2026-02-28 Greg Abel VS Warren Buffett
Greg Abel 的性格特质中具备高能量的执行力，这跟“狂热就是在忘记目标后加倍努力”有一些相似的成分。心理学强调高能量的特质比低质量更危险，但在商业实践中，尤其是在 Berkshire 这样的大型成熟企业里，这类人反而更容易取得成功。
原因并不复杂：跑道是既定的，“因为—所以”的主干链条（商业模式、企业文化）已经搭好。CEO 的主要工作，不是重建这条链，而是在这条链上高速运行。对这种场景来说，高能量的特质反而容易转化为优势：
- 先入为主的结论，不再完全是噪音，而可能与既定跑道的方向一致；
- 占位的本能，在既定规则下会表现为执行力强、动作快、不犹豫、能压住组织。
这里有隐藏的脆弱性：跑道一旦改变，快马最先出问题。但也没有必要过度担忧，决定一家企业长期前景的，首先是跑道本身。只是，跑道更重要并不意味着马与马之间的差异不值得研究。恰恰是在跑道足够成熟的前提下，管理者之间的差异才更容易看清，Greg Abel与巴菲特的对比，正是一个非常好的案例。
1、思维上的差异
注意力在结果上，原因就会变得模糊。结果可以被描述，原因需要被挖掘。这两种注意力指向的是不同的思维深度，有一段针对保险公司承保纪律的评论可以看到两个人在思维方式上的差异。在Right People的评价中，先理清一个概念：不是标上数字的才是量化。
（1）Greg Abel
Our insurance team will remain patient because of Berkshire’s structural strengths:
我们的保险团队将保持耐心，因为 Berkshire 拥有结构性优势：
1. We have significant capital, enabling us to underwrite large and unusual risks.
我们拥有雄厚的资本，使我们能够承保大型和不寻常的风险。
2. We give our insurance managers autonomy to run their businesses, without quarterly earnings targets or growth mandates that might otherwise distort their underwriting judgment.
我们给予保险经理人经营业务的自主权，没有季度盈利目标或增长指令，否则这些可能会扭曲他们的承保判断。
3. We insist on underwriting discipline as the most important ingredient in insurance success.
我们坚持将承保纪律视为保险成功的核心要素。
4. We focus on the long term, resisting temporary industry enthusiasms and exuberances.
我们专注于长期，抵制行业暂时的狂热和过激行为。
The environment ahead will reward insurers whose focus remains on growing underwriting profit sustainably, not volume; customer trust and loyalty, not temporary spikes in market share; and long-term resilience, not short-lived opportunism.
未来的环境将奖励那些专注于可持续增长承保利润而非规模、注重客户信任和忠诚度而非市场份额的暂时飙升、以及注重长期韧性而非短期投机主义的保险公司。
Greg Abel 的表述并没有问题，但他排在前面的、强调最重的，主要是一些客观的外部条件：资本、授权、组织结构、长期导向。这种表达方式很适合 CEO 的职责位置：把事情列清楚，把原则讲明白，把执行要求压实。只要跑道不变、商业模式稳定、组织纪律不坏，做好“能力圈”内的事，一样可能取得很好的成绩。
（2）Warren Buffett
At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
归根到底，一家健康稳健的保险公司必须严格遵守四条纪律：（1）充分理解所有可能导致保单发生赔损的风险敞口；（2）以保守的态度评估这些风险敞口实际引发损失的可能性，以及一旦发生损失时的可能成本；（3）设定一个在平均意义上可以保证盈利的保费水平，也就是说，在覆盖预期赔付成本和运营费用之后仍能留有利润；（4）当无法获得足够的保费时，有毅力、有意愿直接放弃这笔业务。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司在前三条纪律上都能勉强过关，却在第四条上彻底不及格。华尔街的鼓噪、代理人和经纪团队的压力，或者只是某些“荷尔蒙爆棚”的 CEO 不愿意接受业务量下滑的现实，这些因素共同推动了太多保险公司在保费严重不足的情况下仍然硬着头皮承保业务。“别人都这么干，所以我们也得这么干”——这种心态在任何行业都会带来麻烦，而在保险业则尤为致命。
巴菲特这段评论的真正重点其实是第（4）条。前面三条更像是认知和技术要求，真正决定一家保险公司能否长期守住纪律的，是最后那句：当拿不到合适价格时，是否真有意愿离开。
也就是说，决定承保纪律的根本因素，不是“我们有多少钱”“我们有多大自主权”，而是：在价格不合适时，是否真有毅力、有意愿放弃业务。Greg Abel 所说的资本雄厚、自主权充足，当然有帮助，但都不是最底层的原因。真正起决定作用的，是人的性格特质。巴菲特在这里没有强调“有钱”和“有自主权”，而是直接指向了更深的那一层：willlingness to walk away。
这说明两人的思维重心并不一样：巴菲特擅长找到真正起决定作用的那个变量；Abel更习惯从一个已经搭建好的框架和执行力入手。
2、巴菲特对Greg Abel的评价
总体看，巴菲特对 Greg Abel 的评价可以概括为两点：第一，执行力强；第二，不是一个扭曲的人。
（1）执行力强
巴菲特对 Greg Abel 的评价里，反复出现的是同一类词：精力充沛、能量惊人、可以处理更多的问题、能完成更多的事情。【Appendix.1】。
这些评价，与 Greg Abel 首封股东信中表现出来的特质是相互印证的。比如，他喜欢列出详细清单，喜欢把问题放进结构化框架，喜欢把责任、原则、标准和动作一项项摆出来。这种写法未必代表更深的洞察，但非常适合高能量的执行。
从这个角度看，清单并不只是沟通工具，也是一种思维支点。对于一个高能量、偏执行型的人来说，清单可以暂时替代更深的因果推演：一旦事项被放进框架、进入清单，心理上就会产生“已经纳入控制”的感觉。它给人一种全局在手的稳定感，也减少了继续追问的必要。
所以，这里真正支撑高能量执行力的，未必是更强的洞察，而更可能是：一个足够稳定、足够清晰、足够能占位的框架。清单，在某种意义上，正是这种框架。
（2）不是一个扭曲的人
Warren Buffett:He can't imagine how much more he can get accomplished in a week than I can or a month. I mean, he just And at the same time, he's not a distorted individual, you know? I mean, he he likes to play ice hockey with his kids and he lives a what would look like a normal life. And my guess is that if the neighbors didn't know who he was, they wouldn't have any idea that that well on January 1st he is going to be the decider on a company that that employs close to 400,000 people and has got plans around to be around 50 or 100 years from now.
沃伦·巴菲特：他无法想象他在一周或一个月内能比我多完成多少事情。我的意思是，他简直……但同时，他不是一个扭曲的人，你知道吗？我是说，他喜欢和孩子们一起打冰球，他过着看似正常的生活。我猜如果邻居们不知道他是谁，他们根本想不到，到了1月1日，他将成为一家拥有近40万名员工、并计划在未来50年或100年继续存在的公司的决策者。
这段评论很值得仔细拆开。
高能量、高驱动的人，容易往失衡方向发展，这是巴菲特心里显然有的参照系。正因为如此，“not a distorted individual” 这句话才显得特别。如果 Abel 完全不存在这一维度的问题，巴菲特可以使用很多更自然的赞美方式，但他偏偏用了 distorted，而且是否定句，这说明他先处理的是一个风险维度，然后才把 Abel 从那个维度里划出去。
巴菲特顺着一个很现实的逻辑排除风险：如果高能量、高驱动已经发展到外溢的程度，那么有些地方通常是能看到迹象的：
- 喜欢和孩子打冰球；
- 过着看起来正常的生活；
- 邻居未必看得出他将成为最终决策者。
这几句不是在证明 Abel高能量的性格特质没有风险，而是在限定：这种高能量没有外溢造成常见的风险。但是Abel的性格特质需要有心理上的高位，同样体现在股东信的语言风格中，这种需求是结构性的，是性格特质的一部分，是一种稳定的行为模式。
最后那句关于“管理 40 万名员工的决策者”，是性格问题的最终指向。问题从来不是高能量本身，而是这股能量最终被放在什么地方。就像一个电脑极客，去做黑客，整天想着破坏各种系统，肯定不如去大厂上班或者自己创业。高能量本身不是结论，关键在于它被导向哪里。
巴菲特没办法撒谎，在他的思维模式中，内部和外部是同一个系统——他想的、说的、做的在同一条链上，稍有不一致就会出现分裂，事实和叙事之间的界线会变的模糊，时间久了可能再也找不回那个清醒的自我，所以，如何处理一个带有负面的评论就很有意思。
“Not distorted in the usual ways” 可以看作巴菲特能够诚实说出口的、接近极限的一种赞美。他没有直接说 Abel 完全没有问题，而是选择了自己能够承担的表达方式，同时也是他留给听众自己去想的空间。
（3）锚点，以及为什么它重要
在接任 CEO 的过程中，董事会内部并非没有不同意见【Appendix.2】，但无论是已故的芒格，还是巴菲特对Greg Abel都给出了非常明确的支持，这种情绪上的支持对于Greg Abel特别重要。2026 年的首封股东信里，他特意引用芒格在 2021年的那句评价：“Greg will keep the culture”，并且写道这句话 “will forever resonate with me”。这不是随手致意，而是说明这句话在五年之后仍然留在他的脑子里，仍然有重量。
如果把它放进更深一层的心理结构，这句话的重要性不只在于它描述了 Abel，更在于它在 Abel 的自我认知中形成了一个锚点。高能量的心理特质会持续干扰“因为—所以”之间的连接，真正重建这条链的成本很高，在这种情况下，一个公开的、来自权威的肯定，往往会更高效地起到稳定作用。芒格的这句 “Greg will keep the culture”，给出的不是分析，而是定义；不是推导，而是确认。它把 Greg Abel 放在了一个清晰而有分量的位置上。
巴菲特在年会上的宣布用的是同样的逻辑。他没有发布任何预先铺垫的声明，当着几万名股东的面，突然公开宣布。这样的场合、这样的时机，让 Abel 几乎没有空间去构建防御性的反应。什么落下去，就会直接落地。
当众做出的承诺无法轻易撤回，是有份量的，更重要的是，这个锚点正是 Greg Abel 自己想要的。对这类性格的人来说，占据心理上的高位，不只是偏好，更是稳定自我的方式。芒格、巴菲特的认可之所以重要，不只是因为它正面，更因为它公开、权威，而且已经发生了效果：五年之后，Abel把这句话放进自己的首封股东信里，作为自己角色和 Berkshire 文化的说明。
积极的支持会提供一种安全感，而这种安全感，在压力增大、其他参照系变得不可靠的时候，可能会自动激活，推着一个人走过很长的路。Abel 会珍视芒格对他的这个定义，也会不断要求自己去兑现它。
（4）不是每个人都值得这么做
不是每个人都值得这样做，不是每个人都能够被植入一个正确的锚点，也不是每个人都值得别人付出这样的判断、时机和声誉成本。
巴菲特多次提到，父亲早年的鼓励对自己有极深的影响，他还有两个姐妹，可以相信得到过相同的鼓励，“能够被植入”是一个非常正面的结果：这说明对方不仅接收到了支持，还能让这份支持在内心长期存活。
另一个“值得做”的证据发生的更早，假设某种性格上的风险水平像血脂指标一样，5.0是安全的临界值，在心理上注入一个恰当的锚点相当于一剂“降脂”的药，如果指标已经越过临界值，比如，7.0，“降脂”药下去很可能有效果但能不能降到临界值以内是不确定的，但如果已经处于临界值以内，比如，4.5，那么“降脂”药下去会进一步推向更远离风险的位置。
关于这一点，巴菲特的判断方式很值得注意。他不是简单地说 Greg Abel “值得信任”就结束了，而是在评论里不断排除风险外溢的可能：他特别提到 Abel “not a distorted individual”，随后又立即补上生活与人格外观上的限定，说明这种异常强度并没有外溢成失衡。【Appendix.2】
以外，他反复强调 Abel 不是那种只会高高在上发号施令的人，而是能够真正下场、承担、推进、落实的人，这同样是在排除另一类重要风险：占据高位，却无法身体力行。【Appendix.1】
回到Right People的分析框架：able and trustworthy，巴菲特在1993年的股东信中对able、trustworthy分别做了解释，如下：
2.The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
对管理层能够被评估的确定性——既包括其实现企业全部潜力的能力，也包括其明智运用现金流的能力；
3.The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;
对管理层是否可以被指望把企业回报导向股东、而非导向自身的确定性；
就Abel而言，able所指向的“实现企业全部潜力的能力”和“明智运用现金流的能力”，这两条容易过关，不偏离既有的商业模式就行；重点的是trustworthy，也正因为如此，芒格和巴菲特在整个过程中做的，并不只是“支持继任者”这么简单。他们一方面在评估 Abel 是否值得被放到这个位置上，另一方面也在做很多“加固 trustworthy”的动作。
这不是一条没有风险的路，而是一个后果开放的赌注。既然他们已经把自己的声誉压上去，那么这里体现出来的判断力，就应当被视为与他们处理其他重大决策时同样严肃、同样慎重的一种判断。
Appendix
Appendix.1.《2024-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's the answer might surprise you. But they overwhelmingly, the operating executives, well they prefer to talk to Greg or to Ajit. (Laughs) And that's understandable because I don't really do much. And I don't operate at the same level of efficiency that I would have 30 years ago or 40 years ago. I don't know the managers as well as I would have when we were smaller and when I could get more accomplished in a day than I can now. And you've got when you've got somebody like Greg and Ajit, you know, why settle for me, I mean, basically? (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：答案可能会让你惊讶。绝大多数运营高管更愿意和Greg或Ajit交谈。（笑）这是可以理解的，因为我实际上做的不多，我的工作效率也不如30年前或40年前了。我对管理层的了解也不如公司规模较小、我每天能完成更多事情的时候。况且，当你有Greg和Ajit这样的人，为什么还要将就找我呢？（笑）
So it's worked out extremely well. And I almost can't imagine anything working better. Because Greg, in a year, accomplishes I mean, he sees more of them, understands more about their problems, can give them suggestions. He's got incredible amounts of energy. And nobody has more wisdom than Ajit about insurance. And they've got access in insurance to him. Now, they had it before we stuck some of those titles on in insurance. Whereas with Greg, he much expanded things when he became the vice chairman in charge of really everything except insurance.
所以效果非常好，我几乎无法想象还有什么能做得更好。Greg在一年里能完成的事情——他与更多的管理层见面，更了解他们的问题，能给出建议，他有着惊人的精力。在保险方面，没有人比Ajit更有智慧，保险业务的人也能随时找到他。其实在我们给Ajit加上那些头衔之前，他们就已经能联系到他了。而Greg则不同，当他成为负责除保险以外所有业务的副董事长时，他大幅扩展了自己的职责范围。
So, he is if you polled our managers that fall under his jurisdiction, which would be a lot of them, they would much prefer it, unless, like a few, they weren't paying as much attention to their business. And I wouldn't do anything about it. But Greg would. And they still like it when he does it. He can deliver news very well to people. You know, there'll be some people, if you have 20 children and you're very rich, you'll have some that will be go-getters anyway. And you'll have some that won't. And we are a very, very rich company. And we haven't had a history of being very tough on people that coasted. And we've had some that would do that. And Greg will do something about it. And Charlie and I wouldn't have. Not because we didn't know it should be done, but because we were doing so well ourselves. (Laughs)
如果你去问那些归他管辖的管理层——人数相当多——他们会更喜欢这种安排，除非其中有少数人对自己的业务不够上心。我不会对此采取行动，但Greg会。而且他们还是欣赏他这么做的。他很善于向人们传达消息。你知道，就像如果你有20个孩子而且非常富有，有些孩子天生就会积极进取，有些则不会。我们是一家非常非常富裕的公司，过去对那些得过且过的人并没有严格追究的历史，也确实有一些人这样做了。Greg会采取行动，而Charlie和我不会——不是因为我们不知道应该这么做，而是因为我们自己做得太好了。（笑）
找到30岁的巴菲特或者乔布斯，这样的假设一开始就是错的。AJIT JAIN在性格特质上更好一些，Greg Abel年龄上更有优势，巴菲特选了后者，说明两个人在最重要的性格特质上没有足够显著的差别。
It just wasn't something we'd make the effort for. We didn't want to change our lives that way. Plus, we slowed down in various ways physically and everything. So, I would say that the number of calls I get from managers is essentially awfully close to zero. And Greg is handling those. And I don't know quite how he does it. But we've got the right person, I can tell you that.
这件事我们不会去费心。我们不想那样改变自己的生活方式，加上我们在各方面体力上都已经慢了下来。所以我会说，我接到管理层的电话数量基本上接近于零，Greg在处理这些。我不太清楚他是怎么做到的，但我可以告诉你，我们找到了合适的人。
And with Ajit, he does less physical moving. And the insurance people are more used to working with Ajit, obviously, over the years. So, I wouldn't say that changing the title really changes much there. Because he was in charge of insurance anyway. So, you can go to a business school, and they can give you way better answers than I've just given you. But that's the way we do it at Berkshire. (Laughs)
至于Ajit，他的出行相对较少，而且多年来保险业务的人显然更习惯与Ajit合作。所以我不会说头衔的改变在那里真的改变了很多，因为他本来就负责保险。你可以去商学院，他们能给你比我刚才说的好得多的答案，但这就是我们在Berkshire的做事方式。（笑）
Appendix.2.《2025-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
11. Greg Abel’s successor qualities
Greg Abel作为继任者的特质
[01:19:58] Benjamin Graham Sanderson: My name is Benjamin Graham Sanderson from Pasadena, CA Warren, thank you for all you’ve taught us over the years. Earlier, you said, “Nobody but Steve Jobs could have created Apple, but nobody but Tim Cook could have developed it like he has.” Warren, nobody but you could have created Berkshire, and I presume you view Greg as an outlier among outliers? But he seems so normal. Sorry, Greg.
[01:19:58] Benjamin Graham Sanderson：我叫 Benjamin Graham Sanderson，来自 California 的 Pasadena。Warren，感谢你多年来教给我们的所有东西。刚才你说过一句话：“除了 Steve Jobs，没有人能够创造出 Apple，但除了 Tim Cook，也没有人能像他那样把它发展到今天。”Warren，除了你之外，也没有人能够创造出 Berkshire。我想你大概把 Greg 看作是“异类中的异类”？不过他看起来又非常正常。抱歉，Greg。
[01:20:26] Warren Buffett: That’s a nice way of saying not normal, actually, but I appreciate it.
[01:20:26] Warren Buffett：其实那是一种很委婉地说“他并不正常”的方式，不过我还是很感谢你这么说。
[01:20:33] Benjamin Graham Sanderson: So I was hoping you could share what specifically about Greg makes him your preferred successor, and Greg, we’re excited to get to know you more over the next few decades. Thank you.
[01:20:33] Benjamin Graham Sanderson：所以我希望你能具体讲一讲，Greg 身上到底有哪些特质，使他成为你心目中最合适的接班人。Greg，我们也很期待在未来几十年里更多地了解你。谢谢。
[01:20:43] Greg Abel: Thank you.
[01:20:43] Greg Abel：谢谢。
[01:20:51] Warren Buffett: Well, you’ve hit on the most important question, and now in terms of the business, they’ve got a wonderful group of businesses. We’ve got an ability to do things that nobody else can do, which is hard to get in a capitalistic system that’s been developed as fully as the United States has been. I mean, imagine being able to create something that in a very, very, very big playing field it would be very, very hard to develop anything like that. I don’t think you could develop the people around you with that, let alone the capital position, the history, and everything else. And the answer, of course, is that it does take a long, long time. It takes getting around a small cadre of people, which then spreads out somewhat, where you’ve got mutual trust, where people do more than their share. I’ve been around a lot of businesses over the years, and by nature, I’m somewhat critical of everything. I mean, I’m looking for what’s wrong in things because that’s part of investing is looking. What are you missing? But we’ve got people who, if they’re asked to put on a show like this, instead of doing their regular job, they participate.
[01:20:51] Warren Buffett：嗯，你其实问到了最重要的问题。从企业本身来看，我们拥有一组非常出色的业务组合。我们具备一种别人很难具备的能力——去做一些别人做不到的事情。在像美国这样一个资本主义体系已经高度成熟的环境中，这种能力是非常难以建立的。你可以想象，在一个如此巨大的竞技场里，要重新创造出类似的东西会是多么困难。我认为不仅仅是资本实力、历史积累这些东西难以复制，就连你身边的人也很难重新建立起那样的体系。答案其实很简单：这一切都需要非常、非常长的时间。你需要先围绕一小群核心的人，然后这个圈子慢慢扩展，在这个过程中形成相互信任，每个人都愿意多做一点、承担更多责任。多年来我见过很多企业，而我的天性其实是对所有事情都保持某种程度的挑剔。我总是在找事情哪里可能出了问题，因为投资的一部分工作就是去寻找：你可能忽略了什么？不过在 Berkshire，我们有这样一群人——如果让他们来参与像今天这样的活动，而不是去做他们的日常工作，他们依然会愿意参与其中。
Right Business+Right People，Right People“都愿意多做一点、承担更多责任”。
I went around the groups of people who were exhibiting yesterday for an hour, and a half, and these are people that are thanking me, you know, and totally enthused about coming and doing a lot of work for which they don’t get paid anything extra, and I don’t know anything about the arrangements the individual companies make, but they work hard, and they enjoy their work, and you really want to work in something you enjoy.
我昨天花了大约一个半小时在各个展区之间转了一圈，这些人一直在感谢我，而且你能看出来他们非常热情——他们愿意来这里做很多额外的工作，却并没有因此得到任何额外的报酬。我并不了解各家公司内部是如何安排这些事情的，但他们确实工作得很努力，而且他们也享受自己的工作。你真正应该做的，是去从事一份你自己也乐在其中的事情。
I’ve had five bosses in life, and I liked every one of them, and they were all interesting. I still decided that I’d rather work for myself than anybody else. But if you find people that are wonderful to work with, you know that’s the place to go. I’ve told my kids that you don’t get lucky like I did when I found that seven or eight years of age, which really interested me but it could have taken a lot longer. There’s a movie called The Glenn Miller Story, and Glenn Miller went on from having a broken-down band for 15 years. He found the sound and created the first gold record, and you know what it was, but it was the Chattanooga Choo Choo in 1941.
我这一生一共给五个老板打过工，我喜欢他们每一个人，而且他们都很有意思。不过我还是决定，我更愿意为自己工作，而不是为别人工作。但如果你能找到一些非常值得一起共事的人，那么那就是你应该去的地方。我一直告诉我的孩子们，并不是每个人都像我这么幸运——我在七八岁的时候就找到了真正让我着迷的事情，但很多人可能需要更长的时间。有一部电影叫 The Glenn Miller Story，讲的是 Glenn Miller 的故事。他带着一支几乎没人要的乐队挣扎了十五年，后来终于找到了属于自己的“声音”，并创造出了第一张金唱片，你们也许知道那首歌——那就是 1941 年的 Chattanooga Choo Choo。
He turned around from being a nothing with the band that he had till he found the sound, and I have always told my kids ever since that their sound isn’t my sound, and you don’t find it necessarily on the first job you take because you got to eat, you know. But if you get lucky like I did, you find it when you’re very young, and then just keep doing it. Don’t worry too much about starting salaries, and be very careful who you work for because you will take on the habits of the people around you, so there are certain jobs you shouldn’t take. But you’ve got the greatest country in the world, and you got the greatest time in the world. So I would say that I’m handing this over to Greg.
在他找到那个“声音”之前，他和他的乐队几乎是默默无闻的，但一旦找到了，一切就完全改变了。从那以后，我一直告诉我的孩子们：他们要找的是属于他们自己的“声音”，而不是我的“声音”。你也不一定能在第一份工作里就找到它——因为你总得先养活自己。但如果你像我一样幸运，很年轻的时候就找到了，那就一直做下去。不要太在意起薪是多少，但一定要非常小心你为谁工作，因为你会逐渐染上你身边那些人的习惯，所以有些工作是你不应该去做的。不过你们生活在世界上最伟大的国家，也生活在最好的时代。所以我想我就把接下来的话交给 Greg。
这里有两个非常重要的点，一是找到自己擅长的点，每个人都可能有自己的某种天赋；二是自己找到，这一点更关键，“Basic trust”的本质是主动，中间存在的空隙是“Basic trust”不够强，轻轻推一把、或者稍微用点力推，这些都是可以仔细琢磨的，但不会影响“Basic trust”非常强的那些人。
You can’t even dream all the dreams that you could have about a place like Berkshire, but the big thing you have to do though, is always to be sure you can play the next day. I mean, in terms of financial activities on a meaningful scale.
像 Berkshire 这样的地方，你甚至无法想象它未来可能实现的所有可能性。但最重要的一点始终是：你必须确保自己第二天还能继续“在场上打球”。我的意思是，在具有重要规模的金融活动中，始终要确保自己还能继续参与。
There was a book about how you only have to get rich once. I mean, you don’t want to do anything but risks. If very stupid things are happening around you, you do not want to participate. If people were making more money because they’re borrowing money or they’re participating in securities that are really pieces of junk but they hope to find a bigger sucker later on, you just have to forget that. That will bite you at some point.
有一本书讲过一个道理：你只需要变富一次就够了。换句话说，你不应该去做那些可能让你彻底出局的事情。如果你身边正在发生一些非常愚蠢的事情，你不应该参与其中。如果别人因为大量借钱而赚到更多的钱，或者他们在参与一些本质上是垃圾的证券，只是希望以后能找到一个更大的“接盘者”，那你就必须把这些事情忘掉。因为这些行为迟早会反过来伤到你。
The basic game is so good, and you’ve been so lucky to be born now. I mean, if I’ve been born in 1700, I’d say, “I want to go back in the womb. What the hell with this? It’s too hard.” But now I’ve come along to do something where I can just play around all day with things I enjoy doing, and it’s a pretty wonderful life. Anything, Greg, you want to add or subtract from that.
这场“基本的游戏”本身就非常好，而你们又如此幸运，生在这个时代。如果我是出生在 1700 年，我可能会说：“我还是回到子宫里算了，这一切太难了。”但现在，我却可以每天做自己喜欢做的事情，就像整天在玩一样，这是一种非常美好的生活。Greg，你有没有什么想补充或者修正的？
[01:27:30] Greg Abel: Nothing to subtract, but I would always just say it couldn’t be more, as I’ve said in the past, more humble than honoured obviously be in this role, but to have actually been part of Berkshire. Warren, it’s now 25-plus years. I had the opportunity to be part of Berkshire and to work with you, Ajit, our board, and many other people in our company, and as you touched on when you find something like that, and you find something like that like Berkshire that’s so special, you fall in love with it, and it becomes just what you want to do every day, and it’s just an incredible opportunity. So, thank you.
[01:27:30] Greg Abel：我没有什么需要补充的。不过我还是想说，就像我以前说过的那样，能够承担这样的角色，我感到无比谦逊，同时也深感荣幸。但更重要的是，我能够真正成为 Berkshire 的一部分。Warren，到现在已经 25 年多了。我有机会成为 Berkshire 的一员，并且能和你、Ajit、我们的董事会以及公司里许多优秀的人一起工作。正如你刚才提到的，当你找到这样的地方——像 Berkshire 这样特别的地方——你会爱上它，它会变成你每天最想做的事情。这是一个难以置信的机会。所以，谢谢你。
[01:28:15] Warren Buffett:, and to the gentleman who asked the question. If you don’t find it immediately, you know, don’t starve to death in the meantime, but you will find it, and you’ll find it in the right individual. In this sense, it’s almost like finding the right person in marriage. I mean, probably some of you may have married the person you met on your first date, although I guess they don’t even have dates anymore. But you know, sometimes it pays to wait too. OK, Becky.
[01:28:15] Warren Buffett：还有对刚才提问的那位先生说一句——如果你没有马上找到那件事，也不要着急。当然，在这期间也别把自己饿死，但你最终会找到它，而且通常是通过遇到合适的人。在某种意义上，这有点像寻找婚姻伴侣。也许你们当中有人第一次约会就遇到了未来的配偶——不过我猜现在的人可能连“约会”这种事情都不太做了。但有时候，多等一等也是值得的。好了，Becky。
为了当下的生存做的妥协是一种“重力”，Basic trust的力量足够强就能够摆脱“重力”，不会“饿死”在寻找的路上。
21.What did Warren Buffett learn from Greg Abel?
沃伦·巴菲特从格雷格·阿贝尔学到了什么？
[00:02:33] Robert: Hi, Warren. My name is Robert, and I’m a shareholder from Toronto, Canada. So, Warren, three years ago, Charlie Rose asked your question to the effect of what you wanted to be remembered for. And your reply was, “He was a teacher.” So in that spirit, Greg, I’m curious to hear maybe a story of where you learned something very, you know, profound from Warren. I’m sure you learned many things, but if there is a story that kind of comes up in your mind, we’d love to hear it, and vice versa, if we have the time. Warren, what’s something that you may be learned from Greg? Thank you.
Robert：你好，Warren。我叫 Robert，是来自加拿大多伦多的一名股东。三年前，Charlie Rose 曾问过你一个问题，大意是你希望别人怎样记住你。当时你的回答是：“他是一位老师。”在这个背景下，我很好奇，Greg，也许你可以讲一个故事，说说你从 Warren 那里学到过什么非常深刻的东西。我相信你学到的东西一定很多，但如果有一个特别让你印象深刻的故事，我们很想听听。如果时间允许，也想听听相反的情况——Warren，你有没有从 Greg 那里学到过什么？谢谢。
[00:03:14] Warren Buffett: Yeah, I will turn this over to Greg in just one second, but now the main thing I’d like to be known for is old age.
沃伦·巴菲特：好，我马上把这个问题交给 Greg，不过现在我最希望被人记住的一件事是——我活得很老。
[00:03:25] Greg Abel: Well, Warren is obviously a remarkable teacher and I benefit from that every day and as I’ve already touched on for many years, I’m fortunate that if I had to be remembered as something right now, obviously, I want to be remembered as a great father, but equally, a coach and that goes to family, friends and just being involved with the kids I coach in hockey or baseball or whatever it may be.
Greg Abel：Warren 显然是一位非常杰出的老师，我每天都从他那里受益。正如我之前提到的，多年来我一直很幸运。如果现在要说希望别人怎样记住我，当然，我希望首先被记住的是一个好父亲；但同样，我也希望被记住是一名教练——无论是对家人、朋友，还是对我在冰球、棒球等运动中指导的那些孩子们而言。
I think we’ve got a great opportunity to get back to him at a very young age, so obviously, those would be how I’d want to be remembered, and hopefully that will be many, many years from now, but I love thinking of Warren truly as a teacher and he and every day get the opportunity to continue to learn. Warren and I this dialogue is strong every week and we’re always talking about opportunities in Berkshire or things that are going on globally or in the US and each one is truly a learning moment.
我认为我们其实有很好的机会在孩子很小的时候就对他们产生影响，所以如果要说我希望被怎样记住，大概就是这些事情，而且我希望那还是很多很多年之后的事。但我确实很喜欢把 Warren 看作一位真正的老师，而且我每天都有机会继续从他那里学习。Warren 和我之间每周都会有非常深入的交流，我们总是在讨论 Berkshire 的机会，或者全球和美国正在发生的事情，而每一次交流本身都是真正的学习时刻。
I’ll maybe go back to the very first meeting with Warren because it still stands out in my mind, obviously, it was an incredible opportunity. Warren was buying or acquiring Mid-America Energy Holdings company at that time, or thinking about it, I had the opportunity with my partners to go over there on a Saturday morning, and we discussed the business, and Warren had the financial statements in front of them.
我也许可以回到我第一次见 Warren 的时候，因为那件事至今仍然非常清晰地留在我的记忆里。那显然是一次难得的机会。当时 Warren 正在考虑收购 Mid-America Energy Holdings，我和我的合伙人有机会在一个星期六早晨过去见他。我们一起讨论这家公司，而 Warren 当时把财务报表摆在面前。
Like anybody, I was sort of expecting a few questions on how the business was performing or a variety of things, but Warren locked in immediately to what was on the balance sheet and the fact that we had some derivative contracts, the weapons of mass destruction. And associated with the utility business, we do have them because they use them to match certain positions, and they never match perfectly. But you do have them, and we’re required in the regulated business. I just remember Warren going to it immediately and asking about the composition of it and what the underlying risk was, and wanting to thoroughly understand.
像任何人一样，我原本以为他会问一些关于业务表现的问题，或者其他经营方面的事情。但 Warren 几乎立刻就把注意力锁定在资产负债表上，特别是我们持有的一些衍生品合约——也就是他所说的“金融大规模杀伤性武器”。在公用事业行业里，我们确实会使用这些工具，用来对冲某些头寸，它们从来不会完全匹配。但在受监管的业务中，这些工具确实存在。我记得 Warren 马上就抓住这一点，询问这些合约的构成是什么、背后的风险是什么，并且希望把它彻底搞明白。
It wasn’t that big of a position, but it was absolutely one of the risks he was concerned about as he was acquiring Mid-American and obviously, in light of Enron and everything that had gone on, it was a very pertinent question. The follow-up to that was then there was an energy crisis in the US around electricity and natural gas, and a variety of folks who were making significant sums of money. This is a year, 18 months later. And Warren’s follow-up question, a couple of years later, to me was, and I knew it was more just checking or testing, “So how much money are we making during this energy crisis? Are we making a lot? Do we have the speculative positions in place and are we making?” And the answer was we’re really not making any more today than we would have been six months ago, because all those derivatives were truly to support our business and weren’t speculative. So, just that focus on understanding the business of what he was acquiring, understanding the risks around it, still stands out in my mind. Warren?
那个头寸其实并不算大，但在他考虑收购 Mid-American 的时候，这绝对是他非常关注的一项风险。尤其是在 Enron 事件以及当时发生的一系列事情之后，这个问题显得非常切中要害。后来，美国出现了一次能源危机，涉及电力和天然气，很多公司在那段时间赚了很多钱，大约是一年到一年半之后。再过了几年，Warren 又问了我一个后续问题，我知道那更多是在做一次检查或测试：“在这次能源危机中，我们赚了多少钱？是不是赚了很多？我们有没有做投机性的头寸，从中赚了很多？”而答案是：其实我们赚的钱和六个月前并没有什么区别，因为那些衍生品完全只是为了支持我们的业务，而不是用来投机的。所以，他那种专注于真正理解自己正在收购的业务、理解其中风险的方式，一直深深地留在我的记忆里。Warren？
[00:07:25] Warren Buffett: Yeah, that’s one thing we’ve really never talked about here, but I spend more time looking at balance sheets than I do income statements and Wall Street really doesn’t pay much attention to balance sheets, but I like to look at balance sheets over an 8 or 10 year period before I even look at the income account. There are certain things that are harder to hide or play games with on the balance sheet than you can with the income statement. I mean, neither one gives you the total answer on anything, but you still want to understand what the figures are saying and what they don’t say and what they can’t say and what the management will like them to say, that the auditors wouldn’t like them to say.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这其实是我们以前很少在这里谈到的一件事。我花在看资产负债表上的时间，比看利润表的时间还要多。而华尔街其实并不太重视资产负债表。在我看利润表之前，我通常会先看一家公司的资产负债表，往往要回看8年到10年的时间。有些东西在资产负债表上比在利润表上更难隐藏，也更难做手脚。当然，这两张报表都不能给出完整的答案，但你仍然要去理解这些数字在说什么、没有说什么、不能说什么，以及管理层希望它们表达什么，而审计师却不会允许它们表达什么。
性格中外溢的风险，再加上错误方向的正反馈就更麻烦了，会强化错误、让错误更快速的定型，很多人就是这么完蛋的，而资产负债表反映的是存量，最有可能看出定型后的错误行为的地方。
And I mean, there’s just a lot to be learned, and you do learn more from balance sheets in my view than most people give them credit for. I’m not worried about being remembered for that, people don’t remember. Well, they don’t remember enough about Katharine Graham, for example, in terms of this story that shaped America in many ways. Certainly, had just all kinds of impact, and I think I mean history is so fascinating, and Charlie was probably the best person you could imagine in what he learned. Charlie was never satisfied with just superficial things about any subject. He really wanted to understand it, and he always would tell me not to take a position on anything until you can describe the arguments against it better than the person who is arguing with you. That you should be able to argue their case better than they can.
这里面其实有很多东西可以学。在我看来，从资产负债表里学到的东西，往往比大多数人愿意给予它的评价要多得多。我倒不在乎别人是否会因为这一点记住我，因为人们其实记不住太多事情。比如说，人们对 Katharine Graham 的记忆就远远不够，而她的故事在很多方面塑造了美国，产生了极其深远的影响。我认为历史本身是非常迷人的。而在学习这件事上，Charlie 可能是你能想象到的最出色的人之一。Charlie 从不满足于对任何事情只有表面的理解，他总是想真正把它弄明白。他经常告诉我，在你能够把反对你观点的一方的论证讲得比对方自己还要好之前，不要对任何事情轻易下结论。也就是说，你应该能够把对方的观点论证得比他们自己还好。
He was a remarkable teacher and but so and so with those other fellows I mentioned. And, of course, my dad was an incredible teacher. So you make the most of the people you meet who are going to make you a better person, and probably forget about the rest to quite an extent. OK, let’s move on to number 12. Becky, here. Next.
他是一位了不起的老师，而我之前提到的那些人也同样如此。当然，我的父亲也是一位非常了不起的老师。所以，你要尽可能珍惜那些会让你成为更好的人、让你不断进步的人，而对其他人，大体上就不必太在意了。好，我们继续，下一个问题是12号提问点。Becky，下一个。
Greg Abel’s approach to managing the operating subsidiaries
Greg Abel 管理运营子公司的方式
[01:28:53] Becky Quick: Greg, this question is for you. It comes from a shareholder named Jay Milroy, who writes, “Mr. Buffett has a hands-off approach to managing the operating subsidiaries. How would you describe your approach?”
[01:28:53] Becky Quick：Greg，这个问题是问你的。它来自一位名叫 Jay Milroy 的股东。他写道：“Mr. Buffett 在管理各个运营子公司时采取的是一种高度放手的方式。你会如何描述自己的管理方式？”
[01:29:07] Warren Buffett: Better.
[01:29:07] Warren Buffett：更好。
[01:29:13] Greg Abel: Well, we’ve got our managers over there and I would say going back to 2018, it’s been very fortunate being this role because one I had to learn a lot of the businesses and there’s no question as Warren bought the businesses, he had that general knowledge. I absolutely had to engage with each of them, and they’ve been great in sharing their business models, their approach, and their thoughts around where the risks and opportunities are.
[01:29:13] Greg Abel：我们拥有一群非常优秀的经理人在各个子公司里。我想说，自从 2018 年开始担任这个角色以来，我其实是非常幸运的，因为首先我必须去深入了解很多业务。毫无疑问，当 Warren 收购这些企业的时候，他对这些业务本身已经有一种总体性的理解。而对我来说，我必须真正地与每一家企业互动交流。他们也非常愿意分享自己的商业模式、经营方法，以及他们对于风险和机会所在位置的看法。
And I think as we went through that, there’s no question I had questions and wanted to engage with them. And Warren talks about the curiosity being important as you go through things. That would be my style, but have questions and comments around their business, their frameworks. At the same time, they have great businesses, and they run them very autonomously and that remains in place. But if there’s opportunities to see where maybe seen something in another business or an opportunity, I may see in their industry, we’re going to discuss it and see if that’s something we should pursue or are we’re properly addressing the risk.
在这个过程中，毫无疑问我会提出很多问题，也会主动和他们交流。Warren 经常说，在理解事情的过程中，好奇心是非常重要的。我想这就是我的风格——围绕他们的业务以及他们的经营框架提出问题、交流看法。与此同时，他们经营的都是非常优秀的企业，而且这些企业本身运行得非常自主，这一点仍然保持不变。但如果我们看到某些机会，比如我在另一家公司看到的一些经验，或者我在他们行业里观察到的某些机会，我们就会讨论：这是否是我们应该去追求的事情？或者我们是否已经正确地应对了相关风险？
I found all our managers to be absolutely engaging on that and want to have those dialogues. And I’d say that’s a reflection of my approach. I’d also say that when you think of our managers, again, very autonomous, they run their businesses, they know it better than I ever will. But if I see an opportunity that it’s well worth their time to talk to another one of our managers. If it’s GEICO, and they’ve gone through a technology transformation. They’re not by themselves that need to be thinking that way. We want to make sure the right folks are talking and figuring out how we can benefit from the prior experiences. So I would say, more active, but hopefully in a very positive way, and we got an exceptional group. So it’s worked out exceptionally well as I’ve gone through that period of time.
我发现我们的所有经理人都非常愿意参与这样的讨论，并且乐于进行这种交流。我认为这也反映了我的管理方式。再说一次，当你想到这些经理人时，他们都拥有高度的自主权，他们经营自己的企业，而且他们对自己的业务理解得比我更深。但如果我看到一个机会，觉得很值得让他们和另一位经理人交流，比如 GEICO 在技术转型方面经历过一段过程，那么其他公司在思考类似问题时就不必各自单独摸索。我们希望确保合适的人能够彼此交流，并从过去的经验中获得好处。所以我会说，我的方式可能会更主动一些，但希望是以一种非常积极的方式来进行。我们拥有一支非常杰出的经理人团队，因此在这段时间里，这种方式的运作效果也非常好。
[01:31:27] Warren Buffett: It’s working way better with Greg than with me because I just didn’t want to work as hard as he worked and I could get away with it because we’ve got a basically good business, very good business and I wasn’t in danger of you firing me by virtue of both ownership and the fact that we would do pretty well. But the fact that you can do pretty well doesn’t mean you couldn’t do better. And Greg can do better at many things. Many people want to be managed, need help in being managed. Some don’t. Some you just leave alone.
[01:31:27] Warren Buffett：在 Greg 的管理下，这件事运作得比在我手里要好得多，因为我并不想像他那样努力地工作，而我也确实可以“偷懒”——因为我们的业务基础本来就很好，非常好，而且由于我既是大股东，公司表现也一直不错，所以你们也不太可能把我解雇。不过，仅仅“做得不错”并不意味着不能做得更好，而 Greg 在很多事情上都能做得更好。很多人其实希望被管理，也需要在管理中得到帮助；当然也有一些人不需要，那些人你只要让他们自己去做就行了。
We’ve had managers it would have been crazy to start giving instructions to because they just quit. And I wouldn’t blame them because I’d be the same type myself. But a lot of people really do welcome direction and help, particularly when they’re getting it from somebody like Greg that really lives the life himself and doesn’t just come down from on high and say, “Here’s what you do”, while I do something else. A manager who behaves differently than what he’s asking the people beneath them to behave—it just doesn’t work over time.
我们也有一些经理人，如果你开始给他们下达各种指令，那简直是疯了，因为他们很可能立刻就辞职。我也不会怪他们，因为如果是我，我大概也是那种人。但很多人确实欢迎指导和帮助，尤其是当这些建议来自像 Greg 这样的人——他自己真正过着那样的生活，而不是高高在上地说：“你们应该这样做”，而自己却在做完全不同的事情。一个管理者如果要求下属按照某种方式行事，而自己却表现得完全不同，这种做法从长远来看是行不通的。
People want a manager that they admire, and they’re not going to admire them if those people profess to behave in one manner and behave in another manner. It’s easier for an organization to see its quality move downward than it upward. I mean, if the boss behaves badly, it causes everybody to behave badly. I mean, that is really catching. It’s not as catching on the way in upper management, but if the manager is doing a little things to grease his own situation, pretty soon— Let’s say you’re running a retail establishment—pretty soon, all the employees are telling their friends that they get a discount. If their friend wants something, they’ll put it on their account and then get the discount. Once you start deviating downward, it is really contagious and it’s hard to rebuild, so you really need someone who behaves well on top and is not playing games for their own benefit.
人们希望拥有一个他们真正钦佩的管理者。如果一个人嘴上说一套，行为却是另一套，人们是不会真正尊敬他的。一个组织的质量往下滑，比往上提升要容易得多。也就是说，如果老板行为不端，就会让所有人都跟着行为不端。这种事情的传染性非常强。虽然在高层之间未必那么容易传染，但如果一个经理开始做一些小动作，为自己谋取一点额外好处——比如说你经营一家零售店——很快所有员工就会告诉朋友他们能拿到折扣。如果朋友想买东西，他们就会把账记在自己名下，然后享受折扣。一旦开始往下偏离，这种行为会迅速蔓延，而且很难再重新建立起良好的文化。所以你真正需要的是一个在顶层行为端正、不为自己谋私利的人。
And we get a lot of managers that bend over backwards not to do that sort of thing, and then we get a few that bend over forwards. If you get enough companies, you’re going to get a lot of forms of behaviour, and Greg does something about it, and I’ve generally been lax in doing something about it, but he’s done a way better job with that than I have. OK. Station 4.
我们有很多经理人会非常小心地避免任何可能被看作占公司便宜的事情，当然，也有少数人恰恰相反，总是往前凑着去占便宜。当你的公司数量足够多时，各种各样的行为都会出现。Greg 在这方面会采取行动，而我通常对这些事情比较宽松，但他在处理这些问题上做得比我好得多。好了，Station 4。
高高在上地说：“你们应该这样做”，这是非常重要的提醒。心理上想着占据高位是很难改变的，“文化继承者”的身份绑定或许是一种对冲，“或许”的意思是指责别人、纠正别人、对别人施加压力，这股压力本身从哪里来？
- 指责别人通常会强化自己的想法，而大部分想法都是部分事实、部分偏见的组合；
- 随着压力的增加，偏见相比于事实更容易、也更快速的增强。
想一想高能量的执行力是不是很适合“偏见”的生长？或许也跟噪音一样，找到自己擅长的事，跟噪音相关的注意力会自然消退，心理上占据高位的形式有很多，占据了“文化继承者”，这个位置又能够占据足够多的注意力，其他有害的风险就降低了。
Appendix.3.《2026-01-13 Warren Buffett.A Life and Legacy》
Warren Buffett:And Greg is the person to be running Berser right now and it was important that the board be 100% for him and that they uh they just forgot about me and just decided whether he was the right guy and of course uh the day after I announced it at the annual meeting we had a board meeting and whereas I'd plan to wait and give them a chance to because they the big question is how big a deal should they be able to do, for example, without getting the board's approval. That's that's the one that they all got stuck on, but they were fine with that on on the Sunday following the meeting on Saturday.
沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格是现在掌管伯克希尔（Berkshire）的合适人选，重要的是董事会要100%支持他，他们要……呃，忘掉我，只去判断他是否是合适的人选。当然，呃，我在年会上宣布此事的第二天，我们开了董事会。虽然我原本打算等等，给他们一个机会去讨论，因为最大的问题在于，例如在没有获得董事会批准的情况下，他应该有权做多大规模的交易。那是他们所有人都卡住的一点，但在周六会议之后的周日，他们对此都没有异议了。
Becky Quick:So, meaning they signed off on Greg's ability to...
贝基·奎克：所以，这意味着他们认可了格雷格的能力去……
Warren Buffett:Well, they they basically did. Yeah, they there and uh they just all ended up in agreement and Steve B finally said you know we we don't need sit around for three months and pier our naval or anything on this is the right decision and so they voted to do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，他们基本上认可了。是的，在那儿，呃，他们最终都达成了一致。史蒂夫·伯克（Steve Burke）最后说，你知道，我们不需要在这儿干坐三个月，在这件事上优柔寡断，这是一个正确的决定。于是他们投票通过了。
Becky Quick:Meaning what that Greg can do I mean that was always that's always been one of the huge powerful things of Bergkshire that if a company comes to it it it has the cash to do a deal it can promise on a handshake because of the authority you've always had with it and it can make really really big deals happen very quickly. Greg still has that same authority.
贝基·奎克：这就是说格雷格能做……我的意思是，这一直是伯克希尔巨大且强有力的一点：如果一家公司找上门来，伯克希尔有现金做交易，它可以握手为盟做出承诺，因为你一直拥有这种权威，这让非常非常大的交易能迅速达成。格雷格仍然拥有同样的权威吗？
Warren Buffett:He he will he will have a lot of authority. But the fact that I'm sitting there means I think that you know it's okay with me and they'll get used to it at uh...
沃伦·巴菲特：他……他会有很大的权威。但我还坐在那个位置上（指董事会主席），意味着我认为——你知道，这对我来说没问题，他们也会在……呃，习惯这一点的。
*****
Becky Quick:I want to go back to being on stage when you were about to surprise the world and Greg Ael, right, by telling them that he was going to be named the CEO come January 1st? Um, were you anxious about telling the world? Had you figured out what you were going to say? Why why do it as a surprise like that?
贝基·奎克：我想回到你在台上的那一刻，当你准备给世界和格雷格·阿贝尔一个惊喜，对吧，告诉他们他将在1月1日被任命为CEO？嗯，你对向世界宣布这件事感到焦虑吗？你想好要怎么说了吗？为什么，为什么要做成那样一个惊喜？
Warren Buffett:Oh, I I kind of like it. Tomorrow we're having a board meeting of Bergkshire and we have 11 directors. Two of the directors who are my children. Uh how and Susie know of what I'm going to talk about there. The rest of them this will come as news to.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我，我有点喜欢这样。明天我们要召开伯克希尔的董事会会议，我们有11位董事。其中两位董事是我的孩子。呃，豪伊和苏西知道我要在那里谈什么。对其他人来说，这将是新闻。
Warren Buffett:Uh, but I think it it's uh the time has arrived where Greg should become the chief executive officer of the company at year end. I' I've had a few surprises over the years that that and I may be I may not be done yet, but uh don't expect too many, but I had not written out any statement.
沃伦·巴菲特：呃，但我认为，呃，时机已经成熟，格雷格应该在年底成为公司的首席执行官。这些年来我制造过一些惊喜，也许我还没做完呢，但呃，别期待太多。但我并没有写下任何声明。
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