1995-03-07 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%. Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.
我们在1994年的净资产（net worth）增加了14.5亿美元，增幅为13.9%。在过去30年（即现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19美元增长到10,083美元，年复合增长率为23%。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the performance of the past.
查理·芒格（Charlie Munger），伯克希尔的副董事长，也是我的合伙人，我和他很少做预测。不过有一个预测我们可以很有把握地给出：伯克希尔未来的业绩不可能接近过去的业绩。
The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that our formula —— the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able people —— is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect, therefore, to keep on doing well.
问题不在于过去有效的方法在未来会失效。相反，我们认为我们的公式——以合理价格买入具备良好经济属性、并由诚实能干的人经营的企业——必然能带来合理的成功。因此，我们预计会继续做得不错。
A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk dramatically.
但是，“钱袋子太肥”是卓越投资回报的敌人。伯克希尔现在的净资产是119亿美元，而查理和我开始管理公司时大约只有2,200万美元。虽然好企业仍然和以往一样多，但如果我们所做的收购相对于伯克希尔的资本规模而言无关紧要，那就毫无意义。（查理经常提醒我：“如果一件事根本不值得做，那就不值得把它做好。”）现在我们只会考虑那些我们认为至少能投入1亿美元的投资标的。在这个最低门槛下，伯克希尔的可投资范围急剧缩小。
Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."
尽管如此，我们仍将坚持把我们带到今天的做法，并尽量不放松标准。Ted Williams 在《The Story of My Life》里解释了原因：“我的论点是，要成为好打者，你必须等到一颗好球。这是书里的第一条规则。如果我不得不去咬那些不在我‘甜蜜区’的球，我就不可能是.344的打者，我可能只能打到.250。”查理和我同意这一点，并会努力等待那些完全落在我们自己“甜蜜区”里的机会。
We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.
我们将继续忽略政治与经济预测；对许多投资者和商人来说，那些预测是昂贵的干扰。30年前，没有人能预见越南战争的大规模升级、工资与价格管制、两次石油冲击、一位总统辞职、苏联解体、道琼斯指数单日下跌508点，或国库券收益率在2.8%到17.4%之间波动。
But, surprise —— none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.
但是，出人意料的是——这些足以载入史册的重大事件，并没有在 Ben Graham 的投资原则上留下哪怕一丝凹痕。它们也没有让“以合理价格协商买入优秀企业”的做法变得不再正确。反过来想：如果我们因为对未知的恐惧而推迟或改变资本投放，我们要付出多大代价？事实上，当市场对某个宏观事件的担忧达到峰值时，我们往往做出了最好的买入。恐惧是追逐时尚者的敌人，却是基本面投资者的朋友。
A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.
未来30年必然会出现另一套重大冲击。我们既不会试图预测这些冲击，也不会试图从中获利。如果我们能找到与过去买入过的那些企业相似的企业，那么外部的意外对我们长期结果的影响将很小。
想着从灾难中获得机会也是有问题的，心理上锚定的是内在价值而不是灾难。
What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.
我们向你们承诺的是——除了更为温和的收益——在你们持有伯克希尔期间，你们的处境将与查理和我完全一致：你们受苦，我们也受苦；你们繁荣，我们也会繁荣。我们不会用“上行分得比下行多”的薪酬安排来破坏这种绑定关系。
We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.
我们还承诺：我们的个人财富将继续以压倒性比例集中在伯克希尔股票上——我们不会一边让你们和我们一起投资，一边把自己的钱放到别处去。此外，伯克希尔也几乎主导了我们大多数家庭成员的投资组合，并且在许多朋友的资产中占据核心地位——这些朋友当年都参与过查理和我在1960年代运营的合伙企业。我们不可能有比这更强的动机去尽最大努力。
Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest expense.
幸运的是，我们有一个很好的起点可供施展。十年前，也就是1984年，伯克希尔的保险公司持有的证券市值为17亿美元，折合每股伯克希尔约1,500美元。先把这些证券带来的所有投资收益与资本利得都剔除不看，那一年伯克希尔税前利润只有大约600万美元。我们确实从各类制造、零售与服务业务获得了收益，但几乎完全被保险承保亏损、公司总部开销以及利息费用的合计所抵消。
1982-1998年，BRK在这个17年的繁荣周期中涨了90倍，而前一个周期（1965-1981年）是30倍。
Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000 (including eleven people at World Headquarters).
如今我们持有的证券价值达到180亿美元，折合每股伯克希尔超过15,000美元。如果同样把这些证券带来的全部收益剔除不看，我们在1994年的税前利润大约为3.84亿美元。十年间，员工人数从5,000人增长到22,000人（其中包括世界总部的11个人）。
We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.
我们的成绩来自一支卓越的经营管理者队伍：他们能从一些外观平凡的生意里做出非凡的结果。Casey Stengel 把管理一支棒球队描述为“靠别人打出的本垒打拿工资”。这也是我在伯克希尔的公式。
The businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280 billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings, which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200 million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250 million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.
我们所部分持股的那些企业，对伯克希尔的成功同样重要。几组数据足以说明它们的意义：1994年，Coca-Cola 大约卖出了2,800亿份、每份8盎司的饮料，每份赚取的利润略低于1美分。但“1美分”累积起来就很可观。通过伯克希尔持有 Coke 的7.8%股份，我们在经济上相当于拥有它210亿份饮料的权益，这些份额为我们贡献了接近2亿美元的“软饮料收益”。同样，通过持有 Gillette 股票，伯克希尔在全球剃须刀与刀片市场（按收入口径，而不是按销量口径）中拥有7%的份额，这一比例在1994年为我们对应了约2.5亿美元的销售额。此外，在 Wells Fargo——一家资产规模530亿美元的银行——我们13%的持股相当于拥有一家“伯克希尔银行”，规模约70亿美元，并在1994年赚取了大约1亿美元。
It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection.
拥有 Hope diamond 的一大块，远胜于100%拥有一颗莱茵石；而刚才提到的那些公司，显然都属于稀世珍宝。更妙的是，我们并不局限于只拥有少数几颗这样的宝石，而是在不断累积一个日益壮大的“珍宝收藏”。
Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.
股价仍会波动——有时还会剧烈波动——经济也会有起起落落。但从长期看，我们认为极有可能：我们所拥有的这类企业将持续以令人满意的速度增值。
Book Value and Intrinsic Value
帐面价值与内在价值
We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.
我们经常报告每股账面价值——这是一个很容易计算的数字，但用途有限。同样经常地，我们也告诉你：真正重要的是内在价值——它无法精确锁定，但必须努力估算。
For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the liabilities are solid."
举例来说，1964 年，我们可以非常确定地说，伯克希尔每股账面价值是 $19.46。但这个数字却明显高估了股票的内在价值，因为公司的全部资源都被绑在一个盈利能力很差的纺织业务上。我们的纺织资产，无论按持续经营价值还是按清算价值，都达不到其账面记录的价值。因此，1964 年如果有人询问伯克希尔资产负债表是否可靠，他很可能“配得上”好莱坞某位名声可疑的大亨曾给出的那句回答：“别担心，负债是扎实的。”
Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate gain in intrinsic value also.
如今，伯克希尔的情况反过来了：我们控股的许多企业，其真实价值远高于其账面记录价值。（而我们不控股的企业，比如 Coca-Cola 或 Gillette，则按当前市场价值计入账面。）尽管如此，我们仍继续向你们提供账面价值数据，因为它可以作为伯克希尔内在价值的一个粗略追踪指标——虽然往往会显著低估。事实上，去年这两个指标同向变动：账面价值增长 13.9%，内在价值的增幅也大致相当。
We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses.
我们把内在价值定义为：一家企业在其剩余寿命中能够被提取出来的现金流的折现值。任何人计算内在价值，必然都会得出一个高度主观的数字——这个数字会随着对未来现金流估计的修正而变化，也会随着利率的变动而变化。尽管内在价值带有“模糊性”，它却至关重要，并且是评估投资与企业相对吸引力的唯一合乎逻辑的方法。
To see how historical input (book value) and future output (intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
为了说明“历史投入”（账面价值）与“未来产出”（内在价值）如何可能出现分叉，我们来看另一种投资：大学教育。把教育成本当作它的“账面价值”。如果要让这个成本更准确，它还应当包括学生因为选择上大学而不是直接工作所放弃的收入（机会成本）。
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
在这个练习中，我们先忽略教育的那些重要的非经济收益，只严格关注它的经济价值。首先，我们必须估算毕业生一生将获得的收入，并从中扣除“如果他没有受教育本来能赚到多少”的估计值。两者之差就是“超额收入”，然后需要用一个合适的利率把这笔超额收入折现回毕业之日。折现后的美元数额，就是教育的内在经济价值。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
有些毕业生会发现，教育的账面价值（成本）超过了它的内在价值——这意味着为这段教育买单的人并没有“物有所值”。在另一些情况下，教育的内在价值会远远超过其账面价值，这证明资本投放是明智的。无论哪一种情况，结论都很清楚：账面价值作为内在价值的指标是毫无意义的。
大部分的美女最后都嫁给了草包，关注的都是账面价值。
Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner.
现在我们少一点学院派，来看 Scott Fetzer——这是伯克希尔自身经验里的一个例子。这段故事不仅会说明账面价值与内在价值之间的关系如何变化，还会顺带给你上一堂会计课——我知道你一定早已屏息以待。当然，我挑的案例是一笔结果极其成功的收购。
Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well.
伯克希尔在1986年初收购了 Scott Fetzer。当时这家公司由22个业务组成，而今天我们拥有的阵容完全相同——没有新增，也没有处置。Scott Fetzer 的主要业务是 World Book、Kirby 和 Campbell Hausfeld，但还有许多其他业务单位也为盈利做出了重要贡献。
We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic value was close to double its book value.
我们为 Scott Fetzer 支付了3.152亿美元，而当时它的账面价值为1.726亿美元。我们额外支付的1.426亿美元溢价，反映了我们的判断：这家公司的内在价值接近其账面价值的两倍。
In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer, as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.
在下面的表格中，我们追踪自收购以来 Scott Fetzer 的账面价值，以及它的盈利与分红情况。
Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in 1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like. Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.
因为在我们达成交易时 Scott Fetzer 持有超额现金，因此它在1986年向伯克希尔支付了1.25亿美元的股息，尽管当年它的盈利只有4,030万美元。我还要说明，我们并没有把杠杆引入 Scott Fetzer 的资产负债表。事实上，这家公司在我们收购时只有非常轻微的负债，而现在几乎完全没有负债（其融资子公司使用的负债除外）。同样地，我们也没有做“出售厂房再回租”、没有出售应收账款之类的操作。在我们持有它的这些年里，Scott Fetzer 一直是一家融资保守、流动性充足的企业。
As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500, a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.
如你所见，自我们买下 Scott Fetzer 以来，它的盈利一直稳步增长，但账面价值并没有按同样的幅度增长。结果就是：股东权益回报率（return on equity），在我们收购时已经很出色，如今已变得真正“惊人”。到底有多惊人，可以把 Scott Fetzer 的表现拿去和 Fortune 500 做比较——如果它是一家独立公司，它完全有资格进入这个榜单。
Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest available for inspection - the company's return on equity would have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company ranking tenth.
如果 Scott Fetzer 出现在1993年的 Fortune 500 榜单上（这是我们能拿来检视的最新榜单），它的股东权益回报率将排名第4。但这远不是全部。回报率排名前三的公司分别是 Insilco、LTV 和 Gaylord Container——它们都在1993年从破产中走出来，而且那一年除了在破产程序中获得债务豁免所确认的收益外，几乎没有取得有意义的经营性盈利。如果把这类非经营性的“意外之财”剔除，Scott Fetzer 的股东权益回报率将排名第一，且遥遥领先于第二名。事实上，它的回报率是第十名公司的两倍。
You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather, the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.
你可能会以为，Scott Fetzer 的成功只能用周期性盈利高峰、垄断地位或高杠杆来解释。但这些情况都不适用。相反，这家公司的成功来自 CEO Ralph Schey 的管理能力；关于他，我稍后会讲得更多。
First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer, that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet. I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings statement.
不过先来上我承诺的会计课：当我们为 Scott Fetzer 支付了比其账面价值高出1.426亿美元的溢价时，这个数字必须记录在伯克希尔的资产负债表上。我就不展开它具体是怎么入账的了（这些细节在我们1986年年报的附录里已经说明），直接讲结论：购买溢价一旦最初确认，在几乎所有情况下，都必须随着时间推移通过每年的费用化冲减来逐步核销；这些年度冲减会作为成本出现在收购方的损益表里。
The following table shows, first, the annual charges Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay, and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott Fetzer actually employs in its business.
下表首先列示：伯克希尔为逐步“消灭”Scott Fetzer 收购溢价所做的年度冲减；其次列示：截至目前我们账面上尚未核销的溢价余额。这些冲减不会影响现金，也不会影响我们缴纳的税；在我们看来，它们也不是经济成本（尽管许多会计师会不同意我们的观点）。这些冲减只是一种方式：让我们在账面上逐步降低 Scott Fetzer 的账面承载价值，使其最终与 Scott Fetzer 在经营中实际使用的净资产相匹配。
Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to $54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's year-end book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have just as consistently marked down its carrying value through purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and net worth.
注意：到 1994 年末，这笔购买溢价（premium）已经被降到 5,420 万美元。把这个数字加上 Scott Fetzer 年末的账面净值 9,400 万美元，总计 1.482 亿美元——这就是 Scott Fetzer 目前在伯克希尔账上的承载价值（carrying value）。这个数额还不到我们收购时对该公司承载价值的一半。然而，Scott Fetzer 现在的盈利大约是当时的两倍。显然，这项业务的内在价值一直在持续增长，尽管我们也一直通过“购买溢价冲减”（purchase-premium charges）持续下调其账面承载价值，而这些冲减会减少伯克希尔的报告利润和净资产。
没什么道理的商誉摊销，2001年后的规则已经变更，商誉一般不再摊销，改为减值测试。
The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart and high-grade manager.
Scott Fetzer 的内在价值与其在伯克希尔账面上的承载价值之间的差距，如今已经非常巨大。正如我之前提到过的——而且我很高兴再强调一次——这种令人愉快的“不匹配”，功劳要归于 Ralph Schey：一位目标聚焦、聪明、并且品质上乘的经理人。
The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self-confident without being self-important.
Ralph 成功的原因并不复杂。45 年前，Ben Graham 教我：投资想取得卓越结果，并不需要做什么惊天动地的事。后来我惊讶地发现，这句话在企业管理上同样成立。管理者要做的，就是把基本功做好，并且不被岔路带偏。这正是 Ralph 的公式：他设定正确的目标，然后从不忘记自己一开始要完成什么。在个人合作层面，Ralph 也让人很愉快：他对问题坦率直接，自信但不自负。
He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.
他也很有经验。虽然我不知道 Ralph 的具体年龄，但我知道他和我们许多经理人一样，已经超过 65 岁。在伯克希尔，我们看重的是业绩，而不是日历。查理和我现在分别 71 岁和 64 岁，我们把 George Foreman 的照片摆在桌上。你大可以相信：我们对“强制退休年龄”的轻蔑，会一年比一年更强。
Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation
内在价值与资本配置
Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares - it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.
理解内在价值，对管理层而言与对投资者而言同样重要。当管理者在做资本配置决策——包括是否回购股份——他们必须以能提高“每股内在价值”为准绳，并避免任何会降低它的举动。这个原则看起来不言自明，但我们却不断看到它被违反。而一旦资本配置错了方向，受伤的就是股东。
For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?
例如，在考虑企业并购时，很多管理者往往把注意力放在：交易对每股收益（EPS）是立即“增厚”还是“稀释”（而在金融机构里，则是看对每股账面价值是增厚还是稀释）。这种强调非常危险。回到“大学教育”的例子：想象一个25岁的MBA一年级学生正在考虑把自己的未来经济利益与另一个25岁的日工合并。MBA学生当下没有收入，如果把双方的“权益”做一次“按股对换”的合并，那么他的短期收益会被大幅提升（提升得很夸张！）。但对这个学生而言，还有什么比这种交易更荒唐的呢？
非常形象的比喻。
In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.
在公司交易中，如果目标公司拥有不同的前景、不同数量的非经营性资产，或不同的资本结构，那么潜在收购方仍然盯着当期盈利不放，同样荒唐。伯克希尔拒绝过很多并购与收购机会——这些交易本可以抬高当期与短期的报告利润，却会降低每股内在价值。我们的做法更接近 Wayne Gretzky 的建议：“去球将要到达的地方，而不是去球现在所在的地方。”因此，如果我们当初采用那套标准教条，我们的股东如今将会少富好几十亿美元。
The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse."
令人遗憾的是，多数大型并购都呈现出一种极其失衡的格局：对被收购方股东而言是大丰收；对收购方管理层而言，收入与地位提高；对双方的投行和其他专业人士而言，更是蜜罐。但可惜的是，这些并购通常会减少收购方股东的财富，而且往往幅度不小。原因在于：收购方通常付出的内在价值，超过了它得到的内在价值。Wachovia Corp. 退休掌门人 John Medlin 说：要是这么干多了，“你就是在反向运行一条连锁信（chain letter）。”
Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.
长期来看，管理层配置资本的能力，会对企业价值产生巨大的影响。几乎可以说，一家真正优秀的企业（至少在度过早期阶段之后）往往会产生远多于其内部所能有效使用的现金。公司当然可以通过分红或回购把钱分配给股东。但很多时候，CEO 会去问战略规划部门、咨询顾问或投行：要不要做一两笔收购？这就像问室内装饰师：你是不是需要一张5万美元的地毯。
The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.
收购问题往往还会被一种“生物学偏见”放大：许多CEO之所以能坐上那个位置，部分原因是他们天生就有充沛的“动物精神”（animal spirits）和自我（ego）。如果一位高管在这些特质上禀赋很高——也必须承认，这些特质有时确实有其优势——那它们在他登顶之后也不会消失。当这样的CEO被顾问们怂恿去做交易时，他的反应就像一个少年男孩被父亲鼓励去过“正常的性生活”——这不是他需要别人推一把的事情。
冲劲的一部分是真实的，另外的部分是幻觉，幻觉不会消失并且很有可能越来越大。
Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."
几年前，我的一位CEO朋友——必须说，是开玩笑——无意中点破了许多大交易的病理。这位朋友是一家财产与意外险公司的负责人，他当时在向董事解释自己为什么想收购一家寿险公司。他用颇为乏力的方式长篇大论地讲着这笔收购的经济性和战略逻辑，讲着讲着突然就把稿子扔到一边。然后他露出一副顽皮的表情，干脆说：“唉，伙计们，别的孩子都有一个了。”
At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.
在伯克希尔，我们的经理人将继续从一些看上去平平无奇的生意里赚取非凡的回报。第一步，他们会先寻找机会，把盈利以对自身业务最有利的方式再投入；剩下的部分，他们会把钱上缴给查理和我。然后，我们会努力把这些资金用于能够提升“每股内在价值”的用途。我们的目标是：收购（部分或全部）那些我们相信自己能理解的企业，它们拥有良好且可持续的基础经济属性，并由我们喜欢、敬佩且信任的管理者经营。
Compensation
薪酬待遇
At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire but Scott Fetzer is lagging?
在伯克希尔，我们希望在薪酬问题上同样保持理性，就像我们在资本配置上所做的那样。举例来说，我们给 Ralph Schey 的薪酬，是基于 Scott Fetzer 的业绩，而不是基于伯克希尔整体的业绩。还有什么比这更合理？因为他只对一个业务负责，而不是对另一个负责。若把现金奖金或股票期权与伯克希尔的命运挂钩，那对 Ralph 的奖励将完全是随机的。比如，他可能在 Scott Fetzer 挥出一个又一个本垒打，而查理和我却在伯克希尔犯下一连串错误，从而把他的努力抵消许多倍。反过来，如果伯克希尔其他部分发生了好事，但 Scott Fetzer 却落后，为什么期权收益或奖金要堆到 Ralph 身上？
In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.
在设定薪酬时，我们喜欢承诺“足够大的胡萝卜”，但要确保胡萝卜的兑现，直接与管理者可控领域内的结果挂钩。当某个业务中投入的资本规模很大时，我们还会对经理人新增使用的资本按很高的利率收费，同时对他们释放出来的资本按同样高的利率给予“信用”（奖励）。
The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge. But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his business.
这种“钱不是免费的”（money’s-not-free）做法，其结果在 Scott Fetzer 上清晰可见。如果 Ralph 能把新增资金用在高回报的地方，那么这么做对他有利：当新增资本产生的盈利超过一个有意义的门槛费用（hurdle charge）时，他的奖金就会增加。但我们的奖金计算是对称的：如果新增投资带来的回报低于标准，那么这部分缺口对 Ralph 同样是“有代价的”，就像对伯克希尔有代价一样。这样双向的安排带来的结果是：只要 Ralph 手上有任何在本业务中无法高效使用的现金，把它送回奥马哈就对他有利——而且会让他“很划算”。
It has become fashionable at public companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside. Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms of "heads I win, tails you lose."
如今上市公司里流行把几乎所有薪酬方案都描述为“让管理层与股东利益一致”。在我们看来，所谓一致，意味着在两个方向上都做合伙人，而不是只参与上行。很多所谓的“一致”方案在这一基本测试上直接不及格，它们只是把“正面我赢、反面你输”包装得更艺术一点。
A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve an option plan.
一种常见的不一致发生在典型的股票期权安排中：这种安排不会定期提高期权行权价，以补偿这样一个事实——留存收益正在不断累积并增厚公司的财富。事实上，十年期权、低分红支付率以及复利这三者叠加，可能会让一个在岗位上什么都没做、只是“原地踏步”的经理人也获得丰厚收益。一个更刻薄的观察甚至是：当对股东的现金分配被压低时，持有期权的经理人的收益反而更高。我至今没见过这一关键点在任何要求股东批准期权计划的委托书（proxy statement）里被明确写出来。
I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the "help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem (and one, of course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.
我忍不住要提一句：我们与 Ralph Schey 的薪酬安排，是在我们收购 Scott Fetzer 后立刻定下来的，大约用了五分钟，而且完全没有律师或薪酬顾问的“帮助”。这个安排只包含几个非常简单的想法——这不是那种顾问偏好的条款：顾问很难在你没有“大问题”（当然还需要每年复审）之前就开出一张“大账单”。我们与 Ralph 的协议从未被修改。它在1986年对他和我都讲得通，现在依然讲得通。我们对其他各业务经理人的薪酬安排也同样简单，只是各协议的条款会因业务的经济特性、某些情况下经理人对业务单位的部分持股、等等因素而有所不同。
In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries.
在所有情况下，我们追求理性。那种回报方式随机、与管理者个人成就无关的安排，某些经理人可能会欢迎。毕竟，谁会拒绝一张免费的彩票？但这种安排对公司而言是浪费，而且会让经理人把注意力从真正该关注的领域上移开。此外，母公司层面的非理性行为，也很可能诱发子公司“照葫芦画瓢”。
At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we have no possible need.
在伯克希尔，只有查理和我对整个业务承担管理责任。因此，从逻辑上讲，也只有我们才应该按企业整体的表现来获得薪酬。即便如此，这也不是我们想要的薪酬安排。我们精心设计了公司以及我们的工作方式，使得我们可以和喜欢的人一起做我们喜欢的事。同样重要的是，我们被迫去做的无聊或令人不快的事情非常少。我们也同样享受着企业掌门人所能获得的大量物质与精神层面的“特权”。在这样近乎理想的条件下，我们并不指望股东再额外掏出大把薪酬——我们根本不可能需要那些钱。
Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."
事实上，即便完全不给我们发薪水，查理和我也会对现在这份舒服的工作心满意足。归根结底，我们奉行 Ronald Reagan 的一句信条：“努力工作大概确实从来没把谁累死，但我想——何必去冒这个险呢？”
Sources of Reported Earnings
账列收益的来源
The table on the next page shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下一页的表格列示了伯克希尔报告利润的主要来源。在这份呈现中，我们把前面在 Scott Fetzer 分析里讨论过的那类“购买溢价冲减”（purchase-premium charges）不再分摊到对应的具体业务，而是汇总起来单独列示。这样处理，使你能够看到：如果这些业务当初不是通过收购进入伯克希尔，它们的利润在报表上本会如何呈现。我们认为，这种呈现方式对投资者与管理者更有用；相比之下，GAAP 要求将购买溢价逐一按业务计入费用。需要强调的是：表格里我们展示的总利润，当然与经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总利润完全一致。
A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
关于这些业务的大量信息，详见第37至48页；在那里你也会看到我们按 GAAP 口径披露的分部利润（segment earnings）。此外，在第53至59页，我们又把伯克希尔的财务数据按非 GAAP 口径重新整理为四个分部，这种呈现方式更贴近查理和我理解公司的方式。我们的目的，是向你提供这样一套财务信息：如果我们的角色互换，我们也会希望你们把这套信息提供给我们。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major restructuring charges.
在以往的报告中，我们讨论过 look-through earnings（穿透式收益）。我们认为，相比我们的 GAAP 结果，它们能更准确地呈现伯克希尔的盈利状况。按我们的计算方式，穿透式收益包括：（1）上一节披露的经营性收益，加上；（2）我们重要被投资企业的“留存经营收益”——在 GAAP 会计下，这部分并不会反映在我们的利润中，减去；（3）一项税收扣减：假设这些被投资企业的留存收益不是留在它们那里，而是改为分配给我们，那么伯克希尔将需要为此缴纳的税。这里所说的“经营性收益”不包括资本利得、特殊会计项目以及重大重组费用。
几十年下来有一些细微的变化。
1、 look-through earnings（穿透式收益），这是最早的说法；
2、每股投资资产（含现金等）+operating earnings（不包含穿透式收益），这是接下来几年的说法；
3、operating earnings（不包含穿透式收益），2018年以后的说法，不再强调每股投资资产。
If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%, our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85 billion.
如果我们的内在价值要以我们目标的 15% 增速持续增长，那么从长期看，我们的穿透式收益也必须以大约同样的速度增长。几年前我第一次解释这个概念时曾告诉你：要实现这一 15% 的目标，到 2000 年我们需要创造大约 18 亿美元的穿透式收益。由于此后我们又发行了大约 3% 的新股，这个目标数值相应提高到了 18.5 亿美元。
We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target but that, of course, is no sure thing.
目前，我们在实现目标的进度上略微领先，但很大程度上是因为我们的 super-cat 再保险业务最近交出了远高于长期趋势线预期的收益（这一点我会在下一节讨论）。在充分考虑到这种异常性的前提下，我们仍然预计能够达到目标——当然，这并没有任何保证。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表展示了我们如何计算穿透式收益，不过我先提醒你：这些数字必然只能是相当粗略的估计。（这些被投资企业分配给我们的股息，已经计入第12页所分项列示的经营性收益中，主要被归在“Insurance Group: Net Investment Income（保险集团：净投资收益）”之下。）
Insurance Operations
保险业务
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
正如我们在以往报告中解释过的，在我们的保险业务里，最重要的两件事：第一，是我们形成了多少“浮存金（float）”；第二，是这笔浮存金对我们的成本是多少。浮存金是我们持有、但并不拥有的钱。在保险业务中，浮存金之所以产生，是因为大多数保单要求保费预付；更重要的是，保险公司通常需要一段时间才能得知并最终解决损失理赔。
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.
通常，保险公司收取的保费并不足以覆盖其必须支付的赔款与费用。这样就会形成“承保亏损（underwriting loss）”——而这份承保亏损，就是浮存金的成本。
An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
一家保险公司若能长期盈利，关键在于：其浮存金成本低于公司通过其他方式获得资金所需付出的成本。但如果浮存金成本高于市场资金利率，那么这门保险生意的价值就是负的。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
如下表所示的数字表明，伯克希尔的保险业务一直是巨大的赢家。为制作该表，我们把伯克希尔的浮存金汇总如下——我们产生的浮存金规模相对于保费规模而言非常突出：将赔付准备金（loss reserves）、理赔费用准备金（loss adjustment reserves）、分入再保险项下的代持资金（funds held under reinsurance assumed）以及未到期保费准备金（unearned premium reserves）相加，然后再扣除代理人余额（agents’ balances）、预付取得成本（prepaid acquisition costs）、预付税款（prepaid taxes）以及与分入再保险相关的递延费用（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。我们的浮存金成本由承保亏损或承保利润来决定。在那些我们实现了承保利润的年份（例如最近两年），我们的浮存金成本为负；而我们计算保险收益的方法，是把承保利润与浮存金投资收益（float income）相加。
Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently looks.
查理和我很高兴：我们的浮存金在1994年增长了；更让我们高兴的是，它事实证明“零成本”。但我们今年要传达的信息，与1993年一样：虽然我们有一家很好的保险业务，但它并没有现在看上去这么好。
The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat" business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes) was again highly profitable. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994 should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995 Kobe earthquake.
我们之所以必须重复这种提醒，是因为我们的“超级巨灾（super-cat）”业务（向保险公司与再保险公司出售保单，用于抵御超大灾难事件的影响）再次取得了很高的盈利。由于真正重大的灾难发生频率很低，我们的超级巨灾业务在大多数年份都可能显示出很大的利润，但偶尔也会记录一笔巨大的亏损。换句话说，这项业务的吸引力需要很多年才能被真正衡量。1994年当然应当被视为接近“最佳情形”。我们唯一显著的损失来自一月份的加州地震。我还要补充一句：我们预计不会因1995年初的神户地震而遭受重大损失。
Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply enormous.
超级巨灾保单数量很少、单笔规模极大，而且高度非标准化。因此，这类业务的承保需要的判断力，远多于例如汽车保险那样的承保——汽车保险有海量数据可用。伯克希尔在这里有一项重大优势：我们的超级巨灾业务负责人 Ajit Jain，他的承保能力堪称业内最佳，他对我们的价值巨大无比。
In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-cat business because of our towering financial strength, which helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.
此外，伯克希尔在超级巨灾业务上还有一个特殊优势：我们“高耸”的财务实力——它在两个方面帮助我们。第一，一家谨慎的保险公司希望：针对真正的超大灾难（比如长岛发生一次造成500亿美元损失的风暴，或者加州发生一次造成类似损失的地震）的保护必须绝对可靠。但同一家保险公司也知道：让它需要依赖一笔巨大超级巨灾赔付的灾难，也可能正是导致许多再保险公司违约的灾难。为一种“恰在最需要时会蒸发”的保障去缴保费，并没有太大意义。因此，伯克希尔能在“难以想象规模”的灾难之后依然保持偿付能力与流动性，这一点对我们而言是巨大的竞争优势。
The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for their own account.
我们资本实力带来的第二个好处是：我们能承保的额度，是其他任何人连考虑都不敢考虑的。比如在1994年，一家原保险公司希望购买一份短期保单，获得4亿美元规模的加州地震保障，而我们立刻就承保了这张单。我们不知道世界上还有谁会为自己的账户承担4亿美元的风险，或任何接近这个规模的风险。
Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-being. At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.
通常，经纪人会试图把大额保障“拆分”成多张小保单，分散给许多承保方。但即便在最好情况下，这类安排也需要相当长的时间才能完成。与此同时，想买再保险的公司就不得不暂时承担它并不想承担、而且可能严重威胁其稳健经营的风险。相比之下，在伯克希尔，我们可以在被要求报价的当天，就对最高可达5亿美元的保障给出价格。行业里没有其他公司会这么做。
By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-optimum strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings. By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.
通过把保障额度写成“大块头”的保单，我们显然会让伯克希尔的财务结果也呈现“大起大落”。我们完全接受这一点：保险公司（以及其他行业）太常为了“平滑”报表利润而采取次优策略。我们愿意承受波动的可能性，因为相比追求可预测性，我们预计这样能获得更高的长期回报。
养老金、卡着脖子过日子的都只能选择次优的策略。
Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our "worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.
考虑到我们承担的风险，Ajit 和我一直盯着我们的“最坏情形”。当然，要判断最坏情形是什么并不容易，因为理论上你可能在同一年同时遭遇：长岛飓风、加州地震，以及“超级巨灾 X”。此外，保险损失还可能与非保险麻烦同时发生。比如，如果我们因南加州一次大地震而在超级巨灾业务上遭受巨额损失，那很可能还会伴随我们在 See’s、Wells Fargo 和 Freddie Mac 等持股价值的大幅下跌。
All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after the inevitable mega-catastrophe.
综合考虑后，我们认为：目前一次超级巨灾事件造成的“最坏情形”保险损失，税后大约为6亿美元——这个数额将略微超过伯克希尔来自其他来源的年度利润。如果你对这种风险暴露水平不舒服，那么你应该现在就卖出伯克希尔股票，而不是等到那场不可避免的超大灾难发生之后才卖。
Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of business in 1995.
我们的超级巨灾业务保费规模在1995年可能会下降。一般性保单的价格有所下滑，而几年前大量涌入再保险行业的资本，也可能会为了追逐保费收入而不顾费率是否足够。然而，我们与一批重要客户关系牢固，他们会在1995年为我们带来相当可观的业务量。
Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster - all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float.
伯克希尔的其他保险业务在1994年也取得了出色成绩。我们本州业务由 Rod Eldred 领导；工伤赔偿业务由 Brad Kinstler 负责；信用卡保险业务由 Kizer 家族管理；National Indemnity 传统的汽车险与一般责任险业务由 Don Wurster 领导——这些业务都产生了显著的承保利润，并伴随形成了大量浮存金。
We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
我们可以像去年一样为本节收尾：总体而言，我们拥有一流的保险业务。尽管其业绩会高度波动，但这项业务拥有的内在价值，远远高于其账面价值——事实上，这种“内在价值高于账面价值”的幅度，比伯克希尔任何其他业务都更大。
Common Stock Investments
普通股投资
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下面我们列出了市值超过3亿美元的普通股持仓。其中有一小部分投资属于某些子公司，而伯克希尔对这些子公司的持股比例并非100%。
Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome).
我们的投资数量依旧不多，理念也很简单：真正的大型投资想法，通常用一小段话就能讲清楚。我们喜欢那些拥有持久竞争优势、并由能力出众且以股东为导向（owner-oriented）的管理者经营的企业。当这些特质具备、且我们能以合理价格买入时，几乎很难出错（当然，我们也会周期性地设法“克服”这一点）。
Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count. If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.
投资者应该记住：你们的计分方式并不是奥运跳水那种——动作难度不加分。如果你对一家企业的判断正确，而这家企业的价值主要取决于一个单一关键因素，并且这个因素既容易理解又能长期存在，那么你的回报并不会因为你分析得“简单”就打折；它和你正确分析了一个变量繁多、持续变化、极其复杂的投资选择，得到的收益是一样的。
We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries about an economy or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess?
我们努力做的是“定价”，而不是“择时”。在我们看来，因为对短期经济或股市的担忧（而我们知道这些短期东西本来就不可预测）就放弃买入一家长期前景可预测的卓越企业，这是愚蠢的。为什么要因为一个无知的猜测而推翻一个有信息支撑的判断？
We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972, Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of wonderful businesses in the stock market?
我们在1967年买下 National Indemnity，1972年买下 See’s，1977年买下 Buffalo News，1983年买下 Nebraska Furniture Mart，1986年买下 Scott Fetzer——原因是这些年份它们“恰好可买”，而且我们认为当时的价格可以接受。每一次，我们思考的都是这门生意大概率会怎样发展，而不是道指、联储或宏观经济短期会怎样。如果我们认为这种方法在收购整家公司时是合理的，那么当我们在股市里买入“优秀企业的一小块”时，又为什么要改变路线呢？
择时同样关系心理上的锚点，正确的锚点和错误的锚点都会自我强化、自我实现。
Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.
在看新投资之前，我们会先考虑加码旧投资。如果一家企业好到值得买一次，那么重复这个过程往往也值得。我们当然很想增加我们在 See’s 或 Scott Fetzer 的经济权益，但对一家100%控股的公司，我们找不到再增加持股的方式。不过在股票市场里，投资者经常有机会增加自己在那些已经了解、也喜欢的企业中的经济权益。去年我们就沿着这个方向做了：增加了在 Coca-Cola 和 American Express 的持股。
Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact, fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised 70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100 shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the 1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents. It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money was in the syrup.
我们和 American Express 的渊源很早，而且这件事也符合我一贯的模式：把当前的投资决策，从过去的关联与经验里“拎出来”。例如，1951年，GEICO 股票占了我个人投资组合的70%，而且 GEICO 也是我作为证券推销员卖出的第一只股票——那时我20岁——卖了100股给我的 Alice 阿姨；谢天谢地，她会买下我推荐的任何东西。25年后，在 GEICO 面临资不抵债威胁时，伯克希尔买入了它的一大笔股份。再比如 Washington Post：我最初的一半投资资金来自1940年代送报纸赚的钱。三十年后，在它上市两年后，伯克希尔建立了该公司的大额持仓。至于 Coca-Cola，我的第一桩生意——那是在1930年代——是花25美分买一组六瓶装的可乐，然后每瓶5美分卖掉。直到50年后我才终于想明白：真正赚大钱的是糖浆。
My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion. (Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)
我与 American Express 的经历里有两个片段：1960年代中期，在公司臭名昭著的“沙拉油丑闻”把股价打得很惨之后不久，我们把 Buffett Partnership Ltd. 大约40%的资金投入到这只股票上——这是合伙企业有史以来最大的一笔投资。我还要补充一句：这笔投入让我们以1,300万美元的成本拿到了 Amex 超过5%的持股。写下这些文字时，我们持有 Amex 接近10%的股份，成本为13.6亿美元。（Amex 在1964年的盈利是1,250万美元，而在1994年是14亿美元。）
My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report - do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1 through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.
我与 Amex 的 IDS 业务（最近改名为 American Express Financial Advisors）的渊源还更早。这个业务今天贡献了公司大约三分之一的利润。我在1953年第一次买入 IDS 的股票，当时它增长很快，而市盈率只有3倍。（那时候“低垂的果子”很多。）我甚至还写过一份很长的报告——我写过短的吗？——并通过《Wall Street Journal》上的一则广告，以1美元的价格出售这份报告。
Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it.
显然，如今的 American Express 与 IDS（也就是现在的 American Express Financial Advisors）和当年的样子已经完全不同。不过我发现：对一家公司的长期熟悉感，以及对其产品的长期理解，往往有助于我们对它作出评估。
Mistake Du Jour
一年一思过
Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the decision become obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie. But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to grow.
错误发生在做决定的那一刻。不过，我们只能在这个决定的愚蠢之处变得显而易见之后，才能颁发“今日之错奖”。按这个标准衡量，1994年堪称“黄金年代”，竞争异常激烈。在这里，我很想告诉你：我接下来要描述的这些错误都源自查理。但每当我试图这么解释时，我的鼻子就开始变长。
And the nominees are . . .
那么，入围者是……
Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5 million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in 1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender. Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.
1993年末，我以63美元的价格卖出了1,000万股 Cap Cities；而到1994年年末，该股价格是85.25美元。（两者差额对应的损失为2.225亿美元——不想自己算痛苦的人，我替你们算好了。）当我们在1986年以17.25美元买入这只股票时，我曾告诉过你：在1978至1980年间，我以每股4.30美元卖掉了我们持有的 Cap Cities 股票，并且补充说，我也无法解释自己当年的行为。现在我成了“重复犯罪者”。也许该给我指定一个监护人了。
不是确信无疑的选择，只是高概率的选择。
Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September. In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an "unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever the reason, the mistake was large.
尽管 Cap Cities 的这个决定已经很离谱，但它也只能拿到银牌。金牌属于我五年前犯下的一次错误，而这次错误在1994年彻底“成熟”了：我们花了3.58亿美元买入 USAir 的优先股，而该优先股的股息在9月份被暂停了。我在1990年年报里就把这笔交易准确地称作一次“非受迫性失误（unforced error）”，意思是：我做这笔投资既不是被逼的，也没有被任何人误导。相反，这是一次粗糙分析的结果——这种疏忽可能源于我们买的是一项更高优先级的证券，或者源于自负。无论原因是什么，这个错误的规模都很大。
Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were also high.
在买入之前，我根本没有把注意力集中在这样一家航空公司必然会遭遇的问题上：它的成本既高，而且又极其难以下降。早些年，这些足以致命的成本并不算大问题。那时航空公司受到监管保护，竞争有限；航司即便成本高，也可以通过同样很高的票价把成本转嫁出去。
When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were non-sustainable became further embedded.
当航空业放松管制到来时，局面并没有立刻改变：低成本航空的运力规模小得多，以至于高成本航司在很大程度上仍能维持既有的票价结构。在这个阶段，长期问题虽然大体“看不见”，却在缓慢扩散；而那些不可持续的成本，反而在这种环境里被进一步固化、嵌得更深。
As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious to your Chairman, but I missed it.
随着低成本航空的座位运力不断扩张，它们的票价开始迫使那些老牌、高成本航空公司也不得不降价。对于这些航空公司而言，清算日可以通过注入资本（比如我们对 USAir 的注资）而被推迟，但最终，经济学的一条基本规律还是会生效：在一个不受监管、同质化（commodity）的行业里，企业要么把成本降到具备竞争力的水平，要么就会走向灭亡。这个原则本应对你们的董事长（我）显而易见，但我却忽略了它。
Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings. (As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said: "Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.") Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to clear.
USAir 的 CEO Seth Schofield 一直在努力纠正公司历史遗留的成本问题，但截至目前仍未成功。部分原因在于，他面对的是一个“移动靶”：一些大型航空公司获得了劳工让步（labor concessions），而另一些航空公司则受益于破产程序带来的“重新起点（fresh-start）”成本结构。（正如 Southwest Airlines 的 CEO Herb Kelleher 所说：“航空公司的破产法庭已经变成了健康水疗中心。”）此外，任何人都不该惊讶：那些合同上拿着高于市场水平薪酬的航空公司员工，只要薪水照常到账，就会抵制任何降薪。
Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But it is far from sure that will happen.
尽管处境艰难，USAir 仍有可能最终实现所需的成本削减，以维持其长期生存能力。但这远非板上钉钉。
Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5 million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it back the way that you lost it.
因此，我们把对 USAir 的投资减记到8,950万美元——按1994年年末计，相当于成本的25美分一美元。这一估值同时反映两种可能性：一种是我们的优先股价值能够全部或大部分恢复；另一种则相反——这只股票最终可能一文不值。无论结果如何，我们都会牢记一条重要的投资规则：你不必以“原来亏损的方式”把钱赚回来。（You don’t have to make it back the way that you lost it。）
The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated. Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value. Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.
对 USAir 减记的会计影响相当复杂。按 GAAP，会计要求保险公司在资产负债表上把所有股票按估计的市场价值计量。因此，在去年第三季度末，我们账上对 USAir 优先股的计量已经是8,950万美元，也就是成本的25%。换句话说，那时我们的净资产（net worth）已经在反映一个远低于3.58亿美元成本的 USAir 价值。
But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the diminution of value had already been reflected.
但在第四季度，我们判断这次价值下跌在会计意义上属于“非暂时性（other than temporary）”，因此要求我们将2.69亿美元的减记通过损益表（income statement）体现。这笔金额不会对第四季度产生其他影响。也就是说，它不会再减少我们的净资产，因为价值的下降此前已经在净资产中反映过了。
Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.
查理和我将在即将召开的年度股东大会上不再竞选连任 USAir 董事会席位。不过，如果 Seth 希望就相关问题与我们咨询，我们仍然很乐意在力所能及的范围内提供帮助。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects. Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our gratitude.
去年有两位为伯克希尔股东做出巨大贡献的 CEO 退休了：Capital Cities/ABC 的 Dan Burke，以及 Wells Fargo 的 Carl Reichardt。近几年，Dan 与 Carl 都遇到了非常艰难的行业环境。但他们作为管理者的能力，使得他们所经营的企业从这些时期走出来时，不仅创下了纪录性的盈利，还增添了光彩，并且具备了明朗的前景。此外，Dan 与 Carl 也为自己的离任做了很好的交接安排，把公司交到极其出色的继任者手中。我们应当对他们心怀感激。
About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities were recipients.
在伯克希尔 1994 年“股东指定捐赠”计划中，约有 95.7% 的所有符合资格股份参与了该计划。通过该计划完成的捐赠金额为 1,040 万美元，共有 3,300 家慈善机构获得捐赠。
Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the program because they either do not have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50-51.
每年都会有少数股东错过参与该计划：要么因为他们在规定的记录日没有把股份登记在自己名下；要么因为他们未能在允许的 60 天期限内把指定表格寄回给我们。由于我们不会在条件未满足时做例外处理，我们建议新老股东都仔细阅读第50至51页关于“股东指定捐赠”计划的说明。
To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995 program.
若想参与未来的计划，你必须确保股份登记在实际所有者名下，而不是登记在经纪商、银行或存托机构的代持（nominee）名下。若在 1995 年 8 月 31 日你的股份仍未按上述方式登记，则将不具备参加 1995 年计划的资格。
We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.
1994 年我们只做了一笔很小的收购——一家规模不大的零售鞋类连锁——但我们寻找优秀收购标的的兴趣仍然一如既往地强烈。我们用于收购或合并的标准，详见第21页附录。
Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear. Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.
去年春天，我们曾提出与一家由家族控制的大型企业合并，条款包括以伯克希尔的可转换优先股作为对价的一部分。尽管最终未能达成协议，这件事却让我意识到：我们需要请求股东授权发行优先股，以便未来若出现类似的收购机会，我们能迅速采取行动。因此，我们的委托书（proxy）提出一项议案，请你们授权发行大量优先股，其发行条款将由董事会决定。你们可以确信：除非我们完全确认自己“付出”的内在价值不超过“得到”的内在价值，否则查理和我不会动用这些股份。
Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of handling another 1,000 people.
查理和我希望你们能来参加年度股东大会——今年地点换了。去年我们略微超过了 Orpheum Theater 2,750人的座位容量，因此我们将在1995年5月1日（周一）上午9:30，于 Holiday Convention Centre 集合。该中心的主宴会厅可容纳3,300人；如有需要，我们还会在相邻房间布置音视频设备，另外可再容纳1,000人。
Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications. All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the collection plate.
去年我们在大会上展示了一些伯克希尔的产品，结果卖出了大约800磅糖果、507双鞋，以及超过12,000美元的 World Book 和相关出版物。今年这些商品仍会供应。尽管我们喜欢把股东大会看成一种“精神体验”，但也必须记住：即便最不世俗的宗教，也少不了“收奉献盘”的仪式。
Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate attire.
当然，你真正应该买的其实是1995年 Orange Bowl 的录像带。你们的董事长每天晚上都会重温这场经典比赛，第四节还会切到慢动作。今年封面的颜色是向 Nebraska 的橄榄球教练 Tom Osborne 及其 Cornhuskers 致敬——他们是全美排名第一的大学球队。我建议你们穿 Husker 红来参加股东大会，并向你们保证：你们这对管理搭档中至少有50%会穿着得体（按这个标准来）。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the meeting and return after it ends.
我们建议你们尽快预订大会期间的酒店，因为我们预计人会很多。喜欢住在市中心（离会场约六英里）的股东，可能会想住 Radisson Redick Tower——一家房间不多（88间）但挺不错的酒店——或者住在几条街外更大的 Red Lion Hotel。会场附近有 Holiday Inn（403间）、Homewood Suites（118间）以及 Hampton Inn（136间）。另一个推荐选择是 Marriott：它位于西奥马哈，离 Borsheim’s 大约100码，开车到会场约十分钟。Marriott 会提供大巴，8:45 和 9:00 发车去会场，会议结束后再把大家送回。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting.
我们委托书材料的附件会说明如何获得入场所需的卡片。会场有相当大的停车区；而住在 Holiday Inn、Homewood Suites 和 Hampton Inn 的股东，则可以步行去参会。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their display on the floor.
像往常一样，会议结束后我们会安排大巴送大家去 Nebraska Furniture Mart 和 Borsheim’s，之后再从那里送大家去酒店或机场。我希望你们一定要抽空去 Nebraska Furniture Mart，因为它新开了 Mega Mart——真正的零售奇观，销售电子产品、家电、电脑、CD、相机和音响设备。自开业以来销售异常火爆；你们一定会对商品种类的丰富，以及卖场的陈列方式感到惊叹。
The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that matter, an hour.
Mega Mart 紧挨着 NFM（Nebraska Furniture Mart）的主店，位于我们那块64英亩的场地上，距离会场（Convention Centre）向北大约两英里。商店营业时间为：周五上午10点到晚上9点；周六上午10点到下午6点；周日中午12点到下午6点。你们到那儿时，一定要跟 Mrs. B 打个招呼——她今年101岁了，会在我们的 Mrs. B’s Warehouse 里忙个不停。她从不缺勤——甚至可以说，从不缺一个小时。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises. Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.
Borsheim’s 平时周日是不营业的，但周日中午12点到下午6点会为股东及其来宾开放。这一天总是很特别，我们也会准备一些小惊喜。通常这还是全年销售额最高的一天，因此出于不止一个原因，查理和我都希望在那里见到你们。
On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will need plenty of vocal support.
4月29日（周六）晚上，Rosenblatt Stadium 将举行一场棒球赛，由 Omaha Royals 对阵 Buffalo Bisons。Buffalo 队属于我的朋友 Mindy 和 Bob Rich, Jr.，我希望他们能到场。如果他们来了，我会试着把 Bob 诱导上投手丘来一场“一球决斗”。Bob 是资本主义阵营的 Randy Johnson——年轻、强壮、运动能力出色——绝不是你想在赛季初就面对的那种人。所以我需要大家用最大的嗓门来给我助阵。
The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be all smoke.
委托书（proxy statement）里会包含如何获取比赛门票的信息。去年大约有1,400名股东参加了这个活动。那天晚上我为比赛开球：手感不错，投出一球好球，记分牌显示球速是每小时8英里。很多球迷没注意到的是：我摇头否决了捕手要我投快球的暗号，转而投了一记变速球。今年我会全是“火球”。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 7, 1995
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