重资产企业的问题为他人做嫁衣裳,巴菲特在这里做了明确的评论,汽车保险受益于汽车制造厂;AMEX早年受益于铁路,后来的信用卡受益于航空公司;Google受益于微软的操作系统;Meta受益于苹果的手机,等等。
Youthful Tycoon
年轻的大亨
Buffett’s office, on the top floor of a modern building about 15 minutes from the centre of Omaha, is clean and anonymous, with framed documents on the walls and a box of fudge on a table, to which Buffett helps himself from time to time. It’s delicious - made by a company he owns. A bookshelf on the wall holds, with other financial volumes, several editions of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis. Buffett, a genial, ruddy, muscular man with a wide, humorous mouth and an inquisitive expression behind his horn-rimmed spectacles, put his feet on the desk, poured himself a Pepsi Cola, and, in the somewhat toneless manner characteristic of Mid-westerners, cheerfully began to babble about what was on his mind. He speaks with a wry earnestness and gives an impression of complete intellectual honesty. His delivery is so casual, rapid, allusive, and clever that unless you pay attention a lot could slip by.
Buffett 的办公室位于一栋现代建筑的顶层,距 Omaha 市中心约15分钟路程。办公室干净而不起眼,墙上挂着装框文件,桌上放着一盒软糖,Buffett 不时自己拿来吃。软糖味道很好——由他拥有的一家公司生产。墙边的书架上,除了其他金融书籍外,还摆着几版 Graham 和 Dodd 的《证券分析》。Buffett 是个亲切、面色红润、体格结实的人,嘴巴宽大而带着幽默感,角框眼镜后是一副好奇的神情。他把脚搁在桌上,给自己倒了一杯 Pepsi Cola,然后用美国中西部人特有的那种略显平板的语调,愉快地开始滔滔不绝地谈起脑子里正在想的事情。他说话时带着一种带反讽意味的认真感,给人以完全智识诚实的印象。他表达得非常随意、快速、充满暗示又机敏,如果不集中注意力,很多东西会从耳边溜过去。
Says Buffett: “When I was a kid at Woodrow Wilson High School in Washington, another kid and I started the Wilson Coin-Operated Machine Co. I was 15 years old. We put reconditioned pinball machines in barber shops. In Washington, you were supposed to buy a tax stamp to be in the pinball machine business. I got the impression we were the only people who ever bought one. The first day we bought an old machine for $25 and put it out in a shop. When we came back that night it had $4 in it! I figured I had discovered the wheel. Eventually we were making $50 a week. I hadn’t dreamed life could be so good”.
Buffett 说:“我小时候在 Washington 的 Woodrow Wilson High School 上学,另一个孩子和我创办了 Wilson Coin-Operated Machine Co.。那时我15岁。我们把翻新过的弹球机放进理发店。在 Washington,如果你想经营弹球机生意,按规定应该买一张税票。我感觉我们可能是唯一真正买过税票的人。第一天,我们花25美元买了一台旧机器,把它放到一家店里。当天晚上回来时,里面已经有4美元!我觉得自己发现了轮子。后来我们每周能赚50美元。我从没想过生活可以这么美好。”
Even before that, Buffett was well along in his career as a tycoon. At the age of 11, he made his debut as a market technician. Soon after, we find him in the business of retrieving and reselling golf balls and running several paper routes for the Washington Post. Delivery of papers accounted for most of his original stake of $9,000 with which he finished his college career. At 12, Warren became fond of handicapping horse races and compiled and sold a tip sheet called “Stable Boy Selection”. He found few aspects of commercial life beyond his grasp, even at that age. “I always knew I was going to be rich,” he has said.
甚至在那之前,Buffett 作为大亨的生涯就已经相当有进展了。11岁时,他以市场技术分析师的身份首次登场。不久之后,我们看到他开始捡回并转售高尔夫球,还经营着几条 Washington Post 的送报路线。他大学毕业时原始本金为9,000美元,其中大部分来自送报收入。12岁时,Warren 开始喜欢给赛马做让分预测,并编写、出售一份名为《Stable Boy Selection》的赛马提示单。即使在那个年纪,商业生活中几乎没有多少方面超出他的理解范围。他曾说:“我一直知道自己会变富。”
The Graham Influence
Graham 的影响
As a boy, Buffett was fascinated by stock market technical analysis. He developed his own market indexes and the like but it all made no real sense to him. He discarded this approach in 1949, after reading The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham while attending the University of Nebraska. The following year he went to Columbia University because both Graham and Dodd (of Security Analysis) were teaching there. Buffett noticed in Who’s Who that Ben Graham, was a director of Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), which sold automobile insurance directly by mail, bypassing the brokers. He went down to the company’s office on a Saturday and pounded on the door. Eventually, a janitor opened up, and Buffett asked if there was anybody around he could talk to about the company. The janitor took him upstairs, where one man was in his office, L.A. Davidson, later chief executive officer. Buffett questioned him for five hours, then went away very excited about its stock.
少年时期,Buffett 曾着迷于股市技术分析。他设计过自己的市场指数之类的东西,但这一切对他来说并没有真正的道理。1949年,在 University of Nebraska 就读期间,他读了 Benjamin Graham 的《聪明的投资者》之后,便抛弃了这种方法。第二年,他去了 Columbia University,因为 Graham 和 Dodd(《证券分析》的作者)都在那里任教。Buffett 在《Who’s Who》中注意到,Ben Graham 是 Government Employees Insurance Co.(GEICO)的董事。这家公司通过邮寄方式直接销售汽车保险,绕开经纪人。一个星期六,他来到这家公司办公室,敲打大门。最后,一名清洁工打开了门,Buffett 问公司里有没有人可以和他聊聊这家公司。清洁工把他带到楼上,那里有一个人还在办公室里,那就是 L.A. Davidson,后来他成为公司的首席执行官。Buffett 向他提问了五个小时,然后带着对这只股票的极大兴奋离开。
After skimping to buy some shares, he discussed GEICO with two brokers who specialised in insurance issues: both pooh-poohed it since the company didn’t look cheap in their tables of insurance stock values. What the tables didn’t show was that the company was making 20% on its underwriting activities as against a normal margin of 5%. At that time the entire company was selling for less than $7 million in the market; later it went to a billion and became a Wall Street favourite. Some 25 years after Buffett made his initial investment in the company, mismanagement brought GEICO to the edge of bankruptcy. During that crisis, Buffett bought 15% of the company and thinks that it again has a bright future. Since Buffett believed in going to work for the smartest person available, on graduating from Columbia he offered his services to Graham for nothing. When Graham declined, Buffett went back to Omaha and entered his father’s stockbroking firm. Buffett kept in touch with Graham, however, sending him ideas in the hope of receiving stock exchange business.
他省吃俭用买了一些股票后,和两位专门研究保险股的经纪人讨论 GEICO;两人都对它不以为然,因为在他们的保险股估值表中,这家公司看起来并不便宜。但这些表格没有显示的是,这家公司在承保业务上的利润率达到20%,而正常利润率只有5%。当时整家公司在市场上的售价不到700万美元;后来它涨到10亿美元,并成为 Wall Street 的宠儿。在 Buffett 首次投资这家公司大约25年后,管理不善把 GEICO 推到破产边缘。在那场危机中,Buffett 买下了公司15%的股份,并认为它再次拥有光明前景。由于 Buffett 相信应该为能找到的最聪明的人工作,所以从 Columbia 毕业后,他主动提出免费为 Graham 工作。Graham 拒绝后,Buffett 回到 Omaha,进入父亲的证券经纪公司。不过,Buffett 一直与 Graham 保持联系,不断把投资想法寄给他,希望能因此获得一些证券交易业务。
Graham, in turn, was generous with his time and thoughts, and in 1954, he suggested that Buffett come to see him. Buffett went to New York and was hired to work for Graham-Newman Corp., where he spent two instructive years. Today he finds it hard to describe what he did there, but it must have included analysing hundreds of companies to see if they met Graham’s investment criteria. Ben Graham didn’t distinguish between franchises. He never would have been able to buy American Express during the salad oil scandal, or Disney, two of Buffett’s great coups. He did not believe in “qualitative” analysis - studying a company’s products, how it operates and its apparent future outlook. He never talked to managements. He believed in doing all his work by exhaustively studying figures generally available. This technique was immensely profitable for Graham and his investors, but did not really satisfy Buffett, who finds such mechanical investing all too similar to filling out an application for group life insurance. After his two years of apprenticeship in the workshop of the master, Buffett was glad to set forth into the great world as a master himself. For the second time he returned to Omaha, where he bought a roomy house - to which he has been adding sporadically ever since - on a wooded corner, and started on his own. In retrospect, one is not too surprised that, given such mental equipment, such fascination for the subject and such a thorough academic and practical preparation, Buffett should have done exceedingly well. Nobody, however, could have foreseen his record.
Graham 反过来也很慷慨,愿意把时间和想法交给 Buffett。1954年,他建议 Buffett 去见他。Buffett 前往 New York,并被 Graham-Newman Corp. 录用,在那里度过了很有启发性的两年。今天,他很难具体描述自己当时做了些什么,但其中必然包括分析数百家公司,看看它们是否符合 Graham 的投资标准。Ben Graham 并不区分特许经营权。他绝不可能在色拉油丑闻期间买入 American Express,也不可能买入 Disney,而这两笔都是 Buffett 的伟大战果。Graham 不相信“定性”分析——也就是研究一家公司的产品、运营方式及其看起来的未来前景。他从不与管理层交谈。他相信,所有工作都应该通过详尽研究公开可得的数字来完成。这种方法为 Graham 及其投资者带来了巨大收益,但并不能真正满足 Buffett;在 Buffett 看来,这种机械式投资太像填写一份团体寿险申请表。在这位大师的工作室里当了两年学徒之后,Buffett 很高兴以大师身份独自走向广阔世界。他第二次回到 Omaha,在一个树木繁茂的街角买下一栋宽敞的房子——此后他一直断断续续地给它扩建——然后开始独立经营。回头看,考虑到这样的心智装备、对这个课题的强烈着迷,以及如此扎实的学术和实践准备,Buffett 取得极佳成绩并不太令人意外。然而,没有人能够预见他的投资纪录会达到那种程度。
Buffett understands the companies he owns stock in as businesses: living organisms, with hearts, lungs, bones, muscles, arteries and nervous systems. It is madness, he would say, for an investor buying stock to have anything else in mind other than the operating realities of the underlying business. Buffett believes that those on Wall Street who talk of the stock trend or institutional sponsorship are ridiculous, combining laziness with ignorance, and compares them with astronomers, setting aside their telescopes to consult the astrology page. He thinks of a stock only as a fractional interest in a business and always begins by asking himself, “How much would I pay for all of this company? And on that basis, what will I pay for 1% of it?”. There are very few companies he considered interesting enough to buy at all, and even those he will look at only when they are very unpopular.
Buffett 把自己持有股票的公司理解为企业:一种有心脏、肺、骨骼、肌肉、动脉和神经系统的活体。他会说,一个投资者在买股票时,如果脑子里想的不是底层企业的经营现实,那就是疯狂。Buffett 认为,Wall Street 上那些谈论股票趋势或机构支持的人非常荒唐,把懒惰和无知结合在一起;他把这些人比作天文学家,放下望远镜不用,却去查星座运势版。他只把股票看成一家企业的一部分权益,并且总是从一个问题开始:“如果我要买下整家公司,我愿意付多少钱?在这个基础上,我愿意为它1%的权益付多少钱?”他认为真正有意思到值得买入的公司极少,而即便是这些公司,他也只会在它们非常不受欢迎时才去看。
Buffett Partnership
In 1956, at the age of 25, Buffett started a family partnership with $100,000 in it, after a while adding all his own capital. As management, he received 25% of the profits above a 6% annual return on capital. As the partnership increased in value and his reputation spread, more money poured in. Homer Dodge, a physicist and former college president who excelled at picking stock-pickers, came to see Buffett, then 26, while on a canoe trip, with the canoe itself perched on top of the car. Long a friend and partner of Ben Graham, who had just retired, Dodge became Buffett’s first partner outside the family, simply writing out a check to join the partnership after a brief talk. Every year Buffett wrote his co-investors:
1956年,25岁的 Buffett 创办了一个家族合伙企业,初始资金为100,000美元;过了一段时间,他又把自己的全部资本投入进去。作为管理人,他收取年化6%资本回报以上利润的25%。随着合伙企业价值上升、他的声誉传播开来,更多资金涌入。Homer Dodge 是一位物理学家,也曾任大学校长,擅长挑选股票投资人。他在一次独木舟旅行途中来到 Omaha 见当时26岁的 Buffett,那条独木舟就架在车顶上。Dodge 长期以来一直是 Ben Graham 的朋友和合伙人,而 Graham 刚刚退休。与 Buffett 简短交谈后,Dodge 直接开出一张支票加入合伙企业,成为 Buffett 家族以外的第一位合伙人。每年,Buffett 都会给共同投资人写道:
His stated goal was not absolute, but relative: to beat the Dow Jones by an average of 10 per cent per year. In general, he bought undervalued listed stocks, but also was unusually involved in merger arbitrage situations. Occasionally he bought a controlling interest in a public company or an entire private business on a negotiated basis. In 1965, for example, he took over Berkshire Hathaway in New Bedford Mass., a textile manufacturer with a long record of unprofitable operations, and installed new management. He now owns 47% of the company (former partners own another 35% or so) and it holds many of his other interests. He brought off perhaps his most spectacular transaction in 1964 when American Express collapsed in the market during the Tino De Angelis salad oil scandal. Studying the company carefully, he determined that the danger from those losses would be limited, while its basic strengths, the credit card operations and the travellers’ checks, would be unaffected. He bought heavily and saw the stock quintuple in the next five years. In 1969, the stock market was booming, even junk stocks were selling at premium prices, and Buffett couldn’t find bargains anywhere. He sent another letter to his partners:
他公开说明的目标不是绝对目标,而是相对目标:平均每年跑赢 Dow Jones 10个百分点。总体而言,他买入被低估的上市股票,但也异乎寻常地大量参与并购套利情形。偶尔,他会通过协商方式买下一家上市公司的控股权,或者买下一整家私人企业。例如,1965年,他接管了位于 Massachusetts 州 New Bedford 的 Berkshire Hathaway,这是一家长期经营亏损的纺织制造商,并为其引入了新的管理层。现在他持有该公司47%的股份(原合伙人还持有约35%),而这家公司也持有他的许多其他权益。他或许最精彩的一笔交易发生在1964年,当时 American Express 在 Tino De Angelis 色拉油丑闻期间于市场上暴跌。他仔细研究这家公司后判断,那些损失带来的危险将是有限的,而它的基本优势——信用卡业务和旅行支票业务——不会受到影响。于是他大举买入,并在随后五年看到股价上涨到原来的五倍。1969年,股市一片繁荣,连垃圾股也以溢价出售,Buffett 到处都找不到便宜货。他又给合伙人发了一封信:
“I am out of step with present conditions. When the game is no longer played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble and so on… On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large, and apparently, easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practised successfully, and which possibly could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital”.
“我与当前环境格格不入。当游戏不再按照你的方式进行时,人很自然会说,新的做法全错了,必然会导致麻烦,等等……不过,有一点我很清楚。我不会放弃一种我理解其逻辑的既有方法(尽管我发现它很难应用),即使这可能意味着放弃巨大而且表面上轻松的利润;我也不会转而拥抱一种我并不完全理解、没有成功实践过、并且可能导致重大永久性资本损失的方法。”
Buffett had an additional problem. He had become fond of some of his principal holdings, such as Berkshire Hathaway, and no longer wanted to sell them at all. That, obviously, put him in potential conflict with his investors, in whose interest it might have been to sell. So after 13 years, he decided to fold up the partnership. It had gained thirtyfold in its value per share, and through the addition of more than 90 members and the success of its investments had grown to over $100 million. Buffett’s profit participation as investor-manager, plus the compounding of his own capital, had made him worth some $25 million. Investors were given back their money and their proportional interest in Berkshire Hathaway (of which he became chairman). Three years after the partnership was liquidated the market went into the 1973-74 collapse.
Buffett 还有另一个问题。他已经喜欢上了自己的一些主要持仓,比如 Berkshire Hathaway,并且完全不再想卖掉它们。显然,这让他和投资人之间存在潜在冲突,因为从投资人的利益角度看,卖出也许是有利的。因此,在13年之后,他决定结束合伙企业。该合伙企业每股价值上涨了30倍;随着90多名成员的加入,以及投资的成功,其规模已增长到超过1亿美元。Buffett 作为投资人兼管理人获得的利润分成,再加上他自己资本的复利增长,使他的身家达到约2,500万美元。投资人拿回了自己的资金,以及他们在 Berkshire Hathaway 中的相应比例权益(Buffett 后来成为该公司董事长)。合伙企业清算三年后,市场进入了1973—1974年的崩盘。
Buffett (directly or indirectly through Berkshire Hathaway) was able to buy big pieces of some of his favourite “gross profits royalty” companies at giveaway prices: 8% of Ogilvy & Mather at 8, 16% of Interpublic, 11% of the Washington Post at 3, the Boston Globe, Capital Cities (an independent chain of television stations that also owns newspapers), Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Affiliated Publications, Media General and Pinkertons. Several have tripled or quadrupled since. He also bought into a number of banks and other companies that have so far been uninteresting in the market. Even when markets disagree with him, however, he is happy with his stocks as long as the underlying businesses continue to do well. At this juncture he is no longer trying to maximise his investment profits, but rather to indulge his collecting instinct and to enjoy himself “playing several different games,” in newspapers, insurance and other areas.
Buffett(直接,或通过 Berkshire Hathaway 间接)得以用近乎白送的价格,买入一些他最喜欢的“毛利润特许权使用费”公司的大额股份:以8美元买入 Ogilvy & Mather 的8%,买入 Interpublic 的16%,以3美元买入 Washington Post 的11%,以及 Boston Globe、Capital Cities(一家独立电视台连锁公司,同时也拥有报纸)、Knight-Ridder Newspapers、Affiliated Publications、Media General 和 Pinkertons。其中几项投资此后已经上涨到三倍或四倍。他还买入了一些银行和其他公司,迄今为止这些公司在市场上并不起眼。不过,即使市场不同意他的判断,只要底层企业继续经营良好,他就会对自己的股票感到满意。到了这个阶段,他已经不再试图最大化投资利润,而更多是在满足自己的收藏本能,并享受自己在报纸、保险及其他领域“玩几种不同游戏”的乐趣。
“If one is ever going to buy common stocks, the time to buy them is now,” said Buffett in mid-1979. “It screams at you”. The enormous advantage the independent investor has, Buffett says, is that he can stand at the plate and wait forever for the perfect pitch. If he wants it to come in exactly two inches above his navel and nowhere else, he can stand there indefinitely until an easy one is served up. Stock market investment is the only business of which that is true. You can not only wait for the bargain but for the particular one that you understand and know to be a bargain. Buffett observes that you might improve your investment performance by having a quota, a limit to the number of investment ideas you could try out in your life: one a year, for instance… or even fewer.
“如果一个人终究要买普通股,那么现在就是买入的时候,”Buffett 在1979年年中说。“它对你大声喊叫。”Buffett 说,独立投资者拥有的巨大优势在于,他可以站在本垒板前,永远等待那个完美投球。如果他希望球只从肚脐上方两英寸的位置飞来,除此之外任何位置都不要,他可以无限期地站在那里,直到一个容易击打的球送上门。股票市场投资是唯一一个具有这种特征的行业。你不仅可以等待便宜货,还可以等待那个你理解、并且知道它确实便宜的特定便宜货。Buffett 认为,如果你给自己设定一个配额,限制一生中可以尝试的投资想法数量,你也许能提高自己的投资表现:比如一年一个……甚至更少。
Swing, You Bum!
挥棒啊,你这个笨蛋!
Many times, though, the investment manager lets his advantage be turned into a disadvantage. Feeling obliged to remain active, he swings at far too many pitches, instead of holding off until he has an absolute conviction. He seems to hear the clients howling, “Swing, you bum!”. When he was 11, for example, Buffett bought three shares of Cities Service preferred at 38. His sister, who was 14, thought that she had better follow suit and bought three shares too. The stock declined to 27, She asked him about it every day. Finally, it recovered to 40. To be rid of the headache and the questions, Buffett sold his stock and hers, making a total profit of $5, after commissions. The stock then went right on to 200! He never forgot the lesson. He points out that if, for instance, he had reported to his partners that 40% of their money was in American Express, or that he was heavily long silver futures, his partners would have been concerned, asked questions, mailed him things to read. At best, he would have wasted a lot of time; at worst, he would have been influenced by their reactions. He says it would have been like a surgeon carrying on a running conversation with the patient during a major operation.
不过,很多时候,投资经理会把自己的优势变成劣势。由于觉得自己有义务保持活跃,他会对太多投球挥棒,而不是一直等待,直到自己拥有绝对确信。他仿佛听见客户在嚎叫:“挥棒啊,你这个笨蛋!”例如,Buffett 11岁时,以38美元买入了3股 Cities Service 优先股。他14岁的姐姐觉得自己最好也跟着买,于是也买了3股。股票跌到27美元。她每天都问他这件事。最后,股价回升到40美元。为了摆脱头痛和那些问题,Buffett 卖掉了自己和姐姐的股票,扣除佣金后总共赚了5美元。随后,这只股票一路涨到200美元!他从未忘记这个教训。他指出,比如说,如果他曾向合伙人报告,他们40%的资金投在 American Express 上,或者他大量做多白银期货,他的合伙人会担心、会提问、会寄东西给他读。最好的情况是,他会浪费大量时间;最坏的情况是,他会受到他们反应的影响。他说,这就像一名外科医生在做一场大手术时,还要不断和病人交谈。
Buffett recommends looking less at earnings per share than at return on capital, which is what produces the earnings. There are ways of manipulating earnings per share and earnings growth; growth on total capital is harder to play with. Buffett believes almost no one should ever go short, but if one does it is best to go short the entire market - a representative list - rather than stocks one considers overpriced. Ben Graham tried going short overpriced stocks. Three out of four times it worked, but the fourth time he would get murdered as an already overpriced stock was run up to the skies by public enthusiasm. Buffett says that the trading approach to the stock market is excessively difficult, like a tournament of bridge experts in which each player can see others’ cards. The stocks are being followed by some of the best brains in the world. When Buffett was buying Disney or American Express there was virtually no competition. Buffett agrees that it’s scandalous for Wall Street houses to encourage small investors to dabble in commodities. He says that one sometimes can analyse the long-term price outlook for a nonagricultural commodity, notably a metal. If the price gets way below production cost for an indispensable metal, it must eventually recover. But the prices of agricultural commodities are subject to weather and other vagaries of nature: investing in them becomes a matter of flair. Since he depends on analysis for success, Buffett never will invest in an agricultural commodity.
Buffett 建议,与其看每股收益,不如更多关注资本回报率,因为资本回报率才是产生收益的东西。每股收益和收益增长都有办法被操纵;总资本回报率则更难做手脚。Buffett 认为,几乎没有人应该做空;但如果真要做空,最好做空整个市场——也就是一组有代表性的股票——而不是做空自己认为价格过高的个股。Ben Graham 曾尝试做空价格过高的股票。四次中有三次有效,但第四次他会被杀得很惨,因为一只已经价格过高的股票,可能会被公众热情继续推上天。Buffett 说,用交易方法对待股市极其困难,就像一场桥牌高手锦标赛,每位牌手都能看见其他人的牌。这些股票正被世界上一些最聪明的大脑跟踪研究。当 Buffett 买入 Disney 或 American Express 时,几乎没有竞争。Buffett 同意,Wall Street 公司鼓励小投资者涉足商品交易是可耻的。他说,有时人们可以分析某种非农产品商品,尤其是金属,长期价格前景。如果某种不可或缺金属的价格远低于生产成本,它最终必然会回升。但农产品商品的价格受天气及其他自然变幻无常因素影响:投资它们就变成了一种凭直觉和手感的事。由于 Buffett 的成功依赖分析,他绝不会投资农产品商品。
A generous target for total return on a stock portfolio would be 3% a year from the dividends, plus a 9% capital gain, or 12% in all. After a 50% income tax and a 30% capital gain, however, 1.5% is left from dividends and 6.3% from capital gain, a total of 7.8% after tax. And when the general market is selling for, say, 1.5 times its own book value, as a whole, the respectable return falls considerably from this level. From time to time you can get a similar return from good quality municipals, such as industrial revenue bonds, without the risks of stock ownership. At such a time, municipals are preferable to stocks. Buffett mentioned that he had negotiated a direct purchase from K Market of an industrial revenue bond earning 7.5%, which should do better than many stocks, after taxes.
对一个股票投资组合而言,一个慷慨的总回报目标可能是每年3%的股息,加上9%的资本利得,总计12%。然而,在50%的所得税和30%的资本利得税之后,股息只剩下1.5%,资本利得只剩下6.3%,税后总计为7.8%。而当整个市场比如说以自身账面价值的1.5倍出售时,体面的回报率会从这个水平显著下降。不时地,你可以从高质量的市政债券,比如工业收益债券中,获得类似回报,却不用承担股票所有权风险。在这种时候,市政债券优于股票。Buffett 提到,他曾与 K Market 谈判,直接购买一只收益率为7.5%的工业收益债券,税后表现应会好于许多股票。
For me, Buffett’s most important single message is his cry of alarm and recurring admonition to steer clear of the standard big American heavy industries requiring continuous massive investment. Most of these companies are in trouble. The cause is competition, over-regulation, rising labour costs and the like. The symptom is that just to stay in business many of these big industries need more money than they can retain out of reported earnings after paying reasonable dividends. To stay in the same place they require endless infusions of net new cash, like India or Egypt. To be sure, there are dividends on the new stock and interest on the new bonds that they constantly issue, but basically, these dividends and interest payments are only a loss leader to induce the investor to buy the new securities being issued. He has only an outside chance of ever seeing his principal again in real terms.
在我看来,Buffett 最重要的单一信息,是他反复发出的警报和告诫:远离那些标准的大型美国重工业公司,因为它们需要持续不断的大规模投资。大多数这类公司都陷入困境。原因包括竞争、过度监管、劳动力成本上升等等。症状则是:仅仅为了维持经营,许多这类大型行业所需要的资金,就超过了它们在支付合理股息之后能够从报告收益中留存下来的金额。为了留在原地,它们需要无休止地注入新的净现金,就像 India 或 Egypt 一样。当然,它们不断发行的新股会有股息,新债会有利息,但从根本上说,这些股息和利息支付只是赔本招徕,用来诱使投资者购买新发行的证券。投资者最终以实际价值拿回本金的可能性,只能说很小。
No Smokestacks
不要烟囱企业
Buffett regards investing in the “smokestack” companies, the heavy industries whose obsolescence is often more rapid than their allowable depreciation, as, in essence, participating in a series of constant mandatory rights offerings, where you have to put up more money to maintain your percentage interest. Instead of distributing their earnings to the shareholders in dividends, these companies are to retain them to build more capacity, either to replace rapidly ageing facilities or to meet competition. This increases output, which further lowers profit margins so that the companies are even less able to make real money in their basic business. Discussing American Airlines, Buffett mentioned that it turns over its capital (including leased equipment and facilities) only once a year. On that basis, it would have to realise close to a 20% pretax profit margin on sales in order to net 10%. In fact, the company makes nothing like a 20% profit margin on its sales, which would, indeed, be one the highest profit margins in all industry.
Buffett 认为,投资“烟囱”公司,也就是那些设备过时速度常常快于允许折旧速度的重工业公司,本质上等于参加一系列持续不断、强制性的配股:你必须不断追加资金,才能维持自己的持股比例。这些公司不是把收益以股息形式分配给股东,而是必须把收益留存下来建设更多产能,或者用于替换快速老化的设施,或者用于应对竞争。这会增加产量,进一步压低利润率,使这些公司在自己的基本业务中更难真正赚钱。谈到 American Airlines 时,Buffett 提到,它的资本(包括租赁设备和设施)一年只周转一次。在这个基础上,它必须在销售额上实现接近20%的税前利润率,才能获得10%的净收益。事实上,这家公司在销售额上的利润率远远达不到20%;而20%的销售利润率,实际上会是所有行业中最高的利润率之一。
Buffett once met a leading executive of a capital-intensive business giant at a time when the company was selling in the market for one-quarter of its replacement value. Buffett asked the executive; “Why don’t you buy back your own stock? If you like to buy new facilities at 100 cents on the dollar, why not buy the ones you know best and were responsible for creating at 25 cents on the dollar?”.
Buffett 曾经见过一家资本密集型巨头企业的一位主要高管,当时这家公司在市场上的售价只有其重置价值的四分之一。Buffett 问这位高管:“你们为什么不回购自己的股票?如果你们愿意按1美元买1美元的价格去购买新设施,为什么不以1美元买25美分的价格,买下那些你们最熟悉、并且由你们自己负责创造出来的设施?”
Executive: “We should”.
高管:“我们应该这么做。”
Buffett: “Well?”.
Buffett:“那为什么不做?”
Executive: “That’s not what we’re here to do”.
高管:“那不是我们在这里要做的事。”