking for businesses in this country or abroad that meet our six criteria and are available at a price that will produce a reasonable return. If you have a business that fits, give me a call. Like a hopeful teenage girl, I’ll be waiting by the phone.
与许多企业买家不同，Berkshire 没有所谓的“退出策略”。我们买来就是为了长期持有。当然，我们确实有“进入策略”：在美国或海外寻找符合我们六条标准、且价格能带来合理回报的企业。如果你手上有符合条件的公司，给我打电话。就像一个满怀希望的少女一样，我会守在电话旁等着。
Insurance
保险
Let’s now talk about our four sectors and start with insurance, our core business. What counts here is the amount of “float” and its cost over time.
现在我们来谈谈四大板块，先从保险开始——这是我们的核心业务。这里真正重要的是：“float（浮存金）”的规模，以及它随时间推移的成本。
For new readers, let me explain. “Float” is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide — insurance protection — is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 entry into insurance has now increased — both by way of internal growth and acquisitions — to $49 billion.
给新读者解释一下。“Float”是一些不属于我们、但我们暂时持有的资金。我们的浮存金主要来源于两点：(1) 保费是预先收取的，但我们提供的服务——保险保障——通常是在一年左右的期间里逐步兑现；(2) 今天发生的损失事件，并不一定会让我们立刻赔付，因为损失有时需要很多年才会被报告（石棉损失就是例子）、谈判并最终结案。我们在 1967 年进入保险业时带来的 2,000 万美元浮存金，如今已经增长到 490 亿美元——增长既来自内部积累，也来自收购。
Float is wonderful — if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an insurer earns an underwriting profit — as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have been in the insurance business — float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.
浮存金很美妙——前提是它的价格不高。它的成本由承保结果决定，也就是我们最终需要支付的费用与损失，相对我们已收取保费的比较。当一家保险公司获得承保利润时——就像 Berkshire 在 39 年保险经营历史中大约有一半年份做到的那样——浮存金甚至“比免费更好”。在那些年份里，我们持有别人的钱，反而还能拿到报酬。但对大多数保险公司来说，日子要困难得多：整体而言，财产与意外险行业几乎总是以承保亏损运行。当这种亏损很大时，浮存金就会变得昂贵，有时甚至是毁灭性的。
In 2004 our float cost us less than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance — absent a mega-catastrophe — of no-cost float in 2005. But we had the mega-cat, and as a specialist in that coverage, Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $3.4 billion. Nevertheless, our float was costless in 2005 because of the superb results we had in our other insurance activities, particularly at GEICO.
2004 年，我们的浮存金成本不仅不是正数，甚至低于零；我当时告诉你——如果没有发生超级巨灾——2005 年我们也有机会实现“零成本浮存金”。但超级巨灾确实发生了；作为该类保险的专业承保方，Berkshire 遭受了 34 亿美元的飓风损失。尽管如此，由于我们其他保险业务（尤其是 GEICO）取得了极其出色的成绩，2005 年我们的浮存金依然是零成本。
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Auto policies in force grew by 12.1% at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of U.S. private passenger auto business from about 5.6% to about 6.1%. Auto insurance is a big business: Each share-point equates to $1.6 billion in sales.
GEICO 的在保汽车保单数量增长了 12.1%，这一增长使其在美国私人乘用车保险业务中的市场份额从约 5.6% 提升到约 6.1%。车险是一门大生意：市场份额每提高 1 个百分点，就相当于 16 亿美元的销售额。
While our brand strength is not quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly. When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual advertising expenditures were $31 million. Last year we were up to $502 million. And I can’t wait to spend more.
尽管我们的品牌实力无法量化，但我相信它也显著增强了。Berkshire 在 1996 年取得 GEICO 的控制权时，GEICO 每年的广告支出是 3,100 万美元。去年我们已经增加到 5.02 亿美元。而且我迫不及待想花得更多。
Our advertising works because we have a great story to tell: More people can save money by insuring with us than is the case with any other national carrier offering policies to all comers. (Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for applicants fitting into their niches; also, because our national competitors use rating systems that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.) Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate — the percentage of internet and phone quotes turned into sales — in our history. This is powerful evidence that our prices are more attractive relative to the competition than ever before. Test us by going to GEICO.com or by calling 800-847-7536. Be sure to indicate you are a shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a discount.
我们的广告之所以有效，是因为我们有一个很好的故事可以讲：与任何一家面向所有客户提供保单的全国性保险公司相比，更多的人通过在我们这里投保能省下钱。（有些专门化车险公司在其细分人群里表现特别好；另外，由于全国竞争对手使用的费率体系与我们不同，他们有时也会在价格上胜过我们。）去年，我们实现了迄今为止最高的转化率——也就是互联网和电话报价最终转化为销售的比例。这是强有力的证据，表明相对于竞争对手，我们的价格吸引力从未如此之强。你可以去 GEICO.com 或拨打 800-847-7536 来测试一下。记得说明你是股东，因为这一事实通常能让你获得折扣。
I told you last year about GEICO’s entry into New Jersey in August, 2004. Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new policyholders is running higher than in any other state, and by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to become the third largest auto insurer in New Jersey. There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead to steady gains in profitable business.
我去年提到过 GEICO 在 2004 年 8 月进入 New Jersey。那个州的司机非常喜欢我们。我们在那里新保单客户的续保率，正在高于其他任何一个州；并且到 2007 年某个时候，GEICO 很可能会成为 New Jersey 的第三大车险公司。在那里——就像在其他地方一样——我们的低成本带来低价格，从而在盈利性业务上持续稳步增长。
That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an article about the company — it’s reproduced on page 24 — when its market value was $7 million. As you can see, I called GEICO “The Security I Like Best.” And that’s what I still call it.
这种简单的公式在 55 年前我第一次发现 GEICO 时就立刻打动了我。事实上，21 岁时，我写过一篇关于这家公司的文章——复印在第 24 页——当时它的市值只有 700 万美元。你可以看到，我称 GEICO 为“我最喜欢的证券（The Security I Like Best）”。而这也是我直到今天仍然给它的称呼。
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We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.
我们在 General Re 和 National Indemnity 都有规模巨大的再保险业务。前者由 Joe Brandon 和 Tad Montross 负责，后者由 Ajit Jain 负责。考虑到席卷行业的异常飓风损失，这两家单位在 2005 年的表现都很不错。
It’s an open question whether atmospheric, oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the frequency or intensity of hurricanes. Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of Category 3 strength, or greater, hit the Southeastern and Gulf Coast states, and that only three of these were Category 5s. We further know that in 2004 there were three Category 3 storms that hammered those areas and that these were followed by four more in 2005, one of them, Katrina, the most destructive hurricane in industry history. Moreover, there were three Category 5s near the coast last year that fortunately weakened before landfall.
关于大气、海洋或其他致因因素是否已经显著改变了飓风发生的频率或强度，目前仍是一个未解之问。最近的经验令人担忧。比如我们知道，在 2004 年之前的 100 年里，袭击美国东南部和墨西哥湾沿岸州、强度达到 3 级或以上的飓风大约有 59 个，其中只有 3 个是 5 级。我们还知道，2004 年有 3 个 3 级飓风重创了这些地区，2005 年又接踵而至 4 个，其中一个——Katrina——是保险业历史上破坏性最大的飓风。此外，去年近海还出现了 3 个 5 级飓风，所幸在登陆前减弱了。
Was this onslaught of more frequent and more intense storms merely an anomaly? Or was it caused by changes in climate, water temperature or other variables we don’t fully understand? And could these factors be developing in a manner that will soon produce disasters dwarfing Katrina?
这次更频繁、更强烈风暴的猛攻，仅仅是一次异常吗？还是由气候、水温或其他我们尚未充分理解的变量变化所导致？而这些因素会不会正在以某种方式发展，使得不久的将来出现远远超过 Katrina 的灾难？
Joe, Ajit and I don’t know the answer to these all-important questions. What we do know is that our ignorance means we must follow the course prescribed by Pascal in his famous wager about the existence of God. As you may recall, he concluded that since he didn’t know the answer, his personal gain/loss ratio dictated an affirmative conclusion.
Joe、Ajit 和我并不知道这些至关重要问题的答案。但我们知道：正因为无知，我们必须遵循 Pascal 在其著名“上帝是否存在”的赌注里所给出的路径。你也许记得，他的结论是：既然他不知道答案，那么从个人得失比的角度出发，他应当选择“相信”。
So guided, we’ve concluded that we should now write mega-cat policies only at prices far higher than prevailed last year — and then only with an aggregate exposure that would not cause us distress if shifts in some important variable produce far more costly storms in the near future. To a lesser degree, we felt this way after 2004 — and cut back our writings when prices didn’t move. Now our caution has intensified. If prices seem appropriate, however, we continue to have both the ability and the appetite to be the largest writer of mega-cat coverage in the world.
在这种思路的指引下，我们得出结论：现在我们只会在价格远高于去年水平的情况下承保超级巨灾（mega-cat）保单——而且还必须把总体风险敞口控制在一个范围内：即便某些关键变量发生变化、导致近期风暴成本大幅上升，我们也不会因此陷入困境。2004 年之后我们在较轻程度上就有这种感觉——当价格没有上移时，我们就减少了承保。现在我们的谨慎更加强了。不过，如果价格看起来合适，我们仍然既有能力、也有胃口，继续成为全球最大的超级巨灾保险承保方。
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Our smaller insurers, with MedPro added to the fold, delivered truly outstanding results last year. However, what you see in the table below does not do full justice to their performance. That’s because we increased the loss reserves of MedPro by about $125 million immediately after our purchase.
我们规模较小的保险公司——加上新并入的 MedPro——去年交出了真正出色的成绩。不过，你在下表里看到的数字，并不能完全体现它们的表现。原因是：我们在收购完成后立即把 MedPro 的损失准备金提高了大约 1.25 亿美元。
No one knows with any precision what amount will be required to pay the claims we inherited. Medical malpractice insurance is a “long-tail” line, meaning that claims often take many years to settle. In addition, there are other losses that have occurred, but that we won’t even hear about for some time. One thing, though, we have learned — the hard way — after many years in the business: Surprises in insurance are far from symmetrical. You are lucky if you get one that is pleasant for every ten that go the other way. Too often, however, insurers react to looming loss problems with optimism. They behave like the fellow in a switchblade fight who, after his opponent has taken a mighty swipe at his throat, exclaimed, “You never touched me.” His adversary’s reply: “Just wait until you try to shake your head.”
没有人能精确知道，我们为继承下来的索赔最终需要支付多少。医疗事故责任险属于“长尾”险种，意思是索赔往往需要很多年才会结案。此外，还有一些损失已经发生，但我们在相当长一段时间里甚至不会听说。只是有一点——我们在保险业摸爬滚打多年后、用惨痛代价学到的——保险里的“意外”远不是对称的：你要是能遇到一个“好意外”，通常得换来十个“坏意外”。但很多时候，保险公司面对隐约逼近的损失问题却会选择乐观。他们就像那个在弹簧刀斗殴里的人：对手狠狠朝他喉咙划了一刀后，他还喊道：“你根本没碰到我。”对手回答：“等你想摇摇头再说吧。”
Excluding the reserves we added for prior periods, MedPro wrote at an underwriting profit. And our other primary companies, in aggregate, had an underwriting profit of $324 million on $1,270 million of volume. This is an extraordinary result, and our thanks go to Rod Eldred of Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, John Kizer of Central States Indemnity, Tom Nerney of U. S. Liability, Don Towle of Kansas Bankers Surety and Don Wurster of National Indemnity.
如果剔除我们为以前期间补提的准备金，MedPro 的承保是盈利的。而我们其他直保公司合计，在 12.70 亿美元的保费规模上实现了承保利润 3.24 亿美元。这是一个极其非凡的结果。我们向 Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies 的 Rod Eldred、Central States Indemnity 的 John Kizer、U. S. Liability 的 Tom Nerney、Kansas Bankers Surety 的 Don Towle 以及 National Indemnity 的 Don Wurster 致以感谢。
Here’s the overall tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance:
下面是我们各主要保险板块的承保结果与浮存金情况总表：
Regulated Utility Business
受监管的公用事业业务
We have an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. When our PacifiCorp acquisition closes, we will add 1.6 million electric customers in six Western states, with Oregon and Utah providing us the most business. This transaction will increase MidAmerican’s revenues by $3.3 billion and its assets by $14.1 billion.
我们在 MidAmerican Energy Holdings（完全稀释后）持有 80.5% 的权益；该公司拥有多元化的公用事业运营资产，其中规模最大的是：(1) Yorkshire Electricity 和 Northern Electric，它们拥有 370 万电力客户，是英国第三大配电企业；(2) MidAmerican Energy，主要在 Iowa 为 706,000 名电力客户提供服务；以及 (3) Kern River 和 Northern Natural 两条管道，它们输送了美国天然气消费量的 7.8%。当我们对 PacifiCorp 的收购完成交割后，我们将新增分布在美国西部六个州的 160 万电力客户，其中 Oregon 和 Utah 将贡献我们最多的业务。这笔交易将使 MidAmerican 的收入增加 33 亿美元、资产增加 141 亿美元。
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”) was repealed on August 8, 2005, a milestone that allowed Berkshire to convert its MidAmerican preferred stock into voting common shares on February 9, 2006. This conversion ended a convoluted corporate arrangement that PUHCA had forced upon us. Now we have 83.4% of both the common stock and the votes at MidAmerican, which allows us to consolidate the company’s income for financial accounting and tax purposes. Our true economic interest, however, is the aforementioned 80.5%, since there are options outstanding that are sure to be exercised within a few years and that upon exercise will dilute our ownership.
《Public Utility Holding Company Act》（“PUHCA”）于 2005 年 8 月 8 日被废除，这是一个里程碑，使 Berkshire 能在 2006 年 2 月 9 日把我们持有的 MidAmerican 优先股转换为具有表决权的普通股。这次转换结束了 PUHCA 强加给我们的那套迂回复杂的公司架构。现在，我们在 MidAmerican 同时拥有 83.4% 的普通股以及 83.4% 的投票权，这使我们可以在财务会计与税务目的下合并 MidAmerican 的利润。不过，我们真实的经济权益仍是前面提到的 80.5%，因为公司尚有未行权期权，几乎肯定会在未来几年内被行使；一旦行使，我们的持股比例将被稀释。
Though our voting power has increased dramatically, the dynamics of our four-party ownership have not changed at all. We view MidAmerican as a partnership among Berkshire, Walter Scott, and two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we will make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Five years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
尽管我们的投票权大幅提升，但四方持股的合作关系在运作层面并没有任何改变。我们把 MidAmerican 视为 Berkshire、Walter Scott 以及两位杰出经理人 Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel 之间的合伙事业。各方拥有多少票并不重要；只有当我们一致认为某项重大行动明智时，我们才会推进。与 Dave、Greg 和 Walter 共事五年，更加印证了我最初的判断：Berkshire 不可能找到更好的合伙人。
You will notice that this year we have provided you with two balance sheets, one representing our actual figures per GAAP on December 31, 2005 (which does not consolidate MidAmerican) and one that reflects the subsequent conversion of our preferred. All future financial reports of Berkshire will include MidAmerican’s figures.
你会注意到，今年我们向你提供了两张资产负债表：一张反映 2005 年 12 月 31 日按 GAAP 口径编制的实际数据（其中并未合并 MidAmerican），另一张则反映我们随后完成的优先股转换。此后 Berkshire 的所有财务报告都会纳入 MidAmerican 的数据。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S. And it’s a gem. The parent company’s name is HomeServices of America, but our 19,200 agents operate through 18 locally-branded firms. Aided by three small acquisitions, we participated in $64 billion of transactions last year, up 6.5% from 2004.
有些不太“搭调”的是，MidAmerican 还拥有美国第二大的房地产经纪公司——而且是一块宝。母公司的名字是 HomeServices of America，但我们 19,200 名经纪人分布在 18 家采用本地品牌运营的公司之中。受三笔小型收购的推动，我们去年参与完成的房地产交易额达到 640 亿美元，比 2004 年增长 6.5%。
Currently, the white-hot market in residential real estate of recent years is cooling down, and that should lead to additional acquisition possibilities for us. Both we and Ron Peltier, the company’s CEO, expect HomeServices to be far larger a decade from now.
近几年炙热的住宅房地产市场正在降温，这应该会给我们带来更多收购机会。我们和公司 CEO Ron Peltier 都预计，十年后 HomeServices 的规模会大得多。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
下面是 MidAmerican 业务运营的一些关键数据：
Finance and Financial Products
金融与金融产品
The star of our finance sector is Clayton Homes, masterfully run by Kevin Clayton. He does not owe his brilliant record to a rising tide: The manufactured-housing business has been disappointing since Berkshire purchased Clayton in 2003. Industry sales have stagnated at 40-year lows, and the recent uptick from Katrina-related demand will almost certainly be short-lived. In recent years, many industry participants have suffered losses, and only Clayton has earned significant money.
我们金融板块的明星是 Clayton Homes，这家公司由 Kevin Clayton 卓越地掌舵。他的辉煌业绩并不是“水涨船高”的结果：自 Berkshire 于 2003 年收购 Clayton 以来，预制住宅（manufactured-housing）行业一直令人失望。行业销量长期停滞在 40 年低位；而 Katrina 带来的短期需求回升，几乎肯定难以持久。近几年，行业里很多参与者都在亏损，只有 Clayton 赚到了可观的钱。
In this brutal environment Clayton has bought a large amount of manufactured-housing loans from major banks that found them unprofitable and difficult to service. Clayton’s operating expertise and Berkshire’s financial resources have made this an excellent business for us and one in which we are preeminent. We presently service $17 billion of loans, compared to $5.4 billon at the time of our purchase. Moreover, Clayton now owns $9.6 billion of its servicing portfolio, a position built up almost entirely since Berkshire entered the picture.
在如此残酷的环境下，Clayton 从多家大型银行手里买入了大量预制住宅贷款——这些银行发现这类贷款既不赚钱、又难以管理。凭借 Clayton 的运营能力与 Berkshire 的资金实力，这对我们来说成了一门极好的生意，而且我们在其中处于领先地位。目前我们管理的贷款规模为 170 亿美元，而在我们收购时这一数字是 54 亿美元。此外，Clayton 现在在其所管理的贷款组合中自持 96 亿美元——这几乎全部是在 Berkshire 加入之后建立起来的头寸。
To finance this portfolio, Clayton borrows money from Berkshire, which in turn borrows the same amount publicly. For the use of its credit, Berkshire charges Clayton a one percentage-point markup on its borrowing cost. In 2005, the cost to Clayton for this arrangement was $83 million. That amount is included in “Other” income in the table on the facing page, and Clayton’s earnings of $416 million are after deducting this payment.
为了给这份贷款组合融资，Clayton 向 Berkshire 借钱，而 Berkshire 再以同等金额在公开市场融资。作为使用 Berkshire 信用的代价，Berkshire 会在自身借款成本之上向 Clayton 加收 1 个百分点。2005 年，这项安排让 Clayton 付出的成本是 8,300 万美元。该金额计入对页表格中的“Other（其他）”收入，而 Clayton 的 4.16 亿美元利润是在扣除这笔付款之后的数值。
On the manufacturing side, Clayton has also been active. To its original base of twenty plants, it first added twelve more in 2004 by way of the bankruptcy purchase of Oakwood, which just a few years earlier was one of the largest companies in the business. Then in 2005 Clayton purchased Karsten, a four-plant operation that greatly strengthens Clayton’s position on the West Coast.
在制造端，Clayton 也同样积极扩张。它最初有 20 家工厂，2004 年先通过收购破产的 Oakwood 又增加了 12 家工厂——而就在几年前，Oakwood 还是行业里最大的公司之一。随后在 2005 年，Clayton 又收购了 Karsten（拥有 4 家工厂的业务），这大幅强化了 Clayton 在美国西海岸的地位。
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Long ago, Mark Twain said: “A man who tries to carry a cat home by its tail will learn a lesson that can be learned in no other way.” If Twain were around now, he might try winding up a derivatives business. After a few days, he would opt for cats.
很久以前，Mark Twain 说过：“一个试图拽着猫尾巴把猫带回家的人，会学到一种别无他法能学到的教训。”如果 Twain 今天还在世，他可能会试着去收尾一家衍生品业务。几天之后，他会选择继续拽猫。
We lost $104 million pre-tax last year in our continuing attempt to exit Gen Re’s derivative operation. Our aggregate losses since we began this endeavor total $404 million.
为了持续退出 Gen Re 的衍生品业务，我们去年税前亏损了 1.04 亿美元。自从我们开始做这件事以来，累计亏损达到 4.04 亿美元。
Originally we had 23,218 contracts outstanding. By the start of 2005 we were down to 2,890. You might expect that our losses would have been stemmed by this point, but the blood has kept flowing. Reducing our inventory to 741 contracts last year cost us the $104 million mentioned above.
起初我们有 23,218 份未平仓合约。到 2005 年初，我们已降到 2,890 份。你可能以为到这时候亏损应该止住了，但“流血”仍在继续。去年我们把存量进一步降到 741 份合约，为此付出了上面提到的 1.04 亿美元代价。
Remember that the rationale for establishing this unit in 1990 was Gen Re’s wish to meet the needs of insurance clients. Yet one of the contracts we liquidated in 2005 had a term of 100 years! It’s difficult to imagine what “need” such a contract could fulfill except, perhaps, the need of a compensation-conscious trader to have a long-dated contract on his books. Long contracts, or alternatively those with multiple variables, are the most difficult to mark to market (the standard procedure used in accounting for derivatives) and provide the most opportunity for “imagination” when traders are estimating their value. Small wonder that traders promote them.
请记得，当初在 1990 年设立这个部门的理由，是 Gen Re 希望满足保险客户的需求。然而，我们在 2005 年清算的一份合约，期限竟然长达 100 年！很难想象这种合约能满足什么“需求”，除非——也许——满足某个对薪酬极其敏感的交易员：希望账上有一份超长期合约。超长期合约，或者包含多个变量的合约，是最难按市值计价（衍生品会计的标准做法）的，也给交易员在估值时发挥“想象力”提供了最大的空间。难怪交易员会推销这种合约。
A business in which huge amounts of compensation flow from assumed numbers is obviously fraught with danger. When two traders execute a transaction that has several, sometimes esoteric, variables and a far-off settlement date, their respective firms must subsequently value these contracts whenever they calculate their earnings. A given contract may be valued at one price by Firm A and at another by Firm B. You can bet that the valuation differences — and I’m personally familiar with several that were huge — tend to be tilted in a direction favoring higher earnings at each firm. It’s a strange world in which two parties can carry out a paper transaction that each can promptly report as profitable.
一个行业里，巨额薪酬来自“假设出来的数字”，显然风险极大。当两名交易员做出一笔交易，合约里包含多个（有时还很晦涩的）变量，并且结算日期遥远时，他们所在的公司随后在每次计算收益时都必须给这些合约估值。同一份合约，Firm A 可能用一个价格估，Firm B 用另一个价格估。你完全可以打赌：这些估值差异——我本人就见过几笔差异巨大——往往会朝着“让各自公司利润更高”的方向倾斜。真是一个奇怪的世界：两方做了一笔纸面交易，随后双方都能立刻把它报告成“盈利”。
I dwell on our experience in derivatives each year for two reasons. One is personal and unpleasant. The hard fact is that I have cost you a lot of money by not moving immediately to close down Gen Re’s trading operation. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the Gen Re purchase that it was a problem and told its management that we wanted to exit the business. It was my responsibility to make sure that happened. Rather than address the situation head on, however, I wasted several years while we attempted to sell the operation. That was a doomed endeavor because no realistic solution could have extricated us from the maze of liabilities that was going to exist for decades. Our obligations were particularly worrisome because their potential to explode could not be measured. Moreover, if severe trouble occurred, we knew it was likely to correlate with problems elsewhere in financial markets.
我每年都会反复谈我们在衍生品上的经历，原因有二。其一是私人的、而且不愉快：残酷的事实是，我因为没有立刻关闭 Gen Re 的交易业务，让你们损失了很多钱。我们在收购 Gen Re 时，Charlie 和我就知道这是一桩麻烦事，并且告诉管理层我们想退出这项业务。确保它发生，是我的责任。但我没有正面处理，而是在我们试图出售这项业务的过程中浪费了好几年。这从一开始就注定失败，因为任何现实的方案都无法让我们从未来几十年将持续存在的负债迷宫中抽身。我们的义务尤其令人担忧，因为它们“爆炸”的潜力无法衡量。更进一步，如果真的发生严重问题，我们也知道它很可能与金融市场其他地方的麻烦高度相关联。
So I failed in my attempt to exit painlessly, and in the meantime more trades were put on the books. Fault me for dithering. (Charlie calls it thumb-sucking.) When a problem exists, whether in personnel or in business operations, the time to act is now.
所以，我没能如愿“体面地、无痛地”退出；而在此期间，又有更多交易被记在账上。请怪我犹豫不决。（Charlie 把这叫作“吮拇指”。）无论问题出在人事还是业务运作上，只要问题存在，行动的时点就是现在。
The second reason I regularly describe our problems in this area lies in the hope that our experiences may prove instructive for managers, auditors and regulators. In a sense, we are a canary in this business coal mine and should sing a song of warning as we expire. The number and value of derivative contracts outstanding in the world continues to mushroom and is now a multiple of what existed in 1998, the last time that financial chaos erupted.
我之所以经常讲这块业务的问题，第二个原因是：希望我们的经历能给管理层、审计师和监管者提供一些教训。从某种意义上说，我们就是这座“衍生品煤矿”里的金丝雀——当我们在里面走向死亡时，就应该唱出一首警告之歌。全球衍生品合约的数量与价值仍在蘑菇式膨胀，如今已是 1998 年（上一次金融混乱爆发时）规模的数倍。
Our experience should be particularly sobering because we were a better-than-average candidate to exit gracefully. Gen Re was a relatively minor operator in the derivatives field. It has had the good fortune to unwind its supposedly liquid positions in a benign market, all the while free of financial or other pressures that might have forced it to conduct the liquidation in a less-than-efficient manner. Our accounting in the past was conventional and actually thought to be conservative. Additionally, we know of no bad behavior by anyone involved.
我们的经历尤其令人警醒，因为我们本该是“比平均水平更容易优雅退出”的那类案例。Gen Re 在衍生品领域只是一个相对小的参与者。我们也很幸运：能够在一个温和的市场环境里，逐步解除那些据称“流动性很强”的头寸；而且整个过程中没有任何财务或其他压力迫使我们以低效方式去清算。我们过去的会计处理属于常规做法，并且实际上被认为是偏保守的。此外，我们也不知道参与者中有任何不当行为。
It could be a different story for others in the future. Imagine, if you will, one or more firms (troubles often spread) with positions that are many multiples of ours attempting to liquidate in chaotic markets and under extreme, and well-publicized, pressures. This is a scenario to which much attention should be given now rather than after the fact. The time to have considered — and improved — the reliability of New Orleans’ levees was before Katrina.
但对未来的其他人来说，故事可能完全不同。你可以想象：一家或多家机构（麻烦往往会扩散）在混乱的市场里、在极端且广受关注的压力之下，试图清算其规模远远大于我们数倍的头寸。这种情景应当在现在就引起足够重视，而不是等事后再追悔。New Orleans 的堤坝可靠性，本该在 Katrina 之前就被认真考虑并加以改善。
When we finally wind up Gen Re Securities, my feelings about its departure will be akin to those expressed in a country song, “My wife ran away with my best friend, and I sure miss him a lot.”
当我们最终把 Gen Re Securities 收尾完毕时，我对它离场的心情，大概会像一首乡村歌曲里唱的那样：“我老婆跟我最好的朋友跑了，而我真是非常想念他。”
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Below are the results of our various finance and financial products activities:
下面是我们各项金融与金融产品业务的经营结果：
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Berkshire 在这一部分的业务几乎无所不包、覆盖面极广。不过，我们先看一下整个板块的汇总资产负债表和收益表：
This eclectic collection, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s, earned a very respectable 22.2% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly, we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.1%.
这一组“混搭”的业务——所售产品从 Dilly Bars 一直到 Boeing 737 的分拆权益——去年在平均有形净资产上的回报率达到了相当可观的 22.2%。同样值得注意的是：这些业务在实现这一回报时，只使用了很少的财务杠杆。显然，我们拥有一些极其出色的企业。不过，我们收购其中许多企业时，支付的价格相对于净资产有显著溢价——这一点体现在资产负债表里的 goodwill（商誉）项目上——而这种溢价会把我们按平均账面计量价值计算的收益率拉低到 10.1%。
Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units.
下面是较大类别或单位的税前利润：
• In both our building-products companies and at Shaw, we continue to be hit by rising costs for raw materials and energy. Most of these operations are significant users of oil (or more specifically, petrochemicals) and natural gas. And prices for these commodities have soared.
在我们的建材公司以及 Shaw（地毯业务）中，我们仍持续受到原材料与能源成本上涨的冲击。这些业务大多大量使用石油（更具体地说是石化产品）以及天然气，而这些大宗商品的价格已经大幅飙升。
We, likewise, have raised prices on many products, but there are often lags before increases become effective. Nevertheless, both our building-products operations and Shaw delivered respectable results in 2005, a fact attributable to their strong business franchises and able managements.
同样地，我们也提高了许多产品的售价，但提价往往需要一段时间才能真正生效。不过，尽管如此，我们的建材业务与 Shaw 在 2005 年仍交出了可观的成绩，这要归功于它们强大的商业特许经营优势（business franchises）以及能干的管理层。
• In apparel, our largest unit, Fruit of the Loom, again increased earnings and market-share. You know, of course, of our leadership position in men’s and boys’ underwear, in which we account for about 48.7% of the sales recorded by mass-marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, etc.). That’s up from 44.2% in 2002, when we acquired the company. Operating from a smaller base, we have made still greater gains in intimate apparel for women and girls that is sold by the mass-marketers, climbing from 13.7% of their sales in 2002 to 24.7% in 2005. A gain like that in a major category doesn’t come easy. Thank John Holland, Fruit’s extraordinary CEO, for making this happen.
在服装业务方面，我们最大的单位 Fruit of the Loom 再次提高了利润和市场份额。你当然知道，我们在男士与男孩内衣领域处于领先地位：在大众零售商（Wal-Mart、Target 等）记录的销售额中，我们约占 48.7%。而在我们收购该公司的 2002 年，这一比例是 44.2%。在更小的基数上，我们在面向大众零售商销售的女性与女孩贴身衣物（intimate apparel）方面取得了更大的增长：从 2002 年占其销售额的 13.7%，上升到 2005 年的 24.7%。在一个重要品类里做到这样的提升绝非易事。请感谢 Fruit 非凡的 CEO——John Holland——让这一切成为现实。
• I told you last year that Ben Bridge (jewelry) and R. C. Willey (home furnishings) had same-store sales gains far above the average of their industries. You might think that blow-out figures in one year would make comparisons difficult in the following year. But Ed and Jon Bridge at their operation and Scott Hymas at R. C. Willey were more than up to this challenge. Ben Bridge had a 6.6% same-store gain in 2005, and R. C. Willey came in at 9.9%.
我去年告诉过你，Ben Bridge（珠宝）与 R. C. Willey（家居用品）同店销售增长远高于行业平均水平。你可能会以为，某一年“爆炸式”的数据会让下一年的同比变得很难看。但 Ben Bridge 的 Ed 和 Jon Bridge，以及 R. C. Willey 的 Scott Hymas 完全经受住了挑战。Ben Bridge 在 2005 年实现了 6.6% 的同店增长，R. C. Willey 则达到 9.9%。
Our never-on-Sunday approach at R. C. Willey continues to overwhelm seven-day competitors as we roll out stores in new markets. The Boise store, about which I was such a skeptic a few years back, had a 21% gain in 2005, coming off a 10% gain in 2004. Our new Reno store, opened in November, broke out of the gate fast with sales that exceeded Boise’s early pace, and we will begin business in Sacramento in June. If this store succeeds as I expect it to, Californians will see many more R. C. Willey stores in the years to come.
R. C. Willey 的“周日不开门”策略，在我们进入新市场开店时，依然持续压倒那些七天营业的竞争对手。几年前我曾非常怀疑的 Boise 门店，2005 年在 2004 年增长 10% 的基础上，又增长了 21%。我们 11 月开业的新 Reno 门店也起步迅猛，销售节奏甚至超过 Boise 的早期表现；而我们将在 6 月进入 Sacramento。如果这家店如我预期般成功，未来几年加州人将会看到更多的 R. C. Willey 门店。
• In flight services, earnings improved at FlightSafety as corporate aviation continued its rebound. To support growth, we invest heavily in new simulators. Our most recent expansion, bringing us to 42 training centers, is a major facility at Farnborough, England that opened in September. When it is fully built out in 2007, we will have invested more than $100 million in the building and its 15 simulators. Bruce Whitman, FlightSafety’s able CEO, makes sure that no competitor comes close to offering the breadth and depth of services that we do.
在飞行服务业务方面，随着企业航空持续复苏，FlightSafety 的利润有所改善。为了支持增长，我们在新模拟机上的投入非常大。我们最近一次扩张——使培训中心总数达到 42 个——是在英国 Farnborough 建成的一处大型设施，并于 9 月启用。等到 2007 年全部建成时，我们在该建筑及其 15 台模拟机上的投资将超过 1 亿美元。FlightSafety 能干的 CEO Bruce Whitman 确保：没有任何竞争对手能在服务的广度和深度上接近我们。
Operating results at NetJets were a different story. I said last year that this business would earn money in 2005 — and I was dead wrong.
而 NetJets 的经营结果则是另一番故事。我去年说这项业务会在 2005 年赚钱——事实证明我大错特错。
Our European operation, it should be noted, showed both excellent growth and a reduced loss. Customer contracts there increased by 37%. We are the only fractional-ownership operation of any size in Europe, and our now-pervasive presence there is a key factor in making NetJets the worldwide leader in this industry.
需要指出的是，我们的欧洲业务既实现了出色增长，也缩小了亏损。那里的客户合约数量增长了 37%。我们是欧洲唯一一家具有相当规模的分时所有权（fractional-ownership）运营商，而我们如今在欧洲无处不在的存在感，是 NetJets 成为该行业全球领导者的关键因素之一。
Despite a large increase in customers, however, our U.S. operation dipped far into the red. Its efficiency fell, and costs soared. We believe that our three largest competitors suffered similar problems, but each is owned by aircraft manufacturers that may think differently than we do about the necessity of making adequate profits. The combined value of the fleets managed by these three competitors, in any case, continues to be less valuable than the fleet that we operate.
然而，尽管客户大幅增加，我们在美国的业务却深陷亏损。效率下降、成本飙升。我们相信三家最大竞争对手也遇到了类似问题，但它们都隶属于飞机制造商；在“是否必须赚到足够利润”这件事上，它们可能与我们的想法不同。无论如何，这三家竞争对手所管理机队的合计价值，仍然比我们运营的机队价值更小。
Rich Santulli, one of the most dynamic managers I’ve ever met, will solve our revenue/expense problem. He won’t do it, however, in a manner that impairs the quality of the NetJets experience. Both he and I are committed to a level of service, security and safety that can’t be matched by others.
Rich Santulli 是我见过最具活力的管理者之一，他会解决我们的收入/费用问题。不过，他不会以牺牲 NetJets 体验质量的方式来解决。无论是他还是我，都致力于一种服务水平、安保与安全标准——这是其他人无法匹敌的。
• Our retailing category includes See’s Candies, a company we bought early in 1972 (a date making it our oldest non-insurance business). At that time, Charlie and I immediately decided to put Chuck Huggins, then 46, in charge. Though we were new at the game of selecting managers, Charlie and I hit a home run with this appointment. Chuck’s love for the customer and the brand permeated the organization, which in his 34-year tenure produced a more-than-tenfold increase in profits. This gain was achieved in an industry growing at best slowly and perhaps not at all. (Volume figures in this industry are hard to pin down.)
我们的零售板块包括 See’s Candies——这家公司我们在 1972 年初就买下了（因此它是我们最早的一家非保险业务）。当时 Charlie 和我立刻决定让当时 46 岁的 Chuck Huggins 来负责。尽管那时我们在“挑选经理人”这门游戏里还是新手，但这次任命，Charlie 和我确实打出了一个全垒打。Chuck 对顾客与品牌的热爱渗透进整个组织；在他 34 年的任期里，公司利润增长了十倍以上。这个增长是在一个最多也只是缓慢增长、甚至可能完全不增长的行业里实现的。（这个行业的销量数据很难准确掌握。）
At yearend, Chuck turned the reins at See’s over to Brad Kinstler, who previously had served Berkshire well while running Cypress Insurance and Fechheimer’s. It’s unusual for us to move managers around, but Brad’s record made him an obvious choice for the See’s job. I hope Chuck and his wife, Donna, are at the annual meeting. If they are, shareholders can join Charlie and me in giving America’s number one candy maker a richly-deserved round of applause.
年末，Chuck 把 See’s 的接力棒交给了 Brad Kinstler。Brad 之前在管理 Cypress Insurance 和 Fechheimer’s 时就为 Berkshire 立下了汗马功劳。我们很少在不同公司之间调动经理人，但 Brad 的履历让他显然是 See’s 这个岗位的最佳人选。我希望 Chuck 和他的妻子 Donna 能来参加股东大会。如果他们来了，股东们可以和 Charlie、我一起，用一阵理应得到的掌声，致敬美国第一的糖果制造商。
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Every day, in countless ways, the competitive position of each of our businesses grows either weaker or stronger. If we are delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs and improving our products and services, we gain strength. But if we treat customers with indifference or tolerate bloat, our businesses will wither. On a daily basis, the effects of our actions are imperceptible; cumulatively, though, their consequences are enormous.
每天，用无数种方式，我们每一项业务的竞争地位都在变强或变弱。如果我们让客户感到满意、消除不必要的成本、并持续改进产品与服务，我们就会变强；但如果我们对客户漠不关心，或容忍组织臃肿，我们的业务就会枯萎。就日常而言，我们行动的影响几乎察觉不到；但累积起来，它们的后果却极其巨大。
When our long-term competitive position improves as a result of these almost unnoticeable actions, we describe the phenomenon as “widening the moat.” And doing that is essential if we are to have the kind of business we want a decade or two from now. We always, of course, hope to earn more money in the short-term. But when short-term and long-term conflict, widening the moat must take precedence. If a management makes bad decisions in order to hit short-term earnings targets, and consequently gets behind the eight-ball in terms of costs, customer satisfaction or brand strength, no amount of subsequent brilliance will overcome the damage that has been inflicted. Take a look at the dilemmas of managers in the auto and airline industries today as they struggle with the huge problems handed them by their predecessors. Charlie is fond of quoting Ben Franklin’s “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” But sometimes no amount of cure will overcome the mistakes of the past.
当这些几乎不可察觉的行动，让我们长期竞争地位得到改善时，我们把这种现象称为“widening the moat（拓宽护城河）”。而如果我们希望在未来十年或二十年拥有我们想要的那种企业，拓宽护城河就是必不可少的。当然，我们总希望短期能赚到更多钱。但当短期与长期发生冲突时，拓宽护城河必须优先。如果管理层为了达成短期盈利目标而做出糟糕决策，结果在成本、客户满意度或品牌强度上陷入被动，那么之后再多的聪明才智也无法弥补已经造成的伤害。看看今天汽车业与航空业的管理者所面临的困境就知道了：他们正在努力处理前任留下的巨大问题。Charlie 很喜欢引用 Ben Franklin 的话：“一分预防胜过十分治疗。”但有时，再多的治疗也无法克服过去的错误。
Our managers focus on moat-widening — and are brilliant at it. Quite simply, they are passionate about their businesses. Usually, they were running those long before we came along; our only function since has been to stay out of the way. If you see these heroes — and our four heroines as well — at the annual meeting, thank them for the job they do for you.
我们的经理人专注于拓宽护城河——并且在这方面极其出色。说到底，他们对自己的业务充满热情。通常，在我们出现之前，他们就已经经营这些业务很久；而我们此后唯一的作用，就是不去碍事。如果你在股东大会上见到这些英雄——也包括我们的四位女英雄——请感谢他们为你所做的工作。
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The attitude of our managers vividly contrasts with that of the young man who married a tycoon’s only child, a decidedly homely and dull lass. Relieved, the father called in his new son-in-law after the wedding and began to discuss the future:
我们经理人的态度，与下面这个年轻人的态度形成了鲜明对比：他娶了某位大亨唯一的女儿——一个相当其貌不扬、而且乏味的姑娘。婚礼之后，父亲松了一口气，把新女婿叫来，开始谈未来：
“Son, you’re the boy I always wanted and never had. Here’s a stock certificate for 50% of the company. You’re my equal partner from now on.”
“孩子，你就是我一直想要、却一直没有的儿子。这里是一张公司 50% 股份的股票凭证。从现在起，你就是与我平起平坐的合伙人了。”
Thanks, dad.”
“谢谢，爸爸。”
“Now, what would you like to run? How about sales?”
“那么，你想负责哪块业务？比如销售？”
“I’m afraid I couldn’t sell water to a man crawling in the Sahara.”
“恐怕我连卖水给在撒哈拉爬行的人都做不到。”
“Well then, how about heading human relations?”
“那这样，负责人力资源怎么样？”
“I really don’t care for people.”
“我其实不太喜欢人。”
“No problem, we have lots of other spots in the business. What would you like to do?”
“没问题，公司里还有很多岗位。你想做什么？”
“Actually, nothing appeals to me. Why don’t you just buy me out?”
“说真的，没有什么能让我感兴趣。要不您把我那份直接买回去吧？”
Investments
投资
We show below our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the end of 2005 are itemized.
下面我们列示我们的普通股投资。在 2005 年年底市值超过 7 亿美元的持仓，会被单独列出。
A couple of last year’s changes in our portfolio occurred because of corporate events: Gillette was merged into Procter & Gamble, and American Express spun off Ameriprise. In addition, we substantially increased our holdings in Wells Fargo, a company that Dick Kovacevich runs brilliantly, and established positions in Anheuser-Busch and Wal-Mart.
我们去年投资组合的几项变化，源于公司层面的事件：Gillette 并入了 Procter & Gamble，American Express 分拆出了 Ameriprise。此外，我们大幅增持了 Wells Fargo——这家公司由 Dick Kovacevich 以卓越的能力掌舵——并新建了 Anheuser-Busch 和 Wal-Mart 的持仓。
Expect no miracles from our equity portfolio. Though we own major interests in a number of strong, highly-profitable businesses, they are not selling at anything like bargain prices. As a group, they may double in value in ten years. The likelihood is that their per-share earnings, in aggregate, will grow 68% per year over the decade and that their stock prices will more or less match that growth. (Their managers, of course, think my expectations are too modest — and I hope they’re right.)
别指望我们的股票投资组合能创造奇迹。尽管我们在若干强大且高盈利的企业中持有重要权益，但它们的交易价格一点也谈不上便宜。作为一个整体，它们也许能在十年里翻一倍。更可能的情况是：这些公司的每股收益合计在十年间将以 6%—8% 的年复合增长率增长，而它们的股价大体会与这种增长相匹配。（当然，它们的管理层会觉得我的预期太保守——我也希望他们是对的。）
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The P&G-Gillette merger, closing in the fourth quarter of 2005, required Berkshire to record a $5.0 billion pre-tax capital gain. This bookkeeping entry, dictated by GAAP, is meaningless from an economic standpoint, and you should ignore it when you are evaluating Berkshire’s 2005 earnings. We didn’t intend to sell our Gillette shares before the merger; we don’t intend to sell our P&G shares now; and we incurred no tax when the merger took place.
P&G-Gillette 的合并在 2005 年第四季度完成，按照规定，Berkshire 需要确认一笔 50 亿美元的税前资本利得。这是一项由 GAAP 强制要求的会计分录，从经济意义上讲毫无意义；当你评估 Berkshire 2005 年盈利时，应当把它忽略。我们在合并前并不打算卖掉 Gillette 的股票；合并后也不打算卖掉 P&G 的股票；并且合并发生时我们也没有产生任何税负。
It’s hard to overemphasize the importance of who is CEO of a company. Before Jim Kilts arrived at Gillette in 2001, the company was struggling, having particularly suffered from capital-allocation blunders. In the major example, Gillette’s acquisition of Duracell cost Gillette shareholders billions of dollars, a loss never made visible by conventional accounting. Quite simply, what Gillette received in business value in this acquisition was not equivalent to what it gave up. (Amazingly, this most fundamental of yardsticks is almost always ignored by both managements and their investment bankers when acquisitions are under discussion.)
很难夸大“一家公司由谁担任 CEO”这件事的重要性。在 2001 年 Jim Kilts 到来之前，Gillette 一直在挣扎，尤其在资本配置上的失误让公司深受其害。最典型的例子是：Gillette 收购 Duracell 让 Gillette 股东损失了数十亿美元——而传统会计并不会把这种损失清晰地呈现出来。说到底，这笔收购中 Gillette 得到的商业价值，并不等于它付出的代价。（令人惊讶的是，在讨论收购时，这个最根本的标尺几乎总是被管理层和他们的投行顾问忽视。）
Upon taking office at Gillette, Jim quickly instilled fiscal discipline, tightened operations and energized marketing, moves that dramatically increased the intrinsic value of the company. Gillette’s merger with P&G then expanded the potential of both companies. For his accomplishments, Jim was paid very well — but he earned every penny. (This is no academic evaluation: As a 9.7% owner of Gillette, Berkshire in effect paid that proportion of his compensation.) Indeed, it’s difficult to overpay the truly extraordinary CEO of a giant enterprise. But this species is rare.
Jim 上任 Gillette 后，很快就建立了财政纪律，收紧了运营并激活了市场营销，这些举措显著提升了公司的内在价值。随后 Gillette 与 P&G 的合并，又进一步扩大了两家公司的潜力。Jim 的成就让他获得了丰厚的报酬——但他每一分钱都赚得名副其实。（这不是学院式的评价：作为 Gillette 9.7% 的股东，Berkshire 实际上承担了他薪酬的相应比例。）事实上，对于一家巨型企业真正卓越的 CEO，很难说“付得太多”。但这种人非常稀少。
Too often, executive compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with performance. That won’t change, moreover, because the deck is stacked against investors when it comes to the CEO’s pay. The upshot is that a mediocre-or-worse CEO — aided by his handpicked VP of human relations and a consultant from the ever-accommodating firm of Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo — all too often receives gobs of money from an ill-designed compensation arrangement.
美国高管薪酬往往与业绩荒谬地不匹配。而且这种状况也不会改变，因为在 CEO 薪酬问题上，牌局对投资者极其不利。结果就是：一个平庸甚至更差的 CEO——在他亲自挑选的人力资源副总裁，以及来自永远“善解人意”的 Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo 咨询公司顾问的帮助下——常常会从一个设计糟糕的薪酬方案中捞到一大把钱。
Take, for instance, ten year, fixed-price options (and who wouldn’t?). If Fred Futile, CEO of Stagnant, Inc., receives a bundle of these — let’s say enough to give him an option on 1% of the company — his self-interest is clear: He should skip dividends entirely and instead use all of the company’s earnings to repurchase stock.
比如说，十年期、固定行权价的期权（谁不想要呢？）。如果 Stagnant, Inc. 的 CEO——Fred Futile——拿到一大捆这种期权——假设足以让他拥有公司 1% 的期权权益——他的自利动机就很明确：他应该完全不分红，把公司全部利润都用来回购股票。
分红附带的好处。
Let’s assume that under Fred’s leadership Stagnant lives up to its name. In each of the ten years after the option grant, it earns $1 billion on $10 billion of net worth, which initially comes to $10 per share on the 100 million shares then outstanding. Fred eschews dividends and regularly uses all earnings to repurchase shares. If the stock constantly sells at ten times earnings per share, it will have appreciated 158% by the end of the option period. That’s because repurchases would reduce the number of shares to 38.7 million by that time, and earnings per share would thereby increase to $25.80. Simply by withholding earnings from owners, Fred gets very rich, making a cool $158 million, despite the business itself improving not at all. Astonishingly, Fred could have made more than $100 million if Stagnant’s earnings had declined by 20% during the ten-year period.
假设在 Fred 的领导下，Stagnant 真的“名副其实”——毫无增长。在授予期权后的十年里，公司每年在 100 亿美元净资产上赚 10 亿美元；最初对应到当时 1 亿股流通股，就是每股收益 10 美元。Fred 不分红，并且每年把全部利润拿去回购股票。如果股价始终以每股收益的 10 倍交易，那么到了期权期满时，股价将上涨 158%。原因是：持续回购会把流通股数降到 3,870 万股，而每股收益就会因此提高到 25.80 美元。仅仅通过把本该属于股东的利润“扣下来”不发，Fred 就能暴富——净赚 1.58 亿美元——尽管公司本身一点也没有变好。更惊人的是：即便 Stagnant 的利润在十年间下降 20%，Fred 仍然可能赚到 1 亿多美元。
Fred can also get a splendid result for himself by paying no dividends and deploying the earnings he withholds from shareholders into a variety of disappointing projects and acquisitions. Even if these initiatives deliver a paltry 5% return, Fred will still make a bundle. Specifically — with Stagnant’s p/e ratio remaining unchanged at ten — Fred’s option will deliver him $63 million. Meanwhile, his shareholders will wonder what happened to the “alignment of interests” that was supposed to occur when Fred was issued options.
Fred 还可以通过不分红，把从股东那里扣下来的利润投入到一堆令人失望的项目与收购中，为自己取得同样漂亮的结果。即使这些举措只带来可怜的 5% 回报，Fred 仍然能赚一大笔。具体来说——在 Stagnant 的市盈率保持 10 倍不变的情况下——Fred 的期权也能让他赚到 6,300 万美元。与此同时，他的股东会纳闷：当初给 Fred 发期权时承诺的那种“利益一致”，到底跑到哪里去了。
A “normal” dividend policy, of course — one-third of earnings paid out, for example — produces less extreme results but still can provide lush rewards for managers who achieve nothing.
当然，即便采用一种“正常”的分红政策——比如把三分之一的利润分出去——结果也不会那么极端，但仍然足以让那些毫无作为的管理者获得丰厚回报。
CEOs understand this math and know that every dime paid out in dividends reduces the value of all outstanding options. I’ve never, however, seen this manager-owner conflict referenced in proxy materials that request approval of a fixed-priced option plan. Though CEOs invariably preach internally that capital comes at a cost, they somehow forget to tell shareholders that fixed-price options give them capital that is free.
CEO 们懂这套数学，并且知道：每多分出去一毛钱股息，就会降低所有未到期期权的价值。但我从未见过，在要求股东批准固定行权价期权计划的委托书材料里，有人提到过这种“经理人—所有者”之间的利益冲突。尽管 CEO 在公司内部总是宣讲“资本是有成本的”，他们却莫名其妙地忘了告诉股东：固定行权价期权让他们得到的是“零成本资本”。
It doesn’t have to be this way: It’s child’s play for a board to design options that give effect to the automatic build-up in value that occurs when earnings are retained. But — surprise, surprise — options of that kind are almost never issued. Indeed, the very thought of options with strike prices that are adjusted for retained earnings seems foreign to compensation “experts,” who are nevertheless encyclopedic about every management-friendly plan that exists. (“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.”)
事情本不必如此：董事会设计一种期权方案，让它把“留存收益自动累积所带来的价值增长”考虑进去，简直轻而易举。但——真是“意外中的意外”——这种期权几乎从不被发行。事实上，把期权行权价按留存收益进行调整的想法，对薪酬“专家”来说似乎完全陌生；然而他们对各种“对管理层友好”的方案却又熟得像百科全书一样。（“吃谁的面包，就唱谁的歌。”）
Getting fired can produce a particularly bountiful payday for a CEO. Indeed, he can “earn” more in that single day, while cleaning out his desk, than an American worker earns in a lifetime of cleaning toilets. Forget the old maxim about nothing succeeding like success: Today, in the executive suite, the alltoo-prevalent rule is that nothing succeeds like failure.
被解雇反而可能给 CEO 带来格外丰厚的回报。确实，他在那一天收拾办公桌时“赚到的钱”，可能比一位美国工人一辈子擦厕所赚得还多。别再念叨“成功会带来更多成功”的老格言了：如今在高管层里，过于常见的规则是——“失败最能带来成功”。
Huge severance payments, lavish perks and outsized payments for ho-hum performance often occur because comp committees have become slaves to comparative data. The drill is simple: Three or so directors — not chosen by chance — are bombarded for a few hours before a board meeting with pay statistics that perpetually ratchet upwards. Additionally, the committee is told about new perks that other managers are receiving. In this manner, outlandish “goodies” are showered upon CEOs simply because of a corporate version of the argument we all used when children: “But, Mom, all the other kids have one.” When comp committees follow this “logic,” yesterday’s most egregious excess becomes today’s baseline.
巨额遣散费、奢华福利、以及对平庸业绩的超额支付，经常发生，是因为薪酬委员会已经成了“对标数据”的奴隶。流程很简单：在董事会开会前的几个小时里，三位左右的董事（当然不是随机挑的）会被一堆薪酬统计数据狂轰滥炸——这些数据永远只会把标准往上拧。委员会还会听到别的公司又给管理层发了哪些新福利。于是，离谱的“好处”就这样被倾盆大雨般浇到 CEO 身上，理由不过是公司版的童年争辩——“可妈妈，别的孩子都有。”当薪酬委员会按这种“逻辑”办事时，昨天最荒唐的过度行为，就会变成今天的基准线。
Comp committees should adopt the attitude of Hank Greenberg, the Detroit slugger and a boyhood hero of mine. Hank’s son, Steve, at one time was a player’s agent. Representing an outfielder in negotiations with a major league club, Steve sounded out his dad about the size of the signing bonus he should ask for. Hank, a true pay-for-performance guy, got straight to the point, “What did he hit last year?” When Steve answered “.246,” Hank’s comeback was immediate: “Ask for a uniform.”
薪酬委员会应该学习 Hank Greenberg 的态度——这位 Detroit 的强打者，是我童年的偶像。Hank 的儿子 Steve 曾经当过球员经纪人。某次 Steve 代表一位外野手与大联盟球队谈判时，向父亲探口风：签约奖金该要多少。Hank 是真正的“按绩付薪”派，直奔主题：“他去年打了多少？”当 Steve 回答“.246”时，Hank 立刻回敬：“那就要一套球衣吧。”
(Let me pause for a brief confession: In criticizing comp committee behavior, I don’t speak as a true insider. Though I have served as a director of twenty public companies, only one CEO has put me on his comp committee. Hmmmm . . .)
（我在这里先作个小小的坦白：批评薪酬委员会的行为时，我并不是那种真正的“圈内人”。尽管我当过二十家上市公司的董事，但只有一位 CEO 曾把我安排进他的薪酬委员会。嗯……）
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My views on America’s long-term problem in respect to trade imbalances, which I have laid out in previous reports, remain unchanged. My conviction, however, cost Berkshire $955 million pre-tax in 2005. That amount is included in our earnings statement, a fact that illustrates the differing ways in which GAAP treats gains and losses. When we have a long-term position in stocks or bonds, year-to-year changes in value are reflected in our balance sheet but, as long as the asset is not sold, are rarely reflected in earnings. For example, our Coca-Cola holdings went from $1 billion in value early on to $13.4 billion at yearend 1998 and have since declined to $8.1 billion — with none of these moves affecting our earnings statement. Long-term currency positions, however, are daily marked to market and therefore have an effect on earnings in every reporting period. From the date we first entered into currency contracts, we are $2.0 billion in the black.
我对美国长期存在的贸易失衡问题的看法——我在之前的报告中已阐述过——依然没有改变。不过，我的这一信念在 2005 年让 Berkshire 付出了 9.55 亿美元的税前代价。这笔金额计入了我们的损益表，这一事实也说明了 GAAP 在处理收益与损失时方式并不相同：当我们长期持有股票或债券时，年度间的价值变动会反映在资产负债表里，但只要资产没有卖出，通常不会进入损益表。比如，我们持有的 Coca-Cola，早期市值从 10 亿美元涨到 1998 年年底的 134 亿美元，之后又跌到 81 亿美元——这些波动都没有影响我们的损益表。但长期外汇头寸不同，它们每天都按市值计量，因此在每个报告期都会影响利润表。自从我们首次进入外汇合约以来，我们总体上已经盈利 20 亿美元。
We reduced our direct position in currencies somewhat during 2005. We partially offset this change, however, by purchasing equities whose prices are denominated in a variety of foreign currencies and that earn a large part of their profits internationally. Charlie and I prefer this method of acquiring nondollar exposure. That’s largely because of changes in interest rates: As U.S. rates have risen relative to those of the rest of the world, holding most foreign currencies now involves a significant negative “carry.” The carry aspect of our direct currency position indeed cost us money in 2005 and is likely to do so again in 2006. In contrast, the ownership of foreign equities is likely, over time, to create a positive carry — perhaps a substantial one.
我们在 2005 年适度降低了直接持有的外汇头寸。但我们又通过另一种方式部分抵消了这一变化：买入了一些以多种外币计价的股票，这些公司也有相当大一部分利润来自国际业务。Charlie 和我更偏好用这种方式来获得“非美元敞口”。主要原因在于利率变化：随着美国利率相对全球其他地区上升，如今持有多数外币会带来显著的负“carry（持有成本/负利差）”。我们直接外汇头寸中的 carry 因素在 2005 年确实让我们亏了钱，并且很可能在 2006 年还会继续如此。相反，持有外国股票从长期看更可能产生正 carry——甚至可能相当可观。
The underlying factors affecting the U.S. current account deficit continue to worsen, and no letup is in sight. Not only did our trade deficit — the largest and most familiar item in the current account — hit an all-time high in 2005, but we also can expect a second item — the balance of investment income — to soon turn negative. As foreigners increase their ownership of U.S. assets (or of claims against us) relative to U.S. investments abroad, these investors will begin earning more on their holdings than we do on ours. Finally, the third component of the current account, unilateral transfers, is always negative.
影响美国经常账户赤字的底层因素仍在恶化，看不到缓解迹象。2005 年，不仅我们的贸易逆差——经常账户中最大、也最为人熟知的项目——创下历史新高，我们还可以预期第二个项目——投资收益差额（balance of investment income）——很快也会转为负值。随着外国人相对美国在海外的投资不断增加其对美国资产（或对我们的债权）的持有比例，这些投资者将开始从其持仓上赚到比我们从海外资产上赚到更多的收益。最后，经常账户的第三个组成部分——单边转移（unilateral transfers）——始终为负。
The U.S., it should be emphasized, is extraordinarily rich and will get richer. As a result, the huge imbalances in its current account may continue for a long time without their having noticeable deleterious effects on the U.S. economy or on markets. I doubt, however, that the situation will forever remain benign. Either Americans address the problem soon in a way we select, or at some point the problem will likely address us in an unpleasant way of its own.
需要强调的是：美国极其富有，而且还会变得更富。因此，美国经常账户中的巨大失衡，可能会在很长时间内持续存在，而不会对美国经济或市场造成明显的负面影响。但我怀疑这种局面不可能永远都保持温和：要么美国人很快以我们自己选择的方式来解决这个问题，要么在某个时点，这个问题很可能会以它自己不愉快的方式“反过来解决我们”。
How to Minimize Investment Returns
如何把投资回报降到最低
It’s been an easy matter for Berkshire and other owners of American equities to prosper over the years. Between December 31, 1899 and December 31, 1999, to give a really long-term example, the Dow rose from 66 to 11,497. (Guess what annual growth rate is required to produce this result; the surprising answer is at the end of this section.) This huge rise came about for a simple reason: Over the century American businesses did extraordinarily well and investors rode the wave of their prosperity. Businesses continue to do well. But now shareholders, through a series of self-inflicted wounds, are in a major way cutting the returns they will realize from their investments.
多年来，Berkshire 以及其他持有美国股票的投资者要想获得富足，是一件很容易的事。用一个真正“超长期”的例子来说：从 1899 年 12 月 31 日到 1999 年 12 月 31 日，道琼斯指数从 66 点涨到 11,497 点。（你猜猜需要怎样的年化增长率才能得到这个结果；令人意外的答案在本节末尾。）这种巨幅上涨背后只有一个简单原因：在整个世纪里，美国企业做得异常出色，而投资者只是顺势搭上了它们繁荣的浪潮。企业现在仍在做得很好。但如今，股东们通过一系列“自我伤害”的行为，正在以一种重大的方式削减自己最终能从投资中获得的回报。
The explanation of how this is happening begins with a fundamental truth: With unimportant exceptions, such as bankruptcies in which some of a company’s losses are borne by creditors, the most that owners in aggregate can earn between now and Judgment Day is what their businesses in aggregate earn. True, by buying and selling that is clever or lucky, investor A may take more than his share of the pie at the expense of investor B. And, yes, all investors feel richer when stocks soar. But an owner can exit only by having someone take his place. If one investor sells high, another must buy high. For owners as a whole, there is simply no magic — no shower of money from outer space — that will enable them to extract wealth from their companies beyond that created by the companies themselves.
要解释这种情况如何发生，得从一个基本事实说起：除了一些无关紧要的例外（比如破产时部分损失由债权人承担），从现在到审判日（Judgment Day），所有者整体能够赚到的最多的钱，只能等于其企业整体赚到的钱。确实，通过足够聪明或足够幸运的买卖，投资者 A 可能以投资者 B 为代价，多分走一块“馅饼”。而且，当股价暴涨时，所有投资者都会感觉更富有。但所有者要退出，必须有人接替他的位置；一个人如果“高位卖出”，就必然有人“高位买入”。对整体所有者而言，这里面没有任何魔法——不会有来自外太空的“金钱雨”——让他们从公司中提取超过公司自身创造的财富。
Indeed, owners must earn less than their businesses earn because of “frictional” costs. And that’s my point: These costs are now being incurred in amounts that will cause shareholders to earn far less than they historically have.
事实上，所有者赚到的必然比企业赚到的少，因为存在各种“摩擦成本（frictional costs）”。这正是我想强调的：如今这些成本被以一种规模惊人的方式支付着，结果将导致股东获得的回报远低于他们历史上曾经得到的水平。
To understand how this toll has ballooned, imagine for a moment that all American corporations are, and always will be, owned by a single family. We’ll call them the Gotrocks. After paying taxes on dividends, this family — generation after generation — becomes richer by the aggregate amount earned by its companies. Today that amount is about $700 billion annually. Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars. But the portion it saves steadily compounds for its benefit. In the Gotrocks household everyone grows wealthier at the same pace, and all is harmonious.
为了理解这道“收费”是如何膨胀的，不妨做个想象：假设所有美国公司过去、现在、将来都由一个家族拥有。我们把他们叫作 Gotrocks。这个家族在缴纳股息税之后，一代又一代地变得更富有，其财富每年增加的总额等于其公司赚到的总额。如今这大约是每年 7,000 亿美元。当然，这个家族会花掉其中一部分，但它储蓄下来的部分会不断为其复利增长。在 Gotrocks 家里，每个人都以同样速度变富，一切和谐。
But let’s now assume that a few fast-talking Helpers approach the family and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart his relatives by buying certain of their holdings and selling them certain others. The Helpers — for a fee, of course — obligingly agree to handle these transactions. The Gotrocks still own all of corporate America; the trades just rearrange who owns what. So the family’s annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the earnings of American business minus commissions paid. The more that family members trade, the smaller their share of the pie and the larger the slice received by the Helpers. This fact is not lost upon these broker-Helpers: Activity is their friend and, in a wide variety of ways, they urge it on.
但现在再假设：有几个能说会道的“帮手（Helpers）”找上门来，说服家族中的每一个成员都尝试通过买入某些亲戚手中的持股、并卖给亲戚另一些持股，来“智胜”自己的亲戚。当然，这些交易需要付费，而 Helpers 很乐意代劳。Gotrocks 仍然拥有“整个美国企业界”，交易只是在家族内部重新分配“谁拥有什么”。于是，这个家族每年的财富增量就变成：美国企业的总盈利减去支付的佣金。家族成员交易越多，他们能分到的“馅饼”就越小，而 Helpers 分到的那一块就越大。经纪型的 Helpers 对此心知肚明：交易活跃对他们最有利，因此他们会用各种方式鼓励大家频繁交易。
After a while, most of the family members realize that they are not doing so well at this new “beatmy-brother” game. Enter another set of Helpers. These newcomers explain to each member of the Gotrocks clan that by himself he’ll never outsmart the rest of the family. The suggested cure: “Hire a manager — yes, us — and get the job done professionally.” These manager-Helpers continue to use the broker-Helpers to execute trades; the managers may even increase their activity so as to permit the brokers to prosper still more. Overall, a bigger slice of the pie now goes to the two classes of Helpers.
过了一阵子，多数家族成员意识到：在这场新的“打败我兄弟（beat-my-brother）”游戏里，他们并没有做得更好。这时又出现了另一类 Helpers。这些新人告诉 Gotrocks 家族的每个人：你单打独斗根本不可能智胜家族其他人。建议的“药方”是：“雇一个经理人——没错，就是我们——让这件事专业化地完成。”这些管理型 Helpers 继续使用经纪型 Helpers 来执行交易；经理人甚至可能把交易做得更频繁，好让经纪人赚得更多。总体而言，“馅饼”里流向两类 Helpers 的份额进一步增大。
The family’s disappointment grows. Each of its members is now employing professionals. Yet overall, the group’s finances have taken a turn for the worse. The solution? More help, of course.
家族的失望加深了。现在每个人都雇了专业人士，但整体财务状况反而更糟。解决方案？当然是——需要更多帮助。
It arrives in the form of financial planners and institutional consultants, who weigh in to advise the Gotrocks on selecting manager-Helpers. The befuddled family welcomes this assistance. By now its members know they can pick neither the right stocks nor the right stock-pickers. Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the right consultant? But this question does not occur to the Gotrocks, and the consultant-Helpers certainly don’t suggest it to them.
更多帮助以“理财规划师”和“机构顾问”的形式出现：他们介入并建议 Gotrocks 如何挑选管理型 Helpers。被搞得晕头转向的家族欢迎这份协助。到这时，家族成员已经知道：自己既选不出好股票，也选不出好的“选股者”。那么问题来了：既然连这两件事都做不好，他们又为什么会期待自己能选对顾问？但这个问题并没有在 Gotrocks 脑海里出现，而顾问型 Helpers 当然也不会提醒他们去想这一点。
The Gotrocks, now supporting three classes of expensive Helpers, find that their results get worse, and they sink into despair. But just as hope seems lost, a fourth group — we’ll call them the hyper-Helpers— appears. These friendly folk explain to the Gotrocks that their unsatisfactory results are occurring because the existing Helpers — brokers, managers, consultants — are not sufficiently motivated and are simply going through the motions. “What,” the new Helpers ask, “can you expect from such a bunch of zombies?”
Gotrocks 家族如今要养着三类昂贵的 Helpers，发现成绩更差了，于是陷入绝望。但就在希望似乎彻底破灭之际，第四类人出现了——我们叫他们 hyper-Helpers（超级帮手）。这些和善的人告诉 Gotrocks：他们之所以结果不理想，是因为现有的 Helpers——经纪人、经理人、顾问——动力不足，只是在敷衍了事。“你们还能指望一群僵尸做出什么结果呢？”这些新 Helpers 问道。
The new arrivals offer a breathtakingly simple solution: Pay more money. Brimming with self-confidence, the hyper-Helpers assert that huge contingent payments — in addition to stiff fixed fees — are what each family member must fork over in order to really outmaneuver his relatives.
这些新来的帮手给出一个“惊人地简单”的解决方案：多付钱。他们信心满满地宣称：除了高昂的固定费用之外，还必须支付巨额的“或有报酬”（也就是业绩提成），每个家族成员只有这样掏钱，才能真正在这场较量中胜过自己的亲戚。
The more observant members of the family see that some of the hyper-Helpers are really just manager-Helpers wearing new uniforms, bearing sewn-on sexy names like HEDGE FUND or PRIVATE EQUITY. The new Helpers, however, assure the Gotrocks that this change of clothing is all-important, bestowing on its wearers magical powers similar to those acquired by mild-mannered Clark Kent when he changed into his Superman costume. Calmed by this explanation, the family decides to pay up.
家族里更敏锐的一些人看出来：有些 hyper-Helpers 其实就是换了制服的 manager-Helpers，只不过胸前缝上了更性感的名字，比如 HEDGE FUND 或 PRIVATE EQUITY。可这些新 Helpers 向 Gotrocks 保证：这身“行头”至关重要，它会赋予穿戴者魔法般的力量，就像温文尔雅的 Clark Kent 换上 Superman 制服后获得的那样。被这个解释安抚后，家族决定照付不误。
And that’s where we are today: A record portion of the earnings that would go in their entirety to owners — if they all just stayed in their rocking chairs — is now going to a swelling army of Helpers. Particularly expensive is the recent pandemic of profit arrangements under which Helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are smart or lucky, and leave family members with all of the losses — and large fixed fees to boot — when the Helpers are dumb or unlucky (or occasionally crooked).
这就是我们今天的处境：如果所有人都老老实实坐在摇椅里不动，本该全部归属于所有者的那部分企业盈利，如今正源源不断流向一支不断膨胀的 Helpers 大军。其中最昂贵的，是近来流行的一种“利润分成”安排：当 Helpers 聪明或走运时，他们能拿走很大一部分胜利果实；而当 Helpers 愚蠢或倒霉（有时甚至不诚实）时，家族成员却要独自承担所有损失——而且还要照样支付高额固定费用。
A sufficient number of arrangements like this — heads, the Helper takes much of the winnings; tails, the Gotrocks lose and pay dearly for the privilege of doing so — may make it more accurate to call the family the Hadrocks. Today, in fact, the family’s frictional costs of all sorts may well amount to 20% of the earnings of American business. In other words, the burden of paying Helpers may cause American equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if they just sat still and listened to no one.
这类安排只要足够多——正面：Helper 拿走大部分收益；反面：Gotrocks 亏钱，还要为“亏钱的特权”付出高昂代价——那把这个家族叫作 Hadrocks（有石头砸在头上的人）也许更贴切。事实上，今天这个家族的各类摩擦成本，很可能已经高达美国企业整体盈利的 20%。换句话说，支付给 Helpers 的负担，可能会让美国股票投资者整体只能赚到“如果他们什么都不做、也不听任何人”时本该赚到的收益的 80% 左右。
Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion*: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.*
很久以前，Sir Isaac Newton 为我们提出了三大运动定律，这是天才之作。但 Sir Isaac 的天赋并不包含投资：他在 South Sea Bubble 中亏了一大笔，后来解释说：“我能计算星辰的运动，却无法计算人类的疯狂。”如果这次亏损没有给他造成心理阴影，Sir Isaac 很可能还会发现“第四运动定律”：对整体投资者而言，运动越多，回报越少。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Here’s the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section: To get very specific, the Dow increased from 65.73 to 11,497.12 in the 20th century, and that amounts to a gain of 5.3% compounded annually. (Investors would also have received dividends, of course.) To achieve an equal rate of gain in the 21st century, the Dow will have to rise by December 31, 2099 to — brace yourself — precisely 2,011,011.23. But I’m willing to settle for 2,000,000; six years into this century, the Dow has gained not at all.
这就是本节开头提出问题的答案：具体来说，20 世纪道琼斯指数从 65.73 上涨到 11,497.12，相当于年复合增长 5.3%。（当然，投资者还会获得股息。）如果要在 21 世纪实现同样的增长率，那么到 2099 年 12 月 31 日，道指必须涨到——做好心理准备——精确的 2,011,011.23 点。不过我愿意把目标下调到 2,000,000；因为在本世纪过去的六年里，道指几乎一点都没涨。
Debt and Risk
债务与风险
As we consolidate MidAmerican, our new balance sheet may suggest that Berkshire has expanded its tolerance for borrowing. But that’s not so. Except for token amounts, we shun debt, turning to it for only three purposes:
随着我们合并报表纳入 MidAmerican，我们新的资产负债表可能会让人觉得 Berkshire 对借款的容忍度提高了。但事实并非如此。除非是象征性的少量负债，我们一向回避债务，只在三种情况下才会使用：
1）We occasionally use repos as a part of certain short-term investing strategies that incorporate ownership of U.S. government (or agency) securities. Purchases of this kind are highly opportunistic and involve only the most liquid of securities. A few years ago, we entered into several interesting transactions that have since been unwound or are running off. The offsetting debt has likewise been cut substantially and before long may be gone.
我们偶尔会把回购协议（repo）作为某些短期投资策略的一部分，这些策略涉及持有美国政府（或政府机构）证券。这类买入高度机会主义，并且只涉及流动性最强的证券。几年前，我们做过几笔有意思的交易，如今要么已经解除，要么正在到期退出。与之对应的负债也已大幅减少，不久可能就会消失。
2）We borrow money against portfolios of interest-bearing receivables whose risk characteristics we understand. We did this in 2001 when we guaranteed $5.6 billion of bank debt to take over, in partnership with Leucadia, a bankrupt Finova (which held a broad range of receivables). All of that debt has been repaid. More recently, we have borrowed to finance a widely-diversified, predictably-performing portfolio of manufactured-home receivables managed by Clayton. Alternatively, we could “securitize” — that is, sell — these receivables, but retain the servicing of them. If we followed this procedure, which is common in the industry, we would not show the debt that we do on our balance sheet, and we would also accelerate the earnings we report.
我们会以一组我们理解其风险特征的、带息应收款组合为抵押来借钱。2001 年我们就这么做过：为了与 Leucadia 合作接管破产的 Finova（其持有范围广泛的应收款），我们为 56 亿美元的银行债务提供担保。那笔债务已经全部偿还。更近期，我们借款是为了给 Clayton 管理的一组高度分散、表现可预测的预制住宅应收款组合提供融资。另一种选择是把这些应收款“证券化”——也就是卖掉——但保留其服务权（servicing）。如果我们采用这种在行业里很常见的做法，我们的资产负债表上就不会出现现在这些债务，同时我们报告的利润也会被提前确认。
In the end, however, we would earn less money. Were market variables to change so as to favor securitization (an unlikely event), we could sell part of our portfolio and eliminate the related debt. Until then, we prefer better profits to better cosmetics.
但最终，我们赚到的钱会更少。如果市场变量发生变化，从而让证券化更划算（这不太可能），我们可以卖出部分组合并消除相关债务。在那之前，我们宁可要更高的利润，也不要更漂亮的“化妆”。
3）At MidAmerican, we have substantial debt, but it is that company’s obligation only. Though it will appear on our consolidated balance sheet, Berkshire does not guarantee it.
在 MidAmerican，我们确实有相当规模的债务，但那只是该公司的义务。尽管它会出现在我们的合并资产负债表上，Berkshire 并不为其提供担保。
Even so, this debt is unquestionably secure because it is serviced by MidAmerican’s diversified stream of highly-stable utility earnings. If there were to be some bolt from the blue that hurt one of MidAmerican’s utility properties, earnings from the others would still be more than ample to cover all debt requirements. Moreover, MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, an equity-building practice that is rare in the utility field.
即便如此，这些债务也无疑是安全的，因为它由 MidAmerican 多元化、且高度稳定的公用事业盈利流来偿付。即使发生某种“晴天霹雳”伤害了 MidAmerican 的某项公用事业资产，其他资产的盈利也仍然绰绰有余，足以覆盖全部债务需求。此外，MidAmerican 会把全部利润留存，用来增加权益——这种做法在公用事业行业里很少见。
From a risk standpoint, it is far safer to have earnings from ten diverse and uncorrelated utility operations that cover interest charges by, say, a 2:1 ratio than it is to have far greater coverage provided by a single utility. A catastrophic event can render a single utility insolvent — witness what Katrina did to the local electric utility in New Orleans — no matter how conservative its debt policy. A geographical disaster — say, an earthquake in a Western state — can’t have the same effect on MidAmerican. And even a worrier like Charlie can’t think of an event that would systemically decrease utility earnings in any major way. Because of MidAmerican’s ever-widening diversity of regulated earnings, it will always utilize major amounts of debt.
从风险角度看：让十个多元且彼此不相关的公用事业运营体的盈利，以例如 2:1 的倍数覆盖利息支出，要比依赖单一公用事业公司提供更高的覆盖倍数安全得多。一次灾难性事件就可能让单一公用事业公司破产——看看 Katrina 对 New Orleans 本地电力公司的打击就知道——无论它的负债政策有多保守。地理性灾难——比如西部某州发生地震——不可能对 MidAmerican 产生同样效果。甚至像 Charlie 这样的“担忧者”，也想不出什么事件能在系统层面显著削弱公用事业盈利。正因为 MidAmerican 受监管盈利来源不断扩展的多样化，它将始终会使用大额债务。
And that’s about it. We are not interested in incurring any significant debt at Berkshire for acquisitions or operating purposes. Conventional business wisdom, of course, would argue that we are being too conservative and that there are added profits that could be safely earned if we injected moderate leverage into our balance sheet.
也就这些了。我们无意在 Berkshire 层面为收购或经营目的承担任何显著债务。传统的商业智慧当然会说，我们太保守了：如果在资产负债表里适度加入杠杆，完全可以在安全范围内赚到更多利润。
Maybe so. But many of Berkshire’s hundreds of thousands of investors have a large portion of their net worth in our stock (among them, it should be emphasized, a large number of our board and key managers) and a disaster for the company would be a disaster for them. Moreover, there are people who have been permanently injured to whom we owe insurance payments that stretch out for fifty years or more. To these and other constituencies we have promised total security, whatever comes: financial panics, stock-exchange closures (an extended one occurred in 1914) or even domestic nuclear, chemical or biological attacks.
也许如此。但 Berkshire 数十万投资者中，有很多人的净资产有很大一部分都在我们的股票上（需要强调的是，其中也包括大量董事与关键管理者）；如果公司遭遇灾难，他们也会遭遇灾难。此外，还有一些永久伤残的人，我们需要向他们支付长达 50 年甚至更久的保险赔付。对这些以及其他相关群体，我们承诺无论发生什么，都提供完全的安全保障：金融恐慌、证券交易所关闭（1914 年就发生过一次长期关闭），甚至国内发生核、化学或生物攻击。
We are quite willing to accept huge risks. Indeed, more than any other insurer, we write high-limit policies that are tied to single catastrophic events. We also own a large investment portfolio whose market value could fall dramatically and quickly under certain conditions (as happened on October 19, 1987). Whatever occurs, though, Berkshire will have the net worth, the earnings streams and the liquidity to handle the problem with ease.
我们愿意承担巨大的风险。事实上，作为保险公司，我们承保的单一巨灾高限额保单比任何其他保险公司都多。我们也拥有一个规模庞大的投资组合，在某些条件下它的市值可能会快速而大幅下跌（就像 1987 年 10 月 19 日那样）。但无论发生什么，Berkshire 都将拥有足够的净资产、盈利来源与流动性，轻松应对问题。
Any other approach is dangerous. Over the years, a number of very smart people have learned the hard way that a long string of impressive numbers multiplied by a single zero always equals zero. That is not an equation whose effects I would like to experience personally, and I would like even less to be responsible for imposing its penalties upon others.
任何其他做法都很危险。多年来，不少极其聪明的人用惨痛代价学到了一个道理：一长串漂亮数字，只要乘上一个零，永远等于零。这不是我愿意亲身体验的等式，更不愿意成为把它的惩罚强加给别人、需要负责的人。
Management Succession
管理层继任
As owners, you are naturally concerned about whether I will insist on continuing as CEO after I begin to fade and, if so, how the board will handle that problem. You also want to know what happens if I should die tonight.
作为所有者，你们自然会担心：当我开始衰退时，我是否还会坚持继续当 CEO；如果我坚持，董事会将如何处理这个问题。你们也想知道：如果我今晚就死了，会发生什么。
That second question is easy to answer. Most of our many businesses have strong market positions, significant momentum, and terrific managers. The special Berkshire culture is deeply ingrained throughout our subsidiaries, and these operations won’t miss a beat when I die.
第二个问题很容易回答。我们众多业务中的大多数都拥有强势的市场地位、显著的动能，以及极其出色的经理人。Berkshire 特殊的文化已经深深植入各家子公司之中；因此当我去世时，这些业务不会漏拍、不会停顿。
Moreover, we have three managers at Berkshire who are reasonably young and fully capable of being CEO. Any of the three would be much better at certain management aspects of my job than I. On the minus side, none has my crossover experience that allows me to be comfortable making decisions in either the business arena or in investments. That problem will be solved by having another person in the organization handle marketable securities. That’s an interesting job at Berkshire, and the new CEO will have no problem in hiring a talented individual to do it. Indeed, that’s what we have done at GEICO for 26 years, and our results have been terrific.
此外，在 Berkshire，我们有三位相对年轻、完全有能力担任 CEO 的经理人。三人中的任何一位，在我这份工作的一些管理层面上都会比我做得更好。缺点是：他们都没有我那种“跨界经验”，让我能在经营与投资两块都做决策时感到从容。这个问题可以通过让组织里的另一个人负责可交易证券来解决。在 Berkshire，这是一份很有意思的工作，新 CEO 也不会在招聘一位有才华的人来做这件事上遇到困难。事实上，我们在 GEICO 过去 26 年里就是这么做的，而且效果极佳。
Berkshire’s board has fully discussed each of the three CEO candidates and has unanimously agreed on the person who should succeed me if a replacement were needed today. The directors stay updated on this subject and could alter their view as circumstances change — new managerial stars may emerge and present ones will age. The important point is that the directors know now — and will always know in the future — exactly what they will do when the need arises.
Berkshire 的董事会已经充分讨论了这三位 CEO 候选人，并一致同意：如果今天就需要更换 CEO，应该由谁接任。董事们会持续更新对这一主题的判断，并可能随着情况变化而调整——新的管理明星可能出现，现有人选也会逐渐变老。关键在于：董事们现在就知道——并且未来也会一直知道——当需要出现时，他们究竟要怎么做。
The other question that must be addressed is whether the Board will be prepared to make a change if that need should arise not from my death but rather from my decay, particularly if this decay is accompanied by my delusionally thinking that I am reaching new peaks of managerial brilliance. That problem would not be unique to me. Charlie and I have faced this situation from time to time at Berkshire’s subsidiaries. Humans age at greatly varying rates — but sooner or later their talents and vigor decline. Some managers remain effective well into their 80s — Charlie is a wonder at 82 — and others noticeably fade in their 60s. When their abilities ebb, so usually do their powers of self-assessment. Someone else often needs to blow the whistle.
另一个必须面对的问题是：如果需要更换 CEO 的原因不是我去世，而是我“衰败”，董事会是否也能准备好做出改变——尤其是当这种衰败还伴随着我产生某种妄想，认为自己正攀上新的管理巅峰时。这个问题并不只会发生在我身上。Charlie 和我在 Berkshire 的子公司里时不时就会遇到类似情况。人的衰老速度差异很大——但迟早都会出现才能与精力的下降。有些管理者 80 多岁仍然非常有效；Charlie 82 岁仍然堪称奇迹；而另一些人在 60 多岁就明显走下坡路。当能力退潮时，通常自我评估能力也会随之退潮。往往需要其他人来“吹哨”。
When that time comes for me, our board will have to step up to the job. From a financial standpoint, its members are unusually motivated to do so. I know of no other board in the country in which the financial interests of directors are so completely aligned with those of shareholders. Few boards even come close. On a personal level, however, it is extraordinarily difficult for most people to tell someone, particularly a friend, that he or she is no longer capable.
等到轮到我“该退场”的那一天，董事会就必须站出来把这件事做好。从财务角度看，董事会成员对此有着异常强烈的动机：我不知道全美还有哪一家公司的董事会，其董事的财务利益与股东利益如此高度一致。几乎没有其他董事会能接近这一点。但在个人层面上，让大多数人去告诉一个人——尤其是朋友——“你已经不再胜任了”，这件事会异常艰难。
If I become a candidate for that message, however, our board will be doing me a favor by delivering it. Every share of Berkshire that I own is destined to go to philanthropies, and I want society to reap the maximum good from these gifts and bequests. It would be a tragedy if the philanthropic potential of my holdings was diminished because my associates shirked their responsibility to (tenderly, I hope) show me the door. But don’t worry about this. We have an outstanding group of directors, and they will always do what’s right for shareholders.
不过，如果有一天我成了需要被告知这句话的人，那么董事会把话说出来，其实是在帮我一个大忙。我持有的每一股 Berkshire 最终都会捐给慈善机构，我希望社会能从这些赠与与遗产中获得最大的好处。如果因为身边的人逃避责任、没有（我希望是温柔地）把我请出门，导致我持股所能实现的公益潜力被削弱，那将是一场悲剧。但你们不必担心这一点。我们有一群非常出色的董事，他们永远都会做对股东最正确的事。
And while we are on the subject, I feel terrific.
顺便说一句，我现在感觉棒极了。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Our meeting this year will be on Saturday, May 6. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and the latest Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. This schedule worked well last year, because it let those who wanted to attend the formal session to do so, while freeing others to shop.
我们今年的股东大会将在 5 月 6 日（星期六）举行。和往常一样，Qwest Center 的大门将于早上 7 点开放，最新的 Berkshire 电影会在 8:30 播放。9:30 我们将直接进入问答环节（中午会在 Qwest 的摊位处休息用餐），一直持续到 3:00。随后短暂休息，Charlie 和我将在 3:15 正式召开股东大会。这个安排去年效果很好：想参加正式会议的人可以参加，而其他人则可以腾出时间去购物。
You certainly did your share in this respect last year. The 194,300 square foot hall adjoining the meeting area was filled with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries, and the 21,000 people who came to the meeting allowed every location to rack up sales records. Kelly Broz (neé Muchemore), the Flo Ziegfeld of Berkshire, orchestrates both this magnificent shopping extravaganza and the meeting itself. The exhibitors love her, and so do I. Kelly got married in October, and I gave her away. She asked me how I wanted to be listed in the wedding program. I replied “envious of the groom,” and that’s the way it went to press.
在这方面，你们去年确实贡献巨大。紧邻会场的 194,300 平方英尺展厅摆满了 Berkshire 子公司的产品，来参加大会的 21,000 人让每个展位都刷新了销售纪录。Kelly Broz（娘家姓 Muchemore），堪称 Berkshire 的 Flo Ziegfeld，统筹安排了这场盛大的购物狂欢以及大会本身。参展商都喜欢她，我也是。Kelly 在 10 月结婚，我还把她送上了礼堂。她问我希望在婚礼节目单里怎么写我的身份。我回答：“羡慕新郎的人”，就这样印出去了。
This year we will showcase two Clayton homes (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that these homes, priced at $79,000 and $89,000, deliver excellent value. In fact, three shareholders came so firmly to that conclusion last year that they bought the $119,000 model we then showcased. Flanking the Clayton homes on the exhibition floor will be RVs from Forest River.
今年我们将展出两套 Clayton Homes（采用 Acme 砖、Shaw 地毯、Johns Manville 保温材料、MiTek 紧固件、Carefree 遮阳篷以及 NFM 家具）。你会发现，这两套房子的定价分别是 79,000 美元和 89,000 美元，性价比非常出色。事实上，去年有三位股东对此确信到直接把我们当时展出的 119,000 美元样板房买走了。在展厅里与 Clayton 房屋相邻展示的，将是 Forest River 的房车（RVs）。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can. And while you’re at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card. It’s the one I now use.
GEICO 将设立一个展位，安排来自全国各地的多位顶尖顾问驻场，随时为你提供车险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能给你一个专属的股东折扣（通常是 8%）。在我们开展业务的 50 个司法辖区中，有 45 个允许提供这一特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你还符合其他折扣条件——比如某些特定群体可享的折扣——该折扣不能叠加。）带上你现有保单的细节，来看看我们是否能帮你省钱。我相信至少有 50% 的人可以。而且顺便办一张新的 GEICO 信用卡吧——我现在用的就是这张。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane.
周六，我们会在 Omaha 机场照例安排一系列 NetJets® 飞机供你参观。到 Qwest 的 NetJets 展位了解如何前往看机。坐大巴来 Omaha；开着新飞机离开。
The Bookworm boutique at the Qwest broke all records last year selling Berkshire-related books. An amazing 3,500 of these were Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the collected wisdom of my partner. This means that a copy was sold every 9 seconds. And for good reason: You will never find a book with more useful ideas. Word-of-mouth recommendations have caused Charlie’s first printing of 20,500 copies to sell out, and we will therefore have a revised and expanded edition on sale at our meeting. Among the other 22 titles and DVDs available last year at the Bookworm, 4,597 copies were sold for $84,746. Our shareholders are a bookseller’s dream.
Qwest 的 Bookworm 精品书店去年卖 Berkshire 相关书籍创下了历史纪录。其中有惊人的 3,500 本是《Poor Charlie’s Almanack》——我这位合伙人的智慧合集。这意味着平均每 9 秒就卖出一本。而且理由很充分：你很难找到一本包含更多有用思想的书。口口相传的推荐让 Charlie 首次印刷的 20,500 册全部售罄，所以我们将在大会上销售一个修订扩充版。去年 Bookworm 还出售了另外 22 种书籍与 DVD，其中共卖出 4,597 份，销售额为 84,746 美元。我们的股东简直是书商的梦想客户。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it.
随本报告附上的委托书材料里有一份附件，说明你如何获得参加大会及其他活动所需的入场凭证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们今年仍再次与 American Express（800-799-6634）合作，为你提供特别协助。每年负责这些安排的 Carol Pedersen 都为我们做得非常出色，我在此向她表示感谢。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM nine years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $27.4 million in 2005 (up 9% from a year earlier). I get goose bumps just thinking about this volume.
位于 72nd Street、介于 Dodge 与 Pacific 之间、占地 77 英亩的 Nebraska Furniture Mart，我们今年也将再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”特价活动。我们在九年前于 NFM 启动这一特别活动，“周末”期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2005 年的 2,740 万美元（比上一年增长 9%）。光是想到这个规模，我就起鸡皮疙瘩。
To obtain the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 4 and Monday, May 8 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque, drinking Coke, and counting sales.
要获得折扣，你必须在 5 月 4 日（周四）至 5 月 8 日（周一）期间（含首尾两天）完成购买，并出示大会入场凭证。活动期间的特价甚至适用于一些声誉卓著的制造商的产品——这些厂商通常对折扣有着铁一般的禁止规则，但出于我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例了。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM 营业时间为：周一至周六上午 10 点到晚上 9 点，周日为上午 10 点到下午 6 点。今年周六晚上 5:30 到 8:00，我们还将举办一场仅限股东参加的特别活动。我会到场，吃烧烤、喝可乐、顺便数数销售额。
Borsheim’s again will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 5. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 7. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
Borsheim’s 今年也将再次举办两场“仅限股东”的活动。第一场是鸡尾酒招待会，时间为 5 月 5 日（周五）晚上 6 点到 10 点。第二场也是主要的盛会，时间为 5 月 7 日（周日）上午 9 点到下午 4 点。周六我们营业到下午 6 点。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheim’s throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1 through Saturday, May 13. During that period, just identify yourself as a shareholder through your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement.
整个周末 Borsheim’s 都会人潮汹涌。为方便起见，股东价将从 5 月 1 日（周一）一直提供到 5 月 13 日（周六）。在此期间，只要你通过大会入场凭证或券商对账单证明自己是股东即可。
Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that, even before the shareholders’ discount, is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals. Last year, our shareholder-period business increased 9% from 2004, which came on top of a 73% gain the year before. The store sold 5,000 Berkshire Monopoly games — and then ran out. We’ve learned: Plenty will be in stock this year.
Borsheim’s 的毛利率即便不算股东折扣，也比主要竞争对手低足足 20 个百分点。去年，我们在“股东期间”的生意额比 2004 年增长 9%，而这又是在前一年增长 73% 的基础上实现的。商店去年卖出了 5,000 套 Berkshire Monopoly 游戏——然后就卖断货了。我们学到教训了：今年会备足库存。
In a tent outside of Borsheim’s, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers in groups of six — blindfolded. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. They plan to keep their eyes open — but Bob never sorts his cards, even when playing for a national championship.
在 Borsheim’s 店外的帐篷里，曾两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的 Patrick Wolff 将蒙眼同时对战——一次对六个人——来者不拒。此外，周日下午我们还会请到 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg——两位世界顶级桥牌高手——与股东同桌打牌。他们会睁着眼睛打——但 Bob 即便在打全国冠军赛时也从不整理牌面。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before).
Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——也将再次在 5 月 7 日（周日）专门为 Berkshire 股东开放，供餐时间为下午 4 点到晚上 10 点。请记住：那天去 Gorat’s 必须预订座位。要订位，请在 4 月 1 日致电 402-551-3733（但不要更早）。
In this school year, about 35 university classes will come to Omaha for sessions with me. I take almost all — in aggregate, perhaps 2,000 students — to lunch at Gorat’s. And they love it. To learn why, come join us on Sunday.
本学年，大约会有 35 个大学班级来 Omaha 与我交流。我几乎都会把他们——总计大概 2,000 名学生——带去 Gorat’s 吃午饭。他们都很喜欢。想知道为什么，周日也来加入我们吧。
We will again have a special reception from 4:00 to 5:30 on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
周六下午 4:00 到 5:30，我们还将再次为来自北美以外地区的股东举办一场特别招待会。每年我们的大会都会吸引来自世界各地的人，Charlie 和我希望能亲自问候那些远道而来的朋友。去年我们很高兴见到了来自数十个国家的 400 多位股东。任何来自美国或加拿大以外地区的股东，都会获得一份特别凭证以及参加该活动的说明。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie and I are extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to other people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped every day in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. No wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 6th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
Charlie 和我实在是幸运至极。我们出生在美国；有了不起的父母，确保我们接受了良好教育；拥有美满的家庭与健康的身体；并且“出厂自带”一种“商业基因”，使我们能够以一种与社会上同样付出、甚至付出更多的人相比极不成比例的方式获得成功——尽管他们对社会福祉的贡献并不比我们少。除此之外，我们长期从事自己热爱的工作，并且每天都在无数方面得到一群才华横溢、而且乐观开朗的同事帮助。难怪我们会“踢踏着舞步”去上班。不过，对我们来说，没有什么比在 Berkshire 年度股东大会上，与我们的股东合伙人相聚更有趣了。所以请在 5 月 6 日到 Qwest 来参加我们的“资本家版 Woodstock”——Berkshire 年会。到时见。
February 28, 2006
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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