1993-03-01 Warren Buffett.Equity-investing strategy

1993-03-01 Warren Buffett.Equity-investing strategy


Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report: “We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price.” We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute “an attractive price” for “a very attractive price.”
我们的股票投资策略与十五年前几乎无异。正如我们在1977年的年报中所说:“我们选择可交易普通股的方式,基本就像评估一整家公司是否值得整体收购。我们希望该企业:(a) 我们能够理解;(b) 具备良好的长期前景;(c) 由诚实且能干的人经营;(d) 可在一个非常有吸引力的价格买到。”只有一处我们认为需要调整:鉴于市场环境与我们的体量,我们如今将“非常有吸引力的价格”改为“有吸引力的价格”。
Idea
非常稳定的框架,几十年不变。
But how, you will ask, does one decide what’s “attractive”? In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition: “value” and “growth.” Indeed, many investment professionals see any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-dressing.
但你会问,如何判定“有吸引力”?在回答这个问题时,多数分析师觉得必须在传统上被视为对立的两种方法之间做选择:“value”与“growth”。确实,许多投资从业者把两者的混搭视为一种“概念易装”。

We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.
我们认为这是一种模糊思维(必须承认,数年前我自己也曾如此)。在我们看来,这两种方法“骨肉相连”:在价值的计算中,growth 始终是一个组成部分——其重要性可以从微不足道到至关重要,其影响既可能是正面,也可能是负面。

In addition, we think the very term “value investing” is redundant. What is “investing” if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value — in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price — should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor — in our view — financially fattening).
此外,我们认为“value investing”这个术语本身是冗余的。若不是在寻找足以证明所付代价的价值,那还称得上“investing”吗?明知一只股票的计算价值低于支付价格,却仍然多付,希望不久后以更高价格卖出,这应被称为“speculation”(既不违法,也不不道德,但在我们看来——也不利于财富增值)。

Whether appropriate or not, the term “value investing” is widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly, opposite characteristics — a high ratio of price to book value, a high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield — are in no way inconsistent with a “value” purchase.
不论是否恰当,“value investing”已被广泛使用。典型含义是购买具备诸如市净率低、市盈率低或股息率高等属性的股票。不幸的是,即便这些特征同时出现,也远不足以决定投资者是否真在“以其所值的价格”买入、从而确实遵循了“在投资中获取价值”的原则。相应地,反向特征——高市净率、高市盈率与低股息率——也并不必然与“value”型买入相矛盾。

Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about value. It’s true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.
同样地,就其本身而言,业务增长并不能告诉我们多少关于价值的事情。确实,增长常常对价值产生积极影响,有时还会非常显著。但这种效果远非必然。例如,投资者长期向美国国内航空业注入资金,去资助那些无利润(甚至更糟)的增长。对这些投资者来说,如果当年 Orville 没能在 Kitty Hawk 起飞,情况反而会更好:行业增长得越多,所有者遭受的灾难就越大。

Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing — in other words, only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.
只有当相关企业能够以诱人的增量回报进行再投资时,增长才会让投资者受益——换言之,只有当用于支持增长的每一美元,能够创造超过一美元的长期市场价值时才行。对于一个需要持续追加资金却回报率偏低的企业,增长只会伤害投资者。
Idea
假设折现率是10%并且未来没有增长,投入1美元每年必须有超过0.1美元(0.1/10%=1)的现金流。
In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago, John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows — discounted at an appropriate interest rate — that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the future “coupons.” Furthermore, the quality of management affects the bond coupon only rarely — chiefly when management is so inept or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast, the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity “coupons.”
在五十多年前写就的《The Theory of Investment Value》中,John Burr Williams 提出了价值的方程式,我们在此将其浓缩为:任何股票、债券或企业当下的价值,取决于其在剩余寿命期间可预期发生的现金流入与流出——并以适当利率折现之。请注意,这个公式对股票与债券同样适用。尽管如此,二者之间存在一个重要且难以处理的差别:债券的票息与到期日界定了未来的现金流;而对于股票,投资分析师必须自己去估计未来的“票息”。此外,管理质量很少会影响债券的票息——主要只有在管理层无能或不诚实到暂停付息时才会发生。相比之下,管理层的能力却会显著影响股票的“票息”。

The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should purchase — irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn’t, displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable: When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment, they should be bought.
在贴现现金流计算中显得“最便宜”的投资,才是投资者应当买入的——而不应在意该企业是否增长、盈利是否波动或平滑、当前市价相对于当期利润与账面价值是高是低。此外,尽管价值方程通常显示股票比债券更便宜,但这并非必然:当计算表明债券更具吸引力时,就应该买入债券。

Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite — that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases.
撇开价格不谈,最好的生意是在较长时期内能以很高的回报率吸纳大量增量资本的那类;最差的生意则恰好相反——持续以很低的回报率吞噬越来越多的资本。不幸的是,前一种生意极难寻找:多数高回报企业需要的资本相对不多。对于这类企业,如果把绝大部分利润以股息形式发放,或进行大规模回购,股东通常会受益。

Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst — even one who is experienced and intelligent — can easily go wrong in estimating future “coupons.” At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we’re not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn’t bother us. What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don’t know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.
虽然评估股票所需的数学计算并不困难,但分析师——哪怕经验丰富且头脑聪明——在估计未来“票息”时也很容易出错。我们在 Berkshire 用两种方式来应对这个问题。第一,我们尽量专注于那些我们自认为理解的企业。这意味着它们的性质必须相对简单且稳定。如果一个企业复杂或经常变化,我们还不够聪明,无法预测其未来现金流。顺带说一句,这个短板并不困扰我们。对大多数投资者而言,关键不在于知道多少,而在于能否现实地界定自己“不知道”的范围。只要能避免大的错误,投资者其实只需要把很少几件事情做好。

Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we’re not interested in buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success.
第二点,同样重要的是,我们坚持在买入价上留有安全边际。如果我们计算出的普通股价值仅略高于其市价,我们就无意买入。我们相信,由 Ben Graham 强调的“安全边际”原则是投资成功的基石。

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