Today the answer to those questions appears to be a resounding “no.” A rejuvenated market has boosted Wells Fargo shares back to respectable levels and forced short sellers to cover their positions at enormous losses. As of mid-March, Wells Fargo stock had ascended to about \$79 a share, delivering Buffett a paper profit of more than \$100 million. Berkshire, riding the euphoric wave that added 500 points to the Dow throughout most of the first quarter, regained nearly all its lost value. Buffett ignored the Barron’s piece.

如今，对这些问题的答案似乎是响亮的“否”。复苏的市场已将富国银行股价重新推高到可观水平，并迫使做空者以巨额亏损回补仓位。截至三月中旬，富国银行股价已升至约79美元，为巴菲特带来逾1亿美元的账面收益。伯克希尔也借助第一季度大部分时间里为道指贡献500点的兴奋浪潮，几乎收复了全部失地。巴菲特对《巴伦周刊》的文章毫不理会。

Throughout the episode Buffett maintained his customary silence. He refuses to comment on Wall Street speculation, except to reiterate his time-tested investing philosophy. He pays no attention to market swings or economic cycles. If he sees an excellent business for sale at an attractive price, he buys it. To that end, recessions and stock market doldrums can be a plus, because bargains often emerge.

在整个事件中，巴菲特始终保持惯常的沉默。他拒绝就华尔街的种种揣测发表评论，只是重申自己历经考验的投资哲学。他从不关注市场波动或经济周期。如果他看到一家优质企业以极具吸引力的价格待售，他就出手买进。因此，衰退和股市低迷反而可能是好机会，因为此时更容易出现捡漏。

As for Wall Street speculations, he harbors nothing but disdain for the herd mentality that characterizes the investment community. During the Notre Dame appearance, he displayed a list of 37 defunct investment-banking firms. “Every one of these has disappeared,” he said. “This happened while the volume of the New York Stock Exchange multiplied fifteenfold. All these companies had people with high IQs working for them, (people) who worked ungodly hard and had intense desires for success and money. They all thought they would be leaders on Wall Street.”

至于华尔街的揣测，他对投资界典型的羊群心态只剩鄙视。在圣母大学的演讲中，他展示了一张37家已倒闭投行的名单。“这些公司一个不剩，全都没了，”他说，“而这期间纽约证券交易所的成交量增长了十五倍。这些公司里都有高智商的人，他们拼命工作，极度渴望成功与金钱，都自认为会成华尔街的领袖。”

Gathering steam, he pressed his point: “You think about that. How could they get a result like that? These were bright people; they had their own money in their businesses. I’ll tell you how they did it: mindless imitation of their peers. I don’t get great ideas talking to people. I never talk to brokers or analysts. You have to think about things yourself. “ The irony really gets to him. “These people all gave advice to companies about how they should run their businesses. You know, Wall Street is the only place people ride to in a Rolls-Royce to get advice from people who take the subway.”

他愈发激动，继续强调：“你们想想，这结果怎么造成的？这些人都很聪明，也把自己的钱投在生意里。我告诉你们原因：盲目模仿同行。我与人交谈得不到好主意。我从不跟经纪人或分析师聊天。事情必须自己动脑筋。” 讽刺让他难掩激动。“这些人都在给公司提建议，告诉别人该怎么经营。你们知道吗？华尔街是唯一一个人们坐着劳斯莱斯去听那些坐地铁的人给建议的地方。”

During the greedy 1980s, Buffett leveled broadsides at the investment-banking community for peddling dubious financial products such as junk bonds to gullible investors. He also expressed disgust at the burgeoning savings and loan mess. Berkshire is a partial owner of a small S\&L;, Mutual Savings and Loan Assn., in Pasadena. In 1989, outraged by the way the United States League of Savings Institutions lobbied against even minimal legislative reform, Buffett and Munger resigned Mutual Savings’ membership in the league with an indignant letter: “It is not unfair to liken the situation now facing Congress to cancer, and to liken the league to a significant carcinogenic agent.”

在贪婪的1980年代，巴菲特猛烈抨击投行向轻信的投资者兜售垃圾债券等可疑金融产品。他还对不断扩大的储贷危机表示厌恶。伯克希尔持有帕萨迪纳一家小型储贷机构 Mutual Savings and Loan Assn. 的部分股份。1989年，因对美国储贷机构联盟游说阻挠哪怕最小幅度的立法改革感到愤慨，巴菲特与芒格致信愤然退出该联盟，信中写道：“把国会目前面临的局面比作癌症并不为过，而把该联盟比作重要的致癌因子也并不过分。”

Another evergreen Buffett target is that group of academicians who preach the “efficient-market” theory. It’s a notion that suggests that since every stock price incorporates all known information about a company, there is nothing to be gained by analyzing companies to ferret out superior buys. At Notre Dame, Buffett chided the faculty. “It has been helpful to me to have the tens of thousands turned out of business schools taught that it didn’t do any good to think.” One professor called out, “Anybody for changing the syllabus?”

巴菲特长期抨击的另一个对象是鼓吹“有效市场”理论的学者群体。该理论认为，既然每只股票的价格都已反映公司所有已知信息，那么深入分析企业以挖掘优质标的毫无意义。在圣母大学，巴菲特揶揄教师们：“商学院培养的成千上万学生被教育说思考没用——这对我倒是大有助益。” 一位教授在台下高呼：“有人要改教学大纲吗？”

This is vintage Buffett, and it signals his intensity and intellectual annoyance with other people’s limitations. Although such feelings are usually masked by politeness, for Buffett is a gracious person, his impatience flickers unmistakably when he is sorely tried.

这正是典型的巴菲特，彰显了他对他人局限性的敏锐与不满。虽然此类情绪通常被礼貌掩饰——毕竟巴菲特为人谦和——但当他备受触动时，那份不耐烦仍会清晰闪现。

As someone who prizes his solitude and independence, Buffett does not relish the role of celebrity that has been thrust upon him. He is only selectively available to the press. He initially declined to cooperate in the preparation of this article but eventually capitulated. He then went to unusual lengths to be helpful (and to educate me--at one point, he assigned two chapters of textbook reading).

作为珍视独处与独立的人，巴菲特并不享受突如其来的名人角色。他只选择性地接受媒体采访。起初他拒绝配合撰写本文，但最终还是同意，并不遗余力地提供帮助（甚至还给我布置了教科书里两章的阅读作业）。

In many ways, Buffett’s vision resembles an artist’s commitment to his art more than a chief executive’s involvement with his company. Indeed, Buffett calls Berkshire his “canvas.” Observes Ross A. Webber, professor of management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania: “For entrepreneurial people like Buffett, the metaphor is art. They create their ideas and, like artists, tend to be aggressively independent--not because they don’t like other people but because they just so crave that sense of connection between artistic vision and result.”

在许多方面，巴菲特的愿景更像艺术家对其作品的投入，而非首席执行官对公司事务的参与。事实上，巴菲特称伯克希尔为自己的“画布”。宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院管理学教授罗斯·A·韦伯评论道：“对于像巴菲特这样的创业型人物而言，最贴切的比喻是艺术。他们创造理念，并且像艺术家一样强烈地保持独立——并非因为他们不喜欢他人，而是因为他们渴望在艺术愿景与最终成果之间建立紧密联系。”

GROWING UP IN OMAHA--WHERE HIS FATHER WAS a stockbroker with Harris, Upham--Buffett at an early age displayed a whiz-bang memory and precocious command of math and statistics. “I was fascinated with anything to do with numbers and money,” he recalls.

在奥马哈长大——他的父亲当时是哈里斯·尤普汉证券公司的股票经纪人——巴菲特很小就展现出惊人的记忆力以及对数学和统计的早熟掌握。他回忆道：“任何与数字和金钱相关的东西都让我着迷。”

By the age of 11, Buffett had bought his first shares of stock and was in the process of memorizing a book titled “One Thousand Ways to Make \$1,000.” The next year he published a racing tip sheet called Stableboy Selections. When he was 13, he began to pay taxes on an income of \$1,000, money earned from two paper routes.

到11岁时，巴菲特已买下了人生第一批股票，并开始背诵一本名为《一千种赚一千美元的方法》的书。第二年，他出版了一份名为“厩童精选”的赛马贴士小报。13岁时，他开始为1000美元的收入缴税——那是他送两条报纸路线赚来的钱。

In 1943, to the family’s dismay, his father, Howard, was elected to represent his Nebraska district in Congress. That led to the only dark period in Buffett’s life that he can recall. He was miserable in Washington, tried to run away and got terrible grades, even in math. He shaped up only after his father threatened to take away his two Washington Post paper routes.

1943年，让家人颇为沮丧的是，他的父亲霍华德当选为内布拉斯加选区的国会议员。这导致巴菲特人生中唯一能回忆起的阴暗时期。他在华盛顿过得极其不愉快，试图离家出走，学业一塌糊涂，甚至数学也拿了差分。只有在父亲威胁要取消他送的两条《华盛顿邮报》路线后，他才收心用功。

At his father’s urging, he enrolled in Wharton in Philadelphia at age 16. He didn’t like it and, two years later, transferred back home to the University of Nebraska, where he graduated in 1950. While a college senior, Buffett read a newly published book, “The Intelligent Investor” by Benjamin Graham. The experience apparently spawned something of an epiphany.

在父亲的敦促下，他16岁进入费城的沃顿商学院就读。由于不喜欢那里，两年后他转回家乡的内布拉斯加大学，并于1950年毕业。大四时，巴菲特读到了本杰明·格雷厄姆新出版的《聪明的投资者》一书，这段经历显然令他如醍醐灌顶。

Here’s how Buffett explains Graham’s theory: “The common intellectual theme is that Graham investors search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market.” (The small pieces are shares of stock.) “These investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock.”

巴菲特如此阐释格雷厄姆的理论：“其共同的思想主题是，格雷厄姆式投资者寻找一家企业的价值与市场中该企业小片段价格之间的差异。”（这些小片段就是股票。）“这些投资者在心理上始终在购买整家公司，而非股票本身。”

Therein lies the crux of the Buffett strategy. To Buffett, “investors” are people who evaluate businesses after careful study and purchase shares only if they are convinced the market has priced those enterprises irrationally. To him, those who trade stocks based on hunches about whether share prices will rise or fall, and when they will do so, are “speculators.”

这正是巴菲特策略的核心。在他看来，“投资者”是指在仔细研究后对企业进行评估，并仅当确信市场对这些企业的定价不合理时才买入股票的人。而基于对股价涨跌及其时点的直觉进行买卖的人，则被他称为“投机者”。

When he applied to Harvard’s graduate business school, he says, he was “a scrawny 19-year-old who looked 16 and had the poise of a 12-year-old.” Harvard wasn’t interested. Soon thereafter he learned that Graham was teaching at Columbia’s business school, so he applied there, and this time around, he was accepted.

他说，当他申请哈佛商学院研究生时，“我瘦得像柴、19岁看上去像16岁，举止像12岁。”哈佛并不青睐他。不久，他得知格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚商学院授课，于是改投该校，这一次他被录取了。

After completing Graham’s course, Buffett offered to work for free at Graham’s Manhattan investment firm. “He turned me down as overvalued,” Buffett jokes. After much pestering, Graham finally caved in and hired Buffett, who toiled as a “peasant” for two years, searching investment manuals for shares that met Graham’s definition of “bargain stocks”--generally those that could be bought for one-third less than the companies’ net working capital.

完成格雷厄姆的课程后，巴菲特提出到格雷厄姆位于曼哈顿的投资公司免费工作。“他说我估值过高，于是拒绝了我，”巴菲特打趣道。经过再三纠缠，格雷厄姆终于让步并雇用了他。巴菲特像个“农夫”一样苦干了两年，翻阅投资手册，寻找符合格雷厄姆“便宜股票”定义的公司——通常是那些股价低于净营运资本三分之一的股票。

During that period, Buffett, by then married and a father, commuted by train from his home in Westchester County. “It didn’t seem like much of a life,” he says. And he wised up to the lemming-like behavior of Wall Street. “People kept coming up to me all the time, whispering into my ear about some wonderful business. I was getting excited all the time. I was a wonderful customer for the brokerages. Trouble was, everyone else was, too.”

那段时期，巴菲特已成家并有了孩子，每天从位于威彻斯特县的家里乘火车通勤。“那并不像什么好日子，”他说。他也看清了华尔街羊群般的行为。“人们总是凑过来，在我耳边低语某个了不起的生意。我一直都很兴奋，对券商而言我是个绝佳客户。问题是，别人也是。”

Convinced it was time to strike out on his own, back to Omaha he went. Buffett was 25, but he had used the Graham techniques to invest his own money for years and was already worth \$150,000. He bid adieu to the last boss he would ever have. From that time forward, Warren Buffett answered only to Warren Buffett.

确信到了自立门户的时候，他返回奥马哈。那年巴菲特25岁，但他已多年运用格雷厄姆技巧投资自己的资金，身家达到15万美元。他向此生最后一位老板道别。从此以后，沃伦·巴菲特只向沃伦·巴菲特负责。

WORKING OUT OF A TINY ROOM, BUFFETT WENT about assembling \$105,100 from family and friends. In 1956, with that seed money, and only \$100 out of his own pocket, he started Buffett Partnership Ltd., a limited partnership in which he, as manager, received 25% of profits earned after investors received a 6% return on capital.

巴菲特在一间狭小的房间里办公，四处从家人和朋友那里筹集了105,100美元。1956年，凭借这笔启动资金以及自己掏出的区区100美元，他创立了“巴菲特合伙企业有限公司”，这是一家有限合伙制基金，他作为管理人，在投资者获得6%资本回报之后，再提取25%的剩余利润作为报酬。

The fund prospered impressively, but not because Buffett went after stocks such as Xerox or IBM at a rock-bottom price. Instead, he scoured the landscape for undervalued, unloved and unheard-of companies. At about this time, Charles Munger, seven years Buffett’s senior, was introduced to the young man whose reputation was growing. “He wore his hair in a crew cut and worked out of his sun porch,” Munger recalls. “What impressed me was the power of his mental apparatus. I wasn’t just slightly impressed; I was very impressed.”

该基金取得了令人瞩目的成功，但并非因为巴菲特以超低价格收购施乐或 IBM 之类的大名股。相反，他满世界搜寻被低估、无人问津且默默无闻的公司。就在这段时间，年长巴菲特七岁的查尔斯·芒格结识了这位声名渐起的年轻人。“那时他是平头发型，在自家阳台办公室工作，”芒格回忆道，“令我震撼的是他那强大的思维能力。我不只是稍微印象深刻，而是非常震撼。”

One spectacular move occurred in 1964 when Buffett bet 40% of the partnership’s money on American Express stock. The shares had been hammered by a scandal in a small subsidiary. Buffett snapped up \$13 million worth and sold them two years later for a \$20-million profit. In 1965, the Graham formula led him to purchase a small Massachusetts textile manufacturer, Berkshire Hathaway, which had a long history of financial troubles, for \$11 million.

1964年，巴菲特做出了一次惊人之举：他将合伙基金40%的资金押在美国运通股票上。该股因一家小子公司爆出丑闻而遭重挫。巴菲特趁机买入了1,300万美元的股票，两年后售出获利2,000万美元。1965年，按照格雷厄姆的方法，他又以1,100万美元收购了一家位于马萨诸塞、长期陷入财务困境的小型纺织厂——伯克希尔·哈撒韦。

By 1969, the market was so speculative, and stock prices were so irrationally high, that Buffett believed he could no longer participate. He decided to fold the partnership. The record he had compiled was 14-karat: Over 13 years the original investment had compounded at the average annual rate of 29.5% to about \$100 million. He returned investors a proportional interest of Berkshire stock, and he became the company’s chairman.

到了1969年，市场投机成风，股价高得非理性，巴菲特认为自己再难参与，于是决定解散合伙基金。他创下的成绩堪称“14K金”：13年间，最初的投资以年均29.5%的复合速度增长至约1亿美元。他将相应比例的伯克希尔股票返还给投资者，并出任该公司的董事长。

A letter Buffett wrote to investors explaining his decision became the forerunner of a tradition. Today his letter to shareholders in the Berkshire annual report is distributed as cult reading by connoisseurs. Wealthy American families are known to buy one share of Berkshire for young scions, so they’ll receive the Buffett perspective each year. His point of view is amplified by quotes from unlikely sources:

巴菲特当年写给投资者的一封解释信，后来演变为一项传统。如今，伯克希尔年报中的致股东信被行家奉为“经典读物”。美国一些富裕家族会为年轻继承人买一股伯克希尔，只为每年收到巴菲特的观点。他的看法常常辅以意想不到的引语：

“Currently liking neither stocks nor bonds, I find myself the polar opposite of Mae West as she declared, ‘I only like two kinds of men--foreign and domestic.’ ”

“当前我既不喜欢股票，也不喜欢债券，这使我与梅·韦斯特恰成两极。她曾宣称：‘我只喜欢两种男人——外国的和本国的。’”

“Billy Rose described the problem of overdiversification: ‘If you have a harem of 40 women, you never get to know any of them very well.’ ”

“比利·罗斯曾形容过度多元化的问题：‘如果你有一个由40位女士组成的后宫，你永远无法真正了解其中任何一位。’”

In 1962, Buffett persuaded Munger, who had founded the L.A. firm Munger Tolles & Olson, to give up law and join him as Berkshire’s vice chairman. Munger agreed, if he could continue to live in Los Angeles, where he is also chairman of the Daily Journal Corp., publisher of the Los Angeles Daily Journal, for lawyers. Munger owns 2% of Berkshire stock.

1962年，巴菲特说服芒格放弃自己创办的洛杉矶律师事务所 Munger Tolles & Olson 的法律事业，加入伯克希尔担任副董事长。芒格提出条件，必须继续居住在洛杉矶——他在那里还兼任《洛杉矶法律日报》出版商 Daily Journal Corp. 的董事长。芒格持有伯克希尔2%的股份。

According to Buffett, over the years Munger convinced him that Graham’s rigid principles required at least one major refinement. Munger maintains that a great franchise is the single most important determinant of a successful business. He argues that moderately priced businesses with such a franchise--and by that he means a recognizable name, a commanding position in an industry and the ability to charge higher prices--are incomparably superior to rock-bottom bargains with a weak market position.

巴菲特表示，多年来芒格让他相信，格雷厄姆的严格原则至少需要一个重大修正。芒格坚持认为，杰出的“特许经营权”（护城河）是企业成功最重要的决定因素。他主张，具备此类护城河且价格适中的企业——即拥有响亮品牌、在行业占据主导地位并能收取更高价格——远胜于价格极低却市场地位薄弱的便宜货。

Buffett’s experience with Berkshire’s textile business confirmed the validity of Munger’s theory. The company lost money, and after 20 years of struggling, Buffett reluctantly closed its doors. He confessed to shareholders in the 1989 annual report that buying the textile business had been an error. In a section titled “Mistakes of the First 25 Years (A Condensed Version),” he admits he did so because it was cheap, and the experience taught him that “time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.”

巴菲特经营伯克希尔纺织业务的经历验证了芒格理论的正确性。该业务持续亏损，历经20年挣扎后，巴菲特无奈将其关闭。他在1989年年报中坦承，收购纺织业务是一次错误。在名为“前25年的错误（简要版）”的章节里，他承认之所以买它是因为便宜，而这段经历让他明白“时间是优秀企业的朋友，却是平庸企业的敌人”。

A second lesson has been much quoted: “When management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.”

第二条经验被广泛引用：“当名声卓越的管理层接手一家以糟糕经济性著称的企业时，最终保留下来的只有企业‘糟糕’的名声。”

He ticks off other newly gained lessons: He has learned to look for what he calls one-foot hurdles rather than seven-footers, because “we’ve done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.” He has learned to go into business only with people he likes and trusts. He has also discovered an unforeseen force he labels “the institutional imperative.” This affliction causes companies to behave irrationally. For example, “Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by . . . studies prepared by his troops.” Or “The behavior of peer companies will be mindlessly imitated.” Buffett says he tries to manage Berkshire in ways that minimize the imperative, mainly by eliminating bureaucracy.

他还列举了其他新近学到的教训：他学会了寻找他所谓“一英尺高而非七英尺高的栏杆”，因为“通过避开巨龙而非斩杀巨龙，我们做得更好”。他学会了只与自己喜欢且信任的人合伙做生意。他还发现了一种他称之为“机构冲动”的意外力量，这种病症会导致公司表现出非理性行为。例如，“领导者任何愚蠢的商业渴望都将迅速得到部下编写的研究支持”，或“同行公司的做法将被盲目模仿”。巴菲特称自己试图通过减少官僚作风来管理伯克希尔，以尽量削弱这种冲动。

Despite--or perhaps because of--Buffett’s mea culpa , his shareholders revere him. Every spring, more than a thousand of them trek to the Orpheum Theatre in Omaha and, at Berkshire’s annual meeting, question Buffett and Munger for hours about the company they have cobbled together, a sprawling holding company (1990 sales: \$2.7 billion) that has at its center a large property-and-casualty insurance operation.

尽管——也许正因为——巴菲特的自我检讨，他依旧备受股东崇敬。每年春天，逾千名股东都会跋涉到奥马哈奥菲姆剧院，在伯克希尔的年度股东大会上，连续数小时向巴菲特与芒格提问，了解他们打造的这家庞大控股公司（1990年销售额27亿美元），其核心业务是一家大型财产和意外伤害保险公司。

Berkshire’s insurance business is run by Michael A. Goldberg, a transplanted New Yorker who oversees 12 subsidiaries headed by National Indemnity Co. of Omaha. He is the only operating executive who shares Berkshire’s modest 14th-floor quarters with Buffett at Omaha’s Kiewit Plaza. Goldberg , an intense, wiry man, describes it this way: “Warren Buffett is a person who, the closer he gets, the more extraordinary he gets. If you tell people about him, the way he is, they just think you were bamboozled.”

伯克希尔的保险业务由迈克尔·A·戈德堡经营，这位迁居而来的纽约人监管着以奥马哈国家赔偿公司为首的12家子公司。他是唯一与巴菲特同在奥马哈基维特广场14层简朴办公室工作的运营高管。身形瘦削、精力充沛的戈德堡这样形容：“沃伦·巴菲特这个人，越靠近他，就越觉得非凡。若你向别人描述他的行事风格，他们只会以为你被忽悠了。”

Goldberg says that nothing much happens at headquarters. “If Buffett has two or three visitors a week, that’s a lot,” he says. There is no computer or Quotron in Buffett’s simple office--only three telephone lines to brokers. On the day I visited, Buffett lunched at his desk, a McDonald’s Quarter Pounder, fries and--what else?--a Cherry Coke. Goldberg’s companies write insurance for big disasters, events called “super-cats,” such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Because Buffett refuses to price policies at a loss the way many in the industry periodically do, some years his companies write very few policies. At other times, when competitors are cutting back due to losses, Berkshire is the only insurer issuing super-cat policies at sizable premiums. The result: Berkshire’s insurance operations boast hefty balance sheets. What Buffett likes about the insurance business is the dollar “float” generated by premiums. Over the years a solid chunk of such capital went to purchase eight businesses that make up Berkshire’s manufacturing, publishing and retailing arm. This group includes the Nebraska Furniture Mart, the nation’s largest furniture retailer under one roof; Borsheim’s, a huge Omaha jewelry retailer, second in size only to Tiffany’s New York store; See’s Candies Inc. of San Francisco; The Buffalo News; Fechheimer Bros., a Cincinnati manufacturer and distributor of uniforms; the Cleveland-based Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, and two of Scott Fetzer’s biggest operations, Kirby and World Book.

戈德堡表示，总部并无太多动静。“如果巴菲特一周接待两三位访客，那就算很多了。”他说。巴菲特那间简朴办公室里既无电脑也无行情终端——只有三条打给经纪人的电话线。我来访那天，他在办公桌前午餐：一份麦当劳四分之一磅汉堡、薯条，以及——还能是什么？——一罐樱桃可乐。戈德堡的公司承保飓风、地震等大型灾害，业内称为“超级巨灾”保险。由于巴菲特拒绝像行业内许多人那样亏本定价，有些年份他的公司几乎不承保新单；而在竞争对手因亏损收缩业务时，伯克希尔却是唯一仍以高额保费承保超级巨灾的保险人。结果：伯克希尔保险业务的资产负债表异常雄厚。巴菲特喜欢保险业，因为保费产生的资金“浮存”。多年来，大量这类资金被用于收购八家企业，构成伯克希尔的制造、出版和零售部门。这些企业包括美国规模最大的单体家具零售商——内布拉斯加家具城；奥马哈大型珠宝商博瑟姆，仅次于蒂芙尼纽约旗舰店；旧金山的See’s糖果公司；《布法罗新闻》；辛辛那提的制服制造与分销商费奇海默兄弟公司；位于克利夫兰的斯科特·费策制造集团，以及该集团最大的两个业务——科比吸尘器和《世界图书》百科全书。

Entrepreneurs built these businesses and in most cases continue to run them. Berkshire’s entrepreneurs are Buffett’s beemers, his magicians. He holds them in the highest regard and lavishes praise on them in each year’s annual report. In return, they perform for him, earning lofty returns on equity of some 50%. Says 66-year-old Ike Friedman, president of Borsheim’s, “I’ve turned over all my shares to my children, but now I’m working harder than ever, because there’s nobody like Warren Buffett as a human being.”

这些企业由创业者创建，大多数仍由他们亲自掌舵。伯克希尔的创业者就是巴菲特的“比默”，他的魔术师。他对他们推崇备至，并在每年的年报中盛赞不已。作为回报，他们为他创造约50%的高额股本回报率。66岁的博瑟姆总裁艾克·弗里德曼说：“我已把所有股份转给孩子，但现在比以往更卖力，因为世上没有第二个像沃伦·巴菲特这样的人。”

Friedman’s cousin, Louie Blumkin, 70, president of the Nebraska Furniture Mart, says that life with Buffett has “no downside. He lets us make our own decisions. Everyone runs his own show.”

弗里德曼的堂兄、70岁的内布拉斯加家具城总裁路易·布卢姆金说，与巴菲特共事“没有任何负面”。“他让我们自主决策，大家各自做自己的主。”

It’s tough to wring any complaints out of this collection of admirers. A lone naysayer is Rose Blumkin, Louie’s 97-year-old mother who founded Nebraska Furniture Mart, sold it to Buffett and ran its carpet department for decades. Two years ago Mrs. B, as she is known, got angry when her three grandsons overrode her objections and redecorated her department. She stomped out in a huff and opened a new store--Mrs. B’s Warehouse, across the street. From her motorized golf cart that whizzes her around the showroom, she says: “Warren Buffett is not my friend. I made him \$15 million every year, and when I disagreed with my grandkids, he didn’t stand up for me.” Asked how business is, she replies, “I didn’t open this store for money; I opened it for revenge.”

从这群崇拜者嘴里想挤出任何抱怨都颇为困难。唯一的反对者是97岁的罗斯·布卢姆金——路易的母亲，她创办了内布拉斯加家具城，将其卖给巴菲特，并在几十年里负责地毯部门。两年前，绰号“B夫人”的她因三个孙子不顾她的反对重新装修该部门而怒气冲冲，于是拂袖而去，在街对面开了一家新店——“B夫人仓库”。她驾驶电动高尔夫球车在展厅中穿梭时说：“沃伦·巴菲特不是我的朋友。我每年替他赚1500万美元，可当我和孙子意见不合时，他却没为我撑腰。”当被问及生意如何，她答道：“我开这家店不是为了赚钱，而是为了报复。”

SINCE NOT SO MANY GOOD businesses are for sale--and because he has so much cash to deploy--Buffett settles for buying huge stakes in large companies, his permanent common-stock holdings. No matter how much they appreciate, Buffett swears the holdings are not for sale. The following chart conveys some idea of his prescience:

由于可供出售的优质企业不多——且他手握大量待投资金——巴菲特干脆买入大型公司的巨额股份，作为他永久性的普通股资产。不论这些持股涨到何种水平，巴菲特都发誓绝不出售。下表多少展示了他的远见：

Buffett also invests in large quantities of marketable securities that are held by Berkshire’s insurance companies. For these, he surveys the market for the highest after-tax returns. Several years ago he rode to the rescue of four embattled managements as a white knight, driving off unwanted suitors.

巴菲特还大量投资于伯克希尔保险公司所持有的流通证券。对此，他在市场上寻找税后回报最高的标的。数年前，他曾以“白衣骑士”身份驰援四家陷入困境的公司管理层，赶走不受欢迎的收购者。

His rewards were handsome: He bought blocks of newly issued convertible preferred shares in each of the four companies, with slightly above-market yields, plus the right to convert them into common shares in the future. So far, only the Gillette preferred has been called, and it looks like a zinger: Berkshire would make about \$280 million in profit if the common were sold. (Buffett says he’ll hang on to the shares for the time being.) The jury is still out on Berkshire’s interests in the investment bank Salomon Inc., the Washington-based airline USAir Group and the big paper company Champion International. Their preferred shares need not be converted for another six to seven years.

他获得了丰厚回报：在这四家公司中，他各买入一批新发行的可转换优先股，收益率略高于市场水平，并享有未来转换为普通股的权利。迄今为止，只有吉列公司的优先股被赎回，结果相当惊艳：若将相应普通股出售，伯克希尔可获利约2.8亿美元（巴菲特表示暂不售出）。至于伯克希尔在投行所罗门公司、总部位于华盛顿的美国航空集团以及大型造纸商冠军国际的投资，仍有待观察；这些优先股在未来六至七年内都无需转换。

Given Buffett’s contempt for Wall Street, the Salomon Bros. investment appears puzzling. Asked about it, he squirms and says “(Salomon chief executive) John Gutfreund is an outstanding, honorable man of integrity” who has advised clients not to take actions that would have brought big fees Salomon’s way.

鉴于巴菲特对华尔街的不屑，投资所罗门兄弟似乎令人费解。当被问及时，他显得有些不自在，只说：“（所罗门首席执行官）约翰·古弗伦德是一位杰出、正直、值得尊敬的人”，他曾劝客户不要采取能为所罗门带来高额费用的做法。

Berkshire is a passive investor (it does not exercise control) in most of the companies it buys into. Therefore, it chooses to include in its stated earnings only dividends received, not a commensurate share of profits. This means that Berkshire’s profits are understated.

伯克希尔在大部分投资公司中都是被动股东（不行使控制权）。因此，它在报表中只计入收到的股息，而不按持股比例并入利润。这意味着伯克希尔的账面利润被低估了。

Buffett advises shareholders to think in terms of what he calls look-through earnings. In the 1990 annual report he defines these as the \$371 million in operating earnings reported by Berkshire, plus \$220 million, which is Berkshire’s share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by the companies in which Berkshire invests, minus relevant taxes. The total for 1990 “look-through earnings,” therefore, comes to about \$590 million, up from the previous year’s figure of close to \$500 million.

巴菲特建议股东用他所谓的“透视收益”来思考。在1990年年报中，他将其定义为：伯克希尔报告的3.71亿美元运营收益，加上伯克希尔在所投资公司1990年留存运营收益中的份额2.2亿美元，再扣除相关税费。由此，1990年的“透视收益”约为5.9亿美元，高于前一年的近5亿美元。

Apparently, shareholders accept the explanation, because the stock continues to sell at what Buffett regards as a “full price” over what he terms “intrinsic value.” Asked the proper price, Buffett replies, “It’s not a scientific number. Charlie (Munger) and I might differ by up to 10%. We tell everybody all the factors they should consider. They have to figure it out.”

显然，股东们接受了这一解释，因为伯克希尔股价仍以巴菲特所称的“充分价格”高于其“内在价值”交易。当被问及合适价位时，巴菲特回答：“这不是一个科学数字。查理（芒格）和我可能会有10%的分歧。我们把所有应考虑的因素都告诉大家，剩下就得他们自己算。”

WHAT DOES ALL THIS MONEY mean to Buffett? “I enjoy the process far more than the proceeds, though I have learned to live with those also,” he says. His son, Peter, 32, sees it somewhat differently. “My dad says the money is not important, but it is. Not because he wants to spend it but because it declares him a winner.” Peter, a composer who lives in Milwaukee, scored the fire-dance scene in Kevin Costner’s film, “Dances With Wolves.”

这么多钱对巴菲特意味着什么？他说：“我更享受过程而非成果，不过我也学会了接受成果。”他32岁的儿子彼得则略有不同看法：“我爸说钱不重要，但它确实重要——不是因为他想花钱，而是因为它证明了他是赢家。”彼得是一位住在密尔沃基的作曲家，为凯文·科斯特纳电影《与狼共舞》中的火舞场景配乐。

“My dad casts a big shadow,” Peter says. “I remember sitting at the dinner table with him, and there was nothing you could tell him that he didn’t already know. But I always got the impression he would support me in whatever I chose (to do).”

“我爸的影子很大，”彼得说，“我记得坐在餐桌旁跟他聊天，没有什么是他不知道的。但我总觉得，无论我选择做什么，他都会支持我。”

Buffett startled people a few years ago when he announced that his money belongs to society, not his children, and that he intends to return it to society when he dies, via his foundation. The Buffett Foundation, which currently has about \$14 million in assets, has two principal aims: to curb population growth and to seek solutions to the problem of nuclear-weapons proliferation. Buffett says, however, that he does not intend to cut off his children without a dime. “They will get substantially less than one-half of 1%.”

几年前，巴菲特宣布，他的钱属于社会而非子女，去世后将通过基金会回馈社会，此举曾让人惊讶。巴菲特基金会目前资产约1,400万美元，主要目标有二：控制人口增长、解决核武器扩散问题。不过巴菲特表示，他并非让孩子们分文不得。“他们得到的将远远少于总资产的0.5%。”

Understandably, his progeny do not jump up and down with glee at this. “It’s probably the right thing,” says daughter Susan, whose husband, Allen Greenberg, runs the foundation. What frustrates her is that everyone assumes that she is rich, and she is constantly solicited for charitable contributions. “They don’t understand,” she says, “that when I write my dad a check for \$20, he cashes it. If I had \$2,000 now, I’d pay off my credit card bill.”

可以理解，他的孩子们对此并不欢欣鼓舞。“这也许是正确的做法，”女儿苏珊说，她的丈夫艾伦·格林伯格运营该基金会。令她沮丧的是，所有人都以为她很富，不断向她索要捐款。“他们不知道，”她说，“我给爸爸开20美元支票，他都会兑现。如果我现在有2,000美元，我会先把信用卡账单还清。”

Buffett’s older son, Howard, 36, farms 406 acres near Omaha and is following in his grandfather’s political footsteps as an elected county commissioner. He rents the land he tills from his father, and the price is adjusted 2% up or down depending on how much Howard weighs, since Buffett thinks his son needs to diet. Says Howard: “Dad always likes to get the best deal.”

巴菲特的大儿子霍华德，今年36岁，在奥马哈附近耕种406英亩土地，并追随祖父的政治足迹当选为郡委员。他向父亲租用耕地，租金会根据霍华德的体重上下浮动2%，因为巴菲特认为儿子需要减肥。霍华德说：“老爸总想谈成最划算的交易。”

Susan Buffett Greenberg adds that her main wish for her dad is for a long life, and in this year’s annual report, Buffett discusses that issue for the first time. He informs shareholders that if his wife outlives him, she will inherit all his stock and effectively control the company. “She knows, and agrees,” he writes, “that neither Berkshire nor its subsidiary businesses and important investments should be sold simply because some very high bid is received for one or all.” He goes on to say, “Neither my estate plan nor that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune; instead, both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning the fortune to society.”

苏珊·巴菲特·格林伯格补充说，她对父亲的最大愿望是长寿，而巴菲特也在今年的年报中首次谈及这个话题。他告知股东，如果妻子比他长寿，她将继承他全部股票并有效控制公司。“她知道并同意，”他写道，“无论伯克希尔本身，还是其子公司和重要投资，都不应仅因遇到很高的出价就被出售。”他接着说：“我和妻子的遗产规划都不是为了保全家族财富，而是为了保持伯克希尔的特质，并将财富回馈社会。”

Finally, he reports, “Were I to die tomorrow . . . Berkshire’s earnings would increase by \$1 million annually, since Charlie (Munger) would immediately sell our corporate jet, the Indefensible--ignoring my wish that it be buried with me.”

最后，他写道：“如果我明天就去世……伯克希尔的年收益将增加100万美元，因为查理（芒格）会立即卖掉我们的公务机‘不可辩护号’——无视我希望把它与我一起下葬的愿望。”

Despite Buffett’s plans, it’s hard to imagine Berkshire maintaining its momentum without Buffett’s propulsion. “You don’t institutionalize an idiosyncratic leader like Buffett,” says Wharton Prof. Webber. “You can create a level of professional managers to run it like a mutual fund after he departs, but whatever unifying vision Buffett saw will evaporate.”

尽管巴菲特已规划未来，但很难想象没有他的推动伯克希尔还能保持动力。“无法把巴菲特这种特立独行的领导者体制化，”沃顿商学院教授韦伯说，“他离开后，你可以建立一批职业经理人像管理共同基金那样运营公司，但巴菲特所见的统一愿景将随之消散。”

Unlike some wealthy industrialists, Buffett has implemented no grandiose scheme to build a fabulous art collection or to imaginatively resolve every last problem that plagues mankind. Because he shrinks from high-risk enterprises, his legacy will not be that of an innovator or creator of a new industry or technology. Besides the tens of thousands of jobs generated by his wealth, his contribution will have been his writings on his business and investing philosophies, which constitute a lucid exposition on the fine art of business--and his example of success achieved with integrity during an era of sleazy financial gimmicks.

与某些富豪实业家不同，巴菲特并未制定宏大的计划去打造惊人的艺术收藏，或对人类所有顽疾进行天马行空的解决。他回避高风险事业，因此他的遗产不会是一项新产业或新技术的创新者或缔造者。除因其财富而创造的数以万计的工作岗位外，他的贡献在于对商业和投资理念的著述，这些著述清晰阐释了商业这门精妙艺术——以及在充斥投机伎俩的时代里，以诚信取得成功的示范。

In the meantime, Buffett’s zest for life and business remains unabated. He has no desire to move into government, or to graduate to academe, or to take on a quasi-public role such as chairman of a stock exchange, as has been rumored in recent months. “I’ll keep doing this as long as I live,” he says. “I love what I do. There is nothing in my life I would change or don’t like. I feel like tap-dancing all the time.”

与此同时，巴菲特对生活和商业的热情丝毫未减。他无意从政、进入学术界，或担任类似证券交易所主席的半公共职位——近几个月曾有此类传闻。“只要活着我就会一直做下去，”他说，“我热爱我的工作，我的人生没有任何想改变或不喜欢的地方。我总想随时踢踏起舞。”

Berkshire Hathaway Holdings

伯克希尔·哈撒韦持股

COMPANY ORIGINAL COST MARKET VALUE (As of March 18, 1991)

公司  原始成本  市值（截至1991年3月18日）

Cap Cities/ABC \$518 million \$1.4 billion

Cap Cities/ABC 5.18亿美元 14亿美元

Coca-Cola \$1 billion \$2.5 billion

可口可乐 10亿美元 25亿美元

GEICO \$45.7 million \$1.2 billion

GEICO 4570万美元 12亿美元

Washington Post \$9.7 million \$404 million

《华盛顿邮报》 970万美元 4.04亿美元

Wells Fargo \$289 million \$384 million

富国银行 2.89亿美元 3.84亿美元