1993-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1993-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.

1992年，我们的每股账面价值增长了20.3%。在过去28年（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到7,745美元，按年复合增长率计算为23.6%。

During the year, Berkshire’s net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative. Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we issued 6,106 shares.

在本年度，Berkshire 的净资产增加了15.2亿美元。其中超过98%的增量来自于盈利和投资组合证券的升值，其余来自新股发行。此次发行源于我们在1993年1月4日赎回可转换债券的操作，部分持有人选择以普通股而非现金作为对价。大多数将债券转换为普通股的持有人等到1月份才进行，但也有少数在12月份完成转换，因此在1992年就收到了股票。概括我们当时尚未到期的4.76亿美元债券的处理结果：年末前有2,500万美元转换为股票；1月份又有4,600万美元转换；还有4.05亿美元被现金赎回。转换价格为每股11,719美元，合计我们发行了6,106股。

Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the company.

目前，Berkshire 的流通在外股数为1,152,547股。你也许会感兴趣：1964年10月1日（Buffett Partnership, Ltd. 获得公司控制权的那个会计年度的开始），流通在外股数是1,137,778股。

We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase Berkshire’s size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners.

我们对发行 Berkshire 股票有明确的政策：只有在我们得到的价值与我们付出的价值相当时才会发行。然而，达到“等值交换”并不容易，因为我们一直对自身股份估值很高。顺其自然：我们只在扩大 Berkshire 规模能同时提升股东财富时才会这么做。

Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren’t they all?) When our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquiree’s net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirer’s. Our management - visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree then insisted on one other condition: “You must promise me,” he said in effect, “that once our merger is done and I have become a major shareholder, you’ll never again make a deal this dumb.”

这两个目标并不总是相辅相成——我们过去一次既滑稽又毁值的经历就能说明问题。当时我们在一家银行持有重要股权，而其管理层一门心思想扩张（大多数不都这样吗？）。当这家银行追求一家更小的银行时，小银行的所有者要求以换股合并，按其要求，被收购方的净资产与盈利能力被估值为收购方的两倍以上。我们“热情高涨”的管理层很快就让步了。随后，这位被收购方的所有者又坚持加上一条条件：他的潜台词是，“一旦合并完成而我成为大股东，你们必须向我保证，今后绝不再做如此愚蠢的交易。”

You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This objective, however, cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire’s net worth. Since 1979, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have required that these securities be valued at their market prices (less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation) rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical industrial company.

你或许记得，我们的目标是将每股内在价值（账面价值是一个保守却有用的替代指标）以年化15%的速度提升。不过，这个目标无法以平滑的方式实现。尤其是由于会计准则对我们保险公司所持普通股的计量要求——这些投资组合占 Berkshire 净资产的很大比例——平滑性更加难以企及。自1979年起，一般公认会计原则（GAAP）要求这些证券按市价计量（并扣除未实现增值对应的税项），而不是按“成本与市价孰低”。因此，股价的日常波动就会使我们的年度业绩出现较大起伏，尤其是相较于典型的工业企业。

To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results - we show on the facing page our annual change in per-share net worth and compare it with the annual results (including dividends) of the S&P 500.

为了说明我们的进展有多波动——并展示市场变动对短期结果的影响——我们在相邻页面列示了每股净资产的年度变动，并与 S&P 500 的年度回报（含股息）进行比较。

You should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years. Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved by the S&P.

在评估这些数据时，你至少应记住三点。第一点涉及我们所经营的诸多业务：这些业务的年度盈利并不受股市估值变动的影响。多年下来，它们对我们的绝对与相对业绩的影响发生了变化。早期，我们的纺织业务（当时占据了净资产的相当部分）回报率很低，严重拖累了表现；与其把资金投在那项业务上，还不如投在 S&P 500 上，平均结果会好得多。近年来，随着我们组建起由卓越经理人经营的一系列杰出业务，运营业务的回报水平很高——通常大幅超过 S&P 的回报。

A second important factor to consider - and one that significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28-year period covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13%. And this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote for it.

第二个需要考虑的重要因素——并且显著拉低我们相对表现的因素——是我们的证券投资收益与资本利得要承担沉重的公司税负，而 S&P 的回报是税前口径。为了理解这种伤害，假设在所述的28年里 Berkshire 只持有 S&P 指数，那么税负会使我们的公司层面表现明显低于表格中 S&P 的记录。在现行税法下，S&P 实现18%的涨幅，指数的公司持有者最终到手的回报远达不到13%。如果公司税率上升，这个问题还会加剧。这是一种我们不得不接受的结构性劣势；对此并无解药。

The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire’s expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index.

第三点包含两个判断：我与 Charlie Munger（Berkshire 的副董事长与我的合伙人）几乎可以肯定，未来十年投资 S&P 指数的回报将远低于过去十年；而我们也极其确定，Berkshire 不断扩大的资本基数会显著削弱我们相对于该指数的历史性优势。

Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain: We’ve long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children. However, it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable, though slowed, pace.

做出第一个判断有些违背我们的本性：我们长期认为，股市“预言家”的唯一价值就是衬托算命先生看起来还不错。即便现在，我与 Charlie 仍坚信短期市场预测如同毒药，应该被锁进保险柜，远离孩童，也远离在市场里像孩童一样行事的成年人。然而，有一点很清楚：股票不可能永远像过去一段时间那样显著跑赢其所对应的真实业务，这使我们对“未来十年股票投资回报显著小于过去十年”的判断更有信心。至于第二个结论——更大的资本基数会像锚一样拖累我们的相对表现——几乎无可争辩。唯一未知的是：我们能否在增速放缓但尚可接受的节奏下，拖着这只锚继续前行。

We will continue to experience considerable volatility in our annual results. That’s assured by the general volatility of the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have made, most especially our move to commit large resources to super-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.

我们的年度结果仍将保持相当的波动性。这一点由多方面所决定：股票市场本身的波动性、我们权益持仓集中于少数公司，以及我们所作的一些业务决策，尤其是向“巨灾再保险”投入大量资源。我们不仅接受这种波动，甚至欢迎它：能容忍短期起伏，有助于提升长期前景。用棒球的行话来说，我们衡量表现的标尺是长打率（slugging percentage），而非打击率（batting average）。

The Salomon Interlude

Salomon 过场插曲

Last June, I stepped down as Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc after ten months in the job. You can tell from Berkshire’s 1991-92 results that the company didn’t miss me while I was gone. But the reverse isn’t true: I missed Berkshire and am delighted to be back full-time. There is no job in the world that is more fun than running Berkshire and I count myself lucky to be where I am.

去年六月，我在任职十个月后卸任了 Salomon Inc 的临时董事长。从 Berkshire 1991—1992 年的业绩你可以看出，公司在我离开期间并没有想念我。但反过来并非如此：我确实想念 Berkshire，并很高兴全职回归。世上没有比经营 Berkshire 更有趣的工作，而我能在这个位置上自觉幸运。

The Salomon post, though far from fun, was interesting and worthwhile: In Fortune’s annual survey of America’s Most Admired Corporations, conducted last September, Salomon ranked second among 311 companies in the degree to which it improved its reputation. Additionally, Salomon Brothers, the securities subsidiary of Salomon Inc, reported record pre-tax earnings last year - 34% above the previous high.

虽然在 Salomon 的那份工作谈不上有趣，但它既有意思也值得：在《Fortune》去年九月进行的“美国最受尊敬公司”年度调查中，Salomon 在声誉提升幅度方面位列 311 家公司中的第二名。此外，Salomon Inc 的证券子公司 Salomon Brothers 去年录得创纪录的税前利润——较此前峰值高出 34%。

Many people helped in the resolution of Salomon’s problems and the righting of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special mention. It is no exaggeration to say that without the combined efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don Howard, and John Macfarlane, the firm very probably would not have survived. In their work, these men were tireless, effective, supportive and selfless, and I will forever be grateful to them.

许多人为解决 Salomon 的问题、扶正公司局面作出了贡献，但有几位尤其值得一提。毫不夸张地说，若没有 Salomon 高管 Deryck Maughan、Bob Denham、Don Howard 与 John Macfarlane 的共同努力，公司很可能无法存活。他们在工作中不知疲倦、卓有成效、彼此支撑且无私奉献，我将永远感激他们。

Salomon’s lead lawyer in its Government matters, Ron Olson of Munger, Tolles & Olson, was also key to our success in getting through this trouble. The firm’s problems were not only severe, but complex. At least five authorities - the SEC, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - had important concerns about Salomon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal, business and human skills. Ron had them all.

Salomon 在政府事务方面的首席律师、来自 Munger, Tolles & Olson 的 Ron Olson 对我们走出困境也至关重要。公司的问题不但严重，而且复杂。至少有五个机构——SEC、Federal Reserve Bank of New York、U.S. Treasury、U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York，以及 Department of Justice 的 Antitrust Division——都对 Salomon 存有重大关切。若要协调而迅速地解决这些问题，我们需要一位兼具卓越法律、商业与人际能力的律师。Ron 具备了这一切。

Acquisitions

收购

Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.

在 Berkshire 的所有事务中，令我与 Charlie 最振奋的，是收购那些具备卓越经济特性、且由我们欣赏并信任的管理层执掌的企业。此类收购并不容易，但我们始终在寻找。在搜索过程中，我们采取一种类似择偶的态度：积极、感兴趣、保持开放心态是有回报的，但急于求成则无益。

In the past, I’ve observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads. (“Fanaticism,” said Santyana, “consists of redoubling your effort when you’ve forgotten your aim.”) Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous “restructuring” charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.

过去，我注意到许多渴望并购的经理人似乎受到了童年读过的“公主亲青蛙”故事的蛊惑。记住了公主的成功，他们愿意付出高价去“亲吻”企业癞蛤蟆，指望出现奇迹般的蜕变。起初，令人失望的结果只会加深他们继续围捕新癞蛤蟆的欲望。（正如 Santyana 所言：“狂热就是在忘记目标后加倍努力。”）最终，即便最乐观的经理人也不得不直面现实。站在齐膝深的“无动于衷”的癞蛤蟆堆中，他随即宣布一笔巨额的“重组”费用。在这种企业版的“Head Start”项目里，CEO 得到教育，股东则支付学费。

In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads. They were cheap dates - I’ve never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads. I kissed and they croaked.

我作为经理人的早年，也“约会”过几只癞蛤蟆。它们算是“便宜的约会”——我从来不是个大手大脚的人——但我的结果与那些追求高价癞蛤蟆的并购者并无二致。我亲了，它们就“呱呱”了。

After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous). Said the pro: “Practice doesn’t make perfect; practice makes permanent.” And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.

在经历了数次这类失败之后，我终于想起一位高尔夫职业球手曾给过我的一条有用建议（和所有见过我球技的职业球手一样，他希望保持匿名）。这位球手说：“练习并不会让你完美；练习只会让你的动作定型。”此后我调整了策略，努力以合理价格买入好企业，而不是以好价格买入一般的企业。

不改变策略、不改变脑子是没有用的。

Last year, in December, we made an acquisition that is a prototype of what we now look for. The purchase was 82% of Central States Indemnity, an insurer that makes monthly payments for credit-card holders who are unable themselves to pay because they have become disabled or unemployed. Currently the company’s annual premiums are about $90 million and profits about $10 million. Central States is based in Omaha and managed by Bill Kizer, a friend of mine for over 35 years. The Kizer family - which includes sons Bill, Dick and John - retains 18% ownership of the business and will continue to run things just as it has in the past. We could not be associated with better people.

去年十二月，我们完成了一笔堪称当下目标“原型”的收购：以 82% 股权收购 Central States Indemnity，这是一家在持卡人因伤残或失业无法还款时按月代为偿付的保险公司。目前该公司的年保费约 9,000 万美元，利润约 1,000 万美元。Central States 总部在 Omaha，由我相识逾 35 年的朋友 Bill Kizer 负责管理。Kizer 家族（包括其子 Bill、Dick 与 John）保留 18% 的股权，并将像以往一样继续经营这家公司。我们不可能与更好的人合作了。

Coincidentally, this latest acquisition has much in common with our first, made 26 years ago. At that time, we purchased another Omaha insurer, National Indemnity Company (along with a small sister company) from Jack Ringwalt, another long-time friend. Jack had built the business from scratch and, as was the case with Bill Kizer, thought of me when he wished to sell. (Jack’s comment at the time: “If I don’t sell the company, my executor will, and I’d rather pick the home for it.”) National Indemnity was an outstanding business when we bought it and continued to be under Jack’s management. Hollywood has had good luck with sequels; I believe we, too, will.

巧合的是，这次最新收购与我们 26 年前的首次收购颇多相似。当时我们从另一位老朋友 Jack Ringwalt 手中购得另一家位于 Omaha 的保险公司 National Indemnity Company（以及一家小的姐妹公司）。Jack 白手起家创立了这家公司，和 Bill Kizer 一样，在他想出售时首先想到我。（Jack 当时的评价是：“如果我不卖，公司终归会由遗嘱执行人来卖，我更愿意自己替它选个归宿。”）在我们收购时，National Indemnity 已是一家出色的企业，并在 Jack 的管理下延续其卓越。Hollywood 常常在续集上走运；我相信我们也会如此。

Berkshire’s acquisition criteria are described on page 23. Beyond purchases made by the parent company, however, our subsidiaries sometimes make small “add-on” acquisitions that extend their product lines or distribution capabilities. In this manner, we enlarge the domain of managers we already know to be outstanding - and that’s a low-risk and high-return proposition. We made five acquisitions of this type in 1992, and one was not so small: At yearend, H. H. Brown purchased Lowell Shoe Company, a business with $90 million in sales that makes Nursemates, a leading line of shoes for nurses, and other kinds of shoes as well. Our operating managers will continue to look for add-on opportunities, and we would expect these to contribute modestly to Berkshire’s value in the future.

Berkshire 的收购标准见第 23 页。除了母公司直接收购外，我们的子公司有时也会进行小型的“加法式收购”，以延伸其产品线或渠道能力。通过这种方式，我们让那些业已被证明杰出的经理人掌管更大的领域——这是一笔低风险高回报的买卖。1992 年我们做了五笔这类收购，其中一笔并不算小：在年末，H. H. Brown 收购了 Lowell Shoe Company，这家公司年销售额 9,000 万美元，生产 Nursemates（护士鞋领域的领先品牌）以及其他品类的鞋。我们的运营经理人将继续寻找“加法”机会，我们预计这些在未来会为 Berkshire 的价值带来温和的增益。

Then again, a trend has emerged that may make further acquisitions difficult. The parent company made one purchase in 1991, buying H. H. Brown, which is run by Frank Rooney, who has eight children. In 1992 our only deal was with Bill Kizer, father of nine. It won’t be easy to keep this string going in 1993.

不过，又出现了一个可能使后续收购变得困难的“趋势”。母公司在 1991 年做了一笔收购——买下由 Frank Rooney 经营的 H. H. Brown，而 Frank Rooney 育有八个子女。1992 年我们唯一的交易对象是 Bill Kizer，他有九个子女。想在 1993 年延续这条“记录”可不容易。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表展示了 Berkshire 报告收益的主要来源。在本次呈现中，Goodwill 摊销以及其他重要的购买价会计调整，并未计入其对应的具体业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这样做能让你看到：如果我们并未收购这些业务，它们会如何报告自身的利润。我已在过去的报告中解释过，为何这种呈现方式（相较于要求按单一业务逐项进行购买价分摊的 GAAP）对投资者与管理者更有用。当然，我们在表中所示的净收益总额与经审计财报中的 GAAP 合计数完全一致。

A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 37-47, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. Our goal is to give you all of the financial information that Charlie and I consider significant in making our own evaluation of Berkshire.

关于这些业务的大量补充信息见第 37—47 页，你也会在那里看到按 GAAP 口径报告的各分部利润。我们的目标，是向你提供我们（我与 Charlie）在评估 Berkshire 时认为重要的全部财务信息。

“Look-Through” Earnings

“穿透式”收益

We’ve previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. Though no single figure can be perfect, we believe that the look-through number more accurately portrays the earnings of Berkshire than does the GAAP number.

我们此前讨论过“穿透式”收益，其构成包括：(1) 上一部分所报告的经营性利润；加上 (2) 主要被投资企业的留存经营性利润——按 GAAP 这些并不会反映在我们的利润中；减去 (3) 若上述留存利润改为向我们分配，Berkshire 应当就此承担的税额。尽管没有哪个单一数字是完美的，但我们认为，“穿透式”收益较之 GAAP 口径更能准确刻画 Berkshire 的盈利能力。

I’ve told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Our look-through earnings in 1992 were $604 million, and they will need to grow to more than $1.8 billion by the year 2000 if we are to meet that 15% goal. For us to get there, our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver excellent performances, and we must exercise some skill in capital allocation as well.

我曾说过，若要我们的企业内在价值以约 15% 的年率增长，那么“穿透式”收益也必须在时间维度上以大致 15% 的年率增长。1992 年我们的“穿透式”收益为 6.04 亿美元；若要达成 15% 的目标，到 2000 年这一数字需要增长到超过 18 亿美元。要实现这一点，我们的运营子公司与被投资企业必须有优异表现，同时我们也需在资本配置上展现一定本领。

We cannot promise to achieve the $1.8 billion target. Indeed, we may not even come close to it. But it does guide our decision-making: When we allocate capital today, we are thinking about what will maximize look-through earnings in 2000.

我们无法承诺一定实现 18 亿美元的目标，事实上，我们甚至可能未能接近它。但这一目标确实指导着我们的决策：当下进行资本配置时，我们会思考何者能在 2000 年使“穿透式”收益达到最大化。

We do not, however, see this long-term focus as eliminating the need for us to achieve decent short-term results as well. After all, we were thinking long-range thoughts five or ten years ago, and the moves we made then should now be paying off. If plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing harvests, something is wrong with the farmer. (Or perhaps with the farm: Investors should understand that for certain companies, and even for some industries, there simply is no good long-term strategy.) Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump up short-term earnings by accounting maneuvers, asset sales and the like, so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail to deliver for extended periods and blame it on their long-term focus. (Even Alice, after listening to the Queen lecture her about “jam tomorrow,” finally insisted, “It must come sometimes to jam today.”)

不过，我们并不认为这种长期导向可以免除在短期内也要取得像样结果的要求。毕竟，五年、十年前我们就在思考长远的问题，而当时所做的布局如今理应开花结果。如果信心满满的播种换来的却是一次次令人失望的收获，那问题不是出在农夫身上，就是出在农场本身。（或者两者皆有：投资者应当明白，对某些公司，甚至某些行业而言，根本不存在什么“良好的长期战略”。）正如你该对那些靠会计手法、资产出售等手段“冲”短期利润的经理人保持警惕一样，你也应对那些长期交不出成绩、却把责任推给“长期导向”的经理人保持警惕。（就像《Alice》里那样，女王反复讲“明天有果酱”，Alice 终究坚持：“有时候总得有‘今天的果酱’。”）

The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly under “Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.”)

下表展示了我们如何计算“穿透式”收益，但我要提醒你，这些数字必然相当粗略。（这些被投资企业向我们支付的股息，已计入第 8 页所列的经营性利润中，主要体现在“Insurance Group: Net Investment Income”。）

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

下方是我们惯常展示的产险行业关键数据表的更新版本：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 106 - 110 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合赔付率（combined ratio）表示保险总成本（已发生赔付加费用）相对于保费收入的比值：低于100意味着承保盈利，高于100意味着亏损。比率越高，当年的情况越糟。若考虑保险公司持有保户资金（“float”）所赚取的投资收益，综合赔付率在106—110区间通常能带来总体盈亏平衡的结果（不含股东提供资金的收益）。

About four points in the industry’s 1992 combined ratio can be attributed to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest insured loss in history. Andrew destroyed a few small insurers. Beyond that, it awakened some larger companies to the fact that their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from adequate. (It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.) One major insurer escaped insolvency solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply a massive transfusion of capital.

行业在1992年的综合赔付率中约有4个点可归因于飓风 Andrew——这场灾害造成了历史上最大的保险赔付损失。Andrew 摧毁了几家小型保险公司。更重要的是，它让一些大型公司意识到其针对灾难风险的再保险保障远远不足。（只有潮水退去时，你才会发现谁在裸泳。）有一家大型保险公司之所以躲过破产，仅仅因为其背后有一位富有的母公司，能够迅速输血大量资本。

Bad as it was, however, Andrew could easily have been far more damaging if it had hit Florida 20 or 30 miles north of where it actually did and had hit Louisiana further east than was the case. All in all, many companies will rethink their reinsurance programs in light of the Andrew experience.

尽管如此，Andrew 本可能造成更糟的破坏——如果它在佛罗里达州登陆的位置再往北20到30英里，并在路易斯安那州更偏东的位置登陆。总的来说，许多公司会基于 Andrew 的经验重新审视其再保险方案。

As you know we are a large writer — perhaps the largest in the world — of “super-cat” coverages, which are the policies that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Consequently, we too took our lumps from Andrew, suffering losses from it of about $125 million, an amount roughly equal to our 1992 super-cat premium income. Our other super-cat losses, though, were negligible. This line of business therefore produced an overall loss of only $2 million for the year. (In addition, our investee, GEICO, suffered a net loss from Andrew, after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings, of about $50 million, of which our share is roughly $25 million. This loss did not affect our operating earnings, but did reduce our look-through earnings.)

如你所知，我们是“巨灾再保险”（super-cat）的大额承保人——或许是全球最大。所谓巨灾保险，是其他保险公司为防范重大灾难性损失而购买的保单。因此，我们也在 Andrew 中遭受了约1.25亿美元的损失，大致相当于我们1992年的巨灾保费收入。不过，除此之外我们的巨灾损失可以忽略不计。于是该业务全年总体仅亏损200万美元。（此外，我们的被投资企业 GEICO 在 Andrew 中，扣除再保险理赔回收与节税后的净损失约为5,000万美元，我们按权益分摊约2,500万美元。此项损失不影响我们的经营性利润，但确实降低了我们的“穿透式”收益。）

In last year’s report I told you that I hoped that our super-cat business would over time achieve a 10% profit margin. But I also warned you that in any given year the line was likely to be “either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable.” Instead, both 1991 and 1992 have come in close to a break-even level. Nonetheless, I see these results as aberrations and stick with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from this business.

在去年的报告中，我告诉你我希望我们的巨灾业务长期能实现10%的利润率。但我也提醒过你：在任何特定年度，这项业务很可能“要么大赚、要么大亏”。然而，1991和1992两年都接近盈亏平衡。尽管如此，我仍将这些结果视为偏离常态，并坚持我的判断：这项业务的年度盈利性将出现巨大的波动。

Let me remind you of some characteristics of our super-cat policies. Generally, they are activated only when two things happen. First, the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must suffer losses of a given amount — that’s the policyholder’s “retention” — from a catastrophe; and second, industry-wide insured losses from the catastrophe must exceed some minimum level, which usually is $3 billion or more. In most cases, the policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area, such as a portion of the U.S., the entire U.S., or everywhere other than the U.S. Also, many policies are not activated by the first super-cat that meets the policy terms, but instead cover only a “second-event” or even a third- or fourth-event. Finally, some policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type, such as an earthquake. Our exposures are large: We have one policy that calls for us to pay $100 million to the policyholder if a specified catastrophe occurs. (Now you know why I suffer eyestrain: from watching The Weather Channel.)

让我提醒你我们的巨灾保单的一些特征。一般来说，它们只有在两件事同时发生时才触发：第一，我们所保护的直接保险公司或再保险公司，因灾难而遭受达到一定金额的损失——这就是保单持有人的“自留额”（retention）；第二，全行业因该灾难产生的承保损失必须超过某一最低阈值，通常为30亿美元或更高。在多数情况下，我们签发的保单仅覆盖特定地域，例如美国的某一片区、全美，或除美国之外的全球其他地区。并且，许多保单并不因首次满足条款的巨灾而触发，而是只覆盖“第二次事件”，甚至第三或第四次事件。最后，部分保单仅在特定类型灾难（如地震）发生时触发。我们的风险暴露规模很大：我们有一份保单规定，一旦特定灾难发生，我们需向保单持有人支付1亿美元。（现在你就知道我为什么眼睛疲劳：因为一直盯着 The Weather Channel。）

Currently, Berkshire is second in the U.S. property-casualty industry in net worth (the leader being State Farm, which neither buys nor sells reinsurance). Therefore, we have the capacity to assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other company. We have the appetite as well: As Berkshire’s net worth and earnings grow, our willingness to write business increases also. But let me add that means good business. The saying, “a fool and his money are soon invited everywhere,” applies in spades in reinsurance, and we actually reject more than 98% of the business we are offered. Our ability to choose between good and bad proposals reflects a management strength that matches our financial strength: Ajit Jain, who runs our reinsurance operation, is simply the best in this business. In combination, these strengths guarantee that we will stay a major factor in the super-cat business so long as prices are appropriate.

目前，按净资产规模，Berkshire 在美国产险行业位居第二（第一是 State Farm，其既不买也不卖再保险）。因此，我们具备承担几乎没有其他公司愿意承接的超大规模风险的能力。我们也有这样的胃口：随着 Berkshire 的净资产与利润增长，我们承保业务的意愿也随之提高。但我要补充的是——这意味着“好生意”。那句谚语“傻子和他的钱会被到处邀请”在再保险领域更是适用，因此我们实际上拒绝了超过98%的上门业务。我们在优劣方案之间做出选择的能力，体现了与财务实力相匹配的管理实力：负责我们再保险业务的 Ajit Jain，堪称业内最佳。两项实力叠加，确保只要价格合适，我们就会在巨灾业务中持续扮演重要角色。

What constitutes an appropriate price, of course, is difficult to determine. Catastrophe insurers can’t simply extrapolate past experience. If there is truly “global warming,” for example, the odds would shift, since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in U.S. coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, the number one creator of super-cats. A hurricane that caused x dollars of damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now.

当然，何为“合适的价格”并不容易判定。巨灾保险不能简单外推历史经验。举例而言，若“全球变暖”确实存在，风险概率就会变化，因为大气条件的微小改变可能引发天气模式的重大变化。此外，近些年来美国沿海地区的人口与承保价值激增，而这些区域对飓风（巨灾的头号制造者）尤为脆弱。20年前造成 x 美元损失的飓风，如今很容易造成 10x 的损失。

Occasionally, also, the unthinkable happens. Who would have guessed, for example, that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston, S.C.? (It struck in 1886, registered an estimated 6.6 on the Richter scale, and caused 60 deaths.) And who could have imagined that our country’s most serious quake would occur at New Madrid, Missouri, which suffered an estimated 8.7 shocker in 1812. By comparison, the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7.1 — and remember that each one-point Richter increase represents a ten-fold increase in strength. Someday, a U.S. earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers.

偶尔，不可想象之事也会发生。比如，谁会想到在 South Carolina 的 Charleston 会发生大地震？（1886年曾发生，估计里氏6.6级，造成60人死亡。）又有谁会想到美国历史上最严重的地震发生在 Missouri 的 New Madrid？1812年的那次估计达里氏8.7级。相比之下，1989年 San Francisco 的地震为7.1级——别忘了里氏每增加1级，强度增加十倍。某一天，美国在远离加州的地区发生的地震也会给保险公司带来巨额损失。

When viewing our quarterly figures, you should understand that our accounting for super-cat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums. Rather than recording our super-cat premiums on a pro-rata basis over the life of a given policy, we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires. We take this conservative approach because the likelihood of super-cats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year. It is then that weather tends to kick up: Of the ten largest insured losses in U.S. history, nine occurred in the last half of the year. In addition, policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely, by their very terms, to cause us losses until late in the year.

在查看我们的季度数据时，你应当理解：我们对巨灾保费的会计处理不同于其他保险保费。我们并不在保单存续期内按比例确认巨灾保费，而是递延至发生损失或保单到期时才确认收入。我们采取这种保守做法，是因为巨灾在年末给我们带来损失的可能性尤为突出。那时天气更易“发威”：美国历史上十大保险赔付损失中，有九起发生在下半年。此外，按条款设计，那些不是“首次事件”触发的保单，往往要到年末才可能导致我们发生损失。

The bottom-line effect of our accounting procedure for super-cats is this: Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year, but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter.

我们对巨灾业务会计处理的“底线效果”是：全年任何季度都有可能报告大额损失，但显著利润只会在第四季度确认。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

As I’ve told you in each of the last few years, what counts in our insurance business is “the cost of funds developed from insurance,” or in the vernacular, “the cost of float.” Float — which we generate in exceptional amounts — is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents’ balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.

正如我在过去几年的每次报告中所说，我们保险业务中关键的是“由保险形成的资金成本”，或者通俗点说，“float 的成本”。所谓 float——我们能以异常可观的规模产生——等于赔款准备金、理赔费用准备金与未赚保费准备金之和，减去代理人应收款、预付获取成本以及与分入再保险相关的递延费用。float 的成本以我们的承保亏损来衡量。

The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.

下表显示了自 1967 年进入该行业以来我们的 float 成本。

Last year, our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the U.S. Government on its newly-issued long-term bonds. This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the Government’s rate, and often we have done so by a wide margin. (If, on average, we didn’t beat the Government’s rate, there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business.)

去年，我们的保险业务再次以低于美国政府新发长期国债利率的成本获得了资金。这意味着在我们从事保险业务的 26 年中，有 21 年我们跑赢了政府利率，而且往往大幅跑赢。（如果平均而言无法跑赢政府利率，那我们从事这项业务在经济上就没有意义。）

In 1992, as in previous years, National Indemnity’s commercial auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, and our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred, made excellent contributions to our low cost of float. Indeed, both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year, thereby generating float at a less-than-zero cost. The bulk of our float, meanwhile, comes from large transactions developed by Ajit. His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during 1993.

1992 年，与往年一样，由 Don Wurster 负责的 National Indemnity 的商用汽车与一般责任险业务，以及由 Rod Eldred 负责的本州业务，为我们实现低成本 float 作出了卓越贡献。事实上，这两项业务在去年都实现了承保盈利，从而以低于零成本的方式生成了 float。与此同时，我们的大部分 float 来自 Ajit 促成的大额交易。他的努力很可能在 1993 年进一步推动 float 的增长。

Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide; and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage. We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business, either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we did by acquiring Central States Indemnity.

我与 Charlie 依然偏爱保险业务，并预期其在未来数十年仍将是我们的主要盈利来源。这个行业体量巨大；在某些细分领域我们可以在全球范围内竞争；而 Berkshire 拥有重要的竞争优势。我们将寻求扩大参与该业务的方式，无论是像通过 GEICO 那样间接参与，还是像收购 Central States Indemnity 那样直接参与。

Common Stock Investments

普通股投资

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下文列示了我们市值超过 1 亿美元的普通股持仓。其中有一小部分归属于 Berkshire 持股未达 100% 的子公司。

Leaving aside splits, the number of shares we held in these companies changed during 1992 in only four cases: We added moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo, we more than doubled our position in Freddie Mac, and we established a new holding in General Dynamics. We like to buy.

撇开拆股不谈，我们在这些公司的持股数量在1992年仅有四处变化：我们适度增持了 Guinness 和 Wells Fargo，在 Freddie Mac 上的持仓翻了一倍多，并新建了 General Dynamics 的持仓。我们喜欢买入。

Selling, however, is a different story. There, our pace of activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself stuck in tiny Podunk’s only hotel. With no T.V. in his room, he faced an evening of boredom. But his spirits soared when he spied a book on the night table entitled “Things to do in Podunk.” Opening it, he found just a single sentence: “You’re doing it.”

然而，卖出则完全是另一回事。在这方面，我们的节奏就像被困在名叫 Podunk 的小镇唯一一家旅馆里的旅者。房间里没有电视，他面临一个无聊的夜晚。但当他在床头柜上看到一本名为《Things to do in Podunk》的书时，心情大好。翻开一看，书里只有一句话：“You’re doing it.”

We were lucky in our General Dynamics purchase. I had paid little attention to the company until last summer, when it announced it would repurchase about 30% of its shares by way of a Dutch tender. Seeing an arbitrage opportunity, I began buying the stock for Berkshire, expecting to tender our holdings for a small profit. We’ve made the same sort of commitment perhaps a half-dozen times in the last few years, reaping decent rates of return for the short periods our money has been tied up.

我们在买入 General Dynamics 上很幸运。直到去年夏天我才开始关注这家公司——当时它宣布将通过 Dutch tender 回购约30%的股份。看到套利机会后，我开始替 Berkshire 买入该股，打算在要约中交回所持股份以获取小额利润。过去几年里，我们大概做过六七次类似的投入，在资金被占用的短期内获得了不错的回报率。

But then I began studying the company and the accomplishments of Bill Anders in the brief time he’d been CEO. And what I saw made my eyes pop: Bill had a clearly articulated and rational strategy; he had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in carrying it out; and the results were truly remarkable.

但随后我开始研究这家公司以及 Bill Anders 担任 CEO 这段短时间里的业绩。所见所闻令我大开眼界：Bill 制定了清晰且理性的战略；在执行上专注且充满紧迫感；而结果确实非同凡响。

In short order, I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided that Berkshire should become a long-term investor with Bill. We were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock. In a one-month period, we were able to purchase 14% of the General Dynamics shares that remained outstanding after the tender was completed.

很快，我放弃了套利的想法，决定让 Berkshire 与 Bill 一起成为长期投资者。要约回购显著放大了该股的交易量，这帮助我们建立了大额头寸。在一个月内，我们买下了要约完成后 General Dynamics 流通股的14%。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report: “We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price.” We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute “an attractive price” for “a very attractive price.”

我们的股票投资策略与十五年前几乎无异。正如我们在1977年的年报中所说：“我们选择可交易普通股的方式，基本就像评估一整家公司是否值得整体收购。我们希望该企业：(a) 我们能够理解；(b) 具备良好的长期前景；(c) 由诚实且能干的人经营；(d) 可在一个非常有吸引力的价格买到。”只有一处我们认为需要调整：鉴于市场环境与我们的体量，我们如今将“非常有吸引力的价格”改为“有吸引力的价格”。

But how, you will ask, does one decide what’s “attractive”? In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition: “value” and “growth.” Indeed, many investment professionals see any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-dressing.

但你会问，如何判定“有吸引力”？在回答这个问题时，多数分析师觉得必须在传统上被视为对立的两种方法之间做选择：“value”与“growth”。确实，许多投资从业者把两者的混搭视为一种“概念易装”。

We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.

我们认为这是一种模糊思维（必须承认，数年前我自己也曾如此）。在我们看来，这两种方法“骨肉相连”：在价值的计算中，growth 始终是一个组成部分——其重要性可以从微不足道到至关重要，其影响既可能是正面，也可能是负面。

In addition, we think the very term “value investing” is redundant. What is “investing” if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value — in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price — should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor — in our view — financially fattening).

此外，我们认为“value investing”这个术语本身是冗余的。若不是在寻找足以证明所付代价的价值，那还称得上“investing”吗？明知一只股票的计算价值低于支付价格，却仍然多付，希望不久后以更高价格卖出，这应被称为“speculation”（既不违法，也不不道德，但在我们看来——也不利于财富增值）。

Whether appropriate or not, the term “value investing” is widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly, opposite characteristics — a high ratio of price to book value, a high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield — are in no way inconsistent with a “value” purchase.

不论是否恰当，“value investing”已被广泛使用。典型含义是购买具备诸如市净率低、市盈率低或股息率高等属性的股票。不幸的是，即便这些特征同时出现，也远不足以决定投资者是否真在“以其所值的价格”买入、从而确实遵循了“在投资中获取价值”的原则。相应地，反向特征——高市净率、高市盈率与低股息率——也并不必然与“value”型买入相矛盾。

Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about value. It’s true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.

同样地，就其本身而言，业务增长并不能告诉我们多少关于价值的事情。确实，增长常常对价值产生积极影响，有时还会非常显著。但这种效果远非必然。例如，投资者长期向美国国内航空业注入资金，去资助那些无利润（甚至更糟）的增长。对这些投资者来说，如果当年 Orville 没能在 Kitty Hawk 起飞，情况反而会更好：行业增长得越多，所有者遭受的灾难就越大。

Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing — in other words, only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.

只有当相关企业能够以诱人的增量回报进行再投资时，增长才会让投资者受益——换言之，只有当用于支持增长的每一美元，能够创造超过一美元的长期市场价值时才行。对于一个需要持续追加资金却回报率偏低的企业，增长只会伤害投资者。

In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago, John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows — discounted at an appropriate interest rate — that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the future “coupons.” Furthermore, the quality of management affects the bond coupon only rarely — chiefly when management is so inept or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast, the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity “coupons.”

在五十多年前写就的《The Theory of Investment Value》中，John Burr Williams 提出了价值的方程式，我们在此将其浓缩为：任何股票、债券或企业当下的价值，取决于其在剩余寿命期间可预期发生的现金流入与流出——并以适当利率折现之。请注意，这个公式对股票与债券同样适用。尽管如此，二者之间存在一个重要且难以处理的差别：债券的票息与到期日界定了未来的现金流；而对于股票，投资分析师必须自己去估计未来的“票息”。此外，管理质量很少会影响债券的票息——主要只有在管理层无能或不诚实到暂停付息时才会发生。相比之下，管理层的能力却会显著影响股票的“票息”。

The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should purchase — irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn’t, displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable: When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment, they should be bought.

在贴现现金流计算中显得“最便宜”的投资，才是投资者应当买入的——而不应在意该企业是否增长、盈利是否波动或平滑、当前市价相对于当期利润与账面价值是高是低。此外，尽管价值方程通常显示股票比债券更便宜，但这并非必然：当计算表明债券更具吸引力时，就应该买入债券。

Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite — that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases.

撇开价格不谈，最好的生意是在较长时期内能以很高的回报率吸纳大量增量资本的那类；最差的生意则恰好相反——持续以很低的回报率吞噬越来越多的资本。不幸的是，前一种生意极难寻找：多数高回报企业需要的资本相对不多。对于这类企业，如果把绝大部分利润以股息形式发放，或进行大规模回购，股东通常会受益。

Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst — even one who is experienced and intelligent — can easily go wrong in estimating future “coupons.” At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we’re not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn’t bother us. What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don’t know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.

虽然评估股票所需的数学计算并不困难，但分析师——哪怕经验丰富且头脑聪明——在估计未来“票息”时也很容易出错。我们在 Berkshire 用两种方式来应对这个问题。第一，我们尽量专注于那些我们自认为理解的企业。这意味着它们的性质必须相对简单且稳定。如果一个企业复杂或经常变化，我们还不够聪明，无法预测其未来现金流。顺带说一句，这个短板并不困扰我们。对大多数投资者而言，关键不在于知道多少，而在于能否现实地界定自己“不知道”的范围。只要能避免大的错误，投资者其实只需要把很少几件事情做好。

Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we’re not interested in buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success.

第二点，同样重要的是，我们坚持在买入价上留有安全边际。如果我们计算出的普通股价值仅略高于其市价，我们就无意买入。我们相信，由 Ben Graham 强调的“安全边际”原则是投资成功的基石。

Fixed-Income Securities

固定收益证券

Below we list our largest holdings of fixed-income securities:

下文列示了我们规模最大的固定收益持仓：

During 1992 we added to our holdings of ACF debentures, had some of our WPPSS bonds called, and sold our RJR Nabisco position.

1992年，我们增持了 ACF 的债券，部分 WPPSS 债券被赎回，同时卖出了 RJR Nabisco 的头寸。

Over the years, we’ve done well with fixed-income investments, having realized from them both large capital gains (including $80 million in 1992) and exceptional current income. Chrysler Financial, Texaco, Time-Warner, WPPSS and RJR Nabisco were particularly good investments for us. Meanwhile, our fixed-income losses have been negligible: We’ve had thrills but so far no spills.

多年来，我们在固定收益投资上表现良好，既取得了可观的资本利得（包括1992年的8,000万美元），也获得了优异的当期收益。Chrysler Financial、Texaco、Time-Warner、WPPSS 和 RJR Nabisco 尤其是成功的投资。同时，我们在固收方面的亏损微乎其微：惊险不少，但至今没有“翻船”。

Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette preferred, which converted to common stock in 1991, and despite our reasonable results with other negotiated purchases of preferreds, our overall performance with such purchases has been inferior to that we have achieved with purchases made in the secondary market. This is actually the result we expected. It corresponds with our belief that an intelligent investor in common stocks will do better in the secondary market than he will do buying new issues.

尽管我们在 Gillette 可转优先股（1991年转为普通股）上获得了成功，也尽管其他协商购买的优先股取得了尚可的结果，但这类买入的总体表现仍不及我们在二级市场所取得的业绩。事实上，这正是我们预期的结果。这与我们的信念一致：一位聪明的普通股投资者在二级市场的表现会优于购买新发行证券。

The reason has to do with the way prices are set in each instance. The secondary market, which is periodically ruled by mass folly, is constantly setting a “clearing” price. No matter how foolish that price may be, it’s what counts for the holder of a stock or bond who needs or wishes to sell, of whom there are always going to be a few at any moment. In many instances, shares worth x in business value have sold in the market for 1/2x or less.

原因与各自的定价机制有关。二级市场周期性地受“群体愚蠢”支配，始终在形成一个“清算价”。无论这个价格多么荒谬，对于那些需要或希望卖出股票或债券的持有者来说，它都具有决定意义——而任何时刻总会有少数这样的人。在许多情况下，商业价值为 x 的股票在市场上以 1/2x 或更低的价格成交。

The new-issue market, on the other hand, is ruled by controlling stockholders and corporations, who can usually select the timing of offerings or, if the market looks unfavorable, can avoid an offering altogether. Understandably, these sellers are not going to offer any bargains, either by way of a public offering or in a negotiated transaction: It’s rare you’ll find x for 1/2x here. Indeed, in the case of common-stock offerings, selling shareholders are often motivated to unload only when they feel the market is overpaying. (These sellers, of course, would state that proposition somewhat differently, averring instead that they simply resist selling when the market is underpaying for their goods.)

相反，新发行市场由控股股东与公司主导，他们通常可以选择发行时机，或在市况不利时干脆不发。可以理解，这些卖方无论通过公开发行还是协商交易，都不会提供捡便宜的机会：在这里，很少能以 1/2x 的价格买到价值为 x 的东西。事实上，就普通股发行而言，出售股东往往在感觉市场“付多了”时才有动力出货。（当然，这些卖方会换种说法，辩称他们只是在市场“付少了”时拒绝出售。）

To date, our negotiated purchases, as a group, have fulfilled but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 Annual Report: “Our preferred stock investments should produce returns modestly above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios.” In truth, we would have done better if we could have put the money that went into our negotiated transactions into open-market purchases of the type we like. But both our size and the general strength of the markets made that difficult to do.

迄今为止，我们的协商类买入整体实现了、但未超过我们在1989年年报中的预期：“我们的优先股投资应当带来略高于大多数固定收益投资组合的回报。”实话说，如果能把用于协商交易的资金投向我们所偏好的公开市场买入，结果会更好。但受制于我们的体量以及市场整体的强势，这样做并不容易。

There was one other memorable line in the 1989 Annual Report: “We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business, the airline industry, or the paper industry.” At the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance. Now, however, even my mother acknowledges its truth.

1989年年报里还有一句令人难忘的话：“我们没有能力预测投行业、航空业或造纸业的经济状况。”当时你们中的一些人或许怀疑这种“无知的自白”。然而现在，连我母亲都承认这话属实。

In the case of our commitment to USAir, industry economics had soured before the ink dried on our check. As I’ve previously mentioned, it was I who happily jumped into the pool; no one pushed me. Yes, I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive, but I did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze behavior. In the last two years, airline companies have acted as if they are members of a competitive tontine, which they wish to bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible.

就我们对 USAir 的投入而言，尚未“墨干字定”，行业经济就已经变坏。正如我之前提到的，这是我自己乐意一跃而下的决定，并非有人把我推下去。没错，我知道这个行业竞争残酷，但我没有料到行业领袖会长期从事“神风”式的行为。在过去两年里，航空公司们的做法仿佛加入了一个竞争版的“合股保生会”（tontine），并急于把它尽快推到终局。

Amidst this turmoil, Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has done a truly extraordinary job in repositioning the airline. He was particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that, had it been lengthy, might well have bankrupted the company. Capitulating to the striking union, however, would have been equally disastrous: The company was burdened with wage costs and work rules that were considerably more onerous than those encumbering its major competitors, and it was clear that over time any high-cost producer faced extinction. Happily for everyone, the strike was settled in a few days.

在这场动荡中，USAir 的 CEO Seth Schofield 在公司再定位方面确实干得出类拔萃。尤其值得称道的是，他在去年秋天敢于直面一次罢工——若罢工拖久，公司很可能破产；但向罢工工会屈服同样会是灾难：公司的工资成本与工作规则明显严于主要竞争对手，显而易见，任何高成本生产者终会被淘汰。所幸的是，这次罢工在数日内即告解决。

A competitively-beset business such as USAir requires far more managerial skill than does a business with fine economics. Unfortunately, though, the near-term reward for skill in the airline business is simply survival, not prosperity.

像 USAir 这种被竞争围困的业务，对管理能力的要求远高于一家经济属性优良的企业。不幸的是，在航空业，管理出色在短期内得到的回报往往只是“活下来”，而不是“繁荣”。

In early 1993, USAir took a major step toward assuring survival — and eventual prosperity — by accepting British Airways’ offer to make a substantial, but minority, investment in the company. In connection with this transaction, Charlie and I were asked to join the USAir board. We agreed, though this makes five outside board memberships for me, which is more than I believe advisable for an active CEO. Even so, if an investee’s management and directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I join its board, we are glad to do so. We expect the managers of our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses they run, and there are times when large owners should do their bit as well.

1993年初，USAir 通过接受 British Airways 对公司进行一笔可观但为少数股权的投资，迈出了确保生存（并最终实现繁荣）的重要一步。与此交易相关，Charlie 和我受邀加入 USAir 董事会。我们同意了，尽管这使我担任的外部董事席位增至五个，这对一位在职 CEO 来说超过了我认为合适的上限。即便如此，如果被投资企业的管理层与董事会认为 Charlie 和我加入其董事会特别重要，我们也乐于为之。我们期望被投资企业的经理人努力提升所经营业务的价值，而在某些时候，大股东也应尽一份力。

Two New Accounting Rules and a Plea for One More

两项新的会计准则以及对另一项的呼吁

A new accounting rule having to do with deferred taxes becomes effective in 1993. It undoes a dichotomy in our books that I have described in previous annual reports and that relates to the accrued taxes carried against the unrealized appreciation in our investment portfolio. At yearend 1992, that appreciation amounted to $7.6 billion. Against $6.4 billion of that, we carried taxes at the current 34% rate. Against the remainder of $1.2 billion, we carried an accrual of 28%, the tax rate in effect when that portion of the appreciation occurred. The new accounting rule says we must henceforth accrue all deferred tax at the current rate, which to us seems sensible.

一项与递延税项相关的新会计规则将于1993年生效。它消除了我们账面上我在往年年报中描述过的一种“二元处理”——即针对投资组合未实现增值所计提的应计税金。到1992年年底，这部分未实现增值为76亿美元；其中64亿美元按当时34%的税率计提税金；其余12亿美元按28%计提，这是该部分增值发生时适用的税率。新规则要求今后所有递延税项一律按现行税率计提，在我们看来这是合理的。

The new marching orders mean that in the first quarter of 1993 we will apply a 34% rate to all of our unrealized appreciation, thereby increasing the tax liability and reducing net worth by $70 million. The new rule also will cause us to make other minor changes in our calculation of deferred taxes.

新的规定意味着在1993年第一季度，我们将对全部未实现增值按34%的税率计提，从而增加税务负债并使净资产减少7,000万美元。新规则还会使我们在递延税的计算上作出其他一些小幅调整。

Future changes in tax rates will be reflected immediately in the liability for deferred taxes and, correspondingly, in net worth. The impact could well be substantial. Nevertheless, what is important in the end is the tax rate at the time we sell securities, when unrealized appreciation becomes realized.

未来税率的变化将即时反映在递延税负债以及相应的净资产上，影响可能相当可观。不过，归根结底，关键还是我们出售证券时的适用税率——那时未实现增值会变为已实现增益。

Another major accounting change, whose implementation is required by January 1, 1993, mandates that businesses recognize their present-value liability for post-retirement health benefits. Though GAAP has previously required recognition of pensions to be paid in the future, it has illogically ignored the costs that companies will then have to bear for health benefits. The new rule will force many companies to record a huge balance-sheet liability (and a consequent reduction in net worth) and also henceforth to recognize substantially higher costs when they are calculating annual profits.

另一项重大会计变更要求自1993年1月1日起实施，规定企业必须确认退休后医疗福利的现值负债。虽然GAAP过去已要求确认未来应支付的养老金，但却不合逻辑地忽视了企业届时必须承担的医疗福利成本。新规则将迫使许多公司在资产负债表上计入巨额负债（从而减少净资产），并在今后计算年度利润时确认显著更高的费用。

In making acquisitions, Charlie and I have tended to avoid companies with significant post-retirement liabilities. As a result, Berkshire’s present liability and future costs for post-retirement health benefits—though we now have 22,000 employees—are inconsequential. I need to admit, though, that we had a near miss: In 1982 I made a huge mistake in committing to buy a company burdened by extraordinary post-retirement health obligations. Luckily, though, the transaction fell through for reasons beyond our control. Reporting on this episode in the 1982 annual report, I said: “If we were to introduce graphics to this report, illustrating favorable business developments of the past year, two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold.” Even so, I wasn’t expecting things to get as bad as they did. Another buyer appeared, the business soon went bankrupt and was shut down, and thousands of workers found those bountiful health-care promises to be largely worthless.

在进行收购时，我与 Charlie 倾向于回避那些承担着重大退休后义务的公司。由此，即便我们如今有22,000名员工，Berkshire 在退休后医疗福利上的现时负债与未来成本仍然微不足道。不过我必须承认，我们曾经险些踩雷：1982年，我承诺收购一家背负异常沉重退休后医疗义务的公司，这是一个大错误。幸运的是，该交易因我们无法控制的原因告吹。我在1982年的年报里这样写道：“如果我们给这份报告配图，以展示去年业务上的利好进展，那么把这笔黄了的交易画成两页空白，最适合作为中页拉花。”尽管如此，我仍未料到后来会糟到那种程度：另一个买家出现后，该企业很快破产清算，数千名工人发现那些慷慨的医保承诺在很大程度上成了废纸。

In recent decades, no CEO would have dreamed of going to his board with the proposition that his company become an insurer of uncapped post-retirement health benefits that other corporations chose to install. A CEO didn’t need to be a medical expert to know that lengthening life expectancies and soaring health costs would guarantee an insurer a financial battering from such a business. Nevertheless, many a manager blithely committed his own company to a self-insurance plan embodying precisely the same promises—and thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable consequences. In health-care, open-ended promises have created open-ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to threaten the global competitiveness of major American industries.

近几十年来，没有哪个CEO会做梦也想到要去董事会提案：让自己的公司去承保其他公司设置的无上限退休后医疗福利。CEO 无需成为医疗专家也明白，寿命延长与医疗成本飙升必然让承保此类业务的保险公司遭受财务重创。然而，许多经理人却轻率地让自己的公司实行自保计划，作出与上述同样的承诺——于是注定让股东承担不可避免的后果。在医疗领域，“无上限的承诺”造就了“无上限的负债”，在少数案例中其体量之大，已威胁到美国主要行业的全球竞争力。

I believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was that accounting rules did not, for so long, require the booking of post-retirement health costs as they were incurred. Instead, the rules allowed cash-basis accounting, which vastly understated the liabilities that were building up. In effect, the attitude of both managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was “out-of-sight, out-of-mind.” Ironically, some of these same managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing “cash-basis” thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other programs creating future liabilities of size.

我认为，这种鲁莽行为的部分原因在于，会计规则长期没有要求按发生额确认退休后医疗成本；相反，规则允许现金基础的会计处理，这极大低估了不断累积的负债。实质上，管理层及其会计师对这些负债的态度是“眼不见，心不烦”。讽刺的是，其中一些经理人却会迅速批评国会在社会保障承诺或其他形成巨额未来负债的项目上采用“现金制”思维。

到处都是这种前后矛盾的逻辑，因为和所以之间没有任何的联系。

Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget one of Abraham Lincoln’s favorite riddles: “How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg?” The answer: “Four, because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg.” It behooves managers to remember that Abe’s right even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg.

在思考会计问题时，经理人绝不能忘记 Abraham Lincoln 最喜欢的一个谜语：“如果你把狗的尾巴称作一条腿，那么狗有几条腿？”答案是：“四条，因为把尾巴叫作腿并不会让它变成一条腿。”即便审计师愿意证明“尾巴是条腿”，经理人也应牢记林肯的这句至理名言。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The most egregious case of let’s-not-face-up-to-reality behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of stock options. In Berkshire’s 1985 annual report, I laid out my opinions about the use and misuse of options. But even when options are structured properly, they are accounted for in ways that make no sense. The lack of logic is not accidental: For decades, much of the business world has waged war against accounting rulemakers, trying to keep the costs of stock options from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue them.

高管与会计师在逃避现实方面最恶劣的案例，发生在股票期权领域。在 Berkshire 的1985年年报中，我阐述了对期权使用与滥用的看法。但即使期权设计得当，其会计处理方式也常常毫无道理。其不合逻辑并非偶然：几十年来，商界相当一部分人一直在与会计规则制定者“开战”，努力阻止股票期权成本反映到发行这些期权的公司的利润中。

Typically, executives have argued that options are hard to value and that therefore their costs should be ignored. At other times managers have said that assigning a cost to options would injure small start-up businesses. Sometimes they have even solemnly declared that “out-of-the-money” options (those with an exercise price equal to or above the current market price) have no value when they are issued.

通常，高管会辩称期权难以计价，因此其成本应当忽略。还有时候，经理人会说给期权计成本会伤害小型初创企业。有时他们甚至郑重其事地宣称，“价外”期权（行权价等于或高于当前市价）在授予时没有价值。

Oddly, the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in with a variation on that theme, opining that options should not be viewed as a cost because they “aren’t dollars out of a company’s coffers.” I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options. So if you’re a CEO and subscribe to this “no cash-no cost” theory of accounting, I’ll make you an offer you can’t refuse: Give us a call at Berkshire and we will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long-term options on your company’s stock.

奇怪的是，Council of Institutional Investors 也附和了一个变体观点，认为期权不应视为成本，因为它们“并未让公司现金流出”。在我看来，这种逻辑为美国公司立刻改善报表利润提供了令人“振奋”的新可能。例如，它们可以用期权来支付保险，从而“消除”保险成本。所以，如果你是 CEO 并认同这种“无现金即无成本”的会计理论，我有一个你无法拒绝的提议：打电话给 Berkshire，我们很乐意用你公司股票的一揽子长期期权来交换我们出售给你的保险。

Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party and not just when cash changes hands. Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can’t be quantified with pinpoint precision. Right now, accounting abounds with imprecision. After all, no manager or auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last, which means he also does not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane should be. No one knows with any certainty what a bank’s annual loan loss charge ought to be. And the estimates of losses that property-casualty companies make are notoriously inaccurate.

股东应当明白：当公司向他方交付有价值之物时就已发生成本，而不只是现金发生变动时才有成本。此外，声称某项重要成本因为无法“精确到毫厘”就不该确认，这既愚蠢又犬儒。会计本就充满不精确：毕竟，没有哪位经理人或审计师知道一架747究竟能用多久，这也意味着他并不知道每年的折旧该计多少。没有人能确定一家银行的年度贷款损失计提应是多少。财产意外险公司的损失估计出了名的不准确。

Does this mean that these important items of cost should be ignored simply because they can’t be quantified with absolute accuracy? Of course not. Rather, these costs should be estimated by honest and experienced people and then recorded. When you get right down to it, what other item of major but hard-to-precisely-calculate cost—other, that is, than stock options—does the accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of earnings?

这是否意味着这些重要成本因为无法绝对精确计量就应被忽略？当然不是。相反，这些成本应由诚实且经验丰富的人进行估计并予以入账。说到底，除了股票期权之外，还有哪一项重大的、难以精确计量的成本是会计行业认为可以在利润计算中忽略不计的？

Moreover, options are just not that difficult to value. Admittedly, the difficulty is increased by the fact that the options given to executives are restricted in various ways. These restrictions affect value. They do not, however, eliminate it. In fact, since I’m in the mood for offers, I’ll make one to any executive who is granted a restricted option, even though it may be out of the money: On the day of issue, Berkshire will pay him or her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she realizes on the option. So if you find a CEO who says his newly-issued options have little or no value, tell him to try us out. In truth, we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet.

此外，期权并没有那么难以计价。诚然，授予高管的期权常带有各种限制，这会影响价值，但并不会令其价值归零。事实上，既然我正有“要约”的兴致，我愿向任何获得受限期权的高管再提一个——即便该期权处于价外：在授予日，Berkshire 愿意以一笔可观的金额购买他/她未来在该期权上实现的全部收益权。所以，如果你遇到声称其新发期权“几乎无价值”的 CEO，劝他来找我们试试。老实说，相比确定公司公务机的合适折旧率，我们更有信心给期权定出一个合适的价格。

It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized quite simply: If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?

在我看来，股票期权的实质可以非常简单地概括：如果期权不是一种报酬，那它是什么？如果报酬不是费用，那又是什么？如果费用不该计入利润，那它究竟该去哪儿？

The accounting profession and the SEC should be shamed by the fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business executives on the option-accounting issue. Additionally, the lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate by-product: In my opinion, the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society—about which it may have much of value to say—when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.

会计行业与 SEC 应该为此感到羞愧：在期权会计问题上，他们长期允许自己被企业高管施压。此外，高管们展开的游说还有一个不幸的副作用：在我看来，当商业精英在涉及自身切身利益的问题上鼓吹“难以置信”的观点时，他们在对社会重大议题（其实他们本可以提出许多有价值见解）的发言上，将面临公信力受损的风险。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We have two pieces of regrettable news this year. First, Gladys Kaiser, my friend and assistant for twenty-five years, will give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting, though she will certainly remain my friend forever. Gladys and I have been a team, and though I knew her retirement was coming, it is still a jolt.

今年我们有两件令人遗憾的消息。首先，我的朋友兼助手 Gladys Kaiser 在服务我二十五年之后，将在 1993 年年度股东大会后卸任助手一职，尽管她当然会永远是我的朋友。多年来我与 Gladys 一直是搭档，尽管我早知她的退休在即，但真正来临时依然让人震动。

Secondly, in September, Verne McKenzie relinquished his role as Chief Financial Officer after a 30-year association with me that began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Verne is staying on as a consultant, and though that job description is often a euphemism, in this case it has real meaning. I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at Berkshire but to do so at his own pace. Marc Hamburg, Verne’s understudy for five years, has succeeded him as Chief Financial Officer.

其次，9 月份，Verne McKenzie 结束了与我长达 30 年的合作关系并卸任首席财务官——我们的渊源始于他担任 Buffett Partnership, Ltd. 的外部审计师。Verne 将以顾问身份继续留下，虽然“顾问”这头衔常被用作委婉说法，但在此情形下确有其义。我期望 Verne 继续在 Berkshire 发挥重要作用，不过以他自己的节奏即可。Verne 的助手 Marc Hamburg（跟随五年）已接任首席财务官。

I recall that one woman, upon being asked to describe the perfect spouse, specified an archeologist: “The older I get,” she said, “the more he’ll be interested in me.” She would have liked my tastes: I treasure those extraordinary Berkshire managers who are working well past normal retirement age and who concomitantly are achieving results much superior to those of their younger competitors. While I understand and empathize with the decision of Verne and Gladys to retire when the calendar says it’s time, theirs is not a step I wish to encourage. It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.

我记得有人问一位女士描述“完美伴侣”，她指名要一位考古学家：“我年纪越大，他就越感兴趣。”她会认同我的口味：我珍视那些远超常规退休年龄仍在工作的 Berkshire 杰出经理人，而且他们取得的成绩远胜更年轻的竞争者。尽管我理解并同情 Verne 与 Gladys 遵照日历选择退休的决定，但这并非我所鼓励的一步。要教一条新狗旧把戏，确实不易。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I am a moderate in my views about retirement compared to Rose Blumkin, better known as Mrs. B. At 99, she continues to work seven days a week. And about her, I have some particularly good news.

与更广为人知的 Mrs. B（Rose Blumkin）相比，我在退休观上算温和派。她 99 岁仍然每周工作七天。关于她，我有特别好的消息。

You will remember that after her family sold 80% of Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM) to Berkshire in 1983, Mrs. B continued to be Chairman and run the carpet operation. In 1989, however, she left because of a managerial disagreement and opened up her own operation next door in a large building that she had owned for several years. In her new business, she ran the carpet section but leased out other home-furnishings departments.

你会记得，1983 年她的家族将 Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM）80% 的股权卖给 Berkshire 之后，Mrs. B 仍担任董事长并负责地毯业务。然而在 1989 年，她因管理分歧而离开，并在隔壁一幢她已拥有多年的大楼里开设了自己的业务。在这家新公司里，她自营地毯部门，而将其他家居用品部门出租。

At the end of last year, Mrs. B decided to sell her building and land to NFM. She’ll continue, however, to run her carpet business at its current location (no sense slowing down just when you’re hitting full stride). NFM will set up shop alongside her, in that same building, thereby making a major addition to its furniture business.

去年年底，Mrs. B 决定把那栋大楼及土地卖给 NFM。不过，她将继续在现址经营她的地毯业务（正在全速前进，没理由放慢脚步）。NFM 将与她并肩在同一栋大楼开设门店，从而对其家具业务进行一次重大扩张。

I am delighted that Mrs. B has again linked up with us. Her business story has no parallel and I have always been a fan of hers, whether she was a partner or a competitor. But believe me, partner is better.

我非常高兴 Mrs. B 再次与我们牵手。她的商业传奇无可比拟，不论她是我们的合作伙伴还是竞争者，我始终是她的粉丝。但请相信我，合作伙伴更好。

This time around, Mrs. B graciously offered to sign a non-compete agreement—and I, having been incautious on this point when she was 89, snapped at the deal. Mrs. B belongs in the Guinness Book of World Records on many counts. Signing a non-compete at 99 merely adds one more.

这一次，Mrs. B 主动提出签署竞业禁止协议——而我在她 89 岁时在这方面疏忽过，这回当然立刻拍板。Mrs. B 在许多方面都配得上《Guinness Book of World Records》，99 岁签竞业禁止，只是又添上一笔而已。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Ralph Schey, CEO of Scott Fetzer and a manager who I hope is with us at 99 also, hit a grand slam last year when that company earned a record $110 million pre-tax. What’s even more impressive is that Scott Fetzer achieved such earnings while employing only $116 million of equity capital. This extraordinary result is not the product of leverage: The company uses only minor amounts of borrowed money (except for the debt it employs - appropriately - in its finance subsidiary).

Scott Fetzer 的 CEO Ralph Schey——一位我也希望能在 99 岁时依然与我们并肩的经理人——去年打出了一记满贯本垒打：公司录得创纪录的 1.1 亿美元税前利润。更令人印象深刻的是，Scott Fetzer 仅用 1.16 亿美元的股本资本就达成了这样的盈利。这个非凡结果并非杠杆所致：公司几乎不借债（其金融子公司所使用的债务除外——这是恰当的）。

Scott Fetzer now operates with a significantly smaller investment in both inventory and fixed assets than it had when we bought it in 1986. This means the company has been able to distribute more than 100% of its earnings to Berkshire during our seven years of ownership while concurrently increasing its earnings stream - which was excellent to begin with - by a lot. Ralph just keeps on outdoing himself, and Berkshire shareholders owe him a great deal.

如今 Scott Fetzer 在存货和固定资产上的投入，较我们 1986 年收购时已显著减少。这意味着在我们持有的七年间，公司一边把超过 100% 的利润分配给 Berkshire，一边还把本已出色的盈利能力大幅提升。Ralph 不断超越自我，Berkshire 的股东对他恩重如山。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Those readers with particularly sharp eyes will note that our corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in 1992. Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet, The Indefensible. Forget it! I find the thought of retiring the plane even more revolting than the thought of retiring the Chairman. (In this matter I’ve demonstrated uncharacteristic flexibility: For years I argued passionately against corporate jets. But finally my dogma was run over by my karma.)

眼尖的读者会注意到，我们的公司费用从 1991 年的 560 万美元降至 1992 年的 420 万美元。也许你会以为我把公司的公务机 The Indefensible 给卖了。别想了！相比“让董事长退休”，我对“让飞机退休”的想法更反感。（在这件事上，我展现了不太符合我性格的“灵活性”：多年来我激烈反对公司公务机，但最终我的教条被我的因果辗过了。）

Our reduction in corporate overhead actually came about because those expenses were especially high in 1991, when we incurred a one-time environmental charge relating to alleged pre-1970 actions of our textile operation. Now that things are back to normal, our after-tax overhead costs are under 1% of our reported operating earnings and less than 1/2 of 1% of our look-through earnings. We have no legal, personnel, public relations, investor relations, or strategic planning departments. In turn this means we don’t need support personnel such as guards, drivers, messengers, etc. Finally, except for Verne, we employ no consultants. Professor Parkinson would like our operation - though Charlie, I must say, still finds it outrageously fat.

公司管理费用的下降，实际上是因为 1991 年的费用特别高——当年我们因纺织业务被指称 1970 年前的行为而计入了一笔一次性的环境费用。如今恢复常态后，我们税后管理费用占报告的经营利润不足 1%，占“穿透式”收益不到 0.5%。我们没有法务、人事、公共关系、投资者关系或战略规划部门；因此也不需要保安、司机、内勤投递等支持人员。最后，除了 Verne，我们不聘用任何顾问。Professor Parkinson 会喜欢我们的运作方式——不过我得说，Charlie 仍然觉得我们“胖得离谱”。

At some companies, corporate expense runs 10% or more of operating earnings. The tithing that operations thus makes to headquarters not only hurts earnings, but more importantly slashes capital values. If the business that spends 10% on headquarters’ costs achieves earnings at its operating levels identical to those achieved by the business that incurs costs of only 1%, shareholders of the first enterprise suffer a 9% loss in the value of their holdings simply because of corporate overhead. Charlie and I have observed no correlation between high corporate costs and good corporate performance. In fact, we see the simpler, low-cost operation as more likely to operate effectively than its bureaucratic brethren. We’re admirers of the Wal-Mart, Nucor, Dover, GEICO, Golden West Financial and Price Co. models.

在一些公司，管理费用高达经营利润的 10% 甚至更多。业务对总部这种“什一奉献”，不仅伤害利润，更重要的是削减资本价值。若一家企业把 10% 用于总部开销，而其经营层面的盈利与另一家仅花 1% 的企业相同，那么前者的股东仅因总部费用这一项，就在持有价值上损失了 9%。我与 Charlie 从未观察到“高总部成本”与“优秀企业表现”之间存在任何相关性。事实上，我们认为简洁、低成本的运作，比官僚化的同类更可能运转高效。我们欣赏 Wal-Mart、Nucor、Dover、GEICO、Golden West Financial 和 Price Co. 的模式。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Late last year Berkshire’s stock price crossed $10,000. Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price causes them problems: They like to give shares away each year and find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction between annual gifts of $10,000 or under to a single individual and those above $10,000. That is, those gifts no greater than $10,000 are completely tax-free; those above $10,000 require the donor to use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and estate taxes, or, if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift taxes.

去年年底，Berkshire 的股价突破了 10,000 美元。几位股东向我提到，这样的高股价会带来一些问题：他们每年都想赠送股票，却受到税法的限制——税法把对同一个人的年度赠与分为两类：不超过 10,000 美元与超过 10,000 美元。也就是说，不超过 10,000 美元的赠与完全免税；超过 10,000 美元的赠与，赠与人需要动用其遗产与赠与税的终身免税额，或者在免税额已用尽时缴纳赠与税。

I can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first would be useful to a married shareholder, who can give up to $20,000 annually to a single recipient, as long as the donor files a gift tax return containing his or her spouse’s written consent to gifts made during the year.

我可以提出三种应对方法。第一种适用于已婚股东：只要在赠与税申报表中附上配偶对当年赠与的书面同意，赠与人可对同一受赠者每年赠与最高 20,000 美元。

Secondly, a shareholder, married or not, can make a bargain sale. Imagine, for example, that Berkshire is selling for $12,000 and that one wishes to make only a $10,000 gift. In that case, sell the stock to the giftee for $2,000. (Caution: You will be taxed on the amount, if any, by which the sales price to your giftee exceeds your tax basis.)

第二，无论是否已婚，股东都可以进行“优惠出售”。举例来说，如果 Berkshire 的股价为 12,000 美元，而你只想赠与 10,000 美元，那么就以 2,000 美元的价格把该股票卖给受赠人。（注意：若卖给受赠人的价格高于你的税务成本，超出部分需要纳税。）

Finally, you can establish a partnership with people to whom you are making gifts, fund it with Berkshire shares, and simply give percentage interests in the partnership away each year. These interests can be for any value that you select. If the value is $10,000 or less, the gift will be tax-free.

最后，你可以与受赠人设立合伙企业，以 Berkshire 股票注入资本，并在每年按比例赠与合伙权益。这些权益可以是你设定的任意金额；若价值为 10,000 美元或以下，该赠与即可免税。

We issue the customary warning: Consult with your own tax advisor before taking action on any of the more esoteric methods of gift-making.

老规矩，还是要提醒一句：采用上述较“偏门”的赠与方式前，请先咨询你的税务顾问。

We hold to the view about stock splits that we set forth in the 1983 Annual Report. Overall, we believe our owner-related policies—including the no-split policy—have helped us assemble a body of shareholders that is the best associated with any widely-held American corporation. Our shareholders think and behave like rational long-term owners and view the business much as Charlie and I do. Consequently, our stock consistently trades in a price range that is sensibly related to intrinsic value.

关于股票拆分，我们仍持 1983 年年报中的观点。总体而言，我们相信与所有权相关的政策——包括不拆分政策——帮助我们聚集了一群在美国公众公司中堪称最佳的股东。我们的股东像理性的长期所有者那样思考与行事，并以与我和 Charlie 相同的方式看待这家企业。因此，我们的股票价格始终在与内在价值合理相关的区间内交易。

Additionally, we believe that our shares turn over far less actively than do the shares of any other widely-held company. The frictional costs of trading—which act as a major “tax” on the owners of many companies—are virtually non-existent at Berkshire. (The market-making skills of Jim Maguire, our New York Stock Exchange specialist, definitely help to keep these costs low.) Obviously a split would not change this situation dramatically. Nonetheless, there is no way that our shareholder group would be upgraded by the new shareholders enticed by a split. Instead we believe that modest degradation would occur.

此外，我们相信相较于其他任何一家公众持股广泛的公司，我们的股票换手率要低得多。交易摩擦成本——对于许多公司所有者而言相当于一项重要的“税负”——在 Berkshire 几乎不存在。（我们在纽约证券交易所的指定做市商 Jim Maguire 的专业能力，确实有助于把这些成本维持在低位。）显然，拆股并不会显著改变这一状况。相反，我们认为，拆股所吸引的新股东不可能提升我们的股东群体质量，反而会带来一定程度的“稀释”。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

As I mentioned earlier, on December 16th we called our zero-coupon, convertible debentures for payment on January 4, 1993. These obligations bore interest at 5 1/2%, a low cost for funds when they were issued in 1989, but an unattractive rate for us at the time of call.

如前所述，12 月 16 日我们通知将于 1993 年 1 月 4 日兑付我们的零息可转债。该债券票面利率为 5 1/2%，在 1989 年发行时属于低成本资金，但在通知赎回时对我们已不具吸引力。

The debentures could have been redeemed at the option of the holder in September 1994, and 5 1/2% money available for no longer than that is not now of interest to us. Furthermore, Berkshire shareholders are disadvantaged by having a conversion option outstanding. At the time we issued the debentures, this disadvantage was offset by the attractive interest rate they carried; by late 1992, it was not.

这些债券在 1994 年 9 月起可由持有人选择赎回，而在这之前 5 1/2% 的资金成本对我们已经没有吸引力。此外，可转债的转换权处于存续状态，对 Berkshire 股东是不利的。在我们发行该债券时，这种不利因素被其具有吸引力的利率所抵消；但到了 1992 年底，情况已不再如此。

In general, we continue to have an aversion to debt, particularly the short-term kind. But we are willing to incur modest amounts of debt when it is both properly structured and of significant benefit to shareholders.

总体而言，我们仍然厌恶负债，尤其是短期负债。但只要结构合理、且能给股东带来显著利益，我们愿意承担适度的债务。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1992 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $7.6 million, and 2,810 charities were recipients. I’m considering increasing these contributions in the future at a rate greater than the increase in Berkshire’s book value, and I would be glad to hear from you as to your thinking about this idea.

约97%的合格股份参与了 Berkshire 1992 年的股东指定捐赠项目。通过该项目完成的捐赠总额为 760 万美元，共有 2,810 家慈善机构受益。我正在考虑未来将这些捐赠的增幅设定为高于 Berkshire 账面价值增幅的水平，也欢迎你们就这个想法提出看法。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1993 will be ineligible for the 1993 program.

我们建议新股东阅读第 48–49 页关于股东指定捐赠项目的说明。若要参加未来的项目，你必须确保你的股票登记在实际所有者名下，而不是券商、银行或托管机构的名义账户名下。未在 1993 年 8 月 31 日前完成此类登记的股份将无资格参与 1993 年的项目。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $2.0 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

除 Berkshire 以股东名义分配的指定捐赠外，我们各运营子公司的管理层每年还会进行包括实物在内、平均约 200 万美元的捐赠。这些捐赠支持诸如 The United Way 等本地慈善机构，并为我们的业务带来大致相称的益处。

However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.

但是，无论是我们的运营经理，还是母公司的管理人员，都不会动用 Berkshire 的资金向全国性项目或他们个人特别关心的慈善活动捐款，除非他们以股东身份这样做。如果你的员工（包括你的 CEO）希望向其母校或其他他们有个人情感联系的机构捐赠，我们认为他们应该使用自己的钱，而不是你的钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 26, 1993. A record 1,700 people turned up for the meeting last year, but that number still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.

今年的年度股东大会将于 1993 年 4 月 26 日（周一）上午 9:30 在 Omaha 市中心的 Orpheum Theater 举行。去年与会人数创纪录达到 1,700 人，但 Orpheum 仍有充足空间。

We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim’s, which is a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议你尽早在以下酒店预订房间：（1）The Radisson-Redick Tower——一家小巧（88 间客房）但舒适的酒店，位于 Orpheum 对街；（2）Red Lion Hotel——规模更大，距 Orpheum 步行约五分钟；（3）Marriott——位于 Omaha 西区，距 Borsheim’s 约 100 码，距市中心车程约 20 分钟。我们将在 Marriott 安排巴士，于 8:30 和 8:45 发车前往会场，会后送返。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.

我和 Charlie 一直很享受这场会议，也希望你能到场。我们股东的素质体现在他们提问的质量上：我们从未在任何地方参加过一场年度会议，能像这里这样持续提出如此高水平、与所有者相关的问题。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.

我们的委托书材料附带说明了如何获取入场所需的凭证卡。随凭证卡我们还会附上 Orpheum 附近停车设施的信息。如果你自驾，请稍早到达。附近的停车场很快会停满，你可能需要步行几个街区。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See’s Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Charlie and I are a good bit wider than we were back in 1972 when we bought See’s.

一如既往，会后我们将安排巴士送你们前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart 与 Borsheim’s，随后再从商店送回市区酒店或机场。希望你能预留充足时间，尽情探索这两家店的魅力。提前到达的朋友可以在任何一天参观 Furniture Mart；周六营业时间为上午 10 点至下午 5:30，周日为中午 12 点至下午 5:30。到店时别忘了去 See’s Candy Cart 转转，亲自体会一下为什么自从 1972 年我们收购 See’s 以来，我和 Charlie 的“横向尺寸”增加了不少。

Borsheim’s normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 25. Charlie and I will be in attendance, sporting our jeweler’s loupes, and ready to give advice about gems to anyone foolish enough to listen. Also available will be plenty of Cherry Cokes, See’s candies, and other lesser goodies. I hope you will join us.

Borsheim’s 通常周日不营业，但将于 4 月 25 日（周日）中午 12 点至下午 6 点对股东及其来宾开放。届时我与 Charlie 将到场，佩戴珠宝放大镜，随时准备为任何愿意“冒险倾听”的人提供宝石建议。现场还会准备充足的 Cherry Coke、See’s 糖果及其他“次一级”的美味。期待与你相聚。

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

March 1, 1993

1993-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1993-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

The Salomon Interlude

Acquisitions

Sources of Reported Earnings

“Look-Through” Earnings

Insurance Operations

Common Stock Investments

Fixed-Income Securities

Two New Accounting Rules and a Plea for One More

Miscellaneous

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