1986-03-04 Warren Buffett.Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation)

1986-03-04 Warren Buffett.Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation)


Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation)
三门极好的生意（以及关于激励薪酬的若干思考）

When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title—brace yourself—was "How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I Have Learned About Fishing". My grandfather was sure that interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world awaited his views. You may conclude from this section's title and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa's literary style (and personality).
我12岁时，曾与祖父同住约四个月。他以经营杂货为业，同时也在写一本书，每晚都会向我口述几页。这本书的书名——请做好心理准备——叫做《如何经营一家杂货店，以及我从钓鱼中学到的一些事》。祖父深信，这两个主题具有普世的吸引力，世界正在等待他的高见。从本节的标题和内容，你或许可以推断出：我受祖父的文学风格（和个性）熏陶，实在是过深了。

I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart, See's Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they earned an aggregate of $72 million pre-tax. Fifteen years ago, before we had acquired any of them, their aggregate earnings were about $8 million pre-tax.
我将 Nebraska Furniture Mart、See's Candy Shops 和 Buffalo Evening News 的讨论合并在此，原因在于自我去年向您汇报以来，这三门生意在经济层面的优势、劣势与前景几乎未有变化。但篇幅简短绝非意味着这些业务对我们不重要：1985年，它们合计税前盈利达7200万美元。而在十五年前，我们尚未收购其中任何一家时，它们合计税前盈利约为800万美元。

While an increase in earnings from $8 million to $72 million sounds terrific—and usually is—you should not automatically assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even more important point must be examined: how much additional capital was required to produce the additional earnings?
盈利从800万美元增长至7200万美元，听起来固然令人振奋——通常也确实如此——但你不应想当然地就此下结论。首先必须确认：基准年的盈利并非处于严重低迷的状态。若基准年盈利相对于所用资本已属可观，则还有一个更为关键的问题需要审视：产生这些新增盈利，需要追加多少资本？

In both respects, our group of three scores well. First, earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are now $64 million greater, the businesses require only about $40 million more in invested capital to operate than was the case then.
在这两方面，我们这三门生意的表现都相当出色。其一，十五年前的盈利相对于当时所用资本而言已属优秀。其二，尽管年盈利如今增加了6400万美元，这三门生意所需的投入资本却仅比当年多出约4000万美元。

The dramatic growth in earning power of these three businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America, however, has had a different experience: in order to increase earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase capital significantly also. The average American business has required about $5 of additional capital to generate an additional $1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would have required over $300 million in additional capital from its owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our group of three.
这三门生意盈利能力的大幅增长，伴随着对资本追加需求极为有限，深刻诠释了通货膨胀时期经济商誉的力量（这一现象已在1983年年报中有详细阐述）。这些业务的财务特性，使我们得以将它们所产生的大部分盈利调配至其他用途。然而，美国企业界的普遍经历却大相径庭：为了实现盈利的显著增长，大多数公司同样需要大幅增加资本投入。一般美国企业每多产生1美元的年税前盈利，约需追加5美元的资本。因此，若要达到与我们这三门生意相当的盈利表现，那样一家企业将需要向其所有者追加逾3亿美元的资本。

When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign—with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.
当资本回报率不过平平时，"多投入、多产出"的记录并不算什么了不起的管理成就。你坐在摇椅上也能取得同样的结果——只需将你存入储蓄账户的资本翻四倍，你的收益便会翻四倍。没有人会因此对你颂扬备至。然而，退休公告却屡屡对那些在任期间将公司盈利翻了四倍的CEO大加赞美——却从不追问，这一增长究竟是否仅仅源于多年的留存收益与复利的自然运作。

If the widget company consistently earned a superior return on capital throughout the period, or if capital employed only doubled during the CEO's reign, the praise for him may be well deserved. But if return on capital was lackluster and capital employed increased in pace with earnings, applause should be withheld. A savings account in which interest was reinvested would achieve the same year-by-year increase in earnings—and, at only 8% interest, would quadruple its annual earnings in 18 years.
若那家公司在整个任期内始终保持着优异的资本回报率，或者在CEO任期内所用资本仅翻了一倍，那么对他的赞誉或许确实实至名归。但若资本回报率平庸，而所用资本的增速又与盈利增速相当，那么掌声便应当收起。一个将利息不断再投入的储蓄账户，同样能实现年复一年的盈利增长——而且，仅以8%的利率计算，其年盈利在18年内便可翻四倍。

The power of this simple math is often ignored by companies to the detriment of their shareholders. Many corporate compensation plans reward managers handsomely for earnings increases produced solely, or in large part, by retained earnings—i.e., earnings withheld from owners. For example, ten-year, fixed-price stock options are granted routinely, often by companies whose dividends are only a small percentage of earnings.
这一简单数学的力量，常常被企业所忽视，而最终受损的是股东。许多企业的薪酬计划，对那些盈利增长完全或主要来自留存收益——即扣押未付给所有者的利润——的管理者给予丰厚奖励。例如，十年期固定价格的股票期权被例行授予，而发放这类期权的公司，往往其股息仅占盈利的极小部分。

An example will illustrate the inequities possible under such circumstances. Let's suppose that you had a $100,000 savings account earning 8% interest and "managed" by a trustee who could decide each year what portion of the interest you were to be paid in cash. Interest not paid out would be "retained earnings" added to the savings account to compound. And let's suppose that your trustee, in his superior wisdom, set the "pay-out ratio" at one-quarter of the annual earnings.
一个例子可以说明此类情形下可能产生的不公平现象。假设你有一个10万美元的储蓄账户，年利率为8%，由一位受托人"管理"，他每年可以决定将多少利息以现金形式支付给你。未支付的利息作为"留存收益"计入账户，继续复利增长。再假设这位受托人以其高超的智慧，将"派息比例"设定为年收益的四分之一。

Under these assumptions, your account would be worth $179,084 at the end of ten years. Additionally, your annual earnings would have increased about 70% from $8,000 to $13,515 under this inspired management. And, finally, your "dividends" would have increased commensurately, rising regularly from $2,000 in the first year to $3,378 in the tenth year. Each year, when your manager's public relations firm prepared his annual report to you, all of the charts would have had lines marching skyward.
在上述假设下，十年后你的账户价值将达179,084美元。此外，在这位高瞻远瞩的管理者治下，你的年收益将从8,000美元增长至13,515美元，增幅约为70%。最后，你的"股息"也将同步增加，从第一年的2,000美元稳步上升至第十年的3,378美元。每一年，当你的管理者的公关公司为你准备年度报告时，所有图表上的曲线都将一路扶摇直上。
Idea
用储蓄账户解释商业模式的优劣，后面的股东信中还有提及。
Now, just for fun, let's push our scenario one notch further and give your trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on part of your "business" (i.e., your savings account) based on its fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager would reap a substantial profit at your expense—just from having held on to most of your earnings. If he were both Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.
现在，不妨再往前推一步，给你的受托管理人按第一年的公允价值，授予一份针对你"生意"（即储蓄账户）部分权益的十年期固定价格期权。有了这样的期权，你的管理人只需将你的大部分收益扣留在账户中，便可从你的口袋里攫取一笔可观的利润。若他既工于心计，又略懂数学，一旦地位稳固，或许还会进一步压低派息比例。

This scenario is not as farfetched as you might think. Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.
这一情形并不像你想象的那样牵强。企业界许多股票期权的运作方式恰恰如此：它们增值，仅仅是因为管理层留存了收益，而非因为他们出色地运用了手中的资本。

Managers actually apply a double standard to options. Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to pay fully for capital added during the option period.
管理者在对待期权问题上，实际上奉行着双重标准。撇开认股权证不谈（认股权证会为发行公司带来即时且可观的补偿），我认为可以公允地说，在商业世界中，没有任何地方会向外部人士授予针对全部或部分业务的十年期固定价格期权。事实上，十个月已会被视为离谱之举。而对于一家持续追加资本的企业，向外部人士授予长期期权更是难以想象之事。任何希望获得此类期权的外部人士，都必须为期权存续期间所追加的资本足额付费。

The unwillingness of managers to do-unto-outsiders, however, is not matched by an unwillingness to do-unto-themselves. (Negotiating with one's self seldom produces a barroom brawl.) Managers regularly engineer ten-year, fixed-price options for themselves and associates that, first, totally ignore the fact that retained earnings automatically build value and, second, ignore the carrying cost of capital. As a result, these managers end up profiting much as they would have had they had an option on that savings account that was automatically building up in value.
然而，管理者不愿将此类待遇给予外部人士，却丝毫不妨碍他们将其慷慨地给予自己。（与自己谈判，鲜少会演变成一场激烈争吵。）管理者们惯常为自己及相关人员设计十年期固定价格期权，这类期权，其一，完全无视留存收益会自动积累价值这一事实；其二，忽视资本的占用成本。结果，这些管理者从中获益，一如他们持有那个自动增值的储蓄账户期权一般。

Of course, stock options often go to talented, value-adding managers and sometimes deliver them rewards that are perfectly appropriate. (Indeed, managers who are really exceptional almost always get far less than they should.) But when the result is equitable, it is accidental. Once granted, the option is blind to individual performance. Because it is irrevocable and unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the company), the sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the star. A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better "incentive" system.
当然，股票期权往往也会授予那些才华横溢、能为公司创造价值的管理者，有时所给予的回报也确实恰如其分。（事实上，真正卓越的管理者，几乎总是所得远低于其应得。）但当结果公平合理时，那不过是一种偶然。期权一经授予，便对个人表现视而不见。由于它不可撤销、无附加条件（只要管理者留在公司），懈怠者从期权中所获的回报，与明星管理者分毫不差。一位准备昏睡十年的管理界 Rip Van Winkle，再也找不到比这更称心如意的"激励"机制了。

(I can't resist commenting on one long-term option given an "outsider": that granted the U.S. Government on Chrysler shares as partial consideration for the government's guarantee of some lifesaving loans. When these options worked out well for the government, Chrysler sought to modify the payoff, arguing that the rewards to the government were both far greater than intended and outsize in relation to its contribution to Chrysler's recovery. The company's anguish over what it saw as an imbalance between payoff and performance made national news. That anguish may well be unique: to my knowledge, no managers—anywhere—have been similarly offended by unwarranted payoffs arising from options granted to themselves or their colleagues.)
（我忍不住要对一个授予"外部人士"的长期期权发表几句评论：那是美国政府就 Chrysler 股票所获得的期权，作为政府为几笔救命贷款提供担保的部分对价。当这些期权为政府带来丰厚回报时，Chrysler 试图修改兑付条款，声称政府所获回报远超当初预期，与其对公司复苏的贡献相比也严重失衡。该公司对这种"回报与贡献不相称"的愤慨之情，一度成为全国性新闻。这种愤慨或许是独一无二的：据我所知，从未有任何管理者——无论身处何处——会对源自授予自身或同僚的期权所产生的不当暴利，表现出类似的义愤填膺。）

Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently describes them as desirable because they put managers and owners in the same financial boat. In reality, the boats are far different. No owner has ever escaped the burden of capital costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs at all. An owner must weigh upside potential against downside risk; an option holder has no downside. In fact, the business project in which you would wish to have an option frequently is a project in which you would reject ownership. (I'll be happy to accept a lottery ticket as a gift—but I'll never buy one.)
颇具讽刺意味的是，关于期权的种种论调，常常将其描绘为可取之物，理由是它能让管理者与所有者同舟共济、利益与共。然而现实是，两条船相差悬殊。没有任何所有者能够摆脱资本成本的重负，而固定价格期权的持有者却完全无需承担资本成本。所有者必须在上行潜力与下行风险之间审慎权衡；期权持有者则毫无下行风险可言。事实上，你希望持有期权的那类商业项目，往往恰恰是你会拒绝直接持股的项目。（我乐于接受别人赠送的彩票——但我绝不会自掏腰包去买一张。）

In dividend policy also, the option holders' interests are best served by a policy that may ill serve the owner. Think back to the savings account example. The trustee, holding his option, would benefit from a no-dividend policy. Conversely, the owner of the account should lean to a total payout so that he can prevent the option-holding manager from sharing in the account's retained earnings.
在股息政策上，对期权持有者最为有利的政策，往往恰恰有损于所有者的利益。回想一下储蓄账户的例子：持有期权的受托人，将从不派息政策中获益；而账户所有者则应倾向于全额分配，以防止持有期权的管理者分享账户的留存收益。

Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three points:
尽管存在上述种种缺陷，期权在某些情形下仍可能是恰当的工具。我的批评针对的是其滥用，就此，我想强调三点：

First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility. Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have incentives that pay off in relation to results under their control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performance—even if he plays for a cellar-dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward—even if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its results.
其一，股票期权不可避免地与公司整体业绩挂钩。因此，从逻辑上讲，它只应授予那些负有整体责任的管理者。职责范围有限的管理者，其激励应与其所能掌控的业绩结果挂钩。一位打击率达.350的击球手，即便效力于一支垫底球队，也理应期待并获得与其表现相称的丰厚回报。而一位打击率仅.150的击球手，即便所在球队夺得联赛冠军，也不应获得奖励。只有那些对球队负有整体责任的人，才应将其回报与球队的整体成绩相挂钩。

Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent special factors, they should have built into them a retained-earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then, should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect, sell part of the business to insiders. While they're at it, they often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price—whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
其二，期权的结构设计必须审慎。在没有特殊情况的前提下，期权应内置留存收益或资本占用成本因素。同样重要的是，期权的定价应当符合实际。当管理者面对收购要约时，他们无一例外地会指出市场价格作为真实价值衡量标准是多么不可靠。但既然如此，为何这些同样被压低的价格，却成了管理者向自己出售部分业务权益时所采用的估值基准？（他们甚至可能变本加厉：高管和董事有时会查阅税法，以确定他们在实质上能够以最低价格向内部人士出售部分业务权益。与此同时，他们往往还会选择对公司税务结果最为不利的方案。）除极为罕见的情形外，以低价出售部分业务——无论是向外部人士还是内部人士——都无法切实维护所有者的利益。结论显而易见：期权应按真实的业务价值定价。

Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire enormously—and whose operating records are far better than mine—disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example, and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a culture is rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact—despite inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" is preferable to "purity at any price".
其三，我想强调，有些管理者是我由衷敬佩的——其经营记录也远胜于我——他们在固定价格期权问题上与我持不同意见。他们建立了行之有效的企业文化，而固定价格期权正是帮助他们达成这一目标的工具之一。这些管理者以身作则、以期权作为激励手段，引导同事以所有者的心态思考问题。这样的企业文化殊为难得，一旦存在，或许就应当保持完整——即便期权计划本身存在若干低效与不公平之处。"没坏就别修"，胜于"不惜代价追求纯粹"。
Idea
巴菲特在这里假设了资本应该取得平均收益，比如，7-8%，或者12%，但是平均收益的概念跟跨越行业的泛化能力有关，大部分企业以及管理团队并不具备跨越行业的泛化能力。

就像1棵树上的苹果，平均200克，那么每个苹果的起点就应该是200克，这个逻辑是有点问题的，200克是相互竞争养份和阳光的结果，每个苹果并没有200克的起点，都只能在既定的位置上争取长的更大、更好。
At Berkshire, however, we use an incentive compensation system that rewards key managers for meeting targets in their own bailiwicks. If See's does well, that does not produce incentive compensation at the News—nor vice versa. Neither do we look at the price of Berkshire stock when we write bonus checks. We believe good unit performance should be rewarded whether Berkshire stock rises, falls, or stays even. Similarly, we think average performance should earn no special rewards even if our stock should soar. "Performance", furthermore, is defined in different ways depending upon the underlying economics of the business: in some our managers enjoy tailwinds not of their own making, in others they fight unavoidable headwinds.
然而在 Berkshire，我们采用的是一套激励薪酬体系，按各位关键管理者在其各自职责范围内达成目标的情况给予奖励。See's 经营出色，并不会为 News 带来激励薪酬，反之亦然。我们在开具奖金支票时，也不会参考 Berkshire 的股价。我们认为，无论 Berkshire 股价上涨、下跌还是横盘，优秀的单位业绩都应当获得奖励。同样，即便我们的股价大幅攀升，平庸的业绩也不应获得任何特别奖励。此外，"业绩"的定义因各业务的基本经济特性而有所不同：某些业务的管理者享有并非源于自身努力的顺风，另一些则须面对无可回避的逆风。

The rewards that go with this system can be large. At our various business units, top managers sometimes receive incentive bonuses of five times their base salary, or more, and it would appear possible that one manager's bonus could top $2 million in 1986. (I hope so.) We do not put a cap on bonuses, and the potential for rewards is not hierarchical. The manager of a relatively small unit can earn far more than the manager of a larger unit if results indicate he should. We believe, further, that such factors as seniority and age should not affect incentive compensation (though they sometimes influence basic compensation). A 20-year-old who can hit .300 is as valuable to us as a 40-year-old performing as well.
这套体系所带来的回报可以相当丰厚。在我们各业务单元中，高层管理者有时可获得相当于基本薪酬五倍乃至更高的激励奖金，1986年甚至可能有一位管理者的奖金超过200万美元。（我衷心希望如此。）我们对奖金不设上限，奖励潜力也不按职级高低而定。若业绩表明应当如此，一个规模相对较小的业务单元的管理者，完全可以赚得比更大单元的管理者更多。我们进一步认为，资历与年龄等因素不应影响激励薪酬（尽管它们有时会影响基本薪酬）。一位能打出.300打击率的20岁球员，对我们而言与一位同样表现的40岁球员一样珍贵。

Obviously, all Berkshire managers can use their bonus money (or other funds, including borrowed money) to buy our stock in the market. Many have done just that—and some now have large holdings. By accepting both the risks and the carrying costs that go with outright purchases, these managers truly walk in the shoes of owners.
显然，所有 Berkshire 的管理者都可以用他们的奖金（或其他资金，包括借款）在市场上购买我们的股票。许多人已经这样做了——其中一些人如今持有相当规模的仓位。通过直接买入股票、承担与之相伴的风险和资本占用成本，这些管理者真正做到了与所有者同甘共苦、设身处地。

Now let's get back—at long last—to our three businesses:
现在，让我们终于回到这三门生意上来：

At Nebraska Furniture Mart our basic strength is an exceptionally low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values available in home furnishings. NFM is the largest store of its kind in the country. Although the already-depressed farm economy worsened considerably in 1985, the store easily set a new sales record. I also am happy to report that NFM's Chairman, Rose Blumkin (the legendary "Mrs. B"), continues at age 92 to set a pace at the store that none of us can keep up with. She's there wheeling and dealing seven days a week, and I hope that any of you who visit Omaha will go out to the Mart and see her in action. It will inspire you, as it does me.
Nebraska Furniture Mart 的核心竞争力在于其极为低廉的运营成本，使其能够持续为顾客提供家居用品领域最具价值的选择。NFM 是全美同类门店中规模最大的。尽管本已低迷的农业经济在1985年进一步恶化，该店仍轻松创下销售新纪录。我也很高兴地告诉大家，NFM 的董事长 Rose Blumkin（传奇的"B太太"）在92岁高龄依然保持着令我们所有人望尘莫及的工作节奏。她每周七天都在店里谈生意、做买卖。我希望各位如有机会前往 Omaha，务必去 Mart 亲眼见识她的风采——正如她每次都激励着我一样，她也必将激励你们。

At See's we continue to get store volumes that are far beyond those achieved by any competitor we know of. Despite the unmatched consumer acceptance we enjoy, industry trends are not good, and we continue to experience slippage in poundage sales on a same-store basis. This puts pressure on per-pound costs. We now are willing to increase prices only modestly and, unless we can stabilize per-shop poundage, profit margins will narrow.
See's 各门店的销售量持续大幅领先于我们所知的任何竞争对手。尽管我们享有无与伦比的消费者认可度，但行业整体趋势并不乐观，同店销售的磅数仍在持续下滑，这对每磅成本形成了压力。目前我们仅愿小幅提价，若无法稳定每家门店的销售磅数，利润率将面临收窄。

At the News volume gains are also difficult to achieve. Though linage increased during 1985, the gain was more than accounted for by preprints. ROP linage (advertising printed on our own pages) declined. Preprints are far less profitable than ROP ads, and also more vulnerable to competition. In 1985, the News again controlled costs well and our household penetration continues to be exceptional.
Buffalo Evening News 的销量增长同样难以实现。尽管1985年广告行数有所增加，但增量主要来自预印广告。ROP 广告行数（直接印刷于我们版面上的广告）则有所下滑。预印广告的盈利能力远低于 ROP 广告，在竞争面前也更为脆弱。1985年，News 再度有效控制了成本，我们的家庭覆盖率依然出色。

One problem these three operations do not have is management. At See's we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey, a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and his unusual business talents have become more evident with every additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins—Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and Steve—a three-generation miracle of management.
这三项业务有一个共同点：它们都不缺乏优秀的管理者。See's 有 Chuck Huggins 坐镇，他是我们收购这门生意当天便委以重任的人选，这一任命至今仍是我们最明智的商业决策之一。News 有 Stan Lipsey，一位同样出类拔萃的管理者。Stan 已与我们并肩共事17年，随着他所承担的责任层层递进，他非凡的商业才能也愈发显露无遗。而在 Mart，我们有令人叹为观止的 Blumkin 家族——B太太、Louie、Ron、Irv 和 Steve——一个横跨三代的管理奇迹。

I consider myself extraordinarily lucky to be able to work with managers such as these. I like them personally as much as I admire them professionally.
能与这样的管理者共事，我深感三生有幸。我对他们的个人情谊，丝毫不亚于我对他们职业才能的钦佩。

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