1989-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1989-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

我们在 1988 年的净值增幅为 5.69 亿美元，即 20.0%。在过去 24 年里（也就是自现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值已从 19.46 美元增长到 2,974.52 美元，折合年复合增长率为 23.0%。

We’ve emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value—the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire’s intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.

不过，我们在过去的报告中一直强调，真正重要的是企业的内在价值——这个数字必然只能是估算值，它表示我们旗下所有组成业务合计究竟值多少钱。按照我们的计算，Berkshire 的企业内在价值明显高于其账面价值。在这 24 年中，企业价值的增长速度总体上略快于账面价值；但在 1988 年，账面价值的增长则稍微更快一些。

Berkshire’s past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.

Berkshire 过去在账面价值和企业价值上的增长速度，是在与当前截然不同的环境下取得的。任何忽视这些差异的人，犯下的错误，就如同一位棒球经理仅凭一名 42 岁中外野手一生的打击率，去判断他未来前景一样。

Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company—Berkshire’s three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth—that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.

今天影响我们前景的重要不利因素有：（1）相比过去 24 年通常所处的环境，如今的股票市场吸引力更低；（2）大多数形式的投资收益所适用的企业税率更高；（3）企业收购市场的价格要昂贵得多；以及（4）Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.、GEICO Corporation 和 The Washington Post Company——这是 Berkshire 的三项永久性投资，约占我们净值的一半——它们所在行业的经营环境，相比 5 到 10 年前，从略微不利到明显不利不等。所有这些公司都拥有卓越的管理层和强劲的资产。但以当前价格来看，它们今天对我们而言的上行潜力，明显不如几年前那样令人兴奋。

The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)

不过，我们面临的主要问题，是不断扩大的资本基础。你们以前已经听我们讲过这一点，但这个问题和年龄一样，其重要性会一年比一年更大。（而且也和年龄一样，这个问题继续增长，总比把它“解决掉”要好。）

Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)

四年前我告诉你们，要想在此后十年实现年化 15% 的回报，我们需要 39 亿美元的利润。今天，若要在接下来的十年里实现 15% 的回报，则需要 103 亿美元的利润。这个数字在我和 Charlie Munger——Berkshire 的副董事长、也是我的合伙人——看来，都显得非常巨大。（如果这个数字最终真的过于庞大，那么 Charlie 在未来的报告里，可能会被追溯性地认定为高级合伙人。）

As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.

作为对不断扩大的资本基础拖累回报这一问题的部分对冲，我们现在拥有一个 24 年前并不具备的非常重要的优势。当时，我们全部资本都被束缚在一家经济特性无可避免地糟糕的纺织企业里。如今，我们的一部分资本投资于一些真正卓越的企业。

Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.

去年我们把这些业务称作“神圣七杰”：Buffalo News、Fechheimer、Kirby、Nebraska Furniture Mart、Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group、See’s 和 World Book。到了 1988 年，这些“圣徒”可谓昂首入场。你可以通过查看第 45 页按历史成本编制的财务报表，直观地看到它们的资本回报率有多么非凡；那张报表把“神圣七杰”的数据与若干较小业务单位的数据合并在了一起。在完全没有财务杠杆助益的情况下，这一组业务平均在股东权益资本上赚取了大约 67% 的回报。

In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

在大多数情况下，这些业务单位之所以表现卓越，部分源于其出色的商业特许经营属性；而在所有情况下，卓越的管理层都是至关重要的因素。Charlie 和我所作出的贡献，就是不去打扰这些经理人。

In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We’ll need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.

依我判断，这些企业作为一个整体，未来仍将继续创造极其出色的回报。我们也确实需要这样的回报：没有这份助力，Berkshire 根本没有机会实现我们 15% 的目标。你完全可以确信，我们的运营经理人会交出成果；我们未来真正的不确定之处在于，Charlie 和我是否能够有效配置他们所创造出来的资金。

In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim’s, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It’s a great way to start the year.

在这方面，我们于 1989 年初朝着正确方向迈出了一步：我们收购了 Omaha 珠宝企业 Borsheim’s 80% 的股权。这笔收购将在本信后文详细说明，它完全符合我们的寻找标准：一家由我们喜欢、敬佩并信任的人来经营的杰出企业。这是一个极佳的开年方式。

Accounting Changes

会计变动

We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.

我们已经进行了一项适用于 1988 年、且属强制要求的重大会计变更，并且很可能还要在 1990 年再做一次。当我们在经济现实并未发生任何变化的情况下，仅仅把数字从一年挪到另一年时，就有必要来上一段我们那一贯“扣人心弦”的会计讨论了。

First, I’ll offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors—and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation’s CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses—the shareholder-owners of the corporation?

首先，我还是照例先作一项免责声明：尽管公认会计原则（GAAP）存在不足之处，但我可一点也不想承担设计一套更好规则的工作。不过，现有规则的局限性并不必然构成束缚：CEO 完全可以，也确实应该，把 GAAP 报表视为其向所有者和债权人履行信息披露义务的起点，而不是终点。毕竟，任何子公司经理如果只上报干巴巴的 GAAP 数字，而遗漏了其老板——母公司 CEO——所需的重要信息，那他肯定会惹上麻烦。那么，CEO 本人又为什么要对他自己的老板——公司的股东所有者——隐瞒那些极其有用的重要信息呢？

What needs to be reported is data—whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP—that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?

真正需要报告的，是那些能够帮助具备财务理解能力的读者回答三个关键问题的数据——无论这些数据属于 GAAP、non-GAAP，还是 extra-GAAP：(1) 这家公司大致值多少钱？(2) 它履行未来义务的可能性有多大？以及 (3) 考虑到他们手中所拿到的这副牌，管理层把公司经营得究竟有多好？

In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.

在大多数情况下，仅凭最基本的 GAAP 披露，要从中看出上述一个或多个问题的答案，往往介于困难与几乎不可能之间。商业世界实在过于复杂，任何单一的一套规则都无法有效描述所有企业的经济现实，尤其是像 Berkshire 这样横跨多种业务领域经营的企业。

Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (“How much,” says the client, “is two plus two?” Replies the cooperative accountant, “What number did you have in mind?”) Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the “big bath” quarter are “white lie” techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.

让问题变得更加复杂的是，许多管理层并不把 GAAP 视为应当达到的标准，而是视为需要跨越的障碍。而他们的会计师往往也乐于配合。（“二加二等于多少？”客户问道；配合默契的会计师回答说：“您心里想要哪个数字？”）即便是诚实且本意良好的管理层，有时也会稍微拉伸一下 GAAP 的边界，以便呈现他们认为更能恰当反映业绩的数字。无论是利润平滑，还是“大洗澡”季度，都是那些原本还算正派的管理层所采用的“善意谎言”式技巧。

Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules “imaginatively” and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.

然后，还有一些管理者会主动利用 GAAP 进行欺骗和诈骗。他们知道，许多投资者和债权人把 GAAP 结果奉为圭臬。因此，这些骗子便会“富有想象力”地解释规则，并以一种在技术上符合 GAAP、但实际上却向外界展示出经济幻象的方式来记录商业交易。

As long as investors—including supposedly sophisticated institutions—place fancy valuations on reported “earnings” that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.

只要投资者——包括那些自诩老练的机构——仍然愿意对一路稳步上升的已报告“收益”给予华丽的估值，你就可以确定，一定会有一些管理者和资本推手利用 GAAP 去制造这样的数字，而不管真实情况究竟如何。多年以来，Charlie 和我见过许多规模惊人的、以会计为基础的欺诈案件。其中极少数作恶者受到了惩罚；很多人甚至连谴责都没有遭到。用一支笔偷走大钱，远比拿一把枪去抢小钱安全得多。

Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a “one-line” basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire’s consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.

根据 GAAP 对 1988 年强制要求的一项重大变更，我们必须在资产负债表和收益表中，将所有子公司全部并表。过去，Mutual Savings and Loan 以及 Scott Fetzer Financial（一家主要为 World Book 和 Kirby 产品的分期销售提供融资的信贷公司）一直采用“单行并表”的方式处理。这意味着，我们（1）在 Berkshire 的合并资产负债表中，将我们在这两家公司合计净资产中的权益，作为一项单独列示的资产反映出来；并且（2）在我们的合并收益表中，将我们在它们合计年度收益中的权益，作为单独一行收益项目列示。如今，规则要求我们在资产负债表中并入这些公司的每一项资产和负债，并在收益表中并入它们的每一项收入和费用。

This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.

这一变化进一步凸显了企业同时报告分部数据的必要性：在传统财务报表中，被混合在一起的、经济特性彼此差异很大的业务经营项目越多，这些报表的实用性就越低，投资者也就越难以回答前文提出的那三个问题。事实上，我们在 Berkshire 编制合并报表的唯一原因，就是为了满足外部要求。另一方面，Charlie 和我却一直在持续研究我们的分部数据。

Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire’s ability to discharge its obligations to creditors—the third question we listed—should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.

既然我们现在被要求在 GAAP 报表中捆绑进更多数字，我们决定公布额外的补充信息。我们认为，这些信息将有助于你同时衡量企业价值和管理层表现。（至于 Berkshire 履行其对债权人义务的能力——也就是我们列出的第三个问题——无论你看哪套报表，答案都应当是显而易见的。）在这些补充列报中，我们不一定会遵循 GAAP 程序，甚至也不一定会遵循公司法律结构。相反，我们会尝试以有助于分析、但又不会让你淹没在细节中的方式，对主要经营活动进行归类汇总。我们的目标，是以一种如果双方角色互换、我们自己也希望得到的形式，把重要信息提供给你。

On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

在第 41 至 47 页，我们分别列示了以下几类业务的合并资产负债表和收益表：（1）从事金融类业务的子公司，也就是 Mutual Savings 和 Scott Fetzer Financial；（2）我们的保险业务，并单独列出其主要投资头寸；（3）我们的制造、出版和零售业务，剔除某些非经营性资产以及购买价格会计调整；以及（4）“其他全部”类别，其中包括第（3）类公司持有的非经营性资产（主要是有价证券），以及 Wesco 和 Berkshire 母公司的各项资产与债务。

If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask.)

如果你把这四个分部的收益和净资产加总起来，所得总数将与我们 GAAP 报表中列示的数字一致。不过，我们想强调的是，我们这种新的列报方式并不属于审计师的审核范围，他们绝没有为此背书。（事实上，他们也许会被吓坏；我可不想去问。）

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial—so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.

我前面提到过一项预计将在 1990 年实施的重大 GAAP 变更。这项变更涉及递延所得税的计算，既复杂又充满争议——争议之大，以至于原定于 1989 年实施的安排被推迟了一年。

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

一旦实施，这项新规则将从多个方面影响我们。其中最重要的是，我们将被要求改变计算保险公司所持股票未实现增值部分递延所得税负债的方法。

Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2 billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.

目前，我们的这项负债是分层计算的。对于可追溯到 1986 年及更早年份的未实现增值，共计 12 亿美元，我们按 28% 计提了税务负债。对于此后累积形成的未实现增值，共计 6 亿美元，税务负债则按 34% 计提。这一差异反映的是 1987 年起生效的税率上升。

It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.

不过，现在看来，这项新的会计规则将要求我们在 1990 年把全部相关负债统一按 34% 确认，并将这项调整计入当期收益。假设到 1990 年税率没有变化，那么这一步将使我们当年的收益（从而也会使我们报告的净值）减少 7,100 万美元。拟议中的规则还会影响我们资产负债表上的其他项目，但这些变化对收益和净值的影响都比较小。

We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.

对于这种递延所得税计算方式变更本身是否合理，我们并没有强烈立场。不过，我们应当指出的是，无论是按 28% 还是按 34% 计提税务负债，都不能精确反映 Berkshire 的经济现实，因为我们并没有计划出售那些承载了我们绝大部分收益的股票。

To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of “faith” approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an “analysis” approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.

对于那些对会计并不感兴趣的各位，我为这篇长篇讨论致歉。我知道，你们当中很多人并不会反复细看我们的数字，而是持有 Berkshire，主要因为你们知道：（1）Charlie 和我把我们的大部分钱都放在 Berkshire；（2）我们会以这样一种方式经营公司，使你们的收益或损失与我们的收益或损失成正比；以及（3）到目前为止，业绩记录还算令人满意。以这种“信任”方式进行投资，并不必然有什么错。不过，另一些股东更偏好“分析”方式，而我们希望提供他们所需要的信息。就我们自己的投资而言，我们寻找的是这样一种情形：无论用哪一种方法，得出的答案都相同。

Sources of Reported Earnings

已报告收益的来源

In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings just as we have in the past.

除了向你们提供我们新的四分部会计资料外，我们还会像过去一样，继续列示 Berkshire 已报告收益的主要来源。

In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

在下表中，Goodwill 的摊销以及其他主要购买价格会计调整，并不会分摊计入其所对应的具体业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这样做，可以让你看到这些业务在“如果我们当初并未收购它们”的情况下，本会报告出的收益情况。我在过去的报告中已经解释过，为什么我们认为这种列报形式，比标准 GAAP 列报——也就是按单个业务分别进行购买价格调整——对投资者和管理者更有用。当然，我们在表中列示的净收益总额，与经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 净收益总额是完全一致的。

Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 32-34, and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best description I have seen of the events that produced the present savings-and-loan crisis. Also, take special note of Dave Hillstrom’s performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested capital. Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past, would rank him number one among his peers.

关于这些业务的更多信息，见第 32 至 34 页的 Business Segment 部分，以及第 36 至 40 页的 Management’s Discussion 部分。在这些部分中，你也可以看到我们按 GAAP 基础报告的分部收益。至于 Wesco 的各项业务情况，我建议你阅读 Charlie Munger 从第 52 页开始的信件。那封信对导致当前储贷危机的一系列事件，作出了我所见过的最佳描述。此外，也请特别关注 Wesco 子公司 Precision Steel Warehouse 中 Dave Hillstrom 的表现。Precision 所处行业竞争极其激烈，但 Dave 却始终能够取得良好的投入资本回报。尽管缺乏足够数据来严格证明这一点，但我认为，无论是在 1988 年，还是在以往年份，他的表现都很可能在同业中排名第一。

The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them.

我们各项经营业务所取得的收益都极为出色，无论是按绝对水平衡量，还是与竞争对手相比，都是如此。对此，我们要感谢我们的运营经理们：你我都很幸运，能够与他们共事。

At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age—whether the traditional 65, or the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.

在 Berkshire，这样的合作关系会持续很久。我们不会仅仅因为超级明星达到某个特定年龄——无论是传统意义上的 65 岁，还是 Mrs. B 在 1988 年 Hanukkah 前夕达到的 95 岁——就把他们从阵容中拿下。卓越的管理者是一种过于稀缺的资源，绝不能因为蛋糕上的蜡烛变得拥挤，就轻易把他们丢弃。此外，我们对那些刚拿到 MBA 学位的新人的经验并不算太好。他们的学业成绩看起来总是无可挑剔，候选人也总是知道该说什么；但他们往往缺少对公司的个人投入，以及对商业运作的整体悟性。要教一条新狗学会老把戏，并不容易。

Here’s an update on our major non-insurance operations:

以下是我们主要非保险业务的最新情况：

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her cart roll on and on. She’s been the boss for 51 years, having started the business at 44 with $500. (Think what she would have done with $1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years away.

在 Nebraska Furniture Mart，Mrs. B（Rose Blumkin）和她的推车依旧不停向前。她已经掌舵 51 年了，当年她在 44 岁时，靠着 500 美元创办了这门生意。（想想看，如果她当时有 1,000 美元，会做出什么成绩！）对 Mrs. B 来说，老年永远都还在十年之后。

The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.

这家卖场长期以来一直是全美国最大的家居用品商店，而且仍在持续增长。到了秋季，商店开设了一座独立的、面积达 20,000 平方英尺的 Clearance Center，这进一步增强了我们在各个价格区间提供便宜货的能力。

Recently Dillard’s, one of the most successful department store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In many of its stores, Dillard’s runs a full furniture department, undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company, announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he, referring to NFM: “We don’t want to compete with them. We think they are about the best there is.”

最近，Dillard’s——美国最成功的百货商店运营商之一——进入了 Omaha 市场。在它的许多门店里，Dillard’s 都设有完整的家具部门，而且无疑在这一业务线上经营得相当不错。然而，就在 Omaha 新店开业前不久，公司董事长 William Dillard 宣布，他的新店将不销售家具。他在谈到 NFM 时说：“我们不想和他们竞争。我们认为他们几乎是业内最好的。”

At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas City—always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.

在 Buffalo News，我们一向推崇广告的价值，而我们在 NFM 的做法也证明了我们言行一致。过去三年里，NFM 一直是 Omaha World-Herald 最大的 ROP 广告客户。（ROP 广告指的是直接印在报纸版面上的那种广告，与预先印制后夹带投送的插页广告相对。）据我所知，在其他任何一个主要市场中，都没有哪家家居用品企业会成为当地报纸的头号客户。有时候，我们还会在远至 Des Moines、Sioux City 和 Kansas City 的报纸上投放大幅广告——而且总能取得很好的效果。只要你提供的东西真正有价值，做广告确实是值得的。

Mrs. B’s son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the winning Blumkin team. It’s a joy to work with this family. All its members have character that matches their extraordinary abilities.

Mrs. B 的儿子 Louie，以及他的两个儿子 Ron 和 Irv，共同组成了这支所向披靡的 Blumkin 团队。能够与这个家族合作，是一件令人愉快的事。这个家族的每一位成员，都拥有与其非凡能力相匹配的品格。

Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey—bless him—has managed to make me look foolish.

去年我曾毫不含糊地表示，The Buffalo News 的税前利润率将在 1988 年下滑。这个预测如果放在几乎任何一家与我们规模相当或更大的报纸身上，都会被证明是正确的。但 Stan Lipsey——愿上天保佑他——却成功地让我显得像个傻瓜。

Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe that our “newshole” percentage—the portion of the paper devoted to news—is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.

尽管去年我们的提价幅度略低于行业平均水平，尽管我们的新闻纸成本和工资水平都按行业常态上升，Stan 实际上却还让利润率略有改善。在报业里，没有人的管理业绩比他更好。而且，他是在经营一份向读者提供极其丰富新闻内容的报纸时做到这一点的。我们相信，我们的 “newshole” 比例——也就是报纸版面中用于新闻内容的部分——比任何一家与我们规模相当或更大、并在当地占主导地位的报纸都要高。1988 年这一比例为 49.5%，而 1987 年为 49.8%。无论利润率的水平或趋势如何，我们都承诺把这一比例维持在大约 50% 左右。

Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the 12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he has made us proud of the paper ever since.

Charlie 和我从年轻时起就热爱报业，而在收购这份 News 之后的 12 年里，我们也从中获得了极大乐趣。我们很幸运，在刚接手时就遇到了 Murray Light 这位一流的编辑，而从那以后，他一直让我们为这份报纸感到骄傲。

See’s Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988. Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in 1987, turned the tide.

See’s Candies 在 1988 年创纪录地卖出了 2,510 万磅糖果。到 10 月底时，前景看上去并不乐观，但圣诞节期间极为出色的销售量——显著好于 1987 年创下的纪录——扭转了局面。

As we’ve told you before, See’s business continues to become more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29 million out of $32.5 million before tax. (It’s enough to make you believe in Santa Claus.) December’s deluge of business produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire’s corporate earnings. Another small bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals are sold.

正如我们以前告诉过你们的，See’s 的业务仍在继续向圣诞季集中。1988 年，公司全年利润中创纪录的 90% 是在 12 月赚到的：税前 3,250 万美元利润中，有 2,900 万美元来自 12 月。（这都足以让人相信 Santa Claus 了。）12 月汹涌而来的业务量，使 Berkshire 的公司收益出现了一个温和的季节性隆起。另一个小幅隆起则出现在第一季度，那时大多数 World Book 年鉴会被售出。

Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See’s about five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you may wonder what took us so long.

Charlie 和我在收购 See’s 之后，大约只过了五分钟，就让 Chuck Huggins 负责这家公司。等你回顾他的业绩记录后，可能会反而纳闷：我们为什么花了这么久才作出这个决定。

At Fechheimer, the Heldmans—Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred—are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And that’s exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: “There’s a lot of heredity in that family.”)

在 Fechheimer，Heldman 家族——Bob、George、Gary、Roger 和 Fred——可说是 Cincinnati 版的 Blumkin 家族。无论是家具零售还是制服制造，这两个行业本身都不具备天然优良的经济特性。在这样的行业里，只有卓越的管理层才能带来高额的投入资本回报。而 Heldman 五兄弟做的正是这件事。（正如 Mets 解说员 Ralph Kiner 曾在比较投手 Steve Trout 和他的父亲、著名 Detroit Tigers 投手 Dizzy Trout 时所说：“这个家族里有很多遗传因素。”）

Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988. Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at it. There are very few managements anywhere—including those running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500—in which we would exhibit similar confidence.

Fechheimer 在 1988 年进行了一笔相当可观的收购。Charlie 和我对 Heldman 家族的商业判断力有着如此之高的信心，以至于我们甚至连这笔交易看都没看，就批准了。放眼各地，几乎没有多少管理层——包括那些经营 Fortune 500 顶级公司的管理层——能让我们展现出类似程度的信任。

Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth, sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.

由于这笔收购以及部分内生增长，Fechheimer 在 1989 年的销售额预计将显著上升。

All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey—World Book, Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group—performed splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be exceptional.

由 Ralph Schey 管理的所有业务——World Book、Kirby 以及 The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group——在 1988 年都表现出色。交付给 Ralph 管理的资本，持续取得非凡的回报。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Hausfeld. This company, the country’s leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings since 1986.

在 The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 内部，其中进展尤其突出的，是其最大业务单元 Campbell Hausfeld。这家公司是全美领先的小型和中型空气压缩机生产商，自 1986 年以来，其盈利已增长超过一倍。

Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong. World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September, when that country’s largest American book store opened in Moscow. Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.

Kirby 和 World Book 的销量在 1988 年都显著上升，其中特别强劲的是出口业务。到了 9 月，随着苏联国内最大的美国书店在 Moscow 开业，World Book 也开始在 Soviet Union 市场销售。我们的是该书店唯一提供的一套综合性百科全书。

Ralph’s personal productivity is amazing: In addition to running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.

Ralph 个人的生产力令人惊叹：除了把 19 家企业经营得极其出色之外，他还活跃于 The Cleveland Clinic、Ohio University、Case Western Reserve，以及一家风险投资机构；这家机构已经孵化出 16 家以 Ohio 为基地的公司，并让许多其他公司重获生机。Ohio 和 Berkshire 都很幸运，能有 Ralph 站在自己这一边。

Borsheim’s

It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have thought of: “Are there any more at home like you?” Last month I corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.

Berkshire 是在 1983 年收购 The Nebraska Furniture Mart 80% 股权的。你们的董事长当时犯了个错误，竟然没有问 Mrs. B 一个连小学生都会想到的问题：“你家里还有没有像你这样的人？”上个月我纠正了这个错误：现在我们已经与这个家族的另一支成员成为了 80% 的合伙人。

After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Mrs. B’s earlier odyssey to the east through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm for work—and that’s all they needed. They have since proved themselves invincible.

在 Mrs. B 于 1917 年从 Russia 来到美国之后，她的父母和五个兄弟姐妹也随后跟来。（她另外两个兄弟姐妹则比她更早到达。）这些姐妹中有 Rebecca Friedman，她和丈夫 Louis 于 1922 年经由 Latvia 向西逃离，这段旅程的凶险程度，丝毫不亚于 Mrs. B 早先穿越 Manchuria 向东跋涉的那场历险。当这个家族成员在 Omaha 团聚时，他们没有任何有形资产。不过，他们带来了非同寻常的头脑、正直品格，以及对工作的热情——而这正是他们所需要的一切。从那以后，他们证明了自己不可战胜。

In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim’s, a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike’s son, Alan, and his sons-in-law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.

1948 年，Mr. Friedman 买下了 Borsheim’s，这是一家位于 Omaha 的小型珠宝店。1950 年，他的儿子 Ike 加入了这门生意；随着岁月推移，Ike 的儿子 Alan，以及他的两个女婿 Marvin Cohn 和 Donald Yale，也都加入了进来。

You won’t be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B’s creed: “Sell cheap and tell the truth.” Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.

你大概不会意外地发现，这个家族带到珠宝生意中的方法，与 Blumkin 家族带到家具生意中的方法如出一辙。这两家企业的基石，都是 Mrs. B 的信条：“Sell cheap and tell the truth.” 这两家业务的其他基本原则还包括：（1）单店经营，但拥有庞大的库存，从而为顾客提供覆盖所有价格区间的巨大选择；（2）高层管理者每天关注细节；（3）周转迅速；（4）采购精明；以及（5）费用低得惊人。最后这三个因素结合在一起，使得这两家店都能够提供全国几乎无人可以接近匹敌的日常低价。

Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry. They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don’t know jewelry, know the jeweler.

大多数人，不管他们在其他事情上多么老练，买珠宝时都会像走进森林里的孩子一样不知所措。他们既无法判断品质，也无法判断价格。对他们而言，只有一条规则是有意义的：如果你不懂珠宝，那你就得懂珠宝商。

I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so—and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.

我可以向你保证，那些把信任交给 Ike Friedman 和他家族的人，永远不会失望。我们购买他们企业股权的方式，本身就是最高级别的背书。Borsheim’s 当时并没有经过审计的财务报表；然而，我们既没有盘点库存，也没有核对应收账款，更没有以任何方式对这项业务进行审计。Ike 只是告诉我们实际情况如何——而我们就在这个基础上，拟出了一页纸的合同，并开出了一张大额支票。

Business at Borsheim’s has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.

近年来，随着 Friedman 家族声誉日益传播，Borsheim’s 的生意迅速扩张。如今，顾客从全国各地来到这家店购物。其中还有一些我来自美国东西两岸的朋友，他们后来都感谢我把他们带到了这里。

Borsheim’s new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say “all members,” the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.

Borsheim’s 与 Berkshire 建立的新关系，不会改变这门生意的运营方式。Friedman 家族的所有成员都会像过去一样继续经营；Charlie 和我则会继续待在我们该待的场边。至于我们所说的“所有成员”，这几个字是有实际分量的。Mr. Friedman 和 Mrs. Friedman 分别 88 岁和 87 岁，仍然每天都在店里。Ike、Alan、Marvin 和 Donald 的太太们在忙碌时也都会一起帮忙，而第四代人则已开始学习这门生意的门道。

It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners.

能够与那些你长期敬佩的人一起做生意，是一件非常愉快的事。Friedman 家族和 Blumkin 家族一样，之所以取得成功，是因为他们配得上这份成功。两个家族都专注于什么才是对顾客最有利的，而这也必然会反过来让他们自身获益。我们不可能找到比他们更好的合伙人。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

下面列示的是我们惯常使用、用于展示保险业关键数据的表格更新版：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合成本率（combined ratio）表示的是保险总成本（已发生损失加上费用）相对于保费收入的比例：比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 则表示承保亏损。当把保险公司因持有投保人资金（即“the float”）所赚取的投资收益考虑在内时，107 至 111 区间的综合成本率通常会带来总体上的盈亏平衡结果，但这还不包括股东提供资金所产生的收益。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry’s underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue—and probably will accelerate—for at least two more years.

基于我们在以往报告中阐述过的原因，我们预计这个行业的已发生损失每年大约会增长 10%，即便是在整体通胀显著低得多的年份也是如此。与此同时，如果保费增长明显落后于这个 10% 的速度，承保亏损就会不断扩大，尽管行业在业务恶化时往往会准备不足，这种倾向可能会在一段时间内掩盖亏损的真实规模。正如表格所示，行业的承保亏损在 1988 年扩大了。这一趋势几乎肯定还会持续——而且很可能会加速——至少再延续两年。

The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: “In life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour.”) One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.

财产与意外险行业不仅盈利能力低于正常水平，它受欢迎的程度也低于正常水平。（正如 Sam Goldwyn 富有哲理地说过：“在人生中，你必须学会把苦和酸一起吞下。”）商业世界中的一个讽刺现象是：许多利润相对不高、而且长期受困于定价不足的行业，反而经常遭到愤怒客户的抨击；与此同时，另一些利润极其丰厚的行业，无论价格多高，却都很少受到抱怨。

Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it’s clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.

以早餐麦片行业为例，它的投入资本回报率超过汽车保险行业的两倍（这也正是为什么 Kellogg 和 General Mills 这样的公司能以账面价值五倍的价格交易，而大多数大型保险公司的交易价格却接近账面价值）。麦片公司经常提价，而这些提价很少与其成本的大幅上升有关。然而，消费者对此几乎毫无怨言。但当汽车保险公司提价，而涨幅甚至还赶不上成本增长时，客户却会愤怒不已。假如你想让人喜欢你，那么很显然，卖高价玉米片要比卖低价汽车保险更合适。

The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn’t mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See’s would be forced to sell its product for $5.76 per pound. rather than the $7.60 we charge—and would be losing money by the bucketful.)

公众对这个行业所抱有的敌意，可能带来严重后果：去年秋天在 California 通过的 Proposition 103，威胁要把汽车保险价格大幅压低，尽管成本一直在飞涨。虽然在法院审查这项提案期间，降价措施已被暂缓执行，但促成这次投票的那股怨气并没有暂停：即使这项提案最终被推翻，保险公司今后想在 California 实现盈利性经营，恐怕也会相当困难。（谢天谢地，民众还没有对 bonbons 生气：如果 Proposition 103 不仅适用于保险，也适用于糖果，那么 See’s 就会被迫把产品售价从我们目前的每磅 7.60 美元降到 5.76 美元——而且会一桶一桶地亏钱。）

The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.

这项提案对 Berkshire 造成的直接即时影响并不大，因为在投票之前 California 既有的费率结构下，我们本来就几乎看不到什么盈利机会。不过，若价格被强行压低，将会严重影响 GEICO——这是我们持股 44% 的被投资企业——因为它大约 10% 的保费规模来自 California。对 GEICO 威胁更大的，是其他州也可能通过公投提案或立法，采取类似压低价格的行动。

If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.

如果选民坚持要求汽车保险以低于成本的价格出售，那么最终就只能由政府来提供这项保险。股东可以在短期内补贴保单持有人，但只有纳税人才能在长期内持续补贴他们。对于大多数财产与意外险公司来说，汽车保险被社会化，对股东而言并不算什么灾难。由于这个行业具有商品化特征，大多数保险公司赚取的只是平庸回报，因此即便政府迫使它们退出汽车保险业务，它们也几乎没有、或者根本没有什么经济商誉会因此损失。但 GEICO 不同，因为它是低成本生产者，能够赚取很高的股东权益回报，因此它有大量经济商誉处于风险之中。相应地，我们也是如此。

At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman’s Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our “premiums written” account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.

在 Berkshire，1988 年我们的保费规模继续下滑，而 1989 年还会因一个特殊原因出现较大幅度下降：我们据以分得 Fireman’s Fund 7% 业务的那份合同，将于 8 月 31 日到期。届时，我们将把与该合同相关、目前持有的未赚保费返还给 Fireman’s Fund。这笔资金划转将在我们的“已签单保费”账户中体现为大约负 8,500 万美元，并会使我们第三季度的数据看起来相当古怪。不过，这份合同的终止不会对利润产生重大影响。

Berkshire’s underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.

Berkshire 在 1988 年的承保结果继续保持优异。我们的综合成本率（按法定口径计算，并剔除 structured settlements 和 financial reinsurance）为 104。继此前连续若干年表现很不理想之后，准备金发展已连续第二年表现良好。关于承保情况和准备金发展的详细内容，见第 36 至 38 页。

Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.

未来几年，我们的保险业务规模很可能会维持在很低水平，因为具有合理盈利潜力的业务几乎肯定会很稀缺。那就这样吧。在 Berkshire，我们就是不会按那些预期会带来经济性亏损的费率去承保。即使是在我们预期会赚钱的时候，麻烦都已经够多了。

Despite—or perhaps because of—low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry’s. We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that respect.

尽管——或者也许正是因为——业务量偏低，我们未来几年的盈利图景反倒很可能会比整个行业明亮得多。相对于保费规模，我们肯定会拥有异常庞大的 float，而这对利润是个好兆头。我们预计在 1989 年和 1990 年，我们的 float/保费比率至少会是典型财产/意外险公司的三倍。Mike Goldberg 在 Ajit Jain、Dinos Iordanou 以及 National Indemnity 管理团队的特别协助下，已经让我们在这方面处于有利位置。

At some point—we don’t know when—we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.

在某个时候——我们不知道会是哪一天——我们将会被大量保险业务淹没。其原因很可能会是某种重大的实体灾害或金融灾难。但也有可能像 1985 年那样，我们会因为其他公司承保亏损巨大且不断扩大，同时它们又意识到自己准备金严重不足，而迎来业务爆发。在此期间，我们会留住我们有才华的专业人员，保护好我们的资本，并努力不犯重大错误。

Marketable Securities

有价证券投资

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险公司选择有价证券投资时，我们可以在五大类中进行选择：（1）长期普通股投资；（2）中期固定收益证券；（3）长期固定收益证券；（4）短期现金等价物；以及（5）短期套利承诺。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

在这些类别之间进行选择时，我们并没有任何特别偏好。我们只是持续不断地在其中寻找，按“数学期望”衡量后税回报最高的机会，同时始终把自己限制在那些我们认为自己理解的投资选项之内。我们的标准与最大化眼前可报告收益毫无关系；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终的净值。

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over $100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下面我们列出市值超过 1 亿美元的普通股持仓，不包括套利承诺；套利承诺将在后文讨论。这些投资中有一小部分属于 Berkshire 持股不足 100% 的子公司。

Our permanent holdings—Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company—remain unchanged. Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.

我们的长期持股——Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.、GEICO Corporation 和 The Washington Post Company——保持不变。同样没有改变的，还有我们对这些公司管理层毫无保留的钦佩：Cap Cities 的 Tom Murphy 和 Dan Burke，GEICO 的 Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson，以及 The Washington Post 的 Kay Graham 和 Dick Simmons。Charlie 和我极为珍视这些经理人为各自企业带来的才干与正直品格。

Their performance, which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.

他们的表现——我们是在近距离观察之下看到的——与许多 CEO 的表现形成了鲜明对比；而后者，我们倒是幸运地始终保持着安全距离来观察。有时候，这些 CEO 显然根本不适合他们的职位；然而，他们的位置通常依然稳如泰山。企业管理中最大的讽刺就在于：一个不称职的 CEO，保住自己职位的难度，远低于一个不称职的下属。

If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can’t make the grade, you’re out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.

比如说，如果一位秘书被聘来从事一份要求每分钟至少打 80 个单词的工作，结果却只能做到每分钟 50 个单词，那她很快就会失去工作。这个岗位有合乎逻辑的标准；绩效很容易衡量；如果你达不到要求，你就得离开。类似地，如果新销售人员不能足够快地产生足够多的业务，他们也会被辞退。借口不能替代订单。

However, a CEO who doesn’t perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.

然而，一个表现不佳的 CEO 却往往会被无限期地留任。其中一个原因是，这个岗位几乎从来没有明确的绩效标准。即便有，这些标准通常也很模糊，或者即使业绩落差重大且一再发生，也可能被豁免、被开脱。在太多公司里，老板先把管理绩效这支箭射出去，然后再匆忙地在箭落下的地方画上靶心。

Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.

老板和普通员工之间另一个重要但很少被意识到的区别在于：CEO 并没有一个其自身绩效也在被持续衡量的直接上司。一个销售经理如果让一群“烂苹果”继续留在销售团队里，他自己很快也会陷入麻烦。迅速清除自己招聘失误的人，符合他的直接自身利益。否则，被清除掉的可能就是他自己。一个雇用了无能秘书的办公室经理，也面临同样的压力。

But the CEO’s boss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)

但 CEO 的老板是董事会，而董事会很少衡量自己，也很少因为公司业绩低于标准而被追责。如果董事会在聘任上犯了错，并且让这个错误持续下去，那又怎样呢？即便公司因为这个错误而被收购，这笔交易很可能仍会给即将离任的董事会成员带来相当可观的好处。（他们块头越大，摔下来反而越柔软。）

Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the CEO’s performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist.

最后，董事会与 CEO 之间的关系通常还被期待应当是融洽的。在董事会会议上，批评 CEO 的表现，往往会被视作一种在社交场合打嗝般的不雅行为。而办公室经理在严厉评价一个不合格的打字员时，可不会受到这种顾忌的束缚。

These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.

这些话不应被理解为对 CEO 或董事会的一概谴责：他们中大多数人都有能力，也很勤奋，其中还有一些确实非常杰出。不过，Charlie 和我所见过的那些管理失误，反而让我们更加庆幸自己与三项长期持股的管理层联系在一起。他们热爱自己的企业，他们像所有者那样思考，而且浑身都散发出正直与能力。

In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd. (“Freddie Mac”) and Coca Cola. We expect to hold these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.

1988 年，我们大举买入了 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd.（“Freddie Mac”）和 Coca Cola。我们预计会长期持有这些证券。事实上，当我们持有的是那些由杰出管理层经营的杰出企业的一部分股权时，我们最喜欢的持有期限就是永远。我们的做法恰恰与另一类人相反：那类人会在公司表现良好时急着卖出、落袋为安，却对那些令人失望的企业死抱不放。Peter Lynch 对这种行为有个贴切的比喻：剪掉鲜花，浇灌杂草。我们持有的 Freddie Mac 已达到法律允许的上限，Charlie 在他的信中对此作了详细说明。在我们的合并资产负债表中，这些股份是按成本而不是按市价列示的，因为它们由一家非保险子公司 Mutual Savings and Loan 持有。

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”

我们仍然把投资集中在极少数几家我们力求深刻理解的公司上。真正能让我们形成强烈长期信念的企业，不过寥寥几家。因此，当我们找到这样一家企业时，我们希望以一种有分量的方式参与其中。我们同意 Mae West 的说法：“好东西，多多益善。”

We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the “tax-exempt” interest earned is subject to tax.

去年，我们将中期免税债券的持仓减少了大约 1 亿美元。所有卖出的债券，都是在 1986 年 8 月 7 日之后买入的。当这类债券由财产与意外险公司持有时，其所获得的“免税”利息中有 15% 仍需纳税。

The $800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds “grandfathered” under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than carrying value.

我们仍然持有的 8 亿美元头寸，几乎全部由在 1986 年 Tax Reform Act 下享有“祖父条款”保护的债券构成，这意味着它们是完全免税的。我们的出售带来了小幅盈利，而剩余债券的平均到期年限约为六年，其价值也略高于账面价值。

Last year we described our holdings of short-term and intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy. During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax profit of about $22 million. This sale explains close to $100 million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our balance sheet.

去年，我们曾介绍过我们持有的 Texaco 短期和中期债券，当时这家公司正处于破产程序中。到了 1988 年，我们几乎卖掉了全部这些债券，获得了约 2,200 万美元的税前利润。这笔出售，解释了我们资产负债表上固定收益证券减少额中接近 1 亿美元的部分。

We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.

去年我们还告诉过你们，我们持有另一种证券，而它的主要特征更接近一项中期固定收益工具：即我们持有的 7 亿美元 Salomon Inc 9% 可转换优先股。这只优先股设有偿债基金，将在 1995 年至 1999 年之间按年度等额分期赎回。Berkshire 对这项持仓按成本入账。基于 Charlie 在第 69 页讨论过的原因，我们这项持仓的估计市值，已经从去年年底略低于成本，改善为在 1988 年年底略高于成本。

The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming portion of the preferred’s value resides in its fixed-income characteristics, not its equity characteristics.

过去一年里，我们与 Salomon 的 CEO John Gutfreund 保持了密切接触，这进一步加深了我们对他的敬佩。不过，对于投资银行业务在短期、中期或长期的经济特性，我们仍然没有什么特别高明的洞见：这并不是一个容易预测未来盈利水平的行业。我们依然认为，我们所拥有的转换权，在这只优先股的整个存续期内，很可能具有重要价值。然而，这只优先股价值的绝大部分，来自它的固定收益属性，而不是它的权益属性。

We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will become enthused about such securities only when we become enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn’t in the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at $247 million and have a market value of about $352 million.

我们并没有失去对长期债券的厌恶。只有当我们开始看好货币购买力长期稳定的前景时，我们才会对这类证券产生热情。而这种稳定性并不在牌面上：无论是社会本身，还是民选官员，都有太多优先级更高、且与购买力稳定相冲突的目标。我们持有的唯一长期债券，是 Washington Public Power Supply Systems（WPPSS）的债券。我们持有的部分 WPPSS 债券期限较短，而另有很多债券由于票息很高，未来几年很可能会被再融资并提前偿还。总体而言，我们的 WPPSS 持仓在资产负债表上按 2.47 亿美元入账，而其市场价值约为 3.52 亿美元。

We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor’s. They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.

我们在 1983 年年报中解释过购买 WPPSS 债券的原因，现在很高兴地告诉你们，这项投资的结果大致符合我们的预期。在买入时，我们大多数债券的税后收益率约为 17%，而且由于评级被暂停，它们当时没有任何评级。最近，这些债券被 Standard & Poor’s 评为 AA-。如今，它们的交易水平仅略低于顶级信用债所享有的水平。

In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns achieved through 1988.

在 1983 年的报告中，我们曾把购买 WPPSS 债券的经济性，与收购一家企业的经济性作过比较。结果证明，这项购买实际上比 1983 年通常进行的一般企业收购表现得更好——前提是二者都以无杠杆、税后、截至 1988 年所实现的回报为衡量标准。

Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market.

我们在 WPPSS 上的这段经历，虽然令人愉快，但丝毫没有改变我们对长期债券的负面看法。它只是让我们希望，未来还能碰到另一只规模很大、却背负污名的证券，其困境导致市场对它产生了严重错误定价。

Arbitrage

套利

In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie’s sign off after we’ve talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: “Okay, at least it will keep you out of bars.”)

在过去的报告中，我们曾告诉过你们，我们的保险子公司有时会从事套利操作，把它作为持有短期现金等价物的一种替代方式。当然，我们更愿意做大额长期投资，但我们常常是现金比好主意更多。在这种时候，套利有时不仅能提供远高于 Treasury Bills 的回报，而且同样重要的是，它还能压制我们放松长期投资标准的诱惑。（每当我们讨论完一项套利承诺后，Charlie 通常都会以这样一句话作结：“好吧，至少这能让你不至于去泡酒吧。”）

During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about $147 million.

在 1988 年，我们从套利中获得了异常丰厚的利润，无论按绝对金额还是按回报率衡量都是如此。我们在平均约 1.47 亿美元的投入资金上，取得了大约 7,800 万美元的税前收益。

This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won’t surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.

这种活动规模，值得我们对套利及我们对待套利的方法作一些较为详细的讨论。过去，这个词只适用于在两个不同市场上同时买卖证券或外汇。其目标是利用那些可能存在的微小价差，比如说，Royal Dutch 股票分别以 guilders 在 Amsterdam、以 pounds 在 London、以及以 dollars 在 New York 交易时所出现的差异。有些人可能会把这称作“剥头皮”；你大概不会惊讶，从业者更愿意采用法语词 arbitrage。

Since World War I the definition of arbitrage—or “risk arbitrage,” as it is now sometimes called—has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won’t happen.

自第一次世界大战以来，套利——或者如今有时被称为“risk arbitrage”——的定义已经扩展到包括从已宣布的公司事件中谋取利润，例如公司出售、合并、资本重组、组织重整、清算、自我收购要约等等。在大多数情况下，套利者预期无论股票市场如何波动都能获利。他通常面临的主要风险，反而是那个已经宣布的事件最终不会发生。

这里没有解释为什么没有从事“Long-short”的套利模式。

1、直觉上感觉不对但是还不敢肯定，巴菲特非常严谨，不敢肯定的事不想说；

2、套利不是重点，芒格就不感兴趣，把时间放在套利上不是最好的选择；

3、事件套利的模式很接近保险，这是巴菲特更习惯的思维方式。

Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 5¢ per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60¢. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory—quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.

套利领域有时也会出现一些离奇而偏门的机会。我在 24 岁、于 New York 的 Graham-Newman Corp. 工作时，就参与过这样一笔。Rockwood & Co. 是一家位于 Brooklyn 的巧克力制品公司，盈利能力有限。它在 1941 年、可可豆价格为每磅 5 美分时，采用了 LIFO 存货计价法。到了 1954 年，由于可可豆一度短缺，价格飙升至每磅 60 多美分。因此，Rockwood 想要迅速处置掉其价值高昂的存货——必须赶在价格回落之前完成。但如果公司只是简单把这些可可豆卖掉，那么它就要为这笔收入缴纳接近 50% 的税。

The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation’s business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.

1954 年的 Tax Code 伸出了援手。其中有一项相当冷僻的条款：如果企业把存货分配给股东，且此举属于缩减公司业务范围计划的一部分，那么原本应就 LIFO 利润缴纳的税款就可以免除。Rockwood 决定终止其一项业务——可可脂销售业务——并宣称其 1,300 万磅可可豆库存归属于这一业务。因此，公司提出以其不再需要的可可豆来回购本公司股票，交换条件是每股支付 80 磅可可豆。

For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.

有几个星期，我忙着买股票、卖可可豆，并且不时去 Schroeder Trust，把股票凭证换成仓单。利润相当不错，而我唯一的开销只是地铁代币。

The architect of Rockwood’s restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you’re familiar with Jay’s subsequent record, you won’t be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood’s continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

Rockwood 重组方案的设计者，是当时一位尚不为人所知、但才华横溢的 Chicago 人，32 岁的 Jay Pritzker。如果你熟悉 Jay 此后的成就，你就不会惊讶于这项操作对 Rockwood 持续持有的股东来说，也带来了相当不错的结果。从要约收购开始前不久到完成后不久，Rockwood 股价从 15 涨到了 100，尽管当时公司正遭受巨额经营亏损。有时候，股票估值里真正起作用的东西，并不只是市盈率。

In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been “Being There.” In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.” (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)

近些年来，大多数套利操作都与收购有关，既有友好收购，也有敌意收购。并购热潮四处蔓延，反垄断挑战几乎不存在，而出价又常常一级一级往上抬，在这种环境下，套利者可谓大获其利。他们并不需要什么特别天赋就能赚到钱；诀窍——套用 Peter Sellers 那部电影里的说法——不过就是“Being There”。在 Wall Street，那句老谚语也被改写了：“给一个人一条鱼，你能喂饱他一天；教会他怎么做套利，你就能喂饱他一辈子。”（不过，如果他是在 Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage 学出来的，那最后给他供饭的，也许会是一家州立机构。）

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire—a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?

要评估一项套利机会，你必须回答四个问题：（1）所承诺的事件真正发生的可能性有多大？（2）你的资金会被占用多久？（3）有没有可能出现更好的情况——例如出现竞争性收购报价？以及（4）如果由于反垄断行动、融资故障等原因，事件最终没有发生，那么结果会怎样？

Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.

Arcata Corp. 是我们若干带有偶然色彩的套利经历之一，很能说明这一行里的曲折变化。1981 年 9 月 28 日，Arcata 的董事原则上同意将公司出售给 Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.（KKR）；无论在当时还是现在，KKR 都是一家大型杠杆收购公司。Arcata 从事印刷和林业产品业务，而它还有另一项特别之处：1978 年，美国政府为了扩建 Redwood National Park，征收了 Arcata 的 10,700 英亩林地，其中主要是原始红杉林。政府分几次为这片土地支付了 9,790 万美元，但 Arcata 认为这笔补偿严重不足，并对此提出争议。双方还对从土地被征收到最终付款之间这段期间应适用的利率存在分歧。授权法案规定的是 6% 的单利；而 Arcata 主张应适用远高得多、并且按复利计算的利率。

Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands.

收购一家涉及大额、高度投机性诉讼请求权的公司，无论这项请求权是公司有利的一方还是不利的一方，都会带来谈判难题。为了解决这个问题，KKR 提出的条件是：每股 Arcata 支付 37.00 美元，外加政府未来就那片红杉林额外支付金额中的三分之二。

Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.

在评估这项套利机会时，我们必须问自己，KKR 是否会把这笔交易真正完成，因为在其他条件之外，它的报价还取决于其能否获得“令人满意的融资”。这种条款对卖方来说总是危险的：它给了一个求婚者在求婚和结婚之间热情消退时一个轻易退出的通道。不过，我们对这种可能性并不是特别担心，因为 KKR 过去完成交易的记录一直不错。

We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.

我们还必须问自己，如果 KKR 这笔交易真的流产了，会发生什么；而在这一点上，我们也感到相当安心：Arcata 的管理层和董事们已经把这家公司兜售了一段时间，而且显然铁了心要把它卖掉。如果 KKR 退出，Arcata 很可能还会找到另一个买家，当然，价格也许会低一些。

Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.

最后，我们还得问自己，那项红杉索赔权究竟可能值多少钱。你们的董事长——一个连榆树和橡树都分不清的人——在这个问题上倒毫无困难：他冷静地把这项索赔估值为介于零和很多很多之间。

We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the $37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40%—not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.

我们从 9 月 30 日开始买入 Arcata 股票，当时股价大约是 33.50 美元；在八周内，我们买入了大约 40 万股，也就是公司约 5% 的股份。最初的公告称，每股 37.00 美元的收购价将在 1982 年 1 月支付。因此，如果一切都进展完美，我们本来可以实现约 40% 的年化回报率——这还没有把那项红杉索赔权算进去，而那本来会是锦上添花。

All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up—even though the closing had been postponed—reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.

但事情并没有完美进行。12 月时，公告称交割将略有延迟。尽管如此，双方还是在 1 月 4 日签署了正式协议。受到鼓舞后，我们提高了持股比例，以大约每股 38.00 美元的价格继续买入，使持股增至 655,000 股，也就是公司 7% 以上的股份。即便交割已经推迟，我们仍愿意提高买入价格，这反映出我们对于红杉索赔权的判断，更偏向于“很多很多”，而不是“零”。

Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”

然后，到了 2 月 25 日，贷款方表示，鉴于“住房行业严重低迷及其对 Arcata 前景的影响”，他们要对融资条款再作一次“重新审视”。股东大会也再次被推迟，延到 4 月举行。一位 Arcata 发言人表示，他“并不认为这笔收购本身的命运已受到威胁”。当套利者听到这种安抚性表态时，他们脑中立刻会闪过那句老话：“他撒起谎来，就像货币贬值前夜的财政部长一样。”

On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to $35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the $37.50 was paid on June 4.

到了 3 月 12 日，KKR 表示其先前的交易方案行不通了，先是把报价降到 33.50 美元，两天后又把报价提高到 35.00 美元。然而在 3 月 15 日，董事会拒绝了这一报价，转而接受了另一组买家的方案：每股 37.50 美元，外加未来任何红杉索赔回收金额的一半。股东随后批准了这项交易，而每股 37.50 美元的对价于 6 月 4 日支付完成。

We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim—was more than satisfactory.

我们收到的是 2,460 万美元，而成本为 2,290 万美元；我们的平均持有期接近六个月。考虑到这笔交易过程中遭遇了这么多波折，我们取得了 15% 的年化回报率——而且这还完全没有把红杉索赔权的任何价值算进去——这个结果已经相当令人满意。

But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.

不过，最精彩的部分还在后头。审判法官指定了两个委员会，一个负责评估林木价值，另一个负责研究利率问题。到了 1987 年 1 月，第一个委员会认定这些红杉价值 2.757 亿美元，而第二个委员会则建议采用复合计算的综合回报率，算下来大约为 14%。

In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.

1987 年 8 月，法官支持了这些结论，这意味着 Arcata 将应收约 6 亿美元净额。随后，政府提起了上诉。不过在 1988 年，就在上诉尚未开庭审理之前，这项索赔以 5.19 亿美元达成和解。因此，我们每股又额外收到 29.48 美元，总计约 1,930 万美元。到 1989 年，我们还将再收到大约 80 万美元。

Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)

Berkshire 的套利活动与许多套利者不同。首先，我们每年只参与少数几笔、而且通常是规模很大的交易。大多数从业者会参与很多笔交易——也许一年 50 笔甚至更多。手里有这么多项目，他们就必须把大部分时间都花在跟踪交易进展以及相关股票的市场波动上。这不是 Charlie 和我想要度过人生的方式。（如果发财的代价只是整天盯着行情带看，那又有什么意思呢？）

Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will—and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.

正因为我们分散得很少，所以一笔特别赚钱或特别亏钱的交易，对我们全年套利结果的影响，会远远大于对一般套利机构的影响。到目前为止，Berkshire 还没有遇到过一次真正糟糕的经历。但这种事迟早会发生——而一旦发生，我们会把那些血淋淋的细节如实告诉你们。

The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.

我们与某些套利操作的另一个不同之处在于，我们只参与那些已经公开宣布的交易。我们不会根据传闻进行交易，也不会试图猜测谁会成为收购对象。我们只是读报纸，思考少数几个大的交易命题，然后依据我们自己对概率的判断来行动。

At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

到年底时，我们唯一一项重大的套利头寸，是 3,342,000 股 RJR Nabisco，成本为 2.818 亿美元，市值为 3.045 亿美元。到 1 月，我们把持股增加到大约 400 万股；到 2 月，则已将全部头寸清空。当我们把持股交给收购 RJR 的 KKR 进行要约出售时，大约有 300 万股被接受，而退回的股票则立即在市场上卖出。我们的税前利润达到 6,400 万美元，比预期还要好。

Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”

更早些时候，在 RJR 的竞购战中又出现了一张熟悉的面孔：Jay Pritzker，他是 First Boston 财团的一员，而该财团提出了一项以税务安排为导向的报价。借用 Yogi Berra 的一句话：“一切又像似曾相识般重演了一遍。”

During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.

在大多数按正常情况我们本会买入 RJR 的时间里，由于 Salomon 参与了一个竞购财团，我们在这只股票上的交易活动受到了限制。通常情况下，Charlie 和我虽然是 Salomon 的董事，但都会被隔离在其并购业务信息之外。我们自己就要求这样安排：这些信息对我们没有任何好处，事实上，反而偶尔会妨碍 Berkshire 的套利操作。

However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.

不过，Salomon 在 RJR 交易中拟作出的承诺规模异常巨大，因此要求所有董事都必须充分知情并参与其中。因此，Berkshire 对 RJR 的买入只发生在两个时点：第一次是在管理层宣布收购计划后紧接着的那几天，也就是 Salomon 尚未介入之前；第二次则是在相隔相当长一段时间之后，也就是 RJR 董事会作出支持 KKR 的决定之后。由于我们无法在其他时间买入，我们的董事身份让 Berkshire 付出了相当可观的代价。

Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.

考虑到 Berkshire 在 1988 年取得了良好成绩，你可能会以为我们将在 1989 年大举投入套利。恰恰相反，我们预计会待在场边观望。

One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down—because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.

一个令人愉快的原因是，我们持有的现金减少了——因为我们在那些预期会持有很长很长时间的股票上的仓位大幅增加了。正如本报告的老读者所知道的，我们的新投资承诺，并不是基于对股票市场短期前景的判断。相反，它们反映的是我们对特定公司长期商业前景的看法。对于一年之后股票市场、利率或商业活动会处在什么位置，我们没有看法，过去没有，现在没有，将来也不会有。

Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”

即使我们手头有很多现金，我们在 1989 年大概也不会做太多套利。收购领域已经发展出一些不同寻常的过度现象。正如 Dorothy 所说：“Toto，我觉得我们已经不在 Kansas 了。”

We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled—and, in our view, often unwarranted—optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”

我们不知道这种过度现象还会持续多久，也不知道究竟是什么会改变政府、贷款人和买方的态度——正是这些态度在助长这种局面。但我们确实知道：别人处理自己事务时越缺乏审慎，我们处理自己事务时就越应该保持审慎。我们无意参与那些反映出买方和贷款人毫无节制——而且在我们看来往往毫无依据——乐观情绪的套利交易。在我们的行动中，我们会牢记 Herb Stein 的智慧：“如果某件事不可能永远持续下去，那它终究会结束。”

Efficient Market Theory

有效市场理论

The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of “efficient market theory” (EMT) also seem relevant. This doctrine became highly fashionable—indeed, almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest, most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day.

前面关于套利的讨论，也使得顺带谈一谈“有效市场理论”（EMT）显得有些相关。这一学说在 1970 年代变得极为时髦——事实上，在学术圈里几乎成了神圣经典。其核心意思是，分析股票是无用的，因为关于股票的一切公开信息都已经被恰当地反映在价格之中。换句话说，市场总是什么都知道。由此引申，教授 EMT 的那些学者说，哪怕让一个人对着股票表随手掷飞镖，他选出来的股票组合，其前景也不会比最聪明、最勤奋的证券分析师选出来的差。令人惊讶的是，接受 EMT 的不仅有学者，还有许多投资专业人士和公司管理者。他们正确地观察到，市场经常是有效的；但随后却错误地得出结论，认为市场永远都是有效的。这两个命题之间的差别，简直是黑夜与白昼。

In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There’s plenty of other evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year. Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham’s arbitrage principles, first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I’ve not made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben’s; he had 1929-1932 to contend with.)

在我看来，Graham-Newman Corp.、Buffett Partnership 和 Berkshire 持续 63 年的套利经历，已经足以说明 EMT 有多么荒谬。（当然，还有大量其他证据。）我在 Graham-Newman 工作时，曾研究过该公司在 1926 至 1956 年整个存续期间的套利收益。其无杠杆回报率平均每年达到 20%。从 1956 年开始，我把 Ben Graham 的套利原则应用到实践中，先是在 Buffett Partnership，后来是在 Berkshire。尽管我没有做过精确计算，但我做过的工作已经足以让我知道，1956 至 1988 年间的回报率平均远高于 20%。（当然，我所处的环境比 Ben 有利得多；他还得应对 1929 至 1932 年那段时期。）

All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements—we simply acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe—they have not been selected by hindsight.

这里具备了对投资组合业绩进行公平检验所需的全部条件：（1）这三家机构在构建这份 63 年业绩记录的过程中，交易过数以百计的不同证券；（2）这些结果并不是被少数几次幸运经历所扭曲出来的；（3）我们不需要去挖掘什么隐秘事实，也不需要对产品或管理层形成特别敏锐的洞见——我们只是对那些被广泛公开报道的事件采取行动；以及（4）我们的套利头寸属于一个边界清晰、可以明确识别的整体——它们并不是事后回头挑出来的。

Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a 10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000 would have grown to $405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that might, conceivably, arouse one’s curiosity.

在这 63 年中，整体市场的年化回报率不到 10%，其中包括股息在内。这意味着，如果所有收益都被再投资，1,000 美元会增长到 40.5 万美元。然而，20% 的回报率却会把这笔钱变成 9,700 万美元。我们觉得，这样的差异在统计意义上已经足够显著，或许——也许——能激起某些人的一点好奇心。

Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type. True, they don’t talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not limited to theologians.

然而，这一理论的拥护者似乎从来都对这类相矛盾的证据不感兴趣。的确，他们今天谈论这套理论的频率，已经不像过去那样高了。但据我所知，从来没有谁承认过自己错了——无论他曾把多少成千上万的学生带偏。更何况，EMT 至今仍是各大商学院投资课程中的一个组成部分。显然，不愿认错、从而不愿拆穿这套“教士集团”神秘外衣的人，并不只限于神学家。

Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest—financial, mental, or physical—it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try. From a selfish point of view, Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT.

当然，EMT 对学生和那些轻信并全盘接受它的投资从业者所造成的伤害，反过来却为我们以及其他追随 Graham 的人提供了非同寻常的帮助。在任何一种竞争中——无论是金融上的、智力上的，还是体能上的——如果你的对手从小被教导“连尝试都毫无意义”，那你就会拥有巨大的优势。从自私一点的角度看，Graham 学派的人或许应该出资设立教席，以确保 EMT 得以永远传授下去。

All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-year period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly-priced.

尽管如此，仍有必要提出一个警告。最近一段时间，套利看上去似乎很容易。但这绝不是一种能够保证每年赚 20% 的投资方式——事实上，它甚至根本不能保证任何利润。正如前面所说，市场在相当多的时候还是相当有效的：在这 63 年里，我们每抓住一笔套利机会，就有更多看起来定价合理的机会被我们放弃了。

An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts.

投资者不可能仅仅靠把自己限定在某一种投资类别或风格上，就从股票中获得超额利润。只有通过仔细评估事实，并持续保持纪律，他才可能赚到这样的利润。就其本身而言，投资于套利机会，并不比靠掷飞镖来选投资组合更高明。

New York Stock Exchange Listing

纽约证券交易所上市

Berkshire’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.

Berkshire 的股票于 1988 年 11 月 29 日在 New York Stock Exchange 上市。在第 50 至 51 页，我们转载了就此次上市向股东发出的信件。

Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter: Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.

让我澄清一下信中没有提到的一点：虽然我们在 NYSE 的标准交易单位是 10 股，但从 1 股起的任何数量都可以进行买卖。

As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over-the-counter market.

正如信中所解释的，我们上市的首要目标是降低交易成本，而我们相信这一目标正在实现。总体而言，NYSE 上买卖报价之间的价差，一直明显低于场外市场中原先存在的价差。

Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500 on September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about $625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with the firm’s performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better hands.

担任我们股票 specialist 的 Henderson Brothers, Inc.，是交易所里仍在持续经营的最老牌 specialist 公司；它的前身创始人 William Thomas Henderson 于 1861 年 9 月 8 日以 500 美元买下了他的席位。（最近，交易所席位的售价约为 62.5 万美元。）在 54 家担任 specialist 的公司中，HBI 按分配股票数量排名第二，共负责 83 只股票。Berkshire 被分配给 HBI 时，我们感到很高兴，而这家公司的表现也让我们非常满意。HBI 的董事长 Jim Maguire 亲自负责 Berkshire 股票的交易管理，我们不可能交到更好的手里。

In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable—or, better yet, unreasonable—rate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire’s business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.

在两个方面，我们的目标大概与大多数上市公司有所不同。第一，我们并不希望 Berkshire 的股价尽可能高。相反，我们希望它在一个以企业内在价值为中心的狭窄区间内交易（而我们希望这个内在价值能以合理的——或者更好地说，不合理地高的——速度增长）。Charlie 和我对于明显高估与明显低估，同样都会感到困扰。无论哪一种极端情况，都必然会使许多股东的投资结果与 Berkshire 的经营结果出现显著偏离。如果我们的股价能够持续反映企业价值，那么每一位股东在其持有期间所获得的投资结果，就会大致与 Berkshire 的经营结果相平行。

Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.

第二，我们希望交易活动尽可能少。如果我们经营的是一家私营企业，只有少数几个被动合伙人，那么如果这些合伙人以及他们的接替者频繁想退出合伙关系，我们会感到失望。经营一家上市公司时，我们的感觉也是一样。

Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don’t understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization—school, club, church, etc.—do leaders cheer when members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: “There hasn’t been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.”)

我们的目标，是吸引那些长期持有者：他们在买入时，没有什么卖出的时间表，也没有什么卖出的目标价格，而是打算无限期地与我们同行。我们无法理解那些希望股票交易极为活跃的 CEO，因为那只有在大量股东不断退出的情况下才可能实现。你想想，还有哪一种组织——学校、俱乐部、教会等等——会在成员离开时让领导者欢呼？（当然，如果有某位经纪人的生计取决于这些组织成员的流动率，那你可以肯定，至少会有一个人会支持“活跃度”，比如说：“基督教已经好一阵子没什么动静了；也许我们下周该改投佛教。”）

Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies, performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder—and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations—Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.

当然，有些 Berkshire 股东时不时会需要或想要卖出，而我们也希望有好的接替者，以公允价格接过他们的股份。因此，我们努力通过我们的政策、业绩和沟通方式，吸引那些理解我们业务、认同我们的时间跨度、并且按照我们衡量自己的方式来衡量我们的新股东。如果我们能够持续吸引这类股东——而且同样重要的是，继续让那些抱有短期或不切实际预期的人对我们不感兴趣——那么 Berkshire 的股价就应当能够持续地以与企业价值合理相关的价格进行交易。

David L. Dodd

Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93. Most of you don’t know of him. Yet any long-time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon our company.

Dave Dodd 是我 38 年来的朋友和老师，去年以 93 岁高龄去世。你们大多数人都不认识他。然而，任何长期持有 Berkshire 股票的股东，实际上都因为他对我们公司产生的间接影响而变得更加富有。

Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and educated me; one influence was as important as the other. Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my education right up until his death.

Dave 一生都在 Columbia University 任教，并且与 Ben Graham 合著了 Security Analysis。从我到达 Columbia 的那一刻起，Dave 就亲自鼓励我、教导我；这两种影响同样重要。他教给我的一切，无论是直接传授的，还是通过他的书传递的，都合乎情理。后来，他又通过几十封信，持续对我进行教育，直到他去世为止。

I have known many professors of finance and investments but I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students: No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have achieved unusual success.

我认识许多金融和投资领域的教授，但除了 Ben Graham 之外，我从未见过谁能与 Dave 相提并论。证明他才华的证据，就在他学生们的成绩记录里：没有任何其他投资教师，培养出过这么多取得非凡成功的人。

When students left Dave’s classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying them has been rare.

当学生们离开 Dave 的课堂时，他们已经具备了终身进行理性投资的能力，因为他所教授的原则简单、扎实、有用，而且经久不衰。尽管这些看起来似乎并不是什么惊人美德，但真正传授蕴含这些品质原则的教学却十分罕见。

It’s particularly impressive that Dave could practice as well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed, his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory) and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was right from the start.

尤其令人钦佩的是，Dave 不仅能讲，而且能做。正如 Keynes 通过把自己的学术思想运用于一笔很小的资金而致富一样，Dave 也是如此。事实上，他的投资业绩远远胜过 Keynes。Keynes 最初是一个市场择时者（依赖商业周期和信贷周期理论），经过大量思考后才转向价值投资。而 Dave 从一开始就是对的。

In Berkshire’s investments, Charlie and I have employed the principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.

在 Berkshire 的投资中，Charlie 和我一直运用 Dave 和 Ben Graham 所教导的原则。我们的繁荣，是他们思想之树结出的果实。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望买入更多与我们现有企业相似的业务，而在这件事上，我们也可以借助一些帮助。如果你拥有一家符合以下标准的企业，请打电话给我，或者更好的是，写信给我。

Here’s what we’re looking for:

我们的收购标准如下：

(1)large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

规模足够大（税后盈利至少达到1000万美元）；

(2)demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),

有经过验证的持续盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，对"困境反转"类的情况同样兴趣不大）；

(3)businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

在几乎不使用债务的情况下，净资产回报率依然良好；

(4)management in place (we can’t supply it),

有现成的管理层（我们自己无法提供）；

(5)simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

业务足够简单（涉及大量技术的业务，我们看不懂）；

(6)an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

以及一个明确的要价（如果价格都是未知数，我们不希望浪费自己和卖方的时间，哪怕只是初步接触）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer—customarily within five minutes—as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会进行敌意收购。我们承诺完全保密，并能给出非常迅速的答复——通常在五分钟之内——告知我们是否有意向。我们偏好以现金收购，但如果能获得与所付出的等值内在商业价值，我们也会考虑发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最偏爱的收购模式，是符合 Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman 风格的交易（即 Nebraska Furniture Mart 的 Blumkin 家族、Borsheim's 的 Friedman 家族、以及 Fechheimer 的 Heldman 家族所代表的那种模式）。在这类案例中，企业的创始人兼管理者希望套现相当数量的资金——有时是为了自己，但更多时候是为了家族或非经营性股东——同时，这些管理者也希望保留重要的所有权份额，并像过去一样继续经营公司。我们认为，对于抱有这类目标的企业主，Berkshire 是一个特别契合的归宿。我们欢迎有意出售的潜在卖家，通过联系曾与我们合作过的人来了解我们。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by another Goldwynism: "Please include me out."

Charlie 和我经常收到各种根本不符合我们标准的收购询问。我们发现：如果你公开表示想买牧羊犬（Collie），就会有很多人打电话来，希望把他们的可卡犬（Cocker Spaniel）卖给你。至于我们对新创企业、困境反转，或竞价拍卖式出售的兴趣，用另一句 Goldwynism 式的话来表达最为贴切（Samuel Goldwyn 是好莱坞制片人，以说出语法混乱却意思精准的名言著称）："请把我包括在排除之列。"（"Please include me out."）

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了上述类型的整体收购之外，我们也有兴趣通过协商方式，购入大额但非控股的股权——规模与我们在 Cap Cities 和 Salomon 所持有的仓位相当。我们对于购入可转换优先股作为长期投资抱有特别的兴趣，正如我们在 Salomon 所做的那样。

* * *

We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard & Poor's raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property-casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.

几周前，我们收到了一个好消息：Standard & Poor's 将我们的信用评级提升至 AAA——这是它所授予的最高评级。目前全美只有另外15家工业或财产意外险公司获得 AAA 评级，而1980年时这一数字还是28家。

Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few years from "event risk." This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.

过去几年里，企业债券持有人饱受"事件风险"之苦。这个术语指的是：一家原本财务政策保守的企业，在经历高杠杆收购或资本重组之后，信用评级一夜之间急剧恶化。在一个由职业经理人而非创始股东主导的并购世界里，大多数企业都存在这样的风险。Berkshire不然。Charlie 和我向债券持有人承诺：我们给予他们的尊重，与给予股东的一样。

* * *

About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319 charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.

在 Berkshire 1988年度的股东指定捐赠计划中，约97.4%的合资格股份参与其中。通过该计划共捐出500万美元，共有2,319家慈善机构受益。如果我们的业务取得合理的成果，我们计划在1989年提高每股捐赠金额。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第48至49页关于股东指定捐赠计划的说明。如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议您立即确认您的股份已登记在实际所有人名下，而非券商、银行或托管机构的代名人名下。凡在1989年9月30日前未完成上述登记的股份，将无资格参与1989年度的计划。

* * *

Berkshire's annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday, April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.

Berkshire 的年度股东大会将于1989年4月24日（周一）在 Omaha 举行，希望您能出席。大会为您提供一个提问的平台，任何与股东权益相关的问题，我们都会一一作答，直到所有问题（投资组合操作及其他涉及商业机密的问题除外）都得到解答为止。

After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Be prepared for bargains.

大会结束后，我们将安排几辆巴士，带大家前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart 拜访 B 女士（Mrs. B），以及前往 Borsheim's 拜访 Ike Friedman。请做好捡便宜的准备。

Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is not open on Sunday.

外地来的股东或许更愿意提前抵达，趁周日营业时间（中午至下午五点）去拜访 B 女士。（周日这几个小时在 B 女士看来短得可笑——她觉得这点时间连热身都不够；她更喜欢那些从上午10点一直开到晚上9点的日子。）不过，Borsheim's 周日不营业。

Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you—as she does to everyone—how she does it: "I can sell so cheap 'cause I work for this dummy who doesn't know anything about carpet."

不妨问问 B 女士，她的地毯价格为何能低得令人咋舌。她会像对所有人那样，把这个"秘密"悄悄告诉你："我能卖这么便宜，是因为我给一个对地毯一窍不通的笨蛋打工。"

February 28, 1989

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

1989-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1989-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Accounting Changes

Sources of Reported Earnings

Borsheim’s

Insurance Operations

Marketable Securities

Arbitrage

Efficient Market Theory

New York Stock Exchange Listing

David L. Dodd

Miscellaneous

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