1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Measuring Insurance Performance

Refer To：《1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Measuring Insurance Performance

衡量保险业绩

In the previous section I mentioned “float,” the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth—that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.

在前一节中，我提到了“float（浮存金）”，即保险公司在经营业务过程中暂时持有的他人资金。由于这些资金可用于投资，典型的财产-责任险公司可以承受超过保费 7% 至 11% 的损失和费用，并在业务上依然实现盈亏平衡。同样，这一计算不包括保险公司在净资产（即股东提供的资金）上实现的收益。

However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer.

然而，这一 7% 至 11% 的范围存在许多例外。例如，针对农作物冰雹损失的保险几乎完全不产生浮存金。这类业务的保费在冰雹威胁即将来临前支付给保险公司，如果农民遭受损失，他几乎会立即获得赔付。因此，对于农作物冰雹保险来说，100 的综合成本率不会给保险公司带来任何利润。

At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance “long- tail” business, in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and to the insurer’s lawyers as well).

在另一个极端，针对医生、律师和会计师潜在责任的 malpractice（专业责任保险）与年保费量相比，会产生极高比例的浮存金。浮存金之所以产生，是因为索赔往往在所谓的侵权行为发生很久之后才提出，而且由于漫长的诉讼，赔付可能会被进一步推迟。业界将专业责任险和某些其他类型的责任险称为“long-tail（长尾）”业务，这是考虑到保险公司可以长期持有大笔资金，而这些资金最终将支付给索赔人及其律师（以及保险公司的律师）。

In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch, though, is that “long-tail” means exactly that: Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.

在长尾业务的情况下，115（甚至更高）的综合成本率也可以被证明是有利可图的，因为浮存金产生的收益将超过索赔和费用超出保费的 15%。然而，问题在于，“长尾”的确切含义正是如此：某一年承保的责任险业务，最初推测产生的综合成本率为 115，但随着岁月流逝，当所有索赔最终结案时，可能会给保险公司带来 200、300 甚至更糟糕的打击。

The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses; aiming for 110—115 is business suicide.

这项业务的陷阱强制要求一个经常被忽视的经营原则：尽管某些长尾业务线在 110 或 115 的综合成本率下可能被证明是有利可图的，但保险公司若将这些比率作为定价目标，最终总会发现这是无利可图的。相反，定价必须提供健康的“安全边际（margin of safety）”，以抵御那些不断给保险业带来昂贵意外的社会趋势。将目标定在 100 本身就可能导致重大亏损；而将目标定在 110—115 简直是商业自杀。

All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer’s profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio—and it’s true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float developed.

话虽如此，衡量保险公司盈利能力的标准应该是什么？分析师和管理层通常关注综合成本率——诚然，这个尺度通常能很好地衡量一家公司的盈利排名。然而，我们认为一个更好的衡量标准是：将承保亏损与所产生的浮存金进行对比。

This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost translates into a poor business.

这种“亏损/浮存金”比率，就像任何用于评估保险业绩的统计数据一样，在短期内是毫无意义的：季度的承保数据甚至年度数据都过多地基于估算，因此没有太大用处。但当这一比率涵盖了数年的跨度时，它就能大致显示出保险经营所产生的资金成本。极低的资金成本象征着一项优良的业务；而高成本则意味着一项差劲的业务。

On the next page we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year. From this data we have computed a “cost of funds developed from insurance.”

在下一页，我们展示了自我们进入该行业以来，保险集团每年的承保亏损（如果有的话），并将该底线与我们在年内持有的平均浮存金联系起来。根据这些数据，我们计算出了“由保险产生的资金成本”。

The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents’ balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored.

浮存金（float）的数字是由损失准备金、损失调整费用准备金以及未赚保费准备金的总额，减去代理人余额、预付收购成本以及适用于分入再保险的递延费用而得出的。对于某些保险公司，其他项目也应纳入计算，但在我们的案例中，这些项目并不重要，因此被忽略了。

During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years, such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government.

1990 年间，我们持有约 16 亿美元的浮存金，这些资金最终注定要流向他人手中。我们在这一年承担的承保亏损为 2700 万美元，因此我们的保险业务为我们产生资金的成本约为 1.6%。如表所示，我们在某些年份实现了承保盈利，在这些情况下，我们的资金成本低于零。而在其他年份，例如 1984 年，我们为浮存金支付了极高的代价。不过，在我们从事保险业的 24 年中，有 19 年产生的资金成本低于政府支付的成本（国债利率）。

There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won’t know our true 1967—1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax-efficient.

这一计算有两个重要的限制条件。首先，“胖女人还没开始漱口，更不用说开唱了”（意指事情远未结束），直到几十年后这一时期的所有损失都结算完毕，我们才会知道 1967 年至 1990 年真正的资金成本。其次，浮存金对股东的价值在一定程度上因以下事实而受到削弱：股东必须投入自己的资金来支持保险业务，并且这些资金赚取的投资收益还要面临双重征税。直接投资在税务上会更有效率。

The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire.

间接投资给股东带来的税务惩罚实际上是相当大的。尽管计算必然是不精确的，但我估计普通保险公司的所有者会发现，税务惩罚会使他们的浮存金成本增加约一个百分点。我也认为这大致是 Berkshire 的正确数值。

Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty) is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive—and if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.

计算保险业务的资金成本，可以让任何分析它的人确定该项业务对股东而言是正价值还是负价值。如果这一成本（包括税务惩罚）高于替代资金来源的成本，那么其价值就是负的。如果成本较低，价值就是正的——如果成本显著降低，那么这项保险业务就是一个非常宝贵的资产。

So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO’s growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially, GEICO’s policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But handsome is as handsome does: GEICO’s unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for policyholders.)

到目前为止，Berkshire 一直属于“显著降低”阵营。更具戏剧性的是 GEICO 的数据，我们目前持有该公司 48% 的权益，且该公司通常在承保上是盈利的。GEICO 的增长产生了规模日益庞大的投资资金，其有效成本远低于零。从本质上讲，GEICO 的投保人作为一个整体，是在向公司支付浮存金的利息，而不是相反。（但“行美方见貌美”：GEICO 非同寻常的盈利能力源于其非凡的经营效率和对风险的细致分类，这一组合反过来又使投保人能够享受极低的价格。）

Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance—and history indicates that is an almost impossible task—their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.

另一方面，许多知名的保险公司承担着承保亏损/浮存金成本，加上税务惩罚，为所有者带来了负面结果。此外，这些公司与行业内所有其他公司一样，在灾难性损失面前非常脆弱，这些损失可能会超过其再保险保障，并使它们的浮存金成本飙升至无法衡量的程度。除非这些公司能够实质性地改善其承保业绩——而历史表明这几乎是一项不可能完成的任务——否则它们的股东所经历的结果，将类似于一家支付给存款人的利息高于其贷款利息的银行所有者所承受的结果。

非常形象的比喻。

All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the benefits produced by the float.

总而言之，保险业务对我们非常眷顾。我们以平均而言合理的成本扩大了我们的浮存金，并且由于我们在这些低成本资金上获得了良好的回报，我们进一步实现了繁荣。诚然，我们的股东承担了额外的税收，但到目前为止，浮存金产生的收益已远远补偿了这项成本。

A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg’s arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.

关于我们的记录，一个特别令人鼓舞的点是，尽管在 Mike Goldberg 到任之前你们的主席犯过一些巨大的错误，但我们依然取得了这样的成绩。保险业提供了大量的犯错机会，而当机会敲门时，我往往都会应门。多年以后，这些错误的账单仍在不断寄来：在保险业，愚蠢行为是没有诉讼时效的。

The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one—among all the fine businesses we own—that has the greatest potential.

计算我们保险业务的内在价值，总是比计算（比如说）我们的糖果或报纸公司的价值要困难得多。然而，无论以何种标准衡量，该业务的价值都远高于其账面价值。此外，尽管这项业务周期性地给我们带来麻烦，但在我们拥有的所有优秀业务中，它是潜力最大的一个。

1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Measuring Insurance Performance

1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Measuring Insurance Performance

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