1984-03-14 Warren Buffett.Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

Refer To：《1984-03-14 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

商誉及其摊销：规则与现实

This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill—not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.

本附录仅讨论经济商誉与会计商誉——而非日常语境中的"信誉"或"口碑"。举个例子：一家企业可能深受大多数客户的喜爱，甚至令他们钟爱有加，却不具备任何经济商誉。（AT&T在拆分之前普遍口碑良好，但经济商誉为零。）而遗憾的是，一家企业可能不受客户待见，却拥有可观且不断增长的经济商誉。因此，请暂时放下情感因素，仅聚焦于经济与会计层面。

When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".

收购一家企业时，会计准则要求将收购价格首先分配至所收购的可识别资产的公允价值。通常情况下，各项资产公允价值之和（扣除负债后）低于企业的总收购价格。在这种情况下，差额被记入一个名为"收购净资产成本超过权益的溢价"的资产科目。为避免不断重复这一拗口的表述，我们以"商誉"代替。

Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.

1970年11月前收购企业所产生的会计商誉具有特殊地位。除极少数情况外，只要所收购的企业仍被持有，它就可以作为资产持续留存于资产负债表上，无需通过摊销逐步冲减盈利来消耗该资产。

The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges—of equal amount in every year—to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.

然而，1970年11月之后的收购情况则有所不同。此类收购所产生的商誉，必须在不超过40年的期限内，以每年等额摊销的方式计入损益账户。由于40年是允许的最长期限，管理层（包括我们）通常选择40年。这一年度摊销费用不允许作为税务扣除项，因此对税后收益的影响大约是大多数其他费用的两倍。

That's how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let's look at an example close at hand. We'll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We'll also mention some implications for investors and managers.

以上就是会计商誉的运作方式。为了了解它与经济现实的差异，让我们来看一个近在眼前的例子。我们将对一些数字进行四舍五入，并大幅简化，以使例子更易于理解。我们也将提及一些对投资者和管理者的启示。

Blue Chip Stamps bought See's early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See's had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See's was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.

Blue Chip Stamps于1972年初以2500万美元收购了See's，彼时See's拥有约800万美元的有形净资产。（在本次讨论中，应收账款将被归类为有形资产，这是适合商业分析的定义。）这一有形资产规模足以在不使用债务的情况下维持正常经营，季节性短期借款除外。See's当时的税后盈利约为200万美元，这一盈利水平以1972年不变美元计算，看来是对未来盈利能力的保守代表。

Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.

由此得出我们的第一个启示：当一家企业能够以远超市场回报率的水平在其有形净资产上产生盈利时，该企业在逻辑上理应远比其有形净资产价值高得多。这种超额回报的资本化价值，就是经济商誉。

In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See's—doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.

在1972年（乃至今日），能够像See's那样持续实现有形净资产税后回报率25%的企业寥寥无几——更何况是在保守会计处理且零财务杠杆的条件下做到这一点。产生这种超额回报率的，并非存货、应收账款或固定资产的公允市场价值，而是一系列无形资产的综合作用——尤其是消费者基于对产品和员工无数次愉快体验而形成的广泛良好声誉。

Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.

这种声誉创造了一种消费者特许经营权，使得产品对购买者的价值——而非其生产成本——成为售价的主要决定因素。消费者特许经营权是经济商誉的首要来源。其他来源还包括不受利润管制的政府特许经营权（如电视台），以及在一个行业中长期稳固的最低成本生产者地位。

Let's return to the accounting in the See's example. Blue Chip's purchase of See's at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip's books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See's. This ownership meant that Berkshire's balance sheet reflected 60% of See's Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.

让我们回到See's案例的会计处理上。Blue Chip以超出有形净资产1700万美元的价格收购See's，要求在Blue Chip账簿上将这一金额设立为商誉资产，并在40年内每年向损益账户计提42.5万美元以摊销该资产。到1983年，经过11年的摊销，这1700万美元已减少至约1250万美元。与此同时，Berkshire持有Blue Chip 60%的股权，因此也间接持有See's 60%的权益。这一持股意味着Berkshire的资产负债表反映了See's商誉的60%，约为750万美元。

In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.

1983年，Berkshire通过一项合并收购了Blue Chip的其余股权，该合并须采用购买法会计处理，而非某些合并所允许的"权益结合法"处理。在购买法下，我们向Blue Chip股东支付（即"给付"）的股份的"公允价值"，须分摊至从Blue Chip收购的净资产之上。这一"公允价值"的衡量方式，与上市公司以股份进行收购时几乎一贯的做法相同——以所放弃股份的市场价值为准。

The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See's and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.

所"收购"的资产由Blue Chip所有资产的40%构成（如前所述，Berkshire已持有另外60%）。Berkshire所"支付"的金额超出所收到的可识别净资产5170万美元，这一差额被分配至两项商誉：See's商誉2840万美元，Buffalo Evening News商誉2330万美元。

After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See's that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.

因此，合并完成后，Berkshire持有的See's商誉资产由两部分构成：1971年收购时遗留下来的750万美元，以及1983年收购那40%股权时新产生的2840万美元。我们今后的年度摊销费用，在未来28年内约为100万美元，此后2002年至2013年的12年内约为70万美元。

In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)

换言之，不同的收购时间和价格，使我们对同一资产的两个组成部分形成了截然不同的资产价值和摊销费用。（我们再次声明：我们无法提出更好的会计处理方案。所要应对的问题令人头痛，且必然需要某种武断的规则。）

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See's were not true economic costs. We know that because See's last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets—a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.

但经济现实究竟如何？现实之一是：自收购See's以来，每年在损益表中作为成本扣除的摊销费用，并非真实的经济成本。我们之所以知道这一点，是因为See's去年在约2000万美元的有形净资产上实现了1300万美元的税后盈利——这一表现表明，经济商誉的存在远远大于我们会计商誉的原始总成本。换言之，在会计商誉自收购之日起持续规律地减少的同时，经济商誉却以不规则但极为可观的方式持续增长。

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See's economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won't shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase—in current, if not in constant, dollars—because of inflation.

另一个现实是，未来的年度摊销费用将与经济成本不相对应。当然，See's的经济商誉有可能消失。但它不会以均等递减或任何近似均等递减的方式萎缩。更有可能的情况是，即便以不变美元计算的商誉不增长，以当前美元计算的商誉也将因通货膨胀而有所增加。

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let's contrast a See's kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See's in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.

这种可能性之所以存在，是因为真实的经济商誉倾向于随通货膨胀按比例提升其名义价值。为了说明其运作方式，让我们将See's这类企业与一家更为普通的企业加以对比。回顾一下，我们1972年收购See's时，它以800万美元的有形净资产创造了约200万美元的盈利。假设我们这家假想的普通企业当时同样盈利200万美元，但正常经营需要1800万美元的有形净资产。以所需有形资产计算的回报率仅为11%，这家普通企业几乎不具备任何经济商誉。

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See's, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes"—even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume—as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.

因此，这样一家企业的售价很可能就等于其有形净资产的价值，即1800万美元。相比之下，我们为See's支付了2500万美元，尽管它的盈利并不比这家普通企业更多，而"货真价实"的资产还不到后者的一半。我们的收购价格是否真的印证了"少即是多"？答案是肯定的——即便两家企业的销售量预期都将持平——只要你像我们在1972年所预期的那样，预见到一个持续通货膨胀的世界。

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.

为了理解其中的原因，设想价格水平翻倍对这两家企业的后续影响。两家企业都需要将名义盈利翻倍至400万美元，才能跟上通货膨胀的步伐。这看起来似乎不难：只需以原来两倍的价格销售同等数量的产品，在利润率保持不变的假设下，利润也必然翻倍。

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.

但关键在于，要实现这一点，两家企业都可能必须将其有形净资产的名义投资翻倍，因为这正是通货膨胀通常对所有企业——无论优劣——所施加的经济要求。美元销售额翻倍，意味着必须立即在应收账款和存货上投入相应更多的资金。固定资产上投入的资金对通货膨胀的响应会慢一些，但最终结果可能同样确定。而所有这些因通货膨胀所要求的投资，都不会带来回报率的任何改善。这种投资的动力是企业的生存，而非所有者的繁荣。

Remember, however, that See's had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large—a need for $18 million of additional capital.

然而请记住，See's的有形净资产仅为800万美元。因此它只需再投入800万美元，便能满足通货膨胀所带来的资本需求。而那家普通企业的负担则超过前者的两倍——需要额外投入1800万美元资本。

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

尘埃落定之后，这家普通企业如今每年盈利400万美元，价值可能仍然等于其有形资产的价值，即3600万美元。这意味着其所有者每投入一美元新资本，仅获得一美元的名义价值增长。（这与他们把钱存入储蓄账户所能获得的一比一结果别无二致。）

See's, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital—over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.

而See's同样盈利400万美元，若以我们当初收购时的同等估值基础（逻辑上理应如此）来衡量，则可能价值5000万美元。因此，在所有者仅追加投入800万美元资本的情况下，它的名义价值增长了2500万美元——每投入1美元，获得逾3美元的名义价值增长。

如果折现率是10%，投入100万赚10万，再投入100万再赚10万生意没有意义。

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See's kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

尽管如此，请记住，See's这类企业的所有者仍被通货膨胀迫使追加投入800万美元资本，仅仅是为了维持实际盈利不变。任何需要一定有形净资产才能运营的无杠杆企业（几乎所有企业都如此），都会受到通货膨胀的侵蚀。对有形资产需求较少的企业，所受的损害不过是最小而已。

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom—long on tradition, short on wisdom—held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn't work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return—rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

这一事实当然令许多人难以理解。多年来，传统智慧——有传统之名，却缺乏真正的智慧——认为抵御通货膨胀的最佳保护来自那些拥有丰富自然资源、厂房机械或其他有形资产的企业（"我们信赖实物"）。但事实并非如此。重资产企业通常回报率偏低——这种回报率往往仅够勉强为现有业务的通胀需求提供资本，既无剩余用于实际增长，也无法分配给所有者，更谈不上收购新业务。

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment—yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

相比之下，在通货膨胀年代所积累的巨额商业财富中，有相当大比例来自于这样的企业：它们将持久价值的无形资产与相对有限的有形资产需求结合在一起。在这类情况下，名义盈利大幅攀升，而这些盈利大部分都可用于收购更多业务。这一现象在传媒业中尤为突出。该行业对有形资产投入的需求甚少，其特许经营权却经久不衰。在通货膨胀期间，商誉是那份持续馈赠的礼物。

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill—and there is plenty of it around—is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can't go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.

但这一论断自然只适用于真实的经济商誉。虚假的会计商誉——此类情况比比皆是——则是另一回事。当头脑过热的管理层以荒唐的价格收购一家企业时，同样的会计处理规范照样得到遵守。由于这种荒唐无处可去，它最终落入商誉账户。考虑到造就这一账户的管理层缺乏自律，在这种情况下，也许更应将其标注为"无意志"。不管叫什么名字，40年的摊销仪式照旧进行，那些被资本化的肾上腺素依然作为"资产"留存于账簿之上，仿佛这次收购本是一笔明智之举。

* * * * *

If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.

如果你仍然坚持认为商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳方式，我建议你思考最后一个问题。

Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.

假设一家公司每股净资产为20美元，全部为有形资产。进一步假设该公司内部培育了某种出色的消费者特许经营权，或有幸通过FCC最初的许可获得了一些重要的电视台。因此，它在有形资产上获得了丰厚的回报，比如每股5美元，即25%。

With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.

凭借这样的经济特质，它的股价可能达到每股100美元甚至更高，在整体出售的协议交易中也很可能实现这样的价格。

Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?

假设一位投资者以每股100美元买入该股票，实际上相当于为商誉支付了每股80美元（与收购整家企业的企业买家如出一辙）。这位投资者是否应当每年摊销每股2美元的商誉费用（80美元除以40年），以计算"真实"每股盈利？如果是的话，每股3美元的新"真实"盈利是否应当促使他重新审视自己的买入价格？

* * * * *

We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:

我们认为，管理者和投资者都应从两个视角来审视无形资产：

1.In analysis of operating results—that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit—amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation's economic Goodwill.

在分析经营成果时——即评估一个业务单元的基本经济特质时——摊销费用应当被忽略。一家企业在无杠杆有形净资产上预期能够赚取的回报，剔除商誉摊销对盈利的任何冲减，是衡量该业务经济吸引力的最佳指标。它同时也是衡量该业务经济商誉当前价值的最佳指标。

2.In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value—not just the recorded accounting value—of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See's and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.

在评估收购决策是否明智时，摊销费用同样应当被忽略。它既不应从盈利中扣除，也不应从业务成本中扣除。这意味着永远以商誉的全额成本来看待它，而不做任何摊销。此外，成本的定义应当涵盖所付出的全部对价的完整内在商业价值——而非仅仅是账面记录的会计价值——无论合并时所涉证券的市场价格如何，也无论是否允许采用权益结合法处理。举个例子，我们在Blue Chip合并中为See's和Buffalo News各40%商誉所真正支付的代价，远超账面记录的5170万美元。这一差异的存在，是因为合并中所放弃的Berkshire股份的市场价值，低于其内在商业价值——而内在商业价值才是界定我们真实成本的标准。

Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase—although it's a good place to look for one.

从视角（1）来看似乎是赢家的业务，从视角（2）来看可能黯然失色。好企业未必总是好的收购标的——尽管它确实是寻找好标的的好地方。

We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.

我们将努力收购那些以（1）衡量具有卓越经营经济特质、同时以（2）衡量能够提供合理回报的企业。会计处理后果将被完全忽略。

At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.

1983年底，我们会计账簿上的净商誉合计6200万美元，由资产负债表资产端列示的7900万美元，以及抵减我们在Mutual Savings and Loan权益账面价值的1700万美元负商誉构成。

We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.

我们相信，净经济商誉远超6200万美元的会计数字。

1984-03-14 Warren Buffett.Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

1984-03-14 Warren Buffett.Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

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