1992-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 1991 was $2.1 billion, or 39.6%. Over the last 27 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $6,437, or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.
1991年，我们的净资产增加了21亿美元，增幅为39.6%。在过去27年里（也就是自现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19美元增长到6,437美元，折合年复合增长率为23.7%。
The size of our equity capital—which now totals $7.4 billion—makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As Berkshire grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the company’s performance constantly shrinks. When we were working with capital of $20 million, an idea or business producing $1 million of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year. Now we need a $370 million idea (i.e., one contributing over $550 million of pre-tax profit) to achieve the same result. And there are many more ways to make $1 million than to make $370 million.
我们权益资本的规模——目前合计74亿美元——使得我们确定无疑地无法维持过去的增幅，甚至说，根本不可能接近那个水平。随着Berkshire不断变大，能够对公司业绩产生显著影响的机会集合在持续缩小。过去我们管理2,000万美元资本时，一个点子或一门业务若能产生100万美元利润，就能为当年的回报率增加5个百分点。现在，要达到同样效果，我们需要一个“3.7亿美元级别”的点子（也就是说，税前利润贡献要超过5.5亿美元）。而创造100万美元利润的办法，远比创造3.7亿美元利润的办法多得多。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, and I have set a goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire’s intrinsic value. If our growth in book value is to keep up with a 15% pace, we must earn $22 billion during the next decade. Wish us luck—we’ll need it.
Charlie Munger（Berkshire副董事长）和我设定了一个目标：让Berkshire的内在价值实现年均15%的增长。如果我们的账面价值增长要跟上15%的节奏，那么未来十年我们必须赚到220亿美元。祝我们好运——我们会需要它的。
Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the price-earnings ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks accounted for nearly $1.6 billion of our $2.1 billion growth in net worth last year. When we loaded up on Coke three years ago, Berkshire’s net worth was $3.4 billion; now our Coke stock alone is worth more than that.
1991年我们账面价值的超常增长，来自一种不太可能重演的现象：Coca-Cola和Gillette的市盈率大幅上升。这两只股票就贡献了我们去年21亿美元净资产增长中的将近16亿美元。三年前我们大举买入Coke时，Berkshire的净资产是34亿美元；而现在，仅我们持有的Coke股票的市值就已经超过了这个数字。
Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in the world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings in these stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however, the valuations of these two companies rose far faster than their earnings. In effect, we got a double-dip benefit, delivered partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the market’s reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal was warranted. But it can’t recur annually: We’ll have to settle for a single dip in the future.
Coca-Cola和Gillette是世界上最好的公司之二，我们预计它们未来几年盈利会以相当可观的速度增长。随着时间推移，我们在这些股票上的持仓价值也应该大体按比例增长。然而去年，这两家公司的估值上涨速度远远超过了盈利增长。实际上，我们吃到了“双层蘸酱”的好处：一部分来自出色的盈利增长，更大一部分来自市场对这些股票的重新定价。我们认为这种重新定价是合理的。但它不可能年年重来：未来我们只能满足于“单层蘸酱”了。
A Second Job
第二份工作
In 1989 when I—a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry Coke daily—announced our purchase of $1 billion worth of Coca-Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example of putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18 of last year, when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc, it was a different story: I put my mouth where our money was.
1989年，当我——一个每天快乐地喝掉五罐 Cherry Coke 的消费者——宣布我们买入价值10亿美元的 Coca-Cola 股票时，我把这笔行动形容为“把钱放到嘴边”的一个相当极端的例子。到了去年8月18日，我被推选为 Salomon Inc 的临时董事长时，故事就反过来了：这一次，我是“把嘴放到我们钱所在的地方”。
当时（1987年）重金押注Salomon（7亿美元，仅次于 Coca-Cola）是因为看好股市整体的上升趋势，但是押错了个股，参考：《1996-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the 9% dividend is currently quite attractive.
到目前为止，我们把 Salomon 优先股转换为普通股的选择权并没有体现出价值。并且，自从我承诺买入这只优先股以来，道琼斯工业指数翻了一倍，经纪券商板块表现也差不多。这意味着：我当初因为看中了转换期权的价值而选择 Salomon，这个决定必须被评为“很差”。即便如此，在一些艰难条件下，这只优先股仍作为固定收益工具持续兑现承诺，而其 9% 的股息率目前相当有吸引力。
You’ve all read of the events that led to my appointment. My decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but important message: Berkshire’s operating managers are so outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was spending at the company and yet remain confident that its economic progress would not skip a beat. The Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney (CEO of H.H. Brown, our latest acquisition, which I will describe later) are all masters of their operations and need no help from me. My job is merely to treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate. Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon.
你们都已经了解导致我获任命的那些事件。我决定接下这份工作，其中隐含着一个重要的信息：Berkshire 的经营管理者们足够出色，以至于我确信自己可以大幅减少投入在公司上的时间，而公司的经济进展依然不会有丝毫停顿。Blumkins、Friedman family、Mike Goldberg、Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey、Ralph Schey 以及 Frank Rooney（我们最新收购的 H.H. Brown 的 CEO，我会在后文介绍）都是各自业务的高手，完全不需要我去帮忙。我的工作只是公平地对待他们，并把他们创造出来的资本进行配置。而我在 Salomon 的工作并不会妨碍这两件事。
The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira, the one-time quarterback of the University of Miami, and his coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal line, Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver but found his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida linebacker. The right-handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to his other hand and threw the only left-handed pass of his life—for a touchdown. As the crowd erupted, Gustafson calmly turned to a reporter and declared: “Now that’s what I call coaching.”
Charlie 和我在各经营单位成功中所扮演的角色，可以用一个关于 George Mira（University of Miami 曾经的四分卫）以及他的教练 Andy Gustafson 的故事来说明。在对阵 Florida、接近对方达阵区的一次进攻中，Mira 后撤准备传球。他看见一名接球手处于空位，但他的右肩却被 Florida 的一名线卫死死抓住，怎么也挣脱不了。于是，惯用右手的 Mira 把球换到另一只手，用左手投出了他此生唯一一次左手传球——并且完成达阵。全场沸腾时，Gustafson 却淡定地转向记者说：“这才叫教练。”
“反讽式”的比喻：表面在夸教练，实质是在说——真正赢球的是球员，教练并没有做什么。
Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units, Berkshire’s performance is not affected if Charlie or I slip away from time to time. You should note, however, the “interim” in my Salomon title. Berkshire is my first love and one that will never fade: At the Harvard Business School last year, a student asked me when I planned to retire and I replied, “About five to ten years after I die.”
鉴于我们经营单位里拥有这些管理明星，Charlie 或我偶尔离开一段时间，并不会影响 Berkshire 的业绩。不过你们要注意我在 Salomon 的头衔里有“临时”（interim）二字。Berkshire 是我的第一挚爱，而且这份感情永远不会褪色：去年在 Harvard Business School，有个学生问我打算什么时候退休，我回答说：“大概在我去世后的五到十年。”
Sources of Reported Earnings
披露利润的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了 Berkshire 披露利润的主要来源。在这种呈现方式下，我们并不把 Goodwill 摊销以及其他重大“购买价会计调整”直接计入其对应的具体业务，而是把它们汇总起来单独列示。这样做可以让你看到：如果这些业务并非被我们收购，而是从一开始就属于我们，它们的利润本应如何被披露。我在以往的报告中解释过，为什么我们认为这种呈现方式对投资者和管理者更有用；相比之下，一般公认会计原则（GAAP）要求把购买价调整按业务逐一分摊。需要强调的是：表中所列示的“合计净利润”，当然与我们经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 合计数完全一致。
A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 33-47, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. However, we will not in this letter discuss each of our non-insurance operations, as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number—and will continue to grow—so it now makes sense to rotate coverage, discussing one or two in detail each year.
关于这些业务，还有大量补充信息列在第33至47页，你们也会在那里看到我们按 GAAP 口径披露的分部利润。不过，我们在这封信里不会像过去那样逐一讨论每一项非保险业务。我们的业务数量已经增长——而且还会继续增长——因此更合理的做法是轮换覆盖范围：每年挑一两项进行深入讨论。
“Look-Through” Earnings
“穿透式”（Look-Through）盈利
We’ve previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us.
我们以前讨论过“穿透式”盈利（look-through earnings）。它由三部分构成：（1）上一节披露的经营利润，加上；（2）我们主要被投资公司留存的经营利润——在GAAP会计处理下，这部分并不会反映在我们的利润中——再减去；（3）一项税负扣除：假设这些被投资公司留存利润不是留存、而是分配给我们，那么Berkshire将需要为此缴纳的税。
I’ve told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in 1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the identical 23% rate of gain recorded for book value.
我曾告诉你：若要让我们的内在商业价值以年均约15%的速度增长，那么从长期看，“穿透式”盈利也必须以大约15%的年增速增长。事实上，自现任管理层1965年接手以来，我们的“穿透式”盈利几乎以与账面价值相同的23%增速在增长。
Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow at all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year’s report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through earnings.
然而在去年，我们的“穿透式”盈利并没有增长，反而下降了14%。在一定程度上，这一下降是由我在去年报告中讨论过、并且提醒你们会对“穿透式”盈利产生负面影响的两股力量所触发的。
First, I told you that our media earnings—both direct and look-through—were “sure to decline” and they in fact did. The second force came into play on April 1, when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common. The after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about $45 million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination in 1991 of three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of look-through earnings on the common.
第一，我告诉你们我们的媒体业务盈利——无论直接盈利还是“穿透式”盈利——都“肯定会下降”，而事实也确实如此。第二股力量在4月1日开始发挥作用：由于我们持有的 Gillette 优先股被赎回（call），我们必须把它转换为普通股。我们在1990年从该优先股获得的税后收益约为4,500万美元；这个数额略高于我们在1991年所获得的组合收益：其中包括三个月的优先股股息，加上九个月普通股对应的“穿透式”盈利。
Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look-through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from the company were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I said that such a result at Wells was “a low-level possibility—not a likelihood.” Second, we recorded significantly lower—though still excellent—insurance profits.
还有两个我未曾预见的结果，也在1991年拖累了“穿透式”盈利。第一，我们在 Wells Fargo 的投资上得到的是“打平”的结果（我们从公司收到的股息，被其负的留存盈利所抵消）。去年我说过，在 Wells 出现这种结果属于“低概率的可能性——但不太可能”。第二，我们记录到显著更低的——尽管依然非常出色的——保险承保利润。
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6, mostly under “Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.”)
下表会向你展示我们如何计算“穿透式”盈利，不过我先提醒你：这些数字必然只能是非常粗略的估算。（这些被投资公司向我们支付的股息，已经计入第6页列示的经营利润中，主要归在“Insurance Group: Net Investment Income”之下。）
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We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on their own look-through earnings. To calculate these, they should determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares they hold in their portfolio and total these. The goal of each investor should be to create a portfolio (in effect, a “company”) that will deliver him or her the highest possible look-through earnings a decade or so from now.
我们也认为，投资者如果把注意力放在“自己的穿透式盈利”上，会受益匪浅。要计算它，投资者应当先算出：自己投资组合里每一只股票所对应、归属于自己持股份额的“底层盈利”，然后把这些加总起来。每位投资者的目标，应当是构建一个投资组合（本质上相当于一家“公司”），使其在十年左右之后能够为自己带来尽可能高的“穿透式盈利”。
An approach of this kind will force the investor to think about long-term business prospects rather than short-term stock market prospects, a perspective likely to improve results. It’s true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard for investment decisions is market price. But prices will be determined by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball, to put runs on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not the scoreboard.
这种方法会迫使投资者关注长期的企业经营前景，而不是短期的股市行情；而这种视角很可能会改善投资结果。当然，从长期来看，投资决策的“记分牌”确实是市场价格。但价格由未来的盈利决定。在投资中，就像在棒球比赛里一样：想把分数写到记分牌上，你必须盯着比赛场上发生了什么，而不是盯着记分牌本身。
做不到的都是神经病，神经病如此之多以至于脑子正常的被认为是“神经病”。
A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math
媒体经济学的变化，以及一点估值算术
In last year’s report, I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case: The economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate. In the business world, unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always clearer than the windshield: A few years back no one linked to the media business—neither lenders, owners nor financial analysts—saw the economic deterioration that was in store for the industry. (But give me a few years and I’ll probably convince myself that I did.)
在去年的报告中，我表达了一个看法：媒体公司的盈利能力下滑，既有周期性因素，也有结构性（长期趋势）因素。1991年的事件进一步加强了这一判断：随着零售模式改变、广告和娱乐选择大幅增加，昔日强大的媒体企业的经济实力仍在持续侵蚀。在商业世界里，不幸的是，后视镜永远比挡风玻璃更清晰：几年前，凡是与媒体行业有关的人——无论是放贷人、所有者还是金融分析师——都没有看见行业即将发生的经济恶化。（不过再给我几年时间，我大概也会说服自己：我当时看见了。）
The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their economic behavior. Let’s take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise, keeping in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle ground and can best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses.
事实是，报纸、电视和杂志这些资产，在经济行为上已经开始更像“生意”（business），而不是“特许经营”（franchise）。我们快速看看这两类企业的区分特征。当然也要记住：很多业务处在中间地带，最贴切的描述往往是“弱特许经营”或“强生意”。
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company’s ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise’s profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage.
所谓“经济意义上的特许经营”，来源于一种产品或服务，它：（1）被需要或被渴望；（2）在客户心中没有接近的替代品；（3）不受价格管制。这三项条件是否齐备，会通过一家公司能否经常性地对其产品或服务进行强势定价、并因此赚取高资本回报率而得到验证。更进一步，特许经营能够容忍管理不善：无能的经理人可能会降低特许经营的盈利能力，但无法造成致命伤害。
“特许经营”（franchise），可以和2007年股东信里的world-wide brand对比着看：
1、needed/desired
desired更容易理解，可以对应world-wide brand的心智份额（share of mind），(1) desired+(2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and+(3) is not subject to price regulation，三者是强关联的关系。
此处的needed可以对照巴菲特的实践，比如，（1）巧克力、可口可乐、冰淇淋（甜食，美好的感觉，needed）;(2) Gillette和几家鞋厂的对比（Gillette的刀片每天在脖子上做决策，鞋的“注意力密度”通常更低、更分散，巴菲特可能真的认为刀片上的承诺更有确定性，needed）；（3）Helzberg、Borsheim（跟承诺有关，desired）；（4）NetJets、AMEX（高端服务，身份的象征，desired）。
2、定价权
定价权是评估“特许经营”最重要的单一因素，参考：《2010-05-26 Warren Buffett.Interview With FCIC》。
WARREN BUFFETT:
There is no staff. I make all the investment decisions and I do all my own analysis. And basically it was an evaluation both of Dun and Bradstreet and Moody’s but of the economics of their business. And I never met with anybody. Dun and Bradstreet had a very good business and Moody’s had an even better business. And basically the single most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power. You’ve got the power to raise prices without losing business to a competitor, and you’ve got a very good business. And if you have to have a prayer session before raising the price by a tenth of a cent (laughs), then you got a terrible business. And I’ve been in both and I know the difference.
Warren Buffett：
没有什么团队。我做所有投资决策，也做所有分析。基本上，我评估的是 Dun and Bradstreet 与 Moody’s 的业务经济性（economics of their business）。而且我从未与任何人见面。Dun and Bradstreet 的生意非常好，而 Moody’s 的生意更好。说到底，评估一家企业时最重要的单一决策因素，就是定价权（pricing power）。如果你能提价而不把生意拱手让给竞争对手，那你就拥有一家非常好的企业。反过来，如果你每次把价格提高十分之一美分之前还得先开个祷告会（笑），那你拥有的就是一家糟糕的企业。我两种生意都做过，所以我知道其中区别。
“少变化、少杠杆、长期高ROE”是这类企业的综合表现。
3、可以经受糟糕的管理
商业模式本身就具备比较强的韧性，Coca-Cola和AMEX历史上都经历比较糟糕的管理，但都没有造成致命的伤害。
In contrast, “a business” earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management.
相对地，“生意”（business）只有在两种情况下才会获得超额利润：要么它是最低成本运营者，要么它所提供的产品或服务处在供给偏紧的状态，供给偏紧通常不会持续太久。即使在更优秀的管理下，一家公司也许能更长时间保持其最低成本地位，但即便如此，它仍会持续面临竞争对手的攻击风险。而且，“生意”不同于特许经营：糟糕的管理是可能把它“做死”的。
“生意”（business）对应2007年股东信里的lowcost producer，可以理解为从“特许经营”（franchise）滑落的状态，获得增长的主要方式是“拼”。
1、低成本的两种结果
（1）结构性的低成本优势
结构性的优势通常能保持很长的时间，比如，GEICO的直销，为什么竞争对手不能复制？通常跟惯性有关，也因为心理上的屏障；再比如，日本商社和中国国有企业的融资成本。这种优势最终需要体现在DCF，通常是市场份额的不断提升。
（2）滑落成为周期性的行业
周期性行业在计算DCF时不能考虑g（增长率），PE值给不高，如果数学期望值是10%，PE值超过10倍都是不合理的。
2、激烈的竞争和管理能力
相比于“特许经营”下的提价，成本节省的空间是有限的，增长主要依靠市场份额的提升（抢占别人的市场份额），要有一股子蛮劲，有比较强的执行力。
强竞争的商业模式非常考验管理能力：（1）最好能想出结构性的成本优势，能保持比较长的时间；（2）时刻保持聪明，保持强大的执行力，不进则退；（3）一旦跌下去很难再回来。
Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment (their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them. Unfortunately, demand can’t expand in response to this new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour day are all that’s available. The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some—though far from all—of its franchise strength.
直到不久以前，媒体资产具备特许经营的三项特征，因此既能强势定价，也能“松松垮垮”地管理。然而现在，寻找信息与娱乐的消费者（他们主要关心的是后者）在获取渠道上拥有大幅扩展的选择。遗憾的是，需求并不会因为供给增加而同步扩张：美国人的眼球总量就那么多——大约5亿只——一天也只有24小时可用。结果就是竞争加剧、市场被切碎，媒体行业失去了一部分——尽管远未失去全部——特许经营的力量。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The industry’s weakened franchise has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings. For an understanding of this phenomenon, let’s look at some much over-simplified, but relevant, math.
行业“特许经营”力量的削弱，对其价值的影响远远超过对当期盈利的直接冲击。要理解这种现象，我们来看一些大幅度过度简化但与问题相关的算术。
A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper, television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment of additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings, which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year. Say, next, that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay a whopping $25 million for a property with current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax multiplier of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.)
几年前的主流看法认为：一家报纸、电视或杂志资产会永远以大约每年6%的速度增长盈利，而且不需要额外投入资本。理由是折旧费用大体会与资本开支相当，而营运资金需求很小。因此，报表上的盈利（扣除无形资产摊销之前）也几乎等同于可自由分配的盈利。换句话说，拥有一家媒体资产，几乎可以被视为拥有一份“永续年金”，并且这份年金每年还会以6%的速度增长。接着，假设用10%的贴现率来计算这条盈利流的现值，那么你就会得出：对一家当前税后盈利为100万美元的媒体资产，支付高达2,500万美元是合理的。（税后25倍的乘数，大致相当于税前约16倍的乘数。）
25倍PE=4%+6%（增长）=10%。
Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million represents “normal earning power” and that earnings will bob around this figure cyclically. A “bob-around” pattern is indeed the lot of most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of retained earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of earnings, discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation. Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property’s valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times pre-tax earnings).
现在我们换一个假设：把这100万美元视为“正常盈利能力”，并且认为盈利会随经济周期在这个水平上下波动。“上下浮动”（bob-around）模式确实是大多数“生意”的宿命——它们的收入流只有在所有者愿意投入更多资本（通常以留存收益的形式）时才会增长。在这个修正后的假设下，同样的100万美元盈利，用同样10%的贴现率折现，对应的估值就是1,000万美元。于是，一个看似并不大的假设变化，就把该资产的估值降到了税后盈利10倍（或税前大约6.5倍）。
Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in the past caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property were expected to constantly grow (without the business requiring much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly fell in the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for media have moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified example illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations are revised.
无论这1美元来自媒体资产还是来自钢铁厂的经营，都是1美元。过去买家之所以愿意为“媒体的1美元盈利”付出远高于“钢铁的1美元盈利”的价格，是因为媒体资产的盈利被预期会持续增长（而且不需要太多额外资本），而钢铁的盈利显然属于“上下浮动”那一类。如今，市场对媒体的预期却已经向“上下浮动”模型靠拢。正如我们这个简化例子所示，一旦预期被修正，估值就必须发生剧烈变化。
从特许经营滑落、落入普通生意=失去有意义的增长，因为收入流只有在所有者愿意投入更多资本（通常以留存收益的形式）时才会增长，能增长和不能增长在估值上的差别很大。
We have a significant investment in media—both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC—and the intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. (Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings, but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our Business Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which we run Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses—or investee holdings that we have classified as permanent—simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did sell certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were relatively small.)
我们在媒体行业有相当大的投资——既包括直接拥有 Buffalo News，也包括持有 The Washington Post Company 与 Capital Cities/ABC 的股份——而由于该行业正在经历的结构性转型，这部分投资的内在价值已经显著下降。（周期性因素也损害了我们当期的“穿透式”盈利，但这些因素并不会降低内在价值。）不过，正如第2-3页我们的《经营原则》所写，Berkshire 的一条经营规则是：我们不会仅仅因为看到了在其他地方更有利的用钱方式，就出售我们拥有的企业——或我们已归类为“永久持有”的被投资公司股权。（我们确实在较早时期卖出过一些其他媒体持股，但那些规模相对较小。）
从一开始就为这样的结果留出空间，这是必然会出现的结果，有两个理由：
（1）从容面对好过于匆匆忙忙，在内部造成紧张氛围会损害企业文化；
（2）“Water the flowers and skip over the weeds.”，任何时候都应该抓住关键问题，注意力留给鲜花而不是野草。
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey’s leadership, has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed. In particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980’s period in which purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold. As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned media companies, our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net income.
我们遭受的内在价值损失之所以被部分抵消，是因为 Buffalo News 在 Stan Lipsey 的领导下表现远好于多数报纸公司，而且 Cap Cities 与 Washington Post 的管理也异常出色。尤其值得一提的是：在上世纪80年代末那段时期，媒体资产的买家经常支付非理性的高价，而这两家公司当时选择了按兵不动。此外，Cap Cities 与 Washington Post 的负债都很少，而且它们持有的现金大体可以抵消这些负债。因此，它们资产价值的收缩并没有被杠杆效应进一步放大。在上市媒体公司中，我们这两家被投资公司几乎是仅有的基本无债公司。其他大多数公司则因为激进收购政策与盈利下滑的双重作用，债务已膨胀到相当于其当前净利润的五倍甚至更高。
杠杆只是加速器，如果相信自己肯定会赢，应该享受过程而不是想着加速。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof franchises and cornucopian economics.
Cap Cities 与 Washington Post 强健的资产负债表和强大的管理层，使我们持有它们比持有任何其他媒体公司都更安心。此外，大多数媒体资产依然拥有远好于美国平均企业的经济特性。但那种“子弹打不穿的特许经营”与“聚宝盆般的经济学”的时代已经一去不复返了。
Twenty Years in a Candy Store
糖果店里的二十年
We’ve just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January 3, 1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it) bought control of See’s Candy Shops, a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal price that the sellers were asking—calculated on the 100% ownership we ultimately attained—was $40 million. But the company had $10 million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was $30 million. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative of the value of an economic franchise, looked at the company’s mere $7 million of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high as we would go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.
我们刚刚跨过一个里程碑：20年前的1972年1月3日，Blue Chip Stamps（当时是Berkshire的关联公司，后来并入Berkshire）买下了 See’s Candy Shops 的控股权——这是一家位于西海岸、生产并零售盒装巧克力的企业。卖方提出的名义价格——按我们最终获得的100%股权计算——是4,000万美元。但公司账上有1,000万美元的多余现金，因此真实的要约价格是3,000万美元。Charlie 和我当时还没有充分理解“经济特许经营”的价值，只盯着公司区区700万美元的有形净资产，于是说我们最多只能出到2,500万美元（而且我们是认真的）。幸运的是，卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from $102.5 million in 1972 to $1.2 million in 1991. But See’s candy sales in the same period increased from $29 million to $196 million. Moreover, profits at See’s grew even faster than sales, from $4.2 million pre-tax in 1972 to $42.4 million last year.
此后，Blue Chip 的交易印花（trading stamps）销售额从1972年的1.025亿美元下降到1991年的120万美元。但在同一时期，See’s 的糖果销售额却从2,900万美元增长到1.96亿美元。更重要的是，See’s 的利润增长速度甚至快于销售额：从1972年税前420万美元增长到去年的4,240万美元。
For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must be compared with the incremental capital investment required to produce it. On this score, See’s has been astounding: The company now operates comfortably with only $25 million of net worth, which means that our beginning base of $7 million has had to be supplemented by only $18 million of reinvested earnings. Meanwhile, See’s remaining pre-tax profits of $410 million were distributed to Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies to deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most sense.
要正确评估利润的增长，必须把它与为实现这份增长所需要的“增量资本投入”进行对照。从这个角度看，See’s 的表现堪称惊人：公司如今只需2,500万美元的净资产就能从容运转，这意味着我们最初的700万美元基础，只需要再补充1,800万美元的再投资收益即可。与此同时，See’s 在这20年里剩余的税前利润4.10亿美元，都以分红方式分配给了 Blue Chip/Berkshire，让这两家公司在缴税之后可以把资金投向任何最合算的用途。
In our See’s purchase, Charlie and I had one important insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing power. Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was not derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price. Second, we found Chuck Huggins, then See’s executive vice-president, whom we instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the purchase was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation arrangement—conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a written contract—that remains unchanged to this day.
在收购 See’s 这笔交易中，Charlie 和我有一个重要洞见：我们看到了这门生意尚未充分释放的“提价能力”。除此之外，我们还两次走运。第一，交易没有因为我们愚蠢地坚持2,500万美元价格而被搅黄。第二，我们找到了当时担任 See’s 执行副总裁的 Chuck Huggins，并立刻让他负责全局。我们在业务与个人层面与 Chuck 的相处都非常出色。举一个例子：收购完成时，我们与 Chuck 仅靠握手就敲定了一个薪酬安排——大约五分钟想出来、从未写成合同——直到今天仍一字不改、原封不动。
In 1991, See’s sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of that slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits. Despite the weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax profit margin was a record 21.6%.
1991年，See’s 的销售额（按美元计）与1990年持平；但按磅数计算，销量下降了4%。所有下滑都发生在年末两个月——而这段时期通常贡献全年利润的80%以上。尽管销售疲弱，去年的利润仍增长了7%，税前利润率更是创下21.6%的纪录。
相比销量，提价是更重要的能力，过去20年，销量增长了6.76倍；利润增长了10.10倍，不能提价或者提价能力不够还想获得增长只有一个办法：抢占别人的市场份额，结果就是竞争。
Almost 80% of See’s sales come from California and our business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however, was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7%-8% (depending on the county involved) on “snack food” that was deemed applicable to our candy.
See’s 近80%的销售来自 California，而我们的生意显然受到了经济衰退的冲击——这次衰退在年末对该州打击尤为严重。不过还有一个不利因素：California 在年中开始对被认定为适用于糖果的“snack food”征收7%—8%的销售税（具体税率取决于所在县）。
Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will enjoy California’s classifications of “snack” and “non-snack” foods:
热衷于研究“认识论微妙差别”的股东，会喜欢 California 对“snack”和“non-snack”食品的分类：
What—you are sure to ask—is the tax status of a melted Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does it more resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the sun? It’s no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California’s State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill but must now administer it, has said: “I came to this job as a specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should have elected Julia Child.”
你们一定会问：一根融化了的 Milky Way 冰淇淋棒，该按什么税目征税？在那种“雌雄同体”的形态下，它更像一根冰淇淋棒，还是更像一根被太阳晒化了的糖棒？难怪 California 的 State Board of Equalization 主席 Brad Sherman（他当初反对这项“snack food”法案，但如今必须负责执行）会说：“我来做这份工作时，是个税法专家。现在我发现，我的选民当初该选 Julia Child 才对。”
Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our association with Chuck and See’s. The obvious ones are that we’ve earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process. Equally important, ownership of See’s has taught us much about the evaluation of franchises. We’ve made significant money in certain common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See’s.
Charlie 和我有很多理由为能与 Chuck 和 See’s 结缘而心怀感激。显而易见的理由是：我们获得了非同寻常的回报，而且整个过程也很愉快。同样重要的是，拥有 See’s 的经历让我们在评估“特许经营”方面学到了很多。正因为从 See’s 学到的这些教训，我们在某些普通股上赚到了相当可观的钱。
H. H. Brown
We made a sizable acquisition in 1991—the H. H. Brown Company—and behind this business is an interesting history. In 1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for $10,000 and began a 62-year career of running it. (He also found time for other pursuits: At age 90 he was still joining new golf clubs.) By Mr. Heffernan’s retirement in early 1990 H. H. Brown had three plants in the United States and one in Canada; employed close to 2,000 people; and earned about $25 million annually before taxes.
1991年我们做了一笔重要收购——H. H. Brown Company——而这门生意背后有一段有意思的历史。1927年，一位29岁的商人 Ray Heffernan 以1万美元买下了当时位于 Massachusetts 州 North Brookfield 的这家公司，并由此开始了长达62年的经营生涯。（他也为其他爱好挤出时间：90岁时他仍在加入新的高尔夫俱乐部。）到1990年初 Heffernan 先生退休时，H. H. Brown 在美国有三家工厂，在 Canada 有一家；雇员接近2,000人；税前利润每年约2,500万美元。
Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray’s daughters, married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might have about working for his father-in-law. That was one of Mr. Heffernan’s few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of Melville Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss, from 1964 through 1986, Melville’s earnings averaged more than 20% on equity and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from $16 to $960. And a few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill, asked him to run Brown.
在这个过程中，Ray 的女儿之一 Frances Heffernan 嫁给了 Frank Rooney。婚前，Heffernan 先生严厉告诫 Frank：最好把“给岳父打工”的念头彻底忘掉。这是 Heffernan 先生为数不多的错误之一：Frank 后来成为 Melville Shoe（现为 Melville Corp.）的 CEO。在他担任老板的23年里（1964至1986年），Melville 的股东权益回报率平均超过20%，其股票（已按拆股调整）从16美元涨到960美元。而在 Frank 退休几年后，Heffernan 先生病重，便请他来掌管 Brown。
After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to sell the company—and here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to a major investment banker, which failed also to think of us. But last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who is always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company should be right up Berkshire’s alley, and Frank promptly gave me a call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and before long it was done.
Heffernan 先生于1990年末去世后，家族决定出售公司——而我们在这里走了好运。我认识 Frank 有几年了，但关系还不够近，不足以让他把 Berkshire 当作潜在买家。他把出售 Brown 的任务交给了一家大型投行，而那家投行也没想到我们。但去年春天，Frank 在 Florida 与 John Loomis 一起打高尔夫。John 是我多年的老友，也是 Berkshire 股东，而且总在留意有什么生意适合我们。听说 Brown 即将出售，John 告诉 Frank 这家公司“很对 Berkshire 的胃口”，Frank 随即给我打了电话。我立刻觉得这笔交易能成，没过多久就办妥了。
Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank’s willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be “hired” in the normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a concert hall in which business artists of this class will wish to perform.
我之所以对这次收购格外热情，很大一部分原因在于 Frank 愿意继续担任 CEO。和我们大多数经理人一样，他并不需要为了钱而工作，但他之所以继续干，是因为他热爱这场“比赛”，也喜欢把事情做到出类拔萃。这类经理人并不能用通常意义上的“雇佣”方式获得。我们必须做的，是提供一座音乐厅，让这类商业艺术家愿意登台演出。
Brown (which, by the way, has no connection to Brown Shoe of St. Louis) is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business—of the billion pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85% are imported —and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly. The wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes inventories to be heavy; substantial capital is also tied up in receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding managers like Frank and the group developed by Mr. Heffernan can prosper.
Brown（顺便说一句，它与 St. Louis 的 Brown Shoe 毫无关系）是北美领先的工作鞋与工装靴制造商，并且长期以来在销售与资产上都能赚到异常优异的利润率。鞋业是个艰难的行业——美国每年购买的约10亿双鞋中，大约85%依赖进口——行业里大多数制造商都经营得很差。由于生产商提供的款式与尺码组合极其繁多，库存往往很重；同时，应收账款也会占用大量资本。在这种环境里，只有像 Frank 以及 Heffernan 先生培养出来的团队那样卓越的管理者，才能做得好、做得久。
商业模式一般，需要重点考察Right People的关键因素：able and trustworthy，家族企业对trustworthy的影响比较大，足够长的时间才能在脑回路中跑出足够稳定的轨道。
A distinguishing characteristic of H. H. Brown is one of the most unusual compensation systems I’ve encountered—but one that warms my heart: A number of key managers are paid an annual salary of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of the profits of the company after these are reduced by a charge for capital employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don’t walk the walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that are long on carrots but short on sticks (and that almost invariably treat equity capital as if it were cost-free). The arrangement at Brown, in any case, has served both the company and its managers exceptionally well, which should be no surprise: Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on.
H. H. Brown 有一个显著特征：我见过的薪酬体系里，它算得上最不寻常之一——而且它特别合我心意。公司有一批关键经理人的年薪是7,800美元；在此基础上，再加上一项“指定比例”的利润分成——但这项利润必须先扣除一笔“已投入资本的费用”（charge for capital employed）后才能计算分成。因此，这些经理人是真正站在所有者的立场上行事。相比之下，大多数经理人口头上说得漂亮，却不愿真按所有者的方式去做；他们偏爱那种“胡萝卜很多、棍子很少”的薪酬体系（而且几乎总把股东权益资本当作“免费资金”）。无论如何，Brown 的这套安排对公司与经理人都极其有效——这并不奇怪：愿意在自己能力上重点下注的经理人，通常也确实有足够的能力值得下注。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It’s discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us—and therefore repeat here what we’re looking for:
令人沮丧的是：尽管我们曾四次完成由知名投行代表卖方的重大公司收购，但其中只有一次是投行主动联系了我们。其余三次，都是在投行已经按自己的方式去联系潜在买家之后，由我本人或朋友在某个时点主动发起并推动了交易。我们非常希望看到中介能通过“想到我们”来赚取应得的费用——因此我们在此再次重申我们想要的是什么：
1.Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
大型收购（税后盈利至少1,000万美元），
2.Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
经证实的、持续稳定的盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，也不对“扭亏为盈/重整”（turnaround）情形感兴趣），
3.Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
企业能取得良好的股东权益回报率，同时几乎不用债或完全不用债，
4.Management in place (we can’t supply it),
管理层已在位（我们无法提供管理团队），
5.Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
业务简单（如果技术含量很高，我们就看不懂），
6.An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
给出一个要约价格（如果价格未知，我们不想浪费自己的时间，也不想浪费卖方的时间，即使只是初步聊一聊交易也不行）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer—customarily within five minutes—as to whether we’re interested. (With Brown, we didn’t even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并且会非常快速地给出答复——通常在五分钟内——告诉你我们是否有兴趣。（收购 Brown 时，我们连五分钟都用不上。）我们更喜欢用现金收购，但在我们“拿到的内在商业价值不低于我们付出的内在商业价值”时，也会考虑发行股票。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer’s and Borsheim’s. In cases like these, the company’s owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最喜欢的收购形式，是符合我们收购 Nebraska Furniture Mart、Fechheimer’s 和 Borsheim’s 时的那种模式：在这种情况下，公司的“所有者兼经营者”希望套现一大笔资金——有时是给自己，但更多时候是为了家族成员或不参与经营的股东。同时，这些经营者又希望自己仍然是重要股东，并继续像过去那样经营公司。我们认为，对于具有这类目标的所有者来说，我们能提供非常匹配的方案；并且我们邀请潜在卖家去“核实我们”，方法是联系那些过去与我们做过生意的人。
全资收购的主要目标是家族企业。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: “When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”
Charlie 和我经常收到一些并购建议，但这些标的离我们的标准差得很远：我们发现，如果你公开表示想买一只 collies（苏格兰牧羊犬），就会有很多人打电话来，希望把他们的 cocker spaniels（可卡犬）卖给你。一句乡村歌曲恰好表达了我们对新项目、重整型交易或拍卖式出售的感受：“当电话不响的时候，你就知道那是我。”
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.
除了对上述那类企业收购感兴趣之外，我们也对“协商谈判式”买入大额、但不取得控制权的股票块感兴趣——类似于我们在 Capital Cities、Salomon、Gillette、USAir、Champion 和 American Express 的持股。至于让我们在公开市场里按一般意义去买股票的建议，我们则不感兴趣。
Insurance Operations
保险业务
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
下面所示，是我们惯常用于展示财产意外险（property-casualty）行业关键指标的表格的更新版本：
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107—111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合成本率（combined ratio）表示保险总成本（已发生损失加上费用）相对于保费收入的比例：低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100意味着承保亏损。比率越高，年份越糟。当把保险公司因持有投保人资金（即“浮存金”（the float））而获得的投资收益计入后，综合成本率通常在107—111区间时，整体结果大致会打平——这里的“打平”不包括股东提供资金所产生的收益。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount.
基于以往报告中阐述的原因，我们预计行业的已发生损失（incurred losses）即使在总体通胀明显更低的时期，也会以接近每年10%的速度增长。（过去25年里，已发生损失的实际增速甚至更快，达到11%。）因此，如果与此同时保费增长明显落后于这10%的增速，承保亏损就会扩大。
However, the industry’s tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time—and that could well describe the situation last year. Though premiums did not come close to growing 10%, the combined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved. Loss-reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that outcome, and it may turn out that 1991’s ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the long run, of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously-ill patient who tells his doctor: “I can’t afford the operation, but would you accept a small payment to touch up the x-rays?”
不过，当经营环境转差时，行业往往倾向于“少提准备金”（under-reserve），这可能会在一段时间内掩盖真实情况——而去年很可能就是如此。尽管保费增长远未接近10%，综合成本率却没有像我预期的那样恶化，反而略有改善。行业的赔付准备金数据表明，我们有理由对这一结果保持怀疑：1991年的比率最终可能会被证明本应比报告出来的更糟。从长期看，用会计手法粉饰经营问题的管理层，当然终究会遇到麻烦。这类管理层最终会得到和那个重病患者同样的结果——他对医生说：“我负担不起手术，但你能不能收点小钱，帮我把X光片修一修？”
Berkshire’s insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios, our own or the industry’s, largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the “cost of funds developed from insurance,” or in the vernacular, “the cost of float.”
Berkshire 的保险业务已经发生了变化，以至于无论是我们的综合成本率还是行业的综合成本率，对我们业绩的解释都在很大程度上变得无关紧要。对我们真正重要的是“从保险业务中形成的资金成本”，用更通俗的话说，就是“浮存金的成本”（the cost of float）。
Float—which we generate in exceptional amounts—is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
浮存金（float）——而我们能以非同寻常的规模创造它——指的是：赔付准备金（loss reserves）＋理赔费用准备金（loss adjustment expense reserves）＋未到期保费准备金（unearned premium reserves），再减去：代理人余额（agents balances）－预付取得成本（prepaid acquisition costs）－与分入再保险相关的递延费用（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。而浮存金的成本，则由我们的承保亏损来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.
下表展示了自我们1967年进入该业务以来的浮存金成本。
As you can see, our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U. S. Government’s cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in fact beat the government’s rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow; the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.
正如你们所见，1991年我们的资金成本远低于美国政府新发行长期国债的融资成本。事实上，在我们进入保险业的25年中，有20年我们的资金成本都低于政府利率，而且往往低出很大一截。在这段时间里，我们持有的资金规模也大幅增加——这本身是件好事，但之所以是好事，只是因为我们的资金成本一直令人满意。我们的浮存金（float）应当还会继续增长；真正的挑战在于：如何以合理的成本获得这些资金。
Berkshire continues to be a very large writer—perhaps the largest in the world—of “super-cat” insurance, which is coverage that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are enormously volatile. As I mentioned last year, $100 million in super-cat premiums, which is roughly our annual expectation, could deliver us anything from a $100 million profit (in a year with no big catastrophe) to a $200 million loss (in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes and/or earthquakes come along).
Berkshire 仍是“超级巨灾”（super-cat）保险的超大型承保人——也许是全世界最大的之一。这类保险是其他保险公司为了保护自身免受重大灾难性损失而购买的保障。这个业务的利润波动极其剧烈。正如我去年提到的那样，我们每年大致预期能收到约1亿美元的 super-cat 保费，而这1亿美元在不同年份可能带来从1亿美元利润（没有大灾的年份）到2亿美元亏损（碰上两场大飓风和/或大地震的年份）之间的任何结果。
We price this business expecting to pay out, over the long term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given year, however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAAP accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe-free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited to the nature of this business—and that is a reality you should be aware of when you assess our annual results.
我们给这类业务定价时的长期预期是：最终赔付出去的金额大约会占我们收到保费的90%。但在任何单一年份里，我们看起来要么会“赚得离谱”，要么会“亏得离谱”。这在一定程度上是因为 GAAP 会计不允许我们在“无灾之年”为那些必定会在其他年份发生的损失预先计提准备金。换句话说，一年的会计周期并不适合这类业务的本质——而当你评估我们的年度业绩时，必须把这一现实放在心上。
10%的数学期望值。
Last year there appears to have been, by our definition, one super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about 25% of our policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting profit from our catastrophe business to have been about $11 million. (You may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest catastrophe in 1991: It was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the industry an insured loss now estimated at about $4-$5 billion. At the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)
按我们的定义，去年似乎只发生了一次 super-cat，但它只会触发我们大约25%保单的赔付。因此，我们目前估计：1991年我们的巨灾业务承保利润约为1,100万美元。（你也许会惊讶于1991年“最大灾难”的身份：既不是 Oakland 大火，也不是 Hurricane Bob，而是日本在9月遭遇的一场台风。它造成行业的已保险损失目前估计约为40亿—50亿美元。按较高的估计，这场台风的损失将超过此前的纪录保持者 Hurricane Hugo。）
Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural catastrophes. In the 1980’s much of this reinsurance was supplied by “innocents”—that is, by insurers that did not understand the risks of the business—but they have now been financially burned beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often when I was personally running the insurance operation.) Insurers, though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes. At some point—probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years—innocents will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge to silly levels.
无论是海难、空难，还是自然灾害，保险公司始终都需要巨量的再保险保护。上世纪80年代，这些再保险中有很大一部分由“无辜者”（innocents）提供——也就是那些并不理解该业务风险的保险公司——但他们现在已在财务上被烧得“面目全非”。（而在我亲自经营保险业务的时期，Berkshire 自己也曾多次当过这种“无辜者”。）不过，保险公司和投资者一样，最终都会重复自己的错误。在某个时点——很可能是在连续几年灾难稀少之后——“无辜者”会再次出现，super-cat 保单的价格也会跌到荒唐的水平。
As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however, we will be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing this product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that when “the big one” comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some reinsurers can say what Jackie Mason does: “I’m fixed for life—as long as I don’t buy anything.”) Berkshire’s ability to fulfill all its commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is unquestioned.
只要表面上看起来仍然“够用”的费率存在，我们就会继续作为 super-cat 保障的重要参与者。在销售这一产品时，我们因为卓越的财务实力而拥有显著的竞争优势。懂行的保险公司知道：当“那个大的”（the big one）真的来临时，许多再保险公司在承保时觉得轻松，到要开支票时就会觉得艰难。（有些再保险公司可以像 Jackie Mason 说的那样：“我这辈子都稳了——只要我什么也不买。”）而 Berkshire 在极端逆境下仍能履行全部承诺的能力，从未有人质疑。
Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with this operation since he took charge and it has become a very valuable asset, albeit one that can’t be appraised with any precision.
总体而言，保险业务为 Berkshire 提供了最大的机会。Mike Goldberg 自接手以来在这项业务上创造了奇迹，它已成为一项非常有价值的资产——尽管这种价值无法被精确评估。
Marketable Common Stocks
可交易普通股
On the next page we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下一页我们列出了市值超过1亿美元的普通股持仓。其中有一小部分投资属于那些 Berkshire 持股比例并非100%的子公司。
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the other seven stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage (“Freddie Mac”), in which our shareholdings increased slightly. Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in check, I suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned “idle rich” have received a bad rap: They have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the “energetic rich”—aggressive real estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc.—have seen their fortunes disappear.)
照例，这份名单体现了我们“Rip Van Winkle”式的投资方法。Guinness 是一个新仓位。但另外七只股票我们一年前就持有了（考虑到我们把 Gillette 的持仓从优先股转换为普通股这一变化），其中六只我们持股数量完全没变。唯一的例外是 Federal Home Loan Mortgage（“Freddie Mac”），我们的持股略有增加。我们这种“原地不动”的行为，反映了我们的看法：股票市场就像一个“搬迁中心”，资金从“积极的人”流向“耐心的人”。（我半开玩笑地说，最近发生的一些事情表明：长期以来被贬低的“闲散富人”（idle rich）其实背了黑锅——他们的财富得以保持甚至增长；而许多“精力旺盛的富人”（energetic rich）——激进的房地产操盘手、企业收购者、石油钻探者等等——却眼看着自己的财富灰飞烟灭。）
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire’s first significant investment in a company domiciled outside the United States. Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense of where they earn their profits—continent-by-continent—Coca-Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you’ll never get their drinks confused—and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp.)
我们持有 Guinness，代表了 Berkshire 第一次对一家注册地在美国之外的公司进行重大投资。不过，Guinness 的赚钱方式与 Coca-Cola 和 Gillette 颇为相似——这两家虽然是美国公司，但它们的大部分利润来自国际业务。事实上，从利润来源的地域分布——按洲来看——Coca-Cola 与 Guinness 展现出很强的相似性。（不过你绝不会把它们的饮料搞混——而你们的董事长仍坚定不移地站在 Cherry Coke 阵营。）
We continually search for large businesses with understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that are run by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus doesn’t guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business performance from our companies that validates our assessment. But this investment approach—searching for the superstars—offers us our only chance for real success. Charlie and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think many others can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name “investors” to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.
我们持续寻找规模足够大、经济特性易理解、能持久、而且“让人口水直流”的企业——它们由能干且以股东利益为导向的管理层经营。这样的聚焦并不保证结果：我们既要以合理价格买入，也要让企业经营表现验证我们的判断。但这种投资方法——寻找“超级明星”——是我们实现真正成功的唯一机会。考虑到我们操作的资金规模，Charlie 和我并没有聪明到能够通过灵巧地买卖一堆远谈不上伟大的企业的“碎片”，就取得很好的结果。我们也不认为有多少人能够靠着在花丛间飞来飞去，获得长期投资成功。事实上，我们认为把那些频繁交易的机构称为“投资者”，就像把一个不断进行一夜情的人称作“浪漫主义者”一样荒唐。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the long-term economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult, why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to say “the real thing.”) Our motto is: “If at first you do succeed, quit trying.”
假如我能选择的商业机会仅限于 Omaha 的私人公司，那么我会：第一，评估每家企业的长期经济特性；第二，评估负责经营的人的素质；第三，以合理价格买入其中少数最好的企业。我当然不会想把全城每一家企业都平均持有一份。那么，当 Berkshire 面对更大的上市公司宇宙时，为什么反而要采用不同策略？而且，既然找到伟大的企业与杰出的管理者如此困难，我们又为什么要丢掉已经验证过的“好产品”？（我差点想说“the real thing”。）我们的座右铭是：“如果你一开始就成功了，那就别再折腾了。”
如果事后看已经以相对好的价值买入伟大的企业，卖掉再换一家新企业是有问题的。
John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: “As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. . . . One’s knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence.”
John Maynard Keynes，这位在实践投资上的才华与他在思想领域的才华同样耀眼的人，在1934年8月15日写给一位商业伙伴 F. C. Scott 的信中，把道理讲得一清二楚：“随着时间推移，我越来越确信，投资的正确方法，是把相当大的一笔钱投入到那些你自认为多少懂一点、而且你对其管理层完全信任的企业里。以为把资金过度分散到一堆你知之甚少、也没有任何特殊信心的企业之间，就能限制风险——这是错误的想法……一个人的知识和经验明确是有限的，而且在任何特定时点，我个人真正觉得有资格给予充分信任的企业，很少会超过两三家。”
Mistake Du Jour
每日一错
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about “Mistakes of the First 25 Years” and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the first few years of this second “semester” indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams; why not for businesses and investors?)
在1989年的年报里，我写过《前25年的错误》，并答应在2015年给你们更新。但我在这第二个“学期”头几年里的经历表明：如果我坚持原计划，到那时我需要讨论的存货会多到不可收拾。因此，我会不时在这些页面上卸下心头之重，希望公开认错能阻止我继续笨手笨脚。（尸检对医院和橄榄球队都有用；企业和投资者为什么不行？）
Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission, rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment, since you don’t see these errors; but their invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive—but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying.
通常而言，我们最严重的错误属于“该做没做”（遗漏，omission），而不是“做错了什么”（作为，commission）。这也许能让 Charlie 和我少尴尬一些，因为你看不见这些错误；但看不见并不会降低它们的代价。在这篇自我检讨里，我说的不是那种依赖某项深奥发明（比如 Xerox）、高科技（Apple），甚至天才式营销（Wal-Mart）的公司——我们永远也不会具备早期识别这类企业的能力。我指的是：那些 Charlie 和我能看懂、而且显然很有吸引力的商业机会——但我们最终却只是吸着大拇指发呆，而没有买入。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I wish the one I now present wasn’t quite so dramatic: In early 1988, we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the company’s business. Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae’s CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the company as a financial powerhouse—with the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large position.
每个写作者都知道，举例越醒目越好，但我真希望我现在要举的这个例子没那么戏剧化：1988年初，我们决定买入3,000万股（已按后来拆股调整）的 Federal National Mortgage Association（Fannie Mae），这本可以是一笔3.5亿—4亿美元的投资。我们在更早几年曾持有过这只股票，也理解公司的生意。此外，我们也清楚：Fannie Mae 的 CEO David Maxwell 以极高的水平处理了他接手时遗留下来的问题，把公司打造为一家金融强者——而且最好的日子还在后头。我在 Washington 见了 David，并确认：如果我们建立一个大仓位，他不会感到不舒服。
After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that, thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned.
在我们买入约700万股之后，股价开始上涨。我一气之下就停止继续买入（谢天谢地，当 Coca-Cola 在我们的买入过程中也出现类似上涨时，我没有重犯这个错误）。更蠢的是，我屈服于自己“不喜欢持有小仓位”的毛病，把手里那700万股也卖掉了。
非常合理的聚焦注意力的办法。
I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn’t one. What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn’t make because of your Chairman’s mistake: about $1.4 billion.
我真希望能给你们一个半吊子、勉强说得过去的解释，来说明我在 Fannie Mae 上这种业余得不能再业余的行为。但没有。我能给你们的，只是一个截至1991年底的估算：由于你们董事长的这个错误，Berkshire 少赚了大约14亿美元。
Fixed-Income Securities
固定收益证券
We made several significant changes in our fixed-income portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:
1991年，我们对固定收益投资组合做了几项重要调整。如我前面提到的，我们持有的 Gillette 优先股被赎回，迫使我们转换为普通股；我们清空了所持的某一期 RJR Nabisco 债券（该债券先是被纳入一次交换要约，随后又被赎回）；我们买入了 American Express 与 First Empire State Corp.（一家位于 Buffalo 的银行控股公司）的固定收益证券。我们还增加了在1990年末建立的 ACF Industries 的小仓位。到年末，我们最大的持仓包括：
Our $40 million of First Empire State preferred carries a 9% coupon, is non-callable until 1996 and is convertible at $78.91 per share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.
我们持有的 First Empire State 优先股投资额为4,000万美元，票息9%，1996年前不可赎回（non-callable），转换价格为每股78.91美元。按常规来说，这种规模的投资对 Berkshire 来说通常太小，但我对 First Empire 的 CEO Bob Wilmers 极为敬重——无论规模多大，我都愿意做他的合伙人。
Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income security. Rather it is a “Perc,” which carries a fixed dividend of 8.85% on our $300 million cost. Absent one exception mentioned later, our preferred must be converted three years after issuance, into a maximum of 12,244,898 shares. If necessary, a downward adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit to $414 million the total value of the common we receive. Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the common stock is below $24.50 on the third anniversary of our purchase.
我们持有的 American Express 优先股并不是典型的固定收益证券。它是一种叫“Perc”的证券，我们以3亿美元成本买入，享有8.85%的固定股息。除下文提到的一项例外外，我们的优先股在发行三年后必须转换为普通股，最多转换为12,244,898股。如有必要，会向下调整转换比例，以把我们最终收到的普通股总价值限制在4.14亿美元。因此，我们在转换时能收到的普通股价值有上限，但没有下限。不过，这份优先股条款里包含一项安排：如果在我们买入满三周年时普通股股价低于24.50美元，我们可以将转换日期延长一年。
Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well, both over the long term and recently. We have realized large capital gains from these holdings, including about $152 million in 1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.
总体而言，我们的固定收益投资对我们很友好——无论从长期还是近期来看都是如此。我们从这些持仓中实现了可观的资本利得，包括1991年的约1.52亿美元。此外，我们的税后收益率也显著高于多数固定收益投资组合所获得的收益。
Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salomon’s annual report and I refer you to that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048) Despite the company’s travails, Charlie and I believe our Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991. Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon’s common produced this result.
尽管如此，我们也遇到了一些意外，其中没有什么比我不得不亲自、而且深度地介入 Salomon 事件更出乎意料。我写这封信的时候，也在同时写一封将收录进 Salomon 年报的信；关于该公司的最新情况，请你们参阅 Salomon 的年报。（写信索取：Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048）尽管公司经历了不少磨难，Charlie 和我仍认为我们持有的 Salomon 优先股在1991年略微升值。利率下降以及 Salomon 普通股股价上升共同促成了这一结果。
Last year I told you that our USAir investment “should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years.” Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add Continental and TWA.)
去年我告诉你们，我们对 USAir 的投资“除非未来几年行业遭到毁灭性打击，否则应该问题不大”。不幸的是，1991年正是一个对行业具有毁灭性打击的时期：Midway、Pan Am 和 America West 都进入了破产程序。（如果把观察期拉长到14个月，还可以把 Continental 和 TWA 也算进去。）
The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry’s costs because the bankrupts don’t incur the capital costs faced by their solvent brethren and because they can fund their losses—and thereby stave off shutdown—by selling off assets. This burn-the-furniture-to-provide-firewood approach to fare-setting by bankrupt carriers contributes to the toppling of previously-marginal carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to bring the industry to its knees.
我们在表格中对 USAir 给出的低估值，反映了这样一种风险：航空业可能会长期对几乎所有参与者都不盈利——而这种风险绝非微不足道。更糟的是，法院一直在鼓励破产的航空公司继续运营。由于破产公司不需要承担其尚未破产的同行所面对的资本成本，而且它们可以通过变卖资产来弥补亏损、从而延缓停业，所以这些破产公司可以在一段时间内把票价压到低于行业成本的水平。这种“把家具烧了当柴火取暖”的定价方式，会推倒那些本就勉强维持的航空公司，形成多米诺骨牌效应——其设计之完美，几乎就是为了把整个行业按到地上摩擦、直到跪下为止。
资本主义的公共服务照样有社会主义的一面。
Seth Schofield, who became CEO of USAir in 1991, is making major adjustments in the airline’s operations in order to improve its chances of being one of the few industry survivors. There is no tougher job in corporate America than running an airline: Despite the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it, the industry, in aggregate, has posted a net loss since its birth after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and experience—and Seth possesses all three of these attributes.
Seth Schofield 在1991年成为 USAir 的 CEO，正在对航空公司的运营做出重大调整，以提高它成为少数幸存者之一的机会。在美国企业界，没有比经营一家航空公司更艰难的工作了：尽管行业已经注入了巨额股东权益资本，但从 Kitty Hawk 之后诞生以来，整个行业总体上一直是净亏损。航空公司管理者需要头脑、胆量和经验——而 Seth 三者兼备。
Miscellaneous
杂项
About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1991 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $6.8 million, and 2,630 charities were recipients.
在Berkshire 1991年的“股东指定捐赠”计划中，约97.7%的符合资格股份参与了该计划。通过该计划作出的捐赠金额为680万美元，共有2,630家慈善机构成为受捐方。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1992 will be ineligible for the 1992 program.
我们建议新股东阅读第48-49页对“股东指定捐赠”计划的说明。若要参加未来的计划，你必须确保你的股份是以实际所有者的名义登记，而不是以经纪商、银行或托管机构的代持名义（nominee name）登记。未在1992年8月31日前完成上述登记的股份，将没有资格参加1992年的计划。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
除了Berkshire 通过“股东指定捐赠”计划发放的捐赠外，我们各经营企业的经理人也会作出捐赠（包括实物捐赠），年均约150万美元。这些捐赠主要支持当地慈善机构，例如 The United Way，同时也会为我们的企业带来大体相称的回报与益处。
However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
不过，无论我们的经营经理人，还是母公司高管，都不会动用 Berkshire 的资金去支持全国性的大型项目，或去资助他们个人特别感兴趣的慈善活动——除非他们是以股东身份自掏腰包。若你的员工（包括你的CEO）希望向自己的母校或其他他们个人有情感依附的机构捐赠，我们认为他们应当用自己的钱，而不是用你的钱。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The faithful will notice that, for the first time in some years, Charlie’s annual letter to Wesco shareholders is not reprinted in this report. Since his letter is relatively barebones this year, Charlie said he saw no point in including it in these pages; my own recommendation, however, is that you get a copy of the Wesco report. Simply write: Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101.
细心的读者会注意到：这是多年来第一次，Charlie 写给 Wesco 股东的年度信没有在本报告中重印。因为他今年的信内容相对“干货少、骨架多”（relatively barebones），Charlie 说他觉得把它放在这里没有意义；不过我个人的建议是，你们还是去索取一份 Wesco 的年报。只需写信至：Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand for election as a director this year. But the association of the Chace family with Berkshire will not end: Malcolm III (Kim), Malcolm’s son, will be nominated to replace him.
Malcolm G. Chace, Jr. 现年88岁，已决定今年不再参选董事。不过，Chace 家族与 Berkshire 的关系不会结束：Malcolm 的儿子 Malcolm III（Kim）将被提名接替他。
In 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Co. in 1955 to form our present company. Two years later, Malcolm became Berkshire Hathaway’s Chairman, a position he held as well in early 1965 when he made it possible for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives. This purchase gave our partnership effective control of the company. Malcolm’s immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire stock and for the last 27 years has had the second-largest holding in the company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has been a joy to work with and we are delighted that the long-running relationship between the Chace family and Berkshire is continuing to a new generation.
1931年，Malcolm 加入 Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates 工作；该公司于1955年与 Hathaway Manufacturing Co. 合并，形成我们今天的公司。两年后，Malcolm 成为 Berkshire Hathaway 的董事长；在1965年初他仍担任该职务，并促成 Buffett Partnership, Ltd. 从他的一些亲属手中买入 Berkshire 的一大块关键股份。这次买入使我们的合伙企业获得了对公司的实际控制权。与此同时，Malcolm 的直系家庭一直保留着 Berkshire 的股票，并在过去27年里始终是公司第二大持股方，仅次于 Buffett 家族。与 Malcolm 共事一直是一件令人愉快的事；我们也很高兴看到 Chace 家族与 Berkshire 这段长期关系正在延续到下一代。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 27, 1992. Attendance last year grew to a record 1,550, but that still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.
今年的年会将于1992年4月27日（星期一）上午9:30在Omaha市中心的 Orpheum Theater 举行。去年的参会人数增长到创纪录的1,550人，但 Orpheum 仍然绰绰有余。
We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim’s and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.
我们建议你尽早在以下酒店之一预订房间：（1）The Radisson-Redick Tower——一家规模不大（88间客房）但很不错的酒店，就在 Orpheum 对街；（2）规模大得多的 Red Lion Hotel，步行到 Orpheum 大约五分钟；或（3）Marriott，位于West Omaha，距离 Borsheim’s 大约100码，开车到市中心约20分钟。我们会在 Marriott 安排巴士，分别于8:30和8:45出发前往会场，并在会议结束后送大家返回。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
Charlie 和我总是很享受年会，也希望你能来。我们股东的素质，体现在提问的质量上：我们从未参加过任何一家公司的年会，能像这里一样持续不断地出现如此高水平、如此“主人翁视角”的聪明问题。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.
随同委托投票材料（proxy material）附上的说明会告诉你如何获取入场所需的卡片。我们会在寄给你的入场卡里一并附上 Orpheum 附近停车场的信息。如果你开车来，建议早点到。附近停车位很快会满，你可能需要走几条街。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See’s Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Americans ate 26 million pounds of See’s products last year.
照例，会议结束后我们会安排巴士送大家去 Nebraska Furniture Mart 和 Borsheim’s，之后再送大家回市中心酒店或机场。我希望你能留出足够的时间，充分逛一逛这两家店的“看点”。提前到达的朋友，一周任何一天都可以去 Furniture Mart；它周六营业时间是上午10点到下午5:30，周日是中午12点到下午5:30。到了那里，别忘了去 See’s Candy Cart 看看——亲自体验一下为什么美国人去年吃掉了2,600万磅的 See’s 产品。
Borsheim’s normally is closed on Sunday, but we will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 26. Borsheim’s will also have a special party the previous evening at which shareholders are welcome. (You must, however, write Mrs. Gladys Kaiser at our office for an invitation.) On display that evening will be a 150-year retrospective of the most exceptional timepieces made by Patek Philippe, including watches once owned by Queen Victoria, Pope Pius IX, Rudyard Kipling, Madame Curie and Albert Einstein. The centerpiece of the exhibition will be a $5 million watch whose design and manufacture required nine years of labor by Patek Philippe craftsmen. Along with the rest of the collection, this watch will be on display at the store on Sunday—unless Charlie has by then impulsively bought it.
Borsheim’s 通常周日不营业，但我们会在1992年4月26日（周日）中午12点到晚上6点为股东及其来宾开放。Borsheim’s 在前一晚还会举办一场特别派对，欢迎股东参加。（不过你必须写信给我们办公室的 Gladys Kaiser 女士索取邀请函。）当晚将展出 Patek Philippe 最杰出腕表的150年回顾展，其中包括曾属于 Queen Victoria、Pope Pius IX、Rudyard Kipling、Madame Curie 和 Albert Einstein 的手表。展览的重头戏是一枚价值500万美元的腕表，其设计与制造需要 Patek Philippe 工匠九年的劳动。和其他藏品一起，这枚表也会在周日于店内展出——除非到那时 Charlie 一时冲动把它买走了。
Nicholas Kenner nailed me—again—at last year’s meeting, pointing out that I had said in the 1990 annual report that he was 11 in May 1990, when actually he was 9. So, asked Nicholas rather caustically: “If you can’t get that straight, how do I know the numbers in the back [the financials] are correct?” I’m still searching for a snappy response. Nicholas will be at this year’s meeting—he spurned my offer of a trip to Disney World on that day—so join us to watch a continuation of this lop-sided battle of wits.
Nicholas Kenner 去年又“逮住我一回”——他指出我在1990年年报里说他在1990年5月是11岁，但事实上他当时才9岁。于是 Nicholas 带点刻薄地问我：“你连这个都搞不对，那我怎么知道后面那些数字（财务报表）是对的？”我还在琢磨一个漂亮的回击。今年年会 Nicholas 还会来——他拒绝了我提出的那天送他去 Disney World 的提议——所以欢迎你一起来看这场明显“一边倒”的斗智斗勇续集。
February 28, 1992
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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