Super-Cat Insurance
超级巨灾保险
As in the past three years, we once again stress that the good results we are reporting for Berkshire stem in part from our super-cat business having a lucky year. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years—and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat business is not a possibility—it’s a certainty. The only question is when it will come.
和过去三年一样，我们再次强调：Berkshire 所报告的良好业绩，部分原因在于我们的 super-cat 业务在这一年“运气不错”。在这项业务中，我们出售保单给保险公司与再保险公司，帮助它们对冲超级巨灾（mega-catastrophes）带来的冲击。由于真正重大的灾难事件并不常见，我们的 super-cat 业务在大多数年份预期会取得可观利润——但偶尔会出现一次巨额亏损。换句话说，这项业务的吸引力，需要用很多年才能衡量清楚。但你们必须理解：在 super-cat 业务中，真正糟糕的一年不是“可能发生”，而是“必然发生”。唯一的不确定是：它会在什么时候到来。
I emphasize this lugubrious point because I would not want you to panic and sell your Berkshire stock upon hearing that some large catastrophe had cost us a significant amount. If you would tend to react that way, you should not own Berkshire shares now, just as you should entirely avoid owning stocks if a crashing market would lead you to panic and sell. Selling fine businesses on “scary” news is usually a bad decision. (Robert Woodruff, the business genius who built Coca-Cola over many decades and who owned a huge position in the company, was once asked when it might be a good time to sell Coke stock. Woodruff had a simple answer: “I don’t know. I’ve never sold any.”)
我之所以强调这个沉重的点，是因为我不希望你们在听到某场巨大灾难让我们损失惨重之后，就恐慌性地抛售 Berkshire 股票。如果你倾向于那样反应，那你现在就不应该持有 Berkshire 的股票；就像如果市场暴跌会让你恐慌抛售，你就应该完全避免持有股票一样。因为在“吓人的消息”下抛售优秀企业，通常是个坏决定。（曾有人问 Robert Woodruff——这位用几十年时间打造 Coca-Cola 的商业天才、并在公司持有巨大仓位——什么时候可能是卖出 Coke 股票的好时机。Woodruff 的回答很简单：“我不知道。我从未卖过任何一股。”）
In our super-cat operation, our customers are insurers that are exposed to major earnings volatility and that wish to reduce it. The product we sell— for what we hope is an appropriate price— is our willingness to shift that volatility to our own books. Gyrations in Berkshire’s earnings don’t bother us in the least: Charlie and I would much rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%. (After all, our earnings swing wildly on a daily and weekly basis—why should we demand that smoothness accompany each orbit that the earth makes of the sun?) We are most comfortable with that thinking, however, when we have shareholder/partners who can also accept volatility, and that’s why we regularly repeat our cautions.
在我们的 super-cat 业务里，客户是那些利润波动很大、希望降低波动的保险公司。我们出售的产品——我们希望以合适的价格——是：愿意把这类波动转移到我们自己的账面上。Berkshire 盈利的起伏对我们毫无困扰：Charlie 和我宁愿长期赚一个“颠簸的”15%，也不愿意赚一个“平滑的”12%。（毕竟，我们的财富每天、每周都在剧烈波动——那我们为什么要要求：地球每绕太阳一圈，我们的报表也得“平滑”一次呢？）不过，当我们拥有同样能接受波动的股东/合伙人时，我们会对这种思维方式更为安心，这也正是我们反复强调风险提示的原因。
We took on some major super-cat exposures during 1996. At mid-year we wrote a contract with Allstate that covers Florida hurricanes, and though there are no definitive records that would allow us to prove this point, we believe that to have then been the largest single catastrophe risk ever assumed by one company for its own account. Later in the year, however, we wrote a policy for the California Earthquake Authority that goes into effect on April 1, 1997, and that exposes us to a loss more than twice that possible under the Florida contract. Again we retained all the risk for our own account. Large as these coverages are, Berkshire’s after-tax “worst-case” loss from a true mega-catastrophe is probably no more than $600 million, which is less than 3% of our book value and 1.5% of our market value. To gain some perspective on this exposure, look at the table on page 2 and note the much greater volatility that security markets have delivered us.
1996 年我们承担了一些重大 super-cat 风险敞口。年中，我们与 Allstate 签订了一份覆盖 Florida 飓风风险的合同。虽然没有权威记录能让我们证明这一点，但我们相信：这在当时可能是单一公司为自身账户承保的最大一笔单项巨灾风险。随后在年内，我们又为 California Earthquake Authority 承保了一份保单，自 1997 年 4 月 1 日生效；这份保单使我们面临的潜在损失，超过 Florida 合同可能损失的两倍。同样，我们把全部风险都留在自有账户中。尽管这些承保额度很大，但如果发生真正的超级巨灾事件，Berkshire 税后“最坏情形”的损失大概不超过 6 亿美元；这相当于我们账面价值的不到 3%，以及市值的 1.5%。要正确理解这类风险敞口，请看第 2 页的表格，并注意证券市场带给我们的波动远远更大。
In the super-cat business, we have three major competitive advantages. First, the parties buying reinsurance from us know that we both can and will pay under the most adverse of circumstances. Were a truly cataclysmic disaster to occur, it is not impossible that a financial panic would quickly follow. If that happened, there could well be respected reinsurers that would have difficulty paying at just the moment that their clients faced extraordinary needs. Indeed, one reason we never “lay off” part of the risks we insure is that we have reservations about our ability to collect from others when disaster strikes. When it’s Berkshire promising, insureds know with certainty that they can collect promptly.
在 super-cat 业务中，我们有三项主要竞争优势。第一，向我们购买再保险的一方知道：在最不利的情况下，我们既有能力也有意愿履约赔付。若发生真正灾难性的事件，金融恐慌随后迅速出现并非不可能。如果那样，某些声誉良好的再保险公司，可能恰恰在其客户需求极端迫切之时，却面临赔付困难。事实上，我们之所以从不把已承保风险的一部分“转分”出去（lay off），原因之一正是：当灾难发生时，我们对能否从其他机构顺利回收赔款心存疑虑。而当承诺来自 Berkshire，被保险人就能确定：他们可以迅速、足额地拿到赔付。
Our second advantage—somewhat related—is subtle but important. After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult to obtain reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then be particularly great. At such a time, Berkshire would without question have very substantial capacity available—but it will naturally be our long-standing clients that have first call on it. That business reality has made major insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirability of doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable “stand-by” fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get coverage from us should the market tighten.
我们的第二项优势——与第一点多少相关——更为微妙，但很重要。超级巨灾发生后，保险公司可能会发现很难再买到再保险；而此时它们对保障的需求反而会特别强烈。在这种时刻，Berkshire 毫无疑问仍会拥有非常充足的承保能力——但自然，最先获得这部分能力的，会是我们长期合作的客户。这一商业现实使全球的主要保险公司与再保险公司都意识到：与我们建立业务关系是有价值的。事实上，我们目前正从一些再保险公司那里收取可观的“备用费”（stand-by fees），它们这么做只是为了锁定：一旦市场收紧，它们能够从我们这里获得保障的权利。
Our final competitive advantage is that we can provide dollar coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a single call to Berkshire will produce a firm and immediate offering.
我们的第三项竞争优势是：我们能够提供的承保额度规模，是业内其他公司既无法匹配，也无法接近的。需要超大额度保障的保险公司明白：只要给 Berkshire 打一个电话，就能得到明确且即时的报价。
A few facts about our exposure to California earthquakes—our largest risk—seem in order. The Northridge quake of 1994 laid homeowners’ losses on insurers that greatly exceeded what computer models had told them to expect. Yet the intensity of that quake was mild compared to the “worst-case” possibility for California. Understandably, insurers became—ahem—shaken and started contemplating a retreat from writing earthquake coverage into their homeowners’ policies.
关于我们在 California 地震方面的风险敞口——这是我们最大的风险——有几点事实值得交代。1994 年的 Northridge 地震，使得房主损失最终落到保险公司身上的金额，大幅超过了电脑模型此前告诉他们应当预期的水平。然而，与 California “最坏情形”的可能性相比，那次地震的强度其实还算温和。可以理解的是，保险公司随即变得——嗯——“心有余震”，开始考虑退出：不再在房主保单中承保地震风险。
In a thoughtful response, Chuck Quackenbush, California’s insurance commissioner, designed a new residential earthquake policy to be written by a state-sponsored insurer, The California Earthquake Authority. This entity, which went into operation on December 1, 1996, needed large layers of reinsurance—and that’s where we came in. Berkshire’s layer of approximately $1 billion will be called upon if the Authority’s aggregate losses in the period ending March 31, 2001 exceed about $5 billion. (The press originally reported larger figures, but these would have applied only if all California insurers had entered into the arrangement; instead only 72% signed up.)
在一次深思熟虑的回应中，California 的保险监管官 Chuck Quackenbush 设计了一种新的居民地震保单，由一家州政府支持的保险机构——The California Earthquake Authority——来承保。该机构于 1996 年 12 月 1 日开始运作，需要分层配置大额再保险——这正是我们介入的地方。Berkshire 承担了约 10 亿美元的责任层：在截至 2001 年 3 月 31 日的期间内，如果 Authority 的累计损失超过约 50 亿美元，我们这一层就会被触发。（媒体最初报道的数字更大，但那只有在 California 所有保险公司都加入该安排时才适用；实际上只有 72% 的公司签署加入。）
So what are the true odds of our having to make a payout during the policy’s term? We don’t know—nor do we think computer models will help us, since we believe the precision they project is a chimera. In fact, such models can lull decision-makers into a false sense of security and thereby increase their chances of making a really huge mistake. We’ve already seen such debacles in both insurance and investments. Witness “portfolio insurance,” whose destructive effects in the 1987 market crash led one wag to observe that it was the computers that should have been jumping out of windows.
那么，在保单期限内我们真正需要赔付的概率到底有多大？我们不知道——而且我们也不认为电脑模型能帮上忙，因为我们认为它们所展示的精确度是一种“海市蜃楼”（chimera）。事实上，这类模型可能让决策者产生虚假的安全感，从而提高他们犯下巨大错误的概率。我们在保险和投资两个领域都见过这类惨剧。比如所谓的“portfolio insurance”，它在 1987 年市场崩盘中的破坏性影响，曾让人打趣说：那次该跳楼的其实是电脑。
Even if perfection in assessing risks is unattainable, insurers can underwrite sensibly. After all, you need not know a man’s precise age to know that he is old enough to vote nor know his exact weight to recognize his need to diet. In insurance, it is essential to remember that virtually all surprises are unpleasant, and with that in mind we try to price our super-cat exposures so that about 90% of total premiums end up being eventually paid out in losses and expenses. Over time, we will find out how smart our pricing has been, but that will not be quickly. The super-cat business is just like the investment business in that it often takes a long time to find out whether you knew what you were doing.
即便我们无法完美评估风险，保险公司仍然可以理性承保。毕竟，你不需要知道一个人的精确年龄就能判断他是否已到投票年龄，也不需要知道他的准确体重才能看出他该减肥了。在保险业务中，必须牢记：几乎所有“意外”都不是好消息。基于这一点，我们努力为 super-cat 风险定价，使得总保费中大约 90% 最终会以损失与费用的形式支付出去。随着时间推移，我们会知道自己的定价有多聪明，但这不会很快发生。super-cat 业务与投资业务极其相似：你往往需要很长时间才能知道自己当初到底懂不懂自己在做什么。
What I can state with certainty, however, is that we have the best person in the world to run our super-cat business: Ajit Jain, whose value to Berkshire is simply enormous. In the reinsurance field, disastrous propositions abound. I know that because I personally embraced all too many of these in the 1970s and also because GEICO has a large runoff portfolio made up of foolish contracts written in the early-1980s, able though its then-management was. Ajit, I can assure you, won’t make mistakes of this type.
但有一点我可以确定地说：我们拥有全球最适合负责 super-cat 业务的人——Ajit Jain；他对 Berkshire 的价值大到难以言表。在再保险领域，灾难性的交易提案比比皆是。我之所以这么说，一方面是因为我在 1970 年代亲自拥抱过太多这类“坏主意”；另一方面是因为 GEICO 也有一个规模很大的“runoff”（存量退出）组合，其中包含了早 1980 年代签下的许多愚蠢合同——尽管当时的管理层很能干。我可以向你们保证：Ajit 绝不会犯这类错误。
I have mentioned that a mega-catastrophe might cause a catastrophe in the financial markets, a possibility that is unlikely but not far-fetched. Were the catastrophe a quake in California of sufficient magnitude to tap our coverage, we would almost certainly be damaged in other ways as well. For example, See’s, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac could be hit hard. All in all, though, we can handle this aggregation of exposures.
我曾提到，一场超级巨灾可能会在金融市场引发“另一场灾难”；这种情况概率不高，但也并非天方夜谭。假如灾难是一场足以触发我们承保层的 California 大地震，那么我们几乎肯定也会在其他方面受到冲击。例如，See’s、Wells Fargo 和 Freddie Mac 可能会遭受重创。尽管如此，综合来看，我们能够承受这些风险敞口的叠加。
In this respect, as in others, we try to “reverse engineer” our future at Berkshire, bearing in mind Charlie’s dictum: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” (Inverting really works: Try singing country western songs backwards and you will quickly regain your house, your car and your wife.) If we can’t tolerate a possible consequence, remote though it may be, we steer clear of planting its seeds. That is why we don’t borrow big amounts and why we make sure that our super-cat business losses, large though the maximums may sound, will not put a major dent in Berkshire’s intrinsic value.
在这一点上，就像在其他方面一样，我们会尝试对 Berkshire 的未来进行“逆向工程”（reverse engineer），并牢记 Charlie 的箴言：“我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不去那儿。”（倒过来确实有效：试着把乡村西部歌曲倒着唱，你很快就能把房子、车子和妻子都找回来。）如果某个潜在后果是我们无法承受的——即便它发生的概率很低——我们也会避开“种下它的种子”。这就是为什么我们不进行大规模借贷，也为什么我们会确保：尽管 super-cat 业务的最大损失听起来很吓人，但它不会对 Berkshire 的内在价值造成重大打击。