1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Wells Fargo

Refer To：《1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.

近乎懒散的沉稳依然是我们投资风格的基石：今年，对于我们的六大重仓股中的五只，我们既没有买入也没有卖出过一股。唯一的例外是 Wells Fargo，这是一家管理卓越、高回报的银行业务，我们将其持股比例增加到了略低于 10% 的水平，这是在未经 Federal Reserve Board 批准的情况下我们所能持有的最高限额。我们持仓中约六分之一是在 1989 年买入的，其余部分是在 1990 年买入的。

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity—a common ratio in this industry—mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the “institutional imperative:” the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

银行业并非我们的心头好。当资产是净资产的 20 倍时——这是该行业常见的比例——仅涉及一小部分资产的错误就可能摧毁大部分净资产。而在许多大银行中，错误一直是常态而非例外。大多数错误源于我们去年在讨论“制度性强制力（institutional imperative）”时描述的一种管理失败：即高管们倾向于盲目模仿同行的行为，无论这样做有多么愚蠢。在贷款方面，许多银行家以旅鼠般的狂热玩着“跟随领导者”的游戏；现在，他们正经历着旅鼠般的命运。

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a “cheap” price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

由于 20:1 的杠杆放大了管理优势和劣势的影响，我们对以“便宜”的价格购买管理不善的银行股票没有兴趣。相反，我们唯一的兴趣是以公平的价格买入管理良好的银行。

银行因为高杠杆的内在属性很需要好的管理，但是银行的负债结构导致存款不能长期锁定，特别是出现急速变化的、系统性风险的时候，存款出现挤兑，贷款又不能同步收回，这也是中央银行和存款保险制度存在的原因，参考：《2018-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When we eventually experience a decline, it will be modest – at most 3% or so in any single year. Unlike bank deposits or life insurance policies containing surrender options, p/c float can’t be withdrawn. This means that p/c companies can’t experience massive “runs” in times of widespread financial stress, a characteristic of prime importance to Berkshire that we factor into our investment decisions.

至少在未来几年内，浮存金可能会缓慢增长。当我们最终经历浮存金下降时，降幅将是温和的——任何单一年份最多下降3%左右。与银行存款或包含退保选项的人寿保险保单不同，财产意外险的浮存金是不能被提取的。这意味着财产意外险公司在金融普遍承压时期不会经历大规模的“挤兑”，这一特性对伯克希尔至关重要，也是我们做投资决策时会考虑的因素。

Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.

查理和我绝不会以依赖陌生人善意的方式来运营伯克希尔——甚至也不会依赖那些自身可能面临流动性问题的朋友。在2008-2009年的危机期间，我们乐于持有美国国库券——大量的国库券——这使我们不必依赖银行或商业票据等金融资源。我们有意将伯克希尔打造成能够从容抵御经济中断的模式，包括像长期市场关闭这样的极端情况。

结构性的压力使贷款端倾向于短期滚动，这又造成注意力的偏差，银行在贷款端不关注贷款企业的本质，商业模式的缺陷会重塑参与其中的人的行为。因为钱是同质化的，且主要靠短期滚动来赚取利差，银行家们很容易沦为“交易员”而非“资本配置者”。他们不再关心借款企业的实质风险，只关心浮在表面的指标（抵押品够不够、下一期能不能续贷）。

巴菲特的评论中基本上把“制度性强制力（institutional imperative）”和银行业做了强关联，管理质量是银行业的关键因素。

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another—Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: “I’m no genius,” he said. “I’m smart in spots—but I stay around those spots.”)

对于 Wells Fargo，我们认为我们得到了业内最好的管理者 Carl Reichardt 和 Paul Hazen。在很多方面，Carl 和 Paul 的组合让我想起另一对搭档——Capital Cities/ABC 的 Tom Murphy 和 Dan Burke。首先，每一对组合都比其各部分之和更强大，因为每一位合伙人都理解、信任并钦佩对方。其次，这两个管理团队都给予能干的人丰厚的报酬，但都极其厌恶拥有超出需要的员工人数。第三，无论利润处于创纪录水平还是面临压力，两支团队都会同样积极地缩减成本。最后，两者都坚持自己理解的领域，让他们的能力而不是自我意识来决定他们的尝试。（IBM 的 Thomas J. Watson Sr. 也遵循同样的规则：“我不是天才，”他说，“我在某些方面很聪明——但我只待在那些领域周围。”）

检查的点：

NICO在1986-1999年让收入持续萎缩，因为定价纪律；Wells Fargo的Carl Reichardt在加州房地产泡沫期间拒绝跟风。这是Basic trust的直接证据——不需要同行认可来维持安全感。

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled—often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well—investors understandably concluded that no bank’s numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

我们在 1990 年对 Wells Fargo 的购买得益于银行股市场的混乱。这种乱局是理所应当的：昔日备受推崇的银行那些愚蠢的贷款决策月复一月地被公之于众。随着一笔又一笔巨额亏损被揭露——而且往往紧随管理层关于“一切安好”的保证之后——投资者理所当然地认为，没有任何一家银行的数据是值得信赖的。借着他们逃离银行股的机会，我们以 2.9 亿美元买入了 Wells Fargo 10% 的权益，这还不到其税后收益的五倍，不到其税前收益的三倍。

Wells Fargo is big—it has $56 billion in assets—and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.

Wells Fargo 规模庞大——它拥有 560 亿美元的资产——且净资产收益率一直超过 20%，资产回报率为 1.25%。我们购买该银行十分之一的股份，可以大致等同于我们买下了一家具有相同财务特征、资产规模为 50 亿美元银行的 100% 股权。但如果我们真的去进行这样一笔收购，我们需要支付的金额大约是投资 Wells Fargo 所花的 2.9 亿美元的两倍。此外，那家开出溢价的高价银行还会给我们带来另一个问题：我们无法找到一个 Carl Reichardt 来管理它。近年来，Wells Fargo 的高管比银行业中任何其他人都更受猎头青睐；然而，没有人能够挖走这位“院长”。

Of course, ownership of a bank—or about any other business—is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic—the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market’s major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.

当然，拥有一家银行——或几乎任何其他业务——都绝非没有风险。California 的银行面临着大地震的特定风险，地震可能给借款人造成足够的破坏，进而摧毁向他们提供贷款的银行。第二个风险是系统性的——即可能发生极其严重的经济萎缩或金融恐慌，以至于几乎危及所有高杠杆机构，无论其经营得多么明智。最后，市场目前主要的担忧是，由于过度建设，West Coast 的房地产价值将会暴跌，并给资助了这一扩张的银行带来巨额损失。由于 Wells Fargo 是领先的房地产贷款人，它被认为特别脆弱。

None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank’s loans—not just its real estate loans—were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

这些可能性都不能被排除。然而，前两种情况发生的概率很低，即使房地产价值出现实质性下跌，也不太可能给管理良好的机构带来重大问题。考虑一下数学计算：Wells Fargo 目前在扣除超过 3 亿美元的贷款损失支出后，每年税前收入仍远超 10 亿美元。如果 1991 年该银行全部 480 亿美元贷款中的 10%——不仅仅是房地产贷款——出现问题，且这些问题导致的损失（包括利息损失）平均占本金的 30%，该公司也大约能达到盈亏平衡。

1、特定地区的风险；（2）金融危机的风险；（3）特定业务的风险，巴菲特的结论是前两者概率低，第三个风险真实但可以用数学测算承受能力。

可以相信前几大银行是“大而不倒”的，任何政府都很承受大型银行倒闭的风险，中国的银行更不担心前两者的风险，特别是第（2）点，大银行很难发生挤兑，可能都没有实施操作的方法。

但是对于新加坡的银行，比如，DBS，巴菲特列举的三个风险要真实的多。2023年硅谷银行（SVB）的崩溃是个可以参考的例子，由于持有大量长期国债，利率上升导致资产端浮亏，引起储户担忧后存款大规模流出，银行被迫在市场最差的时候贱卖长期资产，两边同时崩塌。

SVB 给了一个现代版本：数字化提款速度可以把“挤兑”从几天压缩到几小时——官方材料披露，2023-03-09 单日流出约 420 亿美元存款，且第二天还有大量提款指令排队；同时 90%+ 存款为未保险存款，先天更容易在恐慌中迁移。这也解释了为什么美国事后动用了系统性风险例外来保护未保险存款人，而中国的银行可能采用了成本更低的策略。

A year like that—which we consider only a low-level possibility, not a likelihood—would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new, panic prices.

像那样的一年——我们认为这只是一种极低的可能性，而非必然——并不会让我们感到困扰。事实上，在 Berkshire，我们非常乐意收购那些在一年内不产生回报、但随后预期能以不断增长的净资产获得 20% 回报的业务，或对其进行资本项目投资。尽管如此，由于担心 California 发生类似于 New England 经历过的房地产灾难，Wells Fargo 的股价在 1990 年的短短几个月内下跌了近 50%。即便我们在大跌前的价位已经买入了一些股份，我们依然对这种下跌表示欢迎，因为它使我们能够以全新的、惊恐的价格买入更多股份。

15%以上的ROE+可以不断投入新的资本，能够长期做到这两点估计不多。如果能找到一家银行，其管理层在过去的压力周期中展现出清晰的纪律——拒绝跟风扩张、主动收缩高风险业务、在同行贪婪时保守——那么这家银行长期15%+的ROE是可以持续的，而且每一元再投入的新资本都在以这个速率复利。

这种商业模式的内在价值增长率，等于ROE × 留存比率。如果DBS的ROE维持16%，留存60%利润，内在价值每年自然增长约9.6%，再加上分红，总回报不难超过12%。

Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore price increases. (It’s the seller of food who doesn’t like declining prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint—even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand—because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.

那些预期一生中会持续购买投资资产的投资者，应当对市场波动采取类似的态：然而，许多人却不合逻辑地在股价上涨时感到欣喜若狂，在股价下跌时感到闷闷不乐。他们在面对食物价格时却不会表现出这种困惑：因为知道自己永远是食物的购买者，他们欢迎价格下跌，而对价格上涨感到不满。（不喜欢价格下跌的是食物的卖方。）同样地，在 Buffalo News，我们会为新闻纸价格的下跌而欢呼——即便这意味着我们必须减记手头始终持有的大量新闻纸库存的价值——因为我们知道我们将永远购买这种产品。

Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire’s investments. We will be buying businesses—or small parts of businesses, called stocks—year in, year out as long as I live (and longer, if Berkshire’s directors attend the seances I have scheduled). Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and rising prices hurt us.

同样的逻辑指导着我们对 Berkshire 投资的思考。只要我活着（如果 Berkshire 的董事们能参加我安排的降神会，我活得还会更久），我们年复一年地购买企业——或者称为“股票”的企业小部分所有权。基于这些意愿，企业价格的下跌对我们有利，而价格的上涨则对我们有害。

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism—some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It’s optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

低价最常见的原因是悲观情绪——有时是普遍性的，有时是针对特定公司或行业的。我们希望在这种环境中开展业务，并不是因为我们喜欢悲观，而是因为我们喜欢它所产生的价格。乐观情绪才是理性买家的敌人。

None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What’s required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell’s observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: “Most men would rather die than think. Many do.”

然而，这并不意味着仅仅因为某项业务或股票不受欢迎，它就是一项明智的购买；逆向投资的方法与随大流的策略同样愚蠢。投资需要的是思考而非民意调查。遗憾的是，Bertrand Russell 对普通生活的观察在金融界有着异乎寻常的约束力：“大多数人宁愿死也不愿思考。事实上，很多人确实死了。”

1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Wells Fargo

1991-03-01 Warren Buffett.Wells Fargo

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