General Re
On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition of General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124 countries.
12 月 21 日，我们完成了对 General Re Corp. 的 220 亿美元收购。除了 100% 持有 General Reinsurance Corporation（美国最大的财产与意外险再保险公司）之外，该公司还持有（包括它已达成协议将买入的股票在内）全球历史最悠久的再保险公司 Cologne Re 的 82% 股权。这两家公司合在一起，覆盖所有险种的再保险业务，并在 124 个国家运营。
For many decades, General Re’s name has stood for quality, integrity and professionalism in reinsurance — and under Ron Ferguson’s leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more. Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re’s and Cologne Re’s managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can teach us.
几十年来，General Re 这个名字在再保险行业一直代表着质量、诚信与专业；在 Ron Ferguson 的领导下，这份声誉被进一步擦亮。Berkshire 对 General Re 与 Cologne Re 的管理团队的能力“完全加不了任何东西”。相反，他们能教我们的很多。
Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire’s ownership will benefit General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re’s management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow the company to exploit its strengths.
尽管如此，我们相信 Berkshire 的所有权会在关键方面让 General Re 受益，并且我们预计：十年之后，它的盈利将显著高于在没有这次合并的情况下所能达到的水平。我们之所以乐观，是因为我们能够给予 General Re 的管理层一种经营自由：让他们以最能发挥公司优势的方式来运作。
Let’s look for a moment at the reinsurance business to understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.
我们先简单看一下再保险业务，以理解为什么 General Re 单靠自己做不到在 Berkshire 旗下能做到的事。再保险的大部分需求来自原保险公司：它们希望摆脱由于重大且异常损失而导致的盈利大幅波动。实质上，再保险公司拿到的保费，就是为了承担客户保险公司想甩掉的波动性。
Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by both its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are called “retrocessions”) or rejecting good business simply because it threatens to bring on too much volatility.
但讽刺的是，上市的再保险公司，无论在股东眼里还是在信用评估者眼里，都会被拿“自身业绩的平滑程度”来打分。盈利的大起大落会伤害信用评级与市盈率（p/e ratios），即便造成这种波动的业务从长期看仍然有望带来令人满意的利润。正是这种市场现实，有时会迫使再保险公司做出代价高昂的动作：其中包括把相当一部分已承保业务再转分出去（这类交易被称为“retrocessions”，即再转分保），或者仅仅因为担心带来过多波动而拒绝那些本来很好的业务。
Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as it carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time. Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile earnings can’t impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the perfect structure for writing — and retaining — reinsurance in virtually any amount. In fact, we’ve used this strength over the past decade to build a powerful super-cat business.
与之相反，Berkshire 乐于接受波动——只要这种波动伴随着“长期利润增加”的预期。此外，我们的资本实力堪比 Fort Knox（金库堡垒），这意味着盈利波动不可能损害我们顶级的信用评级。因此，我们拥有一种近乎完美的结构：几乎可以在任何规模上承保——并留存——再保险业务。事实上，过去十年我们就一直在运用这种优势，打造出一项强大的“超级巨灾”（super-cat）业务。
What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force, technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re’s outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by the constraints that have limited its growth.
不过，General Re 带给我们的，是渠道力量、技术能力和管理团队——它们能让我们把这种“结构性优势”运用到行业的每一个角落。尤其是，General Re 与 Cologne Re 现在可以加速进军国际市场；而行业增长的大头几乎肯定会发生在那里。正如合并委托书（proxy statement）里所阐述的，Berkshire 也会给 General Re 带来税务与投资方面的好处。但这次合并最有说服力的原因，其实很简单：General Re 那支卓越的管理团队，现在可以不再受那些限制其增长的约束，专注做他们最擅长的事。
Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re’s investment portfolio, though not for Cologne Re’s. We will not, however, be involved in General Re’s underwriting. We will simply ask the company to exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its geographical coverage — making these moves in recognition of Berkshire’s financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings. As we’ve long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.
Berkshire 将接管 General Re 的投资组合管理，但不接管 Cologne Re 的投资组合。不过，我们不会参与 General Re 的承保工作。我们只会要求公司延续过去的纪律，同时提高业务留存比例、扩展产品线、扩大地域覆盖——并且这些动作要充分考虑到 Berkshire 的财务实力以及我们对盈利大幅波动的容忍度。正如我们长期以来所说：我们宁要“起伏的 15% 回报”，也不要“平滑的 12% 回报”。
Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re’s new potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.
随着时间推移，Ron 和他的团队会把 General Re 的新潜力发挥到极致。我和 Ron 相识多年，我们两家公司都曾开展过大量业务，并彼此进行过再保险安排。事实上，General Re 在 1976 年把 GEICO 从濒死状态救回来这件事上，扮演了关键角色。
Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.
Ron 和 Rich Santulli 都计划出席年度股东大会，我希望你有机会跟他们打个招呼。