1987-06-03 American Express.J.C., TC, M.F., and MO 3

Refer To：《American Express: The Unofficial History of the People Who Built the Great Financial Empire》。

In 1881, a few months after W. G. Fargo’s death, Amexco’s board elected his brother James Congdell \[J.C.] president; the succession never was in doubt. J.C. ruled Amexco for the next thirty-three years, but the decisions he made affected its destiny for many decades thereafter. Not only did Amexco grow vastly richer under his autocratic regime, but it expanded beyond the borders of the U.S. and the confines of the express business itself. Both inadvertently and by design, J.C. set in motion a process that eventually turned Amexco into a financial institution. He did it with two key decisions—the first, to devise a money-order system; and the second, to create the American Express Travelers Cheque.

1881年，在W.G.法戈去世几个月后，Amexco董事会选举他的弟弟詹姆斯·康戴尔（J.C.）为总裁；这一继任从未存在疑问。在接下来的三十三年里，J.C.掌管着Amexco，但他所做出的决策对公司未来几十年的命运产生了深远影响。在他专制的统治下，Amexco不仅变得更加富有，而且扩展到美国境外，走出了传统快递业务的范畴。无论是无意中还是有意为之，J.C.启动了一个过程，最终将Amexco转变为一家金融机构。他通过两个关键决定实现了这一点——首先，设计出一套汇票系统；其次，创建了美国运通旅行支票。

When J.C. took over, he found himself in the middle of a battle. But this was different from the ones the company had faced in the 1850s. He and the other major express companies were fighting an opponent that could not be crushed, merged with, or bought off—the U.S. Post Office Department. The Post Office wanted to take the package and money-carrying business for itself, and postmasters general beginning in the 1860s campaigned for the next half a century to persuade the U.S. Congress to abolish the express. Failing that, they wanted permission to compete with it in all lines of business. Congress refused to do either, but did allow the Post Office gradual encroachments into the express business. For example, when Congress voted to create third-class mail, it broke the express monopoly on the transport of magazines and newspapers. But more damaging was the authorization by Congress in 1864 of the postal money order. The money order ended another express monopoly, one in the transmission of small sums of money.

J.C.接任时，发现自己置身于一场战斗之中。但这场战斗不同于公司在19世纪50年代所面对的战斗。他和其他主要的快递公司正在对抗一个无法被击败、合并或收买的对手——美国邮政部。邮政部希望将包裹运输和资金转运业务据为己有，自19世纪60年代起，历任邮政总局长在接下来的半个世纪里不断游说国会取缔快递行业。如果不能取缔，他们就希望获得在所有业务领域与之竞争的权力。国会既未同意取消快递业，也未授权其全面竞争，但确实允许邮政逐步蚕食快递业务。例如，当国会批准设立第三类邮件时，就打破了快递公司对杂志和报纸运输的垄断。但更具破坏性的是，1864年国会授权设立了邮政汇票业务。这项业务终结了快递公司在小额资金传输方面的又一项垄断。

The express companies of course had carried cash from the very beginning, and while they sought principally the business of the banks, they also transported small amounts for individuals. With the rapid expansion of the American frontier and of American commerce, more people had more reason to send money. Personal checking accounts existed only for the wealthy; consequently, many cash transactions traveled via the express. Customers put their money into an envelope, sewed the envelope shut, and sealed it with wax. Since the express provided rapid transport and guaranteed delivery, the system offered speed and safety. Although it was a bit cumbersome, it worked successfully, and the express companies dominated the business for small sums through the Civil War. But afterward the postal money order, simply a kind of check, grabbed an ever-increasing share of the business.

快递公司从一开始就承运现金，虽然他们的主要客户是银行，但也为个人运输小额资金。随着美国边疆和商业的快速扩张，越来越多的人有理由汇款。那时支票账户仅限于富人拥有，因此许多现金交易依靠快递进行。客户将现金放入信封，缝合封口并以蜡封印。由于快递服务提供快速运输和交付保障，这种系统既快速又安全。虽然略显繁琐，但运行顺利，快递公司在南北战争期间一直主导着小额资金业务。然而战后，邮政汇票——一种简化的支票形式——逐渐夺走了这部分市场的份额。

Though the postal money order presented a challenge to the expresses, initially the Post Office Department had not intended it as one. Postal officials created the money order to keep postmen from stealing cash out of letters. At a cost of 10 cents for a \$10 order, it was cheap enough to break the express monopoly. Despite express industry fulminations that money orders represented “a prostitution of the mails to illegitimate purposes,” the public bought them. In 1880, the Post Office Department sold \$100 million worth from 5,491 branches.

虽然邮政汇票对快递行业构成了挑战，但最初邮政部并非有意为之。邮政官员创建汇票制度，是为了防止邮差从信件中偷取现金。每张面额10美元的汇票只需10美分，价格足够低，足以打破快递业的垄断。尽管快递业激烈抨击汇票是“将邮政服务堕落用于非法用途”，但公众依然大量购买。到1880年，邮政部通过其5,491个网点销售了价值1亿美元的汇票。

The express companies tried to fight the Post Office on all fronts. In the 1870s they met to plan joint action “to meet the serious opposition of the mails.” They agreed on an industry-lobbying effort, and they dropped rates on magazines and newspapers to compete with third-class mail. They also fought the postal money order, lowering rates on their money packages. But sales of post office money orders continued to rise anyway.

快递公司试图在各条战线上与邮政抗争。19世纪70年代，他们召开会议，计划采取联合行动以“应对邮件系统的严重威胁”。他们同意发动行业游说行动，并降低杂志和报纸的运费以对抗第三类邮件。同时，他们也对抗邮政汇票，通过降低自己的资金运输费用来竞争。但邮局汇票的销售额仍持续上升。

By adopting its own money order, Amexco decided to take on the Post Office at its own game with a similar product that was better than the original. This was a departure from the industry’s usual tactics. Amexco took this step on its own, although express companies usually dealt with the government jointly, in order to bring more resources and more influence to bear than any one company could muster. Also, the expresses had previously used only two methods in fighting the government: they influenced legislation when they could, or lowered prices on competing services. Neither the industry nor any individual express company had tried developing a whole new weapon.

通过推出自家的汇票，Amexco决定以类似但更优质的产品，在邮政的主场与其正面交锋。这一举措不同于行业以往的策略。Amexco是单独采取此举的，尽管快递公司通常会联合应对政府，以集合更多资源和影响力。此外，快递业此前应对政府的手段只有两种：一是尝试影响立法，二是压低竞争服务的价格。无论是整个行业还是任何一家快递公司，此前从未尝试过开发一种全新的“武器”。

The idea of a money order was not in itself new at American Express. The company could have gotten the jump on the Post Office if it had started a money order system when the idea was first raised at a board meeting in 1857. At the time, board factionalism ruled out the adoption of new products, and a money order became possible only after W\.G. took over. Yet when the idea resurfaced in 1868, W\.G. opposed it for unspecified reasons. By 1877, he appeared more receptive to a money-order system, but only if it were adopted by the entire express industry. Amexco could not persuade the other companies of the need for a money order, however, and neither W\.G. nor J.C. appeared interested in a system belonging to Amexco alone.

其实，汇票的构想在美国运通并非新鲜事。早在1857年的董事会上，便有人提出这一构想，如果当时就实施，Amexco原本可以在邮政之前抢占先机。但当时董事会内部派系纷争，无法达成共识采纳新产品，因此汇票计划直到W.G.接管公司后才有可能推进。然而，当该想法于1868年再次提出时，W.G.以未明原因予以反对。到1877年，他似乎更愿意接受汇票系统，但前提是整个快递行业都采用它。然而Amexco未能说服其他公司接受汇票概念，而W\.G.与J.C.也都不愿推动一个只属于Amexco的系统。

决策的关键是质量而不是速度，GEICO采用驾驶跟踪的技术也花了10多年时间。

J.C. might never have changed his mind but for the persistence of one individual—Marcellus Fleming Berry. Berry had joined Amexco in 1866 as a messenger, and he later moved up to a clerkship in the company’s Boston office. In 1880, J.C. appointed him traffic manager at the company’s New York headquarters, now located in a nondescript building at 65 Broadway. Berry was a small man, with a cheeky, round face, a thick mustache, and a mostly bald head that he kept covered with a straw boater even at the office. Berry possessed an active business imagination that set him apart from others in the company. And he had something else that allowed him to continue to pursue his ideas, a streak of optimism that made him believe he would get his way in the end.

如果不是马塞勒斯·弗莱明·贝里（Marcellus Fleming Berry）的坚持，J.C. 可能永远不会改变主意。贝里于1866年以信使身份加入Amexco，后来升任公司波士顿办事处的文员。1880年，J.C. 任命他为公司设于纽约总部的交通经理，当时总部位于百老汇65号一栋毫不起眼的建筑中。贝里身材瘦小，圆脸调皮，蓄着浓密的胡子，头顶大多秃了，哪怕在办公室里也戴着一顶草帽。他有着一套与公司其他人不同的商业想象力。而他之所以能坚持推动自己的想法，还因为他天性乐观，总相信最后一定能如愿以偿。

He needed that attitude to deal with J. C. Fargo. The slightly built, ruddy-cheeked J.C. was not an easy man to persuade. He was an absolute autocrat, a tyrant to many, who assumed for himself more power even than his brother had exercised. J.C., who held both executive and operational authority, tried to control every detail of the company’s business, and he did not welcome suggestions from his subordinates. When they approached him, he looked down at them over glasses perched at the end of his nose, and fixed them with a cold, humorless stare. Usually, he greeted new ideas with a sharp, sometimes angry, “No!”—a reaction few were willing to face a second or third time. But if a man could ignore the hostility and rejection and keep trying, he might get what he wanted. J.C. could say no and mean never, but he could also be persuaded.

他必须具备这种态度才能应对J.C.法戈。J.C.身形瘦削，面色红润，性格却极难说服。他是个彻头彻尾的独裁者，许多人称他为暴君，其掌控力甚至超过了他的哥哥。J.C.既掌握行政权也掌控业务运营，试图干涉公司业务的每一个细节，对下属的建议极不欢迎。下属接近他时，他会从鼻尖架着的眼镜后居高临下地注视对方，目光冰冷毫无幽默感。通常他会用尖锐甚至愤怒的“不要！”回应新点子——这种反应让大多数人不愿再尝试第二次或第三次。但如果有人能无视敌意和拒绝，坚持不懈，他最终可能会成功。J.C.说“不”可能意味着永远不行，但他也是可以被说服的。

J.C.’s hostility never stopped Berry. Younger executives recalled that when J.C. snapped at him, Berry would mutter to himself and walk away. Later he would plop down at his desk, a dark look on his face. But after a moment’s reflection, his expression would change, and he would announce that, next time, everything would work out all right. Such a rosy outlook kept him pursuing J.C. for months on the money order. Rejection followed rejection. He muttered to himself, but he continued pursuing J.C. until the time was right, and there was no better time than just after J.C. took over. Newly promoted executives have always been especially susceptible to new ideas, and J.C. was no exception.\* In 1881, he told Berry to go ahead and create a money-order system for American Express.

J.C.的敌意从未阻止贝里。年轻一代的高管回忆说，每当J.C.厉声斥责他时，贝里总是低声嘀咕着离开。后来他会坐回自己办公桌前，脸色阴沉。但过了一会儿，他的表情就会改变，然后宣布下次一定会成功。正是这种乐观态度，支撑他在汇票问题上追着J.C.跑了好几个月。他一次次遭到拒绝，但仍坚持不懈地说服J.C.，直至时机成熟。而在J.C.刚刚接任时，正是最佳时机。刚晋升的高管往往更容易接受新点子，J.C.也不例外。*1881年，他告诉贝里可以着手为美国运通建立汇票系统。

作者是只鸡，如果AMEX历任CEO很容易接受新的观点，这个公司早完蛋了。

Berry believed that he could create a better money order than the one offered by the Post Office. Since the postal order required literacy in English, it presented particular difficulties for the immigrant population. Immigrants were arriving in the greatest wave in U.S. history, and the postal money order was the right idea for them, but the system defeated them. Berry claimed that immigrants as well as “stupid persons, or persons who cannot read or write \[have] to blunder about \[a post office] until some outsider takes pity on them and writes out their application for them.”

贝里相信他能做出比邮政汇票更好的产品。由于邮政汇票要求具备英语读写能力，这对移民群体而言构成了极大障碍。美国正处于历史上最大规模的移民潮中，邮政汇票本是为他们量身打造的好点子，但系统本身却令他们望而却步。贝里声称，移民以及“一些愚笨者或无法读写的人必须在邮局里摸索半天，直到有好心人替他们填写申请单。”

The postal order presented other complications. To prevent people from buying an order for one amount and forging a higher amount in its place, a postal order could only be cashed at a designated post office, which was notified by a separate advice that an order had been issued. The postal system proved equally troublesome to those wanting refunds on lost orders; the process of fighting red tape could take weeks. But despite its lack of flexibility, the postal money order sold well. That suggested to Berry how successful a more efficient money order system could be.

邮政汇票还有其他不便之处。为了防止买家购买低金额汇票后篡改金额，汇票只能在指定邮局兑现，并须由邮政另行发出通知确认汇票已签发。对于那些希望退还遗失汇票的顾客，邮政系统也极为繁琐，整个流程可能耗时数周。尽管系统不够灵活，邮政汇票依然畅销。这使贝里意识到，一个更高效的汇票系统有多大的成功潜力。

J.C., too, feared forgery, and he conditioned his acceptance of an express money order on a solution to that problem. But Berry already had solved it. His method, which he later patented, was simple. On the left side of the money order (the MO in company shorthand), he placed nine columns of figures which he called a “protection margin.” The figures depicted all 5-cent denominations from 1 to 10, the maximum amount of the first express money orders. When a customer purchased an order, the express clerk wrote the name of the payee and the amount on two stubs, and gave one to the buyer and kept the other for company records. But instead of writing the amount on the MO itself, he cut the protective margin to the designated sum. The customer could not raise the value of the order because the figures simply were no longer there. While the American Express money order changed to some extent over the years, the company retained Berry’s basic concept well into the twentieth century.\*

J.C.同样担心伪造问题，他同意推行快递汇票的前提，是必须解决这一问题。但贝里早已想出了解决办法，并随后申请了专利。其方法十分简单：在汇票左侧（公司内部简称为MO），他设置了九栏数字，称之为“防伪边框”。这些数字代表从5分到50分之间所有5分增量的面额，对应最初快递汇票的最高额度10美元。当顾客购买汇票时，快递职员会在两张存根上分别写下收款人姓名及金额，一张交给客户，另一张留档。但职员并不在汇票上填写金额，而是在防伪边框处剪掉相应面额的数字。这样顾客就无法提高汇票金额，因为相关数字已经不复存在。尽管美国运通的汇票系统后来有所调整，但公司一直沿用了贝里的这一核心设计，直至二十世纪。\*

chatGPT还能找到1890-1930年间的票据，非常聪明又实用的设计。

American Express did not expect to make money at first, and Berry said it was “more a means of advertising our general business than . . . the expectation of making a profit.” The company took a sales charge of 5 cents on orders of \$5 or less, and 8 cents (\$2 cents lower than the Post Office) on orders from \$5 to \$10. If Amexco sold millions of orders, it could earn significant sales charges. But that seemed unlikely. The company had over 4,000 offices, all of which sold orders, but at first only 457 could cash them. Also, the company had offices only in nineteen states; what if someone wanted to send an order into territory controlled by Adams Express? Amexco had not made provisions for cashing orders outside its own lines.

美国运通起初并未指望靠这项业务赚钱，贝里表示这“更多是为了宣传我们的主营业务……而不是指望从中获利。”公司对5美元或以下的订单收取5美分手续费，对5至10美元的订单则收取8美分（比邮政便宜2美分）。若Amexco每年售出数百万张汇票，手续费收入将颇为可观。但这看起来并不现实。公司当时拥有4,000多个办事处，均可出售汇票，但最初只有457处能够兑现。此外，公司仅在19个州设有办事处；若有人要将汇票汇入Adams Express控制区域怎么办？Amexco并未安排如何在自家线路之外兑现汇票。

Berry explained his system to the executive committee in January 1882, and J.C. gave it his support; three months later, the first orders reached the market. From the start, the company as a whole made a concerted effort to make the MO work. The EC authorized \$5,000 for an advertising campaign, a huge amount in those days, particularly for a company that had little need to advertise its monopoly express service. Soon, ads began appearing in newspapers and magazines throughout Amexco’s territory proclaiming Berry’s creation to be “The Cheapest, Safest and Most Convenient Money Order System Ever Adopted.” Perhaps more importantly, before the end of the first year of the MO, other express companies announced a willingness to cash Amexco’s orders, as well as an intention to get into the money order business themselves. \*(American Express would honor their paper too.) But, because it was first, Amexco always dominated the express money order business; only the Post Office money order offered significant competition.

1882年1月，贝里向执行委员会讲解了他的系统，J.C.给予了支持；三个月后，第一批汇票就投放市场。从一开始，公司上下便齐心协力推动汇票业务成功。执行委员会批准了5,000美元的广告预算，这在当时是一个巨额数字，尤其是对于一家几乎不需要为其垄断快递服务打广告的公司而言。不久，广告便出现在Amexco辖区内的报纸和杂志上，宣称贝里的发明是“史上最便宜、最安全、最方便的汇票系统”。也许更重要的是，在汇票推出的第一年内，其他快递公司也宣布愿意兑现Amexco的汇票，并表示有意进入汇票业务领域。（\*美国运通也愿意兑现他们的汇票。）但由于Amexco率先推出该业务，因此始终主导着快递汇票市场；唯一具备实质竞争力的只有邮政汇票。

The American Express money order caught on much more quickly than Berry expected. In the first month, the company sold 11,959 orders, totaling \$51,835.83, with commissions for the company of \$559.03. By the end of that first year Amexco had sold 240,000 more of them. And that growth continued; May 1883 saw a 100 percent increase in sales over May 1882. Sales continued to rise and volume grew, especially after 1885, when the company raised the maximum amount of a money order from \$10 to \$50. By the end of the century Amexco would be selling 3.5 million MOs a year. Seeing that MOs were fast becoming big business, J.C. wasted little time putting the operation into family hands; though Berry had created the business, J.C. called in his brother Mortimer to manage the new Money Order Department, and Berry returned to the traffic desk.

美国运通汇票比贝里预期的更快走红。首月公司就售出11,959张汇票，总额为51,835.83美元，公司从中获得559.03美元的手续费。到第一年年底，Amexco又售出24万张汇票。业务增长持续不断；1883年5月的销售额比1882年5月增长了一倍。销售持续上升，业务量不断扩大，尤其是在1885年公司将汇票最高限额从10美元提高至50美元后更为明显。到19世纪末，Amexco每年售出汇票达350万张。眼见汇票业务迅速壮大，J.C.毫不拖延地将其交由家族成员管理；尽管这项业务由贝里一手创立，J.C.还是让其弟莫蒂默负责新成立的汇票部门，而贝里则重返交通事务岗位。

While Amexco made some profit from the sales charges on MOs, company officials soon discovered another, ultimately more important, profit opportunity—uncashed money orders. Customers paid for an order in cash, in full, on a no-interest basis, and the money stayed in Amexco’s hands until the order was cashed. This amount fluctuated, of course, but the company realized that it always had an average positive balance of money waiting for redemption. In fact, as the volume of money order sales grew, so did the average outstanding balance. To be sure, this balance ultimately represented company liabilities, but as long as an average existed and could be tracked, the company could invest the money from the uncashed MO fund, the “float,” as it came to be called. Actually, it took Amexco officials a few years to begin to realize that they had a substantial and growing investment opportunity, and not until 1891 did the executive committee begin to concern itself with the size of the float and how float funds were invested. But by that time, American Express had an average outstanding balance totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. The fund was producing an investment income that, although only a small percentage of Amexco’s overall earnings, was growing steadily.

虽然Amexco从汇票手续费中获得了一些利润，但公司高管很快发现了另一项、最终更重要的利润来源——未兑现的汇票。客户用现金全额购买汇票，不收利息，这笔资金在汇票兑现前一直掌握在Amexco手中。这一余额当然会有波动，但公司意识到，始终存在一笔平均的正向未兑余额。事实上，随着汇票销量的增长，这一平均余额也随之增加。诚然，这笔余额在账面上属于公司负债，但只要这笔平均余额存在且可追踪，公司便可投资这笔未兑现的汇票资金——后来被称作“浮存金”（float）。实际上，Amexco的高管用了好几年才意识到这是一个可观且持续增长的投资机会，直到1891年执行委员会才开始关注浮存金的规模以及如何进行投资。但到那时，美国运通的平均浮存金已达数十万美元。这笔基金带来的投资收益，虽在整体盈利中占比不大，却在稳定增长。

骗子的反应会更快。

Three years after its inauguration, the MO unexpectedly created a new opportunity, which propelled the company into a financial business abroad. As Berry had hoped, the new immigrant population took to the Amexco MO. But Berry had expected immigrants to use orders as a convenient way to pay their bills in the U.S. Instead they were sending them abroad. In Europe, however, Amexco had no financial standing, and money orders sent abroad in the early 1880s could not be cashed.

在汇票业务启动三年后，它意外地带来了一个新机遇，推动公司踏入海外金融业务领域。正如贝里所预期的，新一代移民开始使用Amexco的汇票。但贝里原以为移民们会用它来在美国境内支付账单，实际上他们却将汇票寄往海外。然而在欧洲，Amexco并无金融立足点，19世纪80年代初寄往国外的汇票无法兑现。

When Mortimer Fargo, the head of the money-order department, discovered what immigrants were doing, he regarded it as an opportunity. He wrote to his brother J.C., enthusiastically proposing that Amexco plunge ahead with a campaign to sell MOs for use abroad. However, he did not understand the problems and implications. Berry had investigated the question of issuing foreign orders and knew the problems they posed, but Mortimer did not check the records or talk to the MO’s creator.

当汇票部门主管莫蒂默·法戈发现移民的用法后，他将其视作一项机遇。他写信给哥哥J.C.，热情建议Amexco大力推动海外汇票销售计划。然而，他并未意识到其中的问题与复杂性。贝里曾研究过签发国际汇票的问题，并了解其所带来的种种挑战，但莫蒂默既未查阅记录，也未与汇票系统的创始人沟通。

J.C. read his brother’s letter on foreign MOs and passed it on to Berry, who blasted Mortimer for his lack of preparation. “It will be a grand fizzle if agents are given to understand that our present forms can be issued payable abroad,” he wrote. Berry noted his own investigation and told the brothers Fargo that, if they wanted to have the money order payable in Europe, they would have to make arrangements with foreign banks first.

J.C.读完弟弟关于海外汇票的信后，转给了贝里。贝里严厉批评莫蒂默准备不足：“如果让代理人误以为我们的现有表格可以用于海外兑付，那将是一次彻底的失败。”他指出自己曾对此问题做过调查，并告诉法戈兄弟，如果他们想要实现欧洲兑付，就必须先与外国银行达成合作安排。

Mortimer took Berry’s advice and went out and established the necessary banking link. On June 15, 1886, Amexco announced that Kidder, Peabody & Co. of the U.S., as representative for Baring Brothers of London, had arranged “for the payment of this Company’s Money Orders in Europe.” Foreign orders became cashable in thirty-nine locations in ten countries. As the foreign money order business grew, so too did the number of Amexco’s foreign banking correspondents, soon reaching the hundreds.\*

莫蒂默听取了贝里的建议，出面建立所需的银行联系。1886年6月15日，Amexco宣布，美国的基德、皮博迪公司（Kidder, Peabody & Co.）作为伦敦巴林兄弟公司的代表，已安排“在欧洲兑现本公司的汇票”。国外汇票可在十个国家的三十九个地点兑现。随着国际汇票业务的发展，Amexco在海外的银行代理行数量也迅速增长，很快达数百家。\*

The need to service the money order abroad was perhaps as important a development as the creation of the money order itself. Purely by chance, American Express suddenly had a network of correspondent banking relationships throughout Europe. This network opened new business relationships and made possible Amexco’s development as an international financial organization.

为海外兑付汇票所做的努力，或许与汇票本身的创立一样重要。纯属偶然，美国运通突然在整个欧洲建立起一套代理银行网络。这一网络开启了新的商业关系，使Amexco得以向国际金融机构方向发展。

In subsequent years, the company continued to move in that direction. Soon, Amexco published circulars giving the exact dollar equivalents of six European currencies, so customers could know how much money their relations back home would be receiving. And in 1891, American Express introduced the Series K money orders, the company’s first MOs specifically intended for foreign remittances.\* By this time, the company’s foreign financial business ran into the millions of dollars per week. To service and guarantee this growing operation, American Express started to put thousands of dollars in cash and securities on deposit in the banks of Europe.

在随后的几年里，公司继续朝这一方向发展。很快，Amexco发布通告，公布六种欧洲货币的准确美元兑换值，方便客户了解他们在家乡的亲属将收到多少款项。到了1891年，美国运通推出了K系列汇票，这是公司首批专为国际汇款设计的汇票。\*此时，公司在海外的金融业务每周就已达到数百万美元。为了支持并保障这一不断扩张的业务，美国运通开始在欧洲各银行存入大量现金与证券。

The MO and the foreign remittance MO were launched and doing well, growing year by year. But at just this time, another development led to the most significant, and curious, decision in the company’s history.

国内与国际汇票业务双双成功推出，并年年增长。就在此时，另一个契机促成了公司历史上最重要、也最引人好奇的一项决策。

J.C. Fargo was about to go on a trip abroad.

J.C.法戈即将出国旅行。

No other event in company history has quite the legendary status, or quite the importance, of J. C. Fargo’s trip to Europe. Yet no one ever recorded very much about it, not even the time it occurred. Some have said it took place in the summer of 1890, but the trip probably came earlier, perhaps as early as 1888. That year the board granted J.C. an indefinite leave of absence to take a vacation in Europe. No one has ever revealed exactly what happened on the trip. Several people, none of whom actually witnessed the events, have described them broadly, usually with fictional embellishments. Nevertheless, the general outline of the tale is the same.

在公司历史上，没有哪件事像J.C.法戈的欧洲之行那样富有传奇色彩、意义深远。然而，几乎没有任何人留下这次旅行的详细记录，甚至连确切时间也未说明。有人说是在1890年夏天，但更有可能是在更早的1888年——那年董事会批准J.C.无限期休假，前往欧洲度假。至今无人确知旅途中究竟发生了什么。尽管有一些人描述了这次经历，但他们都不是亲历者，讲述内容通常夹杂虚构。不过，故事的基本轮廓却是一致的。

J.C.’s story involved his money. He went to Europe with a letter of credit from a leading American bank. Letters of credit had existed since the Renaissance and were the accepted way for a traveler to finance his way abroad. A letter represented a certain amount of cash on deposit at a bank in the U.S. that the user could draw on at correspondent banks overseas. Every time a holder presented his letter to withdraw cash, the bank authorities would compare his signature to a sample on an advice in their files, and they would note on the letter the amount the holder drew down. The letter provided safety for the traveler; no one else could cash it, and he or she could get reimbursed if the letter were lost. The signature system also afforded a measure of safety to the banks.

J.C.的故事与他的钱有关。他带着一家美国大银行出具的信用证前往欧洲。信用证自文艺复兴时期起便存在，是当时旅客出国最常用的财务工具。它代表持有人在美国某家银行存有一笔现金，可在海外的代理银行提取。每当持有人出示信用证提取现金时，银行会将其签名与档案中的样本比对，并在信用证上记下提款金额。信用证为旅行者提供了安全保障：他人无法兑现，若遗失还可获赔。而签名制度也为银行增加了一层安全性。

However, for travelers, a letter of credit often caused considerable delay and trouble. Magazines of the era reported it could take “a half hour” or longer to get cash from a letter of credit. Some banks, to ascertain the validity of a signature, would have everyone “from the charwoman up” scrutinize it.

然而，对旅客而言，信用证常常带来延误与麻烦。那个时代的杂志报道说，从信用证提款可能耗时“半小时”甚至更久。有些银行为了确认签名真伪，会让“从女清洁工到高管”所有人都审查签名。

Letters of credit proved inconvenient to travelers in other ways. Only specific correspondent banks could cash them; in major cities, travelers could get money in only one or two places, and they could not use their letters at all in small towns. Since letters of credit were denominated in dollars (or sometimes British pounds), they also provided no guarantee on exchange rates, which bank officials could determine arbitrarily at the moment the traveler drew his funds. Travelers faced additional exchange problems if they withdrew large amounts of cash at one time and then had to exchange and re-exchange currency every time they crossed a frontier.

信用证在其他方面也令旅行者不便。它只能在特定的代理银行兑现；在大城市里，旅客往往只能在一两个地方取款，小城镇则完全无法使用。由于信用证以美元（有时是英镑）计价，它也无法锁定汇率，银行职员可在旅客提款时随意设定兑换比价。若旅客一次性提取大量现金，之后在穿越各国边境时还需不断兑换货币，面临更多兑换困扰。

J.C. apparently experienced both inconvenience and exchange problems, even though, as the company noted later, he was the president of a major American company. Banks kept J.C. waiting a long time for his cash. As a result, J.C. at the very least went into what one company executive termed a “slow boil.” J.C. was also a virtuoso of the towering rage. He had a volatile and easily jostled temper that could flare up even in correspondence. On occasion, he would scrawl on the top of letters: “Tell this person to go to hell!” But however he displayed his anger to the Europeans, he stewed about the events for weeks afterward, and when he came back to America, he had decided that something should be done.

尽管公司后来指出，J.C.是美国一家重要企业的总裁，但他在欧洲还是遇到了不便和汇率问题。各家银行让J.C.长时间等待取现，结果他起码陷入了一位公司高管所谓的“慢性怒火”中。J.C.是发怒的高手，脾气暴躁，极易触发，甚至在书信往来中也会爆发。有时他会在信纸顶部潦草写下：“叫这个人见鬼去吧！”不论他在欧洲如何发泄愤怒，回来之后他为此事郁闷了好几周，并在返回美国后下定决心要有所作为。

Upon his return to 65 Broadway, he summoned M. F. Berry. “I had a lot of trouble cashing my letters of credit,” he reputedly said. “The moment I got off the beaten path they were no more use to me than so much wet wrapping paper. If the president of American Express has that sort of trouble, just think what ordinary travelers face. Something has got to be done about it.”

回到百老汇65号后，他召见了M.F.贝里。据称他说：“我在兑现信用证时遇到了很多麻烦。一旦离开主要城市，它们对我而言就跟湿掉的包装纸一样毫无用处。如果连美国运通的总裁都要面对这种困境，那你想想普通旅客会怎么样。这件事必须解决。”

J.C. definitely did speak to Berry, though this monologue, quoted frequently by the company, is largely fictitious, and his expression of concern for the ordinary traveler dubious, or at least misleading. J.C. was a man of deep irrational prejudices. He detested, for example, young male employees (“hoodlums as a rule being a better name for them”), and women employees (he decreed the company would close its doors before hiring any). And he also hated tourists, whom he called, among other things, “rabble” and “loafers.” If he expressed any concern for the “ordinary” traveler in his charge to Berry, he did so only because at the time most travelers were not ordinary people. In 1890, European travel still remained a pleasure of the wealthy; the more ordinary travelers became, the more J.C. detested them.

J.C.的确曾与贝里谈过此事，尽管公司频繁引用这段独白，但其真实性很大程度上是虚构的，他对“普通旅客”的关切也令人怀疑，甚至可以说具有误导性。J.C.怀有许多非理性的偏见，例如，他厌恶年轻男性员工（“通常称他们为地痞流氓更合适”），也厌恶女性员工（他曾下令公司宁愿关门也不雇佣女性）。他同样讨厌游客，称他们为“乌合之众”、“游手好闲之辈”等。如果他在向贝里布置任务时表达了对“普通”旅客的关切，那也只是因为当时大多数旅客并不普通。1890年，赴欧洲旅游仍是富人的享乐；而旅客越“普通”，J.C.越是厌恶他们。

这些都是优点。

In any event, J.C.’s motivation to do “something” probably stemmed less from what others faced than from his own inconvenience, from the fact that bankers did not accord proper respect to the president of American Express—the largest company in an industry he modestly termed “aside from the railroads . . . the greatest Mercantile Institution in America. . . .” If J.C. was not accorded the treatment usually given to a prominent person, it was partly his own fault. On the one hand, he expected to get attention as the leader of a great company, but at the same time, he did everything he could to keep his company and himself out of the public eye. He just expected people, including Europeans, to know his importance and treat him accordingly, but they did not. And so J.C., an intensely proud man, decided to do something, to get the better of the people who had made him cool his heels like a common man.

无论如何，J.C.之所以决定“有所作为”，与其说是为了他人所遭遇的问题，不如说更多是源于他自己的不便——源于银行家未能给予美国运通总裁应有的尊重，而在他看来，美国运通是他谦逊地称为“除了铁路公司之外……美国最伟大的商业机构”。若J.C.没有受到公众人物应得的待遇，也有一部分责任在他自己。一方面，他希望以伟大公司的领袖身份获得关注，另一方面，他又尽力让公司及自身保持低调。他理所当然地认为人们（包括欧洲人）应该认识到他的重要性并相应对待，但他们并未如此。因此，极度自负的J.C.决定采取行动，好让那些曾让他像个普通人一样在门口干等的人见识见识。

Whatever words J.C. had used, he gave Berry the task of devising a way to make it easier for Americans to carry money abroad. Berry pondered the problem for months and months. He wanted to create an instrument with the safety of a letter of credit and the convenience of cash, and could not readily come up with an answer. But gradually he began to develop an idea, and toward the end of 1890, he finished his work. He called his new invention the American Express “Travelers Cheque,” using the British spelling of “check.” The travelers cheque, a device of remarkable ingenuity, was the only original product idea ever created at American Express.

无论J.C.具体用了怎样的话语，他确实把任务交给了贝里，让他想出一种办法，使美国人更方便地携带资金出国。贝里为此苦思冥想了数月之久。他希望能创造出一种既具信用证安全性、又具现金便利性的工具，但一时间难以找到答案。渐渐地，他开始有了想法，并在1890年底完成了设计。他将这项新发明命名为“美国运通旅行支票”（Travelers Cheque），采用了英式拼写“cheque”。旅行支票是一项极具巧思的发明，也是美国运通有史以来唯一真正原创的产品构想。

Berry’s invention, known within the company as the T/C or TC, resembled the old letter of credit in one sense. Its security rested on the double signature: the first fixed in the upper, left-hand corner at the time of purchase, the second written in the lower left when it was cashed. If the signatures did not match, the cheque would be considered a forgery.

贝里的发明，在公司内部被称为T/C或TC，在某种意义上类似旧式信用证。它的安全性依赖于“双签名”机制：第一次签名是在购买时签于左上角，第二次签名则在兑现时写于左下角。如果两个签名不匹配，该支票便被视为伪造。

But in two other respects, the TC was new and innovative. First, cheques came in set small amounts: 10, 20, 50, or 100. Berry realized that tourists spend small amounts in many places. By carrying books of TCs, tourists could pay for each item individually and would not be stuck with lots of Italian lire or French francs they did not need. Also, Berry eliminated foreign exchange problems. He placed in a band across the center of the cheque its value in all major European currencies. Berry based the amounts on the average rates of exchange over a period of two years, and American Express guaranteed that its cheques were convertible to the sums as printed. Because it was an age of stable rates of exchange, the company could take the risk implicit in guaranteed conversion rates. Obviously, though, it became a key selling point since it eliminated the opportunity for bankers and exchange dealers to take huge premiums from unsuspecting American tourists.

但在另外两个方面，旅行支票是全新的、极具创新性的。首先，支票面额被设定为小额固定数值：10、20、50或100。贝里意识到，游客在多个地点消费小额款项的情况很常见。携带一册旅行支票簿，游客可以单笔逐项付款，避免最后手头留下一堆不需要的意大利里拉或法郎。其次，贝里彻底解决了外汇兑换问题。他在支票正中央的横带上标明该支票在所有主要欧洲货币中的等值金额。贝里根据两年期间的平均汇率制定这些金额，美国运通则承诺按所印金额无条件兑换。由于当时处于汇率稳定的时代，公司能承担汇率保证所隐含的风险。当然，这也成为旅行支票的关键卖点之一——它杜绝了银行家和兑换商向不知情的美国游客索取高额兑换费用的空间。

The chief executive personally led the drive to make the TC a working business. First, he launched a major effort to sign up establishments in Europe to accept the TC. Amexco started its TC drive with European banks in March 1891 and won widespread acceptance. Because of the MO, dozens of European banks already had correspondent relationships with the company and they were quite willing to accept the TC as well. In a real sense, the MO launched the TC.\*

总裁亲自领导推动旅行支票成为一个可行的业务。首先，他大力推动欧洲各机构接受旅行支票。Amexco于1891年3月率先向欧洲银行展开推广，取得了广泛的接受度。由于汇票业务的关系，数十家欧洲银行早已与公司建立代理关系，因此也愿意接受旅行支票。从某种意义上说，正是汇票业务催生了旅行支票。\*

But Amexco wanted and needed a far broader acceptance in Europe than it had for the money order. J.C. wanted an instrument people could use, not only in dozens of banks, but in hundreds of banks, hotels, and shops in every town tourists visited. Its breadth of coverage had to be one of its features. Soliciting entirely through the mail, J.C. and his men pushed hard. J.C. offered commissions to those who sold and/or cashed travelers cheques, and he guaranteed that, if merchants or banking establishments took a loss on a currency exchange, Amexco would reimburse them. More importantly, though, he guaranteed practically without condition to pay cheques. Amexco promised “to assume all risks and responsibilities in payment . . . of fraudulent or forged cheques—you \[cashing establishments] to exercise due vigilance and care in payment . . .” And although J.C. told Europeans that, because of money order sales, Amexco had “an established credit rating probably sufficiently good” to leave no questions about its ability to pay, he put additional funds on deposit in major European banks to allay fears that cheques might not be covered.

但Amexco希望、也需要比汇票更广泛的欧洲接受度。J.C.想要创造一种不仅在几十家银行可用，还能在游客所到每一个城镇的数百家银行、酒店和商店广泛使用的支付工具。覆盖广度必须成为其一大特色。J.C.与手下全靠信函邮寄方式全力推广。他向销售或兑现旅行支票的机构支付佣金，并承诺，如果商家或银行因货币兑换而蒙受损失，Amexco将予以补偿。更重要的是，他几乎无条件地承诺兑现支票。Amexco声明，“愿承担一切因欺诈或伪造支票所产生的支付风险与责任——贵单位在支付时应尽到应有警惕与审查责任……”尽管J.C.向欧洲方面表示，由于汇票业务，Amexco已经拥有“足以令人信服的既有信用评级”，无需质疑其支付能力，他仍在欧洲主要银行额外存入资金，以消除对支票兑付保障的担忧。

保留了信用证的原则。

Amexco’s blanket guarantees actually posed a grave danger to the company’s existence. American Express suddenly became extremely vulnerable to counterfeit and fraud throughout the world. Although Amexco possessed considerable resources, those resources were limited; for decades afterward, executives would report that they lay awake nights recognizing that a good counterfeiter could bankrupt the company. By offering such a sweeping guarantee, however, Amexco made the TC not just another money order, but rather a kind of universal international currency.

Amexco所作出的全面担保实际上对公司生存构成了巨大威胁。美国运通突然在全球范围内面临极高的伪造与欺诈风险。虽然Amexco拥有相当的资源，但其资源终归有限。此后数十年，公司高管们仍会回忆起当年因担忧遇上高明的伪造者可能让公司破产而彻夜难眠。然而，正是通过这项全面担保，Amexco才使旅行支票超越了传统汇票的范畴，成为一种真正意义上的“国际通用货币”。

Amexco came to recognize another important point, too: the TC depended on perception as much as reality. In order for the device to work, the company would have to maintain both the appearance and reality of financial solidity. If it promised to pay off frauds, it had to pay off. If it promised to reimburse customers for lost cheques (another of its selling points for users), it had to do so quickly and willingly. If Amexco appeared unwilling or unable to pay, the TC could lose its market instantly.

Amexco还意识到另一个关键点：旅行支票的成功既依赖于“现实”，也依赖于“印象”。为了使这一工具真正运行，公司必须同时维护自己“财务稳健”的外观与实际状况。如果承诺赔付欺诈支票，就必须履行承诺；如果承诺赔偿遗失支票（这是旅行支票对用户的另一个卖点），也必须迅速且积极兑现。只要Amexco在公众面前表现出任何“不愿意”或“无法赔付”的迹象，旅行支票的市场就可能瞬间崩塌。

J.C. continued to solicit the banks of Europe, and beginning in April, Continental hotels as well. With hotels, J.C. and his staff faced a more difficult selling job than they had with the banks, because Amexco had no previous relationship with European hotels, and hotels did not routinely cash financial instruments. What Amexco was asking was unique. Nevertheless, J.C. and his men tried to convince hundreds of hotels across the Continent to cash TCs. In a form letter complete with cheque sample, Amexco promised hotel owners optimistically, that “a very large proportion of Americans traveling in Europe hereafter, will carry with them such cheques instead of other forms of credit.” The letter went on to trumpet the size and creditworthiness of the company, to explain how the cheque worked, and to guarantee to merchants and hoteliers that Amexco would pay all cheques without discounting or inconvenience. The letter finally asked permission to list the respondent among the “prominent” hotels accepting the TC.

J.C.继续在欧洲游说银行，并从4月开始，向大陆各大酒店展开推广。相较银行，与酒店的推销任务更为艰难，因为Amexco此前与欧洲酒店毫无业务往来，酒店通常也不负责兑现金融工具。Amexco的请求可谓史无前例。尽管如此，J.C.与手下还是努力游说了欧洲大陆上数百家酒店接受旅行支票。他们寄出一封附带支票样本的标准信函，乐观地向酒店业主承诺：“今后，大多数在欧洲旅行的美国人将随身携带这种支票，而不是其他信用工具。”信中继续吹捧公司的规模与信用等级，说明支票的操作方式，并向商家与酒店主保证，Amexco将全额兑现所有支票，且不打折、无任何麻烦。信函最后请求将收信方列入接受旅行支票的“知名”酒店名单中。

The campaign to sell the TC made steady progress. By 1892, Amexco published a brochure listing fourteen pages of banks, hotels, and tourist offices (including the worldwide network of Thomas Cook & Son) that had all agreed to accept American Express Travelers Cheques. A traveler could cash the TC all across Europe and into North Africa, Asia Minor, India, Burma, Bermuda, Australia, and New Zealand. Even with this initial success, J.C.’s efforts did not diminish, and he kept company agents actively pursuing more establishments for the TC.

推销旅行支票的行动取得了稳定进展。到1892年，Amexco出版了一本宣传册，列出了十四页接受美国运通旅行支票的银行、酒店和旅游机构（包括遍布全球的托马斯·库克父子公司网络）。旅客几乎可以在整个欧洲以至北非、小亚细亚、印度、缅甸、百慕大、澳大利亚和新西兰兑现旅行支票。即使取得了初步成功，J.C.的努力也没有减弱，他继续让公司代理积极推动更多机构接受旅行支票。

Although Berry had invented the TC for European travel, it did not take Amexco long to recognize its potential for domestic travel as well. In August 1891, B. F. Green, assistant manager for money orders in the eastern region (called the Eastern Department), wrote in a circular letter, “The use of Cheques payable in the United States and Canada will probably be a convenience to Commercial Travelers, persons making long journeys, Excursionists, \[et al.]” He advised agents throughout the East to keep hotel managers “fully informed” and to give all rail and ship ticket offices signs and brochures advertising the advantages of the TC.

尽管旅行支票最初是为欧洲旅行而发明的，但Amexco很快意识到它在国内旅行中的潜力。1891年8月，负责东部地区汇票业务的助理经理B.F.格林在通函中写道：“在美国和加拿大可兑付的支票，对商务旅行者、长途旅客、旅游人士等可能是很大的便利。”他建议东部各地的代理让酒店经理“充分知情”，并向所有铁路和船票售票点提供标识和宣传册，推广旅行支票的优势。

Green’s letter also showed that Amexco had decided to expand its domestic sales force. Fargo and Berry had initially planned to sell TCs through the now 6,000 company offices in the U.S. as well as correspondents abroad, but Green exhorted company employees “to get every Bank, Banker, Broker” to act as branch agents to sell and cash cheques on a commission basis. In Chicago, headquarters of the Western Department, top company officials personally signed up major banks as branch agents for the TC.

格林的信也显示出Amexco已决定扩展其在国内的销售队伍。法戈和贝里最初计划通过美国境内现有的6,000家办事处以及海外代理销售旅行支票，但格林号召公司员工“让每一家银行、银行家、经纪商”都成为代理点，按佣金制度销售和兑现支票。在芝加哥（西部地区总部），公司高层亲自出面与主要银行签约，作为旅行支票的分销代理。

While Amexco successfully recruited establishments to cash TCs, much to the chagrin of officials, the company found it could not sell them. Unlike the money order, which sold initially at the rate of almost 2,000 per week, Amexco sold only 248 cheques—\$9,120—in all of 1891. Worse, travelers who carried TCs had trouble getting them cashed. J.C. and his son William Congdell (W\.C.) traveled to Paris in the summer of 1891, and they took their cheques to the Credit Lyonnais. As J.C.’s assistant Francis F. Flagg later wrote, “They were subjected to an unusual delay at the several times when they went to the bank for this purpose—Mr. W’m C. Fargo at one time consuming over two hours to obtain his funds—seemingly due to a lack of information on the part of the Tellers.” Bank director J. Edmond Moret sent his regrets and promised it would not happen again. But it was not an auspicious beginning, and if such problems persisted, they would undermine the raison d’être for the TC.

尽管Amexco成功招募了众多机构负责兑现旅行支票，但令公司高层颇为沮丧的是，支票的销售却未能打开局面。与汇票初始每周能售出近2,000张不同，Amexco在1891年全年仅售出248张支票，总值仅9,120美元。更糟的是，携带旅行支票的旅客还遇到兑现困难。J.C.和他的儿子威廉·康戴尔（W\.C.）于1891年夏天前往巴黎，他们带着支票前往里昂信贷银行（Credit Lyonnais）兑付。J.C.的助理弗朗西斯·F·弗拉格后来写道：“他们几次前往银行，都遭遇了异常的延误——W\.C.先生有一次竟花了两个多小时才取到现金——似乎是由于柜员缺乏相关信息所致。”银行董事J·埃德蒙·莫雷特表示歉意，并承诺此类事件不会再发生。但这并不是一个吉兆的开端，若此类问题持续存在，将严重破坏旅行支票存在的意义。

Within a year, though, the problems cleared up, and the TC began to pay off. Fortunately, Amexco had created the TC just as the American middle class began to participate in what had been largely an upper-class activity. Americans possessed greater wealth and a growing awareness of European culture, and that in turn led to a travel boom.\*

然而，不到一年，问题就逐渐消除，旅行支票开始带来回报。幸运的是，Amexco推出旅行支票之际，正逢美国中产阶级开始参与本属上层阶级的活动。美国人的财富水平不断上升，对欧洲文化的认知也日益加深，进而催生出一波旅游热潮。\*

The company sold more than 21,000 TCs, worth \$483,490, in 1892, and by 1896, that volume had more than quadrupled.\*

1892年，公司共售出超过21,000张旅行支票，总额达483,490美元；到了1896年，这一销量已增长至四倍以上。\*

As with the money order, buyers paid a small sales charge to purchase TCs, but the real profit came from the float. Indeed, the TC floated a lot more efficiently and profitably than the money order. While most money orders were cashed in a couple of days, TC use followed a different pattern: typically, a traveler bought a book of TCs, stowed them in a stateroom for a week while he or she sailed to Europe, then cashed them as needed, one or two at a time over the course of weeks, sometimes months. Sometimes buyers held onto cheques for another trip months or years later.† Because travel followed seasonal patterns, the company discovered a predictable short-term float, as well as one based on long-term balances of cheques outstanding. As TC sales grew, so did the two floats and the income they provided.

与汇票类似，购买旅行支票的客户需支付一笔小额手续费，但真正的利润来自于浮存金（float）。事实上，旅行支票的浮存效应远比汇票高效且可盈利。大多数汇票会在几天内兑现，而旅行支票的使用方式则不同：旅客通常在启程前购入一整册支票，搭船前往欧洲期间将其存放在船舱内，随后在数周甚至数月的行程中按需逐张兑现。有时，买家甚至会保留支票，留作几个月甚至几年后的再次出行使用。由于旅行呈现出季节性，公司也就形成了一个可预期的短期浮存金流，以及长期未兑现支票所带来的资金沉淀。随着旅行支票销量的增长，这两类浮存金及其所带来的收益也同步上升。

The TC owed a great deal to chance. Its inspiration was accidental; its success depended on a travel boom no one had foreseen. Indeed, its creation defied business judgment and logic. Unlike the money order, it did not tie neatly into the express business. On J. C. Fargo’s whim, Amexco rushed it to market, though no one in the company had the slightest indication that the public would buy the new product. But the TC was wildly successful nonetheless.

旅行支票的成功极大地归功于机缘巧合。它的灵感纯属偶然，其成功依赖于一场无人预料的旅游热潮。事实上，它的诞生违背了商业判断与逻辑。与汇票不同，旅行支票与快递业务并无直接联系。正是在J.C.法戈的突发奇想下，Amexco仓促将其推向市场，而公司上下当时根本无法预知公众是否会买账。但旅行支票最终却取得了巨大成功。

At the same time, the TC was an example of creative thinking and determined marketing. Without Berry’s inventive mind and J.C.’s tenacious salesmanship, Amexco would not have had a product to exploit the new demand. The TC also owed much to the success of the MO and the growth of Amexco as a financial organization; because of the MO, Amexco’s financial paper had instant credibility.

与此同时，旅行支票也是创造性思维与坚定市场推广的典范。若无贝里的创新头脑与J.C.坚持不懈的销售精神，Amexco就不会拥有这个足以满足新需求的产品。旅行支票的成功也有赖于汇票的成功及Amexco作为金融机构的发展——正因有汇票的铺垫，Amexco的金融票据才能立刻赢得市场信任。

苹果或许也能找到新的发展路径。

But the TC had another unintended consequence. Even more than the money order, the TC pushed American Express to become an international company. And overseas, because of the TC, Amexco underwent a transformation in its public image and in its corporate identity, alterations J.C. unsuccessfully resisted. By accident, he set in motion a process which he could not stop; J.C. started American Express on a path of fundamental change.

但旅行支票还带来了一个意想不到的结果。相比汇票，旅行支票更大程度地推动了美国运通向国际公司转型。而在海外市场，正因旅行支票的影响，Amexco的公众形象与企业定位都发生了转变，这一变化是J.C.所不愿却又无法阻止的。他无意间启动了一个自己无法终止的进程——J.C.让美国运通踏上了一条根本性的转型之路。

1987-06-03 American Express.J.C., TC, M.F., and MO 3

1987-06-03 American Express.J.C., TC, M.F., and MO 3

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